World Resources Institute. WORLD RESOURCES 1994-95: A GUIDE TO
ixi+400 pp. ISBN 0-19-521044-1, $35.00 (hardcover); ISBN
0-19-521045-X, $21.95 (paper).

Reviewed by

Brad Bullock, Department of Sociology/Anthropology, Randolph-Macon
Woman's College, Lynchburg, Virginia, USA

v. 8/12/96

Scholars familiar with the difficulties of finding good
sources of comparable, international statistics will appreciate
the stated purpose of the WORLD RESOURCES series: "to meet the
critical need for accessible, accurate information on environment
and development" (p. ix). The volumes are published biennially by
the World Resources Institute (WRI), an independent,
not-for-profit corporation, in collaboration with the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the related United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP). The 1994-95 report, sixth in the
series, examines the relationship between people and the
environment and emphasizes global resource consumption, population
growth, and the roles of women -- especially how women will figure
into efforts to protect or manage environmental resources.

The structure and style of WORLD RESOURCES will remind you of
the UNDP's HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, or perhaps even more the
World Bank's WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT -- a particular theme is
presented in analytical overview, complete with multitudinous
color graphics and all the boxed inserts one could possibly want.
A distinguishing feature here is the tradition of examining, in
painstaking detail, the volume's thematic issues for a particular
region (in this volume China and India, the world's two most
populous nations and those facing the most serious resource
challenges). For research and teaching, this series excels in its
conscious focus on the environment and who actually uses the
world's resources. WRI claims, validly, that their organizational
status allows them to take a more independent stance on

development issues. The ongoing project of data gathering is
guided by the premise that sustainable development requires wise
resource management that "puts people first." Clearly stated,
"sustainable development is based on the recognition that a nation cannot reach its economic goals without also achieving environmental and social goals -- that is, universal education and employment opportunity, universal health and reproductive care, equitable access to and distribution of resources, stable populations, and a sustained natural resource base" (p. 43).

By now scholars generally appreciate the growing interdependency of environmental and development issues, as socioeconomic facts about the consequences of resource depletion and degradation continue to pile up. This resource book, however, stands out for how thoroughly it explores related conditions and trends. The sheer breadth of the topics covered is impressive -- e.g., there are whole chapters devoted to forest and rangelands, biodiversity, atmospheric pollution and climate, and the structure of national and local policies. I found particularly impressive the chapters on food and agriculture and on energy. It should not surprise us that such a careful look at trends in resource consumption or patterns of trade, while confirming some of our worst suspicions, also challenges conventional wisdom. For example, the resources most in danger of depletion are the renewable, rather than the nonrenewable ones, and manufactured exports from developing countries are growing considerably more rapidly than are raw material exports.

This volume is also commendable for acknowledging as primary, rather than secondary, the roles of women in achieving sustainable development. At least since Ester Boserup's A ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1970), a growing literature has criticized traditional schemes for marginalizing women, and more recent works (e.g., Gita Sen and Caren Grown, DEVELOPMENT, CRISIS, AND ALTERNATIVE VISIONS, 1987) stress that the reigning development models themselves are flawed and must be redrawn to fully utilize the potential of women in development. The present work emphasizes that "women have greater influence than men on rates of population growth and infant and child mortality, on health and nutrition, on children's education, and on natural resource management... inequalities that are detrimental to them... are detrimental as well to society at large and to the environment" (p. 43).

The data tables and technical notes presented in the back of the publication are extensive and, generally, the country data is fairly complete. Among interesting tables of note: Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Industrial Processes; Other Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (for 1991, by country). Some scholars may be drawn to claims of wider coverage, more countries, and new variables (see preface and introduction), but this series will be most useful as a compendium of data that may be found in various other sources (it relies heavily on UN data). It does assemble in one place a wealth of international information about the global environment that is not usually available in similar publications. While the narrative is clear and concise, the use of statistics is sometimes confusing -- e.g., per capita and absolute statistics are sometimes mixed indiscriminately to support generalities about the growth of consumption or trade.

The entire data series presented in this volume is offered on 3.5" or 5.25" high-density, IBM-compatible diskettes for $99.95. The database is touted as "expanded to include additional countries, variables, and where possible a 20-year time series for many of the variables" (p. ix), but the book does not indicate how many or which countries and variables are added. A TEACHER'S GUIDE TO WORLD RESOURCES is also available.
Response to Wilma A. Dunaway and Donald A. Clelland


by

Miguel E. Korzeniewicz, Department of Sociology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA

Gary Gereffi, Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA

Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz, University of Maryland at College Park, College Park, Maryland, USA

v. 8/12/96

Wilma A. Dunaway and Donald Clelland have raised important issues in their recent review of Gary Gereffi and Miguel E. Korzeniewicz's Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994) (henceforth, CCGC). Dunaway and Clelland criticize several aspects of the book in question, and extend their criticisms to the general orientation of the annual conferences on the Political Economy of the World-System (PEWS). Regarding CCGC, they raise two central objections. First, they argue that the articles contained in this book are preoccupied with empirical detail to the exclusion of reference to world-systems theory. Second, they contend that the book fails to consider unequal exchange as the key to international division of labor, as "none of the articles in this volume directly analyzes the extraction of surplus between the nodes of the chain or the exploitation of labor that occurs in the many processes" (p. 2). According to Dunaway and Clelland, by focusing on competition rather than exploitation, many of the articles in CCGC adopt an approach that resembles the "free-market" language/interpretation of mainstream economists. In the eyes of the reviewers, "Even

though Wallerstein (WORLD INEQUALITY, 1975, pp. 9-29) declared it dead twenty years ago, developmentalism leaps off the pages of this book more often than world-systems theory." Dunaway and Clelland do spare the editors of CCGC from some of the blame,
calling attention to a larger pattern of PEWS conferences and edited volumes that focus on "theoretical descriptions of the international arena" (p. 4), and urging future PEWS editors to restrict contributions to authors who use or directly address world-system explanations of social change.

The articles contained in CCGC clearly do not restrict themselves to mere empirical description. Even a superficial reading of the book reveals important conceptual insights into the social processes through which commodity chains are organized and transformed. We can illustrate this point with a few examples.

In Chapter 2, Hopkins, Wallerstein, Ozveren, and Pelizzon provide a detailed discussion of how commodity chains are transformed during the A- and B-phases of Kondratieff cycles. The authors argue that the activities commanding the highest profits within a given chain undergo dynamic changes, and they challenge both mainstream classifications of production processes (such as the emphasis on primary, secondary and tertiary sectors) and the theoretical assumptions derived from these classifications (such as the importance given to manufacturing as an engine of growth). R. Korzeniewicz and Martin in Chapter 4 analyze variations in the peripheralization of six commodities over time, establishing procedures through which to identify the spatial distribution of commodity chains across zones in the world-economy. Gereffi’s Chapter 5 introduces a fundamental distinction between producer-driven and buyer-driven commodity chains, a distinction that is further probed in many of the subsequent chapters, and that can be used to clarify the character of shifts in the relative distribution of wealth between producers and intermediaries. Among other issues, the remaining articles use their analysis of commodity chains to critically evaluate the concepts of Fordism and Post-Fordism (e.g., Raynolds in Chapter 7 and Taplin in Chapter 10), ongoing changes in the linkages between production, distribution and consumption (e.g., Chapters 12-15), and shifts in the importance of different activities (such as services) during periods of expansion and contraction in the world-economy (e.g., Rabach and Kim in Chapter 6). As indicated in the introduction to the book, such insights are clearly relevant to those engaged in further developing world-systems theory, and they are likely to have an impact within other theoretical frameworks as well.

Instead of assessing the merits of these efforts to break new ground in commodity chain analysis, Dunaway and Clelland propose measuring theoretical engagement by limiting world-systems theory
to the analysis of the extraction and uneven distribution of surplus. But even using this restricted yardstick, CCGC contains relevant observations. Again, space limitations allow merely a few examples. Wallerstein and Hopkins are only cited by Dunaway and Clelland for their mention of "the pivotal question" of commodity chain analysis, namely "the division of [economic] surplus among the various boxes of the chain." In fact, Wallerstein and Hopkins' analysis of commodity chains in chapter 2 is far more variegated and richer than the reviewers suggest. They list six questions that can be posed in looking at the social organization of the nodes or boxes in commodity chains (CCGC, pp. 18-19), the first and most important of which is "the degree to which the box is relatively monopolized by a small number of units of production, which is the same as asking the degree to which it is core-like and therefore a locus of a high rate of profit . . . ."

In Chapter 12, M. Korzeniewicz indicates that "[w]hile Korean and Chinese firms are producing the actual (athletic) shoe, U.S.-based Nike promotes the symbolic nature of the shoe and appropriates the greater share of the value resulting from its sales (p. 261)."

Chapter 9 (by Appelbaum, Smith, and Christerson) examines changes in the geography of apparel production (raw materials, fabric, and final product) to argue that surplus extraction is most acute (and capital most mobile) in the low-wage, low-value sector. In Chapter 10, Taplin argues that the apparel industry in the United States is becoming increasingly hierarchical. The subordinate relationship of contractors to firms placing the orders is extreme, as the latter firms are forcing contractors to contain their costs through wage-depressing tactics that accentuate existing structural inequalities between firms. These inequalities, together with the pressures from overseas manufacturers who also pursue cost-lowering strategies, add to the evolving stratification of the production process and the reconfiguration of the commodity chain. The extraction and uneven distribution of surplus is likewise an important concern in many of the other chapters.

Insofar as world-systems theory is concerned with the analysis of asymmetrical interdependence, both dimensions of this process -- asymmetry and interdependence -- require our attention. Dunaway and Clelland seem to prefer studies that emphasize the asymmetrical character of world-economic relationships, examining only a relatively narrow range of asymmetries at that. While the questions concerning the distribution of economic surplus in a
commodity chain are certainly worthwhile, the measurement of such flows between and within commodity chains requires both good description and dynamic theoretical constructs. CCGC seeks to develop a more complex understanding of the various dimensions inherent in both asymmetry and interdependence (such as regions, countries, communities, households, firms, and organized as well as unorganized labor). The scope of this framework helps commodity chains research meet one of its biggest challenges, which is to promote world-systems theory as a bridge that crosses the macro-micro divide in social, economic, and political analysis.

If Dunaway and Clelland seek to carve out a narrow niche for their definition of theoretical relevance, so be it, but we should be allowed a healthy dose of skepticism in evaluating whether their exclusionary approach indeed provides the only way to advance our knowledge of the world-economy. The issue is pertinent to the current direction of PEWS conferences and publications.

While we would all agree on the need to use such opportunities to continue building world-systems theory, we reject the notion that such an objective requires the exclusion of either related theoretical perspectives (in areas such as the sociology of development or organizations) or scholars who are not already strong adherents of our approach. There are inherent difficulties in our choice. Often, we will need to forge new areas of consensus as we seek to combine theoretical elaboration with exposure to research developed outside a world-systems perspective. Such an intellectual exchange, however, is essential to the advance of world-systems theory.

Note: In preparing this response, we have received useful suggestions from Richard Appelbaum, Brad Christerson, Walter Goldfrank, and Ian Taplin.
The presentation of modernization theory is good - succinct and to the point: they call it blaming the victim. Their critique is weak. For example, they say modernization theory has some good ideas but do not state which ones (later it turns out that the ones they think relevant are the importance of local corruption and incompetence in the determination of GNP growth). They also contend that modernization theory overestimates the capacity of poor countries to develop. That statement is then followed by a list of 10 rapidly developing countries and the observation that US aid to the poorest countries in Africa is less than US consumers spend on beer (p. 45). These are major league non sequitur.

The explication of world-system theory is not so succinct nor to the point. It wanders, in midstream, for example, into the barbarities of African enslavement and its similarity, in emotional terms, to the genocide of Europe’s Jews. In describing the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in world-system theory, Bradshaw and Wallace gloss over the theoretical tension (and controversy) involved in noting the exploitation of cheap manufacturing (as distinct from extractive) labor in peripheral and semi-peripheral areas. In relation to this point they explicate the deindustrialization perspective as part of world-system theory - a chancy interpretation at best. Their critique
of world-system theory is somewhat more to the point than their critique of modernization theory, but it is not complete nor in all instances appropriate. They argue that when scholars visit poor countries they come to conclude that the corruption and inefficiencies they see bear some responsibility for the economic problems around them. They also claim that international debt problems are not attended to by world-system theory, which, they say, puts too much focus on foreign investment. They mention Firebaugh’s work which challenges the finding of negative empirical effects of MNC investment noted by most world-system analysts. And they claim that ethnic conflict, not just economic exploitation, are major problems in developing countries.

In short, Bradshaw and Wallace offer critiques of world-system theory which do not go to the heart of the theoretical controversies which actually surround the theory, and they mix in some empirical matters which do not, in themselves, challenge world-system theory at all (e.g., environmental issues). Finally, they neglect to note the importance of the changing structure of world manufacturing to a long range evaluation of world-system theory.

The authors propose to combine modernization and world-system theory. In practice that means they intend to blame the poor countries for part of their poverty, not all of it. They wish to combine, as they put it, a view which acknowledges both external (world-system) and internal (modernization) approaches. The themes they announce in this combination are not hypotheses or theories, but "approaches," sometimes attitudes, as in: "Theme 4: Demonstrate more respect for non-Western cultures" (p. 55); or "Theme 5: Place greater emphasis on women, children, refugees, and other vulnerable groups in society."

Then ensue a series of brief chapters: Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas. The areas are so vast that the problem of balancing detail and generalization would daunt any writers, but Bradshaw and Wallace do manage to present some parallel data for many countries in each area (e.g., gross domestic product per capita, urbanization). Each continent, however, provokes different thematic issues. In Africa, they emphasize the internal obstacles to development, especially governmental incompetence and corruption, and they also feature the worsening record in child
mortality and poverty and the staggering impact of AIDS. I was a bit shocked at the sheer size of the AIDS impact: hundreds of thousands of orphans, for example, and widespread child prostitution.

For Asia, Chinese development and cross-national comparisons of income inequality in the Four Dragons, Japan, and the US figure prominently in the discussion. The chapter on Europe features a discussion of comparative welfare benefits, while their writing on the Americas focuses on a discussion of environmental and energy use inequalities.

While theoretically unsatisfactory, the authors' eclectic approach is not the main problem with the usefulness of this book for students. That problem lies in the matter of focus and comparison. With 203 small pages of text, and a slim chapter for each continent, the treatment could at best be an overview. But the organization of the book obstructs clarity. Income, trade, production, health - these topics might be systematically arrayed; or alternatively, regions of the world defined by position in the world system (or merely by income grouping) could be arrayed, and the dimensions of inequality analyzed by region.

As it is, a great deal of what is in this book can be found in the large introductory sociology texts which invest in good graphics and lots of tables. With that in mind, this work could be of use in such classes where the instructor chooses not to use a textbook. Even then, one probably would be better off with either a more theoretically coherent work (e.g., Thomas Richard Shannon's AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD-SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE, 1989, or for that matter W.W. Rostow's THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1960) or one better organized empirically.

Bradshaw and Wallace are notable scholars and intellectuals of humane intent. Their effort is marked by generous impulse throughout. The book is part of a series apparently intended to provide affordable paperback supplements introducing parts of fields for course use - an honorable goal. While checkered with interesting material this volume lacks the compelling logic or systematic presentation which most of us would prefer.

[Page 4]
Journal of World-Systems Research
This book belongs to a disappearing genre in today's publishing world, a Festschrift for a distinguished scholar. It is extremely difficult to get such books published today, I am told, because of the economics of publishing. It is therefore to the credit of the editors of this volume that they were able to convince a respected publisher to undertake its publication. Perhaps the publisher felt that this Festschrift would provoke widespread interest because of the worldwide fame of its subject, Andre Gunder Frank, one of the most fertile minds and productive social scientists of the second half of the twentieth century.

The editors of this volume, Sing Chew and Robert Dencmark, have assembled Frank's complete bibliography at the end of the book, and the numbers are staggering: a total of 880 items appearing in 27 different languages, which breaks down into 36 books in 126 different editions, approximately 600 versions of more than 350 different articles in periodicals, and 158 chapters in 134 collections.

Chew and Dencmark have organized their volume into four major sections, each corresponding to a major facet of Frank's work, and many distinguished scholars have contributed the dozen and a half essays. In addition to these essays, there is an introduction by the editors, as well as a very interesting and highly informative intellectual autobiography contributed by Frank. In his autobiographical sketch, Frank traces out his life beginning with his family's emigration from Germany in 1933, when he was four years old, and its eventual settlement in the United States. From there we learn of his attendance at Ann Arbor, Michigan, high school, his undergraduate studies at Swarthmore, and his graduate work in economics at the University of Chicago.
Then we follow him to Latin America, where his dependency theory was born, and then back to Europe, first to Berlin, and then on to teaching posts in England and Amsterdam.

Now retired from the University of Amsterdam, he lives in Toronto and devotes himself primarily to studying the economic evolution of what he is calling his "5,000-year world system."

Part I, "On Development and Underdevelopment," contains essays by Samir Amin, Eric Wolf, Philip Wagner, Otto Kreye, and Herb Addo. Although a close friend and colleague of Frank's, Amin does not hesitate to criticize him on a number of counts. For example, he takes issue with Frank's 5,000-year world system and its obliteration of the distinction among modes of production, calling it "fundamentally erroneous and sterile" (p. 64). In this context he asks whether, "if polarization has characterized the world system for five thousand years, it must, so to speak, be the consequence of some anthropological characteristics of the human species transcending social formations" (p. 66). This seems to me one of the most critical questions to ask of Frank's recent work, and I would argue that the answer is yes. I wonder to what extent Frank recognizes this extremely important implication of his work.

Kreye's essay, focusing on Frank's work on the debt crisis of the Third World countries, declares that, contrary to much recent argument, this crisis has not abated and in some ways has gotten worse. Addo's contribution is built largely around the argument that "developmentalism" -- which he doesn't really define, but by which he seems to mean a package of ideas stressing the linear, progressive, and universal nature of history, and thus the evolutionary imitation of the First World by the Third World -- is a Eurocentric hoax and delusion. He also discusses some of Frank's reversals of opinion, such as his abandonment of the idea that decolonization from the world-system is a possibility for Third World countries, or his abandonment of all optimism for a socialist transcendence of the capitalist world-system. Like Amin, he is also critical of Frank's recent work, arguing that his 5,000-year world system is a "cruel joke." Addo concludes with Frank, though, that we must recognize that full-scale industrial development is open only to a few nations, an argument that seems to me quite right. That being the case, the "future should be open to allow in the serious consideration of multiple cultural routes to modernity" (p. 145).

Part II, on peripheral regions, includes essays by Theotonio
Dos Santos, George Aseniero, and Samir Amin once again. Dos Santos's essay is basically a sketch of the history of Latin American developmental efforts, especially import substitution industrialization. It is a useful essay, although it repeats ideas likely to be very familiar to development specialists. Aseniero's essay also covers very familiar ground, in this case in regard to economic development in East Asia. He discusses, for example, Japan's historical role in laying the foundations for economic development in its two colonies, Korea and Taiwan, and the role of U.S. aid and loans to these countries in their developmental spurt since the 1950s. All this is familiar from the work of Bruce Cumings and many other scholars. But Aseniero also has a few new things to say. He sees Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand as soon to be the "New NICs," and regards China, the world's fastest growing economy in the last decade and a half, as the nation that will spell the future of the Pacific Rim. He also suggests, sensibly in my view, that on a political level the People's Republic of China will disintegrate as the result of its increasing incorporation into the capitalist world-economy. Amin's second essay is devoted to the growing

Journal of World-Systems Research

tragedy of Africa, the "Fourth World." In Frank's words, Amin's argument is that the lemon was sucked dry and then discarded. Africa's mode of incorporation into the world-economy was such that an agricultural revolution was retarded for a century, and no significant local bourgeoisie had a chance to form. Africa thus continued to be the focus of the production of primary products at the time that much of the rest of the Third World was beginning to industrialize. Africa is now of little use to the First World, so it has been almost entirely marginalized.

The third section of the book devotes itself to long-term historical change, thus embracing Frank's most recent work. William McNeill contributes an essay, originally published as the preface to the Frank- and Gills-edited collection, THE WORLD SYSTEM: FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OR FIVE THOUSAND?, in which he indicates strong support for Frank's notion that the role of economic exchange was a critical stimulus to developmental trends in world history. However, he wants to make networks of economic exchange dependent on even larger networks, what he calls "communication nets." Barry Gills' essay in this section, "The Continuity Thesis in World Development," is one of the best in the book, and serves as an excellent summary of his work with Frank on the 5,000-year world system. The central idea in this work is
that the ceaseless accumulation of capital can be dated to 5,000 rather than 500 years ago and that this process is the key developmental process of world history. Gillis and Frank are actually making a kind of evolutionary argument in which capital accumulation is the driving engine not only of economic evolution, but of social evolution in general. What Gillis and Frank have done is, essentially, to "out-Wallerstein" Wallerstein. In the 1970s Immanuel Wallerstein changed the thinking of a great many of us by insisting that capitalism did not develop in the late eighteenth century, but arose as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. As bold as this claim was in 1974 (when volume one of THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM appeared), for Gillis and Frank it is not nearly bold enough. They want to go much further back in time and farther out in space to locate the basic elements of capitalist exchange.

Gillis and Frank are certainly on to something, and they make an excellent case for the unjustified neglect of "capitalistic" economic processes throughout world history. In his essay in Part III, Christopher Chase-Dunn argues that Frank's work on the 5,000-year world system represents "the most significant turn that Frank's thinking has ever taken" and "that the inclusion of a much greater time depth in world system analysis has the potential to generate a new and much more powerful theory of historical evolution" (p. 246). I couldn't agree more. Gillis and Frank may go too far in seeing capital accumulation as THE central developmental process of world history, but that it is A central process is becoming clearer and clearer. But we must be cautious. As Chase-Dunn points out, processes of commodification were important in the ancient and medieval worlds, but they were not DOMINANT in those worlds, having become so only since the sixteenth century. And this points up the essential difference between Chase-Dunn's world system approach and that of Gillis and Frank: Chase-Dunn wants to retain the idea of modes of production, whereas Gillis and Frank want to abandon it as meaningless, and Chase-Dunn thus wants to theorize historical transitions between modes of production, an activity deemed worthless by Gillis and Frank. And this difference has an important consequence: with his collaborator Thomas Hall, Chase-Dunn has engaged in a systematic comparative analysis of modes of production, a route completely closed off to Gillis and Frank. Only time will tell who is right in this debate, but it is extremely difficult to believe that the economic processes of the past 500 years are just
quantitative extensions of processes that have gone on for thousands of years. As Chase-Dunn points out, Frank seems to have moved "toward a timeless and endless model of historical repetition. Gunder Frank has become a Hindu" (p. 248).

The final essay in Part III breaks significantly from the others. This essay, by Albert Bergesen, sets forth a provocative argument for the existence of art cycles that run parallel to hegemonic cycles in the modern world-system. Bergesen claims that during periods of hegemony art tends toward abstract, classic, and idealized forms because these forms express the order, balance, and symmetry created by a hegemom. By contrast, during periods of interstate rivalry, art turns toward realism and emphasizes the particular and the many. Bergesen actually moves on to formulate the notion of a complete artistic cycle that passes through four stages: hegemony, hegemonic decline, interstate rivalry, and hegemonic ascent. He outlines three basic artistic cycles from 1500 to the present, drawing connections between particular artistic forms and the stage of the hegemonic cycle. I found this analysis extremely interesting and provocative, but there are problems that cannot be overlooked. First of all, the connection between economic stages and artistic forms is very loose. For example, Bergesen relates the Rococo period (1700-1750) to British hegemonic ascent, but was Britain ascending to hegemony this early? A second problem concerns Bergesen's identification of hegemonic powers. He completely ignores the widely-regarded Dutch hegemony of the seventeenth century, treating this period as one of interstate rivalry, and substituting instead the Hapsburg Empire as the first hegemom. Bergesen tells us that he is among those who regard the Dutch as never having been hegemonic, but he provides no explanation or justification for his view.

The final section of essays concerns social movements and social justice. There is an essay by Gerrit Huizer, one by Pat Lauderdale on Frank as a "political deviant," another on women's interests by Virginia Vargas, and a concluding essay by Immanuel Wallerstein suggesting some remedies for underdevelopment. I found Wallerstein's essay the most interesting of these final four. Here Wallerstein tries to suggest short-run, middle-run, and long-run strategies for transforming the current world-system into something else.

As we all know, editing a collection can be a difficult task, and when that collection is a Festschrift the task is usually even
more difficult. The biggest problem in any collection is getting the essays to cohere into a single whole, and when the collection is honorary in nature the problem is not only attaining integration, but also getting the essays to have real intellectual substance. The editors of this volume have succeeded admirably in achieving both ends. The book is very intelligently organized, as each major section is built around a major dimension of Frank's work. And most of the contributions have something of real substance to say. Who should read this book? All those concerned with the modern world-system, with the strikingly different levels of economic development within that system, and with the general problem of long-term historical change that preceded the formation of the world-system that is called modern. I am one such person, and I found reading the book a real pleasure. I know there are many other such persons out there, and they should read it too.

Reviewed by
Michael Timberlake, Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, USA

v. 8/12/96

With ever-increasing speed and intensity, since the 16th century the Western European-centered world-system has incorporated and peripheralized the rest of the earth’s land and people, transforming relations among people and between humans and the natural and cultural environments. Commodification and proletarianization have been fundamental to this transformation. Other key processes have been uneven development and resistance. Dunaway concretizes these processes by giving us an exceptionally careful account of Southern Appalachia’s historical transformation from an external arena to a periphery of the world-system -- an internal periphery within the rising semiperiphery that was the United States at the onset of the American Civil War.

THE FIRST AMERICAN FRONTIER works powerfully on at least two levels. First, Dunaway’s foremost explicit central thesis is that the character of Southern Appalachia was molded by its intimate involvement in world-systemic processes. On this level she is addressing primarily students of regional American history, countering the widely expressed view that this region’s underdevelopment, or backwardness, is explicable in terms of its alleged isolation. The reader is reminded of images of the self-sufficient backwoods family, living off the land by farming, hunting, and subsistence household production, minimally involved in exchanges with the rest of the world, and unready and culturally unavailable for modern industrial development. Such allusions are threaded throughout much of the literature on the region, Dunaway points out. But these claims are empirically unfounded and theoretically naive.

Dunaway details the empirical weakness of the isolationist position on the region’s underdevelopment with a detailed
examination of the historical record. Her data-dredging is guided by world-system theory. Instead of isolation, she finds clear evidence that Southern Appalachia's history from before 1700 was one of involvement in the institutional and cultural structures of a dynamic world-economy. She argues, for example, that the region -- and the indigenous peoples who occupied it (i.e., the Cherokees) -- became important early on as a peripheral fringe of the British, used as a buffer shielding the colonies from the New World manifestation of the hegemonic rivalry of the era. This role shaped the region, profoundly restructuring Cherokee social organization and culture, integrating these people with the world-economy. For example, the British encouraged the trade of primary commodities, such as Cherokee deer skins for British manufactured goods. The commodification of land soon followed, with much of it passing into the hands of distant absentee speculators, planter capitalists, and settler elites (who together owned three-fifths of the region's agricultural land), with only a small proportion owned by small investors and heirs. (In an appendix, Dunaway describes her complex and careful methods of analyzing courthouse and other records in order to accurately describe such patterns of land ownership.) In the region, land is increasingly important, first, in relation to the removal of indigenous peoples and the successful European settlement of the region, then ultimately as a mechanism of regulating labor.

Agricultural production was certainly important within the region, but it could hardly be characterized predominantly as subsistence agriculture. Several categories of landless agricultural workers, including slaves, indentured laborers, and sharecroppers provided the labor needed to render profitable the investments in Appalachian land that had been made by distant speculators and local elites. Thus, "... land served as the critical mechanism for anchoring labor relations between landholders and propertyless families" (p. 119). These structural arrangements generated agricultural surpluses that Dunaway shows were exported from the region, in many cases to European destinations, further integrating the region within the global division of labor. The nature of development generated by this integration, however, was akin to that which has typified much of the Third World. As has historically been the case in the peripheries of the modern world system, Southern Appalachia never fully experienced the final step in
the transition to (core) capitalism, for the region's antebellum agriculture and manufacturing were never fully separated. Instead, locally dominant agrarian-merchant elites and absentee speculators sank the region's limited investment capital into enterprises that were complementary to those activities stimulated by integration into the world market. [pp. 154-155]

Thus, the region's underdevelopment were reproduced by its peripheral integration into the world economy; with its social structure molded by these linkages. For example, class formation in the region mirrored that of other of the world's peripheries: a highly coerced semiproletariat, including slave labor, the emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie as the region's political elite, and disproportionately small representation of mid-size agriculturalists.

Dunaway includes a similarly detailed and compelling discussion of the region's extractive and manufacturing industries, also revealing their peculiarly peripheral character, and making a strong argument linking this to the way in which the region was interlinked with the world-economy. Again, Dunaway backs up these claims with painstaking attention to detail, using census records and other primary sources as well as reinterpreting some secondary sources. Timber, ginseng, coal, copper, salt, and iron in addition to wheat, corn, cotton, hogs, cattle, and even turkeys were produced in the region and exported in significantly large quantities. There are fascinating chapters on spatial integration and commodity chains. She documents (and maps) a "highly rationalized" network of water transport, for example. The region's rivers comprised the most important transportation avenues, connecting a large proportion of its counties "ultimately to the Atlantic or Gulf seacoasts" (p. 209), but overland transport was important as well. Although the region's counties were linked to the "outside" through an elaborate system of river, canal, and turnpike transport through which exports left the region, most of these exports left in unfinished form. Southern Appalachia was clearly at the bottom end of the global division of labor, with (relatively) capital-intensive processing (e.g., shoe manufacturing) of locally-produced inputs (e.g., leather) taking place in distant places rather than within the region. Once again, its peripheral status in the national and world-economy was reinforced by these patterns of production and exchange.
As a carefully crafted argument for reconsidering Southern Appalachia’s underdevelopment the book seems to me to be overwhelmingly successful, although historians of the region will be the final judges. The book is clearly successful at the theoretical level as well. Dunaway shows that using world-system theory serves as an important sensitizing framework in guiding the collection, interpretation, and reinterpretation of historical facts. The result is a far more persuasive explanation of the region’s underdevelopment than has apparently heretofore been available -- one that makes sense of the numerous ways in which Southern Appalachia was integrated with an encompassing political economy and which flies in the face of the pervasive view that the region’s underdevelopment was rooted in its isolation from the "modern" world. At the same time, her methods of analysis compel her to reveal weaknesses she finds with the world-system paradigm, at least in the manner in which it has usually been used. She does this by paying a great deal of attention to the ways in which the cultures and environments of the region were changed by its incorporation and peripheralization. For example, she includes an interesting analysis of the ways in which the indigenous Cherokee culture reacted to and was changed by incorporation, followed by a discussion of the ways in which capitalist values came to permeate social relations among these and subsequent inhabitants of the region. Thus, world-system theory is seen as an invaluable interpretive tool for reformulating the historiography of this region, but it is used critically. The history of the region was, in some ways, too rich and too big for the theory -- at least as it is usually articulated. Rather than ignore these aspects of the history, Dunaway contributes, at least implicitly, to theory by suggesting that it be reformulated to address these important aspects of social change.

Even though Dunaway's effort is about a very specific region during a very specific period of time, there are other general lessons it provides. The book demonstrates the relevance of using world-system theory to interpret other historical examples of uneven development within countries, even those of the core and semiperiphery. For example, social change in the region known as the Mississippi Delta is also subject to a world-system analysis. It was populated by European and coerced African immigrants as it was being integrated into the world-economy in a similar position as exporter of agricultural products and raw materials. The historical examples of both Southern Appalachia and the Delta also
suggest a more nuanced interpretation of the role of "the state." Usually world-system analysis focuses nearly exclusively on the role of the national state. But in these two cases, we are forced to acknowledge the importance of local states. For example,

THE FIRST AMERICAN FRONTIER is an exemplary work of scholarship. It combines serious attention to the theoretical insights of world-system theory with meticulous attention to the historical record. The result is a compelling analysis of one of the most fascinating and misunderstood regions of the United States. No doubt historians of the American South will also recognize this to be a significant, possibly controversial, contribution to knowledge of this region's history. The book should also be read by scholars and students interested in comparative historical sociology, world-system theory, regional studies, and rural social change. It would also be useful in graduate and advanced undergraduate classes in these areas.