This essay is my personal and intellectual tribute to Immanuel Wallerstein. It takes the form of my also personal intellectual account of our first independent, then joint, and again increasingly separate journeys through the maze of the world [-] system with and without a hyphen. Imagine our relations as a horizontal Y shaped rope. It began with strands that, in the 1960s, ran parallel, becoming intertwined during the 1970s and 1980s until the strands (or at least some) separated again in the 1990s, going off in increasingly different directions like a horizontal Y. Why?

My answer is both circumstantial and personal, in which the personal choices and trajectories are driven primarily by world and local political circumstance. Of course, my account reflects my own perspective on this story. However it also includes other colleagues and friends of Immanuel’s and mine, in particular our co-authors in several books and edited volumes, Giovanni Arrighi and Samir Amin, with whom I can check this account. Others, alas, are no longer with us.

Our Parallel Development in the 1960s

Significantly, all early world-systematizers previously worked in and on the ‘Third World,’ which led to our subsequent collaboration and friendship. Immanuel, Terence Hopkins, Giovanni Arrighi, Otto Kreye, Samir Amin and Herb Addo worked in or on Africa, and the latter two were born there. My ‘dependency’ colleagues, like Theotonio dos Santos, and I of course worked in, and primarily on, Latin America. Our respective and also common personal commitments to and scholarly and political experiences...
in various parts of the Third World are therefore inescapable antecedents and components of the development of the world-system [henceforth WS] perspective/approach/theory/analysis. Indeed, I recalled in my contribution to the festschrift for Theotonio dos Santos (Lopez ed. 1997), to which Immanuel and Samir also contributed, that Theotonio did so from a Latin American perspective because, as he said, the Third World losers must analyze the workings of the WS and imperialism for themselves rather than letting the WS winners use their own triumphalist platform to write WS history for them (see dos Santos 1978, 1993 among many others).

Indeed, in some cases the insistence on the WS capitalist structure/accumulation/development/history whole world pie actually preceded the detailed analysis of African, Latin American, or Brazilian dependent slices of the pie. Thus, it was Samir Amin’s 1957 doctoral dissertation that was then expanded into his Accumulation on a World Scale, which was published in French in 1970 and later in English. Only after his dissertation did Samir write a number of dependence type works on Africa. Giovanni, Samir and I met in Paris in 1968/9, and Samir visited me in Santiago in 1971, where I introduced him to Theotonio and other dependentistas. Samir then invited us and others to a major international conference he organized in Dakar in 1972 to introduce dependency theory to Africans. With his agreement, some of us also smuggled some nascent WS theory and analysis in as well.

Working in Latin America I had pleaded for an analysis of the world system’ [without a hyphen] since the mid-1960s and in 1970 presented a 150 page paper on “the development of a theory and analysis adequate to encompass the structure and development of the capitalist system on an integrated worlds scale” to a conference in Lima. Further expanded, that became two complementary books written in Chile before the 1973 military coup and published in 1978, World Accumulation 1492–1789 and Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment.

However, while still in Chile in 1973, I also received, welcomed and marveled at the manuscript of Immanuel’s Modern World-System. It came with a request from the publisher, I presumed at Immanuel’s suggestion, to write a blurb for the dust jacket. I gladly did, writing: The first and only serious, comprehensive and successful attempt to advance an analysis and explanation of the early development of a world economy, the understanding of which is essential for the proper appreciation of all subsequent development. This book should become a classic immediately upon publication.

Immanuel and I, working independently but parallel (and, to some extent Samir, who also helpfully commented on mine) had written about the development of the same world capitalist system from its origins in Europe between 1450 and 1500 and its spread from its West European center to incorporate more and more of the world overseas. Our independent treatments were similar, not only with regards to center-periphery relations, but also of West-East European relations and their impact on such ‘minor’ controversial issues as the ‘second serfdom’ in Eastern Europe. One major difference between our books was that Immanuel’s much more erudite and detailed one ended in 1640, while my more superficial one went on to 1789, a period Immanuel would take up in his second volume. Another major difference was Immanuel’s more detailed focus on the core/periphery/semi-periphery structure of the system, as compared to my attempt to identify the cyclical dynamics of the system, especially how the recurrent long economic crises of capital accumulation modified the geographic extension and economic structure of the world capitalist system. In his volumes II and III Immanuel would devote increasingly more attention to this cyclical dynamic and its structural consequences as well.

OUR COMMON DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970s AND 1980s

It should therefore not be surprising that in the 1970s and 1980s some of our work became intertwined, although our circumstances and styles remained very different. We collaborated at conferences, co-authored books, and Immanuel published articles of mine in his journal, Review, even after we started to disagree. At dozens of conferences we both attended, no matter what the issue—and there were many—Immanuel and I were now mostly in greater agreement with each other than either of us was with anybody else.1

1. Among these have been the more than a dozen International Conferences on World-Economy sponsored by his Braudel Center, the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, and the first Max Planck and then Starnberger Institut of Otto Kreye whom I introduced to Immanuel when I was a visiting fellow there in 1974/5. Three members of each of the institutes, e.g. Terry Hopkins, Giovanni and Immanuel for his institute plus Samir and myself were the original inner sanctum. We were joined at almost every conference
Our world-systemic historical interests, then as always, included concerns with the present as history to use the bon mot of Paul Sweezy, who published several of our products on contemporary affairs at Monthly Review. Immanuel initiated a long ‘Kondratieff’ cycle research group at his Fernand Braudel Center and devoted a whole issue of Review (II,4, Spring 1979) to its research hypotheses. Giovanni Arrighi had already persuaded me in 1972 that we were in a new long Kondratieff cycle B phase; contrary to his intentions, he claims, since he now disavows the existence of any K cycle. But Samir and I devoted much attention to this Kondratieff crisis and itsressive political consequences in many co- and individually authored books and articles, some featuring George Orwell’s 1984 Big Brother (Frank and Amin 1974/5, 1976, 1978), Frank (1980).

Other collaborative projects were some books co-authored by Samir, Giovanni, Immanuel and myself. The division of labor would be that each of us would write his own chapter on one aspect of the whole, which would then be discussed by all of us for subsequent revision again by each of us. We would then write a common introduction to stress our agreements (that distance the four of us from most others) and a common conclusion identifying the remaining differences among us. These agreements and disagreements were hammered out in several hour-long meetings at Samir’s apartment in Paris. Interestingly, the line ups on many issues turned out to be 3 to 1, but on one issue they were A,B,C vs. D and on the next one A,B,D vs. C and so on. All things considered, the greatest conflict among us was about yes-or-no-smoking there and at dinner afterwards; on that issue I was always the suffering odd no man out. The first of these books also focused on the Kondratieff ‘B’ down phase and was entitled Dynamics of Global Crisis (Amin et al 1982). The second one was Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World-System (Amin et al 1990).²

A very important question in all this, both theoretically and politically, was whether this world capitalist systemic crisis excludes or includes the ‘socialist’ countries. As Immanuel pointed out, the received wisdom on the left was that the socialist countries were part of what Stalin, in his swan song about socialism in 1953, had called a separate world system. In 1982, Christopher Chase-Dunn credited Immanuel and other Braudel Center colleagues for the “inspiration” to edit Socialist States in the World-System, which still included chapters on both sides of the question. Immanuel and Giovanni, however, placed the Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe squarely into their ‘semi-periphery’ category of the MW-S and therefore included it in the WS itself. I had already argued in 1972 that the ‘socialist’ countries would be again increasingly drawn into this world capitalist system and its crisis, and since then insisted on treating their contemporary and prospective developments as part and parcel of this same world economy and its crisis of accumulation. At one and another conference only Immanuel and I agreed consistently on this issue [Samir changed his mind back and forth and Giovanni did not much pronounce himself despite putting them in his semi-peripheral bag]. So it was gratifying if in retrospect perhaps not so surprising that in 1977 Immanuel published my then still outlandish seeming “Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Countries in the Capitalist International Division of Labor” in Volume I, Number 1 of his Review. In 1983, this was followed by my book The European Challenge—From Atlantic Alliance to Pan-European Entente for Peace and Jobs, which predicted and supported “a pan-European alternative political, economic, and strategic rapprochement,” as the back cover summarized. However, the book’s final paragraph also warned that “the implementation

by Theotonio, Anibal Quijano from Peru and the German/Venezuelan Heinz Rudolf Sonntag, representing Latin America, Amiya Bagchi, Kinhide Mushakoji and Pu Shan from Asia and a more changing cast of characters from Africa and Europe. And as the site of the conference moved around the world the local organizer invited additional ‘regional representatives’ for each occasion. My late wife Marta negatively likened us to the “Canasta Club” of the same old ladies in tennis shoes, going around to each other’s homes to play, a reasonable analogy except that we went around the world to do so, from Germany to France and Italy, to Senegal, Brazil, Venezuela, India and Japan.

² We originally also planned a book on our respective and intersecting world systemic trajectories, but that one fell by the wayside. Parts of its hypothetical contents have however appeared as Samir’s autobiographical Intellectual Itinerary (Amin 1994) and my own (Frank 1991 and 1996) and in the prefaces to Frank (1993 and 1998) as well as in the present essay.
of such global political economic realignments would not eliminate East European and Third World dependence.” Again, Immanuel and I were among the few who lent some credence to these arguments.

OUR DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1990S

Immanuel and I began to differ most—and increasingly so—on the prospects for the future: Immanuel always ends with the conclusion that for better or worse the present world capitalist system is doomed to be replaced by some other ‘system.’ I saw, and continue to see, less and less evidence for any such prospective ‘systemic’ transformation. This different perception between Immanuel and me about the future either derived from, or also led us to, increasing divergences about the past, or both. Accordingly, our WS rope began to disentangle into separate strands that are no longer parallel as they had been in the 1960s, nor as entangled as in the 1970s and 1980s, but that now increasingly diverge as in a horizontal Y. The initial parting of the ways came in 1989 as we were completing work on our Transforming the Revolution, and it coincided with the events at Tiananmen Square and the Berlin Wall. How much it was influenced by these events is hard to tell.

However, our divergence already had at least two identifiable antecedents in the 1980s. One was that Joseph Needham had invited me to contribute to the planned Volume VII of his monumental Science and Civilization in China with a chapter on why Europe and not China made an industrial revolution. I declined on the grounds that I was not qualified to do so. Needham also invited Immanuel, who accepted and wrote “The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World-System” circulated in manuscript form in 1989. [For many reasons, including Needham’s death, this Volume 7 was still-born, so that Immanuel eventually published his paper separately in Review (1991) and elsewhere, and finally in a book by the other contributors and himself (Blue, Brook & Wallerstein 1999)]. My argument was that what Immanuel had written about Europe, the three, six, or twelve essential, defining characteristics of capitalism in Europe applied equally to the world elsewhere and earlier so. Therefore, it could not be true that the MW-S was born and bred in Europe, and there is nothing distinctive about ‘capitalism’ and even less about ‘feudalism’ and ‘socialism.’ Hence my title “Transitional Ideological Modes: Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism” published in Critical Anthropology (1991) and elsewhere with a reply by Immanuel entitled “World System vs. World-Systems: A Critique.” Both, in addition to a similar 1991 critique by Samir Amin, were also included in my book The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (Frank and Gills 1993)

The other antecedent of Immanuel’s and my growing divergence about world system history is that I was invited to comment on an early version of Janet Abu-Lughod’s work on the thirteenth century world system that later appeared as Before European Hegemony (1989). Doing so obliged me to reconsider my choice of 1492, and Immanuel’s choice of 1450, for locating the emergence of the world system. If there was one—even if not the same one as she claimed—already in the thirteenth century, then how and when did that world system emerge, and why not also already earlier than that? Moreover, perhaps there was a continuity in the world system across all these ages. Perhaps what seemed to be beginnings and ends of supposedly different world systems only masked cyclical ups and downs in the same world system. The subsequent pursuit of these questions resulted first in my “A Theoretical Introduction to 5,000 Years of World System History.” It was my first wide-ranging critique of Immanuel’s account and theory of the alleged fifteenth century beginnings of the MW-S, which was graciously published by Immanuel in his Review (Frank 1990). He also published a subsequent “World System Cycles” elaboration of the same by Gills and Frank (1992).3

Since these discussions are all available in published form in the aforementioned book and elsewhere, it should be sufficient here to reproduce only part of Immanuel’s own clarification of a major issue between us:

Note a detail in word usage that distinguishes Frank and Gills from me. They speak of a “world system.” I speak of “world-systems.” I use a hyphen; they do not. I use the plural; they do not. They use the singular because, for them, there is and has only been one world system through all of historical time and space. For me there have been many world-systems…. The modern world-system” (or the “capitalist world-economy”) is merely one system among many….That brings us to the hyphen. My “world-system” is

3. For more details on these developments, I refer the reader to the story in the Preface and to my 1993 World System book with Barry Gills, which contains the above mentioned essays about cycles and ideological modes as well as several others by Immanuel, Samir, Janet, Barry and myself which debate these issues.
not a system “in the world” or “of the world.” It is a system “that is a world.” Hence the hyphen, since “world” is not an attribute of the system. Rather the two words constitute a single concept. Frank and Gills’s system is a World system in an attributive sense, in that it has been tending over time to cover the whole world (Wallerstein 1991, 1993: 294-295).

Gills’s and my response was that:

…the real debate/disagreement revolves around the question of what structure constitutes a ‘system’ or a ‘World(-)system’ in particular….In our view, Amin and Wallerstein continue in the footsteps of Polanyi and Finley and underestimate the importance of capital accumulation via trade and market in the ancient world system….The real dispute is over the character of the “international” or world system division of labor—not over its very existence….Wallerstein stresses what in our view is only a particular modern phase in the development of this world system division of labor at a higher level of integration than may have generally prevailed earlier (Frank and Gills 1993:298).

So, our historiographic and theoretical disputes are over “the character of the world system” as Gills and I put it in our discussion with Immanuel quoted above. Yet elsewhere, Immanuel goes so far as to write “let’s not quibble about the unit of analysis” (Wallerstein 1997). That is a strange thing to say for someone who has built his career on the proposition that, a ‘society’, ‘country’ or state are not adequate units of analysis, whereas the ‘world-system’ is. So the unit is not just a quibble. It is the question. But then we insist the question also becomes which world-systemic unit, the Braudel/Wallerstein European world-system or the real world global economy and system?

Braudel (1992) said that Immanuel had taken the largest possible geographical unit in which his systemic relations were still identifiable. But it turns out, as Gills and I already demonstrated several years ago, that by this criterion the world economy and system is far larger and older than Immanuel’s capitalist “Modern World-System.” So the first question was how much larger and older? The derivative second question became what implications the extent and age—not to mention structure and transformation—of this larger and older real world system has for the empirical and theoretical foundation of world-systems theory [or even analysis], as well as the remainder of the social theory that we have inherited from Marx and Weber. The answer is that the larger and older unit of analysis pulls the historical and theoretical rug out from under all of this received wisdom.

Alas, that includes denying the alleged distinctive ‘capitalist’ character of the modern world economy and system.

And that is no quibble.

Therefore, the dispute between Immanuel and me has also been extended further to a ‘higher level of integration’ at least for the period from 1400 to 1800. In recent years, our WS paths have diverged in several additional steps and ways. In the course of the 1990s, Immanuel’s work has turned increasingly to contemporary and future affairs and to ‘opening the social sciences,’ while for personal reasons I had to stop working and thus also disengage from current events for several years; when I returned to work I turned increasingly to history. My “The Modern World System Revisited: Rereading Braudel and Wallerstein” argued—I said demonstrated—that Braudel’s and Wallerstein’s Eurocentric thesis is contradicted time and again by their own ample evidence reviewed below, as well as by the evidence and analysis of others” (Frank 1995:163). In response, Immanuel made a strong plea to “Hold the Tiller Firm: On Method and Unit of Analysis.” Both essays appeared in Sanderson, ed. (1995) as did Albert Bergesen’s “Let’s Be Frank about World History.”

Al poses three alternative paths to “Challenging Today’s Social Science Models:” (1) Total denial—as practiced by my friend Bob Brenner—that the received wisdom poses any problem whatsoever; (2) Stretching old theory, such as social evolution and the logic of capitalism, to fit the new stretched history, as per Chase-Dunn and Hall and of course Immanuel and Samir; (3) Letting go of the old models altogether and beginning to build a new model of world-historical development. That is where Bergesen pigeonholes me in his discussion and title. In deference to the old admonition ‘better to say nothing if you can’t say something nice,” he says that I am in effect arguing that ‘if you can’t categorize world history in a new way, don’t categorize it at all….He is not arguing for nihilism or antitheorism, but [is] simply saying that a new conceptualization is needed. Stretching past theory is not enough, even if it seems to roughly fit. What is needed is new theory” (Bergesen 1995: 199,200). No wonder that Immanuel insists that we hold the theoretical/conceptual W-S tiller firm lest we drift off course altogether without a [political] rudder, which is what Immanuel and also Samir claim I have already done, the latter in his contribution to my Festschrift (Chew & Denemark, eds. 1996).
Nonetheless, Immanuel and I have both pushed ahead to navigate the troubled world-systemic waters without maps and with uncertain grips on the tiller. Immanuel has steered an elegant Gulbenkian Commission passenger liner with a Nobel laureate and other blue ribbon crew in his attempt to Open the Social Sciences (1996). It laudably invokes inter-supra/non-disciplinary social science as a goal. But with the tiller held as firm as Captain Immanuel insists, the ship cannot be steered out of the well-traveled Mediterranean and Atlantic historical waters and into Afro-Asian and global ones. To do that, we still need to divest ourselves of the good old European—indeed Eurocentric—navigational charts, historiography, and social theory that still guide Immanuel and his tiller.

That is my goal in ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Frank 1998), where Immanuel and I really part company. I asked myself three related questions: (1) What are the implications for Braudel’s ‘European World-Economy’ and Immanuel’s capitalist ‘Modern World-System’ of my having argued that our single World System goes back at least five thousand, and not just five hundred, years? (2) What are the implications for the continuation of the world system since 1400 if Janet Abu-Lughod’s “Thirteenth Century World System” was a step in the development of that same system, so that it did not break down in 1350 as she argued, and was not reborn in Europe in 1450 as Immanuel still insists? (3) What is to be done both historically/empirically and theoretically/analytically if the Braudel/Wallerstein models of a European world-economy and capitalist modern world-system are unsatisfactory, as I argued in my ‘Re-reading’ of them in Sanderson ed. (1995)? To begin even to answer all three questions, we must examine the world economic [at least that!] evidence and system on a global and not just a ‘European world-economy’ scale. But that global economy can in no way be crammed into the MW-S European capitalist procrustean bed, no matter how much we try to stretch it, as Bergesen already warned. And unlike Goldilocks, we cannot just choose among three or any other number of existing bear-beds. Since no one thought—and many even denied and still deny—that there was a global economy before 1800, nobody has so far sought to build an empirical and analytic world economy-bear size bed large enough to encompass it. And, as Bergesen observed, stretching past small- or medium-size theory to fit that global economy is not enough. What is needed is new theory. And that is a tall order after we have all muddled through with the old small-bed classical theory for nearly two centuries and then two-three decades ago tried to amend it or [stretch?] it to a medium-size ‘modern world-system’ analytical bed.

Alas, however much we continue to try to stretch the Braudelian world-economy and the Wallersteinerian world-system, they will never be able to encompass the bulk of humanity and its world economy which until 1800 was and remained in Asia. In Immanuel’s book until 1750 all of Asia and even Russia and the Ottomans remained outside of and did not begin to be incorporated into the world-economy/system that had its origins in 1450 according to Immanuel or earlier according to Braudel, but in either case in Europe. So where was this ‘other’ eighty percent of humanity? Literally out of it, by these Eurocentric lights. An insufficient step ahead in this regard is Giovanni’s prize-winning book The Long Twentieth Century (1994) and his present work in which he has discovered the importance of East Asia in the earlier world economy/system (Arrighi, Hamashita and Selden, 1997). Working alone, Giovanni tried to fit the world economy into a Procrustean theoretical bed that rests on ‘financial innovations’ by and financial instruments of Braudelian city states in southern and then northern Europe. But in reality, the southern ones rested on the “Oriental trade” with Asia and the northern ones were financed by silver from the Americas that was used as collateral for credit raised on much more developed financial markets in Asia. So with his co-authors and next to his European one, Giovanni is now setting up an additional East Asian bed. Yet they still fail to deal with the world economic baby, because it is too big to fit into either or even both of their Procrustean beds.

Models and Thompson (1996) do try to fit the world economy into a single bed that rests on the ‘technological innovations,’ which drive the nineteen Kondratieff cycles they claim to have identified since 930 A.D. Alas, after the first four of these that are centered in Song China, their bed collapses on them there; and from the thirteenth century onward they set it up again in Western Europe. That is because they allege that after the first four K cycles the world economic innovative motor force suddenly jumped from East to West and has remained there through the fifteen so far succeeding K cycles. They note in passing but completely disregard the significance of
the observation that all but one of the first dozen “Western” innovations and cycles in fact reflect and rest on important economic events in the East and/or its relations with the West. So in their attempt to fit in more world economic evidence, all three of these innovative authors and friends [or all five counting Giovanni’s co-authors] are still trying to stretch their Procrustean theoretical beds to and beyond the limits, which as Bergesen already warned simply cannot be done. To encompass the real world economy and system, we need a new theory, and to construct that we need to begin by looking at and analyzing the world economy as a global whole.

ReOrient first demonstrates both empirically and theoretically that the real world economy or historical world system simply will not fit into the Braudelian European World-Economy or the Wallersteinian capitalist Modern World-System, no matter how much anybody tries to neglect the evidence of a truly global division of labor and competitive economy within which Asia was central—and Europe marginal—until 1800. To encompass that in a global economic bed something has to give way, and that is the Eurocentric wisdom and received theory from Marx to Wallerstein [and Frank Mark I]. In my book [Frank Mark II?], the two-thirds of humanity living in Asia in 1750 accounted for four-fifths of all production in the world economy. This world economy’s international division of labor had already been well developed, at least throughout Afro-Eurasia, by the fifteenth century when Immanuel’s ‘modern world-system’ allegedly only just began to emerge in a marginal peninsula of the real world system.

Therefore, we need to review, and I fear more reject than refurbish, the historiography and social theory, including especially all attempts to account for the Rise of the West, that we have so far all been taught, including by Immanuel. He will, of course, agree with me about the bankruptcy of Bergesen’s ‘denialist’ category #1: The supposed European exceptionalism [a la Weber and others] by which the West allegedly pulled itself up by its own bootstraps and/or its Marxist version of doing so simply by changing its class structure from feudal to capitalist with a bit of colonial loot thrown in. But alas, much the same is the case for Bergesen’s #2 category of ‘stretchers’ who privilege ‘The Expansion of Europe’ and the progressive [or regressive] ‘incorporation’ of more and more of ‘The Rest’ by ‘The West’ in the capitalist “Modern World-System” set out and analyzed by Immanuel. Unfortunately, that will no longer do either, particularly at a time when the world economy and system is itself reorienting de facto.

For a major limitation of the stretched category #2 is that it retains and only stretches the ‘societal’ mode of production’ of #1 out to the range of the MW-S of category #2. The reason is of course that those who do so—including me then and Immanuel still—need something [capitalism] that historically replaced something else [feudalism] and hence is logically subject to being itself again replaced by something else [socialism?]. Witness that every one of his analyses of the real past and present ends with an unsubstantiated—and unsubstantiable—prediction: The future mode will be different, sometimes even ‘socialist’, sometimes maybe better, sometimes maybe not, because ‘things can’t go on this way’ and ‘all things must come to an end.’ So our 1991 dispute about ‘a hyphen’ already was about the character of the real world [-] system and the political [and policy] implications to be derived therefrom. That is why already in my 1991 critique of Immanuel’s essay for the Needham book, I asked if there is any scientific basis for, and whether we still have a political/ideological need for, the ‘tri- tional ideological modes: feudalism, capitalism, socialism.” My answer was and remains no. Immanuel’s remains yes, and that is the difference a hyphen makes.

The moral of the story is therefore that the outstanding question of theory and praxis is not what to do in or about a world that was not born in or by Europe, as has been mistakenly alleged by everybody from Marx and Weber to Braudel and Immanuel. The question is instead how to ReOrient our historiography and social theory, to take account not only of the “Global Economy in the Asian Age” before the year 1800 but probably also after the year 2000 (Frank 1998). It is strange, and for me sad, that after so long a road traveled together Immanuel’s and my paths should now diverge on that account. All the more so since, to close my personal and theoretical tribute to him, I can do no better than to quote Immanuel himself where we still agree:

The expectation of universality, however sincerely pursued, has not been fulfilled thus far in the historical development of the social sciences…. It is hardly surprising that the social sciences that were constructed in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century were Eurocentric. The European
world of the time felt itself culturally triumphant…. Every universalism sets off responses to itself, and these responses are in some sense determined by the nature of the reigning universalism(s)…. Submitting our theoretical premises to inspection for hidden unjustified a priori assumptions is a priority for the social sciences today.

–Immanuel Wallerstein for Gulbenkian Commission

Opening the Social Sciences [1996]

Amen!

REFERENCES


