INTRODUCTION

In January of 1999 a new student movement announced itself on the campuses of American universities. It began a campaign for a “sweat free campus” and it did so in dramatic fashion—by occupying over the next four months Administration buildings on seven campuses—Duke (January 29), Georgetown (February 5), Wisconsin (February 8), Michigan (March 17), Fairfield (April 15), and North Carolina and Arizona (April 21). In each case, the students’ demands were focused on labor exploitation in the apparel industry—the sweatshop problem.

In the four years from that season to this writing, the antisweatshop movement and its participants have evolved into a broader “global justice” movement. In what follows I analyze the movement and its evolution with two goals in mind: first, to compare it to the nearest historic analogue, the white New Left and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) of the 1960s. The second axis of this analysis is an inquiry into the ways in which the growth of global capitalism (otherwise known as “globalization”) and some of its technological media have affected the evolution of the movement.

There are striking similarities in the ideological radicalization of USAS and SDS that seem to be driven by ongoing features of capitalist development and culture. Among the differences between that era and this are those produced by
THE FORMATION OF USAS

The campus-based antisweatshop campaign has its origins in changes in the AFL-CIO that were signaled by John Sweeney’s election to that federation’s presidency in 1995. The new Sweeney administration created two programs aimed at reviving organizing activity in the labor movement, an effort made dramatically necessary by the decline of U.S. union density to fewer than ten percent in the private sector. (U.S. Census Bureau 2002: 412) The AFL-CIO created an Organizing Institute (OI) to train new organizers. The OI engaged in aggressive outreach, and this included recruitment among college students and recent graduates. Associated with the OI was a program called Union Summer.

Explicitly recalling the idealism of the Mississippi Freedom Summer of 1964 (inter alia Weisbrot 1990), Union Summer recruits young adults to “try out” the labor movement by way of summer internships as organizers and union staff. In the summer of 1997, a group of Union Summer interns at the offices of the former International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) offices in New York began to develop the idea of a “sweat free campus.” Their supervisor, Ginny Coughlin, a staffer with experience as a youth organizer for the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), helped them elaborate the idea. One of these interns was Tico Almeida, a student at Duke University. (Ginny Coughlin 2002, 1997)

Aimed at a bit over 1% of the U.S. apparel market, the campaign for sweatfree campus clothing targets an approximately $2.5 billion market in clothing that bears university and college insignia or logos. This market is structured largely through licensing contracts. A University licenses a company, say, Champion, a maker of premium sweatshirts, to use its logo and name on clothing. In turn, the company pays the University or College about 7.5–8% of revenue for that right. Clearly, some schools have national markets—the top three licensors in 2001–2002 were North Carolina, Michigan and Tennessee—others have regional markets, and still others have only campus sales. Some small schools are non-licensors—generally their campus bookstore contract calls for the store to have the right to sell logo apparel, and the store’s rent or fee to the University includes consideration for this right.

The licensees, in another example, VF Corp. (the largest apparel maker in the world), behave as clothing “manufacturers” do—they find contractor factories to make the gear.³ VF (and its label Lee Sport), for example, contracted for a variety of products for Michigan, North Carolina, Northwestern, Arizona State and other universities which were made by Sinha Apparel in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

About 180 of the largest schools use the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) to broker and manage their licensing deals. Much of the initial round of actions in the sweatfree campus campaign was directed at the CLC. In the Fall of 1998 it adopted de facto, the Code of Conduct that the Apparel Industry Partnership (later the Fair Labor Association) announced. Criticism of that code led students into conflict with Universities who made use of CLC services.

When he returned to Duke in the Fall of 1997, Tico Almeida organized a letter from student leaders to Duke President Nannerl Keohane, urging that Duke adopt a Code of Conduct governing conditions under which Duke licensees might produce Duke logo clothing.⁴ Duke agreed.

During the next year Duke did adopt a code, but as it turned out, the Duke Administration’s initial agreement to Almeida and his fellow students’ initiative did not include an item that the student movement soon came to believe was critical to the overall effort to monitor labor standards—full disclosure of licensees’ contractor sites. This was a critical matter—for campus logo apparel as it is for retail chain store brand apparel.

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⁴. The general idea was based on Notre Dame’s pioneering 1996 code—a product of Jesuit social conscience, not a social movement outside of usual channels.
If a university licenses a firm to make t-shirts and sweatshirts, that firm will then contract with (potentially) hundreds of factories to make the garments. For the really large “manufacturers” and licensors a staggering number of contractors is involved in the commodity chain of their licensees. Realizing that no particular monitoring protocol could guarantee 100% coverage of a vast, ever-changing list of factories, the students wanted to have “full disclosure” access to the list of contractor factories (vendors) that made logo clothing.

The demand for disclosure of contractor sites parallels two broader concepts that now have currency in public policy discussion of global issues: transparency (that is, visibility of transactions and openness to scrutiny); and accountability, that is, the means by which an actor can be made to accept to responsibility for its actions.

In support of their demand that the Duke Administration Code of Conduct include disclosure of vendor contractor locations, the students held a sit-in at the University Administration building. It lasted but one day, and by the time the sit-in ended, on January 29, 1999 Duke had agreed.

In an interesting regional convergence, a group of students at the University of North Carolina, “20 minutes” down the road from Duke, among whom Marion Traub-Werner was an active leader, had been actively addressing the major contract that Nike was in the process of signing with their own major college athletic teams. They too demanded a code of conduct. (Traub-Werner 1999)

While these two spearhead campuses were working on their local versions of the issues, earlier, in the summer of 1998 students from 30 campuses met in New York as an informal but cohesive international coalition of campuses and individual students working on anti-sweatshop and Code of Conduct campaigns. The general goals of the group were: (1) to provide coordination and communication between the many campus campaigns and (2) to coordinate student participation and action around the national, intercollegiate debate around Codes of Conduct and monitoring systems. (USAS 2002)

By early 1999 United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) had been formed, and about 50 campus groups were involved. In January and then through April, groups loosely affiliated with USAS held sit-ins in seven places and held rallies for campus codes of conduct at many others. In the course of 1999, then, a new activist movement was clearly in evidence on American campuses, recalling or provoking comparison with the movements of the Sixties.

Through academic year 1999–2000 USAS continued to grow, but it added a startling new dimension to its activity. In the Fall of 1999, reacting to the apparel workers union’s criticism of what was now called the Fair Labor Association (FLA) a group within USAS, centered at Brown University, devised an alternative plan for insuring University licensed apparel would be “sweatfree.”

The FLA had stemmed from a Clinton Administration initiative to bring together the “stakeholders”—firms, unions and human rights groups, and consumers—to form an industry-wide code of conduct that would enable consumers to “choose” sweatfree clothing. It was (and is) clearly aiming at a certifying “fair labor” label.⁶

Among the principle criticisms of the FLA put forward by UNITE and USAS were these:

- The Code of Conduct called for obeying local law on (often inadequate) minimum wages, rather than a “living wage” standard; (UNITE 1998; USAS 1999)
- The monitoring protocol called for sampling only 10% of contractor locations per year;⁷ (UNITE 1998)
- The original Code did not call for disclosure of locations.
- The original monitoring structure called for corporations to hire monitors; by 2002, though, FLA would pay and accredit monitors; the critics re-emphasized the need for monitors to be conversant with local workers’ needs and to include human rights groups. (USAS 2002)

Calling their proposal a “Worker Rights Consortium” (WRC) the USAS chapters around the country worked on their various campuses to get their universities to join the WRC and reject or leave the FLA. By contrast to the FLA the WRC board has no corporate members; it engages local human rights organizations to obtain information from workers about factory conditions; it responds to complaints rather than certifying factories.

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⁵. There are almost 3000 entries in the University of Michigan database of factory locations for calendar year 2002; of these my estimate is that there are about 2000 discrete factories that produce everything from glasses to coolers to t-shirts to t-shirt printing. (Workers Rights Consortium factory database: http://workersrights.org/fdd.asp).

⁶. The original conference and working group was called, in 1996, the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). For a history see Ross (forthcoming).

⁷. However sympathetic with the critics one might be it is clear that the student and union criticisms neither understood nor cared to understand modern sampling or statistical quality control theory. In the critics’ defense, the question of random selection and unannounced visits—central to a sampling model—have been consistently muddled by the FLA.
The campaign for the WRC was most intense as the deadline for its first national founding convention in April 2000 approached. Against many predictions USAS was successful in getting over 50 universities and colleges to join the WRC, many of these leaving FLA. (By May 2002 the 100th institution joined the WRC; see Worker Rights Consortium 2002)

Whether the WRC can fulfill the students’ hope for important change in the apparel supply chain is matter for both skepticism and patience. The college apparel market is but 1–2% of the entire apparel market. As such it is a niche market that may be exploited in a specialized way. As of this writing, however, many of the largest suppliers to this market were part of very much larger firms. College and licensed apparel are very small fractions of the sales of these firms, and a similar fraction of profits. The leverage of university licensors in relation to the largest suppliers in the market is only moderate.

There is however, another aspect to the question of creating labor rights bridgeheads in the apparel commodity chain. While campus logo licenses might be but one or two percent of the gross of a giant merchandiser like VF Corporation, the contractor factories that perform college logo work also perform other work. So, for example, when the BJ&B cap factory in the Dominican Republic acquiesced to pressure to recognize a union, the WRC and the brand name licensees (Nike and Reebok) used the college logo contracts as leverage on behalf of the workers; that factory was also making caps for the general market place. (See Ross forthcoming, Chapter 11)

Repeated public opinion surveys indicate that a substantial majority of U.S. consumers is willing to pay slightly more for apparel they are certain is “sweatfree.” (Marymount 1999; Pollin et al 2001; Program on International Policy Attitudes 2000) This and the fact that the campus market is between $1 billion and $2 billion suggests that the “ethical” market is large enough to sustain some sizeable enterprises. This may be the logic behind SWEATX, a new unionized t-shirt maker, funded by “Ben” of Ben and Jerry’s famous ice cream (Marc B. Haefele and Christine Pelisek 2002), and an East coast version, No Sweat apparel, made by Bienestar International.

The creation of the WRC and subsequent affiliations with it are major victories for the new student movement, and as of the summer of 2003 USAS claimed over 200 campus groups (133 actual affiliates). This rate of growth (from 1998–99 to 2003) is greater than that of Students for a Democratic Society until after 1965 (when it called the first March on Washington Against the War in Vietnam); or of the white and/or Northern support groups for the southern civil rights movement in the early 1960s. The comparison provides fascinating insight to the perennial question of historical analysis: what is the same; what is different; why?

### Table 1: Sit-Ins on the Campus Logo/Sweatshop Issue 1999–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Source*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/5 (4 days)</td>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Disclosure</td>
<td>SP/Chronicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disclosure; living wage research; women’s rights</td>
<td>Kreider 2000, PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/17</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disclosure; living wage research; women’s rights</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/15</td>
<td>Fairfield</td>
<td></td>
<td>For Janitor’s Union University. Dropped contractor</td>
<td>NYT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/21–4/30</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disclosure; living wage research; women’s rights</td>
<td>Sp/PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/21</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disclosure; living wage research; women’s rights</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7–2/15</td>
<td>U Penn</td>
<td></td>
<td>Join WRC</td>
<td>NYT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/16–2/18</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Join WRC</td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17–2/20</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Withdraw FLA join WRC</td>
<td>Milwaukee Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/6–3/17</td>
<td>Macalester</td>
<td></td>
<td>Withdraw FLA</td>
<td>AP/sp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/15–3/25</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopt a code</td>
<td>Tor Star</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/27–4/7</td>
<td>Purdue</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hunger Strike Join WRC</td>
<td>sp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/29–4/9</td>
<td>Tulane</td>
<td></td>
<td>Withdraw from both</td>
<td>Times Picayune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lex Herald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/5–4/8</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Join WRC/ lost FLA w/draw</td>
<td>sp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4–4/6</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Temp join WRC (rescinded later)</td>
<td>AP/sp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>SUNY Albany</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other Labor Related Sit-Ins (2000)**

| Johns Hopkins |
| Ohio State |
| Pitzer |
| Pomona |
| Wesleyan |

* PR= University web site Public Affairs; AP= Associated press. Various newspapers by name. SP= Student paper web site.
THEN AND NOW: METHODS AND SOURCES

The observations about USAS that follow are based on group interviews with students at Brown University, the University of Connecticut; Smith College, and my own Clark University in 1998–1999. In total, about 75 students were part of these snack and chat sessions. I talked informally with groups of USAS students at Northeast regional meetings in 1998 and 2003. The Worcester Global Action Network, which evolved in part out of the Clark USAS chapter hosted regional meetings on two occasions at which I was, as above, a participant observer. Repeated conversations with Harvard and Holy Cross University USAS leaders provided information about their evolution as well. The list serve at the University of Michigan of Students Organizing for Labor and Economic (SOLE) located at a former center of SDS has provided a steady source of information about activity there. From its founding (1998) to the present, the founders of Clark University USAS chapter and then the Worcester Global Action Network have been available for interviews and close observation.

These sources do not include New York or Los Angeles—where the garment industry is centered, where sweatshops are more than half of all workplaces in the industry, and where immigrants have overwhelming presence in it. Perusal of documentary sources (especially websites) and list serves indicates that this does not strongly influence the substantive observations.

The comparison to SDS was facilitated by the author’s participation in the founding of the organization and close involvement with its subsequent evolution (Cf. Miller 1988; Sale 1973; Newfield 1966)

DIMENSIONS OF COMPARISON

The two movement organizations can be compared along a number of dimensions. These are summarized in Table 2. Among the themes of the comparison that follows are the ways in which the globalization of capital over the last thirty years has affected the course of the two movements—and the way it has not.

1. Who were and are the student boat rockers? (Otherwise referred to as “Demographics”)

In 1961, Tom Hayden, who had been editor of the Michigan Daily and was soon to be President of SDS wrote an article for Mademoiselle Magazine:

8. I should note at the outset that these comparisons are mainly with the white young adult, campus based movement of the 1960s. There was obviously more to the New Left than just that; and there is more to the antisweatshop movement than its college based wing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Different</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>Upper middle class initiating groups</td>
<td>Newer diffuses outward faster</td>
<td>Measured for SDS v. USAS chapters or sit-ins of USAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Types</td>
<td>Elite institutions, flagship state universities: Duke, Michigan, Wisconsin, Harvard.</td>
<td>Faster outward and downward diffusion</td>
<td>Pattern not geographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Action</td>
<td>Sweat Issue and Civil Rights</td>
<td>Now: On codes and the Workers Rights consortium, Administrations more responsive: more early local victories</td>
<td>Less cultural praise for current global justice activists. Early CR and antipoverty radicals had a certain level of praise; now: “senseless in Seattle.” &quot;Luddites.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same International Financial Institutions (IFIs - World Bank, International monetary Fund, WTO)</td>
<td>Response to antiwar movement more repressive by second year (1967-68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Development</td>
<td>Diffusion from Specific to Global: deepening radicalism in anti-capitalist analysis</td>
<td>Vaguer about socialism as THE or AN alternative</td>
<td>Much higher level of training, interpersonal sensitivity and multicultural sensitivity – perhaps to a fault. Not yet recoiled from the “tyranny of structurelessness.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to Labor</td>
<td>War (post 9/11/01) may be wedge</td>
<td>Now: much closer, more sympathy; work and job, not poverty and dependence</td>
<td>Vietnam v. Afghanistan and Iraq: different matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Scene</td>
<td>War opposition</td>
<td>Anti-imperialism (nationalism as referent) vs. global political economic justice (class refersent; also gender and race)</td>
<td>Complexity: now: identity politics in fuller bloom. Current opposition relevant to controversy over the role of draft in creating antiwar movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle/Culture</td>
<td>Counter culture</td>
<td>Veggie not druggie</td>
<td>Ghettoized anyhow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political economic context</td>
<td>Affluent time</td>
<td>Debt burden on current cohort; part-time work pay is insufficient to support groups</td>
<td>Debt as social control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Who are the Student Boat Rockers?” Later, in the opening of the Port Huron Statement he wrote, in answer to that question: “We are people of this generation bred in at least modest affluence, housed in the universities, looking uncomfortably to the worlds we inherit.” For white civil rights and antiwar students, and the New Left of SDS and other groups, the earliest movement participants came disproportionately from upper middle class homes.⁹¹⁰ Eventually however, by 1967, the movement and SDS membership spread among students of working class and lower white-collar families. Institutionally, the movement began at exclusive or elite private colleges, for example, Swarthmore and Harvard, but also at the cosmopolitan public institutions with long histories of radical colonies—like Berkeley, Wisconsin and Michigan.

Among the more striking findings of research on the backgrounds of student activists in the Sixties were these: generational conflict over political values was rare in activists’ backgrounds (See Flacks, 1971 and 1967). Most, especially leaders, were from homes where in the language of the times, they were red diaper (Communist) or pink diaper (Socialist) babies, or where their parents were New Deal liberals. Also distinctive was the egalitarianism of New Left activists’ families in comparison to their cohort. Activists reported more equal relations between their mothers and fathers and higher levels of education among their mothers than did non-activists.

This kind of detailed research with and about today’s campus movement has just begun. Nevertheless, it seems that initially the movement began among those of professional if not wealthy family backgrounds. One study of anti sweatshop activists finds that they are twice as likely to come from high income households as are the universe of college freshman; much less likely to come from lower income households; and roughly similar in the middle of the income distribution. (Elliot and Freeman 2000) There are interesting differences in the dynamics of class and region between the new movement and the old.

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⁹. What follows summarizes a great deal of research on the white New Left of circa 1960–1970—a topic which produced an immense literature. The best three places to find the research information summarized here are Flacks (1967, 1971) and Mankoff and Flacks (1971).

¹⁰. This has actually been exaggerated in the popular social science about the movement. While early SDS people did come from relatively more educated homes, these also included working class and modest professions—schoolteachers and therapists, not often wealthy business backgrounds.

From Antisweatshop to Global Justice to Antiwar

The old New Left witnessed a progression from larger and/or more selective elite institutions, outward to more broad-based institutions. From Michigan, Swarthmore, and Harvard early on, for example, chapters later developed at places like Indiana, St. Cloud State, and Roosevelt University in Chicago. This process took five years and was speeded up after SDS was discovered by the national press around the time of the (first) March on Washington to End the War in Vietnam, in April 1965. By the late Sixties community colleges had chapters of SDS or other New left groups.

The current pattern of outward diffusion has some, but highly compressed similarity to the Sixties.¹¹ From 1999–2000 there was marked “outward” movement from more to less elite campuses. The first wave of sit-ins, in 1999, was at relatively “elite” or flagship state universities. In this regard, looking for initiating movement groups among young adults with higher income and/or educational family backgrounds is similar in both generations.

However, history is moving at warp speed. Despite the fact that the early and strongest presence of USAS was, as with SDS, at the most cosmopolitan institutions, outward motion is very rapid in comparison to SDS. During the next spring, 2000, sit-ins were much more representative of the national student body. (See Table 3) The speed with which chapter construction is moving to non-elite places—and growing—is faster than SDS before the War in Vietnam. It compares to the Southern students’ civil rights movement, which spread the sit-ins and lunch counter boycotts around the south within weeks, and created SNCC within three months of the first sit-in. It also compares to the tremendous growth of SDS after the March on Washington of April 1965. (For material on SDS chapter growth, see Sale 1973)

Already, by the fall of 1999 campuses in Alabama, Arkansas, and Georgia were involved and active. There were contacts at South Carolina, and a few community colleges. Acting in response to local demonstrations, or fear of them, or even a desire to do the right thing, 122 universities had joined the Fair Labor Association by June of 1999, 150 by Spring of 2000. Then when USAS initiated WRC, and campaigned against the FLA, membership increase slowed drastically. There are 178 college and university members of the Fair Labor Association (as of March 2003), a growth of only 28 in two years. In the meantime the WRC

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¹¹. I have supplemented work first done by Aaron Kreider, then an undergraduate at Notre Dame University, who summarized the institutional rankings of campuses where major USAS actions occurred between 1999 and 2000. (Kreider 2000, 2002)
Table 3: Institutional Status and Anti-Sweatshop Sit-Ins 1999–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Ranking Among “National Universities”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spring 1999 USAS Sit-Ins – Chronological Order</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown University</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Wisconsin</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Michigan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfield</td>
<td>4 (Masters Universities – North)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of North Carolina</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
<td>2nd tier*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spring 2000: Not Chronological “National Universities”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Toronto</td>
<td>1 (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulane</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNY Albany</td>
<td>2nd tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>2nd tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purdue</td>
<td>2nd tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>2nd tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>2nd tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNY Albany</td>
<td>2nd tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State</td>
<td>2nd tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spring 2000 Liberal Arts Colleges</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomona</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesleyan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macalester</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitzer</td>
<td>2nd tier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aaron Kreider. USAS Listserv. Monday August 8, 2000; supplemented by sources in Table 1 and U.S. News and World Report.

* Second tier refers to those institutions ranked 51–120

membership is now one hundred twelve, having grown by 25/year in the same period.

To summarize the demographic picture on the basis of nonsystematic data, it appears the structure of membership and the geography of institutional diffusion is similar to the Sixties, but democratization is more rapid.

A simple hypothesis about participation among “conscience” (as distinct from beneficiary) constituencies of movements like the antisweatshop movement would predict concentration among affluent and professional families. (See McCarthy and Zald 1977 for the distinction; see Schuman 1972 for different class bases of opposition to the Vietnam War.) Attention to international issues—and activism about them—tends to be higher among the more highly educated population. These are the families too, where young people are taught that civic life is theirs to mold. Finally, more elite institutions tend to be those where “critical” thinking and certain kinds of dissent are more tolerated or even valued.

Diffusion towards more representative populations follows this track. Initiators in conscience constituencies are those with more time, more social space, more family support in a given political tradition; once begun, such activity attracts those akin to the initiators at the next level outwards. The initiators seek this outwards motion (they “organize”).

Even more than during the Vietnam War—which touched students’ lives through conscription—current movement participants have little personal stake in the issue. Countering that however is the possibility that new cohorts of students among sons and daughter of blue-collar workers may be more empathic with sweatshop workers, and may have a more positive sense of unions. The growing number of children of immigrants in higher education may make this issue more accessible to non-elite students, especially in places like California, for example, where large numbers of Latino students have entered higher education, and the largest group of sweatshop workers is Hispanic.

About these possibilities there is only indirect information and it conflicts. The institutional data above suggest, indirectly, that the current movement has the same elite initiation as the white New Left, with more rapid broad-based recruitment subsequently. On the other hand, a study of a sample of 233 students from four campuses showed that immigrant background makes no very large difference in their general attitudes toward sweatshops issues.¹² (Ross, Grandmason and London 2000).

Elliot and Freeman (2000) report a study of 100 activists in which their parents are disproportionately activists; and their incomes are higher than average among college students. My own interviews showed that most parents were positively inclined toward or involved with these movements.

¹². The study from which that conclusion is based was not about movement participation.
2. Geography and Diffusion

When Doug McAdam mapped the Southern student sit-ins of 1960, he found a strong geographic pattern of diffusion through time. (1982) The sit-ins spread from place to place through chains of physical proximity. While no similar mapping study has been done of SDS, my personal observation is similar. In each region, locally or self-designated “travelers” would set out to organize SDS chapters within driving distance from his or her base campus or city.¹³ While new nodes might spring up, leap-frogging across distances, strong nodes became the geographic centers of organizing.¹⁴

Among activists and observers today there is universal agreement that email, the internet and cheap (er) long distance phone service has changed the way ideas and movements spread from person to person. Although the pattern of sit-ins does suggest a Midwestern concentration, it more strongly reproduces a profile of places with long traditions of progressive young adult activism (Madison; Ann Arbor; Iowa City). The extremely reduced friction of communication and information exchange means that new movements among those “wired” up spread with much less physical proximity than in earlier periods.

3. Strategy and Tactics: Direct Action

A fairly dramatic and obvious similarity between the two movements is the use of the sit-in to compel administration attention and attempt to win change. Important differences include the much higher rate of success of the early actions of the more recent group, and their greater focus on winnable goals. In this regard the new New Left of 1999–2000 was more like the early civil rights movement and its integration sit-ins and boycotts than it was like the more militant and diffuse radicalism of 1968.

The movements are entirely similar in their basic rejection of mainstream electoral action. Interestingly, the white (and black) New Left of the Sixties and the current movement both began with demands on private parties (integrating lunch counters; imposing codes of conduct on clothing labelers) not, in the very first instance, governments.

4. Dynamics of Action and Ideology

There was a dynamic in place in the new movement through the Spring of 2003 that was highly reminiscent of the late Sixties New Left. At the outset of the civil rights movement, as many have noted, the emerging student movement’s demands were relatively modest reforms, e.g., integrate lunch counters. SDS began, in 1962, a process of broadening the scope of radical imagination, projecting a democratic critique and vision. In the earliest few years of the student antisweatshop movement it too had a focused agenda. The sit-ins of 1960 and the sit-ins of 1999–2000 were similar in the targeted nature of their agendas.

By 1969, radical student leadership saw immediate campus issues as more or less immaterial, and the real goal the creation of “revolutionary consciousness.” In Chicago, for example, what began, in 1969, as a sit-in over the firing of a Marxist professor reached its denouement with a list of demands including the use of University facilities by the Community, the hiring of minorities and women, and some foreign policy issues as well. The immediate causes of the sit-ins, and the student constituency’s initial understanding of the action, for some of the political leadership, were but pretexts for radicalizing students—if need be with the wrong end of a police baton.

The New Left experienced a process that widened the critique of society, leading it to envision a more profound structural change—socialism in some form—that would be required to meet a vision of justice and democracy. Student leftists then and now call this process “radicalization.” In addition to evolution toward a more sharply socialist or revolutionary vision, the New Left of the Sixties conflated three arguably separate matters: radical vision, radical strategy and militant tactics. Culminating in the Weather Underground embarkation on a campaign of bombing, there was a tendency to think that “proper radicalism” required each demonstration to make use of escalating militancy in tactics.

It is fascinating to observe a similar, recent evolution of campus activists away from focus on the sweatshop issue. Initially, that evolution was toward a focus on the IFIs (international financial institutions), the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. While not yet creating a hyper-revolutionary rhetoric, there is a similar dynamic to today’s young activist movement and that of the earlier generation. Then it was from the focused demands of the Civil Rights Movement, for example, to the more diffuse opposition to the forms of imperialism. Now it is from sit-ins about apparel codes of conduct, to (for many young activists), a “tolerance” of street vandalism against “neoliberalism.”

For the young people in Worcester, MA who went to the April 20, 2002 Washington, D.C. demonstration, their consensus evaluation was that (a) the demonstration was hijacked by pro-Palestinian presence (rather than pro peace); (b) it underemphasized the IMF and the other IFIs; and (c) it was too bad there was not civil disobedience. (Entin 2002)

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¹³. I played this role in the Upper Midwest (Minnesota and Wisconsin) from a base in Chicago for a while in 1965.

¹⁴. For some tales of Texas organizing see Robert Pardun (2002).
but they do not talk about a different mode of production. and their greed; they talk of a new society built around new ethical principles—
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view of appropriate means and the need for desperate measures—their tactics—
became more militant.
The white radical leadership tended to drift, as the decade progressed,
toward ever more explicit socialist models and despite an earlier repugnance for factionalism, their leadership groups fell into doctrinal disputes about big visions: socialism, communism, and anarchism.

At the base, though, the student movement was politically literal and culturally polymorphous. By literal, I mean that the people at the demonstrations on a given campus wanted pretty much what they said they did: an end to the war, more democracy at home, more resources to fight poverty, and racial equality, and
more democracy in the communal life of higher education.

Culturally, the most bizarre images of the left have dominated memory. Yet, just as it is false to see most Seventies kids as punk, or Eighties young adults frumpy in torn jeans, or most nineties students as body pierced, hair dyed and brain-damaged on “speed,” so too is it wrong to understand most Sixties protest-
ers as hippies, yippies or bomb throwers. Qualifications having been stated, by
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Today’s global justice movement has evolved from an antisweatshop move-
ment to one whose leading cadres are more or less explicitly anti-capitalist, certainly “anti-corporate” in sentiment, but who approach only cautiously the historically burdensome term “socialist.” At its core the new young activists harbor a radical democratic impulse almost exactly similar to that of the young New Left of the early 1960s. The documents of today’s campaigners attack the corporations and their greed; they talk of a new society built around new ethical principles—but they do not talk about a different mode of production.

Ideology Then and Now

Summarizing ideological tendencies for truly mass movements is always hazardous. Students for a Democratic Society, the largest “radical” organization of the Sixties had a tremendous variety of ideological outlooks within it: populist liberals, anarchists, social democrats, Trotskyites, communists, radical Christians, and maybe a few Martians.

Starting out as red and pink diaper babies asking, the New Left’s young leaders thought, for the implementation of liberal promises (civil rights) they found themselves in the midst of a life and death struggle against imperialism, and saw their hopes for a war on poverty ground up in the dust of the war effort. They became more radical in that the vision, given their socialist and communist homes, did not change so much as became more imminent. Making a revolu-
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Here is an opening paragraph from a Mission Statement from a local “global action network.”

The people of WoGAN are feminist, partner preference supportive, anti-imperialist, anti-classist, anti-capitalist, anti-racist as well as being respectful toward all forms of life, all religions and the diversity of human experience. We believe that all should have equal access and equal voice in the global community. We view direct action as a viable method of decentralizing control and establishing autonomy. (Wogan 2002: #438)

At first glance I thought that this new movement was therefore—as radical, labor oriented, and non-socialist—the first authentically post-socialist left movement in American and even, given its equivalents abroad, world history. After all, move-
ments built around community or race or gender demands do not test whether the
domination of the new economy is socialist or not. If radicals without a socialist
vision led a movement for economic justice, that really would signal a shift in the paradigm of the left. As usual reality is more subtle.

The vast majority of the USAS activists I interviewed in the late Nineties said, then, in some personal way, that they were socialists or sympathetic to social-
ist vision. They did not however think that they could communicate this vision successfully to their peers or to other Americans; and their view of what social justice means is so local, so close to identity politics, the traditional meanings of socialism do not excite their consciousness. If Sixties socialists were sociology students with economic ideas, this decade’s radicals are international studies students with vegetarian anarchist culture.

Thus, the current cohort of young activists, and their political evolution, is, for better and for worse, not so different from the radicals of SDS who began their journey in 1962. Emerging from the Cold War, SDS leaders knew that mainstream Americans could not hear the word socialism. The notion of participatory democracy in the Port Huron Statement of 1962, was a way of talking about social control of the economy with an American accent.

Alliances – Relations to Labor

The biggest difference between today’s activists and those of the Sixties is the current cohort’s positive relation to the Labor Movement and to class issues. In the Sixties SDS was critical of the labor movement and invested in (residen-
tial) community issues.¹⁵ In the Nineties the new movements, though not slav-

¹⁵. This has been exaggerated in a legion of places. I do not want to distract from the main line of discussion to engage the matter in detail. Emblematic item: The Port Huron Statement was written at a Michigan AFL-CIO summer camp, use of which was obtained by a member whose mother was a UAW VP; one of three UAW VP’s
ishly devoted to it, were influenced by the reformers in the AFL-CIO, and more strategically, relate to working class issues through workers in their production roles not only or primarily in their community and consumption roles. Today’s movement began not about the dependent poor but about those whose work is exploited. This was obviously expressed in the fact that sweatshop exploitation, not welfare reform was the central founding issue of the new activists. It was made into a literally millennial vision when the Seattle 1999 demonstrations seemed to bring about a golden alliance of “Turtles” (environmentalists—symbolizing young middle class activists) and Teamsters (symbolizing diverse unionists).” This alliance with the labor movement, the most marked contrast between the old New Left and the beginning of the new New Left, was traceable to the emergence of global capitalism.

Although serious students of power rejected the notion of “Big Labor” by the 1960s, the desperate decline of the U.S. labor movement was not yet quite apparent. Many old New Left participants did not include the mass of blue-collar workers as a focus of concern or sympathy.¹⁶

By the year 2000 though, union density in the private sector was one third of what it was in the Sixties. While a radical egalitarianism united the movements of these two periods, that same egalitarianism in the context of globalized capital made the union movement more attractive to students, and it still is. Blue-collar workers, who seemed to be riding the crest of American expansion in the Sixties, have been losing materially and politically for thirty years.

The reversal of fortune of the labor movement also changed its attitudes toward community coalitions and to students in particular. As previously noted, at the peak of the AFL-CIO, John Sweeney’s “new broom” swept out much of the provincialism of the Meany/ Kirkland era. The Organizing Institute and Union whose children at one time or another were leaders of the Michigan SDS chapter. At Port Huron numerous leading figures (not including Tom Hayden) came from union homes.

¹⁶. The obvious caveat to this interpretation of the New Left is the 1968 appearance in SDS of the faction organized by the Maoist Progressive Labor Party (PL) ostensibly devoted to a “worker-student alliance.” Short-lived (many attribute SDS’ demise to PL sectarianism), the worker student alliance “line” was indistinguishable from PL’s preference for organizing among minority workers (i.e., it defined the revolutionary core of workers as black workers), and it took second place to PL’s preference for China over Vietnam in strategic discussions for the US antiwar movement. Most veterans of SDS consider PL to have been an “outside” force, rather than an expression of the “new left.”

Summer are examples. But even among middle and rank and file labor activists the years during and since the Reagan Administration changed labor movement attitudes to community partners. The development of Jobs with Justice metropolitan areas coalitions is an example: most of these welcome student allies and religious and other community linkages.¹⁷ The pressures of the last twenty years have seen a revival, in some places, of ‘social movement’ unionism. (Voss and Sherman 2000) To the extent that globalization forces the labor movement on the defensive, and impels it to seek out new allies, in community action and in politics, to that extent is globalization driving this change.

Some unions have put their money where their rhetoric is: and USAS has benefited from it. UNITE and the AFL-CIO have given major subsidies to USAS. (See Featherstone 2002)

There is another, even more profound way in which globalization has affected the young left and labor. Many of today’s young activists, while sympathetic to low wage and immigrant workers in the United States, are primarily oriented to the problems of these workers in the low wage nations that supply labor-intensive imports to the United States. They also feel responsible for—or called upon to act against—the policies the United States puts forward in the International Financial Institutions.

So there is an analytical difference in the type of internationalism in the two movements. The earlier one was anti-imperialist and its subjects of sympathy were national liberation movements. The current movement is “anti-corporate” and the subjects of sympathy are workers’ and others exploited by American corporations and their local agents around the world. Among the things these somewhat different approaches have in common, at the emotional level, has been noted by conservative critics: a tendency to attribute to the United States a substantial fraction of the world’s woes.

More recently, however, the defeat of reformers in the Teamsters (i.e., the forced ouster of the errant reformer Carey and the election victory of Jimmy Hoffa, Jr.), the Nader candidacy of 2000, and now the “war on terrorism,” have each in its particular way driven the new activists farther from the labor movement, and closer culturally, to the old New Left. So, in an entirely startling turn of the wheel, a movement that began with a very different relationship to labor,
and the labor movement, now may be headed (though it is not entirely there yet) away from the mainstream labor movement. In part this is because the young radicals are much more militant than the mainstream labor movement is in opposition to the war in Iraq 2003. Another reason for the apparent divergence is mainstream labor’s investments in (its perceived dependence on) Democratic party electoral success, in comparison to the deepening estrangement from the Democratic party among the new New leftists.

Decentralization and Organizational Structure

The continuing and dramatic attraction of a democratic vision produces among today’s campaigners a very similar organizational vision as that which animated much of SDS in the middle of the 1960s. Briefly, this vision assumes full participation by everyone, with little distinction between the responsibilities of leaders and others. It prefers consensus about decision-making, and it reserves to local groups important decision making about policy and action. The resulting forms of organization are typically networks and only imperfectly unified or representative political organizations.

Despite these careful generalizations abut similarity, there are large differences between the organizational forms adopted by the current New Left and the old one. Contrary to much “pop-soc” commentary—and important contentions at the time—SDS actually had a rather conventional representational structure. Chapters were entitled to certain numbers of votes at conventions; conventions elected representative bodies with strong interim powers between conventions. Chapters were not compelled to carry out national programs however; most local chapters, until the very factionalized last year or two, understood that participation in programs was best maximized by having high consensus on decisions. Chapters did tend to have elected officers. Meetings ranged from highly informal to highly parliamentary—depending and size and the level of internal contention.¹⁸ The preferred use of consensus decision-making was restricted to small groups and a limited period of time—roughly 1965–67.

By contrast, local groups of the new global justice movement have elaborately formalized consensus decision-making procedures; they eschew representative forms almost entirely. Jo Freeman’s famous caution about the “tyranny of structurelessness” is unknown. (Freeman 1972–73; n.d.)

In this, USAS will rediscover the old problems of such open and unformed organizations: they are vulnerable to indecision and to factional intrusion by more disciplined outsiders. By the Fall of 1999 one of the older style socialist groups (the Independent Socialist Organization—ISO) had focused on USAS as a place to do its “mass work” and in response the USAS had a bit of internal factional controversy. In 2000 and then 2001 anarchist factions had disproportionate influence on USAS national conventions. By 2002–2003 the new anti-war movement, of which USAS was but one part, was confronted with the fact that an extremely small, arguably sectarian group, the Workers World Party, had seized control of the basic demonstration-calling apparatus (the ANSWER coalition) that had sponsored the biggest antiwar marches.

Despite these perilous similarities, one very strong difference between the internal workings of USAS and SDS is the sophistication of USAS training in and understanding of group process. Perhaps as a result of the influence of a kind of seasoned feminism, USAS meetings are characterized by teaching and emulation of fairly sophisticated techniques of group discussion and leadership. Repeated observation of USAS meetings at local and regional levels demonstrated their painstaking efforts to include all participants in discussion and active care to insure that women were selected as discussion leaders or representatives and spokespersons. This is reflected substantively in USAS Code of Conduct campaigns and WRC inspections: treatment of women workers is specifically focused upon (in an industry in which the vast majority of workers are female).¹⁹

I observed one exercise in which the lead organizer from the Washington Office at that time, Eric Brakken, led a New England Regional group in a training exercise in resolving a community conflict. The problem was about community need for a playground and a nearby factory expansion. Impressive to an outside observer was the checklist of concerns (remembering that this was an undergraduate group being instructed by a person who had graduated from college six months earlier): the workers; the mothers; the children; the community need for play space and for jobs.

Observing USAS from the perspective of a campus at its periphery, in fact, one guess is that factional fights at its national center—at its annual conference, for example—has produced centrifugal force. Local groups are pretty much on their own, and the coordinating center has little authority. Thus, the decentralist logic of SDS’ cultural progression, interrupted at the end of the Sixties by (plural) sectarian Leninisms, is reproduced in the campus based global justice

¹⁸. These observations are based on widespread and long-term personal observation. See also Rothstein 1989.

¹⁹. See “Why are we concerned about women’s rights?” at the USAS “Frequently asked questions”: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~fragola/usas/faq.html.
movement. It has no real democratically empowered center; it runs locally on consensus and it identifies strongly with life-style definitions of radicalism.

**Globalization, Technology, and Organization.**

Communication and coordination always has some relative cost—in resources or labor or both. Consequently there may be economies of scale and other ways of making the work of communication and coordination more efficient, less costly. The larger the distances among those communicating or attempting to coordinate their efforts the larger, potentially, are the costs. All this is obvious and in some ways obsolete. Among the most determinative differences between the global justice movement and those of the Sixties is impact on organizational structures and cross-border thought and action of technological change.

Imagine the task of discussion and coordination among a geographically spread membership of a few thousand in the mid-1960s. The means of print dissemination entailed the use of a low cost printing process called mimeographing which in turn required painstaking typing and extraordinarily slow error correction (each typing error would require minutes to apply a fluid erasure to an inked template). If an organization did not have a machine collator, volunteers would have to put together multiple page newsletters and hand staple them. Photocopiers with automatic collating extensions were rare and expensive. Printing services were expensive and slow. The internal cost of communication was very, very high.

Word-processing, email, the Internet, cheap long distance telephony, cell phones: these actually cut down on the need for central offices and for their cost advantages. The consequence is entirely paradoxical. A group like USAS can have 150 chapters with an extremely slender central office and very few employees. The recent largest antiwar marches in US history recruited people “electronically.” On the other hand, the possibility of movements without a strong center means that highly organized, homogeneous cadre groups can have disproportionate influence at the center.

Nowhere is the conquest of space and time by electronic communication more apparent than in the global aspect of contemporary movements. Phone service is of course much less costly than a generation ago; but email has almost no marginal cost and has in addition the virtue of carrying print quality publications, posters, etc. over it. Entire campaigns and organizations depend on email distribution lists to convey immense amounts of detailed information. However much digital technology has revolutionized finance capital, its impact on social movements is also profound.

**Life-style politics**

A question for every social movement is who is in, who is out; who are one’s comrades, potential or actual, who are one’s adversaries? What categories are presumed friendly; which hostile? For example, as the old New Left crumbled in the early Seventies some women were torn by pressures from radical feminism. Within feminism were tendencies that argued that women who lived with men, in heterosexual relations—conventional or not—could not be true feminists. Some argued that women should not be in organizations with men, no less organizations dominated by men. In some circles, people in conventional marriages (heterosexual, legalized) were frowned upon. A slogan of the times “trash the nuclear family” comes to mind. Later, men who did not actively engage in child care during workday hours were seen as “evading” a responsibility. This array of distinctions and judgments was termed at the time, “life-style politics.”

Somewhat more broadly, the New Left, if not SDS per se, participated in what became known as the “counterculture.” The referent is to a range of symbolic and relational practices that evinced estrangement from bourgeois, profit-seeking culture and practice and also to aspects of the culture taken, however mistakenly, to be props of it. Sometimes included were rational analysis, scientific method, and positivism (i.e., empirical investigation in aid of hypothesis testing). Almost always included were the forms of etiquette and manners taken as conventional—in dress, grooming or speech. And of course, there was the symbolic role of drug use as a defining aspect of subculture membership.

Taken as a complex whole, the relation of the counter culture to the political movement of the late Sixties and early Seventies had a paradoxical element. On the one hand, it is probable that without the ebullience of the counter culture the more focused political movement of young adults would have been much smaller. On the other hand, the estrangement of the counter culture, and the life style politics reflected inside the political movement, were separated from all subcultures and classes—not just “bourgeois” culture. It created a cultural ghetto within which political radicalism could flourish but beyond which it could not grow. If hostility to the nuclear family and contempt for the coping strategies of working class families characterize a social movement, it is unlikely to make inroads to any class no less the working class.

SDS itself was complexly divided over the counter culture. On one hand it had a relatively “straight” atmosphere, so much so that figures like Abbie Hoffman and the notorious San Francisco Diggers had contempt for the “bores” in SDS.²⁰

²⁰ In 1966 the Diggers and Hoffman came to an SDS conference. The Diggers, an anarchist group of street organizers in San Francisco’s notorious Haight –
Much of its older leadership was repelled by the hedonism of the drug culture, and predicted its commercial cooptation. Thoroughly rooted in its constituency of young adults however, SDS was gradually permeated by all aspects of the counter culture—language, dress and yes, marijuana.²¹ It was not possible to be entirely credible and effective as a young adult organizer from 1968 through the early 1970s without some of the trappings of the counter culture.

By comparison, today’s young activists evince continuity with the cultural frontiers of the Sixties New Left, with some differences. There is a high level of gender consciousness and great care is taken to insure gender equity. This is part of broadly conceived identity consciousness in which inherited characteristics—race, ethnicity, gender—ascribed attributes, are taken to be political building blocks. USAS, for example, has four organized “official” caucuses: Working Class Caucus; People of Color Caucus; Women and Gender Caucus; Queer Caucus.

Among the more obvious developments, pressed but not yet fully explicit in the Sixties, is the acute consciousness of sexual orientation in today’s movement. Thus the litany of affirmations from the Worcester Global Action Network:

The people of WoGAN are feminist, partner preference supportive, anti-imperialist, anti-classist, anti-capitalist, anti-racist as well as being respectful toward all forms of life, all religions and the diversity of human experience.

USAS’ Principles of Unity include the following:

2. We struggle against racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, and other forms of oppression within our society, within our organizations, and within ourselves. Not only are we collectively confronting these prejudices as inherent defects of the global economy which creates sweatshops, but we also recognize the need for individuals to confront the prejudices they have internalized as the result of living and learning in a flawed and oppressive society. (USAS 2003)

Drug taking does not appear to be as central to identity and to cultural participation as it was earlier.²² On the other hand, vegetarianism has a strong and osten-

²¹. When the present author went to work as the founding staff member for a post-SDS graduate student and faculty new left group, the New University Conference, in 1968, he grew a beard; people were suspicious of him as he traveled clean shaven.

²². I assert this with some caution. For the earlier period I am a witness participant; in this one I am separated by 35-40 years from the actors. I may know less than I think.
“If I was an Afghan refugee in Kila Abdullah, I would have done just what they did. I would have attacked Robert Fisk. Or any other Westerner I could find.” (Fisk 2001; emphasis added)

Fisk's testimony of cultural self-hatred was widely circulated on movement list serves immediately upon its publication in Britain, and was quoted favorably in the leftist magazine, The Nation. The notion that the September 11 attacks were in some sense “just deserts” suggests an estrangement deeper than the pragmatic proposition that a “war on terrorism” is apt to be both eternal and ineffective.

The new face of antiwar activism tends to nudge the new New Left towards formulations of the older dialectic: Imperial America vs. dominated nationalities or cultures.²³

In the early months of 2003 yet another dimension of this complex cultural and political relationship emerged. As the Bush and Blair governments moved toward war with Iraq the largest demonstrations in British and American history protested against them. In this period the AFL-CIO joined the British Trades Union Congress, not in war fever, but in a pointed note of caution. John Sweeney and his British counterpart John Monks wrote in a joint letter to their respective heads of government:

…the goal of our policy now should be to take every possible step to achieve the legitimate ends of disarming Iraq without recourse to war, and to win the fullest support of our friends and allies before the path of war is chosen as a last resort.

As we write to you today, we do not believe that this first path has come to an end, and urge you to continue to pressure all concerned to find a resolution to this situation that preserves peace and security for our countries and across the world. (Monks and Sweeney 2003)

In the meantime, USAS, even as its activists organized (or attempted) civilly disobedient actions on New York City streets during the anti war February 15, 2003 demonstrations, continued its close relationship to the AFL-CIO, announcing summer internships and organizing workshops with it.

By February 27th the AFL-CIO Executive Committee spoke against the US as “lone enforcer,” complaining “The president has not fulfilled his responsibility to make a compelling and coherent explanation to the American people and the world about the need for military action against Iraq at this time.” (AFL-CIO 2003)

²³. At a conference on Critical Globalization Studies at the University of Californian at Santa Barbara, in May, 2003, eminent scholars and intellectuals, Tariq Ali and David Harvey argued that globalization, in the current conjuncture, means imperialism.

USAS’ opposition to the war in Iraq did not drive a wedge between it and the labor movement—in part because the labor movement had such a large component of antiwar sentiment itself. Besides the openly cool attitude evinced by Sweeney, dozens of union locals, metropolitan federations of the AFL-CIO, and a few large national unions openly opposed the war.²⁴

PARADOX

In the Fall of 1999 I asked activists at Brown University why they seemed to emphasize the plight of sweatshop workers in other countries to the exclusion (in rhetoric) of domestic sweatshop workers. The answer was that “It's more hard core” to advocate for workers in a developing country.²⁵ This raises a matter of some challenge to the current cohort of activists: are they willing or able to encounter working people as political peers?

Student activists of this cohort seem quite willing to travel to and advocate for working people in Indonesia or Mexico. The “founding” campaign of USAS was a UNITE sponsored tour of workers from a Dominican cap factory. Examples of community involvement in North America are fewer—but far from absent. The Harvard sit-in for a Living Wage for Harvard University employees in Spring 2001 is a notable example, and USAS supported a union campaign at a Derby, New York hat factory. The current group of activists has supported other living wage campaigns, as well. Nevertheless, despite these domestic examples, the new young activists do not dive into local community action in alliance with workers with the same verve with which they advocate for workers at a global level. Their examples of sweatshops in the apparel industry are highly concentrated in developing countries. While they do mention sweatshop examples from the Los Angeles and New York apparel industries on their website (USAS n.d.) their most intense campaigns in the last few years have been about Mexican, Dominican and Indonesian factories.

USAS members communicate through email listserves and conference calls. Among the standing interest-based listserves are: international solidarity; labor (i.e., building relations to labor in the US); and campus community coalitions. In 2003 (Jan 1–July 22) the message volume on these listserves was as follows:

²⁴. For a list of union bodies that passed resolutions see U.S. Labor Against the War: http://www.uslaboragainstwar.org/resolutions.php

²⁵. Translation: hard core—apparently derived from hiphop and ska slang, now meaning more committed, more worthy of one’s effort, tougher, i.e., stronger (more macho?) and braver, more fashionable.
is this relative interest because privileged college students prefer to advocate for those to whom they can be moral and social superiors, figures of charity or beneficence? This would imply a colonial or patriarchal model of social reform. Alternatively, when considering broader examples of class issues in the US young people from the middle class may fear derision or hostility from white workers who are their ascribed status equals, but their class antagonists. I do not think that this implied paternalism or fear applies to the motivations of most of today’s activists—though it is a provocative possibility.

Instead, it may be that the current student movement, like all of us, is influenced by media definitions of issues. Newspapers and magazines tend to define the sweatshop issues as external or immigrant, and these students are ultimately sensitive to media frames. My research shows that the media see the sweatshop issue as either an immigrant or external issue about 40% of the time. (Ross forthcoming, Chapter 10)

Thus, a major difference between the student anti-sweatshop movement of the 90s and the student movement of the 60s is that in the Sixties leading cadres of the antiwar activists placed their challenge to the war economy in a context, for example, of defending a war on poverty. Carl Wittman and Tom Hayden wrote, in a 1964 pamphlet, An interracial movement of the poor?, that an effective movement of poor people making demands on the federal budget would compete with the military industrial complex for resources. They were right—and the war on poverty lost. Nevertheless, their strategic insight was to address the problem of the runaway war machine by pumping demand for domestic spending.

Today’s students know workers in the U.S. have deep problems. But they rarely discuss the connection between the poverty of workers in San Salvador and poverty in LA.

**TWO THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS**

In the course of the Sixties the national administration of Kennedy and then Johnson turned from one that could be called reform oriented to an administration besieged by its war on Vietnam and racial conflict at home. Only three years after Nixon was inaugurated the New Left was largely dispersed. What was left of the old movements turned to community organizing and union organizing, and on campuses much of it soured to a Higher Irrelevance. Then after only episodic upsurge (the campaign against cruise missile deployment - the “nuclear freeze” movement of the early 1980s and the antiapartheid divestment campaigns of the early mid-Eighties) there has been sustained social movement activity among young adults since the mid 1990s—launched during a Democratic Presidency. I note too that the nuclear freeze began during a Democratic Presidency (Carter’s) as well.

Recent social movement theory has developed a variant that appears to explain these timings. In formal theory it is called the political process model of social movement formation. The general idea is movements form when the following ingredients are present: resources that can be used in mobilization; social psychological conditions that allow participants to conceive of alternatives to their present condition; and crucially for our present purposes, political opportunities. In this instance the category “opportunity” corresponds to the informal lore that Sixties veterans mused about in their personal reflections and conversations during the Eighties: liberal Administrations make radical movements; conservative administrations make liberal electoral opponents.

Today’s global justice movement traces its origins to the reformist opening of the Clinton Administration: the analogy is the antiwar movement whose momentum carried it past Johnson to the Nixon years. The specific “opportunity” was the unprecedented attention the Clinton Administration paid to the sweatshop problem under Secretary of Labor Robert Reich.²⁶ That the Clinton Administration was less “liberal” than the earlier Democrats is relevant to this proposition: it creates a rhetoric of reform but in fact disappoints the nascent activists.

This formulation is also consistent with an old, now somewhat discredited view of social movements having an origin in “rising expectations.” In turn, this depends on a social psychology of “relative deprivation.” In the newer framework movements arise when political conjunctures create structures of opportunity. The liberal Kennedy/Johnson moment creates, for example, a rhetoric of rights and a discourse about poverty that allows radicals to voice their concerns within an officially legitimatised framework. The government includes figures who are sympathetic to them and offers large and small resources to some. Common opponents, weakened by the reform surge are less able to harm those farther left.

This opportunity model, or even the “expectation” model, may explain timing; but it does not explain form. Why have college age young adults recreated such similar patterns of dissent 35 years apart? And what accounts for their differences?

In brief: the similarities are found in the characteristics of capitalism and its relationship to educated labor—characteristics that have not changed in the last

²⁶. For a critique of the Clinton/Reich strategy on sweatshops see “Firing Guard Dogs and Hiring Foxes” Chapter Seven in Ross (forthcoming).
generation; the differences are found in the emergence of global capitalism.
Advanced Capitalism is not able consistently or completely to motivate endless consumption. It produces amongst some —often the most accomplished in absorbing its values of civilization—a sense of moral emptiness and a need for the recreation of human community. This hypothesis does not depend directly on a globalization dynamic, but rather the interactions between the culture of consumption and the cultures of training (education) and production. Globalization does allow more acute contrasts between the styles of consumption in the rich countries and the deprivation of the poor. The sense of arbitrary good fortune haunts the imagination of the affluent and near affluent. The Sixties folk troubadour Phil Ochs expressed this for his generation, but unbeknownst to the global justice movement it haunts them too. Here is how Ochs put it:

Show me a prison, show me a jail,
Show me a prisoner whose face has gone pale
And I’ll show you a young man with so many reasons why
And there but for fortune, may go you or I

The protest movement of contemporary young adults—as well as those of the Sixties—is related to their likely occupational destinations: as functionaries in large organizations in which their own contributions will be as cogs in larger machines. They crave more personal sense of contact, impact and morality. This accounts for their cohorts’ entrepreneurial efforts and their radical political responses to issues of their day.

To the extent however that today’s activists are much more highly connected to issues of work and labor and understand the centrality of union rights to human rights, the difference from their earlier cohort lies in the ways in which globalization has stripped the labor movement of its strength. In the period that USAS and the global justice movement grew unemployment was coursing downwards; but working class incomes were too. The centrality of work, working conditions and globalization is unavoidable to those concerned with poverty.

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