The Parallels between Mass Incarceration and Mass Deportation: An Intersectional Analysis of State Repression

Tanya Golash-Boza
University of California, Merced
tgolash-boza@ucmerced.edu

Abstract

In the spring of 2014, President Obama’s administration reached a landmark of over 2 million deportations—more in under six years than the sum total of all deportations prior to 1997. Mass deportation has not affected all communities equally: the vast majority of deportees are Latin American and Caribbean men. Today, nearly 90 percent of deportees are men, and over 97 percent of deportees are Latin American or Caribbean. This article explores the global context under which mass deportation has occurred and draws parallels with mass incarceration. Whereas other scholars have characterized mass deportation as a tool of social or migration control, this article argues that mass deportation is best understood as a racialized and gendered tool of state repression implemented in a time of crisis. I argue that the confluence of four factors has created the conditions of possibility for mass deportation from the United States: (1) nearly all deportees are Latin American and Caribbean men; (2) the rise of a politics of fear in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th; (3) the global financial crisis; and (4) the utility of deportees.

Keywords: Global capitalism, neoliberalism, deportation, incarceration, crisis, politics of fear, intersectionality

1 I would like to thank Zulema Valdez, Anneeth Kaur Hundle, Ma Vang, Vilna Treitler, Mael Vizcarra, Ximena García Bustamante, Elliot Young, Jemima Pierre, and the JWSR editors and anonymous reviewers for critical comments on this article.
In President Obama’s first five years in office, there were 2 million deportations from the United States. This sum is more than the total number of all deportations prior to 1997, and far more than any previous President.

The quantity as well as the quality of deportations has shifted in recent years. There has been a move towards the deportation of convicted criminals and a concomitant focus on interior enforcement—immigration policing within the United States as opposed to along the borders. With these trends, there has also been an increase in the number of deportees who have family ties to the United States. In addition, mass deportation has not affected all immigrants equally: the vast majority of deportees are Latin American and Caribbean men. Nearly 90 percent of deportees are men, and over 97 percent are Latin American or Caribbean nationals (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). Fully 94 percent of deportations from the interior of the United States involve men (Rosenblum and McCabe 2014).

Figure 1: Removals from the United States, 1892-2012

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics

Deportations have increased in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and Australia (Gibney 2008). This “deportation turn” (Gibney 2008: 146) is a reflection of an enhancement in immigration control in these countries; it also shows efforts to

---

2 As of April 1, 1997, the government reclassified all exclusion and deportations procedures as “Removal proceedings,” but in this manuscript, I use the terms deportation and removal interchangeably, as they are used colloquially.
close the gap between the number of people eligible for deportation and those actually deported. This shift in immigration enforcement has been most pronounced in the United States—where the annual number of deportations is by far the largest in comparison to other countries.

Why has mass deportation emerged in this particular historical moment? I argue that the confluence of four factors has created the conditions of possibility for mass deportation from the United States: (1) nearly all deportees are Latin American and Caribbean men; (2) the rise of a politics of fear in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th; (3) the global financial crisis; and (4) the utility of deportees. I further contend that an understanding of the emergence of mass deportation is aided by an analysis of a similar form of state repression: mass incarceration.

The Context of Mass Deportation

Between 1997 and 2015, there were over five million deportations from the United States—two and a half times the sum total of all deportations prior to 1997. This trend can be examined using policy-level explanations, which will show us how this happened, and after we can discuss why this happened.

The policy of mass deportation in the United States is a result of punitive laws passed in 1996 as well as recent policy and budgetary shifts in the Executive Branch of the U.S. government. Deportations increased beginning in 1997 because Congress had passed two laws the previous year which fundamentally changed the rights of all foreign-born people in the United States—namely, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). These laws eliminated judicial review of some deportation orders and required mandatory detention for some non-citizens (Fragomen 1997). The 1996 laws led to an increase in the number of deportations for three reasons: (1) they expanded the grounds on which a person could be deported; (2) they narrowed the grounds for appealing a deportation order; and (3) they allocated more funds to immigration law enforcement.

The passage of the 1996 laws resulted in the number of deportees nearly doubling from 70,000 in 1996 to 114,432 in 1997. In 1998, the number of deportees rose to 173,000. The numbers crept up slowly until 2003 when the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) infused more money into immigration law enforcement, and deportation rates skyrocketed. Two factors led Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to develop an annual goal of 400,000 deportations in 2010—congressional funding for immigration law enforcement and pressure to enforce the law. In 2012, this goal was surpassed with over 419,000 deportations carried out that fiscal year. In 2013, the number of deportations was even higher: 438,421.3

The 1996 laws were passed in a moment of racialized fears related to crime, and these laws have not changed substantially since 1996. Instead, Congress appropriated increasing amounts of money for immigration law enforcement in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget for DHS was $56 billion, 30 percent of which was directed at immigration law enforcement through ICE and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). Another 18 percent of the total went to the U.S. Coast Guard and five percent to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). In other words, over half the DHS budget is directed at border security and immigration law enforcement. To put this $56 billion in perspective, the Department of Education FY 2011 budget was $77.8 billion, and the Department of Justice budget was $29.2 billion. In short, the rise in deportations over the past decade primarily stems from policies designed to expand immigration law enforcement as part of the broader response to the September 11 attacks. Notably, the 1996 laws were also implemented in the aftermath of terrorist attacks: the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center blast. The links between fears of terrorism and immigration law enforcement are thus longstanding.

**Theorizing Deportation**

Scholars are only beginning to grapple with the significance of the current era of mass deportations, yet few thinkers are placing deportation within the larger context of global capitalism. Researchers from diverse disciplines have analyzed the soaring number of deportations (Coutin 2010, Hernandez 2008, Brotherton and Barrios 2011, Kanstroom 2012; King, Massoglia, and Uggen 2012; Kretsedemas 2012; Golash-Boza 2012), and the increases in local immigration law enforcement (Coleman 2012; Armenta 2012; Stumpf 2006; Zilberg 2004), yet these studies have not considered why mass deportation is happening now. Moreover, little attention has been paid to why nearly all deportees are Latin American and Caribbean men, nor to how deportation is related to global movements of labor and capital.

Scholars who consider why deportation happens generally provide two related explanations: (1) deportation functions as social or migration control (Bloch and Schuster 2005; Gibney 2008; Bosworth 2011; Collyer 2012); and (2) deportation creates a vulnerable workforce (de Genova 2005). For many scholars, deportation is a demonstration “of the capacity of the state to control the movement of non-citizens” (Bloch and Schuster 2005: 509). Since only non-citizens can be deported, “deportation works for governing elites to reinforce the value and significance of

---


national citizenship” (Anderson, Gibney, and Paoletti 2013: 2). Kanstroom (2007: 5) takes this idea further when he argues that “deportation is now, and has always been, considerably more than [an instrument of immigration policy]” and that it is also a “powerful tool of discretionary social control.” Governments use deportation statistics to show they are tough on crime and thereby gain legitimacy through this version of social control (Gibney 2008; Bosworth 2011). In addition, Tamara Nopper (2008: 204-5) points to the racial dimensions of this process when she argues that that the increase in criminal deportations “reflects the growing intersection between immigration enforcement and the forms of crime control to which Black populations in the United States (both immigrant and native born) have been historically subjected.” Nopper’s point is important: the tough-on-crime approach has historically been used primarily on racial minorities, and deportation is no exception. Deportability subordinates migrants not by actually deporting all those that are deportable but by deporting some such that others may remain in a state of enhanced vulnerability. The illegality and deportability of undocumented migrants render them and their labor power “an eminently disposable commodity” (de Genova 2005: 215).

These studies all provide useful ways to understand deportation. However, I would like to offer a few general critiques. Most of these studies do not explain the racialized and gendered nature of deportation, thus failing to address the question of why nearly all deportees are men of color. Moreover, they tend to look at deportation as a domestic policy issue even though deportation involves a relationship between at least two countries. Because of this international aspect, it makes sense to consider deportation in the context of theories of migration that view international migration as part of the global movement of labor and capital. As I will argue below, deportation is best understood when we take into account the latest crisis of global capitalism. Looking at deportation from this perspective helps us to perceive how global economic restructuring has played out in gendered and racialized ways.

**Mass Incarceration and Mass Deportation**

There are a number of parallels between mass incarceration and mass deportation. For instance, the vast majority of targets of both forms of state repression are Black and Latino men (Christian and Thomas 2009; Western 2006; Alexander 2012; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). Both mass incarceration and mass deportation have been justified using a racialized and gendered politics of fear. In addition, they both emerged in times of crisis: mass incarceration came in the aftermath of the 1970s oil crisis and the consequent deindustrialization, and mass deportation escalated and intensified in the aftermath of the 2007 Great Recession. Finally, there are sectors of the transnational corporate elite that have found ways to profit from each of these phenomena. In this section, I will make these connections clear.
Demographics of Incarceration and Deportation

According to the Pew Hispanic Center, of the 10.4 million undocumented adults in the United States in 2008, 4.1 million were women. And, 80 percent were from Latin America or the Caribbean (Passel and Cohn 2009). Any non-citizen can face deportation, but undocumented immigrants are most at risk for deportation. Although 40 percent of undocumented immigrants are women, they make up only 10 percent of deportees. And, although 20 percent of undocumented immigrants are not Latin Americans, these immigrants account for less than 2 percent of deportees. Latin American and Caribbean men are much more likely to be deported than any other group.

The expansion of immigration law enforcement has focused almost exclusively on immigrant men, yet scholarly studies of deportation rarely mention gender (Coutin 2010, Gibney 2008; Hernandez 2008, Brotherton and Barrios 2011, Kantrroom 2012; King, Massoglia, and Uggen 2012; Kretsedemas 2012; Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez. 2008). In 2011, 89 percent of all removals involved men. Moreover, the rise in removals since 1998 has almost exclusively affected male non-citizens while the number of females deported has remained stable.\(^6\) There were 44,029 deportations of women in 1999, and there were 43,781 deportations of women in 2011—both figures are roughly the same. By contrast, the number of male deportations rose from 138,231 in 1998 to 347,947 in 2011—a 250 percent increase. The gender ratio of removals between 1998 and 2011 is displayed in Figure 2 below. This figure renders it evident that the policy changes in 1996 as well as those changes brought about by the War on Terror have led to increased deportations of men but not of women. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 appears to have coincided directly with a rise in the deportation of men from the United States.

The tremendous rise in deportations has also affected some national origin groups more than others. Nearly all of the increase in removals since 2003 is due to an increase in the number of Mexicans and Central Americans removed. These disparities refer to overall removals, which can include undocumented immigrants as well as those who are legally present. Whereas any undocumented immigrant can face removal, legally present immigrants only face deportation after a criminal charge or a visa violation (such as working more than the allotted hours on a student visa). When the numbers of Caribbean legal permanent residents deported are examined, distinct trends emerge. Dominicans and Jamaicans are the two groups most likely to be deported on drug charges. Overall, around a quarter of all criminal deportees are deported on drug charges, yet these percentages are far higher for Jamaicans and Dominicans—80 percent for Dominicans and 40 percent for Jamaicans (Siulc 2011; Headley et al 2005). The Dominican Republic and Jamaica are

---

\(^6\) The Office of Immigration Statistics provided me with removal data by sex between 1998 and 2011. I requested data going back to 1892, and am still waiting to hear if I am able to obtain more historical data.
the two countries with the highest rate of criminal deportees. Relatedly, they are also the legal permanent residents most likely to face deportation. Both Jamaicans and Dominicans are about five times as likely as other legal permanent residents to be deported (Golash-Boza 2015).

Figure 2: DHS Removals by Sex: Fiscal Years 1998 to 2011.

![Graph showing DHS removals by sex: Fiscal Years 1998 to 2011.](image)


Deportations data show a marked increase in the deportations of male Mexicans and Central Americans as well as in male Jamaican and Dominican legal permanent residents since 1996. The rise in deportations has targeted Black and Latin American male immigrants as these populations have become superfluous in the downsized economy. Jamaicans and Dominicans have primarily been apprehended via the criminal justice system, thus their deportations are an extension of mass incarceration (Golash-Boza 2015). Mexicans and Central Americans have also been caught up in the dragnet in this fashion, but many others have been apprehended due to changes in the way immigration laws are enforced. We can imagine ways that immigration laws could be enforced that would have targeted women: there could have been raids on hotels or informal markets, but this did not happen. Instead, immigration law enforcement has teamed up

---

7 In January 2016, there was a widely publicized roundup of Central American women and children. In many ways, this was more spectacle than law enforcement. News accounts report 121 people were deported in this way. Although pernicious to these families, this is a relatively small number when we consider that over 1,000 people were deported every day between 2009 and 2014.
with criminal law enforcement—a collaboration that has led to these specific gender and racial disparities in deportations.

Figure 3: Total Removals and Removals by Region, 1998-2011

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics

Similar to the race and gender disparities in mass deportation, we find parallel disparities in mass incarceration. In 2008, less than one-third of the population of the United States was Black or Latino. In that same year, Blacks and Latinos made up 58 percent of the nation’s prison population (NAACP 2011). In 2013, men made up 93 percent of all prisoners in the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress implemented a series of drug and crime control policies that disproportionately affected African Americans (Tonry 2011). Whereas Black-to-White prison admission rates were three-to-one from 1926 to 1975, they had risen to six-to-one by 1997 (Murakawa 2014). The United States has engaged in a long-standing War on Drugs that has failed in its mission to eliminate the prevalence of illegal drugs, yet has succeeded in incarcerating millions of African Americans. Michael Tonry (2011: 75) explains: “it is clear that Black people bear most of the brunt of the War on Drugs. It is also clear that racial disparities among people imprisoned for drug offenses arise primarily from racial profiling by the police, deliberate police policies to focus drug law enforcement on inner-city drug markets, and deliberate legislative

---

decisions to attach the longest prison sentences to drug offenses for which Blacks are disproportionately arrested.” Research in this area renders it clear that mass incarceration and mass deportation both disproportionately target men. Whereas Black men are the primary targets of mass incarceration, Latino men are the primary targets of mass deportation.

The Politics of Fear
The above section demonstrates that mass incarceration and mass deportation are both forms of state repression that have disproportionately targeted Black and Latino men, which, I argue, is one of the conditions of possibility as this is a vulnerable and stigmatized group. This section explores the raced and gendered discourses that made this targeting possible. The implicit argument in both of these sections is that these extreme forms of state repression would not have happened without the dehumanization of the targets through racialized and gendered discourses.

One of the most famous examples of a politician using the fear of crime as a campaign tactic is known as the “Willie Horton” case. In the 1988 run for presidential office, the George H. W. Bush campaign was able to play on White Americans’ fear of crime and racial prejudices against Blacks through the use of an ad that featured “Willie Horton.” William Horton, a Black man, escaped from prison while on a weekend pass. He then “kidnapped and brutally assaulted a White couple in their home, raping the woman and stabbing the man” (Mendelberg 1997). An ad that featured this story and a mug shot of Mr. Horton was used by the Bush campaign to portray Democratic candidate Dukakis as lax on crime. This ad was part of Bush’s successful presidential campaign. This is just one of many examples of politicians using the fear of crime for political gain. Notably, the Willie Horton case used both the fear of crime and the fear of Black men to push forward a political agenda.

As Katheryn Russell-Brown (1998) explains when she writes about the criminalblackman, fear of crime is both raced and gendered. Whereas Black women are stereotyped as angry, welfare queens, and jezebels, Black men are stereotyped as thugs, rapists, and hustlers (Collins 2004). The gendered and raced stereotypes of Black men as criminals contribute to a racial and gendered ideology that justifies the mass incarceration of Black men. Popular discourse in the United States that represents Black men as criminally inclined serves as a justification for the mass incarceration of Black men, and leads people to believe that we build prisons to protect ourselves from this threat. Which discourses, then, justify mass deportation of Black and Latino men?

In the post-9/11 context, a construction of immigrant men as dangerous criminal aliens and terrorists has emerged. This construction of the dangerous immigrant is gendered male and racialized as a Latino criminal (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013) or an Arab terrorist (Naber 2006). In the post-9/11 context, people perceived to be Arabs have been victims of hate crimes and other forms of harassment due to the conflation of Arabs and terrorists. State policies
have targeted Arabs. One example is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which required male visitors from twenty-five Arab and Muslim countries and North Korea living in the United States to report to immigration officers and be fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned. Despite interviewing over eighty thousand people, no one was deported or denied entry on terrorism grounds, although many were deported for having overstayed their visas. Overall, relatively few Arabs have been deported from the United States since 9/11 (Golash-Boza 2012). Instead, state policies designed to combat terrorism have targeted Latinos.

The targeting of Latinos in immigration policy enforcement has been accompanied by media representations of Latinos as dangerous. As scholars such as Leo Chavez (2013) and Otto Santa Ana (2002) have long argued, media outlets and political pundits often frame Latin American immigrants as a threat. Mainstream media outlets use words such as “illegal aliens, fugitives, hordes, and lawbreakers to identify [immigrants] as perpetrators; flood, flow, and invasion to describe their movement to the United States; and harm and threat to illustrate their presence in the United States” (Quinsaat 2011: 40) The use of these words to describe immigrants, migration flows, and the presence of immigrants invokes a masculine threat that portrays immigrants—and particularly Latinos—as dangerous.

These representations have led to a sense of fear among White Americans towards Latino men (Eitle and Taylor 2008), and politicians have played into these fears. In the run-up to the 2016 Presidential election, candidate Donald Trump told a crowd: “When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. … They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems … They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists.”9 Statements like these reinforce the stereotype of Mexicans as “criminal aliens.” The escalation of deportations has been carried out in the name of making the United States safer – both from “criminal aliens” and from terrorists. Notably, the stated mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), according to its website, is “to secure the nation from the many threats we face” and, a substantial portion of the DHS budget has been dedicated to deporting Latinos who pose no obvious threat to the nation. As Alberto Gonzales (2013: 6) notes, “criminalization in the discursive sense serves as the ideological glue of the homeland security state; it is a process in which a set of discourses attribute criminal characteristics to a targeted group, in this case, Latinos, to win consent for legal violence.” The legal violence, in this case, is mass deportation.

These “controlling images” (Collins 2004) of Black, Latino, and Arab men as scary have served as the discursive fodder for the implementation of state repression. If people in the United

---

States did not live in fear of terrorism and of crime, it would be more difficult for the state to justify massive spending on mass incarceration and mass deportation. It is remarkable that the state spends billions of dollars on deportation during a time of economic uncertainty. However, a look at the rise of mass incarceration in the aftermath of the oil crisis can help us to understand this apparent paradox.

Crisis of Capitalism
An analysis of deportation as a tool of state repression in the context of a global economic crisis is aided by a look back at a similar analogy: the relationship between mass incarceration and the oil crisis. In the United States, the oil crisis and concomitant deindustrialization of urban areas were the precursors to the rise of mass incarceration as a tool of state repression. The global impacts of the oil crisis of the 1970s led to worldwide economic turmoil and widespread emigration. The 1970s crisis set into motion a series of global processes that led global elites to expand their sphere of influence through economic restructuring. This restructuring involved the incorporation of countries into the global economy, yet also led to mass displacement: millions of people began to leave their countries of birth in search of survival and opportunities elsewhere. The migrants deported today are often the same migrants (or their children) who were forced out of their home countries in the aftermath the 1970s oil crisis.

The oil crisis, deindustrialization, and globalization. After World War II, the U.S. economy grew rapidly with the production of automobiles and steel. These manufacturing jobs often paid well and came with benefits. Mostly men worked in these jobs, and many earned a family wage—an income sufficient to support their wives and children (Milkman 1997; Sugrue 2014). However, the post-World War II period did not last long. In the 1970s, capitalism began to enter one of its cyclical crises of overproduction (Robinson 2012). In the United States, the economy evolved from one with a strong manufacturing base and a solid working class to one with an hourglass economy featuring a preponderance of service sector jobs, tremendous inequality, and a decline in unionized jobs (Lee 2005). In 1954, 35% of the nation’s workforce was unionized. By the early 1980s, this had dropped to 20%. And, by 2008, the unionization rate was 8% (Thompson 2010).

The crisis of capitalism in the early 1970s had two primary causes: 1) the rise of global competition in the manufacturing sector; and 2) the skyrocketing of oil prices in 1973. In Detroit, for example, competition from German and Japanese automakers combined with the increase in oil prices led manufacturers to redesign their products, outsource production, and automate parts of the production process. Outsourcing and automation led to a decrease in the number of manufacturing jobs in the United States. Between 1979 and 1985, the United States lost 10 percent of its manufacturing jobs. These losses were concentrated in certain geographical areas, thereby
amplifying their localized effects. The Midwest lost over a million jobs and the Northeast lost 800,000. By contrast, the West gained 53,000 manufacturing jobs (Sassen 1989). Detroit was one of the cities hit hardest by global economic restructuring: it lost 70 percent of its manufacturing jobs between 1969 and 1989 (Farley, Danziger and Hozer 2000).

The decision of transnational corporations to move their labor-intensive manufacturing jobs to developing countries transformed the local economies in those countries in gendered ways. Instead of providing jobs to unemployed urban males, most of these manufacturing jobs in developing countries have gone to young women—many of whom had migrated from rural areas. These new industrial zones often have high turnover rates due to difficult working conditions. Young women migrate from the countryside to work in these jobs yet often only last a few years. Instead of returning to their countryside homes after quitting or being fired, many of these women have become international migrants. The prevalence of women from developing countries entering the global economy in this fashion has led to a feminization of international migration (Sassen 1998).

Since 1990, about half of all international migrants have been women (United Nations 2016) and migrants have entered the labor force in gendered ways. In the United States, deindustrialization and the concomitant outsourcing of manufacturing led to high-income gentrification, which generated a demand for high-end goods and services that can’t be mass produced (Sassen 1998). The rise of couples with both partners in high-end jobs created a new need for specialized and individualized services such as nannies and gardeners as well as specialty shops with pre-made delicacies. Many of the jobs in this sector created by high-income gentrification are highly segregated by gender and nativity—male immigrants labor outdoors in construction and gardening while women work indoors in childcare and housekeeping. The U.S. native-born men who had worked in manufacturing were often not in a position to retool themselves and take on the new service jobs. Instead, immigrants filled many of these low-paying service jobs (Boehme 2011; Louie 2001; Massey et al 2002). In 2010, immigrants made up 16 percent of the workforce, and they were over-represented in specific industries, namely construction, food services, agriculture, household employment, and hotels (Singer 2012).

Race, gender, and deindustrialization. The loss in manufacturing jobs translated into increases in unemployment and poverty rates, and African Americans and men were affected the most. By the end of the 1980s, over a third of all African Americans in Detroit lived in poverty, as did half of Detroit’s African American children (Kodras 1997). When the economic crisis hit Detroit and other cities, White residents often fled, whereas African American residents rarely had this option. The consequence of this is that by the end of the 1980s, urban areas were much less White and much more impoverished than they had been a decade earlier. The unemployment rates of African American men in these urban areas rose to extraordinarily high rates—by 1990, only
37 percent of males 16 or over who lived in the Black Belt in Chicago were regularly employed (Wilson 1996).

African American men were hit hard by deindustrialization in Detroit, largely because Black men were concentrated in the sectors that experienced the greatest decline. In 1940, more than half of all employed African American men worked at the Ford Motor Company, one of the few companies willing to hire Black men and pay them a decent wage. These well-paying jobs, however, began to move from the city of Detroit in the 1950s (Sugrue 2014). By 1970, 94 percent of employed Black men in Detroit had blue-collar jobs. However, three out of four production jobs disappeared from Detroit between 1972 and 1992 (Boyle 2001). As the availability of manufacturing jobs declined, Black men began to have difficulty finding work. Whereas in 1950, 84 percent of Black men were employed, by the late 1990s, one third of Black men aged 25 to 64 were unemployed, nearly three times the rate of unemployment for White men in Detroit (Farley, Danziger and Hozer 2000).

There are three primary reasons for the prevalence of Black unemployment in Detroit: 1) the skills mismatch; 2) the spatial mismatch; and 3) racial discrimination by employers. African American men in Detroit are less likely to have the skills and education needed for the types of jobs where there has been growth such as engineering, which leads to the skills mismatch. Much of the job growth in Detroit has been in the suburbs and African American families have been excluded from buying homes in these areas, which has created the spatial mismatch. Notably, in 1990, 50 percent of employed Blacks who lived in the city of Detroit commuted to the suburbs for work. Finally, studies have shown that discrimination persists. Black applicants find it more difficult to find work even when they are qualified. One study found that although Black men and women do apply for jobs in the suburbs of Detroit, they are less likely than White men and women to be hired (Farley, Danziger and Hozer 2000).

It is worth pointing out that the “spatial mismatch” is not due to African Americans’ refusal to move to White neighborhoods. Instead, as Thomas Sugrue (2014) argues, White Detroiters forced African American residents to stay in ghettoized areas by terrorizing Black families when they attempted to move into White neighborhoods in the 1940s and 1950s. As Detroit’s city center was being depleted of jobs, Black families were forced to stay in these hollowed out areas due to White terror as well as state policies that excluded Black people from desirable areas of Detroit and the outlying suburbs.

**Gendered and raced effects of mass incarceration and deindustrialization.** Economic restructuring is related to mass incarceration in the United States (Gilmore 2007; Harvey 2005; Wacquant 2009). It is not coincidental that the rates of incarceration began to escalate at the same time that the rates of unemployment for Black men increased and cities across the country encountered Black rebellions. By the end of the 20th century, a quarter of all Black men born in
the 1960s had experienced incarceration. For those Black men without a high school education, the likelihood of having experienced incarceration was about 60 percent (Pettit and Western 2004). As jobs became unavailable for Black men, prison doors opened up.

Scholars such as Loic Wacquant (2009) argue that economic restructuring made African American male high school dropouts redundant, and that incarceration is a system of social control designed to rein in these populations (Wacquant 2001). Insofar as these economic changes diminished opportunities and services for the poor, the state had to ensure that working class and poor people do not pose a threat to the rich. High unemployment alongside the state’s cutbacks in social services led to dissent on the part of frustrated workers. In response, the state made calls for law and order. David Harvey (2005: 77) explains: “in the United States incarceration became a key state strategy to deal with problems arising among discarded workers and marginalized populations. The coercive arm of the state is augmented to protect corporate interests and, if necessary, to repress dissent.”

The “prison fix” (Gilmore 2007: 88) has had enduring implications. Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007) connects the prison build-up in California directly to crises of capitalism. She explains that shifts in California’s political economy in the 1970s led to surpluses of financial capital, labor, and state capacity, which enabled the rise of prisons. The shifting of California’s economy away from the defense industry led to a surplus of labor in urban centers. Consecutive droughts led to a surplus of idle land in the Central Valley. High interest rates created a surplus of finance capital. The confluence of these factors created the conditions of possibility for a massive prison-building project in California, in which the state prisoner population increased five times in size between 1982 and 2000, even as the crime rate declined. Similar to the rest of the United States, there were racial disparities: “African Americans and Latinos comprise two-thirds of the state’s 160,000 prisoners; almost 7 percent are women of all races; 25 percent are noncitizens. … as a class, convicts are deindustrialized cities’ working or workless poor.” (Gilmore 2007: 7).

Although men have been the primary targets of mass incarceration, the effects of mass incarceration have rippled out into communities in gendered ways. Children are the most obvious victims of the incarceration of their parents. Megan Comfort (2007: 274) reports that “an estimated 1.1 million jail and prison inmates in the United States are parents to 2.3 million children; 90 percent of these parents are fathers.” 93% of inmates are men, and half of these inmates have children (Christian and Thomas 2009). Foster and Hagan (2009: 191) present strong evidence that the imprisonment of fathers has negative causal consequences for children.” They further contend that economic disadvantages are only one of many that children of the incarcerated face: children also suffer educational and emotional disadvantages when their parents are incarcerated. Women—both mothers and grandmothers—are left behind to pick up the pieces when a father is incarcerated.
We can perceive a similar pattern of gendered collateral consequences of mass deportation. Nearly all deportees are men, and about a quarter of all deportees—or 100,000 a year—are the parents of U.S. citizen children (Rosenblum and McCabe 2014). Because of this, there are over 5,000 children in foster care because their parent has been deported or detained (Applied Research Center 2011). Insofar as mostly men are deported, women are left to fend for themselves when their children’s father is deported. In most cases, the deported men are no longer able to provide financially for their children after they have been deported. Scholars are just beginning to contend with the collateral consequences of deportation, yet it is clear that mass deportation has gendered and racialized consequences.

The Great Recession and mass deportation. Scholars of global capitalism argue that the current crisis is a new one—and that it was caused by the transnational capitalist class having reached its limits (Robinson 2014; Sassen 2014). In recent years, it has become apparent that there is little room for global capital to expand: nearly all corners of the globe have been incorporated into global capitalism (Robinson 2012; 2014; Sassen 2014). The 1970s crisis led to expansion due to global competition and deindustrialization, and the more recent crisis is a consequence of this expansion having reached new limits. In the early twenty-first century, with little room to create new markets, the “transnational capitalist class” turned to “fictitious capital—that is, money thrown into circulation without any base in commodities or in productive activity” (Robinson 2012: 183). Investors and speculators began to make securities, pensions, and debts “tradeable,” and therefore a potential source of profit. These financial activities led to a collapse of the U.S. financial markets in 2008, and this collapse was at the core of the most recent crisis of global capitalism. The response of the U.S. government has been to bail out the financial industry and to enhance repression. Mass deportation is one example of the repressive response to the latest economic crisis.

Just as the rise of mass incarceration can be linked to deindustrialization processes that gutted primarily Black neighborhoods in urban areas, the rise of mass deportation can be linked to the global economic crisis. There was a consistent rise in the number of deportations with the passage of the 1996 laws. However, in 2008, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, we witnessed a shift towards more interior enforcement of immigration laws. According to a report published by the Migration Policy Institute in 2014, in 2003, when the DHS was created, there were 30,000 interior removals. By 2008, there were 140,000 interior removals, and they reached a peak (188,000 annual removals) in 2011 (Rosenblum and McCabe 2014). A removal is a deportation that involves a court process, while an interior removal is a deportation that involves a person who is arrested inside the United States and is not a recent border-crosser. Just as there was a shift towards more interior removals, there was also an increase in ICE apprehensions.
With the slowdown in employment during the Great Recession, fewer immigrants were attempting to enter the United States—and thus there were fewer border apprehensions. Immigration law enforcement officers in two branches of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carry out deportations: Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP is only authorized to work up to 100 air miles from the border; most interior enforcement falls to ICE. Over the past decade, we have witnessed a shift towards ICE apprehensions. In 2002, interior apprehensions accounted for 10 percent of all DHS apprehensions. By 2011, that figure was nearly 50 percent. Notably, as Figure 4 makes clear, there was a clear rise in interior apprehensions in 2008. This shift from 83,969 ICE apprehensions in 2007 to 319,934 ICE apprehensions in 2008 is a consequence of the implementation of the Secure Communities Program and the consequent rise in interior enforcement. Figure 4 displays these trends.

**Figure 4: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) versus Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) apprehensions, 2004-2013.**

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics

---

The Secure Communities Program has been decried by immigrant rights organizations for stoking fear in immigrant communities. Its implementation in 2008, at the height of the Great Recession, makes it clear that Secure Communities is a clear example of heightened state repression in a time of economic crisis.

One other piece of evidence that supports the argument that there is a connection between the mass deportation of Latino men and the economic crisis is that undocumented Latino men are concentrated in the construction sector and this sector contracted greatly during the Great Recession. Between 2007 and 2009, the United States lost 1.5 million construction jobs, representing a 20 percent drop. The contraction of the construction sector led to a surplus of Latino male labor. The buildup of immigration enforcement with the 1996 laws and the 2003 creation of the Department of Homeland Security led to a surplus of state capacity in the realm of immigration law enforcement at a time when fewer migrants were attempting to enter the United States. These surpluses in turn created the conditions of possibility for the enhancement in the interior enforcement of immigration laws. It is worth noting that interior removals and ICE apprehensions appear to have leveled off since 2013. It is too early to draw conclusions with regard to this trend, but the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has also reported that unemployment has also decreased of late.

**Corporate Profit**

It is difficult to substantiate the claim that corporate profit is the primary reason for mass incarceration or mass deportation. However, it is clear that certain sectors bring in enormous profits from mass incarceration and mass deportation, both through prison labor and private prisons and detention centers. It is also clear that corporations have spent millions of dollars lobbying for legislation that would enhance their profits.

In 1979, a series of laws were passed that reduced or eliminated New Deal-era restrictions on the sale of prison-made goods and the use of prison labor. By the end of the 20th century, over 80,000 inmates were working and earning between 25 cents and $7 an hour for their labor. Although prison laborers make up a small portion of the overall workforce, the employment of prisoners does have important localized effects. For example, Lockhart Technologies closed its circuit board factory in Austin, Texas once it realized it was cheaper to have prisoners perform the labor. In another example, a hospital in Eugene, Oregon moved all of its linen service to a prison laundry. The use of prison labor has served the interest of particular corporations and has negatively affected the lives of free-world workers (Thompson 2010).

---

Whereas some industries have profited from the use of prison labor, private prison companies have profited directly from prisons themselves. The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) was awarded its first government contract in 1984. During the 1990s, CCA began to see substantial profits. CCA was doing so well that, at the end of the twentieth century, the company began to build speculative prisons—“excess prison space for inmates who did not yet exist” (Wood 2007: 232)—with the expectation that the prison population would continue to grow. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, rates of incarceration leveled off, and CCA faced serious problems. Its stock values fell from $44 in 1998 to a mere 18 cents in December 2000. By 2001, CCA had 8,500 empty beds and was over a billion dollars in debt (Wood 2007). Because states had cut back funding for prisons, CCA looked to the federal government. Its federal lobbying expenses increased from $410,000 in 2000 to $3 million in 2004, and these efforts appear to have paid off. Not only has CCA been awarded lucrative federal contracts in recent years to build new prisons, but the government has increased its rate of immigrant detention, leaving no doubt that newly built prisons could be kept full.

The imprisonment of immigrant detainees is another area of overlap between mass incarceration and mass deportation. In 2009, Congress passed a bill that included a “detention bed mandate.” This mandate requires immigration detention facilities to fill 34,000 beds each day with non-citizens who are either awaiting deportation or awaiting an immigration hearing. In 2009, 49 percent of ICE immigration beds in the United States were in private detention facilities. After the implementation of the quota, this percentage went up to 62 percent (Carson and Diaz 2015). Whereas private prisons make up only a small fraction of the prison sector, private immigration detention facilities account for a majority of these facilities. This fact is due in no small part to private prison lobbying.

Between 2008 and 2014, CCA spent $10 million dollars on lobbying related to immigration detention and immigration reform. This lobbying paid off, as their annual profits increased from $133 million to $195 million during that time (Carson and Diaz 2015). The private prison sector was able to grow as a business during the prison boom. As prison expansion leveled off in the late 20th century, these companies set their sights on the immigration detention business, and this move has been extremely profitable for companies like CCA.

Whereas the United States will eventually free most of its U.S. citizen prisoners, it banishes non-citizen deportees typically for life. This keeps them from competing for scarce jobs or for public aid. However, deportees continue to exist in their countries of origin. Unable to stop this flow of deportees, countries have responded by finding ways in which deportees can serve another purpose. In many cases, deportees serve as convenient scapegoats for rising crime. Instead of blaming crime on years of repression, on tremendous inequality or on poverty (conditions often created by the global economic restructuring itself), it is easier for the government to blame crime
on deportees—expendable, stigmatized subjects. This can be seen happening in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Central America (Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Headley et al 2005; Coutin 2010; Gonzalez 2013).

In Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, media outlets and government officials blame the rising crime wave on deportees (Headley et al 2005; Brotherton and Barrios 2011). In El Salvador and Honduras, a similar trend can be seen with the blame placed primarily on deportation for the proliferation of gangs. In these and other countries, deportees have become a convenient scapegoat for longstanding public safety problems (Coutin 2010; Gonzalez 2013). There is no concrete evidence that links deportation to crime waves in these countries, yet deportees are targets to blame (Golash-Boza 2015; Headley et al 2005).

Deportees also serve as ideal laborers for transnational call centers since deportees are bilingual and bicultural, and they have very few options for survival. Call centers in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic are replete with deportees. They answer phone calls from people located in the United States, often earning only US$100 a week. The proliferation of call centers in Latin America is part of a growing trend towards outsourcing jobs in the manufacturing and service sectors to cheaper locations. Under global capitalism, the race to the bottom means companies can search around the globe for the most exploitable labor.

In Latin America, deportees are often an ideal labor force in call centers. Having lived in the United States, they speak English and are familiar with U.S. culture, and their cultural competence is an asset in these call centers since the majority of callers are from the United States. In addition, these deportees have limited choices in the labor market. For example, the state of Baja California has about 35 call centers that employ 10,000 people—nearly half of them are deportees. Overall in Mexico, the call center sector doubled between 2005 and 2010, making it a $6 billion industry. Similarly, the bilingual call center sector is projected to double in the Dominican Republic - mostly due to the arrival of bilingual deportees. Only a small fraction of deportees end up working in call centers. Most deportees don’t have the required skill set. However, with five million deportations since 1997, a small percentage of deportees with this skill set has been sufficient to fuel the growth of this industry.

---


---
Conclusion

An understanding of why mass deportation is happening now and why it targets Black and Latino men requires bringing two fields into conversation that often talk past one another: studies of the political economy of global capitalism and studies of mass incarceration in the United States. Research on global capitalism helps us to understand the global nature of the current crisis and the repressive state response to it. Research on mass incarceration sheds light on how the economic crisis affects people in inner cities as well as how and why Black and Latino men are targeted. When we look at the issues *writ large*, it becomes clear how they are all connected, and provides a more comprehensive explanation for why we are seeing unprecedented numbers of deportations. An understanding of mass deportation requires a consideration of the political economy of racialized and gendered state repression.

This analysis of the political economy of racialized and gendered state repression renders it evident that studies of mass deportation and mass incarceration need to take into account global economic trends, corporate interests, and racialized and gendered discourses that attempt to justify this repression. The use of extreme force by the state is seldom exercised against the most powerful sectors of society. Politicians, the media, corporations, and government bureaucrats have found ways to manipulate state power and use it to further marginalize the marginalized. They are able to do this by relying on a gendered and raced politics of fear that resonates with popular stereotypes about Black criminals, Arab terrorists and Latino criminal aliens. Once these strategies are made clear, it is easier for scholars to challenge these depictions as well as the state policies on which they are based.

I’d like to end this article, with two observations, one theoretical, and one empirical. First, a theoretical note: to arrive at the conclusions set forth in this article, this article has engaged at least three areas of inquiry: critical race theory, feminist theory, and world systems theory. This intersectional analysis moves us beyond a consideration of race, class, and gender as embodied identities and towards a systemic intersectional analysis. I hope that this piece pushes scholars in these three areas to collaborate and develop new ways to incorporate analyses of racism, capitalism, and patriarchy to develop more complex sociological understandings of society.

My final observation is empirical: at the time of this writing in the summer of 2016, both mass incarceration and mass deportation appear to be leveling off. Nevertheless, the state capacity for repression is not being contested in any substantial way. DHS continues to have a budget of $60 billion and oversees a broad complex of cages. One key difference between immigration detention and criminal incarceration is that detention was built up in large part based on privately owned capacity. DHS could draw down its capacity for 34,000 detainees a day to 15,000 simply by cancelling all contracts with private prisons and repealing the detention bed mandate. Of course, a daily average of 15,000 detainees would still be a historic high.
In contrast to detention, the state capacity for criminal incarceration is much more entrenched. Despite this, there are still possibilities for a reduction in the number of prisoners. In California, state prisons have been as high as double their capacity. We could substantially reduce the prison population in California by eliminating prison overcrowding. Closing prisons is also not out of the question: in New York, Governor Andrew Cuomo has closed thirteen prisons, and plans to close more.\footnote{Man Brian, 2016 “Governor Cuomo says he will close more state prisons” in North Country Public Radio.. Retrieved Jan 11, 2016. (http://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/30633/20160111/governor-cuomo-says-he-will-close-more-state-prisons)} As these changes take place, it will be critical for scholars of race, gender, and political economy to pay attention and call for an end to these repressive state practices.

About the Author

Tanya Golash-Boza is a Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Merced. Her most recent book is *Deported: Immigrant Policing, Disposable Labor and Global Capitalism* (New York University Press, 2015).

Disclosure Statement

Any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledgments section of the article’s text. Otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon submission of their article to the journal.

References


