GLOBALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP

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CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIETY

Across much of the globe over the past decade two of the most powerful organising processes have been those of ‘citizenship’ and ‘globalisation’. They have swept much else before them, reconstituting social and political life. In the case of citizenship, movements to demand rights of national citizenship have been enormously powerful in one continent after another. This demand for the rights of the citizen, and for the institutions of civil society, occurred most strikingly within former Eastern Europe. 1989 in many ways represents the year of the citizen, falling, as it does, some two hundred years after the subjects of Paris took to the streets in 1789, demanding themselves to be citizens (see Murdock 1992). Garton Ash argues that during the 1980s, across many diverse societies, people: 'wanted to be citizens, individual men and women with dignity and responsibility, with rights but also with duties, freely associating in civil society' (1990: 148).

And yet 1989 is also when the discourse of ‘globalisation’ really took off, when exponential growth in the analyses of the global began to suggest that there was a putative global reconstitution of economic, political and cultural relationships. One central feature of that was the sense that people had that they were living in a global village, as the struggles for citizenship themselves were brought instantaneously and ‘live’ into their homes wherever they were located. The struggles for citizenship, most strikingly seen in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crushing of the Pro-Democracy movement in China, were increasingly globalised, instantaneously transmitted through the global media communication systems. More generally, global money markets,
world travel, the Internet, globally recognised brands, globally organised corporations, the Rio Earth summit, ‘global celebrities’ living as global citizens and so on, all speak of modes of social experience that transcend each nation-state and its constitution of the national citizen.

So just at the moment that almost everyone is seeking to be a citizen of an existing national society or to set up their own national society, globalisation appears to be changing what it is to be a citizen. In this paper, I rethink what we mean by citizenship in the light of the globalisation of economic, political and cultural relationships. What is globalisation and what might be the mechanisms by which it generates new forms of citizenship? Does globalisation mean that nationally-based forms of citizenship are, or will become, redundant? What are the risks, rights and duties of a global citizen? Does globalisation imply a notion of universal human rights and duties as opposed to those attributed to a national citizen?

The concept of citizenship has been based upon the notion of the bounded society. Societies are typically presumed to be sovereign social entities, with a state at their centre that organises the rights and duties of each member. Most major sets of social relationships are seen as flowing within the territorial boundaries of each society. The state possesses a monopoly of jurisdiction over the territory of the society. It is presumed that especially economies and social class, but also politics, culture, gender and so on, are societally structured. In combination such relations constitute the social structure in terms of which the life-chances of each member of that society are organised and regulated. And through their interdependence with each other, all such societies are constituted as self-regulating entities significantly defined by their differences from each other. The North Atlantic rim has been constituted as a system of such national societies, with clear boundaries that appear to mark off one society from the other (see Held 1995; Rose 1996). Brubaker writes of ‘the articulation of the doctrine of national sovereignty and of the link between citizenship and nationhood; the substitution of immediate, direct relations between the citizen and the state for the mediated, indirect relations characteristic of the ancien régime’ (1992: 35).

This pattern of societal governance of the nation reached its apogee within what I call organized capitalism (roughly 1900s-1970s in Europe and North America; see Lash and Urry 1987; 1994). It was held that most economic and social problems or risks were produced by, and soluble at the level of, the individual society. The concerns of each were to be dealt with through national policies, especially after the Second World War through a Keynesian welfare state that, it was believed, could identify and respond to the risks of organized capitalism. These risks were taken to be principally located within the borders of each society, and solutions were also envisaged as devised and implemented within such national borders. Societies involved the concept of the citizen who owed duties to and received rights from their society, particularly as organised through the core institutions of the nation-state. Citizenship has been conceived of within the west in terms of national risks that may face anyone living within a given territory, national rights that those possessing full membership should receive, and national duties that are appropriate for all such citizens of a society.

The most important formulation of this conception of society and citizenship was T. H. Marshall’s lectures on citizenship and social class delivered in 1949 during the heyday of welfare state formation in Britain (reprinted in Marshall and Bottomore 1992; see Bulmer and Rees 1996, for some recent assessments). Marshall articulates the relationship between society and citizenship: the claim of all to enjoy these conditions [of civilised life] is a claim to be admitted to a share in the social heritage, which in turn means a claim to be accepted as full members of the society, that is, as citizens (Marshall and Bottomore 1992: 6). Underlying such notions has been the prism of social governmentality: ‘Government from “the social point of view”’ (Rose 1996: 328). In the British context: codifiers such as Beveridge and Marshall constructed a vision in which security against hardship, like hardship itself, was social and to be provided by measures of benefit and insurance that, in name at least, were to be termed “universal”, including all within a unified “social citizenship” (Rose 1996: 345).

But global transformations are transforming the nature of this social citizenship (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton 1999). Global flows across societal borders make it less easy for states to mobilise clearly separate and coherent nations in pursuit of societal goals. This can be seen both economically and culturally. On the former, the breaking down of the coherence of ‘national economies’ has been combined with an increased political unwillingness of many states to tax and spend let alone to nationalise industries so as to bring them under societal control. States have increasingly shifted to a regulative rather than a direct production/employment function, partly
facilitated by new forms of information gathering, storage and retrieval (see Majone 1996). On the latter, the hybridisation of cultures, the global refugee problem, the importance of travelling cultures, some growth of a global dwellingness, diasporas and other notions of the ‘inhomely’, all problematise the notion of a society which is somehow in and of itself able to mobilise for action. These configurations weaken the power of the society to draw together its citizens as one, to govern in its unique name, to endow all with national identity and to speak with a single voice. As Rose argues while our political, professional, moral and cultural authorities still speak happily of “society”, the very meaning and ethical salience of this term is under question as “society” is perceived as dissociated into a variety of ethical and cultural communities with incompatible allegiances and incommensurable obligations’ (1996: 353; generally see Urry 2000).

NEW CITIZENSHIPS

Thus globalisation seems to involve some weakening of the power of the social and a corresponding development of post-national citizenship (Rose 1996). Soysal argues that national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of membership located within an increasingly de-territorialised notion of a person’s more universal rights (1994: 3; Bauböck 1994). This post-national citizenship is especially connected with the growth of guest-working across many societies, greater global interdependence, increasingly overlapping memberships of different kinds of citizenship, and the emergence of universalistic rules and conceptions regarding human rights formalised by international codes and laws (such as the UN, UNESCO, ILO, EU, Council of Europe, Geneva Conventions, European Human Rights Convention and so on). Overall Soysal suggests an increasing contradiction between rights, which are universal, uniform and globally defined, and social identities, which are particularistic and territorially specified (1994).

Contemporary citizenship can thus be described as loosely ‘post-modern’. In some places there is no modern rational-legal state, with a clear monopoly of power, able to deliver unambiguous rights and duties to its citizens who comprise a nation of strangers. And elsewhere, global processes restructure social inequalities and transform many states into ‘regulators’ of such flows. Corporations, brands, NGOs and multi-national ‘states’ also have emerged as in some respects more powerful than nation-states. Societies, such as those of the overseas Chinese, have developed that are non-coterminous with the boundaries of nation-states. Overall the hybrid and fragmented character of many apparent societies in a post-colonial period is said to result in a disjunctive, contested and inconsistent citizenship, according to Yuval-Davis a ‘differential multi-tiered citizenship’ order (1997: 12; and see Bauböck 1994).

This growth of post-national citizenship, and more globally reinforced notions of human rights, stem from a wide array of new processes and institutional arrangements stretching within and across different societies. There are thus a wide variety of citizenships emerging in the contemporary world. These include:

- cultural citizenship involving the right of all social groups (ethnic, gender, sexual, age) to full cultural participation within their society (Richardson 1998)
- minority citizenship involving the rights to enter another society and then to remain within that society and to receive appropriate rights and duties (Yuval-Davis 1997)
- ecological citizenship concerned with the rights and responsibilities of the citizen of the earth (van Steenbergen 1994)
- cosmopolitan citizenship concerned with how people may develop an orientation to other citizens, societies and cultures across the globe (Held 1995)
- consumer citizenship concerned with the rights of people to be provided with appropriate goods, services and information by both the private and public sectors (Stevenson 1997)
- mobility citizenship concerned with the rights and responsibilities of visitors to other places and other cultures (Urry 1990).

Van Steenbergen has elaborated ecological citizenship (1994; see Batty and Gray 1996). Three extensions of such rights are important: to future generations, to animals and to ‘natural’ objects. And duties and responsibilities for animals and such objects have to be undertaken which in effect serve to re-construct humans as possessors of special powers and responsibilities. Van Steenbergen argues that there is an ecological citizenship consisting of a set of rights (e.g. reasonable quality of water and air) and duties
(e.g. not to consume CFCs) which should be seen as sitting alongside T. H. Marshall’s civil, political and social rights. As the Brundtland Report states: ‘All human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for their health and well-being’ (quoted Batty and Gray 1996: 154). Various American states have affirmed the ecological rights of their citizens, while the South African constitution asserts such an ecological right (Batty and Gray 1996: 153). However, van Steenbergen’s formulation is too mechanistic. Ecological rights and duties involve the implosion of the supposedly separate civil, political and social rights. Indeed, the generalisation of risk in many ways highlights the artificiality of Marshall’s differentiations, and of how contemporary social life involves simultaneous experiences that subsume and fuse Marshall’s different dimensions of citizenship.

I will now set out below a citizenship of flow. First, globalisation produces a collapse of power of the national society through the development of apparently new global risks (Beck 1992; Macnaghten and Urry 1998). These include:

- environmental or health ‘bads’ resulting from what is now conceptualised as ‘global’ environmental change;
- cultural homogenisation which destroys local cultures (so-called ‘cocolonisation’ of culture);
- the development of diseases carried across national borders by travellers (aids);
- the intermittent collapse of world markets particularly for agricultural commodities;
- financial meltdowns and their devastating effects upon economic and social life within particular places especially in the developing world;
- the proliferation of hugely insecure, unpolicing and out of control ‘wild zones’ (such as former Yugoslavia, Somalia, inner-city USA);
- the dependence of people upon expert systems (for travel, environmental protection, medical support, safe food and so on) which they may not trust since such systems contradict day-to-day social experiences and forms of lay knowledge.

With regard to global rights these might be thought to include the rights (see Held 1995; Pierson 1996; Castells 1997):

- to be able to migrate from one society to another and to stay at least temporarily with comparable rights as the indigenous population;
- to be able to return not as stateless and with no significant loss of rights;
- to be able to carry one’s culture with one and to encounter elsewhere a hybrid culture containing at least some elements of one’s own culture;
- to be able to buy across the globe the products, services and icons of diverse other cultures and then to be able to locate them within one’s own culture and hence to change it in incremental ways;
- to be able to form social movements with citizens of other cultures to oppose particular states (such as UK as the dirty man of Europe), sets of states (the North), corporations (Shell), general bads and so on;
- to be able to engage in leisure migration throughout almost all the 200 countries on the globe and hence to ‘consume’ all those other places and environments (including those en route). Most barriers to leisure travel have now disappeared;
- to be able to inhabit environments which are relatively free of risks to health and safety produced by both local and distant causes; and to be provided with the means by which to know about those environments through multi-media sources of information, understanding and reflection;
- to be able to sense the quality of each environment one encounters directly rather than to have to rely on expert systems which are alienating and often untrustworthy;
- to have access to the variety of multi-media products increasingly available across the globe. Such products reconfigure contemporary citizenship because of the way in which they come to be constituted out of diverse actors, images and technologies stretching across the globe;
- for future generations to be able to have access to these rights into the unknowable future.
Global duties and responsibilities could be thought to include:

- to find out the state of the globe, both through national sources of information and image but especially through sources which are internationalised (see Ohmae 1990, on the borderless world where states are increasingly unable to control information flows);
- to demonstrate a stance of cosmopolitanism towards other environments, other cultures and other peoples. Such cosmopolitanism may involve either consuming such environments across the globe or refusing to so consume such environments (see Bell and Valentine 1997, on how to 'cook global' on the one hand, and 'cooking for a small planet' on the other);
- to engage in forms of behaviour with regard to culture, the environment and politics which are consistent with the various official and lay conceptions of sustainability which often contradict each other (Macnaghten and Urry 1998: chap 7);
- to respond to images, icons, narratives and so on, which address people as highly differentiated citizens of the globe rather than as citizens of a nation, ethnie, gender, class, generation (as in Benetton advertising the colours of the world; more generally, see Szerszynski and Toogood 1999);
- to seek to convince others that they should also seek to act on part of the globe as a whole which is suffering collectively, rather than in terms of shared identity interests. Such persuasion will involve both informational and image-based media (Hansen 1993).

GLOBAL MEDIA

I will now consider one factor in the development of this putative global citizenship, namely the mass or global media. Citizenship has always necessitated symbolic resources distributed through various means of mass communication, as with what Anderson terms “print capitalism” in the nineteenth century development of the imagined community of the nation (1989). Particularly important in the development of twentieth century notions of national citizenship has been that of radio broadcasting, especially when publicly owned. As Murdock notes:

Where commercial broadcasting regarded listeners as consumers of products, the ethos of public service viewed them as citizens of a nation state. It aimed to universalise the provision of the existing cultural institutions... (1992: 26-7).

In the past two decades or so the global media have been important in generating images of many environmentally threatened localities throughout the world, such as the Amazonian rain forest. As a consequence people can imagine ourselves as sharing some of the same global problems partly because of the development of images which involve what can be called the globalisation of nature, as opposed to those images of nature which have in the past been predominantly national (see Hansen 1993). At least one precondition then of global citizenship is the development of global media, and especially of images of threatened places which partly stand for the plight of the globe as a whole and which may enable people to view themselves as citizens of the globe, as opposed to, or at least as well as, citizens of a nation-state. Szerszynski and Toogood argue the mass media have transformed the possibilities of interaction and dialogue in contemporary societies, remaking the public sphere through highly mediated forms of quasi-interaction and involving new ways of conceiving self and identity (1999).

Five points about the media should be emphasised here. First, the media produce images as well as information, and—if anything—it is such images which provide the means by which nature has come to be understood as seriously threatened has become a widely shared belief at the end of the twentieth century. This is a non-cognitivist view of the role of the media and also one which by-passes the conventional debates on the media about distortion.

Second, these images of the globe, icons of nature and exemplary heroes may have come to play a central role precisely because many sources of information are only at best weakly trusted. Both states and corporations are viewed by many people as untrustworthy and so paradoxically media images can provide more stable forms of meaning and interpretation in a culture in which ‘seeing is believing’, especially if those images are repeated time and time again (see Macnaghten and Urry 1998: chap 2).

Third, these media images can connect local experiences with each other and hence provide powerful sources of hermeneutic interpretation which make sense of what would otherwise be disparate and apparently...
unconnected events and phenomena. Electronic communication has begun to create a global village, blurring what is private and what is public, what is frontstage and what is backstage, what is near and what is far, what is now and what is in the future. Little remains hidden from view and this may assist in forming shared structures of social and political experience, such as environmental thought and practice (see Meyrowitz 1985).

Fourth, the effects of the media in producing a public staging of what might otherwise remain private means that all individuals and social institutions can be put on that stage and subject to ‘shaming.’ The identification within the various media of potentially shameful behaviour can happen to every person and every institution. No-one is exempt from this shaming culture, especially not powerful figures or institutions. Much backstage behaviour can be revealed, put on display, revealed around the globe and represented over and over again. Where that behaviour transgresses norms, others express their disapproval through what Thompson terms an opprobrious discourse, and where those involved have a reputation or ‘name’ to lose, then a scandal will ensue and the person or institution will be nationally or even globally shamed (see Thompson 1997, especially on how those ‘who live by the media are most likely to die by the media’). And media-driven scandals of course are not just confined to sexual or financial revelations. Increasingly states and corporations are subject to shaming over their environmental policies and practices. The ‘good name’ or the ‘brand’ of the state or corporation is a particularly vulnerable symbolic capital that can rapidly evaporate within an increasingly mediated culture of shame.

Finally, media events also reveal themselves as visibly staged. Albrow notes the importance of global events in which, in a sense, the world views itself. Examples include the globally broadcast Live Aid concert, the release from prison of Nelson Mandela, the dramatic death and subsequent funeral of Princess Diana, the Olympics Games, the World Cup and so on (Albrow 1996: 146; Anderson 1997: 172-3). In each of these striking images came to be globally circulated, recognised and consumed, images which have become central to the iconography of global citizenship. Such images were seen as both depicting the globe and speaking for the globe.

Such visual images are often accompanied by written or by spoken text which contextualise these images. Within an electronic age there are many possible relations between speakers and audiences. Thus such texts will involve a complex deixis of little words which imaginatively connect the speaker to particular audiences (Billig 1995: 106). The little words involved here include ‘T’, ‘you’, ‘we’, ‘they’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘this’, ‘that’. They are all used deixically, that is they point to various contexts of the utterance. To understand the meaning of a deixic utterance, the listener has to interpret it from the viewpoint of the speaker.

When Clinton points to ‘this, the greatest country in human history’, the ‘this’ evokes a national place of belonging, an habitual nation which will implicitly understand that the ‘this’ in Clinton’s speech refers to the US (Billig 1995: 107). All Americans will understand the deixis involved, that the US is ‘the greatest country in human history’. In much of the media there is a very clear deixis. Billig provides many examples of the use of such rhetorical pointing with regard to the imagined community of the nation. ‘We’ typically means not just the speaker and the immediate listeners but the imagined nation which is the site of routine obligation and connection (Stevenson 1997: 45).

But what is also important to consider is how, and in what ways, this deictic pointing occurs not just to the nation, but to wider imagined communities stretching beyond beyond its borders. Billig cites Mandela who at one point refers to the people of South Africa and the world who are watching (1995: 107). The ‘we’ in his speeches almost always evokes those beyond South Africa who are watching on the global media and have collectively participated in the country’s rebirth. When Mandela states that ‘we are one people’ he is pointing both to South Africa and beyond to the rest of the world. Likewise at Princess Diana’s funeral much of the deictic pointing from the television commentators to the collective ‘we’, was in fact to the estimated 2.5 billion people watching the event around the world.

I now turn briefly to some research on the scale and impact of ‘global images’. What evidence does this provide of what, following Billig, we might term ‘banal globalism’; how through depiction and speaking is the globe represented? This global representation was researched through a 24-hour survey of visual images identifiable on a variety of TV channels available within Britain (see Toogood 1998, for detailed findings).

The following array of such images was found during this period. These images were deployed both within advertising as well as on regular program-
Numerous examples of images from the following ten categories were found over this 24-hour period:

- images of the earth, including the mimetic blue earth, but also including a football as indexical of the globe where soccer is conceived of as the iconic game of the global citizen
- long, often aerial images of generic environments which are taken to depict the globe (and threats to it) rather than depicting particular nations (a desert, an ocean, a rainforest)
- images of wildlife—especially auratic animals (lions), persecuted species (seals) and indicator species which index the overall state of the environment (eagles)
- images of the family of man where it appears that people from almost all the cultures of the globe can all be happily in one place (a sports stadium) or share one global product (Coke)
- images of relatively exotic places and peoples, often taken with unusual camera perspective, which suggests the endless possibilities of global mobility, communication and cosmopolitanism (beaches, native dancers, ski slopes)
- images of global players who are famous in and through the world’s media and whose actions (and in cases misdeeds) are endlessly on display to the whole world (OJ Simpson, Madonna, Queen Elizabeth II)
- images of iconic exemplars who, through their setting and costume, demonstrate global responsibility—they are seen as speaking and acting for the globe (Mandela, Princess Diana as the queen of hearts, Ken Saro-Wiwa)
- images of those engaging in actions ultimately on behalf of the global community, this being represented by a montage of different cultures or places, or of people encountering the needy, the starving, the sick and so on (Red Cross, UN Volunteers, Special Constables)
- images of corporate actions conducted on behalf of the globe and of its long-term future (water companies cleaning up the environment, drug companies spending billions on new medical research)

These examples show that contemporary citizenship is intertwined with representations of the globe which occur within the contemporary media. I have already noted that many of these images of the globe, and of those who speak for the globe, occur within advertisements. Also global networks and flows involve curious hybrids of the once-separate public and private spheres. There is thus increasing overlap between the public and private spheres and therefore between issues of citizenship and the nature of contemporary consumerism. Culture and cultural policies which crisscross the public and private spheres are also increasingly central to issues of citizenship (see Stevenson 1997: 51).

**CONCLUSION**

Many appeals within the global media are concerned to develop a sense of planetary responsibility rather than responsibility for particular locales. This is a relatively new notion and one that appears to distinguish humans from other species. However, previous citizenships have been based upon antagonism between those who are inside and those who are outside, upon identifying the non-citizens, the other, the enemy. We can thus ask whether a sense of global citizenship is a historically unique notion that is not in fact based on the contestation between global citizens and others. So although global citizens are well aware of difference, has a conception of citizenship developed which does not presume an enemy, an other? Or alternatively does the lack of an ‘enemy’ for the global citizen mean that such a citizenship will never develop on any significant scale—there are no global citizens because there is nobody to be excluded? Which of these is the case will have some awesome consequences.

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