BOOK REVIEWS


As peripheral states emerged from dictatorships and began to democratize in the neoliberal era, explicitly indigenous organizations and movements began to assert civil and legal rights as citizens. These indigenous movements were not new developments but received renewed attention in a post-dictatorship political atmosphere. The florescence of literature on indigenous politics and social movements that has arisen since the 1970s reflects an intellectual landscape which has broadened to recognize the interrelational characteristics of structurally divided societal groups, including those labeled indigenous. No longer relegated to the background in the intellectual and political fields, indigenous peoples are asserting a right to inclusion in the modern world. As an indigenous intellectual, Emilio del Valle Escalante’s presence in academia as a movement scholar and activist challenges modernity’s rigid hold on knowledge production.

Little has been written explicitly on the Guatemalan Maya movement (with the notable exception of Kay Warren’s Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 1998 Princeton). Emilio del Valle Escalante’s Maya Nationalisms and Postcolonial Challenges in Guatemala seeks to close this gap in the literature by articulating the unique intellectual character of the Guatemalan Maya movement. Del Valle Escalante does this through a literary analysis of the historical development of knowledge surrounding indigeneity, which at times is undeveloped, and the ways the Maya movement challenges dominant constructions of indigeneity. Using Anibal Quijano’s theory on the coloniality of power, del Valle Escalante provides a textual analysis of several prominent indigenismo intellectuals of Guatemala, both Maya and non-Mayan, to highlight the way indigenous peoples struggle to alter hegemonic discourse and at times fall prey to it.

The Maya movement in Guatemala is principally an intellectual endeavor, engaged in primarily by journalists and academics that have obtained the social status to disseminate information widely. Writing forms the foundation from which the culturally dominant power in society disseminates information on the native. In turn, the Maya movement appropriates this knowledge in order to reconceptualize discourse on native peoples. Del Valle Escalante recognizes the challenges indigenous intellectuals face in gaining the ability to participate in the mass media and as such highlights the importance of how contemporary capitalism influences the political perspectives of individual authors in the movement.

The main questions the book addresses are what kind of nation is being (re)constructed in the challenges posed by the Maya movement and what kind of interethnic relationships does the Maya movement propose for Guatemalan society. Through these questions del Valle Escalante attempts to articulate a conceptualization of indigeneity that considers the indigenous as fully modern peoples whose locus of articulation is on “the other” side of the colonial divide. The Maya movement seeks intercultural exchange of knowledge on equal terms. Del Valle Escalante argues that through the development of a subaltern epistemology and knowledge exchange a more just and democratic society can evolve.

Part Two of Maya Nationalisms discusses attempts by the state to institute a project of interculturality and the reproduction of coloniality in the specific case of intercultural education.
Analyzing various authors that contribute to the debate surrounding interculturality, del Valle Escalante, a Maya K’iche intellectual, critically engages with other indigenous intellectuals arguing that the intercultural project is merely a recycling of the coloniality of power. While remaining within the text’s stated objectives, del Valle Escalante leaves the reader desiring a deeper analysis of how the coloniality of power pertains to the situation of the Maya movement beyond the discursive level. However, this only comes out in the conclusion. Confronting capitalist tensions and the coloniality of power, del Valle Escalante argues “the Maya movement should articulate a critical perspective that organically ties its situation to the historical processes that have produced the conditions of inequality we have been confronted with historically” (p. 158), which is consistent with the structure of this brief text.

This text highlights the ways indigenous intellectuals are engaging in the discursive transformation of Guatemalan society through the Maya movement. Through a critical analysis of literary texts, del Valle Escalante contributes to the reappropriation of Maya history by Maya peoples. Challenging the coloniality of power and those indigenous intellectuals whose imaginations conform to the patterns of knowledge of the dominators, del Valle Escalante offers the Maya movement a framework for decolonizing knowledge through historical analysis on the origins of inequality.

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Contemporary Shanghai is an amazing place! It is a mixture of old and new, Chinese traditions and cosmopolitan consumption, the staid architecture of the Bund and the post-modern skyline of Pudong. A dynamic fast-growing city, Shanghai was home to more than 23 million people, according to the 2010 census, making it one of the world’s most populated urban areas. But the city is also undergoing an incredible building boom, with skyscraping glass towers and multilane highways sprouting up everywhere, and seemingly endless economic dynamism, attracting twice as much foreign direct investment as all of India in recent years. In his introductory essay, Xiangming Chen provides an apt appraisal: quoting a US-based architect who does planning work in Shanghai, he observes that the city is undergoing “the greatest transformation of a piece of earth in history. It’s mind-boggling.”

Editor Chen tells us in his preface that this book is designed to place this transformation in comparative perspective and assess Shanghai as an emerging “global city.” Saskia Sassen’s first chapter lays out her global city model schematically and provides some evidence that the erstwhile “Paris of the East” is, once again, assuming “command and control” functions in terms of the spectacular growth of its increasing centrality in world transportation and telematic grids. For me, a comparative urban political economy scholar, an entire volume that really did focus on “Shanghai as a global city”—and systematically addressed the conceptual issues Sassen presents—would have been excellent. But that’s not exactly what this book provides. Instead, we
get some of that but also parts that are a bit broader and vaguer and not quite so theoretically concise: the volume subtitle about a “global megacity” mixes conceptual categories, and both the introduction and the conclusion describe Shanghai as a “global(izing) city.” This slight blurring of the central focus may be necessary as the book is actually a product of multiple conferences, beginning with one in Shanghai in 2002. (Indeed, as a scholar who has also organized “themed” conferences and edited the volumes that resulted, I know how difficult it is to attract both top-notch, interesting, engaged scholars and try to focus their attention on common issues.) The editor has managed to attract a diverse array of intellectual talent for this volume: in addition to Sassen, he has included Ann Markusen (a prominent regional and urban planning scholar), Jack Kasarda (a former high profile urban sociologist now a business professor—and my MA advisor many years ago!), several world-renown scholars of Asian and Chinese urbanization and development (including Stephen Chui, Tai-Lok Lui, Fulong Wu), and some rising young stars in this area. Chen did a fine job to keep this entire “cast” on board, and the result is a very valuable compilation of research on “rising Shanghai.” With frequent cross-references to each other, the chapters combine to create a coherent book that is more than just a collection of disparate essays.

The first half of the volume examines Shanghai in comparative perspective. After Sassen’s exposition of the global city perspective, Markusen and Pingkang Yu’s essay explicitly tries to draw lessons from the US urban experience. Their interest is in the “high-tech metropolis,” and they see the growth of highly innovative, knowledge-intensive jobs as key to urban and regional economic growth and resiliency. In this tightly argued but also data-laden paper they maintain that Boston, Chicago, and Washington, DC rank high in this type of growth, which serves their regional economies well. These cities avoid the over reliance on manufacturing characteristic of “rust belt” U.S. cities of the mid-20th century, but also do not fall into the “trap” of overspecialization in business and financial services—which makes New York City “vulnerable to cyclical swings and structural changes.” The authors argue that Shanghai ought to similarly promote diversified high-tech occupations and industries and explicitly warn against following New York’s excessive reliance on “financial and management services.” Implicitly, Markusen and Yu recommend that Shanghai avoid the kind of “command and control” specialization that one expects in a top global city.

Next, Kasarda’s very accessible, if not too scholarly, essay focuses on the key role of “speedy delivery” of products in today’s world of e-commerce. Kasarda sees airport development as important for Shanghai, and he discusses “aerotropolis” (his term)—the idea of building airports for regional development, an interesting concept that is certainly relevant to Shanghai and other major East Asian cities. But the “build it and they will come” optimism may be misplaced, especially if too many cities in the region try it simultaneously. And the simple reality today is that China’s huge volume of low-value exports to the United States (the Wal-Mart “stuff”) still travel by containerized ships—so, in fact, the recent development of Shanghai’s massive Yangsan deep water port (the busiest container port in the world in 2010) may be more critical than the new airport at Pudong.

The final two essays in this section return to Sassen’s “global city” framework, comparing Shanghai to two other East Asian contenders. K. C. Ho’s view from Singapore stresses the policy and planning issues inherent in that city’s rise and struggle to maintain competitiveness in the global economy, with a nod to the key role of the local “developmental state.” In the final chapter, Lui and Chiu offers a précis of their book, Hong Kong: Becoming a Chinese Global City (Routledge, 2009). In this chapter-length version, they stress Hong Kong’s long-term historical role as the gateway to China and the preeminent financial center for the
They also note the changes as the former crown colony becomes increasingly integrated into the People’s Republic and its political and economic systems (which themselves are, of course, simultaneously becoming more and more embedded into global capitalism). One aspect of this is the emergence of Shanghai as a potential rival, which has redoubled Hong Kong’s efforts to enhance its local connectivity in the Pearl River Delta and to the mainland. This is a very interesting theoretically-informed chapter (but much more about Hong Kong than Shanghai).

The second half of the book is all about Shanghai and attempts to focus on how global and local changes are linked. Wu’s opening essay on the state and local governance in Shanghai is probably the strongest in the volume. For anyone really interested in the growth dynamics behind the amazing transformation that is unfolding on the ground in the city, this chapter provides a lot of information, once again richly contextualized in the global city framework (and the debates about it). In recent decades Shanghai has been a magnet for western investment with explicit policies designed to move the city from manufacturing to a service-oriented economy. Although Wu does not think Shanghai has achieved global city status yet, his key insight is that a process of global city formation is underway that incorporates both national and local state governance. Here we are seeing seemingly paradoxical processes like the “state-led marketization of urban development” or the “re-engineering [of] entrepreneurial local governance” as key to the land development, infrastructure upgrading, and investment promotion designed to “remake” Shanghai as a global city. Complicated—but fascinating—processes!

The remaining essays focus on specific aspects of the changes sweeping Shanghai and their links to wider global dynamics. These essays, based on solid empirical research and a plethora of data, tend to be more descriptive than theoretical. Perhaps because of my own interest in urban ecology, Tingwei Zhang’s chapter on the spatial differentiation and restructuring of the city’s various urban districts was most interesting; the author documents rather dramatic population and land use changes in three different Shanghai districts and does a nice job of linking those to local factors like the particular political dynamics of the “growth coalition” and the history of each area. Other chapters describe telecommunications and information infrastructure and access in Shanghai (Zhenhua Zhou and Chen), community organization and cohesion (Hanlong Lu, Yuan Ren and Chen), and increased consumption of “fast food and brand clothes in Shanghai,” particularly among younger people (Jiaming Sun and Chen).

The editor and Anthony Orum (a prominent urban sociologist and founding editor of the journal City & Community) cap the volume with a conclusion that attempts to draw the lessons from these studies of Shanghai. Interestingly (but probably wisely) they highlight some areas that might have been slightly underplayed in the earlier essays: the key role of history in urban development, the complex way that states (at various “levels”—local, regional, national) are crucial to city-building, the key role of an urban area’s relationship to its tributary region (in this case the vast Yangtze River Delta), etc. All in all, this thoughtful essay is a fine way to close this excellent and extremely well organized volume. Understanding the process of global city formation in Shanghai and other burgeoning Chinese metropolises is a big challenge for urban sociology and global political economy – this book is forward progress.

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India is an interesting case for students of comparative politics: not only does it have a vibrant, more or less peaceful, democratic tradition in the context of significant religious and linguistic diversity, it also disproves the axiom that democracy is a luxury for rich countries. Authors Stepan, Linz, and Yadva develop the concept of the state-nation in an attempt to understand the peculiarities of Indian society and politics and shed some light on what types of democratic politics might be possible.

The authors open by arguing that, “state-nation policies stand for a political-institutional approach that respects and protects multiple but complementary sociocultural identities. State-nation policies recognize the legitimate public and even political expression of active sociocultural cleavages, and they include mechanisms to accommodate competing and conflicting claims made on behalf of those division without imposing or privileging, in a discriminatory way, any one claim” (p 4, emphasis in original). State-nations fall in a middle range of intensity of political activity by groups claiming to be ‘nations’; where intensity is low or confined to one group we see nation-states, and where intensity is too high democratic practice within a single state is not possible. If France and Japan typify what happens when one nation finds one state, the break up of the Former Yugoslavia typifies what happens when there are too many nations within one state. State-nations, like India, are able to balance the demands of different would-be nations within one democratic state.

The implementation of state-nation policies arise from an “unusual, almost counterintuitive” (p 17) set of elements that cohere into a policy “grammar” that facilitates the emergence and persistence of a state-nation policies. Briefly, the key elements of this grammar are: an “asymmetric” federalism in which sub-units have substantial, but not necessarily uniform, prerogatives; a parliamentary system that does not center political processes on an “indivisible” presidency; polity-wide and regional political parties that can channel the political energy of diverse cultural groups toward the center and, at the same time, allow for regional politics (both being alternatives to secessionist activity); and, politically integrated groups that, while not culturally homogenous, express identities that compliment, instead of conflict with, each other.

The second chapter presents evidence that four sets of individual political attitudes and beliefs the authors argue are part of the ideal type of state-nation are present in India. First, citizens of state-nations should show a high degree of positive identification with the state and pride in being citizens. Second, the authors expect that the citizens of state-nations would have multiple but complimentary political identities. Third, there should be a comparatively high degree of support for democracy in state-nations. Lastly, where state-nation policies succeed, there should be a high degree of institutional trust.

Here, and in the other chapters dealing with South Asia, the authors present data from large, representative, surveys (some of which the authors were involved in designing). For example, with regards to their first characteristic of state-nation above, upwards of 80% of Indians claim to be “proud” or “very proud” to be Indian and very few claim no pride at all. They present data on the complementariness of identities like India and Muslim as well as data on trust in institutions and democracy. Further, they are able to split the data to show that patterns are
remarkably similar across religious or linguistic groups. (On this last point they find another peculiarity of India: voting is negatively correlated with income and education, in contrast to most other democracies where lower status groups tend to be disenfranchised.) Their use of these survey findings convincingly grounds what would otherwise be a somewhat abstract ideal type in the patterns of opinions and perceptions of individuals.

The third chapter reviews several events—demands for a Sikh state, unrest in the North East, and tensions in Kashmir—that might undermine the authors’ claims that India’s state-nation policies are effective. They find, however, that where the policies could be successfully implemented, sectarian violence was diffused and, conversely, the places where violence has persisted were places were such policies could not be effectively implemented.

The fourth and fifth chapters are given over to an analysis of something of a natural experiment in the significant Tamil population split between south Indian and Sri Lanka when those states were created. Tamils in south India, initially harboring secessionist tendencies, were successfully and peacefully drawn into India’s political system because state-nation policies allowed Tamil leaders to take part in politics at the center and, at the same time, diffused demands for an independent Tamil homeland by allowing for the protection of their language and culture within the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the Hindu Tamil minority and the majority Buddhist Sinhalese were involved in a bloody civil war within decades of independence, despite having lived peacefully together for hundreds of years prior to that. Sri Lankan politicians mobilized support from Buddhists Sinhalese-speakers to pursue policies designed to create a linguistically and cultural homogenous nation-state. The Tamils, now feeling that their culture was under attack and that avenues to political redress were closed, turned to increasingly bloody guerilla warfare tactics. In both chapters data from recent social surveys are again used to good effect in supporting the argument.

The authors then take their analysis of the state-nation beyond South Asia to Ukraine where they argue that much of Ukraine’s success in remaining unified, peaceful, and in the process of becoming the most democratic of the former Soviet Republics centered on the implementation of state-nation (as opposed to nation-state) policies, particularly with regards to language. At the same time, Ukraine does lack some elements of the state-nation grammar: an irredentist Russia has made pursuing any federal devolution of power unwise and Ukraine’s strong presidential system means that Ukrainian democracy lacks a strong parliamentary tradition.

The last two chapters sat oddly with the rest of the book for this reader. In the penultimate chapter the authors develop a new ideal type of a federacy, or an administrative sub-unit of an otherwise unitary state that enjoy extensive autonomy. They take a handful of examples of federacies—Greenland with Denmark and the Aland Island with Finland as just two—as well as address places where federacy-like policies have been pursued. They then speculate on why federacies have worked where they have and where else they might. In the final chapters the authors examine the nature of U.S. federalism, with some comparison to the handful of other developed, democratic federal states. Their major conclusion is that the U.S. would be a less than ideal model of democratic politics in many multi-national states: mal-apportioned representation in a comparatively powerful upper house and the indivisibility of a powerful president lead to high representative inequality and difficulty in amending the constitution.

In both of these chapters, it is clear that the authors are trying to develop alternative models to the nation-state to fill out the conceptual space in which they place the state-nation.
There is, however, no substantive discussion of how these concepts relate to each other. In what seems to be another shortcoming, the authors turn to analysis of legal documents to support their arguments with regards to federacy and US federalism, and away from the survey research methods that served them well in other chapters. (Their attempt to link high levels of economic inequality in the U.S. to shortcomings in the U.S. federal model in just a few pages was particularly unconvincing.)

Returning to the stronger first portion of this book, the authors do introduce an interesting problem in Indian democracy, suggest a new way to think about it and cite survey research that does convincingly ground an ideal type in observed reality. Even here, however, there are two problems.

First, the historical development of state-nation policies in India is only dealt with in a very limited way. While it is not discussed, one suspects that at least part of the genesis of state-nation policies may lie in the history of British colonization, which linked a number of princely states into a single political framework that asked little more than that taxes were paid. Certainly the British did not create modern India from whole cloth, and the struggle to rid the subcontinent of the British united India. While it is always possible to find something that a book left out, a more sustained focus on Indian history and the emergence of an independent, democratic state would give better analytic depth to the concept of state-nation.

Second, as for the breath of the state-nation, it is not clear how well the concept travels outside of India. While comparisons are made to other state-nations, the authors’ one extended case study, Ukraine, lacks some elements of the state-nation ideal type and is less convincing than the analysis of India. The remaining chapters introduce new concepts but do little to link them back to the state-nation. The concept of state-nation is an interesting way to think of modern India that may, or may not, have wider relevance.

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It is important to note that I am a long-time colleague and some-time collaborator with the editors of this collection, I edited the chapter from Frank’s unpublished manuscript for inclusion in this volume, I am especially thanked (by Frank) for my input in one of the chapters presented, and I provided a very positive blurb for the back cover. I stand by my suggestion on the back cover that this is a well-organized collection of the work of Andre Gunder Frank that will have enduring value. That said, there are both strengths and weaknesses in the present volume that should be considered, and as someone ‘close to the action’ I am perhaps well-placed to discuss them. Readers are free to be skeptical. I fear I am also compensating a bit by being tougher on my colleagues regarding editorial choices than I might otherwise be. The reader is duly warned about that as well. I want to make it clear that this is a fine collection that is being offered in an era when collections, if not ‘books’ of all sorts, are on the wane. As such, Chew and Lauderdale
as volume editors, and William Thompson as series editor, have done a true service by bringing this work to the public when the arguments presented are most relevant, but when its format is out of favor and under (what were quite likely) draconian production constraints.

The volume brings together some of the work of Andre Gunder Frank, a particularly prolific scholar who raised interesting and difficult questions across a half-century long career, and always refused to accept simple answers. It is surprising that his work did not appear in an ‘essential’ collection or comprehensive set of volumes. There are several thematic collections that Frank himself put together over the years, but nothing that contains the core of his work on world system history. In that sense the editors provide a critical resource by placing some of Frank’s earliest works on dependency theory and his penultimate works on global history into a context that helps make sense of both.

Both underdevelopment and global trajectories are of continuing importance. Underdevelopment has not disappeared. If anything it has gotten worse. We simply hide it with new terms like ‘failed state’. The prevailing ideology that underdevelopment is the result of bad policy, bad people, or both, is wearing thin. Frank never had time for either excuse. If we are going to face the problems of the coming age we must look at global inequality in non-trivial ways. Frank does so.

The challenges do not end here. Great powers rise and fall, and these can be traumatic events for all concerned. It is not that periods of hegemony are better than periods of rivalry, or vice versa. Periods of hegemony are characterized by order and stability (if you are favorably impacted) or by stultification and inertia (if you are not). Periods of rivalry are characterized by a flowering of new ideas and movements (if you are favorably impacted) or by chaos and disorder (if you are not). Either way, when great powers rise or decline the impact is global, not just local. We remain locked in a fierce debate as to why some powers rise or decline hundreds of years after the fact. Without such knowledge we are in poor shape to face the next round of change, which is likely to be fast upon us. Neither the declining core nor the rising powers are going to have a solid sense of what has led to their current situations or how others have coped, for better or worse, in their place. What a poor commentary on the ability of humans to be effectively self-aware. This is something Frank sought to remedy.

The first of three parts of this volume are introduced in a particularly short and cogent statement of only five pages, followed by iconic essays on the development of underdevelopment from 1966 and 1967. With little ado the national state model of underdevelopment is dispatched, as is the ideology that gave rise to it. “Underdevelopment” is not an original form, a function of traditionalism, nor did it ever exist in the core. It is an outcome of unequal relationships with core areas designed to advantage those areas at the cost of the periphery. The real question is one of how this dynamic proceeds, and Frank offers several mechanisms both in these works, and more importantly in the more complete and careful regional analyses that they are built upon. In re-reading the volume I was taken with the crisp and clear exposition of Frank’s attack on modernization theory. It is a model not just of what was ‘wrong’ with our vision of underdevelopment, but of how to assess it: with hard evidence; with trenchant analysis; and head on. Frank’s 1967 essay ‘The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology’ does an especially fine job of taking to task those that need to be taken to task, and teaching, by example, what kinds of errors to avoid. Readers who are unfamiliar with these works would do well to review these two chapters.

The second part of the volume is also introduced in a scant four pages that cover as much of the relevant contextual ground as can be considered in so brief a commentary. Here we skip
from the 1960s to work that appeared in 1991 and 2002. The essays are again well-chosen. ‘Transitional Ideological Modes’ draws an ideological line in the sand and challenges us to abandon abstractions and study really existing human history. It is perhaps the most ideologically controversial of Frank’s works. Here is an explicit argument for abandoning the better part of the western canon. In an earlier essay I argued that Frank was not attacking just one or two sacred cows, but the entire sacred herd. There were no modes of production as such, certainly not at the global level. And Frank further dismisses the search for key periods and epochal changes with the suggestion that ‘a transition is a transition from a transition to a transition.’ Robert Brenner once characterized Frank’s work on underdevelopment as ‘neo-Smithian’. Frank’s counter-attack is that standard ideological categories are simply an ideological charade. Another 1991 publication, ‘A Plea for World System History,’ is designed to challenge students of history to consider the evidence and the implications for a very different kind of social analysis. Twenty pointed questions (and preferred answers) are offered. This is a piece worth serious consideration.

I wonder why these two works are separated by the decade-later co-authored ‘Structural Theory of the 5,000-Year World System’. The ‘Structural Theory’, along with ‘The 5,000-Year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction’ that appears in Part III, form the core of the intellectual agenda that Frank, with Barry Gills, offered over a very fruitful decade-long collaboration. ‘Structural Theory’ introduces a world system (sans hyphen) that emerged long before 1500 and should be studied more for its continuity than in search of any alleged epochal changes. Capital accumulation is its motive force, and the core-periphery structure, the hegemony-rivalry cycle, and both long and short economic cycles make it tick. This perspective is contrasted with those of other important scholars. In the ‘Interdisciplinary Introduction’ the same model is introduced, but there is more of an emphasis on escaping Eurocentrism, and in an impressive show of intellectual breadth the implications of such a perspective are reviewed for over one dozen disciplines and sub-disciplines.

Chew and Lauderdale introduce Part III with the suggestion that it will be made up of essays that focus more on the politics and economics of world system history. I do not understand their argument. Frank’s work is explicitly political and economic, even when aimed at historians as some of the essays in Part II appear to be. Frank was always cognizant of the political nature of his arguments, along with their political implications. Regarding economics, capital accumulation is identified as the motive force of world system history. Nothing moves, and certainly nothing is correctly analyzed, without it. ‘Structural Theory’ and ‘Interdisciplinary Introduction’ belong together. They even share some passages. Presenting them together, and without a distinction that one is more concerned with politics and economics than the other, would have been more enlightening.

Part III also includes ‘The World Economic System in Asia before European Hegemony’. This is largely a critique of Braudel for his lack of attention to areas outside Europe, with special emphasis on the role of Asia. Here Frank continues his criticism of Eurocentrism. A better introduction to Asia might nonetheless have been ‘The Centrality of Central Asia’ (1992) or even a chapter from Frank’s remarkable volume ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (1998). Part III also includes an early edit of the first chapter of Frank’s unfinished ReOrient the 19th Century in which he outlines the litany of historiographical errors that beset the study of the 1800s. Correcting those errors was the project Frank was engaged in when he passed away.

Part III ends with ‘Social Movements,’ co-authored with Frank’s late wife, Marta Fuentes. This is an iconic work, but in a note tuck into the end of the essay the editors suggest
that it is included mostly to “underscore the fact that Gunder was always committed to encompassing issues of justice and freedom.” There would have been many ways to signal this commitment that might have been exercised. Freed of page constraints, the editors would have been wise to look at Frank’s work in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. While some of this work is a deepening of the dependency analysis that emerged at the end of the 1960s, there is a concerted effort to offer a more global political economy in his volumes of the 1970s. In the 1980s, with Frank back in Europe, there is also a wealth of political work dedicated to issues of justice and freedom. Any of the chapters from The European Challenge (1983) would have been useful. Likewise, Frank’s two volumes on global crisis offer an array of arguments that help clarify the social, economic and political implications of the existence of a single global economy. Among these, the chapter titled ‘Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor and West-East-South Political Economic Relations’ (published in Review in 1977 and reprinted in Crisis: In the World Economy, 1980) offers a clear picture of how a unified global political economy mocks ideology and disciplines states.

Even at the cost of some other pieces, there are some essays that might have appeared to provide a solid grounding in the application of world system history. Frank understood the part that polemics play in the inherently ideological nature of social analysis. He did not shy away from such work. Contemporary issues are covered in articles like ‘Soviet and Eastern European ‘socialism’: a review of the international political economy on what went wrong’ that was the focus of a debate in the summer 1994 issue of Review of International Political Economy that included one of Alec Nove’s final published comments. There is a powerful piece titled ‘Paper Tiger, Fiery Dragon’ (1993) on emerging relations between China and the United States, and the controversial ‘Coup d’Etat in Washington and Silent Surrender in America and the World’ (1993) concerning U.S. politics. ‘East and West’ (in Herrmann and Tausch eds. Dar al Islam: The Mediterranean, the World System and the Wider Europe, 2005) solidified many of the ideas presented in earlier works and was published in a volume dedicated to Frank’s memory. Any of these would have established both the political applicability of Frank’s version of world system history to contemporary events, and Frank’s longstanding commitment to peace, freedom and justice.

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Across the social sciences, scholars have long debated how markets emerge and operate. Economic scholars emphasize the natural forces of supply and demand that regulate markets and commodity prices, while sociologists draw attention to the role of social relationships in actively creating and shaping market operations. In Market Threads, Çaşıkhan contributes to this debate by using the case of cotton production to illuminate the complex workings of markets on the
local and global level. The breadth of the analysis in *Market Threads* provides a unique approach to cotton markets, as the book takes the reader from the cotton fields to the trading floors to present a complete picture of the market-making process. In particular, Çalışkan shows the complicated relationship between world cotton prices and the prices used by specific actors along the cotton commodity chain. He identifies three types of price models employed by cotton traders that inform the actual price of cotton: prosthetic, rehearsal, and associate prices. Prosthetic prices are produced in the market, but not directly used by buyers and sellers. For example, the World Cotton Price may be used by governments and researchers to approximate trends in cotton prices, but it does not correspond to the actual price per pound of cotton when sold from farmer to merchant. Instead, actors at each point of the chain use different prices according to localized logics of exchange.

These constructed price ontology categories serve to reveal the disjunction between prices at different points in the market. Although it is often assumed that the World Price represents the average global price of cotton, *Market Threads* shows how power relations in the market, both at the local and macro level, produce different prices depending on the existing institutional rules and power relations between the economic actors. For example, the World Price of Cotton, according to Çalişkan, represents the ideology and position of the U.S. in the political economy of the world system. Thus the actual manifestations of cotton prices at the local level similarly reflect localized systems of power and meaning.

Drawing on in-depth ethnographic data, the book begins by describing in great detail the interaction between cotton traders on the trading floor of the Izmir Mercantile Exchange. Çalişkan delves so deep as to describe the subtle gestures and linguistic practices used by traders to achieve ideal sales or purchases on the trading floor. Although seemingly irrelevant to global prices, Çalişkan reveals how the behavior of individual traders communicates crucial information about the volume, quality, and price of available cotton that can alter the global market. The book next addresses the point of production by moving to the cotton fields of Turkey and Egypt to provide a detailed picture of the production process from preparing the land all the way to harvesting the cotton. In conjunction with chapters on the New York Board of Trade and regional cotton mills, the book successfully presents a full picture of how the market for cotton is produced on a local, regional, and international scale.

*Market Threads* emphasizes the importance of social relationships in economic exchange by showing how concerted efforts by economic actors shape markets. The relative position of economic actors determines who has a voice in how, and at what price, cotton is sold. As Çalişkan concludes, “markets are neither asocial mechanisms of price setting, nor are they embedded in society,” but instead the book proposes to approach markets as fields of power (p. 188). In viewing markets as fields of power, *Market Threads* rejects existing neoclassical and institutionalist understandings of markets, instead drawing attention to the intermingling of power relations between economic actors and the role of existing rules, strategies, and market logics. In other words, the market is neither a path dependent institution, nor simply an arena governed by social arrangements, but a combination of the two. Market actors operate within the rules but also challenge and reconstruct existing market arrangements. Thus when examining how prices are made for a global commodity such as cotton, scholars cannot simply look at issues of supply and demand, but must also consider how power relations within the market operate, and how these power relations intersect with existing rules of exchange.

While his argument notes the importance of including local and regional actors when examining pricing and market mechanisms, Çalişkan himself sets boundaries around which
economic actors he considers significant players in market-making. For example, Çalışkan notes how cotton farmers are so occupied with producing cotton that they rarely concern themselves with the world price of cotton, nor the process of making prices, but instead see prices as something that just “happens” (203). While this may be true, Çalışkan himself suggests the importance of local power structures that shape cotton production, and in turn affect cotton prices. The ethnic relations between Kurds, Arabs, and Turks play a central role in the political economy of cotton production, particularly in the Turkish labor market.

Moreover, gender relations similarly shape this market; Farmers prefer poor female laborers who will work longer hours to ensure continued employment, and recruiting these workers is the job of gang leaders’ wives who have social networks that provide them access to these workers. Çalışkan recognizes the importance of this gender dynamic, noting that “wives of gang leaders play a role as central as that of their husbands.” However, he fails to conduct a deeper analysis of gender relations and the broader political economy of Turkey that grants such importance to the gang leaders’ wives. While the role of race, ethnicity, and gender is tangential to Çalışkan’s main research agenda, these issues represent an equally important field of power shaping market prices. Çalışkan mentions their importance, but they receive limited analytical attention.

Nonetheless, Market Threads contributes new insights into the active construction and maintenance of markets. And even though it is focused solely on cotton, the book presents an analytic framework useful for any widely traded commodity. The conclusions drawn from Çalışkan’s analysis of the cotton industry reveal the need to more closely examine the role of local power arrangements in shaping prices and market structures for any product, particularly in the context of increasingly globalized production systems that incorporate a wide range of economic actors.

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Miguel A. Centeno and Joseph N. Cohen have written, in Global Capitalism: A Sociological Perspective, a text book survey of the rise of global capitalism and a series of explications of issues attendant to the process now called globalization. With almost no theoretical spine nor original empirical research, nor a strong point of view, the work offers little to scholars or advanced students of political economy. The work can alternatively be judged as to whether it offers students an adequate introduction to the topic. Given a text-like synthetic project dedicated to a “sociological” perspective, numerous productive approaches are possible. One might, for example, relate the rise and functioning of global capitalism to the themes of the classic tradition of sociology.

Surprisingly then this “sociological perspective” on global capitalism has no discussion of Marx, Weber, or Durkheim. There are two brief mentions of Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction (one accurate, p. 86; one inaccurate, p. 206), none of Spencer. Karl Polanyi’s view of
the moral embeddedness of economies is reduced to the proposition that states help constitute
markets (p. 122). Although ideas about core and periphery lurk at the edges of this essay, and
Gunder Frank’s early “development of underdevelopment” thesis is summarized (p. 41),
nowhere is there an explication of world-systems analysis. Wallerstein’s name appears on two
pages (19, 24).

Alas, such cursory attention to classical themes or writers is not compensated for by
command of the relevant contemporary sociological literature. Illustratively, neither Sklair, nor
Robinson, nor Ross and Trachte, nor Chasse-Dunn appears to have affected Centeno and Cohen
and it shows.

After an Introduction that opens with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the declaration of
temporary capitalist victory, the work proceeds with a chapter on Global Capitalism – a brief
overview of what might otherwise be termed the rise of the modern world-system, and a series of
chapters on Trade, Finance, Marketing, Governance, Inequality, and Environment (“Living with
Limits”). A conclusion evinces stronger opinions then the excursions would have otherwise
justified, but still not much to chew on (p. 207): “…expecting global capitalism to manage itself
is not only wishful thinking but also…folly”. “[G]lobal capitalism cannot ignore the constraints
of the environment…” Global capitalism “made us much more dependent on each other. With
dependence comes responsibility to ensure the system takes care of all, not just the privileged
few.” One supposes students need to learn some such propositions before they learn others, but
of interest here is a decapitated system that nevertheless seems to have agency. It manages,
ignores, or ensures (or not) but nowhere in sight is responsibility.

The chapter on global capitalism adopts (without analysis or discussion) the
Wallersteinian proposition that capitalism “arose” in the Sixteenth Century. Its dating
mechanism is political, not structural. Neither enterprise size, structure, mode of competition
(Ross and Trachte), nor trading area or mode of surplus appropriation (Wallerstein and Chase-
Dunn), nor class formation (Robinson, Sklair) informs the developmental analysis. These each
complement or sometimes in alternatives give the current moment a history that is dynamic –
that is the product of struggles, classes, and regions. But in this global capitalism there are no
dynamics, only cycles (financial, by the way, not waves of accumulation) and descriptions.

The discussion of trade will introduce students to relevant data about the rise (late 19th
Century) and rise again (late 20th Century) of global trade. The relevance of the transformation of
what is traded and between who gets little conceptual attention but is partially depicted in a nice
graphic (p. 46). Thus the rise in exchange of manufactures from the poorer semiperiphery and
periphery to the rich core is noted but not understood as a turning point in the evolution of global
capitalism. Centeno and Cohen do know about commodity chain analysis but they do not use it.
The wealth of the rich core is attributed to momentum from the past (they do not use the phrase
“path dependence”, but they might).

The chapter on finance is perplexing. The essay correctly puts financial flows and
institutions at the head of the analysis. Lacking any class analysis however, the concept of
“finance capital” does not make an appearance, and thus the history of the idea of imperialism is
sublimated. Further, the explication of financial institutions lacks the clarity demanded of a text.
In Centeno and Cohen’s favor is their view that the financial bubble was a product of weak
regulatory mechanisms. This is buried in a somewhat meandering rendering of the positive

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1 This was clearly a strategic decision by the authors, since at least one, Centeno, teaches an impeccable classical
potential role of financial markets. The excesses are in the form of “But….” One notes that
neither in this chapter nor in the one on trade is there an analysis of what Richard Peet et al.
(2003) have called the “Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO.”

The link between the U.S. financial catastrophe and world economic slow-down is,
properly, discussed as a matter of complex networks of financial dependence. Let’s call this the
knock-on effect. What the chapter misses is the generative effect of the U.S. position in global
capitalism as a cause. The story can be told briefly here.

The huge U.S. trade deficit is a product of U.S. manufacturing investors’ decisions to flee
from their mid-Twentieth Century empowered working class. (There is one incidental mention of
a race to the bottom in the book.) This has made the world awash in dollars. Dollar denominated
investments are thus attractive to foreign holders of dollars. This leads prudent foreign investors
to buy relatively safe^{2} but low interest U.S. Treasury Bonds—notoriously the Chinese
government. Not all are so prudent. “Between 2002 and 2006 there was a three-fold increase in
U.S. credit market instruments held by foreigners, from $2 trillion to more than $6 trillion. By
2006, international investors owned nearly a third of all U.S. mortgages.”^{3} The defaults on
subprime mortgages spread quickly not just because big banks outside the U.S. held stakes in big
U.S. banks, but also because those external institutions were (ignorantly, and literally from a
distance) holding securitized mortgage paper that they bought because American consumers
were buying way more goods than their employers were selling abroad.

The chapter on finance together with the opening and concluding ones illustrate a
familiar puzzle and a common intellectual danger. Centeno and Cohen write as if the crash of
2008 was the end of an era – institutionally they expect more regulation and ideologically they
seem to expect less legitimacy for the future of what is often called neo-liberalism. With a 2010
publication date, this seemed a reasonable expectation in 2009 when the work was under
completion.

In the first instance the intellectual world should long ago have learned the fateful flaw in
the old communist line: “the worse, the better.” During the Great Depression fascism was as
likely a response to capitalist collapse as was socialism or social democratic reform. Under
contemporary conditions of mass (particularly electronic) media, demagogic leadership has even
more opportunity than it did eighty years ago. That the big financial institutions survived 2008-
2010 with such little loss of power (maybe even gains) is a bit of a puzzle – but this is not the
best venue for a thorough discussion. We all share with Centeno and Cohen however the danger
of writing in the midst of intense crises about their meaning for the future. Sometimes we are
right; and sometimes not. Right now global finance capital and its leading cadre seem more
powerful than ever before. They brought the world to ruin, none went to jail, and many are richer
than when it all started.

The chapter on marketing and consumption develops interesting but familiar data on the
situation of Western Europe and its cultural offshoots in the pyramid of world privilege (though
this is made somewhat more complex in the chapter on inequality). It also raises the aspiration

^{2} As this is written (July 2011), that prudence is being tested by the Congressional Republican Party’s threat to
refuse a vote extending the national debt ceiling. Much depends on the outcome.

of Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy Development and Research. March 2009 Based on a report
prepared for the Office of Policy Development and Research of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development under contract by Christopher E. Herbert and William C. Apgar, Jr., of Abt Associates Inc.
and un-reality of a horizon of endless consumption on the rich country model. Leslie Sklair (1995) originally argued, successfully, that consumerism as ideology is the cultural carrier of global capitalism, but Centeno and Cohen do not seem to be familiar with him or his work.

The chapter on governance has one strong virtue and some glaring problems. The virtue is its insistence on the continuing relevance of states and their policies to both the mode of integration into global capitalism and the regulation of its effects on domestic economies. Beyond this the glaring problems include at least these. From the point of view of a teaching tool, Centeno and Cohen neglect to clarify the contradictory usages of the word liberalism in American political parlance and in global political economy. So countries high on liberalism scales (created by a free market think tank) have various relations to economic growth, but to an American student the discussion is apt to be murky at best. That can be compensated for by professorial instruction. What cannot be merely adjusted is that the International Financial Institutions – the unholy trinity – are not discussed as issues of governance.

The chapter on inequality is a review of some of the literature on within-country and between-country inequality. Its structure is “one the one hand, but on the other hand” with the work of Glen Firebaugh prominently featured. It is fair minded in a very complex field but it fails to thoroughly air support for the proposition that globalization produces more inequality within even relatively equal political economies. It does not explicate the meaning of a Gini index. More to the point for readers of this journal is the more or less casual acceptance of the Kuznets thesis on development and inequality (the U-shape with higher GDP/capita yielding lower inequality). The problem here is that the latest and brilliant work by Korzeniewicz and Moran (2005) requires a drastic revision of the path of inequality over time even in high GDP countries.

The chapter on environmental limits is a swift overview that reasonably asks whether the carrying capacity of the planet can accommodate universal consumerism. As Centeno and Cohen conclude, as mentioned above, they blandly articulate reasonably reformist concerns. Students with little or no exposure to political economy will learn many facts, little history, tiny amounts of conceptualization and a reasonably empirical background to pursue other matters. More advanced students and scholars need not bother. General readers will not be attracted to the textbook style or the lack of a strong thesis.

Despite the shortcomings mentioned here, *Global Capitalism: A Sociological Perspective* would be useful in a course that supplied its own theoretical analyses. It is a clearly written summary of the basic information that any course with a central theme of globalization needs to cover.

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Ruth Mostern’s ambitious and wide-ranging study of the Song state emphasizes territorial analysis within the boundaries of the state. At the same time it conveys an interpretation of politics, administration, and warfare. The interpretation spills over the boundaries of the Song state to yield a picture expanding to all of China from the Tang of the seventh century to the end of the Yuan in the fourteenth century. In the course of her analysis, she develops the specifics of territorial analysis through reliance on Geographic Information Systems (GIS), conveys centuries of debate and historiography on governance within China, and teases out a remarkably precise set of cycles and long-term changes in styles of territorial administration.

The book is a “history of territory.” It is an analysis of over 600 years of administrative decisions (on spatial units and boundaries)—decisions that were intended to adjust tax revenues and military installations so as to maximize the efficiency of an immense realm and focus energies at key points. It emphasizes the perspective of the monarchy: “dividing the realm in order to govern.” It provides a constant reminder that, from the standpoint of the monarch, there were only so many bureaucrats and so many troops to deploy. The book begins with an elegant prologue that articulates the range of issues to be addressed. In this review, the issues will be discussed in the following order: the evidence; the perspective of the monarchy, its bureaucrats and historians; the analytical perspective of the author; and some world-historical comments by the reviewer.

The evidence, discussed in a detailed appendix and presented separately in an online database, was built out of a list of geographic names and descriptions. The database was drawn principally from a text document compiled by Hope Wright published in 1958, which itself drew on three major Song-era documents. Mostern, in collaboration with graduate student Elijah Meeks (to whom she graciously offers the lion’s share of the credit), created the Digital Gazetteer of Song China (DGSG) as the digitization and expansion of Wright’s alphabetical List of Geographical Names in Sung China. Construction of the digital dataset involved several sorts of transformations: from print to Word, from Word to Excel, and from Wade-Giles to pinyin in the transcription of Chinese (the original characters for place names were usually preserved). The text document was coded in terms of “events,” where each event was the establishment or abolition of a county or a prefecture—over a thousand events were coded, each of them with numerous variables. Mostern and Meeks used “entities” as digital representations of places and then associated their events with places; their work draws explicitly on the achievements of a series of digital projects—China Historical GIS, Chinese Civilization in Time and Space (Academica Sinica), and Robert Hartwell’s initial GIS analysis.

The dataset is organized principally in terms of three types of territorial units of expanding scale—counties, prefectures, and circuits. Counties were small, focused on populated centers, and served as gathering points for revenue; prefectures were larger, designed for stationing troops; circuits were still larger and served not as administrative units themselves but for encompassing groups of counties and prefectures. (Circuits were later known as provinces, but Mostern emphasizes that provinces were too large to be effective units of administration in Song times.)

Part 1 of the book includes three chapters on policy debate. It centers on a long discourse at the administrative and historiographical level, relying on textual and interpretive evidence
rather than the event-based and factual evidence of part 2. It begins with the modern, globally conscious political economy of spatial change, focusing on the analyses of Charles Tilly and G. William Skinner, then turns to the complex details of Song administrative structure. Counties were composed of subunits including households, garrisons, towns, and cantons: their variety is displayed in a pair of maps (p. 53) showing cantons per county and towns per county by region, generalizing for the Song era. Prefectures varied greatly in size—no parallel here to the Cartesian prefectures of revolutionary France—and were of three main types (see the map on p. 42). This introduction to Song spatial relations, phrased in terms of the organization of state power through county and prefecture, sets the stage for a deeper analysis.

In a debate traced back to the sixth century BCE but explored mainly within the Song era, Mostern traces the issue of “persistence and transformation,” in which scholars argued that only through detailed accounts of continuity and change in administrative structure was it possible to make adequate decisions on state policy. The depth of the discussion is symbolized in a table (pp. 64-65) which lists three dozen works of geography, most of them Song-era but some from earlier centuries. This section demonstrates the remarkable breadth and depth of administrative historiography in China’s imperial eras. Not only did Song-era scholars debate administrative policy but scholars in Ming and Qing times reviewed the Song-era gazetteers and dynastic histories. Recent historiography continues to review these historical issues, now with new technology and an accumulation of previous interpretations.

Part 2 convey the dynamics of Song administrative history, integrating the full range of policy analysis to set forth the author’s interpretation. These three chapters draw on the data (from the Appendix and the online dataset) and on the debate (as summarized in the initial three chapters) to present the author’s “history of territory” (Ruth Mostern and Elijah Meeks, “Digital Gazetteer of the Song Dynasty,” http://songgis.ucmercedlibrary.info/). This is a narrative and interpretation of the structure and dynamics of the spatial administrative order. It focuses in detail on the Song era yet, at a more impressionistic yet fascinating level, it reveals the contrasts separating the Tang, the 5 Dynasties, and three stages of the Song and Yuan. With the fall of the Tang, central government gave way to localized dynasties and regional warlords for a two-century period that Mostern calls “the fall and rise of the territorial state,” from 750 to 1105 CE. Competing administrations worked on techniques for containing the post-Tang wave of warlords, and eventually the Song put together a system effective in both conquest and administration, reaching its full extent in 960. The succeeding period of “the long eleventh century” (1005 – 1127) brought the high point of Song administrative activism. In it, the era of “New Policies” from 1068 to about 1085 brought “the most rapid and extensive redrawing of the political landscape to occur at any time in Chinese history other than the founding of a dynasty” (p. 184). Emperors Shenzong (r. 1068 – 1086) and Zhezong (r. 1086 – 1101), relying on the administrative procedures developed by Wang Anshi, merged prefectures in the imperial core and expanded them on the periphery, in efforts to adjust labor service and taxation. In the end, however, most of the administrative changes of the New Policies were soon reversed and the rate of administrative transformation declined. The sudden Jurchen conquest of the northern Song territories in 1127, followed by peace with Jurchen once the Song regime successfully shifted its core to the south, brought a long period of little administrative change.

In addition to this detailed narrative, Mostern sketches broader patterns of transformation: the alternation between warlords and bureaucrats; the contrast of early-stage and late-stage administrative practices for a realm; and the development of locally-based discourse, in which gazetteers come to be produced not only by imperial bureaucrats but also by local personalities.
arguing for the advance of their region. This reader found it easiest to maintain contact with the multiple levels of argument by relying on the condensed presentation of data in five timelines showing the relative and absolute frequency of administrative “events” — creating and abolishing counties and prefectures. These timelines addressed three periods for the empire as a whole: 960 – 1279 CE (p. 13); 960 – 1040 CE (p. 108); and 1127 – 1279 CE (p. 223). In addition, timelines show administrative change for Sichuan, 965 – 1040 (p. 132); and six regions for 1068 – 1126 (pp. 184 – 185).

Reading this book leads one to acknowledge not only the contribution of the author but also the strength of previous work: the compilations and debates of Song-era scholars (reflected in the imperial map drawn in c. 1180); the reviews by their successors in later imperial times; the twentieth-century work of laborious compilation by Hope Wright; and the analyses of Tilly, Skinner, and Hartwell. What, then, is added by the twenty-first century digitization, GIS formulation, and interpretation in Mostern’s hands? It provides a way to link the full range of previous studies and to trace parallels and interactions among the data. It provides summary statistics but it also provides an arena for the author to scrutinize individual instances — as she does in several key cases — and then apply the lessons of the case study to the larger dataset. In reviewing her data from various perspectives, Mostern shows why a large historical dataset must preserve not only the completed results but also the raw and intermediate forms of data that enabled their preparation.

Part of the contribution of this study is to raise further questions about Song politics and administration. The Song regime focused intensively on adjusting its administrative units to the current problems in warfare and taxation. Song rulers succeeded well for much of their history but failed twice: with the Jurchen Jin of the North in 1127 and with the Mongol conquest, a long war that ended in 1279. In neither case was there much administrative reorganization: what would the emperor Shenzong and the official Wang Anshi have said about the Song response to these threats?

This is a study of empire — rather than a world-system analysis or a world-historical interpretation — yet the author has provided much that is relevant to these broader perspectives. The work conveys effectively the perspective and the life-course of an imperial administration, especially the intricate balance between reproducing the regime and defending it: China is not the only region to have such a history but is the only region to have recorded so much of it. Mostern shows gradual change in functioning of world-system and of empire at various levels. Beyond the Song frontiers she notes the inability of the Song regime to expand to the larger territory of the Tang because the surrounding peoples had developed strength in administration, warfare, and commerce with which to challenge them on all sides. Within the Song state, she traces the changes in administrative technology that made counties and prefectures into more effective units than the larger provinces. Throughout, the author conveys immense methodological and interpretive breadth. Any academic reader can appreciate Mostern’s multiple skills and the interest of her materials, but few will have the background to follow all of her points.

This detailed imperial overview provides a new perspective from which to ask where the Song state fits into the world. The Southern Song monarchy seems from this perspective to have been less energetic than that of the preceding Northern Song, despite the reputation of the Southern Song dynasty overall. This study, though appropriately focused on the Song, makes clear the need for studies of interactions among a wider range of East Asian polities in the Song era. And while this study explores Song administration and politics with unprecedented
sophistication, it implicitly suggests that social and economic studies may be just as important to understanding the place of Song China in the world a thousand years ago.

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World-systems analysts have argued for some time that archaeologists have both much to gain and much to contribute to the development of this approach. Since archaeologists deal with great time depth, they can display the origins, expansion, contraction, and cyclical nature of modes of societal interaction played out over millennia. While some archaeologists see world-systems analysis (WSA) as too coarse to deal effectively with regional and local variation, others have addressed this shortcoming and made important contributions to the continuing refinement of theory. In the book under review here, Alan Greaves skillfully adapts some important world-systems concepts to the study of Ionia, the central coastal region of western Asia Minor, in the Archaic period (ca. 8th-5th centuries BCE), a time of significant innovations in material culture, intellectual pursuits (philosophy and science in particular), and sociopolitical structure throughout the Aegean world. Ionia was particularly important as a contact zone between east and west after the area came under Persian control in the late 6th century BCE. One of Greaves’s central goals is to move away from the Helleno-centric viewpoint that has dominated scholarship and to place Ionia more fully in the broader context of Asia Minor and the eastern Mediterranean. It is in this effort to stress connectivity with the east as well as the Greeks to the west that the author makes use of WSA, although it is only one of several components to his more comprehensive approach.

Greaves lays out his position in ten well-organized chapters. Chapter 1 provides a cogent discussion of the types of source material available for the study of ancient Ionia: archaeology, ancient literary sources, and epigraphy. He carefully points out the positive and negative aspects of each data source. For example, while excavated material from key sites such as Ephesos provides important information, many objects are scattered among a variety of museums complicating their study, and the exposed remains of many sites date to the later Hellenistic and Roman periods. One could also add that until recently very little work was done at sites outside of the major urban centers, skewing our perception of ancient settlement patterns. Key literary sources perpetuate conventional perspectives that do not deal with important aspects of Ionian life. Greaves argues that various works, such as the histories of Herodotos and Thucydides, tended to be Atheno-centric and obscure “the diversity and regionalism that existed within the ancient Greek world” (p. 11). In subsequent chapters, Greaves systematically explores each line of evidence as it relates to specific topics (e.g., colonization, war, cults, and art).

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical foundations for the study. Greaves takes classical archaeology to task for its lack of explicit theorizing. He has two main goals in the book: (1) to demonstrate how the interaction between Aegean Greece and Anatolia contributed to the regional identities of Archaic Ionia through “conscious acts of creation” (p. 28); and, (2) to
explore the dynamic role of landscape in this process. To reach this level of interpretation, Greaves espouses the interdisciplinary and diachronic *Annaliste* perspective and provides a good discussion of how Braudel’s tripartite chronological framework can be applied as a ground-up approach. Greaves describes the environmental setting in Chapter 3, explaining how geomorphological forces such as alluviation filled in valleys and harbors, requiring people to shift occupational zones over time. Use of large and small islands near the coast enhanced local diversity and contributed to political separation.

Greaves examines the economic system in Chapter 4 in order to dispute earlier assessments of Ionians as primarily overseas traders whose success fueled colonization. He concurs that the region was prosperous, but argues that the movement abroad was due to demographic and political pressure. Agriculture clearly dominated the economy, as was true of all ancient societies. Timber and high-quality marble were important resources, but their bulk negated long-distance trade in these commodities, while decorated pottery and cloth also circulated largely within the region. In this section Greaves discusses world-systems analysis (WSA), especially the four types of networks defined by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997), as an approach that is useful in understanding how the ancient Ionian economy operated.

Chapter 5 begins with a survey of the Ionian cities, describing the location and individual features of 12, with Ephesos and Miletos the most prominent. However, Greaves notes that the landscape also contained rural temples, smaller settlements, and dispersed farmsteads, which, despite being distributed among the various poleis, formed a network of sites. In seeking to “understand how they [Ionians] experienced their cities”, he argues that we need to look to Anatolia, where small independent kingdoms developed in the centuries after the collapse of the Hittites, rather than the Greeks to the west. Several of these Ionian cities played major roles in the Greek diaspora that led to the establishment of colonies throughout the ancient Mediterranean (Chapter 6). In his discussion of this process, Greaves makes subtle use of WSA, identifying the network types (Hall 2006) that correspond with various phases: information network with pre-colonization, prestige goods network with *emporion* (trading post), political-military network with *apoikia* (settlement), and bulk goods network with full assimilation (rarely if ever happened in antiquity); his two-stage model of Ionian colonization focuses on the *emporion* and *apoikia* phases.

In Chapter 7 Greaves examines warfare as a product of choice and of the need to keep up with technology, making it “a useful indicator of common values, identities, and behaviors” (p. 146). In discussing fortifications, he suggests that walls were not just for defense, but that they were also political statements. The construction of walls and trireme ships often required the financial assistance of outside polities, including the Persians, thus drawing Ionians into larger systemic interactions at the military and diplomatic levels. Furthermore, payments required by mercenaries may have been the impetus for the creation of coinage. Service by Ionian mercenaries in Egypt and other regions reflects the complex nature of core-periphery relations in the first millennium BCE.

Religious practices in Ionia (Chapter 8) reveal elements of competition and similarity in Ionian life. Temples were located in many different locations, often where there is archaeological evidence of activity during the Bronze Age, suggesting a clear effort to link past and present in a cultural ethos. Egyptian objects in the Samian Heraion and Egyptian influence evident in kouroi statues suggest the adaptation of foreign items to fit native needs, a process of negotiation that is a nuanced form of incorporation. Greaves further argues that Greek cults introduced during the Archaic period “adapted to the pre-existing ‘Phrygian’ tradition of the region” (p. 200). This
statement mirrors what various world-systems analysts have said about the relationships between indigenous people and outsiders in other parts of the world. The main point in the discussion of art (Chapter 9) is that it indicates a system of “local production and consumption, with significant intra-regional exchange within Ionia and to other regional centers, and limited exchange with other regions, such as Lydia and Athens” (p. 214). There was, in other words, a tiered world-system with local, intermediate, and international components (see Kardulias 1999 for description of a similar system in the Bronze Age).

In addressing the question Who Were the Ionians? (Chapter 10), Greaves argues that Herodotos is of little help since he was writing in the 5th century BCE. He also disregards the myth of the Ionian Migration, which states that Ionian cities were populated by immigrants from Greece. Greaves sees this as politically motivated mythopoesis “designed to suit the contemporary Athenian political agenda which was in the process of claiming Ionia as part of its empire” (p. 223). Instead, he argues for a new methodology that avoids bias whenever possible and examines all the evidence critically.

In this book Greaves makes a strong case for revising our interpretation of Ionian history based on an array of data and an explicit theoretical schema. He skillfully blends elements of Braudel’s *Annales* approach with contemporary WSA and applies the composite model in a manner that provides a richer understanding of Archaic Ionia. I think that other scholars will find much of value in this volume, both in terms of information about a specific area, and how to bring WSA to bear in comprehending other areas with multiple polities that share a common cultural identity. While there are some individual points in the book with which I disagree, it is overall an excellent study that is part of a growing literature on the use of WSA in archaeology. Technically, the book is very clean, with a modicum of typographical errors. With only several exceptions, the images are clear. Scattered throughout the text are useful boxes that deal with specific topics, such as alluviation of the Gulf of Latmos, and the cult statue of Artemis from Ephesos. A useful glossary accompanies a detailed bibliography and index.

References:


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