It is no accident that every political leader in current times is disappointing at best. No head of state inspires confidence much less charts a path for other leaders to follow, as did the likes of Roosevelt and Churchill, or Lenin and Mao. Neither left nor right admires President Clinton no matter how far he tacks in one direction or the other. Lest Clinton’s wobbly personality be blamed, he fares better in popularity than most contemporary leaders of core states. John Major and Boris Yeltsin have occasionally careened down toward single digits in approval ratings, while Alain Juppé has piloted France into a whirlpool of social protest. Even once inspiring protest leaders, such as Lech Walesa, Corazon Aquino or Benazir Bhutto, appear adrift once they obtain state power. While political pundits may endlessly sing the siren song of personal “character” and “values,” they do so only because they have no faith that any policy, plan or platform is obviously better than any other. Wily politicians respond by competing over who would be better at doing less. The problem, however, is not in the leaders, but rather, it is the sovereign state itself that has lost efficacy.

The decline of state efficacy has its source in the remarkable increase in the pace of world integration, or “globalization,” that has occurred over the last two decades. Increased economic and cultural interpenetration across state boundaries is obvious to most observers. The surprise is short lived when we find such ironies as that both sides in the 1992 Gulf War followed the battles on CNN, that Chinese students raised a "Statue of Liberty" during the 1989 protest in Tiananmen Square, or that in 1994 the US dollar became legal tender in Cuba. With globalization has also come a somewhat less evident decline in a state’s ability to manage its share of the world economy.
Hardest hit have been the lower classes who had over the past half century used their electoral power to garner state protection from market despotism. Explanations of stagnant wages, declining unions, increased child labor, corporate restructuring, government deficits, and shrinking welfare provision all point in varying degrees to increased world integration. The legitimacy of the state and of political action declines correspondingly. Older generations lament noticeable losses of state power and benefits, while some younger ones shed their traditional idealism for public cynicism and private nihilism. Globalization of cultural idioms further undermines the protection that national traditions and cultural diversity provide domestic markets from international competition. As such, decline of the state is seen as a crisis in national values.

The solution to the inefficacy of the national state, and the desperation of the lower classes, is a world state, one dedicated to the goals of global democracy and socialist equity. So claims Warren Wagar in his recent essay, "Toward a Praxis of World Integration," a programmatic follow-up to his speculative utopian novel, _A Short History of the Future_. The Enlightenment project of rational progress toward egalitarian universalism can be continued only by taking the task to the global level. A world party, so says Wagar, is a necessary step toward and agent of that project. Building a world party is thus a moral task for responding to the current, and future, development of the world-system.

Yet, the popular response to state illegitimacy has been far from any notion of an Enlightenment progress toward universalism. Instead, the most common populist response has been nationalist. The burst of new states in Central and Eastern Europe is but the most visible manifestation of a rise of nationalist fervor throughout the world. From Azerbaijan to Quebec, ethnic populations with identifiable territories, i.e., nations, increasingly seek their own separate states. The result has been a massive outpouring of nationalist sentiment and of ethnic separatism within what had previously been long stable multi-nation states.

Wagar seems to have found his enemy. The destruction of Sarajevo, a city that as recently as 1984 was a crowning symbol of ethnic integration and universalism, is perhaps the most telling indicator of
this new wave of destructive nationalism. Highly nationalistic right wing terrorists, such as skinheads, militia members, and religious fundamentalists, have replaced infantile leftists as the prime global source of bombings and assassinations. While such extremists have long existed in various guises, they are now the fringe of a larger tide of nationalist parties and politicians. The relationship of extreme mass organizations on the right resembles more the 1920s and 30s than anything in the post-war period up till now. Even among prominent conservative intellectuals, no longer does the memory of HAZI horrors seem to impede them from reviving ideologies of racial superiority, whether biological (The Bell Curve) or cultural (The End of Racism). Nor does refutation by reputable scientists or flagging by respected journalists any longer seem to constrain their popularity.

Wager condemns nationalism as the central impediment to global statehood. Nationalism and globalism are irreconcilable, he claims, because national rights are antithetical to worldwide individual equality and the rational planning goals of the Enlightenment. The goals of his world party must begin with condemning separate national identities and renouncing the independence of national states. A world party, he claims, has not just the organizational task, but also the moral imperative to reject cultural relativism and national identity, and instead embrace the Enlightenment goals of Western civilization.

I want to take issue with Wagar on the irreconcilability of nationalism and globalism. Quite the contrary, I portend that they are inexorably intertwined. The growth of single nation states is both a product and source of global organization. While I agree with Wagar on the value of a world state, rather than oppose ethnic identity, national liberation, or multi-culturalism, supporters of global governance must reassert national self-determination as the central principle of interstate relations. National self-determination is a component of universal human rights, not an opposing principle.

The surge of nationalism is, ironically, driven in no small part by the very process of world integration that makes state power less potent, and global statehood a real possibility. From a world-system perspective, world integration is a continuous and
cumulative process of at least 500 years duration. However, the pace of this integrative process has accelerated markedly since the mid-1970s as a response, and a solution, to an uneven and stagnant world economy (the "B" phase) and a decline of US hegemony. In a cumulative process, even a small increase in growth rates soon has large effects. The result is a conspicuous qualitative shift in political structures within a single generation that accompanies the less perceptible ongoing changes. What is a long term process thus appears to be a novel phenomenon because adaptation to the process now elicits integral rather than incremental change.

While globalization reduces political potency within existing states, it increases dramatically the importance of relations between states. With the growing importance of interstate relations comes an increase in the value of joining the interstate system, which requires having a sovereign state. World integration spawns ethnic separatism as subordinate nationalities gain less from having a voice within an increasingly ineffectual state, and more from interstate relations. Likewise, dominant ethnic groups demand reinforcement of their national identity, and the competitive advantage nationalities have within it. The breakdown of multi-nation states into multiple nation-states becomes a tragedy precisely when self-determination and tolerance are denied. Sarajevo again provides the telling example in that its survival and that of Bosnia depend precisely on the enforcement of interstate relations by supra-state organizations (UN, NATO).

This is not to deny the evils of national chauvinism, but to assert national self-determination as a necessary remedy. Certainly Wagar has identified an enemy for our times where the national identity of one ethnicity comes at the expense of any other. The human tragedy from ethnic separatism in Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Tibet, Lithuania, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere cannot be denied. Yet which of the national minorities in each of these cases should be denied self-determination? Would a world state have decreed that Slovenia or Croatia, or even Bosnia, must remain federated with a Serb dominated Yugoslavia? Or to take Wagar at his utopian best, should a world state strip Slovenians, Croatians, and Serbs of their separate national identities and replace them with an indistinguishable global citizenship?

I think the answer is that a global principle that denies imperial or racist domination does so by
asserting the cultural autonomy of nations and ethnic
groups, not denying it. For oppressed peoples,
nationalism is a source of resistance and sustenance.
Without respecting self-determination, few oppressed
nationalities would support a world party or state, and
most would realistically fear a possible global
imperialism. To be sure, self-determination
contradicts and overrules that part of any national
heritage that includes imperialism or racism. On that
score, Wagar and I are in full accordance. But such a
global principle does not deny nationalism per se and
instead defends it in such a way that all nations have
a self-interest in supporting.

What is critical to recognize is that "sovereign"
states and national identities are created by the
interstate system. That system is the set of agreed
upon institutions, treaties, rules and unwritten norms
that govern relations between states, ranging from
United Nations peacekeeping forces to proper
diplomatic etiquette. The system was forged in Europe
during the (first) Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and was
spread worldwide by capitalist and colonial expansion.
Whatever the origins of a state, whether ancient
principality or recent ex-colony, its definition and
survival as "sovereign" has since depended upon
recognition from other states as a compliant member of
the interstate system. Prior to 1945/60, admission was
primarily limited to imperial states. Since that time,
however, for a variety of reasons entry is potentially
open to any nation that can militarily control a
territory. As a result, we have seen a geometric
increase in the number of states, first from
decolonization and now from the break-up of multi-
nation states.

Admission to the system as sovereign is now
codified and institutionalized by the United Nations.
In principle, this includes acceptance of universal
human rights. Wagar may scoff at how powerless is the
UN to enforce any such standard. Yet one might have
said the same 200 years ago about slavery, or 100 years
ago about colonialism, or even 50 years ago about
racist segregation. The definition of a legitimate
state now includes them all, as even a state as
powerful as South Africa was forced to finally admit.
National cultures are highly diverse, often
inconsistent, and constantly evolving. They change in
response to global capitalist and other processes without any necessary loss of identity. People can hold allegiance to both national and global principles, just as we maintain loyalty to both family and nation.

Admittedly powerless itself, the UN increasingly serves as the medium through which the rules of interstate relations are elaborated and enforced. States support UN and other interstate governance of the interstate system not out of moral exhortation, but out of material self-interest. Trade and other interactions between states, like any other exchange, requires pre-contractual standardization and post-contractual enforcement. The greater the number of states and the more integrated their economies, the greater the importance of a supra-state governance of interstate relations.

The true enemy of the Enlightenment is imperialism, and its biological twin of racism, which

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is identified with nationalism only when self-determination is denied. Wagar’s suggestion that a world party condemn national self-determination only gives comfort to that enemy. Wagar is right, in that a world party is necessary for building a democratic world state that will protect and uplift the lower classes. He is mistaken, however, in seeing nationalism as the moral antipathy of global citizenship. Rather than a contradiction, world governance and nationalism are two sides of the same coin, minted by globalization.

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THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF MACROREGIONAL MESOAMERICA: WITH FOCUS ON THE CLASSIC-POSTCLASSIC TRANSITION IN THE VALLEY OF OAXACA

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Abstract

To date, macro-scale analyses of ancient Mesoamerica principally have debated whether or not Mesoamerica was a world system and have described macroregional processes at the eve of the Spanish Conquest. This paper defines two alternative organizational modes (corporate-based/network-based) that serve to conceptualize diversity in strategies of leadership, production, and exchange. Collective mechanisms of integration are central to corporate strategies, while network-based organization is heavily rooted in the personal connections and material accumulations of individuals. Consideration of these modes helps to define patterns of temporal and spatial diversity in the structure of the prehispanic Mesoamerican world.

What prompts shifts in these macro-scale organizational strategies, and how do they inter-play with key changes at local and regional scales? To examine these questions, the often-discussed Classic-Postclassic transition in the southern highlands of Oaxaca is reconsidered. This Classic-Postclassic shift, marked by increasing volumes of long-distance exchange, growing wealth disparities, and expanded significance of elite genealogical and marriage records, signals the greater importance of network-based strategies. Prior explanations for this transition have relied largely on local stimuli (e.g. ethnic in-migration, climatic change, political collapse) to promote this shift; yet these factors seem insufficient to account for the broad spatial scope of this change. Adoption of a wider spatial perspective fosters both a more complete understanding of this Oaxaca transition, and begins an exploration of how basic formulas of economic and power relations could be transformed across one ancient world.
INTRODUCTION

In the 21 years following Wallerstein's publication of The Modern World-System I (1974), two key issues have stirred persistent debate among researchers who have endeavored to apply (or critique the application of) this perspective to pre-capitalist (and particularly archaeologically known) societies. The first debate concerns the preferred unit of analysis, while the second focuses on the systemic properties of nonmilititarian or prestige goods.

The question of analytical units stems directly from Wallerstein's proposition of World-Systems Theory in direct opposition to earlier developmentalist or evolutionary approaches (cf. Sanderson 1991), which tended to concentrate on regions. Most subsequent world-systems theorists have adhered to Wallerstein's stance on this matter. For example, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993:851) recently asserted that "the fundamental unit of social change is the world-system, not the society."

Since 1984 (Blanton and Feinman 1984), I have repeatedly called for archaeologists, most of whom have long been steeped in neo-evolutionary thought, to give more serious attention to the macroscale and the world-systems perspective. Although I recognize the importance of this broader spatial approach, I question whether it really makes sense to decide unilaterally which analytical or organizational scale is privileged. For example, in opposition to Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993), Sanderson (1991:187) asserts that in most (if not all) preindustrial contexts, processes internal to a society (like population pressure) serve as the principal stimuli for change. Yet is not this question at least partially an empirical issue, depending on context and problem? In another historical science, biological evolution, grand theorists, like Ernst Mayr (1982), have concluded that...
research should be conducted, and theories constructed, at various scales simultaneously (in that case from chemicals to ecosystems). I suggest that study of long-term social transitions requires multiscalar theories (from households through macrorregions), and there is no reason to indelibly tar all regional-scale analysis with the prior sins (mechanistic, reductionist, and unilineal tendencies) of many neo-evolutionary approaches (e.g., Blanton et al. 1993; Blanton et al. 1996; Feinman and Neitzel 1984).

Blanket pronouncements concerning the priority of the macroscale also run counter to the intuitive biases of most archaeologists, who tend to focus more locally. For example, I am sure that David Webster (1994:419) spoke for many of my colleagues when he commented "that the most significant of the forces that stimulate the emergence of cultural complexity in preindustrial societies and thereafter maintain and reshape it are usually quite localized." Although I also find Webster's (as well as Sanderson's aforementioned) position to be overstated, propositions in the opposite direction do not serve to encourage the serious consideration of macroscale processes in archaeology.

The debate over the role of prestige goods has been, if anything, more rancorous and central to the development of preindustrial world-systems approaches. Wallerstein flatly dismissed the role of nonutilitarian goods in the creation of systemically important interregional ties. His rigid stance has been critiqued by Schneider (1970), Abu-Lughod (1989, 1993), and many others. In accord with this polarity, most archaeologists tend to line up on one side of this issue or the other. That is, they either view the role of preciosities as generally (that is cross-culturally) significant or not. Relatively little attention has been given to diachronic changes in the nature of the linkages in (or what Hall and Chase-Dunn [1993:127] have described as the "systemic logic" of) particular macrorregions over time. Yet is it not most likely that the answer again lies at neither extreme position, and that the systemic significance of prestige or wealth exchange shifts with changes in the structure of world-systems and their component societal or regional pieces?

THE CLASSIC-POSTCLASSIC TRANSITION IN ANCIENT OAXACA

With these debates concerning analytical units and preciosities in mind, let us move to a discussion of later prehispanic Mesoamerica. The point of reference is the Valley of Oaxaca in Mexico's Southern Highlands--a large highland valley situated in a mosaic of
surrounding mountain, valley, and coastal regions that comprise western Mesoamerica. The temporal focus is the so-called Classic-Postclassic period transition, which in the western half of Mesoamerica occurred roughly between A.D. 700-900. The Classic period (A.D. 200-800) was the initial era of widespread urbanization in western Mesoamerica, and was dominated by large nucleated centers, like Monte Alban in the Valley of Oaxaca and Teotihuacan in the Basin of Mexico. The Postclassic era (A.D. 900-1520) was a time of mostly smaller centers and politics, although it culminated with the rapid rise of Tenochtitlan and the tribute domain of the Aztec during the last century prior to Spanish conquest.

In the Valley of Oaxaca, scholars have long noted the Classic-Postclassic transition as an episode of dramatic change marked by the curtailment of public building at (and the partial abandonment of) Monte Alban, the increasing importance of other valley centers (such as Mitla), and recognized shifts in the spatial arrangement of large settlements, monumental architectural styles, and ceramic forms. Interestingly, prior explanations for this transition mirror the broader history of archaeological interpretations or paradigmatic frameworks. Prior to 1970, my intellectual grandfathers, Alfonso Caso, Ignacio Bernal (1966), and John Paddock (1966, 1983), emphasized the historic presence of Mixtec speakers in sixteenth-century Oaxaca, and viewed the Classic-Postclassic transition as the consequence of an invasion or population replacement in which the region’s Zapotec inhabitants were subsumed by Mixtecs. Although elements of this interpretation, such as the historic presence of some Mixtecs in the region at conquest, cannot be discounted, there seems little question that these early interpretations (like the culture history paradigm more generally) placed too much weight on ethnicity as the principal basis for societal and artifactual change. More recent generations of scholars in the region (Flannery and Marcus 1983a; Spores and Flannery 1983) have recognized problems with this early view. Many architectural and artifactual elements in the valley show strong continuities between the Classic and Postclassic periods, and the material culture of the Postclassic Valley of Oaxaca hardly duplicates that found in the neighboring Mixtec heartland. Equally important, both at Spanish contact and in this century, more people in the valley speak and define themselves as Zapotees than Mixtecs.

By 1970, the consensual framework for the interpretation of the Classic-Postclassic transition shifted from broad-scale, ethnicity-driven models of culture history to the more regionally focused, socioeconomic perspective of neo-evolutionary processualism (Finsten 1983; Flannery and Marcus 1983b; Marcus 1989). Completion of the full-coverage archaeological settlement survey of the region (Blanton et al. 1982; Kowalewski et al. 1989) revealed that the collapse of Classic period Monte Alban led to a regional "balkanization" in which the valley’s population was subdivided into more than a dozen clusters, several of which were separated by sparsely inhabited buffer zones. Each
of the population clusters surrounded a head town. The largest of these were more
equivalent in size and architectural monumentality than were centers during the prior
Classic period, dominated by the primate capital Monte Alban.

For the Valley of Oaxaca, these processual, regionally focused models of the Classic­
Postclassic transition emphasize collapse and the resultant competition between the
smaller polities that emerged. In the competitive political landscape of the Postclassic, no
one center was capable of dominating either information technologies (writing) or
economic relations. Geneological registers, which trace the ancestry of specific elites,
have been found at several sites. These records of lineal kin ties, which have been
recovered in tombs, were intended to be read by a small audience. In this regard, they
differ markedly from the public monuments of the earlier Classic period (Marcus
volumes of obsidian artifacts have been interpreted to reflect heightened economic
activity or commercialization in the absence of strong central political control during the
Postclassic period (Kowalewski et al. 1983).

LOOKING BEYOND THE REGION

Although many elements of the processual interpretation still appear salient, a regionally
focused explanation cannot account for other key aspects of the Classic­Postclassic
transition in Oaxaca. For example, the increased quantities of obsidian must reflect
broader-scale processes, as obsidian cannot be mined anywhere in the state of Oaxaca.
General artifactual diversity also was greater during the Postclassic than earlier
(Kowalewski and Finsten 1983:419), including a wider assortment of highly decorated
ceramic varieties, such as polychromes, and the incredible cache of wealth and ritual
items that Alfonso Caso unearthed in Tomb 7. Despite repeated excavation attempts, no
Classic period tomb at Monte Alban has even come close to that concentration of wealth.

Balkanization alone also cannot account for the sizeable buildup in the numbers of
settlements and overall population expansion that occurred during the Postclassic period
in three mountain areas that abut the valley. To the north, Drennan (1989) found a
doubling of sites and population between the Late Classic and Late Postclassic. In the
Peeles area to the north and northwest of the valley, Finsten (1996) reports a doubling of
population in the Postclassic. To the east, in the Guirn area (Feinman and Nicholas 1995), the number of sites increased by more than fourfold between the Late Classic and Postclassic periods, while the population more than doubled. In each of these mountain zones, occupation was denser and more continuous than ever before. In fact, the tempo of demographic growth between the Classic and Late Postclassic periods was more rapid in these mountain zones than it was in the Valley of Oaxaca. Clearly, in the Postclassic, the physiographic limits of the Valley of Oaxaca were less of a habitational boundary than ever before.

Yet, the Classic-Postclassic transition was not unique to Oaxaca. Across Mesoamerica, great political and cultural centers declined, while smaller polities vied to take their places. As with the genealogical registers in Oaxaca, greater emphasis at many Mesoamerican sites was placed on the legitimation of specific lines of dynastic succession (Blanton et al. 1992; Diehl and Berlo 1989; Marcus 1992:229-249). Likewise, the Classic-Postclassic increase in the importance of wealth exchange has been noted throughout Mesoamerica (Kepecs et al. 1994; Sabloff and Rathje 1975; Smith 1988; Smith and Heath-Smith 1980).

In Postclassic Mesoamerica (especially prior to the rise of the Aztecs in the last prehispanic centuries), prestige wealth was a key basis of political power. The development of core-periphery hierarchies at the macroscale (and often even the regional scale, as we saw for balkanized Oaxaca) was minimized during much of the Postclassic. Yet interpenetrating accumulation (Gills and Frank 1991:84-85), a key to world-system structure, was clearly at work as elites participated in each others' systems of labor exploitation across political boundaries through the manipulation of prestige exchanges (Kepecs et al. 1994). The ideology of this period, which crossed regional boundaries as an eclectic, "international style," (Blanton et al. 1996; Smith and Heath-Smith 1982) also fostered elaborate ornamentation and prestige wealth in a manner not present in the Mesoamerican highlands during the earlier Classic period (Baird 1989; Nagao 1989; Pasztor 1988:71). Many new varieties of prestige wealth were disseminated widely across the Mesoamerican world at this time, including elaborate metal bells and ornaments, fine paste pottery, and the polychrome ceramic tradition.

Some world-system's theorists might be content if I ended this paper now. After all, what have I argued to this point? The Classic-Postclassic transition in Oaxaca was part of broader macroscale processes that were initiated by the fall of major Classic period urban centers, like Teotihuacan, Monte Alban, and the cities of the Maya Peten, between A.D. 700-900. These changes ushered in a more fragmented, pan-regional, political landscape that was interconnected primarily through the exchange of prestige goods. In this
Postclassic landscape, physiographic boundaries were more open, core-periphery hierarchies were minimized, and prestige goods underlaid a key basis of local power through their role in their attraction and manipulation of factional labor. Prestige goods would be seen as having systemic-defining properties, which they did at this time, and the macroscale could be proclaimed predominant.

A MULTISCALAR PERSPECTIVE

Many of these macroscale observations also remain salient. Yet again, the macroscale approach leaves important aspects of the Oaxaca Classic-Postclassic transition unexplained. For example, major differences in Classic and Postclassic period public architecture exist. Classic period sites feature focal central plazas that often are fairly large. The Main Plaza at Monte Alban is a primary example; there is no question regarding the location of the central precinct at the site. In contrast, Postclassic sites, like Mitla, often have multiple plazas and architectural complexes of roughly equal size and importance. Postclassic plazas tend to be more closed, smaller, and, sometimes, residential in nature. In addition, how would a purely macroscale perspective account for the unsurpassed accumulation of wealth in Postclassic Tomb 7. The mere importance of Postclassic prestige goods does not explain this accumulation, unequaled in any prior era, especially since no Postclassic Oaxaca settlement equaled the size or monumentality of Classic period Monte Alban.

From a simple unilinear perspective, one might have expected to find the greatest concentrations of burial wealth during the Classic period when Monte Alban was clearly the largest and most monumental center in the region. Postclassic Oaxaca centers were more even in size, and smaller than Classic period Monte Alban. Likewise, from a purely macroscale perspective, one might have expected select Classic period interments to contain the most elaborate offerings, since Monte Alban's and the Valley of Oaxaca's interregional influence and power were seemingly greater at that time. Yet although many Classic period tombs have been excavated, the greatest accumulation of prehispanic Oaxacan grave wealth is Postclassic in date. Sampling issues and "negative evidence" always could be raised to "account for" Tomb 7. Yet differences in the distribution of grave wealth, when considered with the aforementioned architectural distinctions for the Classic and Postclassic periods,
seems to signal possible key differences in the way in which Valley of Oaxaca society was organized during these two phases. Interpersonal networks and the exchange of wealth were more critical in the Postclassic, while monumental architecture and the activities associated with it seem to have had a larger role in Classic period society (Blanton et al. 1996).

A further issue concerns Monte Alban’s interregional connections during the Classic period. Although the extraregional flows of prestige wealth were less than later, and the physiographic region of the Valley of Oaxaca did more-or-less define a Classic period settlement frontier, it would be inaccurate to assume that macroscale processes were nonexistent or unimportant during the Classic. For example, Marcus (1983) suggests that a political meeting of significance between Teotihuacan and Monte Alban was commemorated at Monte Alban on the Classic period Lpida de Bazan and on carved stones that were part of the South Platform at the south end of the Main Plaza (Marcus 1983). Byland and Pohl (1994) argue that alliances with Monte Alban helped to sustain population centers in the Mixteca Alta that collapsed after Monte Alban’s demise. Space does not permit it, but many more evidences of apparently important interregional connections could be amassed for the Classic period. But the nature of those extraregional linkages appear to have been rather different during these two phases.

Where does this leave us? First, I suggest that a Mesoamerican world-system existed in the Classic period, but (at least in western Mesoamerica) it was a world-system with a somewhat different "system logic" and was based less directly on wealth exchange than was the later Postclassic world. This implies even for one world-system, ancient Mesoamerica, a blanket statement cannot be made regarding the significance of prestige exchange. The role of such exchanges appears to have varied in systemic importance over time. In a cross-cultural comparison, even greater variation might be expected. Second, I would argue that the differences in public architecture and tomb accumulation underlie key distinctions in the nature of rulership between Classic and Postclassic Oaxaca. Classic period rule was focused on the corporate integration of societal segments through integrative rituals carried out in monumental settings and central plazas that were replicated across the region. Rule was relatively anonymous, perhaps resting in certain offices, such as the heads of certain corporate groups. In contrast, Postclassic rule in Oaxaca appears to have been more closely linked to specific individuals, who lived in elaborate residential complexes, and derived their importance through their network of allies and familial ties. The genealogical registers of this period establish legitimacy through lineal descent and patrimonial rhetoric. The control of wealth was tied to the control of factions, and together these form key bases of power. Yet,
the significance of factions is evidenced in the multifocal layout of most Postclassic centers. Tomb 7 with its massive concentration of loot exemplifies the importance of prestige wealth and elaborate personal adornment at this time.

By now it may be evident that the Classic-Postclassic differences in Oaxaca correspond to a degree with the broader pan-Mesoamerican patterns. But if one looks beyond Oaxaca, the parallels weaken somewhat. Although the Postclassic centers of Xochicalco (in Morelos) and Chichen Itz (in Yucatan) participated in the Postclassic world of prestige exchanges, they had public architectural complexes that belie a more corporate orientation than is found at Postclassic Oaxacan sites. Clearly then, if we are to understand major historical transitions (like the Classic-Postclassic transition in Oaxaca and Mesoamerica), we cannot design our research at only one scale, nor should we expect theories designed for a single scale to provide adequate or complete answers. A more multiscalar approach that bootstraps, rather than juxtaposes, theories from different spatial vantages seems requisite.

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