From Mesopotamia through Carroll Quigley to Bill Clinton: World Historical Systems, the Civilizationist, and the President

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ABSTRACT

The noted comparative civilizationist and world-historical systems analyst Carroll Quigley, whose theorizing rested on the whole historical span from Mesopotamia to the 1960's, was a teacher well-remembered by his student Bill Clinton. Quigley, by an intensive process of reduction, or rather idealization, of masses of historical data, derived a procedure for the diagnosis and therapy of ailing civilizations/world systems, especially the one which he inhabited. The coherent, persistent and personal motifs of the policy discourse and variant initiatives of his student, the President, bear more than a passing resemblance to the hopeful, idealistic, voluntaristic, intellectual, scientistic, economic, demi-materialistic propensities of the civilizationist and teacher.

"Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back." --Keynes

And (on the other hand?) teachers sometimes influence students.

"As a teenager I heard John Kennedy's summons to citizenship. And then, as a student at Georgetown, I heard that call clarified by a professor I had named Carroll Quigley, who said America was the greatest country in the history of the world because our people have always believed in two great ideas: first, that tomorrow can be better than today, and second, that each of us has a personal, moral responsibility to make it so." --Bill Clinton, "A New Covenant" (Clinton and Gore, 1992: 231)

If Carroll Quigley said that much, he said considerably more. The question of whether world system theory has anything to do with the practical performance of politicians and Presidents arises as an empirical one simply because one of the pioneer world system theorists of the 1960's, who hoped to influence his practitioner students, had one student who obtained a position of
unmatched, if also quite circumscribed, political power: Quigley
was the theorist, Clinton the student. Clinton may have been
the first world-system leader to have been directly stricken by the
educational influence of a ranking social theorist since Alexander
decided to ignore Aristotle and conquer the world instead of his
own hubris. Has Quigley fared any better than his remote
predecessor? What difference—if any—did Quigley's systems-
theorizing make to Clinton's praxis: his dispositions, intentions,
vocabulary, policies, achievements? What difference could it have
made?

QUIGLEY AND CLINTON. Carroll Quigley (1911-1977) was
professor of history at Georgetown University for 35 years, from
1941 to 1976. Quigley, a historian by training, identified himself
as a comparative-civilizationist; I have labeled him an analyst of
world systems, for the one implies the other. (I have both long and
recently argued that civilizations are world systems (large-scale
and urbanized), and have accordingly treated Quigley's
civilizational theory as properly comparable to, for example,
was judged by Georgetown's Foreign Service alumni from 1941 to
1969 to have been the most influential course in their
undergraduate studies (Washington Post, 1977). Clinton was a
senior at Georgetown University from fall 1967 through spring
1968, in the School of Foreign Service. His housemate Jim Moore
recollected that, of the Georgetown professors, two had most
impact "shaping the worldview" of those who shared the house.
One of the two was Carroll Quigley. (Maraniss, 1992)

Quigley had just completed a massive history of the Western
"civilization" (i.e. tradition) in its world context (i.e. the
world system), with most focus on the crisis epoch, as he saw it,
since 1914. (Quigley, 1966.) Clinton was a student in Quigley's
world civilization class. What did Clinton think of Quigley?
"Half the people at Georgetown thought he was a bit crazy and the
other half thought he was a genius. They were both right." (Maraniss, 1992)

Clinton was favorably impressed by Quigley's inclination
toward hopefulness, which pointed toward social engineering, even
toward what one might call moral engineering -- the rational and
deliberate choice of moral norms with a view to producing social
consequences. "The hope of the twentieth century rests on its
recognition that war and depression are man-made and needless.
[Page 3] They can be avoided in the future by turning from" the
current cultural tradition of laissez faire, materialism,
selfishness, false values, hypocrisy, and secret vices "and going
back to other characteristics of our Western society always
regarded as virtues: generosity, compassion, cooperation,
rationality and foresight." (Quigley, 1966: 1310-1311; cited by
Maraniss, 1992, and in a context which suggests that Clinton had
cited it to him.)

Clinton naturally recalled his teacher's views as of the time
of their connection. Later Quigley became less optimistic about
Western civilization's retrievability. "In 1961 [Quigley] still thought that the future of the West was open. But by the 1970's he believed that all signs pointed to our violent, irreversible, devastating destruction." (Melko, 1977: 6-7). In his last public statement Quigley spoke favorably of political localism and of "opting out of the system," the "bureaucratic structure": the "process of coping out will take a long time, but notice: we are already coping out of military service on a wholesale basis; we are already coping out of voting on a large scale basis.... People are also coping out by refusing to pay attention to newspapers or to what's going on in the world.... the final result will be that the American people will ultimately prefer communities": "Do not be pessimistic. Life goes on; life is fun. And if a civilization crashes, it deserves to. When Rome fell, [Page 4] the Christian answer was, 'Create our own communities.'" ([1977]: 40)

Without checking the course syllabus, or interviewing its ex-students, one cannot tell whether Quigley used his theoretical treatise (1961) in addition to his historical treatise, which was required reading for Clinton (Maraniss, 1992), and in which his theory is highly condensed (1966:3-7), though embedded descriptively at great length. There are aspects of Quigley's major theoretical work, _The Evolution of Civilizations_, and of the theory it embodies and to which Quigley habitually referred (e.g. 1972b: 2-3; [1975?]: 7; 1977: 29-30), which make it particularly apt to be not only effective but memorable. As the leading contemporary analyst of the comparative study of civilizations, Matthew Melko, puts it: "his theory has a clarity that no other comparative study has.... Because of its brevity and clarity, its marvelous examples ..., striking charts and meaningful maps, it is the best of all books ... for undergraduate students, and an excellent way for any layman to begin studying civilizations" (1977: 7).

Quigley's economics is itself economical, entailing a short and particular vocabulary (expansion, growth, rate of growth, production, surplus, savings, investment, invention, instrument, institution) which he considered necessary and sufficient to form [Page 5] a theory intended to account for those phenomena common to all "civilizations" (citified literate societies). Of these terms, the most significant is "expansion."

QUIGLEY'S CIVILIZATIONAL THEORY: EXPANSION, AND THE ALTERNATIVES. Quigley asserted that civilization systems displayed a periodic alternation between stages with and without "expansion," a fourfold increase: in population, in per capita production, in geographic area, and in knowledge. Quigley perceived the alternative to expansion in several ways. In one formulation, a stage of expansion gave way to one of "conflict" or "crisis": decreasing rate of expansion, increasing class conflict, imperialist war, and irrationality (1961: 82).

In another formulation, Quigley argued that "the process of evolution of a civilization has its main thrust along the economic level, beginning as expansion but gradually changing to growth and ultimately to gross growth." The central economic feature of
"expansion" is per capita production increase; that of "growth" is increase in production without per capita increase; that of "gross growth" is increase in state area. "Expansion" Quigley conceives as intensive, with means subordinated to ends, taking place by innovations in a society's artifactual system for transforming resources of nature to satisfy human needs. "Growth" is extensive, taking place by increased mobilization and consumption of resources, and involving the subordination of ends to means, the frustration of needs, and their replacement by desires manufactured by external controls, "based on political and military means supplemented by ideological propaganda." (Quigley, 1972a: 73, 69.) "Gross growth" is simply growth at the expense of others, violent redistribution by spoliation, conquest and empire. ([1975?]: 11)

In October 1976, Quigley, having retired the previous spring, delivered, to an audience of his former colleagues and students, his final reformulation, in his Oscar Iden lectures. He provided a third sequence, now emphasizing the degenerative succession economics--politics--force, with particular reference to the West.

The West began to expand in 1976. By that I mean they began to produce more goods per person per day or per year. You know what I mean by expansion if you took my freshman course: increased output per capita, increased knowledge, increased geographic area for the civilization itself, and increased population.... The economic expansion was achieved chiefly by specialization and exchange....commercialization.

When the expansion reaches a crisis, you get increasing politicization.... Politicization means that [Page 7] the expansion is slowing up, and you are no longer attempting to achieve increased output per capita, or increased wealth, or increased satisfactions, or whatever is motivating you, by economic expansion, but you are going to do it by mobilizing power. We have seen this going on in our society for almost a century.

And then, as the society continues and does not reform, you get increased militarization....[;] misplacement of satisfactions, [which are obtained increasingly from] power...wealth...organized force...sadism...just war.... ([1977]: 29 -30)

CAUSES OF EXPANSION: THE INSTRUMENT OF EXPANSION. All three versions center on expansion and its breakdown. What explains the occurrence of expansion? Quigley's causal analysis crosscut the nineteenth-and-twentieth-century debate between advocates of capitalism and socialism, or statism and free markets, which characteristically had each party contrasting its idealized utopia to the opposing, deplorable reality--Adam Smith vs. Joseph Stalin, Marx and Engels vs. the Lancashire mills. His approach was empirical, comparative and historical rather than critical and idealistic: he looked for real periods of expansion, and the actual sociocultural structures that accounted for them, periods of crisis and the formations in which they occurred. He concluded that a
wide variety of social organizations and cultural structures had at one time produced expansion, but that each had then stopped expanding and fallen into crisis. He observed that these diverse structures shared common features in their expansive success, and shared a different set of common features in their crisis. Priesthoods, socialist states, slavery, feudalism, commercial capitalism, and industrial capitalism have each and all functioned at times as "instruments of expansion," and later broken down in crisis. When functional, all provided three things: an incentive to innovate, an accumulation of surplus, and an investment of that surplus in innovation. That was what they had in common, and that was all they had in common. (1961: 69-71)

Stages or periods of expansion were uniformly preceded by the establishment of organizational patterns marked by three characteristics: (a) an increased tendency to invention or innovation, both in artifacts and in organization; (b) the accumulation of economic surplus through inequitable distribution of the social product; and (c) the application of such surplus to utilize the innovations. These three could, of course, be called "invention," "capital accumulation," and "investment," except that these briefer terms have a narrow economic sense which is misleading, since the civilizational process is far more than simply a materialist economic process. (1972b: 2-3)

Quigley concluded that these three characteristics could be treated as a causal trinity, "the triplice organization of expansion." (1972b: 9)

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CRISIS. Expansions in due course broke down. The usual form of breakdown is a decrease of the rate of investment in invention, and an application of the surplus to the consumption of its elite controllers instead. (1961: 69-78) "The absence of...investment...is the most frequent cause of a failure of economic progress. It may be absent when both of the other factors [saving and innovation] are working well. In such a case, the savings accumulated are not applied to inventions but are spent on consumption, on ostentatious social prestige, on war, on religion, on other nonproductive purposes, or even left unspent." (1966: 498)

In this connection, Quigley drew attention to a particularly potent systemic process which has been studied by others before and since under various labels; he styled it "the institutionalization of social instruments." Human needs are satisfied by processing resources through an organizational structure or culture. The organization's effectiveness is normally suboptimal, and tends to decline, because its parts develop their own ends, and attempt to preserve established routines despite changing circumstances. When a structure or culture has become a collection of vested interests, we say that it is no longer an 'instrument' for satisfying needs but has become an 'institution,' leaving the original needs substantially
The general economic crisis of a civilization is for Quigley strongly connected to the "institutionalization" of its organization for expansion, a process which occurs in the face of a rising population, hence of insistent demands for an increased output of goods. An early sign of crisis is precisely the shift from "expansion" to "growth."

If a society seeks to increase its supply of goods in spite of an increasingly ineffective productive organization, it may do so either by increasing the inputs processed by the organization, using more resources less effectively ("growth"), or by reforming the organization so that it produces more goods from the same or even fewer resources ("expansion").

Of these, "expansion" is preferable to "growth" for the society as a whole, because resources are always limited in supply, but expansion is not preferred by vested interests which must be reformed in order to obtain expansion rather than growth; vested interests usually prefer growth, or even gross growth, to expansion. The changes which are required to satisfy human needs or the society as a whole (in order for it to survive) are different from the changes which are wanted by institutions within the society. What is good for the country is not necessarily good for General Motors. Indeed, it can be taken as a general rule that long run improvements for a society often require short-run sacrifices and disadvantages for some of its parts. By definition, reform in any society is any increase in the satisfaction of the real needs of its members even when some of those members regard the necessary changes as totally destructive of their own interests. Such members will resist these changes, so that the changes will come about only if the powers supporting reform prevail over the powers of the vested interests resisting these changes. ([1975?]: 7)

The society attempts to increase its production of goods, while each vested interest seeks to prevent its own reform but willingly increases the rate at which resources are processed (and diverted) through its institutionalized structure. This results both in enormous waste of limited resources, and in increased competition for them between groups, classes and states. "These struggles gradually move downward [in a psychological hierarchy] from the economic level to the political level and finally to the level of applied force." ([1975?]: 11)

SYSTEMS AND ETHICS. As with most civilizationists, and most historical economists, a moral vision underlies Quigley's analysis. His is expansive and organicist: expansion is preferable to growth and gross growth (and to stagnation/stability or decline); the interests of the social whole are preferable to those of its various parts; the privileged elite ought to act as trustees for the general good.
Quigley's civilizational theory, intended to be explicitly scientific (1961:1-2) was "not deterministic, has no independent variables, is a system of interaction." (The quote is from my notes on his 1972 presentation to the first annual meeting of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, on "The Civilizational Process: A General Systems Approach.") The evolutionary social process "is not relentlessly deterministic at all points but merely at some points, in the sense that men have power and free will but their actions have consequences nonetheless." (1961: 89) Accordingly, Quigley treats the activities of vested interests as fully explicable in terms of rational self-interest, freely chosen, dystrophic, highly undesirable, and wrong; and he is concerned with how they can be got round.

VESTED INTERESTS AND PUBLIC ACTION. Quigley had Crane Brinton as his honors tutor at Harvard. They discussed Sorokin, Pareto and Lyford Edwards. Quigley judged that Brinton had not derived his model of revolutionary process from a model of social and psychological structure ([1975?]: 1-3). Quigley tried to fill the gap.

Attempts to replace or preserve vested interests necessarily arise both continuously and increasingly in a crisis of expansion. A continuous process of reform by persuasion --intellectual, religious, emotional, social and material-economic appeals, going down level by level in a hierarchy of psychological needs --is conceivable; when it fails, external controls (political power, military force) are resorted to, either to compel reform or to foreclose reform ([1975?]: 8-15).

In Quigley's view, most civilizations failed to reform; successful foreclosure of reform by vested interests, and increasing resort to external controls, marked their next stage of development. Orthodox/Russian civilization reformed once, the Russian Revolution providing it with a new instrument of expansion (1966:93). Western civilization reformed its instrument of expansion twice: the feudal instrument of the 10th-century expansion (1961:227) was replaced by the commercial-capitalist instrument of the 15th-century expansion (1961:233), and that by a more complex agro-industrial-finance-monopoly capitalist instrument of the 18th-century expansion (1961:249-258), in crisis by the late 20th century (1961:265).

Despite its past record of reform, Quigley regarded the contemporary West as deeply sunk in a "crisis of expansion." He pointed to a variety of current practices as exemplifying the obsolescence, the vesting and the hidebound institutionalization of such a crisis: the stubborn persistence of "the internal combustion engine using gasoline" ([1975?]: 7); the extensive, resource-wasting economics of destruction of "natural capital," soils, forests, fossil fuels ([1977]: 35-36); the destruction of human communities by commercialization, corporate and statist bureaucracies ([1977]: 36-37); autonomous, immortal, monopolistic corporate structures ([1977]: 36, 39-40); "a capital intensive medical system devoted to keeping people who are almost dead alive a few more days" ([1977]: 37); the American Imperial Presidency,
with particular reference to the institutionalization and consequent paralysis of the system for impeachment, so that there is no easy way of removing a nonperforming or malperforming incumbent (1977: 38-39).

Without predicting that the West would reform, Quigley believed it reformable, and strongly favored its reformation. "[W]ar and depression are man-made, and needless. They can be avoided in the future.... We now know fairly well how to control the increase in population, how to produce wealth and to reduce poverty and disease; we may, in the near future, know how to postpone senility and death...." (1966: 131.) This was what he taught his students; this was what Bill Clinton recollected.

QUIGLEY'S INFLUENCE. Quigley taught practitioners, and intended to influence their practice. How might we trace his actual influence? Bill Clinton is, I am sure, the first U.S. President to have studied under a theorist of world historical systems -- or, in that theorist's terminology, of the evolution of civilizations. Did it make a difference? Does Clinton show the theoretical as well as the moral influence of Quigley?

"Influence" is difficult to prove; correlation may mean coincidence; statistical techniques are hard to apply when N=1. A may teach B, convert B, resonate with B's preconceptions, or be taken for granted by B as part of the background noise; real influence may be overlooked or denied by the recipient, likewise its absence. Still, I take it that a practical politician influenced formatively by, say, Spengler, would have a rhetoric of gloomy acquiescence to historically inevitable decline; by Toynbee, of the delights and desirability of free-wheeling artistic, cultural and religious creativity; by Sorokin, one of resolute idealistic altruism; by Wallerstein, one of continuing commitment to a socialist future despite realistic acceptance of enormous difficulties; by Quigley, one of general expansiveness and reformativeness, with particular emphasis on ongoing economic reforms and continuous struggle with vested interests. If one knew that Bill Clinton had been influenced by some civilizationist's theory, the choice would seem reasonably clear. Even without that assumption, the question of influence can be pursued by way of a more detailed exploration of rhetoric and policies.

QUIGLEYAN MOTIFS IN PRESIDENTIAL UTTERANCE. The words of a practitioner may reflect not only his thought but its sources. President Clinton's January 25, 1994 State of the Union message (Los Angeles Times, 1994) contained 125 paragraphs. Twenty-eight were devoted to health care reform (a proposed redistributive increase in forced private spending to subsidize the cost of improving health care delivery to the poor). Twenty-three were employed for an inspirational and congratulatory introduction. Eighteen went to defense and foreign affairs. Fourteen were dedicated to an inspirational peroration. Seventeen went to crime-control. Thirteen were given to welfare and unemployment-system reform. Twelve were left over for miscellanea. Among the latter were the following: 

[Page 17]  As we reduce defense spending, I ask Congress to invest...
more in the technologies of tomorrow. Defense conversion will keep us strong militarily and create jobs for our people here at home. (Para. 28)

We must also work with the private sector to connect every classroom, every clinic, every library, every hospital in America into a national information superhighway by the year 2000. (Para. 30)

Among the congratulatory remarks to Congress was praise for "a budget that cut the deficit by half a trillion dollars," for the ratification of the North American Free Trade Area (para. 7), for "tax cuts to reduce the taxes of nine out of 10 small businesses who use the money to invest more and create more jobs," for "a dramatic increase in high-tech investments to move us from a defense to a domestic high-tech economy" (para. 9), and for the fact that "business investment and equipment is growing at seven times the rate of the previous four years" (para. 22).

Also in the congratulations: "Once we reduced the deficit and put the steel back into our competitive edge, the world echoed to the sound of falling trade barriers. In one year, with NAFTA, with GATT, with our efforts in Asia and the national export strategy, we did more to open world markets to American products than at any time in the last two generations. That means more jobs and rising living standards for the American people, low deficits, low inflation, low interest rates, low trade barriers and high investments" (para. 26-27).

Buried in a paragraph on crime control through community empowerment is a reference to "challenging businesses to provide more investment through empowerment zones" (para. 110). There may be more to this than its depth of burial would suggest. One strand in welfare theory proposes that even this stubbornly consumption-directed subsidy can be redirected to investment; e.g. the Empowerment Network Foundation's president, David Caprara, states that its Center for Economic Enterprise's business incubator program has "incubated" a family-based child-care business for an ex-welfare client. (Caprara, 1994)

Although they are certainly not dominant, Quigleyan motifs of saving (exclusively state-based, via deficit reduction), investment (in both state and private sectors, neutrally as to sector) and invention (again bisectoral and neutral), are definitely present, and more than mere undertones.

An element in Quigley's moral policy of which Clinton especially approved was his espousal of "future preference," the practice of sacrificing today for the benefit not of others now living but for future generations yet unborn. (Karmaniss, 1992) To the extent that current U.S. federal and state budgeting inclines very strongly in the opposite direction, i.e. to present consumption subsidies and to "elder preference," via Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security, Clinton's address is slightly Quigleyan, i.e. in its extensive attention to children (paras. 32-34, 38-39, 45-47, 113-118) and its skepticism about doles in
unemployment (paras. 35-36) and welfare proper (para. 37), but about as ambivalent as possible concerning elder preference (e.g. paras. 67-68 on Medicare, proposing to cut, protect and increment it, rather than for instance providing tax incentives for effective and substantial personal retirement savings).

CLINTON AND NAFTA. The evidence so far makes a Quigleyan connection plausible, but remains inconclusive. One way to pursue the question would be to ask what mental picture a person influenced by a Quigleyan analysis would be expected to have of some current political issue.

Take, for instance, the argument over free trade in general, and NAFTA in particular. The protectionist argument both in general and in this instance is noticeably dominated by the sense that free-trading hurts the incomes of existing high-cost protected producers—farmers, industrialists and trade unionists. Populist protectionism leaves the protected industrialists out of the discussion, focuses on the lost jobs of workers (e.g. US auto and apparel workers) and small farmers (in e.g. Chiapas), and plays up the benefits of free trade to the profits of large firms exporting capital, jobs, goods and services.

The free-trade argument tends to be couched in terms of consumer interests, lower prices, and the survival of the most efficient producers. It seems reasonable to expect that the very way in which the argument is habitually couched would incline a student of Quigley's to equate "protection" with "vested interest," and to be alienated by precisely those arguments considered most poignantly persuasive by anti-NAFTANS: "vested interests resist reform, from normal human inertia and because the established ways of operating [within the institutionalized structure or culture] bring incomes to those who are part of it." ([1975?]: 6)

Clinton, himself involved in promoting the import of investment capital to Arkansas as its governor, expressed support for NAFTA in principle ("I believe in open markets and free trade") from the outset of his campaign in 1991, but did not commit himself to a position on the text --negotiated by the Bush Administration in August 1992--until October 4, 1992, when the position was "Yes, if Mexico and Canada would negotiate side agreements with further labor and environmental concessions." Clinton's argument was that, if "done right, it will create jobs in the United States and in Mexico." (Behr, 1993) When those agreements were concluded, he enlisted three former Presidents to join him (September 14, 1993) in promoting NAFTA; in this company, his remarks proposed to embrace global economic change rather than resist it "hoping we can preserve the economic structures of yesterday." (Devroy, 1993)

Clinton's arguments for NAFTA contained attacks on isolationism as selfish (Broder, 1993) and on the job-loss fears of American workers as false since NAFTA would "create 200,000 new high-paying jobs in the next two years." (Jackson, 1993) After its passage, he spoke to seven Central American Presidents of plans for "the expansion of free trade to other market democracies in the
hemisphere." (Scott, 1993) Buried in a foreign policy paragraph on "democratic renewal" we find in the 1994 State of the Union Address: "We will ask Congress to ratify the new GATT accord" (para. 88).

A theoretical defense of free trade could certainly have been couched in Quigleyan terms (as promoting increased per capita production); so could a polemic (against vested interests preferring their own sectoral prosperity to the general interest). Clinton avoided such discourses, preferring a populist rhetoric of "jobs" and an inspirational rhetoric of fearlessness. But these were adventitious, and do not seem to reflect the reasoning process which led him to favor NAFTA in principle, and free trade in [Page 22] principle. It seems unlikely that any reader of Quigley would look at Clinton's discussion of NAFTA and deduce Quigley's theoretical influence therein.

CLINTON AND VESTED INTERESTS. NAFTA is of course more than the surrounding rhetoric, which raises a broader issue. The operations of a Quigleyan politician ought surely to damage "vested interests," more particularly to those which obstruct investment, innovation, productivity, as compared to the more traditional populist conception, which focuses on monopolistic price-raising, monopsonistic wage-squeezing, bureaucratic abuse of individuals, and profit-preserving tax-resistance. A Washington observer expressed surprise at Clinton's 1995 budget, which daringly proposed to eliminate a large number of small programs with protective constituencies, and to cut subsidies for energy consumption, public housing and mass transit. (Risen, 1994b.) A wide variety of "vested interests" have in fact suffered criticism or damage at Clinton's hands. Most are predictable targets on a strictly populist basis: insurance companies (in the healthcare reform package); high-income groups (in the 1993 tax increase and the healthcare reform); the military and the defense industry (in the FY 1994 and 1995 budgets); employers (in the family and medical leave law). Some are predictable from an ideology of nanny-state liberalism, i.e. armed citizens and the National Rifle Association (in the Brady bill and law). But some, fewer, are on [Page 23] those bases, surprising: sunset-industry labor unions and their industries (in NAFTA); government employees (in FY 1995 employment cuts); constituency clients (in the FY 1995 program cuts). Without its being preponderant, there is some inclination in Clinton's praxis to reduce, though not to denounce or confront, interests vested in the Quigleyan but not in the populist sense.

Some observers see this as deliberate: Clinton's purpose "is to change the way the Democratic party works by curbing the power of special-interest groups. The deficit helps him do that. It forces Congress to make a choice between the demands of selfish interest groups and the needs of the whole society." (Schneider, 1992) Still, the evidence remains ambiguous. Once again, it is unlikely that an impartial observer would find more of Quigley than, say, William Jennings Bryan or Franklin D. Roosevelt in this area of Clinton's politics.

CLINTON ON SAVINGS: THE ISSUE OF DEFICITS. The deficit as an issue was forced upon Clinton, not hunted out. The problem is
complex; human and practical-politician ability to grasp and cope in a brief time compels radical simplification of perception. There are many stereotypes for a quick-study practitioner to choose from. Among the various ways of looking at the chronic fiscal "crisis of the state," indicated by the growth of federal entitlements, budgetary deficits, the gross national debt, [Page 24] interest on the national debt, and taxation to finance debt interest, is to focus on the effect of federal borrowing upon net private savings, net domestic savings, net national savings, net world savings, intergenerational wealth transfers, net social welfare, etc. Practitioners who have been trained to be especially alert to the categories of "surplus," "savings" and "investment" are likely to simplify their view of the deficit to see it as combining (1) by definition, state dis-saving; (2) by its special welfare effect on the elderly, discouragement of private retirement savings; (3) by its provision of safe, conservative bond "investment" alternatives, discouragement of investment in "invention," e.g. stocks in general, startup companies and venture-capital operations more particularly.

Clinton's key confrontation with the deficit came in his February 17, 1993 State of the Union Address. Rather than provide a lengthy analysis of the pros and cons of deficits, it assumed a (controversial) analysis, and referred to it only parenthetically, e.g. Clinton's "comprehensive plan" (para. 6) "has a deficit reduction program that will increase the savings available for the private sector to invest" (para. 24). There is not much meat here. There are remarks to the effect that "The more money we take out of the pool of available savings, the harder it is for people in the private sector to borrow money at affordable interest rates for a college loan for their children, for a home mortgage, or to start a new business" (Para. 75.); here private spending in general is counterpoised to government spending in general, a laissez-faire or limited-government rather than Quigleyan argument.

"We have to cut the deficit because the more we spend paying off the debt, the less tax dollars we have to invest in jobs, in education and the future of this country." (Para. 74) This muddles the concept of public investment in a populist but also consumption-disguising direction.

Clinton discussed his proposed tax increases for deficit-reduction (Paras. 88-94) without reference to their effects on private savings, though they were targeted at high-income groups classically considered to have a relatively high propensity to save.

Again the verdict is ambiguous. If we assume a Quigleyan influence, we can find traces of it; if we do not, we are unlikely to notice them.

CLINTON ON INVESTMENT. The rhetorical tag "investment" proves much more rewarding when searched for. Quigley's dynamics center on the investment of saved surplus in invention; breakdown is usually a consequence of a failure of investment. Where does
"investment" figure in Clinton's speech and thought?

Approximately everywhere. A concordance of presidential utterance would, I guess, show that President Clinton has officially uttered the word "investment" more often than the preceding six Presidents combined (since Kennedy was politically competitive with Nelson Rockefeller, the last national politician of rank to home in on the topic of economic growth, I leave him out of the hypothesis).

In a general sense, governments of mixed marketive-corporatist-statist-capitalist-corporatist-socialist states such as the 1994 United States can invest in transportation and communications, research and development, and education and training with some expectation that those portions of state investment not diverted by corruption and fraud to consumption subsidies, wage and salary subsidies, employment subsidies, bureaucratic Parkinsonianism, operating subsidies to prevent the collapse of loss-making enterprises public and private, constituency welfare and representative re-election subsidies will result in some lasting increment to private incomes and income-tax driven state revenues.

Clinton's campaign proposed to spend on standard public investment projects (roads) and unheard-of projects (information superhighway) of parallel character--tending to speed the flow of exchange and to enlarge network penetration of private spheres.

"Clintonomics" became recognizable, and was recognized, in the 1992 campaign, not in issues of free trade, vested interests, deficits, or savings, but in relation to "investment":

Call it "Clintonomics"--a strategy to insure robust economic growth through a one-two punch of government investment, which Clinton would increase by $220 billion over four years, and private investment, which he hopes to spark through tax credits,...

Public investment. Many still call it "government spending. Clinton prefers investment because it suggests the long-term benefits he seeks through improved education, technology and infrastructure. (Peterson, 1992)

At least one observer of the 1992 economic conference came away persuaded that Clinton had a genuine and peculiar economic doctrine:

Clinton distinguishes government spending for investment and consumption. Consumption is spending for immediate needs and gratifications, like welfare payments and veterans benefits. This is exactly the kind of spending that interest groups like. The basic rule of Clintonomics, as George Bush might put it, is, "Investment--good. Consumption--baaad."....

The difference, in the gospel according to Clinton,
is that investment generates economic growth. 
Consumption does not. Therefore, it is good to spend money on investment, even if it increases the deficit in the short term, because a growing economy will eventually bring in new tax revenues....

Clinton wants to change the way government works by shifting resources from consumption to investment.... Clinton wants government to get out of the business of endlessly expanding programs and into the business of promoting growth.

It's really a political strategy to secure middle-class support for the Democratic party. (Schneider, 1992)

No doubt the cynic's special variety of utopianism is the naive faith that someone (usually himself) has penetrated to the core of the truth and perceived Reality. Still, there is a connection, though the means and ends are muddled, among the policies, the "gospel," and the strategy; and the "gospel" seems really to be present somewhere in the muddle.

The 1993 State of the Union Address was reported on at the time as a "Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit" (Marcus and Devroy, 1993), which it certainly was. But Clinton did not view it, nor wish it to be viewed, in these terms, except incidentally. Here is how he introduced it:

The plan I offer you has four fundamental components:

First, it shifts our emphasis in public and private spending from consumption to investment, initially by jump-starting the economy in the short term and investing in our people, their jobs and their incomes over the long run. (Paras. 13-14)

The term "invest" or "investment" appears in paras. 3, 8, 14, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 36, 40, 73, 78, 90, 91, 100, 102, and 107 (of 110), doubtless rivaling "the," "and" and "a."

Nonetheless the reporters for the Washington Post buried their substantive references to "investment" deep in para. 44 of their story (Marcus and Devroy, 1993), and gave it a spin Clinton can scarcely have enjoyed:

New spending. Clinton calls this "investment" and has concentrated it in two places. One is on projects aimed at creating jobs quickly and thus stimulating the economy, much of this traditional pork barrel government spending...that Congress will divvy up among its various members...

Specific references to investment included "a permanent investment tax credit" for the estimated 90% or so of businesses with revenues under $5 million (Para. 27), investment in "our
roads, our bridges, our transit systems and high-speed railways and high tech information systems" (para. 29), in immunizations against preventable childhood diseases (para. 40), and an arcane reference that seemed to invite taxpayers to view Clinton's proposed--and ill-fated--"broad-based tax on energy" as "a wise investment for them" (paras. 98-100). The Republican response by House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel was predictable but not uninvited: "The Clinton spin-doctors have even given us a new political vocabulary: 'Investment' now means big government spending your tax dollars." (Michel, 1993)

In denouncing the deficit, Clinton raised the specter that failure to reduce it would mean "we'll be terribly dependent on foreign funds for a large portion of our investment" (Para. 78), a specter more dreadful to populists than to Quigleyans, and one unlikely to have been mentioned in, say, discussions with Mexico on NAFTA.

The narrowly victorious 1994 budget was not quite so free-ranging in its "investment" rhetoric, but still contained traditional and non-traditional "investments" (sometimes shrunken) such as small business investment tax credit and capital gains exclusion, research and development tax credit extension, the Janus-faced "empowerment zones" (Bush-era "enterprise zones" revised) to encourage investment through tax incentives (Republicans' face) targeted at depressed areas (Democrats' face), Head Start, roads and bridges, nutrition for pregnant mothers, childhood immunizations, the student loan program, worker training, the earned income tax credit for the working poor.

The fiscal 1995 budget planning again involved an "investment" package--technology development, job training, help for small manufacturers--which was also explained as a means to "produce jobs," which is subsidy-rhetoric. However, casual observation suggests that when in 1994 Clinton uttered "investment" he very closely uttered "jobs," which may mean that a term ("jobs") that resonates favorably with his audience has been employed to allay their doubts about a term ("investment") which does not.

In this area, Clinton's rhetoric perfectly reflects one aspect of Quigley's theory, the absolute centrality of investment. The closing link of the circular Quigleyan process, where investment feeds back into surplus production and accumulation, is on the other hand never inspected: no estimates are given for the rates and dates of return on these "investments," some of which (e.g. maternal nutrition) are very long-term. This omission no doubt feeds the suspicion that welfare-consumption-subsidy programs were being misleadingly relabeled "investment" by vested interests intending quick institutionalization of the new investment budget, which would provide an ironic, but predictable, case of Quigley's rhetoric being co-opted by his targets, to evade Quigleyan reforms.

In the area of investment, Clinton's form suggests the influence of Quigley; the substance suggests haste.
CLINTON ON INVENTION. This area, labeled, however, "technology" or "productivity," was early recognized as a Clinton special. In April 1992, Alan Murray, the reporter for the Wall Street Journal quoted Clinton adviser Rob Shapiro of the Progressive Policy Institute: "Clinton foresees a heroic expansion of the government's commitment to support basic research in the development of nonmilitary technology." And Murray concurred that Clintonomics indeed entailed "emphasizing measures to increase investment in technology" so as to increase productivity, hence wages and living standards" (Murray, 1992a) -- pure practical Quigleyanism.

In their 1992 campaign document Putting People First, Clinton and Al Gore proposed a variety of redistributive, regulatory, investment and inventive measures. The latter included:

- Creation of a high-speed rail network linking our major cities and commercial hubs (1992: 10)
- Investment in 'smart' highway technology to expand the capacity, speed and efficiency of our major roadways (1992: 10)
- Development of high-tech short-haul aircraft (1992: 10)
- Environmental technology to create the world's most advanced systems to recycle, treat toxic waste, and clean our air and water (1992: 10)
- Making permanent the research and development tax credit to reward companies that invest in groundbreaking technologies. (1992: 12)

Creating a civilian research and development agency to bring together businesses and universities to develop cutting-edge products and technologies. This agency will increase our commercial research and development spending, focusing its efforts in crucial new industries such as biotechnology, robotics, high-speed computing, and environmental technology. (1992: 13)

Creating a small business Technical Extension Service through the SBA, based on the successful Agriculture Extension and Minnesota's proven Outreach Program, to give small business easy access to technical expertise. (1992: 79)

Directing funds to the development of new, clean, efficient energy sources. (1992: 144)

Reorienting the mission of hundreds of national laboratories, moving from defense R&D to more work on commercial renewable energy projects. (1992: 91)

In this venue, there has been a fairly straightforward follow-through, from the 1993 State of the Union Address ("We propose to give small business access to all the new technologies of our..."
Among the notable actions were: the FY 1994 budget (which sought to protect net government R&D expenditure from deficit-cutting and inflationary erosion while reallocating between programs), the 1994 State of the Union Address (praising Congress for "a dramatic increase in high-tech investments to move us from a defense to a domestic high-tech economy," para. 9; "I ask Congress to invest more in the technologies of tomorrow" via defense conversion, which "will create jobs," para. 28; "we must invest in the environmental technologies of the future which will create jobs," para. 29; "Instant access to information will increase productivity.... It will create jobs," para. 30); the planning for the FY 1995 budget: "For the first time in memory, the Commerce Department has become a top priority at the White House. The Administration plans a 12% increase in the department's budget for 1995, primarily to help fund new technology initiatives. One of the biggest beneficiaries is the Advanced Technology Program ... fostering technological research and development on the civilian side. It would receive about $451 million in 1995, up from $190 million." (Risen, 1994)

Most of the 31.2% proposed 1994-1995 increase (above 3% for inflation) for Commerce is absorbed by a 77% increase for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, including $451 million for the Advanced Technology Program for high-risk high-payoff projects, "critical technologies" in which the state sector becomes increasingly a venture capitalist jointly with industry. Another massive increase is $865 million for technology transfer, up 54% FY 1994-1995.

Even though inflation-adjusted federal R&D spending would actually decline slightly for FY 1995 (due to cuts in defense laboratory and academic research facilities spending, fossil energy funding, nuclear fission funding, human space flight, and the abandoned Superconducting Super Collider), it was relatively protected once again. There would be substantial increases for research on nuclear waste storage, energy efficiency, renewable energy, global change, earth studies from orbit, and individual NSF awards. (Science News, 1994) It is hard to disagree with the substance of Michael Schrage's (1994) judgment --provided it is considered as far apart as possible from its metaphoric expression--that "this is an Administration that is putting taxpayer's money where its mouth is in the high-tech arena." Though that mouth can increasingly be heard chanting the apparently protective mantra "will create jobs....will create jobs....will create jobs," the underlying initiative is surely entirely in accord with the Quigleyan admonition to invest in invention. Again there is no estimated rate of return; but for innovation, that omission seems proper.

The key invention: the Information Superhighway. While Clinton allowed one mammoth scientific-technical project with narrow expected economic return, the Superconducting Super Collider, to suffer supersession, another superproject has become the major technological endeavor defining the Clinton Administration; identified with Vice-President Al Gore, but fully supported by the President. It was advanced in the campaign...
document as "A national information network to link every home, business, lab, classroom and library by the year 2015. To expand access to information, we will put public records, databases, libraries and educational materials on-line for public use." (Clinton and Gore, 1992: 10)

It was accelerated in the 1994 State of the Union Address: "We must also work with the private sector to connect every classroom, every clinic, every library, every hospital in America into a national information superhighway by the year 2000. Think of it. Instant access to information will increase productivity. It will help to educate our children. It will provide better medical care. It will create jobs. And I call on the Congress to pass legislation to establish that information superhighway this year." (Para. 30)

If this superproject is to be an extension rather than a corruption of today's "information highway," the Internet, it will [Page 38] be a state-subsidized linkup between computers in home, backpack, workplace, and market at high bandwidth to allow the fast transmission of enormous volumes of information. Some will be "free," i.e. state-subsidized: library-like, museum-like, school-like, government-document-like, deliberative, rhetorical. Some will be "free," i.e. advertiser-subsidized: radio-like, broadcast-TV-like, newspaper-like, flyer-like, classifieds. Some will be sold for profit, competing with or supplementing or supplanting the videotape, CD, book, magazine, telephone, fax. Some will be as yet unthought-of.

The technical bases for the "information freeway" are the technologies governing rates of information transmission, e.g. speed of electronic circuitry, high-carrier-frequency high-bandwidth cabling (e.g. fiber-optic), information-compression, satellite linkups of computers.

Will the "information superhighway" improve or disimprove the current, spontaneous, accidentally state-subsidized (Internet is a mutant from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's ARPA:net) "information freeway"? Internet has managed a 1983 -1992 growth rate faster than the federal deficit, for its linkups increased over 3000 times, from under 300 to over 1 million computers (with over 4 million users). (Cramer, 1994:131) This is a statistic comparable even to the rate of decline of the ruble: [Page 39] "should this trend continue," all anticipated humans will be plugged in--more than once--by the end of Clinton's (possible) second term in office, as whoever changed the target date from 2015 to 2000 must have noted.

There are, however, constraints on network growth. Since costs of linkup are still too high for most individuals, businesses and universities underwrite and control most Internet nodes. The extension to individuals may come via telephone, cable TV, or cellular telephone. Some of the entities which could accomplish the linkup are hidebound; others have corrupt relationships with state monopolism and regulationeering.
What ought not to be done, in the form of state meddling, is fairly clear. The state could best obstruct the linkup process by choosing the most hidebound and corrupt claimant to access control, granting it a monopoly, and then demanding unsound cross-subsidies of the resulting inefficient system via ever-rising tolls upon the users of the current system; this would provide a constant uproar which, no matter how it was "resolved," would divert attention more or less permanently away from Internet expansion, which could be expected to grind to a halt.

At present, the state sector's participation in the information superhighway has not taken a regulatory, redistributive, institutionalizing form, but rather one of investment in invention: e.g. NSF's high-performance computing initiative, with a 23% proposed increase to $328 million (while NIH's high-performance computing budget would go up 41%, to $821 million) (Science, 1994). But the extant expanding network can hardly fail to attract controllers, monopolists, fixers, protectors, and the like. Internet in fact offers a nicely Quigleyan case of an instrument of expansion already functioning, with would-be vested interests on the verge of a pounce. Perhaps we can treat Clinton's future response to their predictably dystrophic initiatives as a test of Quigley's teaching effectiveness.

THE HEALTH CARE ISSUE. There were initial signs of Quigleyan concepts in Clinton's discussion of health care, the substantive issue which preoccupied him during much of his first two years in office. Thus in the 1993 State of the Union Address, it was explicitly juxtaposed to "investment": "In 1992 we spent 14 percent of our income on health care.... [If present trends continue] almost 20 percent of our income will be in health care.... Reducing health care costs can liberate literally hundreds of billions of dollars for new investment and growth.... Reforming health care over the long run is critically essential to reducing not only our deficit but to expanding investment in America." (Paras. 35-36) There was however also a redistributive side to the issue: the need to provide "a basic package of health care benefits" to all citizens "so that no one will be denied the coverage they need." (Paras. 35, 37)

Even this sidelong investment reference, which sees investment as an alternative to health care, was a deviation from the course laid down in the 1992 campaign document Putting People First, in which the health care section (1992: 19-23) is exclusively regulatory and redistributive, with no reference to investment, return, technology or research.

By the time of the 1994 State of the Union Address, the redistributive aspect had taken full control of Clinton's rhetoric. In his extensive discussion (paras. 48-75) of what was intended to be that year's crucial agenda, the word "investment" does not appear; instead the theme is to guarantee by legislation to every American health care coverage "that can never be taken away" (para. 75) at the same high level of quality and low costs as that available to the state bureaucracy (paras. 66, 73) via state-guaranteed employer-based "private insurance for every American"
Despite a rousing attack on "special interests" that would oppose these proposals (paras. 71-72), Clinton's analysis of the health care issue has become essentially non-Quigleyan, except [Page 42] in reflecting the redistributive struggles characteristic of Quigleyan breakdowns. The possibility of reforming, circumventing or reinventing sclerotic medical institutions by, for example, placing free-access diagnostician programs on the "information freeway," moving more drugs from the pharmacy to the open shelves, expanding the practices of nurses and pharmacists and public-health workers, increasing the reach of mailout pharmacies, shifting the entire balance of health expenditure from treatment toward prevention (especially of smoking-, alcohol- and diet-related disease), concentrating medical research in areas that could reduce chronic debilitation (e.g. neurology, Alzheimer's and other "agings"), shifting costs of preventable diseases toward imprudence by health-cost-taxing not only tobacco and alcohol but salt, animal fats, sugar, and currently illegal (necessarily then legalized to allow taxation) substances, is thoroughly marginalized ("People who smoke should pay more for a pack of cigarettes," para. 70) and next to nowhere.

CLINTONOMICS OR QUIGLOHOMICS? By the time of the Group of Seven industrialized nations Detroit meeting (March 14, 1994), James Risen (or his headline --1994c) was labeling the President's economic-policy tendencies not merely as a consistent "Clintonomics," a label traceable at least to 1992 (Murray 1992a) and one which implies a certain systematicity, but as the "cult of Clintonomics," which implies the same, plus a judgment. Risen's [Page 43] piece and a companion piece by James Gerstenzang did indeed show a certain mantric tendency of their own, citing Clinton's views on "technological advances" four times (to be taken advantage of), "technological revolution" once, "technological changes" once (to be embraced), "productivity" four times (connected with gains, growth, improvements, increases), and "investments" once (to be sharply increased).

At the G-7 meeting, Clinton sought a "convergence" of U.S., European, and Japanese labor policies upon his own vision: full acceptance of labor-saving technologies; substantial state investment in training and apprenticeships in advanced skills. Indeed, in its focused emphasis on the desirability of investment, invention, institutional reforms, and collective convergence toward pattern-uniformity, the President's speech could hardly have been more Quigleyan in character.

The central theme of Quigley's theory--investment in invention--is equally central to Clinton's rhetoric, and there has been a determined effort, marginalized by the deficit crisis, to realize it. "Investment" per se is also central to Clinton's rhetoric, though here there is more room for doubt as to the relationship between the idea, the label, and the programs. Reformist confrontation with vested interests is very important to making Quigley's doctrine operational, and Clinton's rhetoric is [Page 44] frequently confrontation al--but only with respect to traditional populist targets; yet some reforms do impinge strongly
on interests that would be Quigleyan but not populist targets. Deficit-cutting has been accomplished while protecting investment and invention, as Clinton conceives them. Free-trading, consistent with Quigley’s approach, has been pursued, but via a populist, not a Quigleyan rhetoric. The health-care episode, in its fundamentally redistributive character, appears in this context to be a deviation, a very large one to be sure, but a deviation still, from the main track of Clinton’s discourse (represented especially by the 1992 campaign document and the 1994 State of the Union Address), and of his action (represented by the discretionary parts of the FY 1994 budget and the FY 1995 budget plan), to which he recurs whenever considerations of the moment do not persuade him otherwise.

Either Clinton paid very close attention to Quigley, or they chanced to focus on almost precisely the same set of economic ideas. Though intensely inclined to compromise, to hedge, to balance, to screen with references to "jobs," to wander (the health care package wanders almost antipodally), Clintonomics can reasonably be judged the practical and contemporary incarnation of Quigley’s operative world-systems theory.

**CRITIQUE: QUIGLEY.** Once a theorist becomes politically influential, it is well to take a new look at his theory.

I have previously (1988) discussed Quigley’s theories, in the context of comparison to those of Immanuel Wallerstein, at some length. I think now, as I concluded then, that "Carroll Quigley's economically driven model of the evolution of a civilization is elegant, lucid, consistent, and tight." (1988: 55) Quigley’s concept of an instrument of expansion, of core-periphery relationships, and of expansion/stagnation cycles, are of great analytical value, and should receive more attention than world-systems analysts have given them.

I also judged then, and judge now, that there were serious problems in Quigley’s model’s "delimitation of the units of macrosocial analysis, and in its dependence upon a relatively homogeneous structure and process to explain fluctuations in relatively heterogeneous social systems" (1988: 55). The issue of heterogeneity vs. uniformity is of fundamental importance in the study of civilizations/world systems, and has implications for practice as well. At the micro as at the macrolevel societies are culturally heterogeneous stewpots. As regards economic culture, it is entirely normal to change economies as one crosses the house threshold, or moves from marketplace to cathedral, from retail shop to giant corporation. Economic polyculture, with no pervasive "instrument of expansion" or "mode of production," is also the norm of cities past. In ancient Athens one found household economy, and state slavery, and a welfare state, and a trading oligarchy, and statist imperialism, and a marketplace, and a tributary protection racket, all coexisting disharmoniously. If such a variety of instruments and institutions of expansion could struggle on within so tiny an area, how much more likely that a polycultural economy is the norm at the macrosocial level!
We ought to assume that it is the norm for macrosocieties to have many different instruments of expansion, badly orchestrated so as to have different timescales of function and crisis (cf. Iberall and Wilkinson, 1987; 1993). In a diverse polycultural society -- where diversity is not a utopian goal but a natural fact -- this means that what Quigley sees in bilateral relationships as the propensity of those cultures in or nearer to expansion to dominate those cultures not in expansion or farther from it (1961:91-92) may be extended to the whole world system: where all its main regions are in phase (cf. Wilkinson, 1992a) there may be no pre-eminent core, while if they are out of phase one will emerge -- but not last forever (cf. Wilkinson, 1991).

The chief weakness of Quigley's theory seems to me to be its tendency to social monoculturalism, which causes him to perceive in the contemporary world a plurality of monocultural civilizations which have only external relations with each other, rather than the [Page 47] single polycultural civilization, with many complex transactions among its cultural strands, which I would contend now exists (Wilkinson, 1987a) as the sole successor to the plurality of civilizations of the past, which were themselves polycultural rather than monocultural (Iberall and Wilkinson, 1993).

In particular reference to the economics of civilizations/world systems: in Quigley's theory of stages of civilizational development, there is found a stage of gestation during which the whole society is pervaded by a single instrument of expansion (1961:80). If I am right, this never happens, or is never all that happens. Rather the new instrument propagates at first, looks as if it will be all-pervasive, but then slows down, hits boundaries, takes up a merely diffusive velocity, becomes diluted, fails to penetrate this region or that sector, falls into breakdown before it has reached the society's outer boundary, and in short runs into one or another limit on its own expansion. I believe this can be shown to be empirically true of priestly, feudal, slave, statist, marketive and corporate instruments of the past, and that it ought to be treated as generally true.

Quigley himself took two significant steps in this direction, with his core-periphery theory, which incorporates a very significant diffusive delay (1961: 81-82), and with his labeling of the West's economic organization, at least since 1934, [Page 48] as "pluralist" rather than "capitalist." 1966: 37-39)

But more is needed. Quigley admits to his theory a stage of cultural "mixture" (1961: 79-80); but the stage of mixture is always a remote preliminary [or, as a stage of "invasion," postliminary (1961: 88-89)] to the period of expansion, which is one of organizational uniformity. I would propose, on the contrary, that expansion is characteristically heterogeneous and involves continuing "mixture," cultural borrowing, and innovation in response to culture-contrasts. Although within any expansion it is quite likely that some of the expanding regions and sectors become more uniform, i.e. pervaded predominantly by one instrument of expansion, others will have become less alike, i.e. pervaded by
different instruments which serve the same purpose.

World systems as a whole may be more or less homogeneous if their orchestra of instruments of expansion. The more uniform a world system is, the more tightly coupled and synchronized its growths and breakdowns ought to be; the more striking its glorious achievements; the more notable and devastating its catastrophes. The more diverse it is, the more dephased its components should be; always afloat, like Lincoln's raft, but with the rafters' feet always wet. On the whole, it seems wiser to preserve economic diversity, if that can be done.

[Page 49] In a heterogeneous orchestra (or festival?) of expansion, the instruments will all break down from time to time, but out of sync, so that, during each such local crisis, alternative local instruments of expansion may be imported or created to circumvent the old broken-down ones, so that the same subeconomy that exports corporate capitalism in its time of success to broken-down state socialists may import monopolistic bureaucracy, or welfare social-liberalism, in its time of crisis. Accordingly, the abstract test of actual expansion is a better test of a world-economy's vitality than the formal test of economic structure, since all structures function at some times and fail at others.

As far as contemporary students of world systems are concerned, this is a vote for Frank and Gills (1993: 46) in their argument over the disutility of the nodes-of-production concept in world-system analysis, and a suggestion that Quigleyan theory as well as world-systems theory be worked over from a polycultural perspective.

CRITIQUE: CLINTON. Despite this partly critical reading of Quigley's theory, I nevertheless believe that Clinton was lucky in his choice of teachers, and that he would on the whole do well to grant Quigley's economic-reform theory even more power, in his words and his priorities, than it already seems to possess; the more of Quigley's ideas that Clinton's praxis reflects, the more effective, coherent and innovative it seems.

Some of the fringe areas adopted by Clintonomic "investment" rhetoric could profit from further application of Quigleyan principles. Thus "investments" in mass transit commonly turn out to mean enormous and interminable consumption subsidies to failed state monopolies (subways, buses) or state-private monopolies (suburban rail). One needs to think of reforms that might allow the privatization of --and investment in--some elements (despite resistance from such vested interests as riders, employees and bureaucracies); reduced deficits for others (e.g. by extension of subway platforms to serve as walkways, and rentals of business frontage along these "understreets"); circumventions of others, as by jitneys (despite resistance from taxi monopolies); even genuine innovations, such as freeway monorail (however abominable to the nimby).

Another area needing reinvention, even if in violation of vested interests to the contrary, is low-income housing, which historically occurred spontaneously in rapidly developing areas
with low land values and vanished as land values skyrocketed. Why not found new cities, around new industries and universities devoted to government-and-industry funded technological research, on marginal or abandoned farm- and ranch-land (often sold for 1/1000 of the price of land in the high-rent districts); if you [Page 51] build it, they will come. There will still be a subsidy, but it will subsidize invention, which is legitimate Quigleyan economics; the improvement in consumption should be allowed to follow.

Clintonomics also needs to take to heart--and to be seen as taking to heart--the following:

[A] 1991 Congressional Budget Office study of the $125 billion or more the federal government already spends on physical and human capital development concluded that higher rates of return on public over private investment "can only be expected on carefully selected spending projects." (Allen, 1992)

A characteristic of the entire body of Clinton's discourse on "investment" from his campaign blueprint to his FY 1995 budget is the absence of a discussion of anticipated rates of return. Clinton economic adviser Robert Solow of MIT has been quoted as saying "Public capital probably has the same net addition to productivity as private capital" (Murray, 1992b), which may reflect the "Aschauer curve" theory of 1988, showing a net positive relationship between U.S. government spending on infrastructure and productivity growth, a proposition not endorsed by the 1991 study; but more is needed. Aschauer himself doubts (Morgan and [Page 52] Southerland, 1992) that real pork-barrel highways would provide as good long-term returns as more advanced technologies. Without being too ambitious, one might begin by trying to distinguish investments--current as well as proposed, private (especially subsidized) as well as public--with negative rates of return, and turning them into disinvestments, to finance the more hopeful portion of the investment budget.

In the area of foreign policy, however, rather than being more Quigleyan, I judge that Clinton needs to reconsider certain Quigleyan tendencies reflected in his G-7 reference to "convergence." Like most other civilizationists of his generations--and others--Quigley was strongly influenced by the monoculturalism of the preceding great theorists of civilizations, particularly Toynbee. (See, e.g., Toynbee 1972.) Monoculturalism in comparative-civilizational studies draws spatial and temporal boundaries of civilizations around areas of cultural coherence (vs. intense social interaction), treats essential civilizational change as culturally endogenous, and sees intercultural interaction most importantly in terms of threat, clash, or invasion (e.g. Quigley, 1961: 88-92; or, most recently, Samuel P. Huntington: 1993). This description, although it neglects their vital trading relations within the okukumene (Wilkinson, 1992b, 1993a), does in fact fit the historic interaction of genuine civilizations, which collided with each [Page 53] other, and in doing so lost their historical autonomy and ceased to exist as self-determined entities (Wilkinson, 1984,
But the past is past, and this process is obsolete, because it is complete. Today there is only one global civilization, one surviving world system, no longer many: this already extant, singular, world civilization, like the several root civilizations that fused to form it, is polycultural not monocultural; having no civilization external to it, it need fear none.

The external policy of a state in a polycultural civilization can, however, possess a very Quigleyan virtue, albeit one that he praised only in respect of the internal politics of Western civilization," namely "Inclusive Diversity."

The West believes in diversity rather than uniformity, in pluralism rather than monism or dualism, in inclusion rather than exclusion, in liberty rather than authority, in truth rather than in power, in conversion rather than in annihilation, in the individual rather than in the organization, in reconciliation rather than in triumph, in heterogeneity rather than in homogeneity, in relativisms rather than in absolutes, and in approximations rather than in final answers. The West believes that man and the universe are both complex and that the apparently discordant parts of each can be put into a reasonably workable arrangement with a little good will, patience, and experimentation. (1966: 1227)

The tradition of the West...is one of Inclusive Diversity in which one of the chief problems is how elements that seem discordant, but are recognized as real and necessary, may be fitted together. (1966: 1233)

The theme of Inclusive Diversity has a direct application at the systemic/civilizational (global) as well as the regional/cultural (Western) level. It is probably superior to "convergence" as a slogan for international economic policy. The aspect of "inclusion" in this context becomes one of exchange in ideas, persons and patterns, not just trade in goods; the aspect of "diversity" becomes the acceptance that no amount of converging will produce convergence.

Before pressuring Japan to abandon its industrial policy, or India to drop its tariff and investment barriers, or Russia to dissolve its statal/parastatal firms, or West Europe and the US to homogenize their respective welfare states, one should ask, are these economies in a crisis of expansion? If so, are these the responsible institutions? Or are the economies successfully producing surplus, saving, investing, inventing, investing in invention? If so they need and will tolerate no reforming; rather their patterns should be tolerated, studied and learned from. If not they need reforming, and will rebuff it. But in that event, there will also be deprived majorities and innovative reformers critical of the vested interests and willing to try a new way. With such, one can cooperate in discussing reforms which need not be structurally homogenistic, or in creating what Quigley called "circumventions," new patterns which perform the functions of expansion while the old
patterns are left unreformed to wither away.

It isn't clear that Clinton has yet accepted that the world economy is a macroeconomy where "a rising tide lifts all the boats," to quote a phrase Kennedy applied to the US "macroeconomy" (i.e. microeconomy, or at best mesoeconomy). Clinton's arguments for investment in education and infrastructure are said (Peterson, 1992) to derive from Robert Reich's contention (1991) that this will provide a competitive edge in the global struggle to attract free-floating capital and technology -- but the argument is valid only in short-range mesoeconomic terms, since other states are active players and can do the same, ending in a subsidy race whose outcome may or may not be macroeconomically (world-economically) rational, as compared to a cooperative division of labor such as increasingly attractive in big-ticket long-term big-science/high-tech megaprojects like space stations and high-energy physics installations. Who is to say that the boats will not be lifted best by a U.S. subsidy to education or infrastructure in, say, the Philippines, or India, or China, or if one must show more mesoeconomic commitment, in Mexico?

The comparative study of civilizations and world-historical systems may supply would-be reformers and circumventors with a flow of ideas, once it is recognized that history is not a neat sequence of developmental stages each of which renders its predecessor obsolete. For instance: in former times the Phoenician and Greek innovators in Central civilization c. 1500-500 BC got round the stagnant statist economies of extractive monarchs by setting up emporiums (e.g. Emporium itself), free ports where traders could ship and sell at international market prices. Hong Kong embodies the modern version of that ancient but long-effective pattern. Consumers cheated of the chance to shop at international market prices by tariffs, trading monopolies, quotas, and the like, and unable to afford international air fares, might well be able to travel domestically to a St. Petersburg, a Vladivostok, a Goa, a Detroit, a Nagasaki -- among many other potential emporia -- to access the international consumer goods market, if only these cities' national customs barriers were shifted to the city limits. An international agreement to permit a standard minimum duty-free allowance across those shifted barriers (which could also be raised outside rather than inside great international airports, or run-down waterfronts, which would accordingly turn into enormous shopping centers) of, say, US $1000 per trip and $10,000 per year might be less offensive as a bargaining target in international economic negotiations than "Be more like us."

Before saying that, in any case one should have asked, are we ourselves saving? investing? inventing? investing in invention? If we have realized a scheme for doing all of the above, we have something to offer; but if we do we will probably disseminate it unwittingly and unintentionally by the creative fascination of the successful example (cf. Toynbee, 1972: 224). If not, attempts to disseminate imperfect patterns via the power of the jawbone are likely to call forth amusement, resentment, disillusion or resistance. To institute the free-port innovation at half a dozen U.S. airports in troubled cities might be rewarding politically as well as economically, effective domestically as well as
internationally, exemplary rather than domineering; and, for a student of Quigley’s, in accord with his most expansive teachings.

Since it appears that one piece of Clintonomic doctrine, microbanks to make microloans to microenterprises, credited to experience in Chicago and Arkansas (Clinton and Gore, 1992: 149), also involves some learning from the experience of Bangladesh (Murray, 1992a, citing Lewis Solomon), this Administration may in general be inclined to import ideas --and even [Page 58] technology--from less conventional sources than the norm.

A great deal of research of general use to the world economy could be done (and is being done but not disseminated) in the Russian, Indian and Chinese economies, whose labor-intensive research enterprises should not be precluded from competing for grants via NSF, or receiving operating subsidies via AID.

And there is no reason on Earth why the "information superhighway" should be merely national in its reach --Internet is already multi-continental--and every reason why a national web should be conceived as only one major interchange in a global "information freeway." (This point has, in principle, perhaps been taken: Reuters 3/22/94 reports that Vice President Al Gore told the International Telecommunications Union conference in Buenos Aires that it was time to build a "global information infrastructure," a "network of networks," to raise business productivity, bring education everywhere, and promote representative democracy. Privatization, competition, and interconnection were emphasized as governing principles.)

Given these reservations and suggestions, in the net it seems fair to say that Clinton learned much from Quigley, gained much by what he imbibed of Quigley's distillation of world system history. Despite Quigley's objections to Plato, it seems fair to compare him to that philosopher in respect of their students who were, or [Page 59] became, statesmen. In that sense, Clinton as a student to Quigley has proven closer to the model of the faithful Dion ("as soon as he got a taste of a rational philosophy which led the way to virtue, his soul was...on fire": Plutarch, 1918: 9) than to that of the hopeless Dionysius (who "was driven to use inaptly what he had imperfectly learned from Plato": 1918: 37). Distracted by the need to respond to daily events and by the struggle for power and survival, driven by an inclination to compromise, rhetoricize, dilute and seek consensus, constrained by the marginality of his freedom to budget, with neither his own appointees nor the various Washington establishments (bureaucratic, Congressional, media) inherently sympathetic to the theory he favors but does not fully command, Clinton also provides a case study of the limits that would constrain the application of any of the prevalent theories of the very large scale and the very long term, whether of "world-systems," "world systems," or "civilizations."

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