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## *Global Social Movements Before and After 9-11*

EDITED BY

BRUCE PODOBNIK & THOMAS EHRLICH REIFER

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The main editorial goal of the *Journal of World-Systems Research* is to develop and disseminate scholarly research on topics that are relevant to the analysis of world-systems. We especially want to include works that proceed from several different theoretical stances and disciplines. These include, but are not limited to, civilizationists, evolutionary approaches, international political economy, comparative, historical and cultural analysis. We seek the work of political scientists, historians, sociologists, ethnographers, archaeologists, economists and geographers.

We especially encourage works that take theory seriously by confronting problems of conceptualization and making definitions of concepts explicit, by formulating hypotheses, constructing axiomatic theories and causal models. Theoretical research programs that combine theory construction with comparative research are badly needed to take the world-systems approach beyond the stage of a perspective.

We also want to encourage the application of comparative, quantitative and network-analytic methods to world-systems research, though we will certainly also publish pieces that do not use these methods. Any empirical study that is deemed relevant to world-systems analysis may be published even if it uses a very different conceptual framework.

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
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
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## THE GLOBALIZATION PROTEST MOVEMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Bruce Podobnik &  
Thomas Ehrlich Reifer

Throughout the history of the modern world-system, projects of globalization promoted by world elites have been met with resistance from people on the ground whose livelihoods have often been threatened. As the geographic scale of global capitalism has expanded, and its penetration into daily life has deepened, the scale and intensity of resistance to this system has grown as well. Local efforts to protect traditional ways of life, for instance, have evolved into national campaigns for union protections and then into international movements for stronger labor, human rights, and environmental protections. Today, as global elites push for the final incorporation of all regions into a single capitalist system based on neoliberal principles, they are being met by an unexpectedly resilient, far-reaching, and multi-faceted coalition of resistance. Whatever it may be called—the ‘anti-globalization movement,’ the ‘global solidarity movement,’ or the ‘globalization protest movement’—it is clear that this anti-systemic movement has emerged as an important challenger to the dominance of global capital over the contemporary world.

This special issue of the *Journal of World-Systems Research* is dedicated to examining the modern characteristics and prospects of this coalition of resistance to elite-driven forms of globalization. We have gathered together ten articles that explore various facets of the contemporary globalization protest movement. While the authors draw on different theoretical traditions and make use of distinct methodologies, their central research questions are the same: What are the contemporary roots of various components of this anti-systemic movement?

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What beneficial synergies and/or tensions currently exist between constituent groups within the movement? And what are the future prospects of the globalization protest movement? By providing a collection of studies that approaches these common questions from different perspectives, this special issue hopes to significantly advance our understanding of what is probably the most important movement of the left in the current era.

Because the articles in this special issue examine dynamics of opposition to globalization in the contemporary period, we thought it appropriate to briefly sketch out in this introduction some of the earlier antecedents to this movement. Although we will not present a full-fledged analysis of the world-historical roots of the globalization protest movement here, we do want to compare and contrast dynamics of resistance in the first (late nineteenth century) and second (late twentieth century) major phases of financial globalization to have swept through the world-economy.<sup>1</sup> The articles in this special issue of *JWSR* focus on dynamics of contestation in the second phase of globalization. But there are useful insights to be gained by looking back at anti-systemic forms of resistance that emerged in an earlier era as well.

If we examine the period from 1870–1914, when the world-system went through a particularly intense phase of financial globalization, we find that a surprisingly rich array of transnational social movements were already contesting elite-driven projects. Undoubtedly the most important anti-systemic movement during this era was the labor movement. Not only were workers throughout the core and semi-periphery mobilizing to form unions at the national level, but laborers also forged impressive transnational organizations as well. Indeed, the formation of the First International in 1864 revealed that European workers were attuned to the need to organize on an international level from a very early period. The resiliency of this transnational movement was demonstrated when, after the collapse of the First International, it was replaced by a Second International that was even broader in size and scope. From 1889 to 1914, the Second International exerted considerable ideological influence throughout Europe—and even supported worker’s campaigns in North America and some parts of the semi-periphery.

In addition to the consolidation of a transnational labor movement, this period also witnessed the emergence of a variety of international human-rights

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<sup>1</sup> For more complete analyses of the world-historical roots of globalization protests, readers are encouraged to consult the following sources: Walton and Seddon (1994), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Silver and Slater (1999), and Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000). See Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer (2000) for a presentation of new evidence regarding successive waves of trade globalization.

organizations. Leading advocates for women’s rights from Europe and North America, for instance, came together in 1888 to found the International Council of Women. This organization not only demanded equality in legal and political realms, but it also pushed for improvements in working conditions experienced by women and children. Soon afterward, one of the first international human-rights organizations, the Congo Reform Association, was formed to publicize depredations occurring in the rubber industry of the Belgian Congo. By mounting effective media and legal campaigns in Europe and the United States, the association was able to bring about important reforms in the colonial administration of the Congo.

The period 1870–1914 also witnessed the emergence of international conservation associations dedicated to protecting specific species and ecosystems from commercial exploitation. Nature reserves have a long history in Europe, but the modern conservation movement really took shape in the 1870s with the institution of a national park system in the United States. Similar administrative systems, containing some prohibitions against commercial enterprise, then spread through other parts of the core before the First World War. Efforts were also undertaken to protect certain environmental resources in colonial areas during this period. The creation of the Convention for the Preservation of Wild Species in Africa in 1900, and the formation of the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire in 1903, are examples of this embryonic international environmental movement.

Labor, human rights, and conservation activists clearly forged impressive transnational associations at the turn of the twentieth century. However, these organizations had important vulnerabilities that contemporary analysts would do well to note. Most significantly, virtually all the transnational organizations of that era were headquartered in core countries. And though many worked to address concerns of peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, these organizations were nevertheless dominated by European and North American activists. Consequently, there were paternalistic and racist tendencies within many nineteenth century transnational organizations that limited their expansion into the colonial world. For these reasons, the transnational organizations that arose during the first major wave of financial globalization remained vulnerable to disruptions that swept through the core of the world-economy.

While many of these transnational organizations collapsed under the pressures of two world wars and a great depression, they nevertheless left enduring legacies. Through the successes they achieved, late nineteenth century workers, human rights activists, and conservationists demonstrated that capital could be confronted on a transnational level. Moreover, they created organizational tactics and cultures of opposition that remain important in many parts of the world.

And, through their demise, they highlighted a crucial challenge that must be met by the contemporary globalization protest movement. Their example demonstrates that a movement of opposition to contemporary global capital must be deeply rooted in all zones of the world-economy, if it is to be truly enduring and egalitarian.

The second intense phase of elite-driven globalization, which has accelerated from the end of the Second World War to the present, has been accompanied by a movement of resistance that coalesced first in the developing world—and has since matured into an anti-systemic force of global proportions. The early manifestations of this movement came in the form of wide-ranging waves of anti-colonial and nationalist activism that swept through the periphery and semi-periphery from the late 1940s through the late 1970s.<sup>2</sup> Although these movements were generally rooted in specific countries, they also often generated regional associations and networks of mutual support. By the late 1970s, these anti-colonial and nationalist movements had brought about important transformations in the political and economic relations of power between elites in the global north and south.

Anti-colonial and nationalist movements were soon subjected to counter-offensives from domestic and international sponsors of neoliberal globalization policies. The re-assertion of a neoliberal form of globalization, spearheaded by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, involved not only the intensification of military attacks against dissident governments and peoples, but also the imposition of increasingly severe austerity and deregulation policies throughout the developing world. The pressure exerted by the US and UK, as well as multi-lateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, succeeded in rolling back some nationalist and regulationist initiatives. However, structural adjustment policies also generated widespread protests from citizens throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.

Into the mid 1990s, dynamics of contestation between proponents and opponents of neoliberal forms of globalization were centered in the periphery and semi-periphery. However, by 1994 a new round of trade negotiations was bringing increased scrutiny to policies that protected key industries in core nations as well. As pressures to liberalize core economies grew, so too did defensive reactions from workers, farmers, and environmentalists in North America, Western Europe, and East Asia. By the late 1990s, relatively new national and transnational

<sup>2</sup> Analyses of anti-colonial and nationalist movements of resistance can be found in: Girvan (1976), Bergquist (1986), and Cooper (1996).

activist networks headquartered in the global north began establishing links with more established, mature organizations centered in the global south. As a result, just as proponents of a neoliberal form of globalization intensified their efforts to apply their policies on a world-scale, they were met by a multi-faceted coalition of resistance that was also capable of mounting actions on a global level.

The articles in this special issue investigate the recent evolution and current characteristics of this coalition of resistance. In terms of temporal coverage, the articles focus on the period from the 1970s onward—which is when those phenomena characteristic of contemporary globalization took off in a major way.

Jeffrey Ayres' "Framing Collective Action Against Neoliberalism" explores the importance of the framing of collective action in the movement against neoliberal globalization. Ayers analyzes the ways in which the diverse regional and global currents of this developing movement provide an ongoing framework for counter-hegemonic activism. Jackie Smith's "Exploring Connection Between Global Integration and Political Mobilization"\* turns to focus on the relationship between changing forms of global integration and transnational social movement organizations (TSMO) in the aftermath of superpower competition. Using empirical indicators of size, issues orientation, geographical location and organizational structure, Smith is able to test a number of hypotheses regarding the evolution of TSMOs in the context of contemporary globalization.

Frederick Buttel and Kenneth Gould's "Global Social Movement(s) at the Crossroads" analyzes the trajectory of the anti-corporate globalization movement, looking in particular at its different currents, organizational and geographical components, non-governmental organizations, environmental, labor, social justice, North and South. Placing emphasis on the role of environmental claims and strategies in the contentious dynamics of the movement, they examine the dilemmas of its diverse constituencies, multiple discourses and aims, as it gropes its way towards a better future.

Lesley Wood's "Breaking the Bank and Taking it to the Streets," takes a different approach, looking at the targets of global justice protests from 1998 to 2001, from transnational corporations, to governments, to supranational economic institutions. Wood takes into account continental variations, existing cultures of contention, and the role of social movement networks in processes of diffusion of mobilization targets. Robert Ross, in "From Antisweatshop to Global Justice to Anti-War,"† takes instead a comparative approach over time. Ross examines the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) movement beginning in the

\* Erratum: Jackie Smith's article appears pp. 255–285.

† Erratum: Robert J.S. Ross' article appears pp. 287–319.

late 1990s and compares its makeup and trajectory to that of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) of the 1960s. Tracing both similarities and differences in the diffusion of the movement from elite universities outward, Ross then goes on to trace their internal dynamics, ideological orientation and very different political alliances, most especially to labor, while situating these in the context of changes in the global political economy.

Kenneth Gould, Tammy Lewis, and J. Timmons Roberts' "Blue-Green Coalitions" trace the incipient alliance between blue-collar workers and unions and the environmentalist green movements. The authors engage in a nuanced analysis of the points of convergence and divergence between different elements of such groups, including through an exploration of the dilemmas of dependency on outside funding sources in the case of environmental organizations. They go on to suggest the best and most promising possibilities for convergence and coalition within sectors of these movements for greater blue-green alliances in the future.

Amory Starr's "How Can Anti-Imperialism Not be Anti-Racist?" explores one of the key issues that has arisen in the movement around globalization. Starr explores the discursive claims of activists and scholars involved in different spheres of the movements and their points of intersection, as well as concrete experience during different mobilizations. Starr moves on to conceptualize the contemporary movement and to examine the differences between tactics, goals and strategies, the various subcultures, and the problems and prospects confronting those who seek to ensure that the ongoing mobilization against top-down globalization and against global racism are critically entwined.

Thomas Hall and James Fenelon's "The Future of Indigenous Peoples," explores indigenous resistance to capitalist expansion far back into the past and project its likely trajectory into the future. In an analysis reminiscent of Fernand Braudel's famous remark, "events are dust," they argue that recent events, the fall of the USSR, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the war on Iraq are more likely "blips on the radar," obscuring much more significant patterns of large-scale, long-term social change. Exploring the myriad forms of indigenous strategies of resistance and survival to the expansion of state and commercial networks, they also outline a typology of indigenous societies in comparative world-systems perspective.

Gianpaolo Baiocchi's "The Party and the Multitude" looks at the role of Brazil's Workers Party (PT), and their sponsorship of the World Social Forum. the election of the PT's leader Lula, as the country's first working-class born President, and criticism of his administration and the party's relationship with social movements raises a host of questions about progressive politics in the twenty-first century. In examining these issues, the article speaks to the more


general question of the relationship between political parties and social movements in a global civil society today.

Finally, Peter Waterman's "Social Movement Unionism and the World Social Forum," looks at the development of social movement unionism and debates about this and related concepts. Waterman examines the combination of class and popular mobilization in contemporary labor struggles and social movements, as a challenge and alternative to contemporary international business unionism. Waterman goes on to explore the possibilities for a labor revival in the context of the global justice and solidarity movement and the emergence of the World Social Forum.

The articles gathered here are of course, by no means comprehensive. Regionally based studies and inquiries into a variety of issue based movements, from global feminism, the peace movement, or organizing in the South more generally, have all made contributions to our understanding of the battles over wealth and power and for equality and greater participatory democracy and socioeconomic justice in our own time. Nevertheless, it is hoped that these pieces contribute to an ongoing debate, about the past, the present, and the future, both in terms of understanding the contemporary world, and in the struggle to change it as well.

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#### ABSTRACT

The rise of the protest movement against neoliberal globalization represents one of the most significant illustrations of social conflict and contentious political behavior of the past several decades. This paper contends that central to the movement's rise and evolution has been the active mobilization of meanings or interpretations critical of neoliberal policies and institutions. In effect, the so-called "anti-globalization movement" has benefited particularly from a transnationally-shared diagnosis, which implicates neoliberalism for a host of global social ills. However, civil society activists, especially after the Seattle World Trade Organization protests in 1999, have had a dif-

ficult time generating agreed upon strategic responses to neoliberal policies. In particular, the political environment for frame dissemination has become a much more contested one in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, as regional and tactical differences within the protest movement have become much more apparent. The difficult experiences of civil society groups committed to sustaining protest against neoliberal globalization are not unusual, but consistent with the history of other protest movements. These movements similarly matured and positioned themselves as genuine forces for substantial political and social change.

## FRAMING COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST NEOLIBERALISM: THE CASE OF THE "ANTI-GLOBALIZATION" MOVEMENT

Jeffrey M. Ayres

### INTRODUCTION

The rise of the so-called "anti-globalization movement" represents one of the most significant illustrations of social conflict and contentious political behavior of the past several decades. The numerous boisterous and well-attended protest events against neoliberal globalization at the turn of the century, moreover, seemed to provide evidence of the rise of an incipient transnational movement, as from Seattle, to Chiang Mai, to Prague, to Quebec City and finally Genoa, domestic and internationally-represented protests developed solidarities, stirred public debate and attracted larger crowds committed to challenging neoliberal policies and institutions. The transnational character of this movement attracted particular attention, and its emergence coincided with a remarkable and increasingly well-documented upsurge in transnational civic activity around a host of global issues (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997, Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999; Tarrow 2001; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002; Smith and Johnston 2002), while sparking a mini-publishing industry of "how-to" manuals for budding street activists (Danaher and Burbach 2000; Welton and Wolf 2001; Prokosch and Raymond 2002).

One means of understanding the recent trajectory of this protest movement is to appreciate that its dynamics have been shaped by an underlying and quite ferocious contest over people's interpretations and understandings of the supposed benefits of neoliberal economic policies. How people interpret and frame

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understandings of current economic globalization processes—and how these conceptual framings coalesce to structure global protest—is a process at least as important as how political-economic changes associated with globalization have provoked collective action.<sup>1</sup> In fact, part of the framing contest surrounding the globalization debate has centered on the label “anti-globalization;” what we have really been witnessing over the past several years is a maturing of a protest movement against contemporary neoliberal globalization processes. Moreover, critical to this contentious mobilization has been the crystallization of a broadly interpretive, increasingly transnationally-shared diagnostic frame that attributes a variety of social ills to the past 15–20 year span of neoliberal ascendancy.

That the world’s economy has been undergoing a neoliberal transformation over the past twenty years is hardly in dispute (MacEwan 1999; Tabb 2003). Responding to the global economic slowdown as well as increased international competitiveness for markets, which characterized the 1970s, political and business leaders in several key Northern developed states undertook dramatic political-economic reforms designed to channel the globalization of the world’s economy in a so-called neoliberal direction. Proponents of neoliberalism, perhaps most notably the Reagan and Thatcher governments of the 1980s, thus pushed for more liberalized trade and investment, tax cuts and concurrent cuts in public spending on social services, deregulation and the privatization of state-owned industries or services. Notably, such a policy direction was at odds with the initial legitimizing basis for the post-World War Two Bretton Woods international economic management system, in which government regulation, social welfare systems and full employment policies were considered an acceptable compliment to essentially still market-based fundamentals (Korten 1996).

However, the break with the Bretton Woods regime in the 1970s and the resulting neoliberal turn in the global economy played an important role in shaping the incidences of national, regional and at times apparently transnational protest, which erupted in the 1990s to challenge the neoliberal globalization paradigm. Rising criticism and mounting public demonstrations directed at neoliberal policies and institutions had been occurring globally for some time, but gained particular attention after the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle, raising the specter of a budding legitimacy crisis within the

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<sup>1</sup> The amount of research documenting the role played by political opportunities and mobilizing structures in social movement development is voluminous; a good beginning approach for sampling this literature would be to consult McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) and Tarrow (1998) for excellent synthetic overviews.

neoliberal paradigm (Useem 2002; Finnegan 2003). Proponents of neoliberal policies insisted that there remained few alternatives to neoliberal globalization, while the protestors asserted that the globalization of the world’s economy in fact need not inevitably follow a neoliberal template. Rather, many varied proposals for what was argued to be a more socially, economically and ecologically equitable globalization process began to emerge and to be debated.<sup>2</sup>

This paper examines the importance of the mobilization of contentious beliefs and interpretations critical of neoliberal globalization. The record of neoliberalism has given activists a wealth of shared experiences from which to fashion a meaningful and increasingly transnationally-shared understanding of the perceived negative effects of such policies. The discussion herein focuses broadly on the challenges facing civil society activists as they have tried to fashion and sustain such a transnational consensus that both attributes blame and develops strategies of action against neoliberal policy initiatives. Yet, the events of September 11, 2001 have clearly muddied the potential trajectory of this protest movement: while some activists have maintained that the mobilization potential of the movement has been little changed by the fallout from the terrorist attacks on the United States, others in the media and various political establishments have been quick to write off the movement’s potential. Clearly, the protest movement after September 11 has evolved within a more constrained political environment, with activists facing a markedly resilient state, and a resurgent neoliberal agenda (Ayres and Tarrow 2002). At the same time, the events of September 11 and its aftermath have had an unintended effect of illustrating the durable character of the protest movement, which has surprisingly wide geographic reach.

#### COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES AGAINST NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION

The concept of framing processes is analytically useful for highlighting how the development and spread of mobilizing ideas are integral to social movement dynamics (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988). For movement activists, framing is “meaning work”: an active and contentious process where actors are engaged in producing and disseminating meanings that differ from and may in fact challenge existing socio-political conditions (Benford and Snow 2000). As such, when movement participants “frame” a particular social condition, “they frame, or assign meaning to and interpret events and conditions in ways that are

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<sup>2</sup> For just a few examples see Clark (2003), Henderson (1999), and Foster and Anand (1999).

intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituencies, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow and Benford 1988: 198). Framing processes thus will be seen to provide a useful conceptual guide for understanding the ongoing struggle to produce and disseminate mobilizing ideas critical of neoliberal globalization.

So-called collective action frames result from this meaning production and serve several crucial functions for movements. Collective action frames are "constructed as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements and urge others to act in concert to affect change" (Benford and Snow 2000: 613). In other words, collective action frames provide diagnostic attribution, which is concerned with problem identification, and prognostic attribution, which is concerned with problem resolution (Snow and Benford 1992). So-called "master frames" serve similar functions to movement specific collective action frames. However, master frames provide broader interpretive paradigms for multiple movements, shaping the outlook of activists and movements. When faced with what are interpreted as unjust social conditions, activists, then, develop movement specific, and sometimes master collective action frames, to highlight the unjust character of events or conditions which are no longer tolerable and are now framed as undefendable (Ibid: 137). Such frames then provide "legitimizing accounts" (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988: 713) shaping and sustaining mobilization campaigns.

Activists by the late 1990s successfully developed a contentious, increasingly transnationally-accepted master collective action frame to challenge the prevailing neoliberal orthodoxy as it existed in such institutions as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The construction of such an anti-neoliberal globalization collective action frame involved an especially long, contentious and difficult process, as movement activists faced two especially daunting challenges: a powerful and wealthy set of interests in those states, corporations and other social actors supportive of neoliberal policies; and the diversity of different regions, states, languages, cultures and popular experiences affected by neoliberal globalization. For example, where Canadian social activists in the mid-1980s may have crafted one of the earliest collective action frames in the developed North against neoliberalism in their protest movement against the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), the experiences of these Canadians differed considerably from the socially disruptive effects of the IMF's structural adjustment programs, which had encouraged numerous incidents of riots, strikes and other acts of acute collective action across states in the develop-

ing South. Thus, while various movement and region-specific collective action frames were emerging throughout the 1980s and early 1990s in different parts of the world, it would require the development of more inclusive master frame to bind disparate actors into a protest movement against neoliberalism that increasingly had achieved international scope.

### Diagnostic Framing: Identifying Neoliberalism as "the Problem"

Again, by the early-to-mid-1990s, many regions of the world had become settings for contentious political debates and social conflicts between opponents and proponents of neoliberal globalization policies. Across these disparate areas, activists were increasingly linking a variety of social, political and economic problems with some of the major developments in the global political economy. In particular, activists labeled international institutions and regimes associated with the advancement of neoliberal policies, as those actors responsible for some of the economic dislocations and political conflicts of recent years. Thus a process of diagnostic framing was unfolding, serving to motivate individuals through movement specific collective action frames that attacked tenets of neoliberalism.

For example, across Western Europe, the first salvos in what would ultimately evolve into what have become the tens-of-thousands strong European Union (EU) summit protests in recent years emerged with opposition to the European Monetary Union proposals implicit in the Maastricht Treaty. Some states, such as Denmark, outright rejected the treaty (Geyer and Ayres 1995), while others witnessed widespread popular upheaval against the accord's perceived mandate for fiscal austerity and social cutbacks. The massive and disruptive French general strike against the then Juppé government's economic proposals in the winter of 1995 was but the most dramatic example of this public discord (Rodrik 1997; Bourdieu 1998; Ancelovici 2002). More widespread and mainstream concerns about an emerging Maastricht-induced European democratic deficit linked constraints bearing down on the sovereign policy-making capacities of EU-member governments, and fed growing popular perceptions of an aloof clique of European business and political elite more concerned with maximizing continental economic efficiency than with addressing mounting social insecurities such as rising unemployment (Habermas 2001).

Meanwhile, by 1994, a series of popular campaigns against neoliberal policies had buffeted the North American publics in successive waves, from North to South. In Canada, widespread public opposition to the proposed Canada-US Free Trade Agreement coalesced in 1988 into a cross-country anti-free trade movement (Ayres 1998). Canadian social activists and nationalists feared liberalizing trade with the U.S. would result in the exodus of jobs, pressure to harmonize social programs and the possible loss of cultural identity. The anti-free

trade movement that emerged played a highly public and intrusive role in the Canadian federal election that autumn, which turned into a de facto referendum on the proposed accord. Despite the eventual ratification of the CUSFTA, due in no small part to the splintering of the anti-free trade opposition party vote in the federal election, the Canadian cross-country coalition-building campaign provided a useful model for U.S. and Mexican groups to adopt in the subsequent campaign against the NAFTA.

Anti-NAFTA mobilizing drew from both national-level campaigns as well as trilateral strategizing and protest actions mounted between Canadian, U.S. and Mexican civil society groups (Macdonald and Schwartz 2002). More specifically, while national groups may have had different mobilization agendas, there was an emergent trilateral collective action frame rooted in a distrust of NAFTA as a thinly veiled neoliberal document. Nationally, innovative new coalitions emerged, such as the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART) and the Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC) in the U.S. (Dreiling 2001), and the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC) in Mexico, the latter notably modeling itself after the Canadian anti-free trade coalition (Sinclair 1992). NAFTA's eventual ratification, despite persistent public doubts and civil society organizing, ultimately would not be the end of popular discontent. The Zapatista guerrilla movement in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas, began its uprising on behalf of the majority poor indigenous people of Chiapas on January 1, 1994, specifically targeting NAFTA and its neoliberal economic prescriptions for continentally liberalized trade and investment.

Meanwhile, as European and North American collective action frames, which focused on the perceived ills of liberalizing economies, buttressed these continental-level protest campaigns, state actors and civil society organizations across the developing South had been mounting their own protests for years against the social fallout caused by IMF structural adjustment programs, the repressive policies of brutal dictatorships or the generalized inequities of the post-World War Two Bretton Woods system.<sup>3</sup> In the immediate post-war period through to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, many state actors frequently in partnership with business associations and non-governmental associations (NGOs), pursued state-led policies such as import substitution industrialization or cartels, in largely futile efforts to alter the international division of labor, improve the terms of trade, or improve developing states' positions

<sup>3</sup>. Certainly some would argue that people across the developing South have been resisting the economically dominating, colonialist and imperialist policies of the developed North for centuries. See Heckscher (2002) as well as Cavanagh (2002).

relative to the global economy. The United Nation's sponsored New International Economic Order project also represented an attempt by state and civil society actors from the developing South to negotiate new and more favorable economic arrangements with the wealthier Northern industrialized states.

Yet, the oil shocks of the 1970s and the emergence of the debt crisis in the early 1980s largely shifted the locus of resistance in the developing South to civil society actors. As numerous states across Africa, Latin America and Asia sought to stave off fiscal insolvency, structural adjustment programs were arranged with the IMF, the negative repercussions of which almost always fell on the more vulnerable social actors. In exchange for desperately needed loans, the IMF prescribed deep budget cuts to social spending, a lowering of taxes, increases in interest rates and a general liberalization of trade and investment policies to encourage states across the South to become more hospitable to the arrival of multinational corporations and capital. Frequently lacking institutional allies within the affected polities or organizational resources, including independent labor unions, social actors often responded to these austerity programs with much less organized acts of resistance and protest, including food riots, strikes and other sometimes violent urban street actions (Walton and Ragin 1989; Acuna and Williams 1994; Walton and Seddon 1994). Those groups that did mount better organized grassroots responses to this so-called "shock therapy" also found themselves harassed if not shut down by the military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes which were frequently on the receiving end of IMF loans.

Thus, by the mid-1990s, a number of regional protest campaigns were being shaped by collective actions frames that implicated neoliberal policies and institutions for the mounting inequalities and dislocations of the post-Bretton Woods era. In fact, the record of neoliberalism around the world was less than auspicious and made it easier for activists to assign blame: the total external debt of developing countries had skyrocketed, the gap between the richest and poorest states had grown demonstrably, poverty had increased in many developing states, and the average per capita income growth rate was significantly lower across the developing south than had been the case in the roughly twenty years before the onset of the debt crisis and the policy generalization of the neoliberal model.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the international economy had become increasingly unstable, buffeted by a number of financial shocks encouraged by unregulated capital flows. These shocks in Mexico, and then eventually East-Asia, Russia and Brazil, which

<sup>4</sup>. Evidence abounds of the uneven results of neoliberal globalization over the past two decades. These examples are drawn from the United Nations (1999) and the World Bank (2000). Also see Weller, Scott and Hersch (2001) and Stiglitz (2002).

had evolved out of a globally deregulated market for currency speculation, would further blemish the neoliberal record. Even across portions of the developed North, especially in Western Europe, rising unemployment and the image of increasingly financially straightjacketed welfare systems provoked more widespread public unrest.

In conjunction with this at best uneven neoliberal record, an expanding array of international agreements, which codified neoliberal principles to promote and safeguard liberalized trade and investment, encouraged new expressions of social discontent. NAFTA, the EU Maastricht Treaty, and perhaps most notably, the creation of the WTO in 1995, raised concerns about the hierarchical and elitist structure of trade negotiations and institutions. Moreover, the WTO's new agenda also attracted concern, as in an effort to enforce a rules-based trading system, the institution turned its attention beyond such traditional protectionist devices as tariffs and quotas to a much broader and increasingly controversial array of state laws and regulations that could potentially now be interpreted as trade restrictive. Finally, in light of the WTO's new expanded mandate, attention focused on the lack of international safeguards for labor and human rights, environmental protection and other social concerns.

### Towards the Coalescing of a Master Frame Against Neoliberalism

As these disparate collective action frames were shaping regional protests, several important trends were also working to more thoroughly discredit neoliberal policies and institutions, while at the same time legitimate a more widely shared critique of neoliberalism. As the neoliberal record received more widespread and vocal criticism, more space opened up for civil society networking, collective bargaining and political lobbying across a number of developing states, especially across Latin America and South-East Asia, where many states had made transitions to electoral democracies over the previous decade. At the same time, national civil society organizations from developing states were increasingly networking transnationally with organizations from the developed North at so-called countersummits as well as through the Internet. In particular, so-called "People's Summits," became venues for social activists to meet to share experiences, workshop, strategize and align their national diagnostic frames against the perceived inequities of neoliberal policies and institutions (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001). These summits, and the increased availability of the Internet, set the stage for the crystallization of an increasingly transnationally-shared diagnostic master frame against neoliberalism.

People's Summits were held parallel to trade minister and heads-of-state gatherings negotiating the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in Chile, Brazil and Costa Rica. Similar-style summits were being held to coun-

ter the Asia Pacific Economic and Cooperation Forums (APEC) in Vancouver and Manila. One of the more notable counter gatherings took place in Paris in 1997 to strategize and share national perspectives on the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The anti-MAI strategy meetings attended by a coterie of civil society organizations helped to spearhead subsequent domestic and international campaigns against the MAI. The MAI negotiations ultimately collapsed when France pulled out, and credited its decision in part to what it referred to as a "global civil society" of anti-MAI activists.<sup>5</sup>

The explosive use of the Internet by thousands of NGOs would also in fact serve as a key means of bridging a variety of national and regional anti-neoliberal collective action frames. Through the use of listservs, email and web sites, international NGOs as varied as the International Forum on Globalization, the Third World Network, the Hemispheric Social Alliance and the Focus on the Global South,<sup>6</sup> shared information and developed similar critiques of neoliberalism. Hundreds of more nationally-focused NGOs, which were either members of or linked to such larger international organizations, also shared information and critical perspectives gleaned from the Internet in more face-to-face grassroots settings. Hemispheric civil society groups crafted the *Alternatives for the Americas* text,<sup>7</sup> a social-democratic and sustainable-developmental alternative to the proposed FTAA, during parallel People's Summits to the FTAA negotiations, and subsequently edited and revised it via Hemispheric Social Alliance-member Internet exchange (Ayres forthcoming).

Opponents of neoliberalism were also energized by U.S. Congressional opposition to the renewal of fast-trade authority. Fast-track power authorizes the U.S. President to negotiate trade accords with foreign countries, with Congress relegated to a reduced role of simply approving or rejecting the proposed accord. With every president since Richard Nixon in the 1970s enjoying this privilege, U.S. President Clinton sought congressional renewal in 1997. However, Clinton withdrew the request in the face of a groundswell of opposition from both labor unions upset with his strong-arming of NAFTA through Congress in 1993, as

<sup>5</sup> See [http://www.finances.gouv.fr/pole\\_ecofin/international/ami0998/ami0998.htm](http://www.finances.gouv.fr/pole_ecofin/international/ami0998/ami0998.htm). For more on the role played by civil society groups and the Internet in opposing the MAI, see Smith and Smythe (1999) and Diebert (2000).

<sup>6</sup> See Steger (2002) for an excellent discussion of the role played by NGOs in countering neoliberal ideology, as well as a substantive index of NGO web sites.

<sup>7</sup> To read the *Alternatives for the Americas* document, or to retrieve information on the Hemispheric Social Alliance, see <http://web.net/comfront>.

well as opposition from grassroots lobbying efforts from the CTC and ART coalitions. The following year a reintroduced fast-track proposal went down to defeat, marking a significant trade policy victory for the growing number of civil society organizations across the U.S. who had shown increased skepticism of the supposed benefits of neoliberalism (Shoch 2000). The Clinton Administration's efforts to reframe the debate over fast-track, by renaming it "trade promotion authority," thereby putting a more benign spin to what was otherwise a tool to promote neoliberal policy proposals, had failed to win reauthorization.

In short, as the 1990s came to a close, a master diagnostic frame critical of neoliberal globalization slowly crystallized and gained a wider international acceptance. It was not a completely hegemonic counter frame—regional and national-level variations persisted. Yet, the strength of this anti-neoliberal master frame lay in its breadth and capacity to absorb and accommodate the variety of movement and region specific frames that spurred collective action against neoliberal agreements and institutions over the previous several years. In fact, this master frame clearly took on a sufficiently broad interpretive scope in its inclusiveness, cultural reach and flexibility (Benford and Snow 2000) arguably to function as a master "injustice frame" (Carroll and Ratner 1996; Klandermans et al. 1999), indicting neoliberalism for a variety of perceived injustices: from environmental degradation, the shifting of jobs to low wages production sites, human rights abuses in sweatshops, and still growing poverty and persistent indebtedness across the developing world. Thus, on the eve of the autumn 1999 protests against the WTO millennial round in Seattle, the parameters of a more clearly transnational diagnostic master collective action frame that would help guide for nearly two years a burgeoning array of large and geographically-varied anti-neoliberal protests came into focus.

### Framing Mobilizations from Seattle to Genoa

The WTO protests in Seattle certainly did not initiate organizing against neoliberalism, but because the protests took place in the United States, they represented an important milestone in such efforts. United States business and political officials in the Clinton Administration were some of the most vocal supporters of neoliberal policies. Clinton, in fact, risked political capital and alienated members of the Democratic labor-left constituency with his combative and ultimately successful push for NAFTA's ratification (Cohen 2000), as well as his failed efforts to secure fast-track renewal. The emergence of the WTO in 1995, again with the solid backing of U.S. officials, as well as the start of FTAA negotiations, cemented the U.S. as a leading proponent of expanding the neoliberal paradigm globally.

Yet, the tens of thousands strong protests, which disrupted the Seattle

WTO meetings, and contributed to the failure by WTO bureaucrats to establish a negotiating agenda,<sup>8</sup> sent a signal of widening discontent both outside and within the U.S. over its official policy embrace of neoliberal principles. Moreover, the image of failure emanating out of Seattle raised some of the most significant questions to that date about the legitimacy of neoliberal policies. These Seattle protests were highly visible, drawing upon an eclectic repertoire of tactics (Smith 2001): weeks of strategic Internet usage prepared activists with intimate knowledge of Seattle's downtown layout and WTO delegate's schedules; cellphones aided activists as they spread out across the city engaging in traffic blockading affinity groups; black bloc anarchists resorted to property damage to highly visible corporate symbols of neoliberal success, such as Nike and Starbucks; while thousands of people participated in union rallies and marches.

Moreover, Seattle brought together a collection of diverse, international groups,<sup>9</sup> whose protests were buttressed by the highly visible and now transnational master collective action frame against neoliberalism. Protestors decried the hierarchical, elitist and closed-door character of the WTO negotiations, and argued that WTO decisions aided and abetted "corporate rule" over popular sovereignty, and facilitated a global "race to the bottom," where corporations exploited conditions of liberalized trade and investment by constantly relocating production to areas with low wage costs and limited government enforcement of social or environmental regulations. There are in fact numerous examples of what could be considered attempts at both diagnostic and prognostic frame alignment processes in books activists produced and disseminated after Seattle (Danaher and Burbach 2000; Starr 2000; and Barlow and Clarke 2001). Beyond such books, Internet web sites, activist listservs and the Independent Media Center outlets established throughout the world after Seattle served crucial frame dissemination roles. These activities thus challenged the inevitability thesis of neoliberal globalization, stirred what would become a more widespread public debate about the supposed benefits of related policies, and put business and political elites on the sudden unexpected defensive against a newly aggressive master frame that challenged the underlying precepts of neoliberalism.

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<sup>8</sup> While the protests played a dramatically disruptive role during the meetings, and publicized significantly the anti-neoliberal collective action frame, disagreements over trade policy between the European Union and the U.S. as well as between Northern and Southern states, contributed to the overall failure of the Seattle WTO Ministerial.

<sup>9</sup> While a majority of the protestors who descended on Seattle were from the U.S. and Canada, (Almeida and Lichbach 2001), there was still a notable representation of international civil society groups among the demonstrators.

After Seattle, the contest over what “globalization meant”—between the struggle to convince a wider set of domestic and international audiences of the supposed benefits or downsides of neoliberalism—grew intense. This is understandable, as the political context for framing processes frequently changes dramatically between early and more mature periods of collective action, especially after a “movement has established itself as a serious force for social change” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988: 17). Moreover, framing processes in a maturing movement are the “subject of intense contestation between collective actors representing the movement, the state, and any existing countermovements” (Ibid: 16). That political and business elites around the world would react much differently to the anti-neoliberal protest movement following Seattle was then unsurprising.

In fact, a microcosm of the hotly contested framing debate emerged in the middle of the Seattle protests on the opinion pages of the *New York Times*. Following the first and most disruptive day of Seattle protests, *Times*’ columnist Thomas Friedman wrote an essay entitled, “Senseless in Seattle,” in which he decried the WTO protestors as “a Noah’s ark of flat-earth advocates, protectionist trade unions and yuppies looking for their 1960s fix” (Friedman 1999). Friedman, an ardent believer in the benefits, if not the inevitability of neoliberal globalization, as he argues in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Friedman 2000), in effect repudiated the protestors’ diagnostic collective action frame. He also contributed to what would become a major plank in the counter-response by supporters of neoliberalism, by characterizing protestors as “anti-globalization.”

Naomi Klein, Canadian author of *No Logo* (Klein 2000), characterized as a “bible” for activists mobilizing against neoliberalism, met Friedman’s charges the following day in her own *Times*’ essay, entitled, “Rebels in Search of Rules” (Klein 1999). Here Klein refuted Friedman’s critique, reiterating the concerns protestors had with neoliberal globalization and pointedly contesting the “anti-globalization” label. Protestors in Seattle were not against the globalization of economies, cultures and technologies, Klein argued, but against the current WTO-dominated rules-based system that focused mostly on promoting trade and investment liberalization, while remaining silent on consumer, labor, environmental or human rights concerns. What the protestors wanted, Klein argued, were rules for a global economic system that would consider such concerns and a new global institution that matched a focus for economic growth with considerations of the social and environmental consequences of trade and investment promotion. Interestingly, Klein was rearticulating the contours of the diagnostic frame against neoliberalism, while searching out possible parameters for a prognostic frame.

In fact, while the anti-neoliberal “injustice frame” performed reasonably well in crafting a transnationally shared diagnosis of neoliberalism’s faults, movement activists were having more difficulty undertaking prognostic framing. That is, proposing and agreeing upon plans for attacking neoliberal policies and institutions, as well as in encouraging new movement recruits to literally take to the streets to oppose neoliberal policies, was proving to be a far more difficult task. For, out of Seattle emerged a variety of visions for challenging neoliberalism and for presenting an alternative model to neoliberal globalization. While some groups sought to “deratify” the existing neoliberal trade and investment arrangements, others sought to reform the WTO, giving it the mandate and enforcement mechanisms to address social and environmental concerns. While some sought to attack and quite literally destroy global capitalism, branding the protest movement “anti-capitalist,” others sought a global “New Deal” to create a more social-democratic global system that included such protections as a global minimum wage. Yet, despite these divisions, over the course of the nineteen months from the Seattle protest to the much larger protests in July 2000 against the Group of Eight (G8) Summit in Genoa, Italy, the protest movement mobilized effectively and primarily on the strength of its well-received diagnostic master collective action frame, and was less hobbled by differences at this time over longer-term goals.

After Seattle, increasing numbers of people attended protests, which targeted neoliberal summits and institutions. Notable protest events occurred at: the IMF/World Bank meeting in Washington, DC, April 2000; meetings of the World Economic Forum in Melbourne, Australia, September 2000; IMF/World Bank meetings in Prague, Czech Republic, September 2000; the Asian-Development Bank meetings in Chiang Mai, Thailand, May 2000; the 3<sup>rd</sup> Summit of the Americas FTAA meeting, Quebec City, Canada, April 2001; and the G8 summit, Genoa, Italy, July 2001. Notably, these large summit gatherings did not take place in a vacuum, but were accompanied by numerous parallel national protests across developed and developing states. However, the larger gatherings, especially the summit protests, alternative People’s Summits, and the first World Social Forum, which met in Porto Alegre, Brazil in Winter 2001, served as critical diagnostic frame dissemination sites, publicizing, reinforcing and spreading transnationally tenets of the anti-neoliberal collective action frame. Frame alignment processes have been found to be most successful in collective settings (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988), where ideas and sentiments are shared and interpreted. And the proliferation of teach-ins, countersummits, street theater and dramaturgy proved crucial in transnationalizing the anti-neoliberal diagnostic frame.

**Figure 1 – Contested Interpretations of Globalization Processes**

Actors	Arguments/Claim	Policy Proposals
<b>anti-neoliberal protest movement</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• civil society activists</li> <li>• national/transnational social movement organizations</li> <li>• Independent Media Centers</li> <li>• Internet web sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• race to the bottom</li> <li>• democratic deficit</li> <li>• hierarchical</li> <li>• non-transparent</li> <li>• deliberate political process</li> <li>• corporate rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• deratify</li> <li>• reform existing treaties</li> <li>• debt relief</li> <li>• strengthen state sovereignty</li> <li>• deglobalize</li> <li>• return to the local</li> </ul>
<b>neoliberalism proponents (countermovement)</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• states</li> <li>• multi-national corporations</li> <li>• currency speculators</li> <li>• financial media outlets</li> <li>• IMF/World Bank/WTO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• there is no alternative</li> <li>• inevitable, desirable process</li> <li>• irreversible</li> <li>• best prescription for economic growth</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• liberalized trade and investment</li> <li>• deregulate</li> <li>• cut taxes</li> <li>• privatize</li> <li>• reduce public expenditures</li> </ul>

On the eve of the G8 protest in Genoa, Italy, then, politicians, business leaders and media outlets were paying increased attention to the concerns of the movement, as the “Washington Consensus” that had sustained the neoliberal globalization frame appeared to be cracking (Broad and Cavanaugh 1999; Useem 2001). Suddenly the World Bank was professing an interest in sustainable development projects, international institutions were becoming more open to NGO participation, politicians were entertaining thoughts of much more dramatic debt relief for impoverished states as well as taxes on global currency speculation, while debates over neoliberalism became much more common editorial page fare. At the same time, the anti-neoliberal protest movement appeared to have gained momentum, propelled by an eclectic set of protest repertoires combined with a general transnational consensus between civil society groups against the abuses of corporate power and corporate influence over popular democratic decision-making processes. Civil society groups and activists shared a strong sense of what they felt was “wrong” with neoliberalism; what remained unresolved was the development of collectively shared and agreed upon solutions and strategic responses to these problems.

### AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: THE ALTERED TERRAIN FOR ANTI-NEOLIBERAL PROTEST

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 had a dramatic and immediate effect on the mobilization potential for activism against neoliberal institutions. The fallout from the attacks exposed weaknesses in the anti-neoliberal collective frame, temporarily dampened enthusiasm, at least in the U.S., for large-scale contentious protest, and illustrated forcefully the continued relevance of the state in the structuring of movement activity. Over time, moreover, the limits especially of prognostic framing processes became apparent as activists struggled to develop coherent plans of action for challenging neoliberal policies and institutions. Figure 1 illustrates both the framing contest that had ensued, especially following the Seattle WTO protests, as well as the differences between interpretive beliefs germane to anti-neoliberal diagnostic and prognostic framing processes.

In fact, state authorities—particularly in the U.S. after September 11—adopted a much more aggressive approach towards containing protests as well as in reasserting a multi-pronged neoliberal agenda. On the one hand, with the passage of such legislation as the USA Patriot Act, it became easier for U.S. government agencies to criminalize dissent—a tactical approach that had begun prior to September 11 (Stewart 2001; Scher 2001; della Porta and Tarrow 2002)—but one that gained greater legitimacy thereafter as authorities publicly equated protests against neoliberal globalization with terrorism (Panitch 2002).<sup>10</sup> Thus, while protestors still rallied at the New York City meeting of the World Economic Forum in January 2002, the police presence was so extensive, and the aftershocks of September 11 still so fresh, that both the opportunities and the appetite for large contentious protests were missing. This pattern of maintaining a large police presence continued to thwart large-scale demonstrations, especially across North America. From the meeting of the Group of 8 leading industrialized states in Kanakas, Alberta in summer 2002, to the following July WTO ministerial meeting in Montreal, Quebec, police curtailed demonstrations and kept activists off-balance with preemptive arrests and security perimeters (Thanh Ha 2003).

<sup>10</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi mused on the “singular coincidence” between the terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the protests against neoliberal globalization, while U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick in a speech in Washington D.C. hinted at what he felt were “intellectual connections” between terrorists and “others who have turned to violence to attack international finance, globalization and the United States.” See Erlanger (2001) and Palast (2001).

It was clear, moreover, that U.S. activists were on the defensive and hesitant about their tactical direction after September 11, as large-scale raucous protests seemed out of step with the national mood.<sup>11</sup> The state responses to both the terrorist attacks as well as to anti-neoliberal protest, posed a challenge to prognostic frame dissemination, as activists now had to engage in a public relations battle to de-link in the minds of an anxious U.S. public, protest against neoliberal policy from acts of terrorism. Moreover, growing anti-war activism—first as the U.S. invaded Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime, and then once the Bush Administration quickly refocused for a possible war with Iraq—posed a challenge to sustaining an anti-neoliberal collective action frame. The energy devoted to straightening out the protest movement's identity and the meaning behind any new demonstrations was draining, as many protest groups struggled to reconcile being both opposed to neoliberal globalization and pro-peace (Huber and McCallum 2002).

At the same time, as activists across the U.S. worked to clarify their post-September 11 strategies for challenging neoliberalism, the Bush Administration embarked on a campaign to strategically reassert the neoliberal agenda. Only weeks after the terrorist attacks, President Bush told business leaders at the Shanghai meeting of the APEC forum, that terrorism could be defeated through the promotion of free trade, while U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan argued that the attacks on the U.S. made it even more urgent that the WTO talks in Qatar succeed (Wayne 2001). The renewal of fast-track trade negotiating authority became a test of patriotism for waffling members of Congress (Sanger 2001), and by July 2002, Bush had won reauthorization of this power. Once equipped with this negotiating tool, the Bush administration would focus on aggressively advancing neoliberal policy goals through parallel tracks in the ongoing FTAA hemispheric discussions, as well as within the Doha, Qatar round.<sup>12</sup>

Beyond the challenges faced by activists in the U.S., regional and tactical differences within the protest movement against neoliberalism became much more apparent. Clearly, civil society groups during the late 1990s had found it increasingly easier to develop shared and ultimately transnational understandings of the

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<sup>11</sup> See for example Carter and Barringer (2001); Wayne (2001); Fries, (2002); and Bygrave (2002).

<sup>12</sup> Despite marginalizing protestors from the FTAA and WTO negotiating sessions, policy divisions especially between developing and developed states over agricultural subsidies in the developed North, increasingly threaten to derail both the regional and global neoliberal trade agenda. See Drohan (2003).

experiences and problems fostered on different regions by neoliberal economic policies, than in devising mutually reconcilable strategic responses to these problems (Stuart 2003). Differences of opinion, illustrative of the limits of anti-neoliberal prognostic framing, starkly emerged in setting such as the World Social Forum (Cooper 2002; Faux 2003), over a variety of tactics and goals. Questions that confronted activists included: what are the more effective tactics for challenging neoliberal policies: more consultative and collaborative engagement in neoliberal summitry by NGOs, or grassroots mobilization and contentious protest?<sup>13</sup> Moreover, what are the appropriate and mutually acceptable goals for the movement: to reform the existing global capitalist system, or to deratify existing trade agreements? Should activists work to strengthen state sovereignty or move beyond the state to “return to the local” in the pursuit of “deglobalization?”<sup>14</sup>

The persistent North-South divide, in terms of resource availability, organizational strength, and the underlying technological digital disparities, also challenged differently the capacity of regional civil society groups to continue to connect local grassroots concerns to transnational protest campaigns (Smith 2002). Such resource asymmetries have become apparent, for example, in the hemispheric mobilization against the FTAA. Civil society group divisions over tactics and resources have challenged the legitimacy of the Hemispheric Social Alliance as a broadly-based transnational social movement organization (Massicotte 2003), and revealed strategic splits between groups desiring an insider role in summit deliberations and those groups who view themselves as outsiders and supportive of large-scale civil disobedience against FTAA neoliberal summitry (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001).

## CONCLUSION

The mobilization of beliefs and interpretations critical of neoliberal globalization had been central to the eruption of a protest movement that achieved global proportions by 2003. Movement and region-specific collective action frames critical of the impact of neoliberal policy were shaped out of contentious struggles that preceded by well over a decade the eventual development of protests of larger scale and global scope. A master collective action frame rooted in

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<sup>13</sup> To sample such discussions see Klein (2001), Grundy and Howell (2001), Penniman (2002) and Smith and Korzeniewicz (2003).

<sup>14</sup> For discussions of the different possible goals for the anti-neoliberal movement, see Narsalay (2002); Scholte (2002); Bello (2002); Laxer (2003).

a diagnosis of neoliberalism's policy ills served as a broadly inclusive interpretative medium, targeting for blame neoliberal policies such as unfettered trade and investment and the rulings of institutions such as the WTO and the IMF. However, it was the very inclusiveness and accommodating character of this anti-neoliberal master frame—embracing in its diagnosis such varied concerns as the degradation of the environment, emerging democratic deficits and the decline of popular sovereignty, human rights abuses under sweatshop conditions, or even opposition to the U.S. war with Iraq or the rights of Palestinian refugees—which limited prognostic framing processes, exposing divisions within the international community of activists over proposed strategies for carrying out plans of action against neoliberalism.

Yet, despite the more challenging environment for prognostic framing, the fallout from the terrorist attacks on the United States has had an unanticipated effect: it has served to illustrate the durable character of the protest movement against neoliberalism. That is, the movement has evolved and prospered despite the constraints bearing down particularly on U.S. activists. Events since September 11 refute those claims by critics asserting that the movement was largely comprised of labor union protectionists from wealthy Northern states. Rather, the most significant and innovative protest events have continued outside North America. A transnational diagnostic frame critical of neoliberalism has remained a durable feature of demonstrations against neoliberal policies after September 11, even if these protests have retained a national or regional flavor dependent especially on the availability of activists and organizations most closely at hand.

For example, the World Social Forum, held first in Brazil, and in 2004 in Mumbai, India, continues to draw greater numbers of people and represents a crucial forum for potentially developing a more widely accepted prognostic frame against neoliberalism. The European Social Forum held in Florence, Italy in November 2002, drew over one million people, the Asian Social Forum held in Hyderabad, India in January 2003 attracted 15,000 activists, while organizers across North America planned for a series of social forums in select cities throughout 2003 and into 2004. These regional social forums are rooted in the experiences of national civil society groups opposed to neoliberal policy, but are tied together in the larger transnational diagnostic collective action frame that continues to express itself out of Porto Alegre with the slogan, "Another World Is Possible" (Bidwai 2003).

There continues to be as well numerous examples of regional and transnationally-coordinated contentious protests against neoliberal policy initiatives. Hundreds of protest events took place in cities around the world to coincide with

the 4<sup>th</sup> Ministerial meeting of the WTO in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.<sup>15</sup> Regionally, anti-FTAA protests occurred in Quito, Ecuador in autumn 2002, against the 7<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting of the FTAA. These protests were backed by a variety of North and South American solidarity events, with the Quito protests specifically benefiting from North-South civil society collaboration (Ruben 2002).<sup>16</sup> In September 2003, activists also undertook numerous global solidarity actions to complement the protests against the WTO meetings in Cancun, Mexico. In fact, prognostic hemispheric frame alignment against the FTAA seems to be increasingly rooted in a growing option for the use of more combative tactics, indicative of the degree of opposition that exists across this region to the possible implementation of a hemispheric neoliberal agreement.

Finally, it is clear that in the midst of this continued transnational activism, the state has not lost the capacity to control events within its boundaries, and it will continue to play an important role in structuring protest. The current economic crisis spreading across Latin America, captured in the Argentine meltdown and the rejection of neoliberal policy prescriptions by the tens-of-millions who elected the Brazilian Workers Party candidate, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva into the president's office, suggests that critically positioned states in the world economy may become vocal opponents of the expansion of neoliberal policy, with Brazil potentially the leading roadblock to the successful completion of FTAA negotiations. In short, the protest movement against neoliberalism may gain new momentum from states, which ultimately retain the greatest capacity to influence and reform those political processes that have produced over two decades of hotly contested neoliberal policy initiatives. Any success in developing widely shared prognostic frames against neoliberalism may in turn depend upon the concerted opposition of centrally placed states who may share with activist civil society organizations innovative ideas for reforming current neoliberal arrangements.

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<sup>15</sup>. A chart of November 2001 protests events worldwide against the Doha WTO round can be viewed at <http://www.tradewatch.org>.

<sup>16</sup>. For more on the events in Quito, see "Police Rebel and Anti-Free Trade Protests in Quito End on Positive Note." <http://foodfirst.org/progs/global/trade/quito2002/2002-11-01-update.php>.


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#### ABSTRACT

This paper examines the major structural characteristics of the anti-corporate globalization movement, its key bases and antecedents, its relationship with other global social movements (GSMs) and the key challenges it faces in the post-9/11 period. We suggest that despite the potential of the anti-corporate globalization movement to usher in major social changes, the movement faces a number of major crossroads in terms of ideology, discursive approach, and overall strategy. We argue that there has been coalescence of a good many GSMs, including the international environmental movement, under the banner of the anti-corporate globalization movement. We focus primarily on the interrelations of these two GSMs, noting that over the past decade there have been trends toward both the “environmentalization” and “de-environmentalization” of the anti-corporate globalization movement. While the defection of many mainstream environmental groups from

the “Washington consensus” and the resulting environmentalization of the trade and globalization issue were critical to the “Seattle coalition,” there has been a significant decline in the movement’s embrace of environmental claims and discourses, and a corresponding increase in its use of social justice discourses. One implication of our analysis is the hypothesis that while the current vitality of the anti-corporate globalization movement can be gauged by its having adopted an increasingly coherent ideological stance in which international inequality and global corporate dominance are targeted, to be successful the movement will need to coherently ideologically integrate social justice with environmental and sustainability agendas. The amenability of the environmental GSM to such ideological integration will have important ramifications for the future trajectory of the anti-corporate globalization movement.

## GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT(S) AT THE CROSSROADS: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRAJECTORY OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT<sup>1</sup>

*Frederick H. Buttel &  
Kenneth A. Gould*

### INTRODUCTION

One of the most distinctive aspects of late-twentieth century globalization is that many of its predominant features—especially the reinforcement of trade liberalization institutions and the growing ability of national-states and corporate capital to exercise off-shore veto of domestic social and environmental legislation—are challenged directly and aggressively by a global-scale social movement, the anti-corporate globalization movement. Previous world systems of globalization such as British global hegemony of the nineteenth century (roughly 1870–1914) involved no global-scale organizations, and no social movements aimed at curbing one or another of the processes of international integration (with the partial exception, of course, of attempts to create an international working class or socialist movement). Indeed, a growing number of social sci-

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entists believe that in the current era of globalization social movements must *necessarily* be global in their vision and scope if they are to be successful (O'Brien et al. 2000). The power and sway of transnational actors, particularly transnational corporations and trade liberalization institutions such as the World Trade Organization, regional trade institutions, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the G8, implies that the only possibility of effective challenge to these actors must involve organizations and movements that can counter the prerogatives of these globalizing institutions at the (global) scale at which these institutions operate. Indeed, many argue that the anti-corporate globalization movement is the most significant left movement of the new Millennium, and is a movement that has the potential to alter the course of social change in the decades that follow (Brecher et al. 2000).

In this paper we will begin by discussing the major structural characteristics of the anti-corporate globalization movement, which we define in a broad manner to include not only the participants in protests and in the confederations that have loosely coordinated these protests, but also other NGOs and groupings that consider themselves to be anti-corporate globalization and to be part of the movement. We will then comment on the recent history of the anti-corporate globalization movement. We will want to focus on two particular aspects of this movement. First, we will briefly examine the relationships between the anti-corporate globalization movement and another important global-scale social movement, that of the international environmental movement. Second, we will take up the matter of the possible effects that the anti-corporate globalization movement might have on various transnational actors and institutions of globalization, and on selected nation-states. In this regard we will suggest that despite the obvious potential of this movement to usher in major social changes, the movement also faces a number of major crossroads in terms of ideology, discursive approach, and overall strategy. One implication of our analysis is the hypothesis that while the current vitality of the anti-corporate globalization movement can be gauged by its having adopted an increasingly coherent and radical ideological stance in which international—especially North-South inequality and global corporate dominance are targeted—to be successful the movement will need to have more of a coalitional character in which social-justice goals are ideologically integrated with environmental and sustainability agendas.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In this paper the expression “social justice” refers specifically to considerations relating to distributional economic in/equality.

## BASES OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT

The anti-corporate globalization movement has not been formed *de novo*, but has drawn many of its adherents from the groups and networks associated with previous social movements. The anti-corporate globalization movement is a broad coalition of smaller (anti-sweatshops, debt relief, fair trade, AIDS, etc.) and larger (human rights, organized labor, international hunger, etc.) movements and draws participants and participating organizations from a diversity of ideologies (anarchists, socialists, liberal reformists, etc.). What gives this “movement of movements” cohesion is a common critique of neo-liberal economic policies, the anti-democratic nature of international financial institutions (the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank in particular) and the increasing power of transnational corporations. Participants and coalition member organizations coordinate activities primarily through electronic media, allowing for intercontinental simultaneous discussion and mobilization. The movement is therefore able to organize on all continents and maintain communication between very different groups in very different locations. The anti-corporate globalization movement has developed a somewhat unique organizational structure to facilitate the maintenance of such a diverse coalition across ideological and geographic space based on a commitment to non-hierarchical and consensus based decision making. The use of delegates from the various “affinity groups” representing the diverse organizations, movements, and less formally organized groups of participants to form “spokes councils” where strategic and tactical decisions are made allows the movement to operate without formal leaders or a clear organizational hierarchy. Such an organizational structure ensures that all groups are able to participate in decision making, and that all voices are heard, and thus prevents schisms from developing into obstacles to coordinated action.

There are a number of structural bases for the rise of the anti-corporate globalization movement other than the premise that the growing power of transnational actors “requires” global-scale movements to successfully contest these new power relations. First, while there is a general consensus among professional economists and among state officials in most countries of the North that there are mutual gains to be realized through comparative advantage and “freer” world trade, in reality a good many citizens of most contemporary nation-states have reservations about subjecting their countries and themselves to the vagaries of distant, unelected, and unaccountable trade regimes. Increased dependence on trade can create social benefits, but it also creates social losses and engenders insecurities such as the movement of jobs offshore, an increased risk of unemployment, and the loss of worker protections.

Second, contemporary trade liberalization institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement have essentially been established to permit offshore veto of ostensibly protectionist environmental regulations or of the traditional measures for enhancing social security such as the welfare-state “safety net.” Anti-corporate globalization discourses stress the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the emerging Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the G8 as enforcers of the rules of globalization which privilege transnational corporations and, to a considerable but lesser degree, the citizens of the nation-states that host the bulk of these corporations. Movement discourses refer to the competitive global-scale prerogative of offshore corporate veto as creating a powerful “race to the bottom” as nation-states face competitive pressures to “water down” their regulations in order to remain attractive for capital investment. Third, there is also a sizable share of cultural revulsion against the homogenization, “McDonaldization” (Ritzer 1993), and Americanization, which are thought to be associated with globalization. The rise of the anti-corporate globalization movement also seems to be related substantially to the advent of a unipolar, American-dominated world order following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the general demise of state socialism, increased U.S. military dominance, and the relative absence of a countervailing world power.

As noted earlier, while there is a good deal of public and scholarly debate about the socioeconomic and cultural impacts of trade liberalization and related institutions and practices of globalization, there is a surprising consensus on the growing role of global anti-systemic social movements such as the anti-corporate globalization movement.<sup>3</sup> Anti-corporate globalization movement proponents

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<sup>3</sup> We will generally refer to this movement as the anti-corporate globalization movement because this is the most common terminology used within the movement itself. Note, however, that there is an enormous amount of debate and contention over the most suitable terminology for describing this movement. Movement proponents tend to be most comfortable with the notion of “anti-corporate globalization movement,” but even so there is considerable disagreement among movement supporters as to whether the most suitable terminology is that which pronounces the movement’s radical sentiments (such as the “anti-capitalist” movement), or rather that the most desirable terminology is that which sounds more moderate and which is accordingly more likely to appeal to more moderate or casual supporters (such as the “global justice” movement). The movement’s opponents are most likely to refer to the movement as the “anti-trade movement” suggesting, somewhat inaccurately, that anti-corporate

and a good many social scientists see much promise in the development of “global civil society.” In addition to seeing that global social movements are intrinsically better positioned than nationally based movements to advance causes such as environmental protection and ensuring the conservation of protective labor legislation and social insurance programs, movement proponents and a number of social-scientific analysts agree that global social movements (GSMs) have been very adept at creating coalitional movement structures across (and within) national borders and new discourses. Movement opponents, by contrast, are fearful that the continuing attraction of trendy mass rallies at meetings of the WTO, the G8, World Bank, OAS and IMF will create a tidal wave of “mindless” opposition to the fragile institutions that now facilitate freer trade.<sup>4</sup>

Many sociologists and social scientists from related disciplines are now employing the notion of GSMs nearly as often, and as casually (see McMichael, 1996), as the notion of globalization has come to be used. Generally, what these observers of global social movements have in mind is that these movements are a logical—even necessary—response to global processes such as the establishment of new regional and international “free trade” agreements, the expansion of markets, the establishment of international governmental organizations and regimes, and the growing role played by transnational corporations (see the critique by Ancelovici, 2002). GSM theorists (e.g., O’Brien et al. 2001; Cohen and

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globalization movement supporters object to international trade or globalization as a whole rather than to the pro-corporate and pro-Western rules that currently tend to govern world trade and the terms of globalization. Many movement supporters also strongly reject the “anti-globalization” label, retorting that they favor globalization in the form of globally agreed-to labor and environmental standards, while rejecting corporate globalization institutions and practices (neoliberalism, workforce “flexibility” measures, the “race to the bottom” engendered by offshore corporate veto, and so on). They often conceptualize their movement as a manifestation of “globalization from below,” in contrast to a transnational, elite-dominated, “top-down” globalization regime.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to the pronouncements of Thomas Friedman, perhaps the most poignant example of this is the speech of C. Fred Bersgten, a tireless supporter of trade liberalization, entitled “The Backlash Against Globalization,” at the April 2000 Meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Tokyo, in which he said candidly that “anti-corporate globalization forces are now in ascendancy.” Another example is that an impressive array of corporate and governmental supporters of trade liberalization felt the need to create a process through the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, to consider whether globalization leaves some countries and groups behind, and if so what should be done about it.

Rai 2000) believe these movements can be very influential because dominant global actors can be vulnerable to negative public opinion and to the scrutiny by governments that is generated by public sentiments. GSMs also combine the strengths of popular NGOs (such as environmental and development-justice NGOs) in “resource mobilization” (especially in attracting foundation and other funding), and of new social movements or “identity-driven” movements in the strength of collective sentiments. There is also general agreement that the master global social movements are the environmental movement, the peace/human rights movement, the women’s movement, the development-justice/hunger movement, and the anti-corporate globalization movement itself. Some observers of GSMs have tended to see the global environmental movement as the key overarching or umbrella movement, while the more recent tendency has been to assign that role to the anti-corporate globalization movement, especially in light of the fact that the goals, meaning and discourse of environmentalism varies enormously both within and between northern and southern societies (Taylor 1995; Brulle 2000; Schnaiberg and Gould 2000).

One of the basic arguments of this paper is that there has been coalescence of a good many GSMs, including the international environmental movement, under the banner of the anti-corporate globalization movement. Despite its coalitional character, the anti-corporate globalization movement has an identity and organizational structure that serves to distinguish it from other GSMs, such as the hierarchically organized environmental GSM which has its own distinct identity rooted primarily in the international conservation wing of environmentalism. We will focus primarily on the interrelations of these two GSMs by noting that over the past decade there have been trends toward both the “environmentalization” and “de-environmentalization” of the anti-corporate globalization movement. Clearly, an assessment of the current status and future role of GSMs must address the matter of the articulations between the global environmental movement and the anti-corporate globalization movement. We will suggest below that the role that environmental claims and strategies play in the anti-corporate globalization movement’s “repertoire of contention,” to use Tilly’s (1978, 1986) terminology, will be critical to the movement’s future.

There are several focal structural properties of the anti-corporate globalization movement. First, while we in the North almost always presume that the essence of the movement is that of periodic protests by citizen-protesters from OECD countries against institutions located in the North (such as the WTO, World Bank, IMF, or G8) or corporations headquartered in the North, the lion’s share of protests have actually occurred in the global South.<sup>5</sup> Protests have been particularly common in Bolivia, Argentina, Thailand, Ecuador, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, southern activists are generally more radical and confrontational than

their counterparts in the North (Smith 2002). It has been estimated, for example, that on May 1, 2000, there were anti-corporate globalization protests in about 75 cities on six continents across the world. While we acknowledge this very central point (and see Podobnik 2001, for an impressive elaboration), our guess is that these anti-corporate globalization protests in the South are essentially protests that are confined (either by intention, or else by practicalities) to getting the attention of heads of state and finance ministers in the South. Our guess is that the anti-corporate globalization movement in the North is in some respects the more important segment of the movement, in that it has the socio-economic and geographical capacity to attack transnational institutions more directly as well as to gain the attention of the heads of state of the countries which have the dominant voices within these institutions.

The energy and vitality of the anti-corporate globalization movement are clearly very substantially due to the actions of the protesters who now contest the annual meetings of essentially all globalization institutions. But another critically important component of the movement is its active NGO supporters and affiliates. As we will note below, the anti-corporate globalization movements’ cast of NGO supporters and affiliates essentially encompasses the “Seattle coalition,” the unprecedentedly broad coalition that formed during the lead-up to and in wake of the protests at the 1999 Third WTO Ministerial meeting at Seattle. If the 95 percent rule that 95 percent or more of movement work is devoted to “education” (especially writing publications of various sorts and doing media relations work), and to meetings at which coalitions and tactics are negotiated holds in the case of the anti-corporate globalization movement, a sizable share of the work of the movement is in some sense that undertaken by *other movements and associated NGOs*. The anti-corporate globalization movement, for example, is now endorsed in the publications and on the home pages of a vast array of NGOs and related movements, and these other groups consider themselves to be integral components of the anti-corporate globalization movement. A wide variety of environmental, agricultural, labor, consumer, human rights, women’s rights, animal rights, and related groups now have “trade” or “globalization analyst” staffers. The AFL-CIO has been a dependable and effective organizer and has a very strong presence at North American anti-corporate globalization protests. Much of the ideological coherence of the movement is provided by a small group of prominent intellectual figures (e.g., Walden Bello, José Bové, Vandana

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<sup>5</sup> Protests against the Bretton Woods institutions, and IMF structural adjustment policies in particular, have been a fairly regular feature of political conflict in the global South for well over 25 years (Walton and Seddon, 1994).

Shiva, Robert Weissman, Naomi Klein, Kevin Danaher, and Lori Wallach), all of whom are associated with NGOs whose work appears to accord with the 95 percent rule. Not unimportantly, these NGOs turn out a goodly number of their members at anti-corporate globalization protests, and probably many-fold more sympathizers who visit their websites.<sup>6</sup>

Third, the movement is largely consciously and intentionally acephalous, with the partial exception of the important role typically played by the organizers of local protests. Much of protest organizing occurs by way of the internet—websites, email, and chat rooms—without the need for a central source of command, and eliminating much of the resource and bureaucratic needs for organizing protests. The organizations established to loosely coordinate protests (e.g., the Mobilization for Global Justice at the April 2000 World Bank/IMF protest, the Initiative Against Economic Globalization in Prague [INPEG] at the September 2000 Prague World Bank/IMF protest, the Anti-Capitalist Convergence of the April 2001 Quebec City Summit of the Americas protest, and the Genoa Social Forum at the July 2001 Genoa G8 summit protest) largely recede after the protests are concluded. Months prior to a protest multiple independent “clusters” and “affinity groups” form to organize traveling “road shows” and teach-ins throughout the host country. Cell phones and walkie-talkies are the principal means of communication and coordination during protests, often enabling protesters to outmaneuver law enforcement and security personnel. The Internet and cell phone modalities of protest organization have facilitated the accommodation of considerable diversity within the movement. The lack of direct contact among these various groups tends to militate against infighting, but also requires an acceptance of a certain incapacity to generate ideological consensus and enforce decisions on appropriate tactics.

Stressing the diversity that has been accommodated within the street protest component of the movement, Värjyrnen (2000) goes so far as to refer to anti-corporate globalization movements in the plural, stressing that:

...anti-corporate globalization protest is not a single transnational movement, but consists of multiple and variable, even contradictory trends folded

<sup>6</sup> Press accounts and participant observation (Gould) indicate that the following groups are relatively consistently represented at anti-corporate globalization protests in the advanced countries: developed-country trade unions such as the AFL-CIO, Rainforest Network, Sierra Club, Global Exchange, Alliance for Global Justice, Direct Action Network, Jubilee 2000, 50 Years is Enough, Radical Roots, Ruckus Society, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), and Co-Motion Action.

into one. So far, close to 100,000 people have taken part in the demonstrations, among them are professional protesters who travel from one event to the other.<sup>7</sup> The appearance of continuity in the transnational protest movement is somewhat deceptive. In fact, it may better be viewed as a series of episodes—a chain of separate, but interlinked events (Värjyrnen 2000:1).<sup>8</sup> [Footnotes Added]

A fourth structural characteristic of the movement appears to be a tendency for many of its most active participants, particularly in protest actions, to be young people. In general, the majority of movement participants tend to be young and well educated or, in other words, to have a social structural profile similar to that of the “new class,” the presumed base of support of so-called new social movements (Scott 1990). However, those organizing protests and playing key roles in some of the lead organizations and participating NGOs tend to be substantially older, as are the participants representing organized labor.

Finally, the anti-corporate globalization movement finds itself being defined both advantageously and destructively by the mainstream press, which is itself often the focus of negative movement attention as a corporate vehicle for the dissemination of neoliberal ideology. To a significant degree, the size and scope of protest events have been shaped by press attention. Publicity in the press, even when it has the clear overtone of foreboding the anticipated violence and disruption, tends to result in protests taking the form of self-generating growth; more press attention attracts more supporters and onlookers, which attracts more press attention, and so on. But since the Seattle protest, which received some positive mainstream press commentary for having raised issues of concern to many U.S.

<sup>7</sup> These and most other estimates of the number of persons at anti-corporate globalization protests need to be taken with a grain of salt. Värjyrnen’s numbers obviously pertain only to protests in particular focal point cities in the advanced countries up through the time his paper was written (apparently mid-2000). By contrast, there have been informal estimates that 300,000 people took to the streets in cities around the world after the death of a protester at the G8 summit at Genoa in July 2001. Some cumulative figures indicate well over one million people attending such protests in the North and South between, and inclusive of, the Seattle action in 1999 and the Genoa action in 2001, excluding the millions participating in the anti-IMF general strike in Argentina in May of 2000 (George et al., 2001).

<sup>8</sup> Crossley (2002) concurs with this assessment, and goes so far as to say that anti-corporate globalization activism and protest are a “protest field” rather than a movement per se, on account of their highly fluid character. We largely agree with Crossley’s characterization of global anti-corporate struggle but believe that this protest is a movement, albeit an acephalous one.

and world citizens (as well as considerable negative coverage), the mainstream press' treatment of the anti-corporate globalization movement has tended to cast the movement in a distinctly unfavorable light; of angry, antagonistic, violent protesters; of youthful protest participants who would rather demonstrate than negotiate; of the presence of the anarchist groups using "Black Bloc" tactics; portrayal of the movement's message as incoherent and indecipherable, and so on.

#### RECENT ANTECEDENTS OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT

While there is yet only a small amount of published literature on the anti-corporate globalization movement, the literature that exists (e.g., Brecher 2000; Danaher and Burbach 2000; Danaher 2001; Dunkley 2000; Gills 1997; Cohen and Rai 2000; O'Brien et al. 2001; Starr 2000; Epstein 2001; George et al. 2001) has suggested a variety of historical tributaries to the movement. Some of the postulated historical antecedents include the late 1960s New Left and the Paris protests of 1968, the NGO activism leading up to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, during the mid-1990s.

While not denying that these factors and antecedents may have played some role, there were four particularly critical events and phenomena that led up to the debut of the mass anti-corporate globalization movement in Seattle in 1999. First, in the early 1990s Mexico filed a complaint against the U.S. to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Given that the GATT dispute resolution process would almost certainly have involved a ruling adverse to the U.S., there was a bilateral negotiation that led to removing the component of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (a 1991 amendment) that prohibited import of tunas produced under conditions that result in widespread death of dolphins. Then, in one of the first rulings of the WTO, it acted in support of a complaint by Venezuela and Brazil alleging that the U.S.' ban on imported gasoline that exacerbates air quality problems was an impermissible trade barrier. A similar ruling, against a 1998 U.S. law banning shrimp imports from countries whose shrimp harvesters kill sea turtles in shrimp nets lacking turtle excluder devices, was handed down by the WTO in 1999. Also in late 1999, the Vancouver based Methanex Corporation filed suit under NAFTA against the State of California for its proposed ban on the gasoline additive MTBE.

The importance of these anti-environmental rulings cannot be overestimated. Until the 1990s trade liberalization rulings and suits, groups such as the World Wildlife Fund, the National Wildlife Federation, Audubon, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Environmental Defense Fund had supported NAFTA and WTO, while the Defenders of Wildlife and the Nature

Conservancy had been at least nominally neutral toward trade liberalization. The WTO rulings shook most mainstream environmental groups—especially those that had supported or been neutral toward NAFTA and WTO—to their foundations. The willingness to initiate participation in anti-corporate globalization movement protest actions, most notably the Seattle protests of November 1999 is a clear indicator of the fundamental political shift generated by the WTO rulings. More generally, it became apparent to the large professionalized mainstream environmental organizations that a domestic environmental regulation may not be very effective unless its scope can be extended to pertain to the conditions of production of imported goods, as had been the case with the tuna-dolphin import amendment to the MMPA. Further, it became apparent that the WTO might indeed give foreign governments (and capital) leverage to overturn domestic environmental legislation under some circumstances. As the end of the 1990s approached, it was becoming apparent to American environmental organizations that the environmental side-agreements to NAFTA were largely ineffective. As a result of these revelations there was a significant shift in the center of gravity of mainstream environmental NGO opinion about globalization in general and trade liberalization in particular. By early 1999 these mainstream moderate environmental groups had joined Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and Public Citizen in taking a generally negative stance toward corporate globalization.

Second, the Kathie Lee Gifford revelation on live television in 1996 to the effect that her clothing line was manufactured in Honduran sweatshops, and the subsequent revelations about the social and environmental conditions of production of Nike and Reebok athletic gear in Asia, spearheaded an aggressive and highly visible student/labor anti-sweatshop movement, with direct historical links to the anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s. The Nike incident in particular dramatized the social impacts, in both North and South, of footloose corporate capital shifting its production facilities to low-wage countries in the South.

Third, though its significance has not often been appreciated in the North, the Asian financial crisis, and the fact that the IMF appeared to privilege the protection of investors in the North over the livelihoods of billions in the global South, created an IMF crisis of legitimacy. The Asian financial crisis demonstrated to many state officials and activists in the South that the "big three" globalization institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, and WTO—had less regard for the well-being of people in developing countries than for international monetary stability.

Finally, the explosion of public sentiments against genetically modified (GM) foods in Europe and East Asia created a crisis of legitimacy for the WTO. WTO rules suggested that the EU would have little legal basis for excluding

GMO agricultural input products and GM foods, while European public sentiments against these technologies were so strong that the EU had little choice but to act in conflict with WTO rules and with American corporate and federal government views. The GMO controversy galvanized the anti-WTO sentiments of many farm groups, such as the U.S. National Farmers Union and sustainable agriculture organizations. These precipitating events and processes combined to help forge the 1999 Seattle coalition.

The Seattle coalition was impressive in its breadth. The coalition included anti-corporate globalization groups (e.g., International Forum on Globalization, Global Exchange, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch); joint anti-corporate globalization/environmental organizations (e.g., International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, International Institute for Sustainable Development); farm, sustainable agriculture, and anti-GMO groups (e.g., the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Genetic Resources Action International); organized labor (e.g. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the United Steel Workers, the Communications Workers of America); consumer groups (e.g., Consumers International); development activist/world hunger groups (Oxfam, Development Group for Alternative Policies); animal rights groups; religious organizations (Jubilee 2000); and the governments (as well as NGOs and activists) of many countries of the South.

Perhaps the most telling symbol of the Seattle coalition was the ubiquitous poster which read, "Teamsters and Turtles—Together At Last."<sup>9</sup> What made the Seattle WTO Third Ministerial meeting protest so path breaking was the apparent environmentalization of the anti-corporate globalization movement, and the prominent role played by mainstream as well as radical and grass roots environmental groups in a coalition involving anti-WTO and labor activists. The strong environmental overtone of the Seattle protest was among the major factors that conferred on it a certain legitimacy among the U.S. public—and among the citizenries elsewhere among the OCED countries—and that contributed to the partially favorable press coverage of the Ministerial protest.

Following Seattle, there were numerous anti-corporate globalization rallies and protests across the world. The presence of protesters at the April 2000 World Bank/IMF meeting was such that the meeting could be held only with heavy police protection. The September 2000 World Bank/IMF meeting in Prague attracted tens of thousands of protesters. The Quebec City Summit of the Americas, which organized to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas,

<sup>9</sup> Note that the reference to turtles was the 1999 shrimp-turtle ruling by WTO.

attracted substantial protest in April 2001 and provoked security forces to launch a tear gas and water cannon attack that was largely unprecedented in Canada. The G8 Summit at Genoa in July 2001 has been the most violent protest to date (as of this writing), involving one protester death, widespread police repression and brutality, indiscriminate and targeted violence by some protesters (especially the various anarchist groupings), and hundreds of casualties on both sides. Even the United Nations, which is often associated with pro-South and pro-democratic sentiments, was the target of a large protest at its September 2000 Millennium Summit in New York. A protest was organized for the 2001 World Food Summit of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome, though the influence of the United States was the primary focus. Protests rivaling or exceeding these in size and intensity also occurred in such places as Bangkok (the protest at the Tenth Assembly of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, February 2000), Melbourne (the demonstration against the World Economic Forum, September 2000) and Gothenburg (demonstration at the EU summit, June 2001).

However, since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 protests in the U.S. (e.g., the 2002 WEF meetings in New York City) have been more muted. Through internet discussions, hosted by coalition organizations such as Mobilization for Global Justice and others, and spokes council meetings, a conscious decision was made on the part of U.S. anti-corporate globalization activists to take a less aggressive tack as a result of a desire on the part of protesters to distance themselves from the violent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (which at least one Congressman had initially blamed on the movement).

The movement has also decreased its protest activity because of an increase in state repression stemming from the curtailment of civil liberties through mechanisms such as the USA PATRIOT Act. The increased state authority to define any political group as a "terrorist" organization in the wake of the September 11th attacks, and the Justice Department's new legal capacity to preemptively search, copy and monitor social movement organization communications, documents and offices caused most anti-corporate globalization activists to increase their own internal security measures, decrease the volume of accessible communications, and self-censor the expression of ideas on effective movement actions and tactics. The detention of anti-corporate globalization activists at the U.S.-Canadian border, and the denial of flying rights to some activists further disrupted movement organizing. Another factor was the major shift in the U.S. political climate following September 11, 2001, most notably a surge of nationalism openly hostile to dissent of any type. As political dissent became increasingly defined as disloyalty in the American political consciousness, the

movement experienced a certain protest paralysis, and the number of movement sympathizers willing to overtly express political dissent rapidly decreased. As of this writing, the U.S. wing of the movement has yet to return to the more aggressive tone that typified protests from late 1999 through late 2001.

### TRANSFORMATIONS AND DILEMMAS OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT

As noted earlier, the anti-corporate globalization movement is arguably the most significant global social movement today, and clearly is the single most important global scale left movement. The movement has registered some major successes. As is expanded upon below, it has led to concessionary responses from various quarters of the “big three,” particularly the World Bank. Anti-corporate globalization protests and related movement activity have essentially disabled the machinery for negotiating the Millennial Round of the WTO. The anti-corporate globalization movement has been indirectly influential in helping to stiffen the EU’s resolve to hold its ground in the Millennial Round negotiations, e.g., by emboldening the EU member states to persist in rhetoric about “multi-functionality” in the WTO Millennial Round agriculture debate (Burmeister et al., 2001). It has also forced a shift in the rhetoric of international financial institutions (IFIs), which are now on the defensive, especially in regard to poverty alleviation, ecological sustainability, and the collapse of the economy of the 1990s structural adjustment poster child, Argentina. But despite the movement’s stature and successes, it faces some very significant dilemmas, if not contradictions. Interestingly, one of the key challenges to the movement is that the World Bank and IMF “have been surprisingly responsive, expanding and accelerating their policies on debt relief and strengthening their focus on the mitigation of poverty” (Väyrynen 2000:1). The Bank devoted its *World Development Report* for 2000/2001 to poverty alleviation, and in so doing has gone beyond the standard claims about macroeconomic restructuring to giving major attention to health, environmental, and educational mechanisms for reducing poverty and increasing the quality of life in the developing world.

Many of the dilemmas faced by the anti-corporate globalization movement are issues of discourse and strategy typical of mass movements aimed at widespread social transformation. Should the movement seek to transform or disable the main institutions of globalization (A dilemma often referred to within movement circles as the “fix it or nix it” question)? On one hand, the dominant institutions of globalization are deeply entrenched. Thus, a possible shift toward a more conventional “advocacy network” approach, involving formal organizations, a decision making hierarchy, and greater ability to mobilize resources, could exact more concessions from the dominant institutions and create more

favorable press coverage. On the other hand, these dominant institutions have as their bottom line a neoliberal agenda and doctrine that cannot respond meaningfully to the concerns and demands of a diverse array of NGOs, social movements, and national-states. Despite its recent dismissal as irrelevant by the Bush Administration, perhaps the United Nations still offers an institutional alternative to the international financial institutions through which transnational economic relations may be mediated (Bello 2001).

Second, as the resource mobilization tradition of social movements’ research has suggested, the nature of social movements is substantially shaped by their ability to extract resources of time and money from major social institutions as well as from adherents and sympathizers. Many resource mobilization theorists went so far as to suggest that successful social movements are those that are best able to extract funds from philanthropic foundations or government agencies (see the overview and critique in Scott 1990), and that the outer limits of what radical social movements can accomplish consist of the outer limits of what foundations are willing to fund. Thus, from a resource mobilization point of view, we can recognize that capital has latent veto with respect to anti-capital oriented movements.

The anti-corporate globalization movement is in some senses both the antithesis and the confirmation of resource mobilization theory’s perspective on philanthropic foundations’ roles in bankrolling and de-bankrolling the rise and decline of social movements. On one hand, the protest mobilization components of the movement appear to have required relatively few resources, and the most actively involved of protest groupings appear to have received essentially no direct funding from the major foundations and elsewhere. On the other hand, as noted earlier, there is a vast NGO network of movement supporters whose legitimacy and support have been lent to the movement, and which are critical to the movement’s legitimacy and public support over time. And it is in the NGO affiliate wing of the movement—at least that of the U.S.—where philanthropic foundation support has been critical. Pew, MacArthur, Ford, Rockefeller, Kellogg, Mott, McKnight, and other smaller foundations have funded numerous NGOs, particularly environmental NGOs, to weigh in on the trade/globalization/environment nexus. Foundation support of the NGO affiliate wing (encompassing groups as disparate as the Hemispheric Social Alliance, Alliance for Responsible Trade, Institute for Policy Studies, Development Group for Alternative Policies, Center for International Environmental Law, Friends of the Earth, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Global Exchange, Oxfam, and the International Gender and Trade Network) has been sufficient to attract the attention of the right-wing foundation watchdog NGO, Capital Research Center. The Capital Research Center is a largely invisible, but well-funded right-wing

NGO that undertakes exposés on left-leaning social movement organizations that are funded by major foundations. It aims to pressure the families and firms whose names are affixed to these foundations into influencing these foundations to withhold funding from movement groups. The anti-corporate globalization movement, not surprisingly, is now one of the Center's main targets.

The Capital Research Center may very well not succeed in de-funding the NGO affiliate wing of the anti-corporate globalization movement, but it is also arguably the case that the foundation community may not need to be pressured to do so. Foundations are fickle in their funding priorities, since they see themselves as agents of innovative thinking and tend not to give long-term funding to a group to undertake essentially the same program or project. The cult of newness among foundations may very well lead to foundation de-funding of the NGO affiliate branch of the movement. The de-funding of this component of the movement will probably not deter protests, but it is likely to detract from the legitimacy of protests due to a reduction in more mainstream NGO and civil society support. The defection or reduced capacity of mainstream environmental and other formal NGOs may, on the one hand, free the anti-corporate globalization movement to generate a more clearly articulated anti-capitalist ideology.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, such an ideological stance may significantly reduce its appeal to the majority of the northern citizenry. A resultant radicalization and political marginalization could potentially increase the capacity of neoliberalism supporters to discredit and dismiss the movement altogether, a process which the mainstream media has already shown a willingness to facilitate (Ackerman, 2001).

A third dilemma common to global movements concerns the matter of whether international strategies can succeed in a unipolar, U.S. dominated global political economy. This concern is even more immediate now that the Bush Administration in the U.S. appears willing to resist any international agreements that institutionalize agendas that conflict with the prerogatives of international capital. Recent dismissal of the United Nations as "irrelevant" by key Bush administration members and advisors serves to highlight the extent of an increasingly self-confident U.S. unilateralism.

While some of the dilemmas the movement faces are those characteristic of related social movements, the anti-corporate globalization movement faces some dilemmas that are specific to its sphere. One dilemma that is most widely

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<sup>10</sup> Note that in the volume "Anti-Capitalism: A Guide to the Movement" produced in Europe, environmental GSM organizations are not mentioned as coalition partners (George et al., 2001).

recognized concerns violence and the Black Bloc (Epstein 2001). The Black Bloc is the most frequently referenced anarchist group involved in property damage and direct attacks on police at anti-corporate globalization protests, but there are numerous others, most notably the Third Position. Violence, and the adverse press coverage associated with escalating violence, represents a key dilemma. Violence gains the movement official and press attention, though almost always of a negative sort, regardless of whether the violence is initiated by police or protesters.<sup>11</sup> There are indications that the violence and anarchist-group dilemma may be prompting a change in tactics. Mainstream movement participants are striving to distance themselves from violent tactics and from participants such as those from the Black Bloc. Following the World Trade Center and Pentagon destruction on September 11, 2001, violent protests have come under greater scrutiny and control, further constraining the standard type of anti-corporate globalization protest that occurred in 1999, 2000 and the first half of 2001. The need to address the matter of violence, and the fact that the November 2001 WTO meeting was held in the largely inaccessible city of Doha, Qatar, has led many in the movement to ponder eschewing the strategy of staging a single mass action. Instead, they are suggesting that future protests should stress community based actions at the local level across the world.<sup>12</sup> Such debates grow out of long-standing discussions within the movement related to the efficacy of employing a "diversity of tactics,"<sup>13</sup> and a non-hierarchical consensus-based decision-making

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<sup>11</sup> Note, though, that there is some advantage to nonviolent activists having the opportunity to distance themselves from violence and anarchists in the media in the days and weeks following major protest actions.

<sup>12</sup> Also, note that in some cities anti-corporate globalization activists have visibly weighed in supporting local causes (e.g., the resistance against privatizing D.C. General Hospital in Washington, DC).

<sup>13</sup> The "diversity of tactics" approach, wherein each affinity group is permitted to engage in whatever tactical choices and actions it deems appropriate, is a source of conflict within the movement, with much of the debate centered on the Black Bloc and property damage and direct attacks on police. The diversity of tactics issue largely emerges from the existence of a non-hierarchical acephalic organizational structure that makes it virtually impossible to impose constraints on individual affinity groups. This debate is more central to movement discussion in the North American wing of the anti-corporate globalization movement than it is in the European wing, where targeted (and random) property damage and movement-initiated clashes with security forces are a somewhat more accepted feature of protest activity and political culture (Joppke, 1993).

structure, as well as ongoing debates on the extent to which targeted property damage constitutes “violence” within ostensibly “non-violent” protest actions.

Another significant dilemma concerns the nature of the movement’s coalition and ideology. Since the Seattle protest in 1999, the movement has exhibited a significant shift in its discourses. While the defection of many mainstream environmental groups from the “Washington consensus” and the resulting environmentalization of the trade and globalization issue were critical to the Seattle mobilization, there has been a significant decline in the movement’s embrace of environmental claims and discourses, and a corresponding increase in its use of social justice (redress of socioeconomic inequality) discourses. The lead role played by organized labor in the Seattle protests helped to skew movement discourse toward issues of sweatshops, child labor, and international labor standards, ironically effectively rhetorically deprioritizing environmental claims just at the moment when many previously reluctant mainstream environmental organizations were joining the broad anti-corporate globalization movement coalition. The Genoa G8 protest in July 2001 was one in which the predominant emphasis of movement claims-making was focused on global-scale (especially North-South) inequality and growing international economic disparities, and on the imperative to roll back globalization rules in the interest of the poor in the South. This may represent a divergence in emphasis between North American and European wings of the anti-corporate globalization movement, or may represent a broader shift in transnational movement ideology. A recent European book produced by the anti-corporate globalization movement, subtitled “A Guide to the Movement”, fails to list environmentalists or environmental organizations in the section addressing the key “Actors” in the coalition (George et al. 2001).

There are some notable rationales for the movement having undergone a progressive “de-environmentalization” and having undertaken a shift toward North-South inequality claims. One is that while there are good reasons to predict that the WTO and other trade liberalization agreements will lead to pressures toward an environmental “race to the bottom” (Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg, 1996), there has in fact been little other clear evidence of an immediate environmental regulatory race to the bottom (see Kahler, 1998, for an early analysis on this point). Williams (2001:47) has likewise suggested that the WTO dispute resolution system officials now appear to be bending over backwards to avoid making more controversial anti-environmental rulings such as tuna-dolphin and shrimp-turtle. This may stem, in part, from the dominance of “Third Wave”<sup>14</sup> environmental ideology among mainstream environmental social movement organizations, whose Boards of Directors often include a number of executives of transnational corporations (Dowie, 1995), and which often rely on financial support from TNCs that rank among the worst environmental offend-

ers (Foster, 1999). With a foot in both neoliberal and anti-corporate globalization camps (Brulle, 2000; Gonzales, 2001), some large mainstream environmental groups are well positioned to leverage traditional northern environmental concerns against the social justice issues that are gaining increased prominence in anti-corporate globalization movement discourse.

In contrast to the somewhat limited evidence for the notion that “free trade” regimes lead to the demise of national and transnational environmental regulations, there is ample and growing evidence of the enormous ecological damage wrought by IMF-imposed structural adjustment policies (SAPs). SAPs tend to structurally coerce heavily indebted southern nations to greatly increase agricultural and natural resource exports in order to meet transnational interest payment obligations (Athanasίου 1996). IFI-supported increases in the export orientation of southern nations result in widespread land degradation, habitat loss, and the progressive liquidation of the natural capital of southern nations (Gedicks, 2001; Korten, 2001). Therefore, an increased movement focus on the ecological impacts of structural adjustment policies—rather than on the formal rollback of domestic and international environmental regulations—would help to recover the ecological dimensions of anti-corporate globalization movement ideology, while also illustrating the integration of environmental and social jus-

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<sup>14</sup>. Beginning in the 1980s, the Washington, D.C.-based mainstream environmental organizations increasingly moved toward the adoption of “Third Wave” environmentalism, emphasizing (a) cooperation with transnational corporate environmental offenders rather than confrontation, (b) compromise agreements that allowed them to claim victories for their mail-in member constituencies, and (c) increasing acceptance of corporate executives on their Boards of Directors (Dowie, 1995). This resulted in a growing distance between the professionalized staffs of these organizations and the grass roots anti-toxics (Szasz, 1994) and environmental justice (Bullard, 1993) groups which also emerged in the 1980s. Third Wave doctrine has exacerbated the mainstream environmental movement’s historical resistance to incorporation of social justice concerns within their political agendas, and has reflected a growing increasing alignment of the movement with neoliberal agendas emphasizing market-based mechanism to control pollution and depletion and voluntary monitoring and regulation of corporate environmental impacts.

Dowie (1995) contrasts third wave environmentalism with first wave environmentalism which emerged in the U.S. in the early 20th Century, and focused primarily on land and wildlife conservation, and with second wave environmentalism which emerged in the U.S. in the 1960s with a focus on state regulatory approaches to pollution control.

tice concerns. Such a focus on the ecological dimensions of IMF, SAPs is already quite evident within the movement,<sup>15</sup> but this will probably do little to sustain a coalition with many of the “Third-Wave”-oriented environmental groups (Gould, Weinberg and Schnaiberg 1993; Brulle 2000). The focus on SAPs and environmental destruction has, however, helped to generate and sustain the coalition with Southern environmental social movement organizations. This focus on environmental destruction in the South is consistent with the ongoing shift of the attention of the anti-corporate globalization movement to the IMF and World Bank, whose environmental records are more troubling than that of the WTO. Strategically, the IMF and World Bank are also more accessible to the northern movement activists than the WTO. In contrast to the WTO’s ability to meet in remote locations, the IMF and World Bank have stationary offices on 19th Street in Washington, D.C.

In addition, while WTO actions that overrule existing national environmental regulations may be slowed for strategic reasons, transnational trade liberalization does reduce the likelihood that southern (and to a lesser extent perhaps, northern nations) will move to establish higher environmental standards and stricter regulatory regimes as competitive pressures to attract and retain foreign capital investment have a dampening effect on state willingness to constrain private capital (Gould et al. 1996). The SAPs imposed by the IMF, by reducing public revenues and staffing of public regulatory agencies, reduce the ability of states to effectively monitor and enforce compliance with existing environmental regulations (Kim et al. 2000). The political problems that these processes generate for the anti-corporate globalization movement are two-fold. First, it is much more difficult to draw attention to, and make claims about, the failure of environmental regulation to emerge (what Crenson 1971, called the “unpolitics” of environment) than it is to call attention to the reversal of existing regulatory restrictions. Second, the environmental GSMs’ focus on formal regulatory mechanisms rather than on structural processes in identifying the causes of and solutions to ecological disorganization makes it more difficult to recruit these movements’ support in opposition to the IFIs and trade liberalization organizations.

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<sup>15</sup> While the movement has always included a strong critique of structural adjustment policies in its rhetoric, the prominence and frequency of such critique in e-mail discussions and protests signs, banners and slogans has clearly increased in recent years.

By contrast to the limited evidence of negative impacts on formal environmental policy, there is ample evidence that since the establishment of WTO there has been an exacerbation of global economic inequality, with roughly three to four dozen countries in the South having exhibited persistent declines in per capita incomes since the mid-1990s while most industrial nations exhibited considerable, if not vibrant, growth. Even the Harvard University free-trader and neo-liberal proponent Jeffrey Sachs has expressed the view in *The Economist* that the IMF essentially functions as the debt collection enforcer of private banks, and that as a result of these policies the IMF has sacrificed the economic recovery of most of South and Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the South. Further, the concessions that have been granted thus far by the “big three” globalization institutions lie mainly in the arena of North-South inequality. The establishment journal *Foreign Affairs* published a paper by Bruce Scott (2001) documenting the exacerbation of North-South inequality that has occurred since 1990. The deepening global economic marginalization of sub-Saharan Africa is a prime example of the unevenness of globalization processes and the exacerbation of international inequalities that result. Thus, there is in some sense an empirical underpinning to the shift of movement discourses away from threats to the integrity of environmental regulation and toward issues of socio-economic inequality and structurally generated environmental disorganization.

Arguably, though, the shift of anti-corporate globalization discourses to North-South inequality has been due mainly to ideological dynamics and to the growing coherence and self-confidence among movement members rather than to a close reading of *The Economist* or *Foreign Affairs*. The de-environmentalization of movement discourses and the predominance of claims-making about international inequality and social justice involve a major dilemma, however. In most of the North, which is ultimately the most critical audience for the anti-corporate globalization movement, the North-South inequality issue is not likely to attract a wide swath of support, especially (although ironically and unfortunately) following the September 11th attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Environmental claims-making, along with discourses stressing environmental and domestic social-policy “races to the bottom” in the North, are more likely to generate long-term public support, despite a September 11th and recession-driven de-prioritization of environmental concerns on the U.S. public agenda. It is also likely that the current core and strength of the movement—a highly committed, dynamic group of young radicals who see pro-corporate globalization rules reinforcing mass poverty in the South (and generating related impoverishment and inequality in the North)—will not be sufficient to attract a long-term mass following that will assist in effecting policy changes. It seems apparent that the anti-corporate globalization movement will need to be a coali-

tional movement-involving, at a minimum, labor, environmental, and minority groups—to achieve its goals (Epstein 2001). That broad coalition, in constant internal dialogue, is needed in order to generate a coherent yet inclusive movement ideology and rhetoric. Such a coalition requires a focus on neoliberal policy impacts on domestic inequality and environmental concerns, in addition to (and perhaps above all) a focus on North-South equity issues depending on the extent to which such issues can be directly linked to northern job losses and high profile environmental concerns such as rainforest destruction and megafauna extinction. The focus on neoliberal ideology provides the basis of the ideological glue that fuses the concerns of the diverse coalition participants in a common systemic critique. The need to articulate the connectedness of transnational processes and structures to domestic concerns most readily apparent in the lived experience and political focus of most citizens is necessary to broaden the domestic support bases of the movement in order to increase its political leverage at the national level, especially within the G8 countries that exert most influence over international financial institutions.

Further, the shift of the movement toward speaking primarily on behalf of the poor in the global South (and to a lesser but growing extent in the North) has some potential problems. One is that an increased emphasis by the movement on the IMF and World Bank may tend to threaten the coalition with organized labor, which has tended to be more actively supportive of protests targeting the WTO (e.g., Seattle in November of 1999) than the IMF and World Bank (e.g., Washington, D.C. in April of 2000).<sup>16</sup> Another is the “representation dilemma,” of the movement increasingly being positioned to represent groups that are quite different from themselves. For example, movement opponents now point to movement participants’ relative affluence and question whether protesters really have knowledge about what the Third World (or northern poor) really want. Perhaps most fundamentally, the anti-corporate globalization movement, in taking up the cause of the nation-states of the South, will inevitably come to stress agendas, such as adding labor and environmental standards to the WTO that state officials from most countries of the South will be ambivalent about

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<sup>16</sup> This further indicates a need on the part of the anti-corporate globalization movement to more fully and clearly articulate the linkages between the impacts of IMF structural adjustment in the South and job losses in the North. Thus far, labor has shown far more interest in trade liberalization agreements (FTA 1988, NAFTA 1994, FTAA expected in 2005) and the WTO than it has in the Bretton Woods institutions, for obvious reasons related to more clear and direct threats to employment in the North.

at best. A good indicator of this is that the WTO dispute resolution panel rulings that overrode U.S. environmental laws were the result of complaints filed by developing country governments such as those of Mexico, Thailand, Venezuela, Pakistan, Malaysia, and India (Williams 2001). This may also indicate that forging and sustaining meaningful North-South coalitions within the anti-corporate globalization movement may require de-emphasizing formal environmental policy and regulatory standards. The extent of the movement’s losses in terms of its northern environmentalist constituency would then hinge on its ability to effectively articulate the structural causes of transnational ecological degradation to mainstream environmentalists who have traditionally emphasized regulatory policy and market-based environmental protection mechanisms over structural change.

Regardless of whether the anti-corporate globalization movement maintains its emphasis on the North-South economic inequality question or returns to the issues more likely to sustain the more diversified coalitional emphasis of the Seattle protest, the political success of the movement will depend on whether it can help induce two potential blocs of nation-states to resist a “deepening” of the WTO during its Millennial Round negotiations. In a sense, the most likely bloc to be enabled and induced by anti-corporate globalization protests to support major reform (or to attempt to disable) the WTO is that of nation-states of the South (other than those agro-exporting Southern nation-states in coalitions such as the Cairns Group of the Uruguay Round). In the Uruguay Round, developing countries essentially signed away their rights to use trade policy as a means of industrialization and development (a strategy which was quite effectively employed by the Asian Tigers during the 1970s through the early 1990s). Governments of the South also agreed in the Uruguay Round to open up their markets for agricultural imports from the agribusiness superpowers, while receiving few benefits of liberalized markets in the North (Madley 2000:Chapter 1). In addition, liberalization of agricultural markets in the South has unleashed a tide of depeasantization that will have lasting negative effects (e.g., unemployment, mass migration, overurbanization, and perhaps environmental degradation) decades hence (Araghi 2000).

Indeed, state officials from nations of the South can take heart in the successes of the anti-corporate globalization movement and in the movement’s shift toward seeing its beneficiaries as the people and countries of the South. In particular, most developing country states welcome the movement’s efforts to press for debt relief. But most states of even the highly impoverished developing countries see little advantage to disabling the Uruguay Round agreement. Developing country governments now tend to be more interested in enforcing the Uruguay Round WTO agreement than they are in achieving a decisive roll-back of the

WTO. Such Southern state orientations may be an indicator of a growing gap between the interests of states and those of their domestic citizenries, and of a growing elite consensus on trade liberalization in both North and South. While these processes have recently led to grassroots backlash and major political shifts away from neoliberal regimes throughout Latin America, poor countries have few options other than participating in the world trading system on the most favorable terms possible. Thus, while one of the reasons the WTO is now paralyzed has to do with North-South disagreements, the ultimate negotiating position of most governments from the South may not be in sharp conflict with the U.S. position of further market liberalization, deregulation, and more effective enforcement of WTO rules. Developing countries governments are more likely to side with the overall U.S. position against building labor and environmental protections into the next WTO agreement than they are to support the position of the anti-corporate globalization movement. Prohibitions against child and prison labor will be difficult for most developing country governments to accept without significant concessions.

The other bloc of nation-states with a potential interest in significant WTO reform is that of the EU. Hirst and Thompson (1999:228) have noted that:

The role of the European Union is central because it is at one and the same time the most developed and the most completely structured of the major trade blocs. The evolution of the EU's capacities for coordinated common action by its member states will determine to a considerable degree whether the governance of the world economy is strong or minimalist.

There are growing reasons to suggest that the EU's sympathies could well lie toward the minimalist pole. Public support for the anti-corporate globalization movement's agenda—and for related agendas such as curbing GMOs—appears to be significantly stronger in the EU than in the U.S. WTO rebukes of a number of European environmental, trade, and social policies that were prompted by U.S. complaints appear to have created a growing continent-wide view that the EU must stand up for the preservation of the social safety net and for its worker and environmental protections. This, combined with increasingly aggressive U.S. unilateralism in regard to the Kyoto Protocol and the war with Iraq, has hardened and expanded anti-U.S. sentiment throughout Europe. The fact that the EU is a customs union, and thus is built around the notion that fair trade among equal partners on a “level playing field” is desirable, gives the EU rhetorical license to resist claims that it is “anti-trade.”

The anti-corporate globalization movement has not, to our knowledge, specifically endorsed the EU governments' efforts to promote “multidimensionality” in the Millennial Round WTO negotiations. But the EU states' multidimensionality line is clearly derived from the European (and Japanese) impulse to

include social and environmental protections (i.e., of its agriculture and farmers) into the fabric of the Millennial Round Agreement. And the fact that strong advocacy of multifunctionality could derail the Millennial Round is no doubt music to the ears of the anti-corporate globalization movement. Thus, while the movement drifts toward radical North-South inequality discourses, it may find that its most amiable constituencies with significant power to promote tangible policy changes are the EU and Japan, and the North's NGO communities, rather than the governments of the global South. The positions ultimately taken by the more anti-neoliberal governments of Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil and, perhaps Argentina, in regard to the FTAA negotiations may prove crucial to the anti-corporate globalization movement's ideological and tactical trajectories.

## CONCLUSION

The anti-corporate globalization movement is a highly complex one that is enormously difficult to research and understand.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the Northern wing of the movement has changed very substantially over its first four years (presuming that, for all practical purposes, its debut was the build-up to the 1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial). Its dynamics cannot be comprehended adequately by relying exclusively on either resource mobilization or collective identity/“new social movements” perspectives. Much more theoretical work on “global social movements” needs to be developed before this perspective can tell us much more than that the emergence of these movements is the logical outcome of globalization.

The anti-corporate globalization movement has already achieved some significant successes. International institutions now must meet in remote locations or behind immense fortifications. These institutions, which already have public relations problems because of their inaccessibility and lack of transparency, have to insulate themselves from the public to an even greater degree. There is sufficient public support for the movement's agendas that several of these interna-

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<sup>17</sup> The research methodology applied here included extensive review of anti-corporate globalization movement and coalition member group web sites, documents and publications, as well as review of numerous documentary and news media video recordings of movement actions (Buttel and Gould). Participant observation of movements activities, meetings, and protest actions over the course of more than six years in three countries, and participation and review of over 1,000 internal movement and coalition member group e-mail discussion posts provided much of the data upon which this analysis is based (Gould).

tional regimes have been forced or prompted to make changes in their discourses and practices (or to make gestures portending future changes). The Millennial Round of the WTO has been stalled for over three years and counting.

Despite major political gains, the movement faces important dilemmas of organizational structure, ideological coherency, multiple competing discourses, and tactical and strategic choices. But since the movement will very likely continue to be acephalous due to both its deeply coalitional character and its non-hierarchical organizational structure, it will not “make decisions” in the same manner that most social movements—particularly professionalized, NGO and issue-advocacy type movements do. It seems likely that the choices that will be made in the future are not so much choices within a leadership and organization hierarchy, but choices made by many different groups of actors who consider themselves to be part of the movement.

In the analysis above we have implied that some of the most difficult dilemmas and future choices to be made concern the discursive emphasis of the movement. Among the critical choices will be whether to emphasize to groups in the North the employment and environmental benefits of restructuring or disabling the institutions of globalization as opposed to emphasizing a global social justice agenda of reducing North-South economic inequalities. This is not to suggest, of course, that it is impossible to imagine anti-corporate globalization movement agendas that have potential benefits for both groups in the North as well as those in the global South. The Fair Trade movement, a movement that is closely related to and allied with the anti-corporate globalization movement, strives to link conscience consumption oriented groups in the North with peasants and artisans in the South (Dunkley, 2000:Chapter 12). But the fact that a great many more examples such as this do not yet exist suggests that there is a strong element of truth to the notion that some difficult choices will need to be made, albeit within a highly decentralized structure.

Perhaps a greater integration of both northern and southern environmental justice groups and frames offers a potential alternative to attempts to sustain the apparently fleeting coalition with the most conservative Northern mainstream environmental NGOs, which in terms of both ideology and constituency will have a tendency to return to their initial alliance with the neoliberal “free trade” agenda (Dowie 1995; Athanasio, 1996; Taylor 1995; Pellow 2002). Such environmental justice/anti-corporate globalization coalitions could allow for a continued focus on North-South inequality, while constructing a greater focus on intra-North (and intra-South) inequality. Attention to domestic inequality could help to sustain—and in the face of the divisive political impacts of Bush administration energy policy initiatives, regain and solidify—an alliance with organized labor, while simultaneously reaching out to communities of color in

the U.S. whose participation in the anti-corporate globalization movement has been minimal.<sup>18</sup> An environmental justice frame might also allow the movement to retain an environmental agenda (environmental justice in the North, complemented by socially and ecologically sustainable development in the South) that sidesteps the environmental vs. social justice trade-off that is deeply entrenched in “Third Wave” environmental ideology and practice. In the post-September 11th political climate, mainstream environmental organizations are more likely to return to their traditional resistance to both confrontational discourse and protest and direct action political conflict (Schnaiberg and Gould, 2000), seeking accommodation with the very political actors (transnational corporations) and institutions (international financial and trade organizations) which the anti-corporate globalization movement intends to disempower.

Finding an ideological and discursive vehicle through which to link domestic socio-economic and environmental inequality and unemployment (and underemployment) in the North with structurally generated ecological degradation in the South, while still maintaining some emphasis on international inequality, may be necessary to sustain the major components of the diverse coalition which forms the basis of the anti-corporate globalization movement. While a shift to an environmental justice frame and focus on IMF SAP-generated environmental destruction may allow the anti-corporate globalization movement to retain and synthesize both North-South inequality and environmental concerns in its discourse, that does not fully solve the dilemma stemming from the loss of resources, legitimacy, and constituency that comes with a retreat of (or from) the major players involved in the environmental GSM. Environmental justice groups, both North and South, are small in formal membership, decentralized, and quite limited in terms of the financial and other resources they can bring to the anti-corporate globalization movement in comparison to those of the leading mainstream environmental GSM organizations. However, the environmental justice and anti-toxics social movement network is more politically aggressive, overtly active, and takes a more confrontational stance in both its northern (Bullard 1993) and southern forms (Taylor 1995; Gedicks 2001). The environmental jus-

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<sup>18</sup> One reason for the lack of participation of people of color in the movement is related to the privileged socio-economic class and race of its primary constituency. Another factor is most likely its overt prioritization of Southern poverty over Northern poverty. A third factor is probably the high profile participation of mainstream environmental groups with whom environmental justice groups have deep and long-standing grievances (Bryant and Mohai, 1992; Szasz, 1994; Dowie, 1995; Pellow, 2002).


tice movement operates through a deeper, more structurally oriented analysis of power (Lukes 1974; Gould et al. 1996; Foster 1999), making it an easier fit with anti-corporate globalization ideology and tactics. In the end, perhaps the fate of both major GSMs lays not so much with the ideological and discursive decisions of the anti-corporate globalization movement, but rather with those of the international environmental social movement organizations. The extent to which the environmental GSM is willing and able to move itself and its broad constituency away from “Third Wave” approaches to solving the world’s environmental problems may ultimately determine the long-term effectiveness of both GSMs.

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#### ABSTRACT

This paper analyses a set of 467 local protests that took place against neoliberalism on 5 global days of action between 1998 and 2001 and finds that the targets of protest differ on each continent. The majority target either the global institutions of neoliberalism, such as the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization or the Group of 8, or neglect to identify a single institutional target. However,

the most popular local target in Africa and Asia is national or local government. In Latin America protests are most likely to target banks or stock exchanges, and in the US, Canada and Europe, corporations. The sources of such variation lie in pre-existing political repertoires, transnational organizational networks, and processes of structural equivalence that underlie diffusion patterns.

## BREAKING THE BANK & TAKING TO THE STREETS: HOW PROTESTERS TARGET NEOLIBERALISM\*

Lesley J. Wood

How do people fight corporate globalization? When the target is a global system, to whom do activists direct their anger and their claims? While the most visible sites of anti-globalization protest have been the summits of the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, these events are only the tip of the iceberg. On 'global days of action', local events have been organized in over 100 cities. These protests targeted a wide range of institutions which included banks, stock exchanges, local and national governments, McDonalds restaurants, and Nike stores in their opposition to neoliberalism. This paper will examine the targets of these "global justice" protests over a four year period (1998–2001) and will suggest that in order to understand the variation between continents in terms of target choice, one must consider pre-existing political repertoires, social movement networks, and the diffusion processes that spread innovations to new sites.

One must examine the targets of protest in context. Changes in political institutions are tied to transformations of 'political repertoires' or the practices and targets of collective action. In Western Europe, at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, political practices were transformed with the rise of the nation state. At that time, those wishing to agitate collectively became less likely to engage in direct action against local authorities and more likely to use a modular and less

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violent 'repertoire' of petitioning the nation state (Tilly 1995, 1997). Increasingly, the timing of protest came to be tied more closely to the rhythms of parliamentary discussion and governmental action (Tilly 1995:364). Since that time, despite temporary waves and cycles of mobilization, the political repertoires of protesters have remained relatively stable. However, many suggest that with increasingly powerful transnational institutions and dense relationships between formerly isolated domestic social movements, a shift of similar proportions is underway (Smith 2001; Tarrow 2003; Tarrow & Imig 2001).

This paper looks at protests against the transnational institutions most central to extending the neoliberal model. While largely unreported in North America until the Seattle protests of 1999, international coordination began to increase with the initiation of 'global days of action' in 1998. Of course, the barriers to coordinated protest against transnational institutions are daunting. The sites of summits are often distant, the issues complex, and the existing organizational infrastructure that surrounds transnational mobilization weak. Until September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, these demonstrations appeared to be increasing in size and number. But after the attacks on the World Trade Center, many activists, particularly in the US, rushed to distance themselves from anything associated with political violence or "terrorism". In combination with the intensified policing strategies of the 'war on terror,' these changes have (at least temporarily) limited protest in the US. However, globally coordinated protests are on the rise on other continents, with the movements collaborating against neoliberalism segueing into even larger global days of action against the war in Iraq.<sup>1</sup>

For activists interested in influencing global economic policy, organized efforts to intervene in transnational institutions have predominantly taken the form of lobbying, either directly as Non Governmental Organizations, or indirectly through national representatives. Indeed, a class of experts has emerged, working to gain entry and influence into institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional transnational authorities such as the European Union (Smith 2001). Rucht has found that the rate of use of even the most routine protest tactic of public demonstrations seems extremely low among transnational social movements, in contrast with national social movements (Rucht 2001). Many studies of "global resistance"

<sup>1</sup> On February 15, March 15, and March 22, 2003, global days of action were called against the war. The largest globally coordinated protests to date, over 700 cities took part.

focus on this less contentious side of global level politics, the lobbying, conferences and networking that take place in the transnational political arena (Smith 2001; Tarrow 2002).

What about those dissenters who are unwilling or unable to lobby transnational institutions? As observers have noted, movements of the resource-poor derive much of their effectiveness from their ability to disrupt (McAdam 1982; Piven & Cloward 1979; Tarrow 1998). By examining the use of street blockades in Mexico and bank occupations in South Africa, we can begin to build a dataset that incorporates this more transgressive side of transnational protest. Such 'Contentious events' are defined as gatherings of ten or more people—outside of formal government routines, in a publicly accessible place and making claims that, if realized, would affect the interests of their targeted object (Tilly 1995:63). Events were included in the dataset if they affiliated themselves with the global day of action through speeches or signs, or if they submitted a report to compilers of protest activities.<sup>2</sup>

Global days of action are a growing form of transnational contention. Tarrow and others have argued that transnational contention that is truly contentious is rare. His definition of a transnational social movement is a useful one: "sustained contentious interactions with opponents—national or non-national—by connected networks of challengers organized across national boundaries

- challengers must be rooted in domestic social networks
- challengers must be connected to one another more than episodically through common ways of seeing the world, or through informal or organizational ties

<sup>2</sup> Repeated Google™ searches from 1998–2003 for:

protest	demonstration	IMF
action	WTO	World Bank

and the abbreviations for the dates, "M16, J18, N30, S26, and N9" built this collection, with the goal of a complete set of events. Fortunately, activists had already compiled many of these events onto pages including:

<http://www.agp.org>  
<http://www.indymedia.org>  
<http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp>  
[http://www.eco-action.org/dod/no9/seattle\\_chronology.html](http://www.eco-action.org/dod/no9/seattle_chronology.html)  
<http://www.jwj.org/global/S26/s26rep.htm>  
<http://bak.spc.org/j18/site/uk.html#sreports>

and many others. Sites viewed during August 2002. While most of these pages are in English, others are in German, Spanish, Italian, French, Dutch, Norwegian, Portuguese and Korean.

✦ challenges must be contentious in deed as well as word. (Tarrow 1998:184)

The local protests against neoliberal institutions that I examine in this paper meet this definition. But the targets of these mobilizations vary between continents in surprising ways. This paper focuses on the targets of 467 protest events that took place in 69 countries on five global days of action between 1998 and the end of 2001. It will emphasize the patterns of targeting before 9/11, but suggests that even after 9/11, we will continue to see variation in the ways protesters on different continents target neoliberalism.

### GLOBAL DAYS OF ACTION

Both locally rooted and globally coordinated, the strategy of 'global days of action' has become increasingly popular over the past five years. This strategy encourages local activists to protest in their own community on a day identified in a 'call to action', distributed through social movement networks and the media. The dates are selected to correspond with summits of transnational institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, the Group of 8 or the World Trade Organization. The level of communication and coordination between these events varies, depending on the communication and associational networks that link the different sites of protest.

Global days of action are not new. In 1889, the Socialist International declared May 1st a day of workers demonstrations and in 1910 similarly established a Women's Day. The next year, more than one million women and men attended rallies in Austria, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland. In the last five years global days of action have been called by various organizations and networks in support of locked out dockworkers, indigenous people and prisoners, against McDonalds, Nike, genetic engineering, and most recently, the war against Iraq. While not all movements have embraced the tactic with the same degree of enthusiasm, the coordinated anti-war protests indicate that this is a tactic worth observing. This paper focuses specifically on the global days of action protests that contest the neoliberal policies represented by the summits of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the Group of 8 and the World Trade Organization.

### How Targets Change?

How do locally rooted activists make claims on distant institutions like the IMF or the World Trade Organization? Many organize marches and rallies against the institutions and their policies in town squares and city streets, carrying signs and making speeches. Some, however, may also choose more accessible targets in order to express their outrage. These targets often have only indirect ties to the transnational institutions.

In order to understand targets of protest I place the data on collective actors, meaningful practices and targets into context. Research suggests that social movement organizations generally choose targets and tactics that conform to existing modes of action in a particular region and on a specific issue. Successful events will encourage conformity of targets and tactics in subsequent actions. As we stated earlier, targets also conform to the structure of political power, as the growth of the state inadvertently create opportunities for mobilization through restructuring social relations and creating a means of communication by which opinion could be mobilized (Tarrow 1998:58). In a similar fashion, there is some evidence that the formalization of the transnational arena is providing opportunities for mobilization.

While pre-existing repertoires can help to explain continuities, the new opportunities and challenges presented by global institutions and policies have led national and local social movements to innovate. Studies of political networks suggest that the practices of social movements shift when the patterns of relationships in which they are engaged are altered (Gould 1995; Mische 2003; Steinberg 1999). With the decline of state communism and the emergence of the World Trade Organization, local and national social movements that had engaged in struggles against privatization, the IMF and World Bank, for environmental protection, self-determination and other issues began to see their interests as shared, and link their struggles together. Such networks appear to be the modal organizational form in transnational contention (Tarrow 2002). Through these networks, anarchists from Europe broadcast stories about their successful "street party" protests and hear tales of the Zapatista resistance, unions and environmentalists can listen to each other's strategies, and the struggles of different communities and nations in North and South begin to be linked in new ways.<sup>3</sup>

This process has been described as *scale shift*—a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention and a wider range of actors (McAdam et al. 2001:332; Tarrow & McAdam 2003). Tarrow has noted that scale shift involves two related pathways; first, *diffusion/emulation*—whereby practices travel to new sites along pre-existing and new ties and lead to emulation, and second, *brokerage/coalition formation*, through which movements that become linked and organizations that are in coalition increasingly tend to use similar approaches. Scale shift not only spreads tactics, it creates new frames around which the conflict is organized and new conceptions of allies

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<sup>3</sup> The "north" here is defined in terms of economic influence and includes the southern countries of Australia and New Zealand.

and opponents (*ibid.*). While both pathways need to be better understood, this paper highlights the first route—the diffusion of target strategies through four pre-existing networks. As Chabot and Duyvendak (2003) have noted, in order to gain insight into the contingencies and interpretive processes that underlie diffusion, it is necessary to examine the ways that communities interpret and employ a foreign innovation (Chabot and Duyvendak 2003:706). Using the case of the ‘anti-globalization movement,’ this paper will look at how local activists on different continents participate in the global days of action. It will examine how these activists engage, using strategies that reflect their pre-existing political repertoires, and whether they adopt the tactical innovation of targeting multinational corporations as an indirect way of targeting neoliberalism.

### One Struggle – Many Struggles

Despite burgeoning networks, we should not expect a single, unified global revolution, or one world government any time soon. The spread of social movement strategies depends on activists being able to ‘attribute similarity’ to the transmitting groups and their tactics. This depends on the ability of protesters to creatively dislocate and relocate an item for their context, and adapt strategies and identities accordingly (Chabot et al., 2003:707–8). This receptivity depends in part upon the existence of networks that link movement organizations, and in part on dynamics that underlie the flow of information between sites of protest.

Like all information, targets and tactics diffuse most easily to new sites that the transmitters have direct contact with. As a result, social movement networks help to facilitate both diffusion and mobilization. This would help to explain why many protests in France and Germany, linked by the ATTAC network, tend to follow a particular routine, marching along a route of sites of public investment—schools, post offices and hospitals. This would also help to explain why movements within a particular continent, or “state system” that are in contact tend to engage in similar social movement strategies.

In addition to relationships between protesters, it is important to look at the role of relationships to authorities. Political practices tend to diffuse at the same rate to sites that have a similar set of relations to other sites, or are “structurally equivalent” (Soule 1997). Structural equivalence is the level of similarity of a given actor’s external relations to those of other actors, whether directly connected or not (Tilly 1997). Previous studies have suggested that locations and movements that have a similar position to authorities such as the WTO may result in a similar level and form of mobilization (Walton & Seddon 1994). To understand the variation in targets, it is useful to consider the relationship of sites of protest to the structure and membership of global institutions and its influence on the flow of information.

**Figure 1**


Date	Summit Location	Number of Events	Number of Cities Protesting
May 16 – May 18, 1998	Group of 8 (5/16) in Birmingham, WTO (5/18) in Geneva	43	41
June 18, 1999	Group of 8, Koln Germany	58	54
November 30, 1999	WTO in Seattle, USA	111	97
September 26, 2000	IMF and World Bank in Prague, Czech Rep	98	88
November 9, 2001	WTO in Doha, Qatar	157	152
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>467</b>	<b>432</b>

By understanding the significance of pre-existing political repertoires, social movement networks, and the dynamics that underlie the flow of information, I can begin to understand the variation in the ways protesters on different continents target neoliberal institutions.

#### *Protest Data*

This study analyzes a set of the most visible recent protest events against neoliberalism. These protests were held on or around five days designated as “days of action” that took place between 1998 and 2001. These days of action were called by various activist networks to coincide with the meeting of transnational trade bodies.<sup>4</sup> The number of cities mobilized for each event varied, but the Ministerials of the WTO appear to inspire the greatest level of activity, due in part to mobilization by multiple networks that are seeking to take advantage of potential opportunities in a relatively new institution. Protests took place on all continents, and while the majority of demonstrations (69%) were in Europe and North America, Asia and South America held the largest events. See Appendix A

<sup>4</sup>. (1) May 16–18, 1998. At the founding conference of People’s Global Action (PGA) network in February 1998, the decision was made to link up the dates of the summits and call the first global day of action against neoliberalism. (2) June 18, 1999. The Jubilee 2000 network and the International Confederation of Federated Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the PGA and affiliated Reclaim the Streets sub-network called for action. (3) November 30, 1999 was called as a day of action by PGA and Jubilee 2000. (4) September 26, 2000. Called by local organizers in Prague and spread internationally, particularly through the PGA network. (5) November 9, 2001 was called a day of action by the ICFTU and the PGA.

**Figure 2 – Global Days of Action**

Unlike many studies of contentious events, this paper uses activist reports of protest events, taken from the Internet. This approach improves upon standard strategies of using news media as a source. I identified 467 events that took place over the 5 days of action, whereas a LexisNexis™ search of all news media identified only 127, and a Reuters search, only 40.<sup>5</sup> In general, the media coverage of protests increased through time, reporting between 7–30% of each day of action's events. The activist reports incorporated significantly more detail of tactics and organization than media reports but significantly less detail on the activities of targets or the goals of the event. As past studies would predict, the media accounts tended to over-represent violent and large events.

As explained earlier, events are included if they are public, larger than 10 persons and explicitly identified with the global day of action by organizers, participants or compilers of global day of action catalogues. Organizational meetings or

<sup>5</sup> Coverage for the November 9, 2001 event includes one reference to “30 events in Germany”, and a list of 19 cities where events were planned by the Canadian Labour Congress. Evidence suggests that some of the Canadian events were primarily educational, and would not have been considered contentious events in our data. They were excluded unless other reports gave more details.

conferences are excluded. Events that have been included in the activist compilations of global days of action events include, rallies, a guerilla attack on a police station, leafleting the public, marches, street parties, property destruction, street theater, civil disobedience, riots, occupations, banner hangs, and the disruption of offices, businesses, and streets.

Perhaps surprisingly, 27 of the events identified by the news media were not included in activist reports—suggesting that some events that are unconnected to existing activist networks of communication and independent media but are visible to authorities. These ‘missing’ events were equally spread across time and continents.

### Choice of Targets

Protesters target institutions when they march to their front doors, chant, hold signs and distribute leaflets against their policies, break their windows, occupy their offices and generally disrupt business as usual. Often, one demonstration will involve multiple targets. When we look for correlations between these targets and the continent where an event takes place, we find protests target neoliberalism differently on each continent. While the majority of protests explicitly or implicitly target the global institution meeting on that day, or decline to identify a specific target, many direct their ire at local, accessible institutions. The most popular local target is the multinational corporation, with national governments, banks and stock exchanges attracting significant amounts of opposition. Multinational corporations increased in popularity as a local target, especially after the Seattle protests of 1999. However, after the attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, while the number of protests continued to increase, corporations became less popular. This study will examine this geographic and temporal variation carefully, revealing patterns within this specific case, and suggesting more general dynamics of scale shift and its interaction with social movement networks and pre-existing political repertoires.

### Networks of Resistance

There is no consensus amongst activists about whether the WTO and organizations like it should be reformed or abolished (Smith 2001). The reform vs. revolution question is associated with particular networks and targeting strategies. The networks aiming for reform emphasize specific policies, especially around access and accountability, as well as substantive issues around protection of labor and the environment. The International Congress on Federated Trade Unions aim to ensure labor rights are included in the debates.<sup>6</sup> The Jubilee 2000 network demands the abolition of debt for the poorest nations.<sup>7</sup> The ATTAC (*Association pour la Taxation des Transactions Financières pour l'Aide aux Citoyens*)

network began as a campaign for the implementation of the so-called Tobin Tax, the proposal by Nobel laureate James Tobin to tax all speculative financial transactions but has shifted towards a more general goal of democratizing the global financial institutions.<sup>8</sup>

The anti-capitalist People's Global Action network are less interested in the reform of the institutions. One hallmark of this network is: "A very clear rejection of capitalism, imperialism and feudalism; all trade agreements, institutions and governments that promote destructive globalisation."<sup>9</sup> PGA affiliated events offer a more systemic critique, along with the goal of increased global mobilization, and the expression of alternative values.<sup>10</sup> In Europe, North America and Australia and New Zealand, these include the colorful "Reclaim the Streets" protests. While many would be tempted to categorize these demonstrations as solely expressive and counter-cultural, their alliances with unions, human rights

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<sup>6</sup> The most established global network in our data is the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), was set up in 1949 and has 231 affiliated organizations in 150 countries and territories on all five continents, with a membership of 158 million. The events organized primarily by ICFTU make up approximately 10% of our dataset.

<sup>7</sup> Jubilee 2000 emerged from religious communities in 1996, and gathered 24 million signatures in more than 60 countries. Its main goal was the cancellation of debts of the poorest countries by the year 2000. Since that time it has expanded its foci and works more generally against neoliberalism, organizing human chains around summit sites, and can be identified in the leadership of approximately 3% of our events.

<sup>8</sup> Founded in 1998 by Bernard Cassen and Susan George of the socialist monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique*, ATTAC has established local chapters in 33 countries (primarily in Europe), includes 80,000 members. The network works in alliance with the labor movement and uses marches and creative non-violent protest to work towards the democratic control of financial markets and their institutions. The events organized primarily by ATTAC make up 16% of our dataset.

<sup>9</sup> Launched in 1998 in Geneva, the PGA is a decentralized collaboration with no formal membership, linking existing organizations that have endorsed the hallmarks. The network is active in approximately 40 countries, particularly in Latin America, Asia and Europe. Participants include well known movements including the Sandinistas, Zapatistas, Phillipine, Brazilian and Indian peasant movements and the European direct action movement including Britain's Reclaim the Streets and Italy's *Ya Basta*. The demonstrations organized by groups identified as part of the PGA (through inclusion on the PGA webpage) make up 53% of our dataset. <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/en/index.html>. Sites viewed during summer 2002.

<sup>10</sup> As McCarthy has pointed out, a primary goal of many transnational social movement organizations may be to build transnational solidarity beyond state boundaries (McCarthy 1997:72).

organizations and community organizations have tied this street party strategy to concrete local and national issues including the environment, the privatization of social services, labor rights and public space.

The changed political climate after 9/11 led to an increase in the proportion of protest events affiliated with networks interested in reform, while anti-capitalist protests appear to decline in number, due in part to the relative marginalization of the PGA network, especially in the United States.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to having different goals, networks were associated with particular target strategies. A slight majority of protests (52%), particularly those associated with ICFTU, ATTAC or Jubilee 2000 targeted the WTO, G8, IMF and World Bank explicitly or implicitly. In contrast, demonstrations affiliated with the PGA network, or its sub-networks like Reclaim the Streets were more likely to select a local target. Indeed, 226 of the 467 demonstrations made claims against a concrete target other than the transnational institutions explicitly under protest. These targets varied by continent and through time, not only due to the influence of the networks, but as a result of pre-existing regional political repertoires, and the dynamics of diffusion. The most frequent local targets were corporations, banks and stock exchanges and national governments. We'll discuss each in turn.

### Multinational Corporations

The most popular local targets of days of action against neoliberalism were the branches and headquarters of multinational corporations. McDonalds, Nike, Monsanto, the Gap, Shell and others were the target of twenty-seven percent of the protests in our sample. They were picketed, disrupted and destroyed during the course of protest. In Canada, the US, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, activists are more likely to target a corporation than any other local target. Interestingly, these are the countries most central to the neoliberal institutions. These are also the countries that are most likely to lack established repertoires for fighting against neoliberalism. After the 1999 protests of Seattle, this targeting strategy diffused quickly to new sites of protest.

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<sup>11</sup> The global conference of the PGA took place as scheduled from September 19–22, 2001 in Bolivia. However, the post 9/11 political made travel for the delegates difficult for a number of reasons. Delegates were refused visas and permission to travel. The Bolivian government denounced the PGA as a 'terrorist summit'. The Executive Intelligence Review published the article 'Terrorism Central: People's Global Action.' During a press conference held by the PGA, journalists questioned the relationship between the PGA and the terrorist attacks (Sophie 2001).

While protests against businesses by their workers are not new, direct action against businesses by their customers is more unusual. Historically, demonstrations against businesses by consumers have most often been concerned with prices. Although stores were targeted in the US during the civil rights movement, these 'anti-globalization' protests and their linking of economic, labor and environmental issues with consumerism, appear to have emerged from the recent history of environmental and anti-sweatshop activism in North America and Western Europe. But what is the logic behind targeting a corporation that is not accountable in any directly democratic manner to the public? Writer Naomi Klein offers one explanation, arguing that these targets are not the real goal; "For years, we in this movement have fed off our opponents' symbols—their brands, their office towers, their photo-opportunity summits. We have used them as rallying cries, as focal points, as popular education tools. But these symbols were never the real targets; they were the levers, the handles. They were what allowed us, as British writer Katharine Ainger recently put it, "to open a crack in history" (Klein 2001).

The strengths of a corporate target are its accessibility and the way a single target can signify multiple meanings. This flexibility facilitates the diffusion of corporations as targets through easing the process by which communities of activists can identify with other anti-corporate protesters. Protesters can and do argue when they target a McDonalds that they are targeting globalization, "corporate control", the WTO, capitalism, and the USA. They might explain that they are fighting for animal rights, labor rights or against rainforest destruction. Or they may simply argue that McDonalds itself is the problem. Indeed, for some McDonalds appears to have become a universal but multi-vocal symbol of globalization.<sup>12</sup> After 9/11 it seems that the demobilization of protests in the US and Canada meant that this ambiguity became less of a desirable characteristic, as protesters attempted to distance themselves from any resemblance to the attackers of the similarly ambiguous target of the World Trade Center. Indeed, on days of action before 9/11, up to 49% of protests targeted corporations. On 9 November 2001, the figure was only 10%.

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<sup>12</sup> McDonalds was a target at 25 protests in our dataset. The locations were as follows; Aviles Spain, Berkeley, Bialystock, Burlington, VT, Fortaleza, Lisbon (twice), Montevideo, Melbourne, Milano, Minsk, Montreal (twice), London, Newcastle, UK, Oviedo, Spain, Prague (three times), Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Tarragona, Tucson, Wellington and Zagreb.

## National Governments

Nineteen percent of protest events in the sample targeted national governments. In Africa and Asia, protests were more likely to target national governments than any other target. Interestingly, none of the countries that had high levels of targeting national governments were in the G8 or the WTO Quad.<sup>13</sup> Counter-intuitively, this suggests that the most powerful governments were less likely to be targeted by their populations than nations with small markets and less economic power.

Although more recent protests linking both war and globalization appear to have focused their attention on national governments, there does not seem to be any clear increase or decrease of the significance of governments as a target of protest through time in this albeit limited dataset. When we use regression analysis, unsurprisingly we find that larger protests and a location in a capital city can significantly predict the choice of government as a target.<sup>14</sup> The continuing significance of government both before and after 9/11 supports other research that suggests that those who want to protest against European institutions and policies still target domestic institutions. (Tarrow 2001).

## Banks and Stock Exchanges

Fifteen percent of the protests in the sample targeted banks and/or stock exchanges. There was an increase in the proportion of protests that targeted banks on the second day of action, June 18, 1999 (J18) due to the "Global Carnival Against Capitalism's" call to action by the PGA network, which explicitly identified financial centers as targets on days of action. In Latin America, banks and/or stock exchanges are the most frequent local targets.

This pattern is related to pre-existing repertoires. However, in Latin American social movements have been fighting against the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank for over twenty-five years. Massive riots in the 1970s and 1980s built a history of protest against privatization and neoliberal reform. Governments and opposition groups routinely blame the IMF for all

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<sup>13</sup> In principle, WTO rules are established by consensus of all 134 members, but in practice the so-called Quad countries (U.S., Japan, Canada and the European Union) can meet behind closed doors and influence the agenda and organization of meetings and policy. Membership in a Quad country is significantly negatively correlated with targeting government (Pearson's correlation  $-.179$ , Std. Error  $.058$ ).

<sup>14</sup> Location in a capital city correlated with government as a target (Pearson's correlation  $.147$ ). Size of event correlated with government as a target (Pearson's correlation  $.201$ ).

manner of problems, and direct the attention of the public to appropriate targets (Walton et al. 1994:133).

Mirroring the relationship between national governments and global institutions, none of the regions that target banks and stock exchanges are in the G8 or the WTO "Quad." It seems that when choosing local targets, protests tend to target the historically resonant and accessible symbols of transnational power. The influence of new forms of protest may be limited by these pre-existing repertoires. The targets of protest shifted dramatically in the US and Canada after 9/11 away from corporations and towards the transnational institutions themselves. In contrast, in Latin America, protest routines remained largely unaffected. As a result, the frequency that stock exchanges and banks were targeted showed no change.

### Implications for Understanding Target Strategies

In order to understand why the targets of anti-globalization protests differ on each continent, we need to look at pre-existing repertoires, networks of organizations and the processes that underlie diffusion. As we have seen, the economic and political context of different regions influence the existence and activity of political organizations, their issues, campaigns and of course their choices of tactic and target (Appendix B). With the increasing visibility of transnational institutions, these pre-existing domestic networks transpose contention to the international level without liquidating it locally or nationally (Tarrow and McAdam 2003). This shift is a contingent process that depends in part on relationships between domestic social movements and transnational authorities. As a result, there are regional and temporal differences within the struggles against neoliberalism.

As Smith (2001) pointed out, the first stream of resistance to the IMF and World Bank began in developing countries, where resistance to IMF-imposed structural adjustment policies arose as countries of the global "south" sought to address the mounting problem of international debt (Walton and Seddon 1994). Many of the countries most active in the movements in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Africa, did not participate in the global days of action. However those that did participate had pre-existing repertoires from earlier austerity protests that targeted IMF and World Bank policies. In Latin America, the protests targeted the financial institutions that symbolized the agents of austerity policy and the international economy (Walton & Seddon 1994:110). In contrast, most of the political mobilization in the "north" that opposed the policies of these transnational institutions over the past twenty years has taken the form of lobbying and peaceful protest. This difference affects the receptivity of activists to locally new targets. When local activists, particularly those rooted in environ-

mental campaigns that targeted corporations linked up with the PGA network, they adapted their targeting strategy for the protests against neoliberalism. As a result, corporations became an increasingly popular target in Europe, Australia and New Zealand, but especially in the US and Canada.

Yet the practice of targeting corporations did not spread everywhere. It became dominant only in countries which are part of the core of neoliberal institutions, those countries which are 'structurally equivalent' in relation to the WTO and the Group of 8. This finding corresponds with previous research. As Sarah Soule argues, "socially constructed categories of similarity lead to the diffusion of an item." (Soule 1997:873). Countries that were outside of the powerful center of these institutions and had a pre-existing repertoire of protest against neoliberalism remained relatively unconvinced by strategic innovations. This is not an automatic process, being structurally equivalent in this case corresponds with being within similar networks, both factors facilitate the process of 'attributing similarity' between receiving and transmitting anti-corporate activists.

Reversing the process, after the attacks on the World Trade Center, those same networks were used to signal a retreat from the tactic of targeting corporations. The changed political climate prompted many US activists to attempt to distance themselves from those who would attack corporate targets, and thus contributed to an increasing polarization of the movement. It appears that the same networks and processes that facilitated the diffusion of corporate targets, especially after the success of the protests in Seattle, would also facilitate the retreat from this innovation.

### CONCLUSIONS

On November 9, 2001, protesters opposing the meetings of the WTO taking place in inaccessible Qatar organized rallies, marches, and raised a ruckus in 152 cities worldwide. It was possibly the largest globally coordinated protest ever held to that date. At those demonstrations, crowds chanted against the WTO, and railed against their own governments, while others occupied the headquarters of banks and corporations and disrupted commercial outlets. The choices of target differed on each continent, much as they had before 9/11. However, a mere two months after the attacks on the World Trade Center, fewer protesters were targeting corporations, particularly in the US. In response to 9/11, anti-globalization protesters had retreated from more disruptive tactics, preferring to target the transnational institutions directly.

This was not a unified global shift. Protesters from Brazil to Boston continued to reflect their different locations and political histories. However, in the same way that the strategy of attacking a McDonalds diffused through North

American and European sections of activist networks like the PGA, the shift away from corporate targets also followed comprehensible patterns. Of course, understanding how tactics and targets rise and fall in popularity requires more than a map of transmission and reception. Further work must look at the cognitive and interpretive processes that facilitate the diffusion and rejection of tactical innovations. As our knowledge develops, the dynamic connection between local activists and transnational processes and institutions will be better understood.

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## APPENDIX A

**467 protest events, 65 countries, 315 cities****May 16 1998 – May 18 1998 (43 events, 22 countries, 41 cities)**

Asia (4 countries, 5 cities)

Australia/New Zealand (2 countries, 4 cities)

Europe (12 countries, 21 cities)

Latin America (2 countries, 2 cities)

USA/Canada (2 countries, 9 cities)

**June 18, 1999 (58 events, 24 countries, 54 cities)**

Africa (2 countries, 2 cities)

Asia (3 countries, 3 cities)

Australia/NZ (1 country, 3 cities)

Europe – (12 countries, 27 cities)

Latin America (4 countries, 4 cities)

USA/Canada (2 countries, 14 cities)

**November 30 1999 (111 events, 22 countries, 97 cities)**

Asia (7 countries, 20 cities)

Australia/NZ (1 country, 2 cities)

Europe (12 countries, 41 cities)

USA/Canada (2 countries, 34 cities)

**September 26 2000 (98 events, 33 countries, 88 cities)**

Africa (1 country, 3 cities)

Asia (7 countries, 14 cities)

Australia/NZ (2 countries, 2 cities)

Europe (16 countries, 26 cities)

Latin America and the Caribbean (5 countries, 11 cities)

USA/Canada – (2 countries, 32 cities)

**November 9 2001 (157 events, 42 countries, 152 cities)**

Africa (2 countries, 2 cities)

Asia (11 countries, 15 cities)

Australia/NZ (2 countries, 5 cities)

Europe (17 countries, 95 cities)

Latin America and Caribbean (7 countries, 10 cities)

USA/Canada (2 countries, 25 cities)

## APPENDIX B – PERCENTAGE OF EVENTS SELECTED TARGET ON ALL DAYS OF ACTION

Figure B1 – Targets on All Continents




Figure B2 – Local Targets in Europe




Figure B3 – Local Targets in USA & Canada




Figure B4 – Local Targets in Africa




Figure B5 – Local Targets in Asia




Figure B6 – Local Targets in Australia and NZ






Figure B7 – Local Targets in Latin America





#### ABSTRACT

Workers and environmentalists in the United States have often found themselves on opposite sides of critical issues. Yet at the WTO meeting in Seattle in November 1999, they came together in a historic protest many see as a watershed in the formation of a new blue-green "Seattle Coalition." However the two camps are again in conflict over substantive issues, and in the changed political climate of post 9-11, the question arises of the coalition's durability. The paper first briefly reviews the history of labor-environment interactions in the United States. It then examines a series of

problems and potential areas of promise for the movements: difficulties of coalition-building, expectations of reciprocity, local vs. national connections, and the question of differing class cultures and interests. Finally, three areas of potential research and action are suggested: new roles for the mainstream environmental groups, just transition alliances and climate justice alliances. We propose that the environmental justice and environmental health wings of the green movement are more suited to making long-term coalitions with labor than are habitat-oriented green groups.

## BLUE-GREEN COALITIONS: CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE POST 9-11 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Kenneth A. Gould  
 Tammy L. Lewis  
 J. Timmons Roberts

### 1. INTRODUCTION

There have been some high-profile cases of cooperation between environmentalists and labor unions in the United States, especially the Seattle protests against the WTO in November 1999. There was a key moment which was recounted in *The Nation* during the Seattle protest when police repression was especially intense. The media reported that protestors from the environmentalist Sierra Club, dressed in elaborate sea turtle costumes, looked up to see truck drivers from the Teamsters' Union, in their workers' clothes.

"Turtles love Teamsters," said the young environmentalist.

"Teamsters love Turtles," responded the tough truck driver.

These two groups make up two of the largest contingencies of the emerging movement against corporate-led globalization, if not its most radical ones. They represent a major potential expansion of that movement, posing a potential threat to the free trade (Neo-Liberal) project of global marketing, led by the international capitalist class of the IMF, World Bank, Wall Street, and the U.S. government.

The objectives of globalization in the short term were the global marketing of free trade, fast track negotiation of trade treaties, and the expansion of WTO powers. Both labor and environmentalists viewed these issues as extremely dan-

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gerous. Labor unions obviously feared a massive flow of jobs overseas as U.S. industries would be unable to compete with the rock-bottom wages in places like Mexico and China. Environmentalists feared a similar “race to the bottom” of regulations they had spent decades developing to control the behaviors of polluting firms.

However, in many ways forming a coalition at Seattle was easy: this was a short-term marriage of convenience on an issue both groups strongly opposed. Eighteen months later the picture had dramatically shifted, as the coalition faced deep divisions over energy policy changes proposed by Vice-President Dick Cheney. Cheney brought union leaders to the White House to gain their support of drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), and the Bush Administration’s plan to build thousands of new power plants across the country. Fuel-efficiency standards were also on the agenda, since American auto-makers were saved from bankruptcy by the surge in sales of their guzzling SUVs. Finally, the Bush administration wanted support from labor on their position on the Kyoto Treaty on global warming, arguing that the mandatory reductions in carbon emissions would severely endanger jobs in America. On all four cases, labor lobbied successfully, effectively trouncing the environmental lobby. The environmental movement’s largest “Big 10” lobbying groups have not done a lot of reaching out to labor. They appear to be returning to isolationist lobbying techniques. Although the ANWR has been temporarily spared, the coalition has been badly damaged by the split over this sacred cow of preservationists.

### THE SEATTLE COALITION: MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE OR ONE NIGHT STAND?

Despite the claims of media commentators and some activists, the WTO protests in Seattle in November of 1999 were not the result of a close collaboration between the major mainstream environmental organizations and organized labor. In fact, the level of actual direct working relations between these two segments of a much larger “coalition” was quite minimal. The protest actions that received the most media attention were those organized through the Direct Action Network (DAN). DAN orchestrated the non-violent direct actions that included hard and soft lock downs<sup>1</sup> at key intersections and the blockading of the Seattle convention center where the Third Ministerial meetings of

<sup>1</sup> A “soft” lock down involves a symbolic connecting of protesters to each other and/or inanimate objects, usually through linking arms or string in conducting civil disobedience blockades of intersections and entrances. A “hard” lock down employs locks and chains, often with devices to prevent easy cutting by authorities, thus making such civil disobedience blockades more difficult to break up.

the WTO were to be held. Those participating in the DAN direct actions and the preceding non-violence trainings and spokescouncil<sup>2</sup> meetings represented a variety of organizations and interests, few of which were directed affiliated with organized labor or large environmental organizations. Instead, they represented many smaller student and other groups focused on sweatshops, poverty of the Global South, corporate power, human rights, indigenous rights and a variety of “anti-capitalist” ideologies. While many of those participants would have called themselves environmentalists, and some of them were union members, they did not act directly in the name of those larger organizations (Danaher and Burbach 2000).

The participation of organized labor was large and significant in Seattle, but was also primarily separate from the actions taken by DAN and the few mainstream environmental organizations that participated in any significant way. Labor provided the bulk of the funding for the Seattle protests, but primarily participated in labor rallies and labor marches, which were joined by some non-union protestors. The most visible unions in Seattle were the USWA, ILWU, IAM, IBT, AFSCME, and AFL-CIO, all of whose presidents spoke at the major union rally. The ILWU provided perhaps the most powerful protest action in shutting down the port of Seattle and many other west coast ports. The labor rhetoric in Seattle was almost exclusively focused on wages, job loss, import surges, product dumping, child labor and sweatshops, with the overriding theme being corporate greed and corporate power. Rhetorical nods were made to the environment, but such issues never appeared as a high priority in labor’s protests. Labor did participate in a symbolic “sit-down” along the labor union march route, intended to be simultaneous and in solidarity with the DAN direct action protestors who AFL-CIO President Sweeney referred to as “the students,” but the integration of labor, “student” protestors from a variety of organizations, and mainstream environmental organizations that did occur was mainly as a result of the chaos that ensued when the police rioted, and various groups found themselves turning to each other for defensive support. The real meeting of organized labor and other protestors only occurred when the labor and DAN marches converged and were both violently attacked by the police. The convergence of

<sup>2</sup> Spokescouncil is an organizational and decision-making structure through which various participating groups and organizations coordinate actions and generate consensus. Protesters send delegates to the meetings to represent the consensus reached by their groups and organizations. “Spokes” refers to each group representing a spoke on a wheel, and is intended to differentiate such an organizational structure from hierarchical decision-making structures.

marches did require some minimal coordination between environmental organizations and unions, but that relationship was mediated through DAN.

On the environmental organization side, only Greenpeace was highly visible in Seattle. Greenpeace has long been known as the odd member of the “Big 10” group of environmental organizations due to its use of non-violent direct action tactics and its focus on corporate power and the policies of international financial institutions, so it is no surprise that this organization was a key participant. The Sierra Club and other mainstream environmental latecomers to the anti-corporate globalization side were present in Seattle, and did participate in the non-direct action marches and rallies. The Rainforest Action Network, also known for endorsing direct action techniques, was present and visible. However, the direct contact between these environmentalists and organized labor prior to and during the Seattle actions were minimal. The rhetoric of the environmental groups in Seattle was nearly exclusively focused on issues of logging, endangered species, and genetically modified organisms, with occasional passing nods to labor and indigenous rights issues.

At no time in Seattle did a unified rhetoric connecting labor and environment emerge from either camp. That unifying rhetoric was provided by the organizations focused specifically on corporate globalization such as Public Interest Trade Watch and Global Exchange. What is clear from a review of the protests in Seattle is that organized labor and mainstream environmental organizations essentially protested the same institution and the same meetings for largely different reasons. Both camps participated to greater and lesser extents in a much broader coalition organized by DAN, and the bulk of the direct action protesters were affiliated with neither organized labor nor the mainstream environmental organizations. What drew all of the claims of a blue-green coalition emerging from Seattle was largely the simple fact that both groups simultaneously, and with some minimal coordination, protested the same institution and policy, and that other organizations were able to articulate some unifying critique of neoliberalism which included a focus on both labor and environmental concerns. That is not an insignificant step, and could certainly signal the potential for a unified opposition and an even more ambitious unifying ideology. However, Seattle was not a reliable indicator that a blue-green coalition existed, nor that such a coalition would be sustainable. The Seattle protests against the WTO simply represented the finding of some common ground between organization that had been pitted against each other by corporations and the state for three decades (Kazis and Grossman 1991). At best, it was a marriage of convenience that could be developed into a lasting, mutually supportive relationship. At worst, it was a one-night stand unlikely to be repeated until blues and greens met again on the streets of Cancun, Mexico and Miami, Florida.

There have been enduring conflicts between labor and environmentalist groups, based in part in the core need of unions to protect the jobs of their members. Unions have been called “productivists,” seeking to expand jobs, while environmentalists question the future of the current economic model in which those jobs might be created: economic expansion threatens the sustainability of life on the planet, development needs to be entirely rethought. There of course is tremendous variation between wings of the environmental movement, from corporate and reformist groups on the one hand to radical anti-development groups on the other. The same can be said about labor, of course, with some groups accepting nearly all of the values of firms while others question the central tenets of capitalism in the United States. In both cases, the more moderate groups make up the majority of members in the USA.

Contributing to the divide between greens and blues is the impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The events of September 11<sup>th</sup> were initially devastating to the U.S. wing of the anti-corporate globalization movement which crystallized the new blue-green coalition. On the day of the attacks, some power holders (including members of Congress) speculated that anti-corporate globalization activists might be responsible for the attack on the World Trade Center, as the movement had planned a Wall Street action for later that month. While such speculation was quickly put to rest, the emerging hostile political context for domestic dissent was made quite clear. Organizations such as Mobilization for Global Justice, which had served as organizing vehicles for the mass protests associated with the movement, moved quickly to curtail active opposition to neoliberalism. It became quite difficult to appear loyal and patriotic to a government which actively opposed every goal of the movement. When active protest reemerged at the World Economic Forum (held for the first time in NYC for ideological and tactical reasons), protestors were encouraged to be subdued, law abiding, and consequently non-disruptive to corporate business as usual. A complete lack of media coverage was one outcome of the post 9-11 approach. Later protests at the IMF/WB meetings were similarly subdued and non-disruptive. We discuss below how this “anti-globalization lite” version of the current movement has marginalized precisely the wing of the movement whose structural analysis led them to most value and pursue a blue-green alliance. We briefly examine some insights from the world-system perspective in this regard.

Internationally, there are some early developments at coalition building. Union leadership is shifting in the United States. With Sweeney leading the AFL-CIO, the group is attempting to become a social movement again, recruiting new members, undertaking strategic campaigns, and forging alliances with other groups. It is also reaching out internationally, such as in Brazil with new connections between the Sindicato de Petroleiros and Quimicos and the PACE union in the U.S.

The environmental movement has with certain difficulties transformed itself from US-centric to globally-minded in just a decade. Jackie Smith reports that organizations that ally along North-South lines are the global organizations that are most likely to survive and achieve legitimacy (Smith 2001). But there is little evidence of labor-environmental linkages internationally. We will argue these are the key to supporting a longer-term “Seattle Coalition.” Locally, grassroots groups such as those doing environmental justice work *are* reaching out and working with labor and social justice groups. This is true of both the enviro and labor sides.

We will argue that to understand the potential of these two popular movements to create a viable “anti-systemic movement,” we need to examine their ability to work together on tough issues, and to see how they do so at all levels: local, national, and international. Each level presents very different opportunities and pitfalls. In the end, to be effective in this globalizing epoch, the movement has to function globally, but this depends, we will argue, on the quality of relations that are forged at the other levels.

In this paper, we focus on four problems of an enduring blue-green coalition. They are (1) the problem of reciprocation and unbalanced expectations by environmentalists for unionists; (2) the problem of extending short-term marriages of convenience into longer-term coalitions; (3) the debate over whether local or national levels are better places to make these coalitions; and (4) the class issue. By class issue, we mean that these two movements come from different class cultures and sets of structural interests, raising conflicting identities, styles of interaction, and short- and longer-term needs and desires. Based on these challenges, we propose a series of issues that we believe must be addressed for the blue-green alliance to move forward, which we believe it can. We begin with a brief historical review of the social origins and interactions between the movements.

## 2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT<sup>3</sup>

There is a long history of environmental political mobilization in the U.S. that is rooted in labor struggles. While labor has a history of environmental concern, mainstream U.S. environmentalism has little history of direct involvement in labor concerns, at least prior to the Third Ministerial Meetings of the WTO in Seattle in November of 1999. There are many streams of environmentalism in the U.S., including those originating in upper-class preservation concerns, indus-

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<sup>3</sup>The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Andrew D. Van Alstyne in helping to frame the historical context of the movements.

trial conservation concerns, labor health and safety concerns, civil rights concerns, and many others. In terms of the real and potential labor-environmentalist coalition, these separate histories have produced both obstacles to, and opportunities for various types of blue-green coalitions. At the heart of the obstacles to coalition formation lies the ever-widening class divide which has lead labor and mainstream environmentalists to operate on different conceptualizations of “environment”, to form different analyses of power and structure, and make different choices in political tactics and strategies. A brief examination of these divergent environmental histories helps to illuminate the origin of current conflicts between potentially powerful coalition partners.

### Elite Conservation and Preservation

Economic and leisure issues spawned upper-class interest in environmental protection. Up until the mid-1800s, the environment did not exist as an issue on the American political agenda. It was only when the finite nature of environmental resources for industrial exploitation became obvious that conservation began to emerge as an issue for some Americans. The industrial leaders who did begin to promote mildly conservationist thought did not do so in response to the public health threats stemming from air and water pollution. Instead, they were concerned about access to key economic resources that were growing scarce, hence threatening future profitability (Hays 1980). The logic that emerged from the limited environmental actions of wealthy and powerful individuals clearly dictated that economic affairs trumped concerns in other areas of human life (Schnaiberg and Gould 2000).

Other economically privileged groups became concerned about pollution when recreational areas they used began to suffer from environmental degradation. Polluted air and water could reduce fish and game prospects. Many of these original environmentalists emerged from private hunting and fishing clubs, and sought to preserve natural areas for elite recreation (Dowie 1995). At the same time that the wealthy fought to protect wilderness areas from depletion and pollution, they also sought to exclude poor and non-white citizens (Dowie 1995). This helped to set up an environmental conflict between some segments of the working class and the upper class.

### Urban and Labor Environmentalism

Contemporaneously with elite conservation emerged an urban public health movement focused in part on the negative ecological effects of industrialization on the lower and working classes. This “municipal housekeeping” movement, lead primarily by women such as Jane Adams and Florence Kelley, sought to remediate urban air and water pollution that disproportionately impacted the health of

the poor (Foster 1999). These public health related environmental concerns were well integrated with a larger political agenda aimed at improving the living conditions of industrial workers and the unemployed. The demands of these activists would shortly be echoed by those of organized labor, which initially sought to reduce workers exposure to hazardous pollution within the workplace, but eventually expanded to address industrial emissions outside the workplace where the health of workers and their families were disproportionately placed at risk.

Early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the champions of child labor laws were actively pursuing anti-smoke and clean water ordinances, drawing the connections between worker exploitation and ecological degradation. Both issues required a critical analysis of corporate power and the activation of democratic processes to curtail industrial abuses. Both worker rights and ecological responsibility were fiercely opposed by corporate leaders, many of whom enjoyed the elite recreation domains established by the conservationists and preservationists. Interestingly, throughout the early and mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, concessions to labor on wages and benefits appeared to have bought some labor silence on many of the environmental health and safety concerns that were central in the early U.S. labor movement. Nevertheless, steelworkers demanded investigation of deadly air inversions in 1948. The United Auto Workers prioritized worker safety and health issues prior to World War II, and opposed breeder reactor construction in the post-World War II period. A Gas, Coke and Chemical workers local made important contributions to the effort to place strontium 90 contamination on the public agenda. In 1967 the United Auto Workers created a Conservation and Resource Development Department. In 1970 UAW locals produced roughly 750 environmental protection demands, many of which focused beyond in-plant exposure issues. In fact, throughout the 1970s, organized labor consistently placed environmental and health issues on the negotiating agenda across a wide range of industries.

However, the spate of environmental legislation in the 1960s and 1970s combined with the corporate strategy of moving union jobs to non-union locations nationally and transnationally, allowed industrial leaders and their political clients to increasingly pin job losses on environmentalist agendas, effectively driving a wedge between groups that shared many concerns (Kazis and Grossman 1991). While this strategy was largely rejected by unions prior to 1974, the oil price spikes that followed provided more effective grist for the corporate argument. What greens and blues had shared was a critique of corporate power. Finding a common enemy may be the key to successful coalition formation, thus it became a necessary corporate political strategy to pit these groups against each other to both divide and conquer opposition to corporate power and deflect attention from the corporate abandonment of the U.S. economy. While simultaneously

launching a lobbying-legislative assault on organized labor, corporations chose to employ the tactic of projected job losses in their propaganda campaigns against new environmental regulation. In the midst of the debates on the 1977 Clean Water Act amendments, Ford Motor Company released a study stating that new fuel economy standards would result in the lay-off of 75,000 auto workers. These job blackmail studies were quickly picked up by the news media and echoed by studies produced by corporate dominated think tanks. By the late 1970s many unions had reversed their positions on environmental protection. However, siding with corporate elites in the post-oil crises economy did not buy unions much good will among corporate decision-makers. By 1981 the anti-environmental union-busting regime of Ronald Reagan was launching a full-scale assault on U.S. workers and the environment. Having seen in the 1980s that massive job loss, wage stagnation, benefits give backs and union busting are fully consistent with accelerated ecological destruction, by the 1990s union leaders and the rank and file had begun to return to a more activist stance opposing corporate power. The painful lessons of the 1980s made the emergence of a green-blue coalition in the 1990s possible. When critical analysis of trade liberalization regimes revealed the dual threat of massive job loss and greatly accelerated environmental destruction, the stage was set for a convergence of green and blue interests in Seattle (Kazis and Grossman 1991)

Thus, a lower and working class environmental activism rooted in public health concerns emerged separately, but simultaneously with, upper class conservationism and preservationism rooted in economic and leisure concerns. This urban environmental agenda differed from the upper class movement by incorporating people into its definition of the environment. Whereas the wealthy were concerned with "wilderness" areas that were needed for economic or recreational exploitation, the urban environmental movement focused upon the effects of the environment on the day-to-day lives of people who lived within a particular area.

### **Mainstream Environmentalism**

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a mainstream, national ecology movement emerged in the US, rooted in the new suburban middle class. This movement drew upon earlier conservation and preservation oriented social movements that grew out of upper class concerns and experiences, and swelled the ranks of earlier conservation and preservation groups as well as spawning new movement organizations. In a sense this movement sought to extend concerns for protection of the environmental amenities that made suburban living attractive to a more global set of ecological concerns (Hurley 1995). The mainstream U.S. ecology movement combined an awareness of the earth as a finite and fragile biosphere

with a moral obligation of ecological stewardship. However, it failed to identify or address the unequal distribution of ecological costs and benefits by race and class. This movement placed broad environmental issues such as municipal waste, population, pollution, and extinction on the U.S. political agenda. At the same time, it largely ignored the impacts that specific local environmental disruptions had on peoples' lives and health.

Working class environmentalism stemmed from other issues and addressed other environmental concerns. Laborers did not articulate their displeasure in terms of "the environment," *per se*. Instead, working and living conditions were seen as part of a general threat to the workers' (and their families') well being. Workers addressed pollution issues precisely because they suffered from direct exposure at work and home, since they tended to live downwind/downstream of the direct release of poisons. Additionally, workers whose outdoor recreational activities were undermined by industrial effluent lead calls for environmental remediation (Gould 1991).

### **Environmental Justice and Anti-Toxics Movements**

As the civil rights movement expanded its focus beyond traditional segregation and political rights issues, a new stream of U.S. environmental activism emerged. By defining access to a safe and healthy environment as a basic citizenship right, and noting the disproportionate share of the ecological burden of industrialism borne by communities of color, environmental concerns came to be framed as civil rights issues. By the early 1980's, a distinct environmental justice movement emerged demanding equal environmental protection for communities of color. This environmental justice movement is an extension of the civil rights movement, and one that has challenged mainstream environmental activists to integrate social justice concerns in the environmental agenda (Bullard 1990; Bryant and Mohai 1992).

The environmental justice movement emerged simultaneously, and in dialogue with an anti-toxics movement, rooted in white working class communities. The anti-toxics movement developed out of local contamination episodes such as that at Love Canal, New York (Levine 1982). Like the labor and environmental justice movements, the anti-toxics movement is rooted in public health concerns (Brown and Mikkelsen 1990). Here the focus is on disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards as a result of socioeconomic class. Like the environmental justice movement, the anti-toxics movement seeks to move the distributional dimensions of environmental contamination and remediation to the forefront of the environmentalist agenda, thus challenging mainstream environmental movement organizations (Szasz 1994). These locally organized environmental groups have sometimes employed the civil disobedience and direct action tactics used

effectively by civil rights organizations and organized labor in earlier struggles, drawing on a tradition of working class political activism.

## **3. PROBLEMS AND PROMISE IN THE COALITION**

### **Coalition-Building in the Social Movements Literature**

Social movement scholars analyze coalition building and coalition success. Under what conditions do social movement organizations form coalitions? This question necessarily precedes the question of whether coalitions succeed in creating social change. While little empirical work has addressed this question, the literature suggests that alliances, in general, contribute to greater chances for achieving political goals from state and/or industry. However, forming a coalition is no easy task. A number of conditions at the political, organizational, and inter-organization level must come together to make it work.

Whether or not coalitions form depends largely on the external political environment. Analyses of peace, pro-life, and labor-community movements, for examples, suggest that coalitions are more likely to form when there is a political threat or a political opportunity, not under "business-as-usual" conditions (Estabrook et al 2000; Hathaway and Meyer 1993/4; Staggenborg 1986). In many of the recent labor-environment cases, external events precipitated attempts at coalition building; for example political threats (a lock out at a BASF plant in Geismer, Louisiana) and political opportunities (the Kyoto Protocol). Estabrook et al (2000: 143) suggest that the group that is better organized and that has the most to lose or gain typically spearheads the coalition building.

At the organizational level, the two greatest obstacles to coalition formation are limited resources and differing ideologies (Hathaway and Meyer 1993/4: 160). For an organization to consider becoming a coalition partner, it first must be able to maintain itself, in terms of both members and funds. If an organization is losing members, it must focus on its own survival. For example, "The 1980s brought an anti-union president, corporate union-busting and concession demands, recession, and job flight overseas. Concerned with their own survival, many unions saw environmental issues as luxuries" (Moberg 1999: 3). While the 1980s characterized a serious threat, an ideal political condition for coalitions to form, the organizational needs of unions during that time made coalition building difficult.

In other social movements, individual organizations are often competing for the same group of members and funds. For example, peace movement organizations that might consider working together draw members from the same sources and must essentially compete with each other. This is less of a problem for labor-environmental coalitions since the two movements have historically had differ-

ent membership bases. Nonetheless, organizational resources are limited and coalition building requires staff time to manage communication and to create and hold together networks. This takes away from organizations' other work. Some of the leaders in labor-environmental organizations are very aware of this. For example, Friends of the Earth has an on-line guide for organizing complete with a section on building coalitions. It notes, "Building a coalition can increase the impact of an individual organization's efforts. There are also disadvantages... Being a member of a coalition can divert time and resources from your other work. Frequently, compromises have to be made... Disputes over money and staff time might occur... Sometimes it is easier to form an ad-hoc alliance that rallies behind a campaign's goals, but takes no further positions... An assemblage of like-minded groups with even less encumbrance (and less influence) is a network where members work toward common goals and sometimes rally behind a specific event or short-term goal" (Friends of the Earth, n.d.).

Another challenge to coalition building is that potentially allied organizations must have shared, or at least overlapping ideologies. This is a difficulty for the organizations in labor-environment coalitions, especially for mainstream groups. As Sierra Club participants express in a series of quotes in the following section, dues paying members and corporate donors may not agree with "radical" actions of coalition partners. Coalitions between labor unions and environmental justice organizations may be less plagued by ideological differences, but labor representatives and members may feel uncomfortable with the focus of the environmental justice movement on race.

A final piece of the coalition-formation puzzle is the work that must be done between organizations. McAdam (1982) and others have documented the importance of pre-existing networks for the mobilization of social movements. Fred Rose's (2000) work on coalitions among the peace, labor, and environmental movements has argued that bridge builders, "people who are comfortable and competent to act within diverse social [classes]" (167) are critical for the development of coalitions. These individuals understand the positions of both groups. Rose argues that the labor and environmental movements have different class bases that result in different organizational cultures. Labor organizations operate in a hierarchical model that is goal-oriented whereas environmentalists and peace organizations operate in a consensus model that is process-oriented. As a result, individuals in these groups have difficulty communicating. Bridge-builders ease the communications between these two classes/styles.

New social movement theorists argue that movements such as the peace, feminist, and ecology movements are beyond class and that people relate to and bond on the basis of identity and shared values. To the contrary, we would argue, in line with Rose's reasoning, that these are class-based movements that have

shielded the class differences with "identity or culture." What the new social movement theorists consider unifying to individuals based on "identity" needs to be examined as a "class-based" identity.<sup>4</sup>

For some organizations, the political timing, organizational resources, overlapping ideologies and successful communication come together to form coalitions. Whether or not coalitions are short-lived or durable depends on external and internal factors. Speaking of the pro-life movement, Suzanne Staggenborg argues,

Once exceptional environmental conditions subside, ideological conflicts and the organizational maintenance needs of individual movement organizations are likely to cause conflicts within coalitions which may lead to their dissolution. However, such tensions can be alleviated... First, if coalitions can be maintained without forming a formal coalition organization... resource strains... can be minimized. If a coalition organization is necessary, the coalition is more likely to succeed if external funding from foundations or other sources can be secured... (Staggenborg 1986: 388).

Social movement organizations are attentive to the tensions that Staggenborg outlines. Some, like Friends of the Earth, suggest forming temporary alliances or flexible "networks" instead of coalitions. Other organizations are taking the long-term view and creating umbrella coalition organizations. The Just Transition Alliance, a coalition organization discussed in the final section of the paper, succeeded in attaining foundation funding to foster its work in building coalitions between labor, environmental justice groups, and community associations.

In looking at the globalization of movements, social movement scholars have demonstrated that transnational movements, movements with centers in more than one country, are often very effective at changing states' behaviors. Nation states appear to be vulnerable to movement campaigns that work at the level of "global civil society" (Lipschutz 1996). There are numerous examples of national-level environmental campaigns succeeding when the campaign becomes internationalized; for example the creation of extractive reserves in Brazil (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and the success of the anti-dam movement in Brazil (Rothman and Oliver 1999). In both cases, when movement activists from Brazil joined forces with Northern movement organizations, the Brazilian government responded. In these examples, the main strategy was for Northern NGOs to exert leverage

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<sup>4</sup> While much of the analysis of coalitions take a rational approach to political interests following resource mobilization theory (i.e. organizations maximize interests based on analysis of costs and benefits), Rose and others add an important dimension by pointing out that interpretation plays a large role in making choices.

on international actors, such as the United States Appropriation Committee, the Inter American Development Bank, and the World Bank, who then played a role in the Brazilian government's decision-making. Similar cases have been made in regard to the international human rights movement (Brysk 1993, Sikkink 1993).

Such coalitions or alliances raise important questions for world-system research and theory. First, we need to remain aware of the wide range of reformist and revolutionary ideologies within these alliances, and their differing campaign targets (the reform or abolition of global institutions and corporations or simply the push for more governmental protections against the negative impacts of globalization). This range suggests that lumping them all as "Anti-Globalization" is to commit a potentially monumental error, which may lead to our misjudging their durability, intent, and likely direction. Similarly, the mistake by some world-system scholars of lumping such groups within the category of "anti-systemic movements" risks these same errors. World-System research therefore needs to pay close attention to social movement theory and the empirics of the current evolution of these movements. Leslie Sklair forcefully argues for this attention to new social movements, saying flatly that "globalizing capitalism has all but defeated labor" (Sklair 2000). Because of the ability of international companies to shift production or sourcing from any particular factory, strikes by labor unions are only capable of being an "irritation than a real weapon of labour against capital" (2000: 345–6). Sklair goes on to argue that any struggle against globalizing capitalism must therefore focus on subverting consumption rather than production. And he says, more people are likely to join that struggle for environmental than for anti-corporate globalization reasons, and for local rather than global reasons. This suggests the importance of alliances and coalitions across ideologies and scales, and attention to their frequent difficulties.

### Coalition and Reciprocation

The question of a blue-green coalition must then be framed in terms of what streams of U.S. environmentalism offer the greatest potential for a sustainable coalition with organized labor. As structured class interests make upper class environmentalism largely incompatible with labor goals of increased job security, wages, benefits, working conditions and community health, perhaps the most viable long-term coalitions can be formed between labor and the environmental justice/anti-toxics streams of U.S. environmentalism (Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg 1996). At least historically, these groups share similar structural positions in the political economy, similar analyses of power and the responsiveness of elite dominated quasi-democratic governance structures, leading them to similar tactical choices, especially at the local level (Pellow and Park 2002). It is worth remembering that Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated

while actively supporting striking sanitation workers, fusing civil rights, labor and environmental concerns in a people centered struggle.

The hallmark event of the contemporary Green-Blue coalition was the protests at the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting, later dubbed the "Seattle Coalition." However, this hallmark event may not herald the dawning of a new collaborative sustained resistance to corporate power. First, it is worth noting that many greens are latecomers to the critique of trade liberalization. Greens were far more split over support for NAFTA than was organized labor (Hogenboom 1998; Roberts and Thanos 2003). Second, while blues and greens protested together, it is not at all clear that they protested for similar reasons. Having a common enemy in corporate devised trade liberalization initiatives is a positive step toward coalition. But greens and blues would have protested without each other, for different reasons. It is not clear that blues protested environmental threats and greens protested union busting and job loss.

A confluence of interests on specific issues is not the same as a commitment to reciprocal mobilization in support of the key issues of coalition partners. On this score, blues may in fact have a *stronger* record of reciprocation. While labor participation in environmental causes has been fairly common, especially at the local level, environmentalists have not been terribly visible in support of labor causes. Without green opposition to plant closings, downsizing, benefits take backs, and wage stagnation, one can hardly expect blue support for alternative energy initiatives, wilderness preservation and endangered species protection, especially when those issues may threaten the economic livelihoods of workers. Unions like the United Brotherhood of Teamsters were chastised by environmentalists for supporting the Bush-Cheney-Enron energy policy, with accusations of abandoning the Seattle coalition. Certainly energy issues are a tough litmus test for truckers. But where is the litmus test for greens? Many argue that the Green Party bears much responsibility for placing the Bush-Cheney administration in office, which is a disastrous outcome for organized labor. In short, greens have been silent on most issues central to organized labor concerns while expecting unflinching support of their environmental agenda. That makes greens a poor coalition partner, unwilling to compromise their agenda to support most labor, or even lend support where the environment is not central to the conflict. Only when greens overtly and actively support labor in its efforts to keep polluting facilities in the U.S., only when they follow words about just transitions and sustainable economies with deeds that produce real employment options, and only when sustainable working landscapes replace wilderness preservation as ecological priorities will greens be actively pursuing and supporting a genuine alliance with organized labor in opposition to corporate power.

## National Versus Local

There are broadly differing opinions on which strategy works better for blue-green coalitions: organizing at the local or the national level. Fred Rose's book *Coalitions Across the Class Divide*, focusing on the case of forestry, argues that local coalitions are the most likely and promising. There are a series of examples of environmentalists reaching out to their local neighbors in striking factories or other sectors to achieve important local goals.

In Louisiana in the mid-1980s, BASF chemicals locked out its workers from the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (Minchin 2003). Facing a strike which dragged on for months and then years, the workers then started looking for ways to create pressure on the firm to negotiate with them. They discovered several environmental and human rights issues and pressed them locally, in their North America office in New Jersey, and in BASF headquarters in Germany. The OCAW set up the Labor Neighbor project to work with local environmental justice groups in the famed "cancer alley" between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. The project has had lasting impacts on the labor and environmental movement in the state (Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss 2001, Minchin 2003).

On the other hand, Brian Obach (1999, 2000) argues that coalitions can be more effectively made on the national level, in Washington DC, by union and environmental staff members, who are living very similar lives. Supporting his argument is the idea that staffers often have broader knowledge of issues than local membership, and may be able to think beyond the rough "transition" times if some jobs will have to be eliminated for the environmental good. Obach argues that these staffers in DC are in overlapping social circles, share other affinities, support each other in lobbying, and so on. They may also share similar class status.

An argument can be made here that local coalitions are not so easy as is suggested by Rose's work, and as is often true, we lack documentation of negative cases. Local environmentalists may have a certain squeamishness when it comes to such alliances. Here are some revealing statements from a Sierra Club listserver in one of our communities, with identifiers removed for confidentiality. These also illustrate the lack of overlapping ideologies:

"Without being adequately informed, many view these 'anti' issues as being nothing but radical extremist positions. When the Sierra Club aligns too closely with what are viewed as 'radicals,' or issues that are larger than many of it's membership can grapple with, it loses environmental activists (and even supporters)."

"Some valid points however that this organization needs to be careful of is to not become too involved in the 'social environmental' movement. The radicalization of environmental issues by combining pure environmental issues with

social changes (general leaning to a socialistic philosophy or anti-capitalistic, anti establishment view) has given the entire environmental movement a bad name to many middle of the road and right wing members of our society."

"If the purpose is to get local environmental issues solved it needs broad support and pragmatic solutions and not turn off potential supporters because of the wrong (political view point) reasons. A pure environmental approach on local or state issues will work best. Even the most narrow minded folks will support environmental issues if their immediate houses, neighborhoods etc. are threatened by development or other intrusive environmental issues."

## The Class Divide

The divergent foci and origins of the environmentalism of the working class and the upper and middle class dominated mainstream environmental organizations presents major obstacles to the emergence of a successful blue-green coalition. Labor environmentalism has always been rooted in concern for the health and well being of people. This stems from the necessity of struggle to maintain health and well being at the lower ranks of the social stratification hierarchy. Much of mainstream environmentalism is rooted in concern for "wilderness" preservation and the health and well being of ecosystems and non-human species. Because their socioeconomic class position makes maintenance of their own health and well being less problematic, many environmentalists are structurally more free to focus on more abstract and distant concerns.

What this implies is that the problem of finding common ground between the concerns of labor and those of environmentalists may not be a lack of working class environmentalism. More likely, the difficulty arises from the gap between two distinct forms of environmentalism; an anthropocentric environmentalism among those less economically secure, and a biocentric conceptualization of environmentalism more common among those who are relieved of more immediate survival concerns. Greens therefore may not need to infuse labor with environmental consciousness as much as they need to recognize an environmentalism that is already present, but in some ways different from their own.

Forging a lasting coalition between blues and mainstream greens will require that green organizations place the environmental health of people more centrally in their ideological constructs. Similarly, blues will need to recognize the necessity of preserving ecosystemic health to maintain human health and sustainable employment. Unfortunately, the core funding constituency (members and foundations) for most mainstream green organizations is firmly committed to more traditional preservation and conservation issues as a result of class position and the historical origins of many of these organizations. Mainstream green leadership can ill afford to alienate more economically privileged funding members by

emphasizing environmental justice and public health concerns over the preservation of favored species and vistas (see Brulle 2000). In this instance, greens and blues are not competing over limited resources, as is the problem in other social movement coalitions. Instead, aligning with each other threatens their existing sources of resources.

The structural difficulties stemming from the class positions of funding members of mainstream green organizations are numerous. Many of the members of the boards of directors of mainstream green organizations are in fact corporate executives (Dowie 1995). Funding members are often also corporate shareholders whose ability and willingness to provide funding to green organizations is largely dependent on the returns of their corporate investments. Corporate downsizing, mass lay-offs, relocating facilities offshore and other cost-cutting measures usually provide returns to shareholders in increased stock values. Supporting labor in efforts to prevent corporations from downsizing and relocating means directly opposing their own economic interests, at least as commonly conceived in the short-term. For labor this means they are asked to forge political alliances with their traditional political adversaries.

Mainstream green leaders are then faced with a choice between potential organizational contraction in terms of both membership and funding, or a continued alienation from organized labor. Only if mainstream green organizations can be convinced that they cannot win the important environmental political battles of the 21<sup>st</sup> century without the support of labor and the working class would such a trade off be possible. Alternatively and more likely, a blue-green alliance with the environmental justice and anti-toxics movements present fewer ideological obstacles, as the people-centered environmentalism, structural position, and origins of these groups are closer to those of organized labor than they are to those of the mainstream green organizations. In many ways the tensions between labor and mainstream greens echo the tensions between the environmental justice movement and mainstream greens. That the environmental justice movement has had only limited success in forging a lasting alliance with many mainstream green organizations does not bode well for the potential that those organizations will shift foci to accommodate an alliance with labor.

### 9-11 and Anti-Globalization Lite

In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the “anti-globalization” movement has shifted strategies to not appear unpatriotic. In part, this anti-corporate globalization movement “lite” represents a reasonable short-term adjustment to a unique political crisis. All forms of domestic dissent since 9-11 have simultaneously been more repressed by an increasingly authoritarian state, as well as self-policed by activists afraid of having their cause

viewed as unpatriotic. All dissent runs the risk of being cast as treason in times of political crisis. However, the combination of state repression and movement self-policing may have severe long-term consequences for the fate of the movement and its blue-green coalition.

Conservatizing the rhetoric and tactics of the movement has served to marginalize the more “radical” elements within it which have traditionally promoted the clearest structural critique of neo-liberalism. And it has been these more radical anti-captialist elements within the movement which have championed the significance of sustaining a strong coalition between organized labor and environmentalists, drawing the underlying unity of these groups’ interests from the structural analysis. So again/still in 2004, those environmentalists arguing for the need for coalition with labor are viewed by mainstream greens as “radicals.” Those within the labor movement rejecting the jobs vs. environment frame are similarly viewed as more radical within labor circles. The post-9-11 conservatization of U.S. movement politics has served to marginalize those elements within their respective movements, and within the anti-corporate globalization movement, as well. The result has been that efforts to rebuild and sustain a blue-green coalition which challenges the current global development trajectory have been weakened to the point of near invisibility. The dual threat of Bush-Cheney divide and conquer strategies and post-9-11 movement self-policing has made the climate for a sustained blue-green coalition far more problematic than it had been at the WTO protests in November of 1999.

### 4. PROPOSALS FOR ACTION AND RESEARCH: THE ROLE OF THE “BIG 10”

Will mainstream “Big 10” environmental groups be interested in these long-term coalitions that force them to pay real attention to the needs of workers? It would be too easy to summarily dismiss this group, but it is in fact deeply split in this regard. More conservative groups like the National Wildlife Federation, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Nature Conservancy *appear to have* all been uninterested in such coalitions. On the other end of this spectrum, some have already said yes, including the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth. The proof, of course, will be in their long-term commitment to them, especially if they start losing members for the reasons mentioned in the Sierra emails quoted above. The Sierra Club ran a major piece “Green + Blue = Powerful Alliance” in its activist newsletter *The Planet* in June 2002.

The piece appears to be the national staff attempting to educate local activists and encourage them to consider and develop these coalitions. “Developing relationships with unions can be tricky,” the piece reads, “Who do you talk to? ...The best way to get access is through another labor leader...Face time mat-

ters. Don't just e-mail them or phone them" (Sierra Club 2002). At the bottom of the article is a notice that "Sierra Club staff are represented by two unions..." one a UAW affiliate and the other the John Muir Local 100. It concludes with the union label: "The Planet is printed by Howard Quinn, a union printer." So they can say that "working with union labor isn't just something the Sierra Club does outside the Club." Although FOE-U.S. President Brent Blackwelder reported to us on decades of specific issues on which his group had worked with unions (personal communication, March 2002), we have seen nothing like Sierra's high-profile position in the other mainstream environmental groups.

Another layer of the question, then, is whether the different levels and factions within these environmental and labor organizations will be interested in doing the difficult work of developing and sustaining these coalitions. Within the Sierra Club there are already many factions, including those who work on and care most about preservation issues, like the "Stop Commercial Logging" campaign for National Forests and other rural, "green" issues. On the other hand, the club has undergone some changes to boost its presence and legitimacy on the environmental justice and toxics issue, including hiring staffers and committing to fundraising on the issue at its 2000 annual meeting of the Board of Directors. The meeting, held in New Orleans, included a Toxic Tour and press conference at environmental justice sites along the river. They also held their 2001 annual meeting at the Mexican border, looking largely at urban environmental issues and justice. But if one were to do a survey one would probably find a fairly deep split between green and brown agenda factions among the club's staff, directors, volunteers, and the mass of non-active members. The green faction would probably be much larger. On environmental justice, the national staff appears to have been "slapped" by environmental justice groups for excluding minorities in their agendas and hiring, and are now aware of the difficulty of moving forward without people of color in their staff and in their projects. We are arguing that the same should now be said about labor: the environmental movement needs to pay them mind. So now the question is whether people of collar-color will be paid mind. There is some important overlap between environmentalists and workers, but because of the sometimes racist history of unions, minorities and unions are not the same thing.

### Going in New Directions Together: Just Transition

What might the future hold for joint labor-environment actions? One idea that has arisen from blue-green dialogue is the concept of a "just transition" to a more sustainable economy. According to the Public Health Institute, a leader in promoting the just transition,

"Just transition is a process to ameliorate the conflict between jobs and the environment. It brings organized labor, the traditional environmental community and the people of color environmental justice movement together to develop policies and relationships to avert clashes. Through a process of dialogue and common projects these groups are defining a policy of Just Transition that calls for financing a fair and equitable transition for workers and communities in environmentally sensitive industries as we necessarily move forwards towards more sustainable production." <http://www.justtransition.org>

Two parts of this characterization of just transition are key to its potential success. First is the inclusion of both the "traditional environmental community" and the "environmental justice community," which recognizes that these two groups of environmentalists have different interests. The second important point is the emphasis on an *equitable* transition for workers. Transition to greater environmental sustainability, be it through environmental regulations, new technologies, changing production processes, or some other methods, are going to have economic costs and benefits. While the public will benefit from the environmental changes, workers should not pay all of the costs. The just transition concept assures that if there's going to be a green transition, the costs should be shared.

Thinkers in the just transition movement consciously attempt to bypass industry's "jobs vs. environment" framing that can divide and conquer labor and environmentalists (Young 1998:1). Organizations supporting just transition propose a sort of GI Bill for workers, or perhaps more aptly, a "Superfund" for workers (Moberg 1999: 4). This fund would be generated through taxes on toxic-related products that would be used to support workers (unemployment insurance, retraining) whose jobs are lost because of environmental regulations and/or transitions to environmentally friendly production process.

Leaders in the just transition movement have come mostly from labor. A key organization has been the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (now joined with paper workers and called the PACE International Union). This group has made connections with the "public health" side of environmentalism, and some ties with the environmental justice side. The Public Health Institute, a non-profit educational organization with ties to the environmental justice movement, has facilitated education and dialogue around just transition.

While a "Just Transition G.I. Bill" is still a ways off, just transition advocates are building alliances at the local level. The Just Transition Alliance (JTA) is a national alliance with a number of projects bringing together environmental justice organizations and labor unions for education, training and organizing. For example, in Rillito, Arizona, JTA worked with PACE Local 8-296 workers at Arizona Portland Cement (APC), the local community, and an environmental

justice group (Tucsonians for a Clean Environment). Workers had not had a contract for four years. People living in the community were suffering from the effects of air pollution. With the help of educational workshops held by JTA, the union now has a new contract and the company was fined \$82 thousand for nickel and cobalt air releases (Just Transition Alliance 2002). Other important groups include the Alliance for Sustainable Jobs and the Environment and the Blue-Green Working Group. JTA is a coalition organization supported by foundations, including Ford and Jessie Smith Noyes. The successful formation of umbrella groups like this is considered to be one of the essential components to coalition success (Staggenborg 1986).

At the national level, there are also promising developments. In February 2002, the Center for a Sustainable Economy and the Economic Policy Institute produced a report, "Clean Energy and Jobs: A Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change," that forecasted the effects of proposed policies for a "just transition;" policies designed to promote energy efficiency, decrease carbon dioxide emission, tax energy use, and provide assistance to dislocated workers. The modeling suggests that these policies would have the desired effect (increase efficiency, decrease pollution, and generate sufficient taxes to aid workers). Environmentalists and labor unions endorsed the report, including the Sierra Club and Service Employees International Union (Hoerner and Phelps 2002).

### Whither the Blue-Green Coalition?

The 9-11 attacks resulted in both state and movement curtailment of active dissent in the U.S. at a time when corporate libertarianism and neo-liberalism became insurgent under an ideologically driven corporate dominated federal regime. While an emergent anti-war movement may help to re-legitimize overt political dissent, it has yet to do so. Labor and environmental movements, responding to the growing authoritarianism of the state, chose to marginalize red greens and red blues, those elements within each movement with the deepest and most coherent structural critique of the current global development trajectory. Those greens with an affinity for labor struggles have often been marginalized so that environmentalism can be presented as more acceptable to corporate libertarian power holders and an American public rallying around those power holders in time of crisis. Those blues who reject the jobs vs. quality of life tactics of capital and its client state have been similarly sometimes marginalized as union leaders seek common ground with capital and an anti-union administration. We would argue that it is precisely those elements within each movement that represent the potential for lasting coalition. As both labor and environmentalism conservatize, they move ideologically further away from an analysis that would illuminate their confluence of interests, and ground is lost in the effort to rebuild

a blue-green coalition. As "anti-systemic" critiques are more easily cast as anti-American in the post-9-11 political climate, each movement has drifted further away from an ideological basis for collaborative effort. The case of blue-green alliances and non-alliances could be seen as an object lesson in the difficulty of building and sustaining potent and durable anti-systemic movements.

What is the solution to make these coalitions more sustainable? We certainly don't have an answer to make the problems we've identified go away magically. There will be difficulties between national and local levels of organizations, and even factionalism at each level. It may be necessary for smaller, new organizations to lead the way: we see promising efforts like the Climate Justice and Just Transition movements, being built by labor unions and/or Global Exchange and Corporate Watch using the U.S. Environmental Justice movement as something of a model and base. New coalitions with some of the bigger groups like the Sierra Club and FOE look promising. We believe for these coalitions to be sustainable that greens will have to be put to standards as tough as blues.

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
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#### ABSTRACT

The anti-globalization movement is resolutely anti-imperialist, and increasingly says so. It works on issues of economic, political, and cultural justice and autonomy of indigenous people and the Global South, as well as workers and oppressed people in the Global North. Despite this good work, the North American segment of the movement has been harshly criticized by anti-racists within and outside the movement. This paper examines the anti-racist discourse about the movement. It begins with a comprehensive survey of the data available on these issues. The following analysis pursues a number of dimensions, finding that movement “framing” by activists as well as outsiders has played a powerful role in alienating anti-racists from the anti-globalization movement, that

anti-racists are not satisfied by the way in which the anti-globalization movement connects the global and the local, that it is organizing strategy (neither goals nor tactics) that is often a source of conflict, that this strategic difference reflects assumptions of how empowerment happens and of subjectivities of proto-activists, that the anti-globalization movement’s assumptions are rooted in a white cultural individualism, and that this individualism also explains why countercultural politics are often experienced as exclusionary by activists of colour. The paper concludes by suggesting the use of Massimo deAngelis’ re-articulation of the meanings and practices of responsibility and solidarity in the anti-globalization movement.

## HOW CAN ANTI-IMPERIALISM NOT BE ANTI-RACIST? THE NORTH AMERICAN ANTI-GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT

Amory Starr

Shortly after the November 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, that mobilization and the larger anti-globalization movement were criticized by anti-racists. Subsequently, a discourse appeared around issues of whiteness and anti-racism in the movement. This paper describes and analyzes that discourse in the interest of helping activists move forward. Scholars of social movements may also find the analysis useful.

The object of study and source of the data is the discourse of anti-racism/anti-oppression<sup>1</sup> within and addressed to the North American<sup>2</sup> anti-globalization movement. The Colours of Resistance Network has gathered much of this discourse. The statements in this discourse are made by a variety of actors, some of whom position themselves clearly within the movement, others of whom feel drawn to it but also alienated from it, and voices who do not identify with, but lend their criticism to or whose views are adopted for inclusion in the collection of articles posted by the Colours network. It is important to note that the

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<sup>1</sup> Genealogically, anti-oppression is a recent iteration of anti-racist work which adopts a perspective of multiple and intersecting oppressions. Although activists with this view sometimes see themselves as entirely distinct from anti-racist perspectives, for the purposes of this paper anti-oppression is treated within the larger landscape of anti-racism.

<sup>2</sup> The Canadian and US anti-globalization movements share practices but are distinct, as are the two nations’ histories of and discourses on racism. Specific forms of anti-racism have traveled between the US, Britain, and Canada.

discourse under study is not a dialogue. While the anti-racist critiques are easy-to-find and textual, there has been very little *response* from the rest of the anti-globalization movement, and none of that response has taken the form of public texts. To the extent that any response has been documented, it has been captured anecdotally by the anti-racist discourse's texts. In addition to Colours and other public texts, the paper also draws on participant observation at local actions, mass mobilizations, and national-profile trainings.<sup>3</sup>

### THE DISCOURSE: CHRONOLOGY AND CLAIMS

This section first presents a *chronology* of the discourse and then summarizes the *claims* made within the discourse.

Immediately after 30 November 1999 Seattle WTO protests (N30), concerns with neo-fascism were raised. A widely-circulated article by J. Sakai made some outstanding claims: the fascist Far Right went to Seattle to recruit, the anti-WTO movement is nationalist, the anti-WTO movement is composed of the "old middle classes," and the ILWU and other labor unions are "actually fighting the working class."<sup>4</sup> These concerns have largely died out from the discourse the movement has gained legitimacy with the established New Left.

The first important public text was an article by Elizabeth Martinez on N30, which is constantly cited by observers as well as by anti-globalization activists ourselves. It began circulation in December 1999 or January 2000 and a shorter version was eventually published in the Spring 2000 issue of *Colorlines Magazine*.<sup>5</sup> While both versions of the article were far more carefully documented than most

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<sup>3</sup> Actions: Seattle/World Trade Organization (WTO), November 1999; Washington, D.C./IMF-World Bank, April 2000; Los Angeles/Democratic National Convention (DNC), August 2000; Cincinnati/Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), November 2000; Québec City/Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), April 2001; Washington, D.C./anti-war, September 2001; New York City/World Economic Forum (WEF), February 2002; Cancún Mexico/WTO, September 2003; Miami FL/FTAA, November 2003; and Transform Columbus Day 2000, 2001, and 2002 in Denver. The participant-observer's perspective is from what could be called a "rank and file" affinity group which is not privy to the internal workings of the Direct Action Network (DAN), the Colours of Resistance network, or of the host city coordinating committees (with the exception of Denver). Trainings: Ruckus Society 2003, Anti-Racism for Global Justice 2003.

<sup>4</sup> J. Sakai, "Aryan Politics & Fighting the W.T.O.," *Anti-Fascist Forum* n.d.

<sup>5</sup> Elizabeth (Betita) Martinez, 'Where was the Color in Seattle?: Looking for reasons why the Great Battle was so white', circulated on the internet shortly after N30 (original version at <http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvs/Globalism/seattlkecolor.htm>); shorter version published in *Colorlines*, 3.1, Spring 2000.

essays on this issue, the print version was edited in such a way as to eliminate a lot of the more nuanced data.

In both versions, Martinez claims that 5% of the N30 protesters were people of colour. She explores a number of reasons: activists of colour were "unfamiliar" with the WTO and feared being accused of abandoning community issues to protest WTO. The spokespeople included in media coverage leading up to the event were all white. Those activists of colour who did go to the protests were alienated by the culture at the activists' Convergence Center.

The original version contained five paragraphs describing groups of color which did participate, including the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice (SNEEJ) "which embraces 84 organizations primarily of color in the US and Mexico." Had this data been more widely read it would have disrupted the ossification of what is described below as the "Seattle origins" narrative. Also removed from the published version were: a quote from an activist of colour who "originally thought 'the whites will take care of the WTO, I don't need to go'"; a longer discussion of activists' of color reflecting on their experiences of the Convergence, including the quote "It was limiting for people of color to let that one experience affect their whole picture of white activists"; the Coordinator of SNEEJ, Richard Moore's statement that "the white activists were very disciplined"; and the ending quote "We have to work with people who may not know the word 'globalization' but they live globalization." A report from Third Eye Movement was only partly retained in the published version, losing much complexity. In the original version, Third Eye Movement called the experience of the Convergence "culture shock" but also acknowledged they should have spent more time there, and criticized the failure of organizers to fund more people of color to come to the actions but also described gaining new allies and being inspired by the shutdown to use new tactics. The report also gave insight into the specific issues that should have been addressed by anti-WTO activists in order to make more sense to people of color: the prison-industrial complex, conditions of immigrants, and militarization which accompanies globalization projects in the third world.<sup>6</sup> While the original article read as a guideline for improvement, the streamlined version reads simply as documentation that the movement is both all-white and irrelevant to people of color (and indeed it is often cited as evidence of the latter).

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<sup>6</sup> Saga, for Third Eye Movement, "Rap-tivists Storm Seattle: Hip-Hop Youth Battle The World Trade Organization." *Resist Newsletter*. v9 n3, April 2000. <http://www.resistinc.org/newsletter/>

The hour-long IndyMedia film on Seattle, *Showdown in Seattle: Five Days that Shook the WTO*, released in December 1999, already responded to these concerns. In it the vast majority of the talking heads were people of colour and the explanation of the WTO focused on the impacts for third world peoples (rather than on deregulation, environment, or sovereignty issues). The film included segments on the prison industrial complex and on media portrayals of youth of colour which went beyond the immediate project of portraying what happened in Seattle. This emphasis was consistent in the second, September 2000, edition of the film, *This is What Democracy Looks Like*.<sup>7</sup> One of the closing statements in the second film was Vandana Shiva's prediction: "There will be attacks from Democrats and Republicans to ensure that the anti-globalization movement ends up looking like and being a xenophobic movement."

Colin Rajah's article on the Washington D.C. 16 April 2000 mobilizations (A16) became the sister piece to Martinez' Seattle analysis. He quoted activists complaining of "a sea of white" and that "Black and Latino leaders were not even asked to speak at the main events, let alone to really help lead the actions."<sup>8</sup> Another, far less circulated, report on the same event by Robin Hahnel claimed that those involved in A16 organizing made connections with local communities of colour not only by creating "special materials linking corporate sponsored globalization and IMF and World Bank policies to local economic problems like gentrification, job loss, and bank redlining" but also by working in solidarity on a tenants' rights campaign.<sup>9</sup> A key event in the chronology not documented by these writers was the creation of a squat by A16 activists in an African American neighbourhood. Folks from the neighbourhood were angry about the squat because of the increased police presence it brought. Fellow activists critiqued the squatters for setting up a squat without being well-informed about the community. Whether the squat folks were typically or peculiarly clueless was debated.

A few months later, in preparation for protesting the August 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, the Ruckus Society held a training camp near LA. Participants at this camp broke into caucuses in response to challenges from youth of colour, leading to an ongoing crisis within the Ruckus Society about how to address issues of race and oppression in organizing.<sup>10</sup> At the

<sup>7</sup> Independent Media Center Seattle and Big Noise Films, *This Is What Democracy Looks Like*, September 2000, <http://www.thisisdemocracy.org>.

<sup>8</sup> Colin Rajah, 'Globalization and Race at A16 in D.C.', *Colorlines*, 3.3, Fall 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Robin Hahnel, 'Speaking Truth to Power: Speaking Truth to Ourselves', *Z Magazine*, June 2000.

<sup>10</sup> The Ruckus Society refuses to provide documentation or interviews about this process. However, at a 2003 training they mentioned a policy shift from doing week-long action camps held

Convergence Center for the Los Angeles Direct Action Network (DAN-LA) posters on the wall announced "principles of anti-oppression organizing"<sup>11</sup> as well as "mandatory anti-oppression trainings for white folks." Inquiring repeatedly into the context for the posters, I was only informed of two precipitating incidents. (These were: In Seattle some activists had made comments such as "Black people just want to shop" and "people of color aren't interested in direct action." In New York, the Direct Action Network (DAN-NY) had "refused to translate materials into Spanish."<sup>12</sup>) The Friday 18 August debriefing at the Convergence Center captured the divergence between people who felt the action was a success because there were "no major incidents," the protest was mindful of community vulnerabilities, and "kept people safe" and those who felt the actions were "scripted," "elite," that "spontaneous action" was discouraged, that "peaceful" tactics were enforced, and that it resulted in an "internal step backwards."

Colours of Resistance (hereafter 'Colours') was founded around November 2000<sup>13</sup> and has become the most prominent vehicle for anti-racism/anti-oppression organizing in the North American movement. Colours is a grassroots network of people who actively work to develop multiracial, anti-racist politics in

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in rural areas and emphasizing technical skills (climbing, etc.) to doing weekend sessions in urban areas focused on direct action planning and strategy.

<sup>11</sup> (1) Power and privilege play out in our group dynamics and we must continually struggle with how we challenge power and privilege in our practice. (2) We can only identify how power and privilege play out when we are conscious and committed to understanding how racism, sexism, homophobia, and all other forms of oppression affect each one of us. (3) Until we are clearly committed to anti-oppression practice all forms of oppression will continue to divide our movements and weaken our power. (4) Developing an anti-oppression practice is life long work and requires a life long commitment. No single workshop is sufficient for learning to change one's behavior. We are all vulnerable to being oppressive and we need to continuously struggle with these issues. (5) Dialogue and discussion are necessary and we need to learn how to listen non-defensively and communicate respectfully if we are going to have effective anti-oppression practice. Challenge yourself to be honest and open and take risks to address oppression head on."

<sup>12</sup> While it is unreasonable to expect activists to compile comprehensive, systematic empirical studies, the many articles written on the topic provide little documentation of the nature and extent of racist events. Two articles provide some compilation of data. Gabriel Sayegh, 'Redefining Success: White Contradictions in the Anti-Globalization Movement', posted on Colours of Resistance website <http://colours.mahost.org/>, n.d. Sonja Sivesind, 'Combating white supremacy in the anti-globalization movement', posted on Colours of Resistance website <http://colours.mahost.org/>, n.d. Also see Aziz Choudry "Bringing It All Back Home: Anti-globalisation Activism Cannot Ignore Colonial Realities." *ZNet* 3 August, 2001. <http://www.zmag.org/Sustainers/content/2001-08/03choudry.htm>

<sup>13</sup> Colours' website does not provide a founding date. Infoshop.org lists the Colours website as "new on the web" in November 2000. Colours is housed in Montréal.

the movement against global capitalism. Their website gathers documents written from the anti-racism/anti-oppression perspective, some of which are published only on the internet but many of which were circulated prior to Colours posting.<sup>14</sup> A conference called “Colours of Resistance,” but not affiliated with the network, was held in Montréal in March 2001 in preparation for the Québec City protests.

Also in 2000, young white anti-racist organizers founded Anti-Racism for Global Justice (ARGJ). They identified with the anti-globalization movement and embraced the Challenging White Supremacy<sup>15</sup> concepts that “the most effective way to create fundamental social change in the U.S. is by building mass-based, multi-racial grassroots movements led by radical activists of color. We also believe that the major barrier to creating these movements is racism or white supremacy. One way to challenge white supremacy is to do anti-racist training workshops in our own communities.” Challenging White Supremacy was founded in 1993 and both organizations are based in the San Francisco Bay Area in California, U.S. CWS workshops were “designed by a group of white anti-racist organizers” who “believe our special responsibility is to help white social justice activists become principled and effective anti-racist organizers—both to challenge our white privilege and to work for racial justice in all our social justice work.” By 2002, ARGJ had run over 50 four and five hour workshops for over 1600 primarily white social justice activists around the country.<sup>16</sup> ARGJ is part of the Colours network.

At the Québec City FTAA protests in April 2001, elaborate systems of gender and ethnic equity were used at the bilingual spokescouncils and the protests were trilingual. Issues of class came to the forefront as neighbourhood residents who had not agreed to any “action guidelines”<sup>17</sup> joined the protest, some throwing beer and wine bottles across the fence at the occupying forces. The same kinds of issues were raised by Canadian activists of colour as had been raised with regard to Seattle.

In the Summer of 2001, Some Colours affiliates were involved in “Strategic Resistance,” an invitation-only conference for anarchist and anti-authoritarian

<sup>14</sup> <http://colours.mahost.org/>

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.prisonactivist.org/cws/>

<sup>16</sup> <http://cwsworkshop.org/>

<sup>17</sup> Typical “action guidelines” read as follows, from the A16 2000 Washington DC protests: “1. We will use no violence, physical or verbal, towards any person. 2. We will carry no weapons. 3. We will not bring or use any alcohol or illegal drugs. 4. We will not destroy property (excepting barricades erected to prevent us from exercising our First Amendment Rights).”

organizers which focused on anti-oppression organizing. It was held in Los Angeles in August. Two reports on this conference explained that it was useful in helping activists to think about the issues, but neither conveyed specific new concepts or organizing procedures.<sup>18</sup>

After 9/11, the North American movement, with impressive plans for the Fall IMF/World Bank meetings scheduled for end of September, was bewildered. NGOs which had seemed radical in Seattle suddenly fell silent save liberal pro-Arab American statements, isolating the direct action components of the movement which braced for increasing surveillance and harassment under the new anti-terrorism laws. The movement foundered, shrunk, retrenched, and emerged as two embattled and battling movements appearing side by side in New York in February and DC in September 2002. The anti-war/“global justice” mainstream, recommitted to permits and pacifism and an increasingly isolated, paranoid, and ideologically elitist Black Bloc, whose survival (and attempt to keep the idea of direct action alive in the movement while also supporting its own diversity and suffering intense police harassment) was no mean feat.

Approaching the June 2002 G8 meetings in Kananaskis, some anti-oppression organizers were writing “[t]his time we should encourage people NOT to come at all, unless they are from the region’ and instead ‘make principled connections with those people and movements who are already fighting against their oppression, in our own communities.”<sup>19</sup> Interestingly, the Convergence des Luttes Anti-Capitalistes (CLAC, Anti-Capitalist Convergence from Montréal—one of the important groups in the Québec City mobilization) did not provide clear leadership or discussion of these issues in their G8 preparation caravan.<sup>20</sup>

By early 2003, however, the growing legitimacy of the anti-war movement (and the unity between anti-globalization and anti-war forces in Europe and Latin America) enabled North American anti-globalization NGOs to join in

<sup>18</sup> Rahula Janowski & Chris Crass, “Strategic Resistance Against Global Capitalism: lessons from a conference on strategy and anti-racism.” Larry George, “Strategic Resistance Organizing Conference – a look back,” Los Angeles Indymedia, August 21, 2001. <http://www.la.indymedia.org>

<sup>19</sup> Yutaka Dirks, ‘Doing things differently this time: Kananaskis G8 meeting and movement building,’ posted on Colours of Resistance website <http://colours.mahost.org/>, n.d..

<sup>20</sup> When the CLAC caravan came to New York City in April as part of their Anti-G8 Roadshow and Caravan, I was late to the meeting. Concerned by the call “NOT to come,” I asked a number of people who had been present during the day what the caravan’s message was about the Kananaskis meetings. Oddly, no one seemed to have an answer. People directed me to CLAC’s booklet <http://www.tao.ca/~takethecapital/pamphlet.html>, but it also did not present arguments about whether people should attend the protest or not.

wholeheartedly. The combination of anti-war and anti-globalization analysis led to various forms of anti-imperialist analysis throughout the year at the massive February 15 and March 15 anti-war actions, the DC IMF/WB actions in April, the Cancún WTO actions in September, and the Miami FTAA actions in November. The North American anti-globalization movement's frame has developed since 9/11 to become wholeheartedly anti-imperialist, constantly connecting racist militarism with processes of globalization. The anti-globalization movement has a much more coherent analysis of issues, strategy, and tactics than the anti-war movement, and there are many attempts to educate, as well as continuing to move together. Extensive direct action was organized by anti-globalization activists in opposition to the war on Iraq in early 2003; this struggle was particularly rich in the San Francisco Bay Area.

The direct action sectors of the anti-globalization movement have also made national calls for participation in a number of actions since Seattle which make connections between domestic and international manifestations of imperialism. These include: the June 2, 2001 protests of police brutality in Cincinnati, annual Transform Columbus Day protests in Denver, annual November protests intending to shut down the School of the Americas, anti-war protests in DC in September 2001 and October 2002, poverty-alleviation actions of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty,<sup>21</sup> the Latin American Solidarity Coalition actions in DC in April 2003, and the joint calls against the FTAA and the School of the Americas for November 2003.<sup>22</sup>

In the interests of a comprehensive summary of the concerns expressed by the anti-racist discourse on the anti-globalization movement, this section presents each of the distinct claims found in the discourse:<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> "In the autumn of 1990, the founding conference of OCAP took place. After some debate, it set a course for the organization that committed it to mobilizing poor and homeless people to fight back through militant, direct action and rejected notions of basing the organization on methods of consultation and compromise with those in power...As a militant, anti capitalist organization, we reject the notion that we have any common set of interests with those who hold economic and political power. We also reject the rituals of token protest that confine movements to the level of futile moral arguments. We fight to win and are part of a growing force in society that is ready to organize on just that basis." see <http://www.ocap.ca>

<sup>22</sup> The perspectives and experiences of different communities of color are not identical, and may be becoming more uneven. The recent Cancún WTO protests caused Chicano activists to recognize this struggle as their own and as a not-very-white struggle, but did not impact other communities similarly.

<sup>23</sup> Individual citations are not provided for these claims because they have been repeated in many discourse texts and it is difficult to assess the first appearances of each.

- The movement is inadequately diverse.
- When confronted with the lack of diversity in the movement, whites tend to claim that their groups are already open and accessible, or propose to solve the problem by doing "outreach."
- White-dominated organizations have exclusionary practices and when challenged refuse to respond, calling concerns about racism, sexism, etc., "distractions" from more "urgent" work.
- They see race as "subsumed under the 'big tent' of globalization" and not needing to be addressed independently or directly.<sup>24</sup>
- White activists speak, meet, plan, strategize, and organize in culturally-specific ways and are often not open to feedback about how their methods make people of color unwelcome, uncomfortable, or disinterested.<sup>25</sup>
- White activists "fetishize" tactics and ignore strategy, because they don't care about building a long-term grassroots movement.<sup>26</sup>
- Activists who can afford time and money to travel to mass events must be affluent and they protest at low risk because they know that their "white skin privilege" will protect them from police brutality.
- White activists position themselves as the experts and are the visible spokespersons and *de facto* leadership.
- Cultural styles preferred by anti-globalization activists are alienating to people of colour. These include lifestyles, food preferences, intellectual styles, meeting styles, and protest tactics.
- Local communities of colour are put at risk by mass protests operating out of their neighbourhoods.
- Anti-globalization activists do not seem to care about domestic problems faced by people of colour within the US and Canada, continuing a tradition of organizing which ultimately perpetuates white supremacy.

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<sup>24</sup> Daraka Larimore-Hall & Tracie McMillan, "growing pains," *the activist* (Young Democratic Socialists), xxix.1 (Summer 2002): 7–10.

<sup>25</sup> Similar and related criticisms appear around issues of middle-class culture, male domination, and culture of the intelligentsia.

<sup>26</sup> Daraka Larimore-Hall & Tracie McMillan, "growing pains," *the activist* (Young Democratic Socialists), xxix.1 (Summer 2002): 7–10.

- Anti-globalization activists “ignore” and “appropriate” the historic struggles of communities of color and “people in the South.”<sup>27</sup>
- Activism around issues in third world countries is psychologically remote and therefore easier than activism around issues of race at home.
- Privileged activism on behalf of oppressed others is paternalistic and salvific.

Activists with these concerns have also developed proposals for addressing the problems. The following is an attempt at a comprehensive list of each distinct proposal made:

- Anti-globalization organizations should prioritize “anti-oppression” training and organizing techniques.
- “Challenging white supremacy” must be the primary work of movements which seek to challenge globalization.
- Instead of ‘outreach’ and ‘recruiting’ people of colour, activists should question their own organizations, asking “Whose voices are heard? Whose priorities are adopted? Whose knowledge is valued?”<sup>28</sup>
- Rather than creating new projects, anti-globalization activists should go support what people of colour in their town are already working on.
- Activists should be equally or more committed to working on local struggles being waged by people of colour as to international actions.
- People of colour have been fighting globalization for 511 years and therefore are experts who should be looked to for leadership in fighting the current phase of globalization.
- Privileged activists should yield to marginal voices, diverse definitions of radicalism, and alternative ways of organizing.
- More privileged groups in the anti-globalization movement should use their resources to send third and fourth world representatives to international conferences and on speaking tours and to fund local campaigns in communities of colour.

<sup>27</sup> Pari Zutshi in Daraka Larimore-Hall & Tracie McMillan, “growing pains,” *the activist* (Young Democratic Socialists), xxix.1 (Summer 2002): 7–10.

<sup>28</sup> Chris Dixon, “Ten Things to Remember: Anti-Racist Strategies for White Student Radicals.” n.d.

As mentioned in the introduction, responses from the anti-globalization movement have not taken the textual form that the critique itself has taken. Therefore we only know about the responses that the anti-racist critique itself has documented, and we know little to nothing about the extent of these responses. Some of the documented responses are:

- There isn’t time to address issues of racism and sexism.
- Discussion of racism, sexism, etc. is a “distraction” from the work that needs to be done.
- Addressing these issues is simply not necessary or relevant to the larger project of fighting globalization.
- Many people have issues of intense concern but no one has the right to demand that the whole movement stop and do a training in their favorite “single issue.”
- People are whining and should just get to work.
- People concerned with domestic issues of gender and racial equity are reformist or missing the point about a larger threat.

## ANALYSIS

The goal driving this analysis is to enable anti-racist and anti-globalization activists to understand one another’s perspectives. It is critical that anti-globalization activists understand why their anti-imperialist work often fails on anti-racist grounds. At the same time, anti-racist activists may find it useful to re-read some aspects of anti-globalization activism in ways that will aid in communication and collaboration.<sup>29</sup>

### Framed! Conceptualizing Anti-globalization

Many of the anti-racist critiques of the anti-globalization movement hinge on a particular conceptualization of it. This conceptualization (or what in social movements literature is called a “frame”<sup>30</sup>) defines the historical narrative of the

<sup>29</sup> Much of the analysis that follows was performed jointly by Amory Starr and Rachel Luft. The method of analysis used was an intense distillation of perspectives. The version of anti-racism which was used to perform this distillation was not the anti-racism articulated from within the anti-globalization movement, but instead one from outside it, best represented by the influential People’s Institute <http://www.thepeoplesinstitute.org/>, whose analyses were often present in (but not at all completely encompassing of) the anti-racist-anti-globalization discourse. Readers should be aware that references to “anti-racist perspective” below are not descriptive of anti-racist-anti-globalization practice.

<sup>30</sup> Snow, David and Robert Benford. 1988. “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization.” In Klandermas, Kriesi and Tarrow, eds. *International Social Movement Research: From Structure to Action* Vol. 1 pp.197–217.

movement, the key actors, logics, and themes. Frames shape how movements are understood by activists themselves as well as observers. Frames are often contested, and this is certainly the case in the anti-globalization movement.

**512 Year Struggle:** From indigenous and other Global South perspectives globalization is the latest form of colonialism. Vandana Shiva says “The first colonialism lasted 500 years. The second, so-called ‘development,’ lasted 50 years. And this one, ‘free trade,’ lasted only 5 years!”<sup>31</sup> For indigenous people, the anti-globalization struggle has been continuous and virtually uninterrupted.<sup>32</sup> For postcolonial peoples, this latest form originates with the implementation of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s. The World Development Movement’s “States of Unrest” reports trace the anti-globalization movement to the surge of IMF Riots in the Global South: “protests against these institutions and their policies were not limited to privileged ‘students and anarchists’ from rich countries, as some politicians would like us to believe. The report set the European and North American demonstrations into their wider context, showing that they were only one element of a much larger movement rooted in developing countries...”<sup>33</sup> A variety of US groups take this perspective. Peter Hardie of TransAfrica Forum argues that this perspective is particularly relevant to African Americans.

Understanding the political arena as a global one is the best solution to the ongoing plight of African Americans today. We will not solve our employment problem until we understand labor as a global phenomenon, employers as global actors, and much of the wealth in our country (and the world) as the plunder of corporate thieves, rinsed in the blood of Africans and other indigenous peoples... Depressed wages, the increased gap between rich and poor, the sale of the public domain (schools, water and utilities, roads, prisons) to privateers... As corporate wealth and power grow unfettered, Africans throughout the world share a special place of exploitation, regardless of their nationality... We need better and deeper connections to popular movements and organizations in other countries. And there are many such opportunities.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> IFG, International Forum on Globalisation. 1999 (Nov 26 & 27). *Teach In on Economic Globalisation and the Role of the World Trade Organization*. Benaroya Symphony Hall, Seattle Washington.

<sup>32</sup> see Bill Weinberg, *War on the Land: Ecology and Politics in Central America*. 1991: Zed Books, London. Al Gedicks, *The New Resource Wars: Native and Environmental Struggles Against Multinational Corporations* 1998: South End Press, Boston and *Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and Oil Corporations*. 2001: South End Press, Boston.

<sup>33</sup> Jessica Woodroffe and Mark Ellis-Jones, “States of unrest: Resistance to IMF policies in poor countries.” World Development Movement Report, September 2000. and “States of unrest II” at <http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/debt/Unrest2.pdf>.

<sup>34</sup> Peter Hardie, “Apartheid Still Matters: Framing an African-American Internationalism,” *The Black Commentator* September 25, 2003 <http://www.blackcommentator.com/>

“Globalization from below”<sup>35</sup> is the convergence of peoples’ movements in attempts to forge a new hyper-democratic, participatory, and people-centered world system. Its most prominent form is the World Social Forum, which invites all of “civil society” to assert that “Another World Is Possible” and to develop visions for it.<sup>36</sup> Other manifestations are the international organization ATTAC, founded in France, which aims “to put the brakes on most of these machines for creating inequalities between North and South as well as in the heart of the developed countries themselves... [and] to create a democratic space at the global level. It is simply a question of taking back, together, the future of our world”<sup>37</sup> Jubilee and other international movements to repudiate third world debts also represent this perspective. They collectively assert that “Countries of the North owe Third World countries, particularly Africa, a manifold debt: blood debt with slavery; economic debt with colonization, and the looting of human and mineral resources and unequal exchange; ecological debt with the destruction and the looting of its natural resources; social debt (unemployment; mass poverty) and cultural debt (debasing of African civilizations to justify colonization)... Our struggle is similar to those of Seattle, Washington, Prague and Nice.”<sup>38</sup>

**Peoples Global Action (PGA)** is a sector of “globalization from below,” a “non-organization”<sup>39</sup> that emerged from Encuentros hosted by the Zapatistas. PGA’s five hallmarks include “A call to direct action and civil disobedience, support for social movements’ struggles, advocating forms of resistance which maximize respect for life and oppressed peoples’ rights, as well as the construction of

<sup>35</sup> Falk, Richard. 1993. “The Making of Global Citizenship,” pp. 39–50 in *Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order*, edited by J. Brecher, J. B. Childs, and J. Cutler. Boston: South End Press.

<sup>36</sup> The first World Social Forum was held in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul State, Brazil, simultaneous with the meetings of the World Economic Forum in late January, 2001. Approximately 20,000 people participated, including 4,702 delegates representing 117 countries, 2,000 participants in the Youth Camp, and 700 participants in the Indigenous Nations Camp. The second World Social Forum, held again in Porto Alegre in early February, 2002, attracted over 50,000 participants. Its theme, “Another World Is Possible,” has since been taken up in a variety of fora. The third forum doubled in size yet again and fomented regional fora all over the world. The fourth forum was moved to Mumbai, India in 2004.

<sup>37</sup> International ATTAC Platform, adopted December 11–12, 1998, Paris. see <http://www.attac.org>

<sup>38</sup> “The Dakar Declaration for the Total and Unconditional Cancellation of African and Third World Debt” “Dakar 2000: From Resistance to Alternatives” conference that was held in Dakar, Senegal from December 11–17, 2000. at <http://www.50years.org/updates/dakar1.html#MANIFESTO>.

<sup>39</sup> Midnight Notes, *Auroras of the Zapatistas: Local and Global Struggles of the Fourth World War* (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 2001), p. 105.

local alternatives to global capitalism.”<sup>40</sup> Active in the network are the aggressive land occupation movements emerging all over Latin America and also in South Africa, in which urban and rural working classes are together asserting land rights by direct action.<sup>41</sup> Livelihood movements by fisherfolk, forest gatherers, and farmers are asserting Farmers Rights, Rights to Food Sovereignty, Rights to Livelihood through new international alliances and are also taking direct action to protect their economies from corporate predations. The Third PGA Conference was held September 2001, at which more than 150 delegates from organisations of all the continents met in Cochabamba, Bolivia hosted by a federations of peasants and domestic workers. The network has been instrumental in recent “Global Days of Action” such as J18, N30 and has been credited with conceptualizing both the Seattle protests and the international Independent Media Centers <http://www.indymedia.org>.<sup>42</sup> Anarchists who participate in anti-globalization are best be characterized by the PGA frame.

**Northern Convergence:** Anti-globalization is also understood as a re-articulation and new collaboration of existing movements (some decades old) in the Global North such as the anti-roads movements, movements connected with the concepts of “small is beautiful,” “voluntary simplicity,” bioregionalism,<sup>43</sup> the anti-genetic engineering movements, grassroots organic food struggles, movements concerned with child labour, movements against privatization, anti-corporate movements concerned with issues of cultural homogenization (anti-McDonalds, AdBusters, etc.), Central American Solidarity movements, Fair Trade movements, the European and U.S. Jubilee 2000 movement to forgive third world nations’ debts, anti-consumption movements such as Buy Nothing Day, anarchist and other youth movements, and the whole variety of New Social Movements which in Europe have taken the form of Autonomes, Social Centers, and antifa (antifascism). According to George Katsiaficas, not only class is abandoned, but also nationalism: “To the extent they become revolutionary, their international commitment will be to ecology, feminism, racial solidarity, and peace, not to any

<sup>40</sup>. <http://www.agp.org>

<sup>41</sup>. James Petras, “The Rural Landless Workers Movement,” *Z Magazine*. March 2000: 32-36.

<sup>42</sup>. Notes from Nowhere, ed., *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*. 2003: Verso, London.

<sup>43</sup>. E. F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered* (New York Harper & Row, 1973). New York. Wendell Berry, *The Unsettling of America: Culture & Agriculture* (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1977). Duane Elgin, *Voluntary Simplicity: Toward a Way of Life that is Outwardly Simple, Inwardly Rich* (New York: Morrow, 1981). Peter Berg, “Bioregion and Human Location” *All Area* #2, Spring 1983.

nation-state.”<sup>44</sup> The convergence of movements around generalized anti-corporate perspectives and opposition to Free Trade Agreements has expanded their frameworks to multi-issue analyses, new alliances, international solidarity, and more comprehensive perspectives on the meaning of corporate globalization.

**Seattle Origins Narrative:** A popular North American conception of the anti-globalization movement is that it began on November 30, 1999 when a brand new movement coalesced in the streets of Seattle. Those who found themselves joining up had previously only poorly articulated grievances with some aspects of Free Trade Agreements and had hardly expected to find themselves arm in arm, Teamster and Turtle, anarchist and anti-debt campaigner, family farmer and product safety campaigner. Through the cathartic effects of this euphoric experience a new movement was born, which had little conception of the historical struggles underlying it, and credited itself with “giving birth to a new global movement” as it pocketed the greetings and congratulations coming from people around the world. After Seattle, the new North American movement remained obsessed with mass mobilizations and quickly settled down to bickering about property crime, permits for marches, “reformism,” unions, 911, and war. Meanwhile the movement learned that Europeans had been having impressive mass mobilizations for several years before Seattle and that there were “mobes” to attend in exciting places like Cancún. Young white hippies and punks quickly turned their backs on unions and NGOs, adopted “protest hopping” as a lifestyle and began to glorify their time in jail, their radical “direct action” tactics, their culture of selfless filth and urban gleaning. They traveled to Prague in September 2000, Québec City in April 2001, Genoa in July 2001, and some even went to the World Social Fora in Porto Alegre.

**It’s just imperialist protectionism:** Since Seattle, while some communist and socialist groups have embraced the anti-globalization movement as a step in the right direction, more rigid first world communist groups have insisted that the North American anti-globalization movement is ultimately a protectionist and nationalist attempt to keep jobs, comparative advantage, and third world resources in first world control. These groups propose that organized first world workers will always take nationalist positions so as to protect the unequal benefits of the world system to which they have grown accustomed. They will defend their high-paid jobs from third world competition and from domestic minorities

<sup>44</sup>. George Katsiaficas, *The Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life*. 1997: Humanities Press, New Jersey: 265.

and immigrants while also defending the favorable terms of trade which increase their global buying power. This frame interprets first world movements against third world child labor as attempts to unfairly police and punish third world countries. And they see the overall movement against Free Trade as a chauvinist attempt to protect first world standard of living, domestic regulations, and global power.

The anti-racist/anti-oppression critique relies heavily on the “Seattle Origins Narrative, with occasional references to “It’s Just Imperialist Protectionism.” Anti-racist critics position themselves in the “512 Year Struggle” frame and overlook entirely that many of the movements and activists who they purport to critique are also in that frame, or in one of the similar frames—Globalization from Below, PGA, or Northern Convergence.

### Making the Connections

When first confronted by diverse, non-working class movements for liberation, Marxists saw an overemphasis on race and gender as incorrect political theory—what they called “superstructural epiphenomenon.” Since the 1970s, however, race and gender have been well integrated into many schools of radical political theory. While sometimes falling into debates about whether it is capitalism or white supremacy that runs the world, such hierarchies are becoming less legitimate with the rise of “anti-oppression” theory which acknowledges “intersectionality.” Within activist globalization scholarship, issues of cultural imperialism and gender are at the center of the analysis. Anti-imperialist analysis links domestic troubles of racial and economic injustice to international processes of conquest and economic empire, which have always used racism, sexism, and other assertions of cultural superiority as tactics. For anti-racists, however, *no* theoretical definition or ideological commitment in and of itself can be antiracist

Many sectors of what became the North American anti-globalization movement developed from internationalist work (such as Central American solidarity work) which already recognized in practice the essential racism of empire throughout its many forms. Brian Dominick states how the Zapatistas requested a new form of international solidarity work that echoed Black Power exhortations to white allies. Whereas before, solidarity meant sending off the fruits of our privilege (including people to do “protective accompaniment”) to try to “offset the horrible things that our military and our economic system were doing,” the Zapatistas challenged allies to take on the harder task of intervening in US foreign affairs. “Solidarity for the Zapatistas meant, first and foremost, that we’re kicking ass here at home. They said ‘We can hold these folks for a little while longer, but if you can remove the boot from our neck by stopping your society from funding our government who is doing it directly to us...’”<sup>45</sup>

As a result of this movement foundation, in contrast with the perception that “September 11 threw many young white activists...into a tailspin,”<sup>46</sup> what actually happened was that two of the major US student activist groups, the 180° Movement for Democracy and Education and STARC (Students Transforming and Resisting Corporations) promptly took anti-imperialist positions after 9/11. Meanwhile, non-campus white-led organizations, such as ANSWER,<sup>47</sup> organized massive anti-imperialist responses to the so-called “wars on terrorism.” Also responding immediately was the American Friends Service Committee, which has been “bringing a critique of global capital into peace work” for decades.

Nevertheless, anti-racist activists repeatedly argue that “[w]hether it’s global capitalism...or state authority...connections to everyday lives are frequently lost. What about privatization of city services as neoliberalism on the home front?... The connections are all there...yet many white, middle-class radicals simply aren’t seeing them.”<sup>48</sup> Despite some clear cases of white activists failing to make connections,<sup>49</sup> for the most part, an identity-based critique does not hold up.

Take on what they see as the daunting task of confronting international racism, the youth sector of the North American anti-globalization movement may be more familiar with Zapatismo than Chicanismo, the U’wa than the Black Panthers, and debt slavery than cultural appropriation. But the biggest movements on US campuses in the years preceding Seattle were a mix of domestic and international campaigns. The largest were Free Mumia, the defense of affirmative action and ethnic studies programmes, anti-sweatshop campaigns, World Bank Bonds boycotts, and student worker organizing (many campaigning jointly with service-sector workers).

<sup>45</sup> Brian Dominick, “Anti-Capitalist Globalization Organizing.” *Arise! Journal*, June 2001.

<sup>46</sup> the claim continues: “Meanwhile, young activists of color jumped into action and created mass antiwar-antiracist movements protesting the bombing of Afghanistan, supporting Muslims against racist attacks, and bringing a critique of global capital into peace work.” Mike Prokosch, United for a Fair Economy, “Three Tasks for the US globalization movement,” <http://globalroots.net/themoment/2002>. [URL Inactive as of 2/24/04]

<sup>47</sup> Which had already been struggling for some time on the international anti-racist project of ending the sanctions against Iraq as well as the domestic anti-racist Mumia Abu-Jamal campaign

<sup>48</sup> Chris Dixon, “Finding Hope After Seattle: Rethinking Radical Activism and Building a Movement,” posted on Colours of Resistance website <http://colours.mahost.org/>, n.d.

<sup>49</sup> Pauline Hwang, while organizing for Québec City, reports being told, presumably by a white anti-globalization activist, that “the off-campus issues I was working on [including the Shakti Women of Colour Collective, Immigrant Workers Center] were not directly related to globalization.” She concludes that “in other words, ‘globalization’ means white college students protesting, not the issues of working class people of colour.” Pauline Hwang, “Anti-Racist Organizing: Reflecting on Lessons from Québec City,” May 2001, *Colours*.

**The issue is not whether white activists do long-term anti-imperialist work because even when they do it's not enough to qualify as antiracist.**

What's wrong? The Citigroup campaign is an excellent example; for anti-globalization activists it seemed the perfect anti-racist project. Here was a corporation which built prisons in the US, dams in the third world, and was deeply involved in predatory and discriminatory residential lending in communities of color, deceptive loan schemes for trade school students, and manipulative credit card promotions particularly affecting young college students. Here was a campaign that was "local" for a variety of domestic constituencies through which they could experience their co-victimization with one another as well as with indigenous and third world peoples. But the campaign fell flat. Similarly, early protests of NikeTown stores were oddly white and thoroughly opaque to people of color.<sup>50</sup>

The problem is that many campaigns that are about people of color, locally as well as globally, that do indeed "make the connections," are still primarily generated from ideological analysis, not from the immediacy of a particular community need. While anti-globalization activists base their assessment of a "good" campaign on how clearly and compellingly it makes the intellectual connections, antiracist organizers are far more concerned about the intensity with which the issue is affecting the local community. Put another way, for anti-globalization activists "making the connections" is *using* the local to help people understand the global, while for anti-racist activists, "making connections" is talking about the global to help people understand the local.

Fair Trade is another example of this tendency. It is a very analytic, intellectual campaign through which people act in support of working class people of color. Although this campaign is long-term and practiced locally (meeting two criteria for anti-racism), its practice is not driven by an immediate, personal grievance. It is a mobilization developed through an abstract intellectual process of compassion. In communities of colour, there are enough immediate crises! Moreover, agendas that emerge beyond the boundaries of the local community are frequently seen as suspect to communities who have learned historically not to trust the strangers or any "fix" from somewhere else.

### **The Difference is Strategy**

In activist action and campaign planning, groups start by clearly identifying their goals. They then formulate a strategy for achieving those goals. The strategy

<sup>50</sup> Zak Sinclair, "Don't Think. Just Do It. Tripping in Niketown USA." *Third Force*, July/August 1997.

brings together an analysis of power relations with the resources and context of struggle which will shape tactics. In the end, the strategy is the logic that explains how the chosen tactic will achieve the action's goal. "Tactical fetishism," a preference for or tendency toward the use of the same tactic for dealing with different goals is widely repudiated (even by Black Bloc activists<sup>51</sup>). The disagreements between anti-racist and anti-globalization activists are primarily at the level of strategy—not goals or tactics.

The long-term goal of the North American anti-globalization movement is structural change, described variously as "revolution" and "democratization." Some sectors aim to restore the viability of democratic structures linked to the state and some seek to establish independent institutions which reappropriate and reembed aspects of the market. Many sectors work to develop forms of internationalism to replace elite ones; these vary from simple networks of solidarity with no legislative authority to authoritative treaty-type negotiations such as protocols against biopatenting. Short-term (or what are sometimes called "process goals") include empowering people to believe they can make a change and demonstrating that ordinary people around the world already have the technologies, expertise, materials, and skills both to meet basic needs and to achieve higher aspirations such as art, science, and participatory democracy (without "expert" advice and oversight).

Anti-globalization goals are not significantly different from anti-racist/anti-oppression goals. Ending oppression, community self-determination, democratization, and empowerment are the goals of both movements. Since 9/11, increasingly North American anti-racist and anti-globalization movements have been using the concept of anti-imperialism to define and link their domestic and international goals.

These similarities often go unnoticed as activists become polarized around issues of tactics. Tricksters and militants are perceived by anti-racists as not being interested in "organizing" and anti-racists are perceived as inflexible, controlling, or not appreciative of "diversity of tactics."<sup>52</sup> The concept of "direct action" has

<sup>51</sup> *The Black Bloc Papers*, compiled by David and X. 2002: Black Clover Press, printed by Insubordinate Editions, a project of the Claustrophobia Collective, Baltimore MD. available through AK Press.

<sup>52</sup> Diversity of tactics is a strategy intended to facilitate the solidarity of many social sectors without imposing uniformity, univocality, or identity. "Diversity of tactics" demands equal respect to candlelight vigils, property crime, permitted marches, mass actions, lobbying and everything in between. "It is mirrored in a rejection of ideology, an emphasis on materiality, and an assertion of the possibility of local self-determination and global justice at once. It asserts the mutual benefit of collaboration without agreement and rejects all tactical and ideological fetishes and efforts by any

been widely and variously misinterpreted (as a specific tactic, as a synonym for mass actions or protests, as militance, as property crime, and as short-term high-risk dramatic actions preferred by anarchists). Unfortunately, some groups such as Ruckus Society have tried to ease the resulting tension by dissociating the term from any meaning at all, redefining it as “any action that makes space for change.” This move tries to dissolve the tension by undermining the possibility for debate rather than furthering knowledge of history<sup>53</sup> and precise distinctions between tactics and strategy (distinctions which Ruckus otherwise does a good job of promoting).

A second purportedly tactical debate is over mass actions, to which the anti-globalization movement is often reduced, which are contradictorily portrayed as: excessively militant, symbolic acts irrelevant to local organizing, and “summit hopping”/“protest tourism.” Typically, advocates of mass actions are portrayed in anti-racist discourse as not being engaged in local action, which is, quite simply, an empirically false dichotomy. This accusation implies as well a mis-diagnosis of the local.

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groups to impose on others. This framework has been one of the hallmarks of the international movement, articulated alternately by the Zapatistas as ‘one no, many yeses’ and by Uruguayan anarchists as ‘specificismo’, which encourages fluid shifting of tactics appropriate to the situation.” [Jason Adams, ‘Jornadas Anarquistas: Anarchist Convergence in Porto Alegre, Brazil’ *Black Bridge International* February 12, 2002 <http://blackbridge.freehosting.net/brazil.html>].

<sup>53</sup> Voltairine De Cleyre wrote in 1912 that “[e]very person who ever had a plan to do anything, and went and did it, or who laid his plan before others, and won their co-operation to do it with him, without going to external authorities to please do the thing for them, was a direct actionist. All co-operative experiments are essentially direct action...Every person who ever in his life had a difference with anyone to settle, and went straight to the other persons involved to settle it, either by a peaceable plan or otherwise, was a direct actionist.” [*Direct Action*. 1986: Mother Earth, New York.] MC Lynx, a contemporary theorist defines it as “the act of taking direct control over one’s own life and destiny and doing what needs to be done without taking orders from anyone or attempting to influence anyone.” Martha Ackelsberg defines it as: “ways for people to get in touch with their own powers and capacities, to take back the power of naming themselves and their lives.” [*Free Women of Spain: Anarchism and the struggle for the Emancipation of Women*. 1991: Indiana University Press, Bloomington.] Black Panther experiments with community self-provisioning and self-determination are some of the best-known US direct action movements. Handing out leaflets, holding press conferences, and petitioning politicians to build affordable housing is not direct action because these actions appeal to others to solve the problem. Taking over an abandoned building, fixing it up, moving in, refusing to pay rent, and resisting eviction is direct action. Among those who prefer direct action, anarchists embrace it *in part* because they believe that the state is incapable of enacting justice.

the G8 or the WTO or the IMF/World Bank... big summit meetings are elaborate rituals, ostentatious shows of power that reinforce the entitlement and authority of the bodies they represent....Our purpose is to undercut their legitimacy, to point a spotlight at their programs and policies, and to raise the social costs of their existence until they become insupportable...We can’t and won’t abandon the local, and in fact never have: many of us work on both scales...But many of us have come to the larger, global actions because we understand that the trade agreements and institutions we contest are designed to undo all of our local work and override the decisions and aspirations of local communities.”<sup>54</sup>

In beginning to put *some* of their energy toward “mass actions” (in parallel with ongoing local campaigns), North American activist groups<sup>55</sup> have adopted a strategy of Global South and European movements, which have long been converging on elite global governance meetings in order to strategically disrupt, discomfort, sunshine, and delegitimize elite and secretive affairs, while sending the “information...out to millions of people in this country and across the world—there is an alternative to this shit, there is something that is anti-capitalist.”<sup>56</sup>

“Mass actions” turn out to be convergences at each of which hundreds of different tactics are enacted by wildly diverse groups over the space of about a week within a strategic framework of “diversity of tactics.” Each convergence has several centers of organizing which provide collective infrastructure and where people coordinate events and actions, often experiencing new levels of cooperation and community. The tactics themselves include permitted candlelight vigils, media stunts, meetings of international solidarity working groups, permitted marches and rallies, building community gardens, educational events in rented halls, militant unpermitted marches, and a few skirmishes with the police and acts of property crime.<sup>57</sup> Many of the *tactics* used at mass actions and in other

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<sup>54</sup> Starhawk, “After Genoa: Why We Need to Stay in the Streets” August, 2001. at <http://www.starhawk.org/activism/activism-writings/aftergenoa.html>

<sup>55</sup> Long-term movements such as the Greens and School of the Americas (SOA) Watch had been paying increasing attention to globalization and international economics during the 1980s and 1990s and converged in Seattle with young environmentalists, anarchists, and student organizers.

<sup>56</sup> Jazz, “the tracks of our tears” 80–99 in *On Fire: The battle of Genoa and the anti-capitalist movement*. September 2001: One Off Press.

<sup>57</sup> Rough quantitative analysis of Seattle N30 schedules reveals that educational events and conferences outnumbered street actions by a factor of ten. In late 2003 and early 2004 (Cancún and Miami) that ratio had increased in favor of rich, multi-lingual conferences on an array of issues.

manifestations of the anti-globalization movement are not different than those used by anti-racist movements. It is the strategy that is different.

Anti-racist/anti-oppression campaigners see long-term, local organizing on issues organically relevant to a community as the strategy for simultaneously addressing institutional and personal manifestations of oppression. Organizers distinguish between “product”-oriented organizing, in which the most experienced people make sure to get all the work done in the way most likely to “win” the material/political struggle at hand, and “process”-oriented organizing, in which the maximum number of laypeople are involved at every stage. When engaged in specific actions, the external win is considered a bonus; the real accomplishment is the strategic reconstitution of community, and with it the autonomy, justice, and empowerment of people remaking the conditions of their daily lives.

While many anti-globalization activists have process-oriented organizing perspectives, most anti-globalization groups do local actions, many anti-globalization groups are involved in long-term campaigns, and building community is a common concern, these pieces of anti-racist strategy do not appear all at once in the anti-globalization movement. For example: North Americans working on mining and oil exploitation of indigenous lands use the 512 Year Struggle frame, have a sense of the long-term, and take leadership from people of color around the world,—but these campaigns often have very little connection to local community-building processes. Similarly, many sectors in the Northern Convergence perspective, such as Fair Trade and SOA Watch are involved in long-term struggles—but these often do not include the community-building process orientation which anti-racists value. The “communities” built at mass actions are temporary, intense, communal *experiences*, resulting in personal transformations, new skills, and new relationships, all of which may reappear later in another place and which may contribute to local activism when people go home—but these skills and relationships are not embedded in ongoing local campaigns. Frequently the mass actions leave in place new networks (such as a strengthened coalition for police accountability) and new long-term infrastructure (such as community media centers and community vegetable gardens) in the locality—but these have not been built through long term processes of community development.

While anti-racist strategy can be found in the anti-globalization movement, those elements are not at its core, which is more focused on the mechanics of disrupting power through diversity of tactics than on the mechanics of building community—to disrupt power later.

Now we are in a better position to understand what happened at the protests of the 2000 Democratic National Convention in LA. DAN-LA organizers organized 5 permitted marches, intended to be “safe” for “unarrestable” undocumented people, already over-arrested people of colour, people who could be

facing “three strikes” life sentences, and transgender people who face unique risks in incarceration. They used the term ‘direct action’ even though they organized only permitted marches.<sup>58</sup> For some, this strategy produced what was the most inclusive and antiracist mass action yet. For anti-globalization activists, however, the actions were disappointingly ineffective at disrupting the smooth operation and media coverage of the convention, getting dissenting messages to national and international audiences, pressuring delegates and politicians for accountability, or manipulating media into communicating critiques and alternative. For them, only such successes which would bring new people into the movement and lift the spirits of current activists.

Although the long-term goals of anti-racist and anti-globalization activists are not significantly different, their strategies are—and at the DNC these differences were each described as the correct expression of radicalism. (“White radicals who don’t challenge their white privilege will not be able to see what is profoundly radical about communities of color mobilized, regardless of whether or not the march is legal.”<sup>59</sup>) For the anti-globalization movement, the organizing strategy was to disrupt the Party’s legitimacy at its Convention in order bring maximum public attention to dissent and alternative ideas. For anti-racist organizers, the strategy was to “bringing a diverse and radical movement to the street.”<sup>60</sup> This strategic difference depended on a different analysis of effective organizing.

### Organizing and Empowerment

The mechanics of “organizing” are central to both strategies. Both seek to empower people—encourage them to believe that their grievances are legitimate, that collective action will be meaningful and effective, and that their individual contributions will matter. Key to understanding different strategies are the assumptions about power and constituencies.

Anti-racists develop empowerment through the community organizing “process” tradition of organizers slowly encouraging activists to take on bigger and bigger projects. By working together with neighbors to solve local problems,

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<sup>58</sup> According to MC Lynx, “permitted marches and rallies are never direct action and — unless the purpose of the march is to assert the right to gather and march without a permit—unpermitted marches are not either.” The D2KLA coalition was already advertising 33 other “safe”/legal/permitted events.

<sup>59</sup> Chris Crass, “Thoughts and reflections on Los Angeles and taking on global capitalism,” circulated in 2000, published as “Confronting the Democratic National Convention and Working to Build a People’s Movement for Justice,” *Socialist Review*, 28(3+4), 2001.

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*

people discover their power. Anti-globalization activists see that strategy as limited in its appeal and encourage a “diversity of tactics,” including “fun” (party in the middle of a roadway), cultural rupture (costumes, spontaneous theater, adusting), and militancy. From this perspective, spontaneously taking and holding space, witnessing the cops back down, building a barricade with strangers who speak different languages, creatively disrupting elite procedures or messages, or even breaking corporate retail stores’ windows is empowerment comparable to what community organizers call a “small winnable issue.”

But this difference in preference only begins to unravel a set of much deeper issues. When anti-globalization activists focus energy on clever communications and/or disruptions which even the mainstream media will cover, they imagine that the cleverness and surprising courage of these actions will excite people to participate in various capacities or, if they missed out, hearing about these actions or seeing them on TV will inspire people to participate in the next one. Anti-globalization activists assume that planning and executing a good action is an organizing tool. Radical antiglobalization activists put energy into these actions rather than intensive, personal “outreach” because in their experience joining a movement is primarily an intellectual, not a social act. Individualism pre-dates politics, community follows them.

Such assumptions are fundamental aspects of how people organize. Since white organizers assume that activists arrive at meetings having decided already to be committed and to do inconvenient, uncomfortable things in service of their convictions, they make little effort to make meetings themselves comfortable, empowering, or inclusive. The burden is on committed participants to overcome a whole slew of barriers. If people aren’t willing to be uncomfortable, they’re not ready for activism. In contrast, anti-racists endeavor to establish legitimacy, comfort, and confidence by affirming values, traditions, culture, ideas, and leadership of people of color and ensuring that the space is not dominated by white culture, procedures, and ideas (although white people and ideas may be present).

Since for many white activists becoming radical and active is often solitary and accompanied by being marginalized from family and friends, the experience of critical mass is crucial. The Seattle Origins narrative does get right that Seattle gave meaning, strength, and courage to many activists. As Bill Fletcher, President of TransAfrica Forum, argues, “we need 1, 2, 3, many Seattles, because they help people to know they are not alone.”<sup>61</sup> Paul Rosenberg says “Big mass actions are

<sup>61</sup> Bill Fletcher, “Globalization and the African World: Global Economic Justice and the Struggle Against Racism” CU-Boulder, 15 November 2002.

a necessity... They’re exhilarating and they expand people’s sense of the possible.” And Evan Henshaw-Plath (founder of protest.net) explains “the biggest benefit is that all the people who are doing local actions are given a chance to connect and network. Whereas before, I think there was a pretty severe case of isolation.”<sup>62</sup>

In this context, “diversity of tactics” is vital to ensure there is something for everyone—including militance<sup>63</sup>. But the “diversity of tactics” approach doesn’t do it for anti-racists because an “empowering space” is not one with “something for everyone” (diverse individuals) but a space that is dignified and welcoming for oppressed people and *safe* from daily experiences of racism and violence (committed to transforming the experience of the group).<sup>64</sup>

### Individualism & Culture

A thread underlying the discussions of anti-imperialism, strategy, and empowerment is that anti-globalization activists have a more individualistic perspective than makes sense to anti-racist critics. This section examines some of the cultural aspects of anti-globalization which reinforce an individualistic perspective and shows how they are linked with whiteness.

Social movement organizing involves movement building and day-to-day organizational operations. Decisions about how to do both are made in a matrix of ideology and culture. There are hegemonic forms of movement building and operations, some of which are conscious decisions linked with particular ideologies (door-to-door outreach, hyper-democratic processes) and others which are

<sup>62</sup> in John Tarleton, “After Québec, What Next?” *New York Independent*. May 2001.

<sup>63</sup> Brian Dominick argues that the Zapatistas inspired North American resistance because “they managed to organize not just some demonstrations, but an army.” *ibid*.

<sup>64</sup> This fundamental difference leads anti-racist organizers to say “If we’re going to keep escalating the tactics, we’re going to keep turning people off to them.” [Dominick, *ibid*.] But this interpretation of anti-racism is not without its critics. Ward Churchill argues that pacifism sometimes indicates a pathological commitment to pacifism rather than justice. [*Pacifism as Pathology* 1986 (1998): Arbeiter Ring, Winnipeg.] As noted by a recent collective commentary, tactical moderation may actually normalize white middle class perspectives. “But to realize our potential for building a mass movement requires, first and foremost, clarity as to who actually constitutes the “mainstream” and why. The right, the corporate media and elite policy makers persist in painting “mainstream America” as white and middle class. Even many white liberals cling to the notion that building a mass movement against war necessitates the use of techniques and rhetoric that “don’t scare away” middle class whites.”<sup>64</sup> [Numerous Authors, “Open Letter On Movement Building” <http://www.Znet.org> February 21, 2003] One might observe that a sector of those most intensely victimized by globalization are young men of color for whom militance (sometimes even masked, and often armed) is already a familiar form of social insurrection. Would these folks feel “safe” or absurd out in the open in a permitted march down to a cage encircled by riot cops?

unconscious cultural practices (bureaucratic tendencies, leadership styles, preference for concise speeches). One of the ways that racism is institutionalized is the normalization and deracialization of white culture. The result of this process is that many aspects of white culture which are peculiarly white or even racist become invisible to white people yet are painfully visible, and often damaging, to people of color.<sup>65</sup> One of the politically salient aspects of white culture is individualism.

Cultural whiteness is particularly interesting and problematic in the case of “alternative” subcultures which experience themselves as countercultural. While these alternatives do, in many ways, explicitly counteract and displace oppressive hierarchies, including racism, they also often carry aspects of white culture as assumptions which are reproduced unquestioned and even invisible to the cultural frontiersmen. Insistent blindness to the whiteness often undermines the subculture’s language of outreach and inclusion.

A common aspect of white countercultures is the tradition of individualistic self-creation in which one’s family, church, and history are cast off in an exuberant personal embrace of a highly ideological, self-defined individualism which has no accountability to an inherited communal culture or history.<sup>66</sup> Politicization often involves quite abstract compassion for what might best be theorized as “imagined community”<sup>67</sup> with oppressed people.

In contrast with countercultural politicization, activists of color often become politicized *through* their families and immediate communities. Their developing political principles and work need to make sense in the context of their histories, their families, and the spiritual/religious traditions of their communities. Even though communities of color maintain some hurtful values (such as homophobia), radicals of color do not want to turn their backs on the institutions and values of their communities. If a radical of color is attracted to punk culture, embracing it would come at a significant cost for being able to continue to relate well with their community. While this cost also exists for white people, overcom-

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<sup>65</sup> Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming To See Correspondences through Work in Women’s Studies.” 1988: Wellesley Collage Center for Research on Women Working Paper 189.

<sup>66</sup> The lack of accountability often includes a claim to “exceptionalism” in which white people argue that they are different from other white people, a peculiar practice of ahistoricism fundamental to the construction of whiteness in American culture.

<sup>67</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. 1991: Verso, London.

ing it is made possible by traditions valorizing defiant and expressive individualism.<sup>68</sup> Individualism in white culture enables white radicals to reject their birth families, their churches, their home towns, and the values they were raised with and to define themselves anew. Radicals of color cannot relate to this behavior, the lack of love it indicates for family, and its lack of respect for history and community. Whites who have apparently abandoned their families are unaccountable free agents who seem untrustworthy to radicals of color.

Two countercultures common in activist circles are punk and hippie cultures. Interestingly, these cultures have a great deal in common. Both resist what they understand to be capitalist interpellations of the body, including grooming, fashion, acceptable body types, and behavior. Both resist middle class concerns with privacy, individualism, consumption, status, and professionalism. Both envision their respective cultures as models for the future. Art, self-expression, and manifestations of community are prioritized while status, middle-class conceptions of dignity, and “legitimacy” are eschewed as relics of the old liberal order. These cultures *as cultures* assert systemic critiques, alternatives, and collective values and each has explicit political sectors, with activist commitments, frames, and institutions.

Some white activists, and some activists of colour, are attracted to hippie and punk cultures. At mass actions, more people appear to be part of these cultures simply because circumstances demand low-maintenance grooming and sturdy clothing, long car trips, and living in public spaces for days on end. Interestingly, however, non-punk/non-hippie whites easily assimilate temporarily to the subculture for logistical reasons. Radicals of color may feel less able to go unkempt or unclean and do not necessarily accept the logistical necessity.<sup>69</sup>

Just as Free Trade Agreements fail to acknowledge corporate subsidies, white visions of a “free market” of cultural choices fail to acknowledge privileges and entitlement, claiming that a level playing field for cultural diversity already exists. While white subcultures may be alienating to many whites, they are actually experienced as exclusionary and painful by people of color. Expressive culture, even when countercultural, can be a manifestation of power.

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<sup>68</sup> Robert Bellah, et. al., *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. 1985: University of California Press.

<sup>69</sup> Commenting on Seattle, members of Third Eye Movement did not accept the logistical limitations at all, asserting that more money should have been provided to *fly in* activists of color.

...i'm going to stink, i'm going in there even though i'm contagious, i'm going to bring my barking dog, i have the right to do whatever the fuck i want and people just have to deal with it and i'm going to call this "cultural diversity" or "class issues" or "activist dogs." meanwhile other folks around are feeling like another white guy is doing whatever the fuck he wants, which is [again] downright unpleasant for [us folks] who seem to be always subject to some white guy [cop, schoolteacher, boss, landlord...] doing whatever the fuck he wants at our expense even though it's obviously no way to treat other human beings and we don't know anyone in [our group] who would treat people that way nor would [people in our group] let people be treated that way if we had any influence over the situation, which must mean that all these other people in here think that what he's doing is a perfectly fine way to mis/treat (inconvenience/offend) other people...

Individualistic rebellion against oppressive youth and class socialization feels precious. But this part of liberation doesn't put people in a very good position for participating in more collective aspects of struggle. Cultural relativism enables all sorts of hierarchial, oppressive, and selfish (or just self-absorbed) behavior to be dismissed as part of cultural expression. "Culture" is really what is being done and how it's being done.

### Prefigurative Cultural Politics

Activist countercultures often emphasize "prefigurative" actions. Such practices embody the movement's vision as if it were already achieved, thereby calling it into being. None of the diverse movements which participate in anti-globalization can be reduced to or represented by their prefigurative tendencies. Prefiguration is more of an ethic than a manifesto, meaning that those who value prefiguration often, but not always attempt to practice it, while also doing extensive direct political work. But some who hold prefiguration dear use it as a litmus test when interacting with other activists.

George Katsiaficas describes the power of prefigurative projects when he defends "identity construction" as "enacting the freedom to determine one's conditions of existence, to create new categories within which to live." This is a "radically new concrete universal—a reworking of the meaning of human being" in response to the recognition (not only by Habermas) that the entire "life-world" was being "colonized."<sup>70</sup>

One of several ways that anti-globalization activists do prefigurative politics is responsible consumption. Many activists make an effort to be aware of

<sup>70</sup> Jürgen Habermas, "New Social Movements." *Telos* 49 (1981): 33. Katsiaficas, *ibid*.

how much they depend on third world resources and to reduce that dependency. Hence some spend their leisure time re-learning how to grow and preserve food and to make basic items like soap, candles, and clothes. Some people have worked on creating alternative forms of identity and celebration ("Look what I found in the dumpster!") to go along with their attempt to take responsibility for the racist effects of first world consumption. Encouraging a "subsistence perspective" in the Global North Maria Mies & Veronica Bennholdt-Thomsen challenge feminists and other activists within the Global North not to base their liberation on "loot" and their identity on "disgust...degradation and contempt" for peasants.<sup>71</sup>

The amelioration of race and class inequality in the Global North through widening the base of mass consumption relies considerably on the resources of the Global South. Reducing Northern consumption is certainly not a sufficient strategy for confronting globalization, but it will be part of any plan for global justice, the real cost of which is not the risks we take in the streets but allowing the peoples of the Global South to keep their resources for their own use. Even activists who understand that consumption politics are inadequate in themselves often practice responsible consumption as a spiritual and emotional commitment to global justice.

These practices are often quite alienating to anti-racist activists. Even though these activities are intensely *local* (unlike mass actions and international campaigns), this doesn't make them anti-racist. When anti-racist activists talk about "making the connections" they don't mean figuring out on an intellectual level how its effects are personal in some local way. What they mean is showing the concern with globalization by working on alleviating its immediate damage to people in the neighborhood. (Of course, the best neighborhood work relies heavily on first world global privileges—too often, and perhaps unavoidably, global and local activism operate at one another's expense.)

Prefigurative politics don't only make for bad anti-racist campaigns, they have another set of effects. Young anti-globalization activists' willingness to go without creature comforts can be strangely intimidating to other activists who can't imagine going a day without a shower or their favorite products. A set of familiar ways of achieving low-consumption (clothing, hairstyles, and accoutrements) have appeared as signs of youth protest culture and define insiders. People of color frequently find these choices to be downright distasteful and experience them more as (white) culture (to which they, once again, don't measure up), than as political acts. One letter to the editor in *Colorlines* contended:

<sup>71</sup> Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen & Maria Mies, *The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the Globalised Economy*. 1999: Zed Books, London.

Seattle DAN folks romanticize the wholesale abandonment of mainstream culture. They boast of dumpster-diving and television-smashing, dream of self-sufficiency ... But of course, dropping out of society has a different appeal for those who have always-already been invited to participate fully than it does for those whose invitation is eternally lost in the mail.<sup>72</sup>

Standard organizing culture for anti-globalization activists is prefigurative participatory democracy in a space that functions much like a squat (meaning that people can meet their [minimalist] daily needs there). For anti-racist organizers, meetings need to be controlled by familiar local activists of color in a dignified, tidy space to which people can feel comfortable “bringing their parents.”

At the DNC in Los Angeles, these cultural conflicts obscured a joint concern. Both activists of colour in DAN-LA and anarchists alienated from it were struggling for democracy against what they perceived to be a covert vanguard operating within DAN-LA.<sup>73</sup> If they had recognized one another as allies they might have also discovered many similarities between self-determination traditions in communities of color and goals and practices of anarchism.

## CONCLUSION

This paper has distilled a number of deep issues from the apparent conflict between anti-globalization and anti-racist perspectives. These issues result in the anti-globalization movement’s anti-imperialism not being recognized to be anti-racist.

<sup>72</sup> Sage Wilson, letter to the editor, *Colorlines* 3.2, Summer 2000.

<sup>73</sup> At the anarchist conference held in conjunction with the DNC protests there was widespread portrayal of C-DAN (Continental DAN) as “reformist” and “full of paid activists flying around the country from action to action.” [Shawn McDougal “DAN-LA, the Black Bloc, and Anarchism” response to David Graeber on [la-anarchists@lists.ao.ca](mailto:la-anarchists@lists.ao.ca) 9.4.2000, posted to DAN-discuss 9.12.2000.] DAN-LA activists of color interviewed during the actions for this project said that the organizing committee was overwhelmed by people they called “outsiders” who claimed to have the right to make decisions because they had so much experience. In response to these critiques, Elijah Saxon writes “it is true that there are individual organizers with strong personalities who work under the DAN banner who at times have difficulty sharing information or might be intimidating and assertive. that is a far cry from saying that DAN is controlled by a cadre of elitist super-organizers.” [Elijah Saxon, response to McDougal on DAN-discuss 9.12.2000] McDougal’s point was to portray anarchists as “stuck in an attitude of tribalism”, where people find it much easier to categorize and demonize people they don’t know than engage them...really is at the socio-psychological roots of nationalism” when, as it turned out, concerns about vanguardism both from within DAN-LA and from the anarchist conference turned out to be prescient. By the time of the World Economic Forum protests in February 2002, this vanguardism had turned into a movement coup by the so-called Pagan Cluster.

- Movement and activist stereotypes (including the “frames” described above, but also extending to issues of age) are being used as the basis of debates which require considerably more precision if they are to be constructive.
- The anti-globalization emphasis on correct anti-imperialist *analysis* as the key to anti-racist campaigns is totally inadequate from the anti-racist perspective which sees anti-racism as a specific kind of *process of local organizing*.
- The movements have, at times, severe differences in what they understand to be “empowering” for strangers (and how differential empowerment is racialized). These differences are rooted in whether proto-actiivsts are conceptualized as isolated individuals or people embedded in oppressed communities.
- The anti-globalization movement assumes (perhaps incorrectly) that diversity of tactics successfully provides space for ideological and tactical expressions of anti-racism (and any other liberatory politics) while the most important aspect of anti-racist organizing is safe, dignified, non-white-dominated organizing culture.
- Both movements “make connections” to the “local,” but they do so differently.
- The concept of cultural diversity does not effectively manage the conflicts between different styles, particularly when some of those styles are practiced in an entitled manner.

Discussing another set of tactical issues, Massimo De Angelis provides a framework which may be useful for activists seeking to develop accountability while also respecting our diversity. Arguing that the core values and aspirations of the anti-globalization movement are rejection of the forced choice between the market and the state, instead embracing “respect, dignity, grassroots democracy and exercise of real power,” he urges activists to move from debates over the “ethical correctness” of particular acts to an evaluation of “whether that action was a responsible action in that context.” What is transformative about his framework is his definition of “responsibility”:

Responsibility is above all a relationship to the other, one that presupposes the belonging in a community...Irresponsibility is not a light criticism, precisely because it presupposes their inclusion in our struggle. You can be (ir)responsible only towards your community, not towards some outside force or some grand ethical concept...And if you are irresponsible towards the ‘other’ in your community, then think twice, because the world we are fighting against is based precisely on this persistent indifference to the other...

He explains that the struggle against globalization requires both local struggles, where “our desires and aspirations take shape” and the increasingly global context of struggle, which is fundamentally the “discovery of the other.” As we become a global community of activists, we develop solidarity through a “creative process of discovery, not a presumption.”<sup>74</sup> Hence, diversity of tactics as a policy of absolute tolerance is not solidarity. Solidarity requires discovering one another’s needs and figuring out how we can be supportive.

In addition to the challenges and opportunities for activists explored here, there are several points to glean from this study of general importance to social movements literature. First, the persistent misnaming and mislocation of the problem even by activists who identify as movement insiders reveals the complexity of frame mobilization within social movements.

Second, despite the careful distinctions outlined by trainers, anti-racist discourse has a life of its own as a mishmash of various, sometimes contradictory, theories of anti-racism ranging from Black Power to anti-oppression. Activists and critics may create their own amalgams drawing on various trainings, reading, or concepts picked ideas up through activist culture. More detailed case studies could be revealing in how activists and organizations put theory into practice in “messy” ways and what this means for theorists and educators.

Third, the discourse of anti-racism has become hegemonic within activist circles, such that it becomes silencing. The absence of dialogue, dissent, and debate about the anti-racist critiques of the anti-globalization movement is telling—why is it not one of the issues fervently debated all over the internet by activists? Anti-racism is not the only critical perspective with hegemonic status within the anti-globalization movement. Yet other hegemonic positions (such as pacifism and reformism) do not have the silencing power that anti-racism does and are hotly contested. Why is its move for hegemony seemingly more effective? It would be useful to compare the process of silencing with the lively and extensive dialogues regarding pacifism and property crime, which led within a year of the Seattle protests to the breakthrough development and consensual embrace of a new concept and movement strategy (“diversity of tactics”).

Fourth, it is interesting to note that the most vibrant, creative, and confrontational anti-neoliberal movements in Europe are the anti-racist campaigns to support immigrant rights. Using concepts such as “no one is illegal,” “no borders,” “the world belongs to everyone,” and “everyone


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<sup>74</sup> Massimo de Angelis, “from movement to society” 109-124 in *On Fire: The battle of Genoa and the anti-capitalist movement*. 2001: One-off Press: 118-119,124.

is an expert,”<sup>75</sup> this movement has embraced issues of structured North-South inequality where it hits home, at home, engaging not only the official promoters of free trade policies, but the psychological support for it in the racism of their fellow citizens. A comparative study of the European and US anti-globalization movements’ relationship to immigration would be an excellent addition to our understanding of anti-racist politics.

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<sup>75</sup> See <http://www.no-racism.net>, <http://www.noborder.org>, <http://www.expertbase.net/>



#### ABSTRACT

This paper explores the past, present, and future resistance of indigenous peoples to capitalist expansion. The central argument is that the survival of indigenous peoples, their identities, and their cultures, constitutes strong antisystemic resistance against global capitalism and against the deepening and the broadening of modern world-systemic or globalization processes. Furthermore, we argue that recent events often touted as turning points in history—the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9-11 attack on the twin towers, and even the war on Iraq—are at most “blips on the radar” in a larger trajectory of change and resistance. Rather, the important features of indigenous survival are: (1) Indigenous peoples, despite an immense variety of forms of cultural and social organization, represent non-capitalist forms of organization. Their continued survival challenges the fundamental premises of

capitalism and its increasingly global culture. (2) Indigenous people’s challenges to global domination succeed less on economic, political, or military force, and more as fundamental challenges to the underpinnings of the logic of capitalism and the interstate system. (3) In order to learn from these resistance models, it is necessary to ground our understanding in two seemingly antithetical forms of knowledge: (a) information arising from indigenous cultures and values and (b) research about how the *longue duree* of the world-system shapes the form and timing of such movements. (4) Indigenous successes may serve as models and/or inspirations for other forms of resistance. An important task is to discover what is unique to indigenous resistance and to specify what indigenous resistance has in common with other forms of resistance.

## THE FUTURES OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: 9-11 AND THE TRAJECTORY OF INDIGENOUS SURVIVAL AND RESISTANCE\*

Thomas D. Hall  
James V. Fenelon

### INTRODUCTION

Many writers have predicted the end of indigenous peoples, globally, and especially for native nations in North America. Thomas Jefferson Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in the late nineteenth century said, “The great body of Indians will become merged in the indistinguishable mass of our population” (Iverson 1999: 16–17; see Cadwalader and Deloria, 1984). However, they are not only “still here,” but also one of the fastest growing segments of the population of the U.S. (Snipp 1986, 1989, 1992; Nagel 1996). Globally, indigenous peoples number some 350 millions, and possibly more depending on how one defines “indigenous” (Wilmer 1993; Stavenhagen 1990: Ch. 8; Smith and Ward 2000; Sponsel 1995a). However, confrontations and conflicts between states and nonstate peoples are as old as states themselves (Hall 1983; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Clearly, states have been singularly successful in displacing, absorbing, incorporating, assimilating, or destroying nonstate peoples for the five

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\* We have developed parts of this argument in various papers given since 1998. As is typical, we owe a great deal to a number of scholars who have commented on these efforts, including the reviewers for this version. As is usual, remaining problems and errors are our responsibility.

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thousand years that they have existed. Yet, despite myriad dire predictions, and more importantly repeated military and social actions directed against them by states, nonstate or indigenous peoples have not been obliterated. Admittedly, one response to this observation might be, "Not yet, but soon!" But this moment, this "soon," is now several centuries long. So the question remains, how and why have indigenous peoples survived the onslaughts against them? In particular, how have they survived into the late twentieth and early twenty-first century when there are no regions remaining outside global capitalism, and no regions that have not been claimed by one or more states?

The question of indigenous survival and resistance may, at first glance, appear to have little or no bearing on assessing the impacts of 9-11 and like events. However, we argue there are several ways in which the two connect. First, what occurs at the fringes of the world-system is still part of the world-system. Indeed, some processes are best, and only occasionally, observed in the far peripheries (Hall 1989a, 2000, 2002a). Second, we concur with the arguments of Dunaway (2003), Podobnik (2002), and Wallerstein (2003) that 9-11 has had little impact, which is to be expected since it is not a deviation or change in world-systemic processes but a logical, if extreme result of those processes. More specifically, following the arguments of Clark (2002) on the intensification of world-systemic processes, especially the broadening and deepening of system processes (often glossed as globalization), makes "normal accidents" more, not less, likely. Tight network interconnections mean that small events reverberate quickly through the system. This would seem to contradict the first point, but actually sustains it, in that "normal accidents" are just those normal or typical events of system functioning. They are not exceptional. Third, following the arguments of Dunaway (2003b), while ethnic conflict may not have become more common since the end of the cold war, it has become more costly to core states and a larger threat to system stability. Hence pressures are intense to minimize ethnic conflict. As Dunaway argues, ethnic conflict, too, is a normal result of system functioning. Yet the attempts to minimize it may well create more space within which indigenous peoples may survive and resist the inroads of global capitalism and the ideology of consumerism (Sklair 2002). Fourth, as Wickham (2002) argues, 9-11 and the war on terrorism could easily transmute into a new, global, and virulent form of "manifest destiny" in which the United States seeks to export its form of democracy and neoliberalism to the entire planet. Finally, if 9-11 does have impacts on some parts of the system, but not others, this too is important to study and understand. We argue that examination of indigenous survival and resistance is one avenue for such explorations.

We draw many of our examples from the western hemisphere, especially North and Central America where "Indian" nations actively resist social ordering

processes from western, capitalistic society. Our rationale is quite simple: colonial expansion into the western hemisphere is tightly connected to the rise of the modern world-system from European states. This usually violent expansion included a land take-over literally on a continental scale, massive labor exploitation systems including genocide or slavery, natural resource extraction that fueled industrialization, and development of large states. The mythos of an American Revolution misses this central fact which becomes determinative of whether the indigenous peoples become violently incorporated, or not, into and by these states, which are dominated by the United States. We will return to these issues after presenting our answers to the puzzle of continual indigenous survival.

We begin our exploration with brief sketches of a sample of ways indigenous peoples have survived. To increase the precision of the discussion, we will then turn to some conceptual and definitional issues. These, in turn, will require the re-examination of theoretical and empirical issues concerning indigenous survival. This re-examination will entail questions about the origin, nature, and functioning of the capitalist world-system. It also directs attention to a second, related, puzzle, why ethnicity and ethnic conflict, remain the major sources of war and conflict in the last few decades. We will illustrate these issues with a few suggestive examples. Finally, by exploring the puzzle of how people without massive resources, numbers, or weapons can curtail the transformative and often destructive effects of global capitalism we will speculate on the general lessons about resistance to the expansion of global capitalism.

#### EXAMPLES OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO GLOBAL CAPITALISM

Indigenous resistance to global capitalism is world wide, diverse, and yet loosely interconnected.<sup>1</sup> Many forms of resistance are covert, echoing Scott's concept of "weapons of the weak" (1985); they often transmute and/or masquerade as something else. For instance, the events in Chiapas have often been cast in the light of a regional, a peasant (and hence a class), or a caudillo driven rebellion. They are less often discussed as an indigenous Mayan rebellion.<sup>2</sup> Movements in

<sup>1</sup> Among key sources are: Bodley 1988, 1990; Burger 1987; Gedicks 2001; Perry 1996; Smith and Ward 2002; Sponsel 1995a, 1995b; Wilmer 1993. Barry Gills's (2000) collection examines all types of antiglobalization movements as does Bennholdt-Thomsen et al. (2001). The entire Greenwood Press series on Endangered Peoples is also valuable.

<sup>2</sup> Some examples of the latter approach can be found in McMichael 2000; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Collier 1999; Katzenberger 1995; Mignolo 2002; Morton 2000.

the United States, such as American Indian Movement (AIM), are often seen solely in terms of localized ethnic, urban, or racial rebellions. Indigenous resisters are often far ahead of those who report about them—connected via the United Nations, a large variety of their own organizations, and the internet (Langman et al. 2003; Smith and Ward 2000). Anna Tsing's, (1993) *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen*, can be read as an account of ways in which local people, in this case Dayaks in Kalimantan, resist state incorporation. Indeed, Tsing's account along with Stoler's (1995) account of plantation resistance in Sumatra or Peluso's (1992) account of forestry "management" in Java, have as a key component—if not the driving component—the struggle for the survival of indigenous cultures, identities, organization, and economies. This applies to indigenous peoples throughout Southeast Asia (e.g., Steinberg 1987, Sponsel 2000a, 2000b) and Asia in general (Barnes et al. 1995). In other cases traditional culture and organization itself is a resource that facilitates resistance and survival (Champagne 1989, 1992; Fenelon, 1998a). Indigenous resistance struggles are occurring all over the world, even in Europe as, for example, among the Saami (Eidheim 1969). Kurdish activities in West Asia and Miskito resistance in Nicaragua have long been noted as indigenous movements (Gurr and Harff 1994). Gurr's, (1993) *Minorities at Risk*, is a catalog of such movements and Linda Smith's, (1999) *Decolonizing Methodologies*, is itself an act of resistance against the hegemony of European rooted social science concepts. Her work is rooted in her Maori community and her academic experiences.

These movements are so diverse, so fluid in organization, goals, and methods they all but defy summary. Probably the most salient difference between typical class based forms of resistance, as opposed to global capitalism forms of resistance is the emphasis on local community, identity politics, land claims, and rights to a variety of traditional practices, which include alternative family organizations such as matrilineality and/or polygyny, communal ownership of resources such as land, the use of land for sacred ceremonies, and indigenous knowledge, that occasionally includes use of psychoactive substances. Many of these practices contradict, challenge, or threaten deeply held values in state-based systems. The most fundamental challenge to capitalism, though, comes from communal ownership of resources because it denies the legitimacy of private property rights. Contrary to what many early explorers, missionaries, and colonizers thought, and unfortunately many so-called development experts today may think, it is not that indigenous people do not understand individual ownership. Rather, they have long recognized what many environmental movements are beginning to force capitalists to accept: resources are always partially, if not wholly, "public goods" (to use the terminology of economists) and are thereby sites of contestation. The interactions of environmentalists and indigenous peoples have been

something of a mixed bag; although in the first decade of the twenty-first century alliances seem to be becoming more common and antagonism, less so.<sup>3</sup>

Another form of resistance has been the overt, conscious efforts to maintain "traditional culture." Here, we use "traditional culture," not as static and unchanging, but rather as evolving according to the desires of group members resisting domination, rather than in accord with desires or directions of outsiders (see Smelser 1992). That is, "traditional culture," like all other social forms and structures evolves and changes continuously, if sporadically and unevenly (Fenelon, 1998a: 27–30, 72; Smith and Ward 2000). According to Smelser (1992) culture, and hence "traditional culture," are best thought of in relation to domination and dominant groups that change in world-systems according to success or failure of their expansion. Munch and Smelser (1992) propose rebuilding paradigms inclusive of these constructs, which is what we attempt to do with respect to indigenous peoples.

Culture building can be another form of resistance. For instance there are 33 tribal colleges in the U.S. (American Indian Higher Education Consortium 2000; Boyer 1997).<sup>4</sup> These are institutions of higher education, typically equivalents of junior colleges, run by various Native American groups. They differ from the typical U.S. junior college in the number of courses they offer that promote traditional culture, language, crafts, and customs. In some cases, language programs have been aimed at reviving or reinvigorating a language that has fallen out of use. Indeed, these are often their key missions. That is, tribal colleges are often one institutional means of preserving and enhancing "traditional cultures."

Resistance can also take the form of building other localized institutions that conform to traditional cultural values. The Diné (Navajo) have several such institutions. The tribal police force, while acting much like any other rural police force in the U.S., is also culturally sensitive to Navajo traditions and works within them. More direct are the "peace maker courts" which avoid adversarial

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<sup>3</sup> Gedicks (1993) provides an early view of indigenous and environmental movements in the context of Wisconsin. Gedicks (2001) provides a global summary, and clearly shows that the budding movement toward alliances is a global movement, often tied, if at times ambivalently, with antiglobalization movements. Nesper (2002) provides a detailed summary of the fishing controversies in Wisconsin.

<sup>4</sup> Boyer (1997) actually reports 31 such colleges, but two others have opened since that report was published.

techniques of Anglo courts by pursuing resolution of disputes, among Navajos, through means that are in accord with Navajo concepts of harmony.<sup>5</sup>

Other forms of resistance are less institutionalized, but nonetheless important. Ward et al. (2000; and Baird-Olsen and Ward 2000) analyze how women among the northern Cheyenne have adapted conventional 12 step programs that address alcohol abuse or spouse abuse to Cheyenne culture, promoting Cheyenne family values. Miller (1994) and Chiste (1994) discuss the ways in which Native women are producing new feminisms within changing tribal governments. Another common institution among Native Americans in the U.S. is maintenance of matrilineal family systems, especially through the ownership of property. This often comes at a great price, as missionaries and bureaucratic functionaries have repeatedly attacked matrilineality as “barbaric,” unchristian, or chaotic. Native American feminism often organizes in ways that oppose more mainstream feminist movements. Typically Native American feminists focus on issues of identity and cultural preservation as prior to more narrowly focused feminist concerns (Jaimes and Halsey 1992; Shoemaker 1995).

Religion can be yet another form of resistance. Maintenance of religious practices over massive attempts to destroy them, asserts an entirely different way of approaching the supernatural and the sacred. Among the most critical of these practices are lands that are sacred and necessary for religious ceremonies. This leads to conflicts over use of the land for sacred functions versus “productive” and/or “recreational” use (McLeod 2001). Today as “new agers” have begun to practice various forms of shamanism, Indian groups have protested such attempts to appropriate Native traditions (Churchill 1994, 1996; Rose 1992).

The revival of older traditions, such as the Sun Dance (see for example, Jorgensen 1972; Fenelon 1998a: 114, 288–294), can be another form of religious resistance. These revivals hark back to many revitalization movements: the Longhouse religion of the Iroquois (Wallace 1969), the Ghost Dance movement (Brown 1976; Champagne 1983; DeMallie 1982; Landsman 1979; Thornton 1986, 1987), and the Native American Church (La Barre 1964; Aberle 1982; Stewart

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<sup>5</sup> Peacemaker Court – The foundational principle of the Peacemaker Court is *ke*, or “respect, responsibility and proper relationships among all people.” ...Based upon traditional Navajo ceremonies that seek a common goal among groups of individuals, the Peacemaker Court assists disputants in the healing process by fostering a mutually beneficial agreement. [http://tlj.unm.edu/resources/navajo\\_nation/](http://tlj.unm.edu/resources/navajo_nation/) This is well illustrated in the video, *Winds of Change: A Matter of Promises*. PBS documentary, 1990.

1987), etc. These movements, all of which are somewhat syncretic, preserve many traditional values and have all met with some success in combating the destructiveness of incorporation into the capitalist world-system. The Longhouse religion has been a source of strength among Iroquois. Russell Thornton (1986) argues persuasively that adoption of the Ghost Dance Religion helped many small groups that had suffered severe demographic loss, due to disease, to recover both demographically and culturally. More recently the Native American Church (also known as the peyote religion) has been very successful in helping individuals recover from alcoholism. Also NAC has won several court battles that allow members to use peyote (Iverson 1999: 181–182).

All of these religious traditions are vastly different from the various monotheisms found in the states of the modern world-system. Their survival and growth is an important form of resistance to the ideologies of the modern world-system and to pressures for increasing homogeneity of culture due to various globalization processes. Moreover, they are tied to “traditional” culture in important ways for continuing resistance to hegemonic domination.

Some of the most significant forms of resistance are the various ways that resources are managed collectively, for collective good. Phrased alternatively, there are various ways of pursuing collective rationality. Here one must be careful not to read this as conventional “public goods” administration. This goes much further, in collective ownership of goods—land and livestock most commonly—that are typically individually, privately owned commodities in the capitalist world-system.

One of the more dramatic examples of such resistance is the continuing effort of Lakota peoples to regain control of the Black Hills. Several court decisions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have determined that the territory of the Black Hills was illegally taken from the Lakota peoples (Lazarus, 1991; Iverson 1999:117; Churchill 1996:69–80). In accord with U.S. jurisprudence the settlement of this claim has been monetary. The Lakota peoples, however, have steadfastly refused such commodified settlements and have insisted on the return of the land that they consider sacred. The intensity of this commitment is underscored by the relative poverty of Lakota people. Shannon county, South Dakota, where Pine Ridge reservation is located, (the reservation closest to the Black Hills) has been, since 1980, the poorest county in the U.S. Despite the temptation to take the cash settlement, the Lakotas have continued to reject such a settlement and continue to struggle for the return of their land.

Running through all these discussions for Indigenous Peoples in the U.S. has been the issue of sovereignty. Because of initial treaty agreements, indigenous peoples in the U.S. have a special relationship, directly with the U.S. federal government (Deloria and Wilkins, 2000). It is on this legal status that many actions

of Native American groups rest. Indeed, sovereignty issues are often the basis of challenges to states around the world and cut to the heart of the interstate system built on the Peace of Westphalia (1648) (Wilmer 1993, 2002; Alfred and Wilmer 1997). John Stack (1997) argues that various ethnic movements continually challenge the structure and processes of the interstate system and our understandings of it.

Although Native peoples have met with some success in maintaining sovereignty, they have had to fight on European grounds—within European law (for detailed examples from northern New Spain see Cutter 1995a, 1995b). We will discuss the sovereignty issue in more detail later. Recently, one of the more outstanding successes has been to use the doctrine of sovereignty to build various gaming operations (Mullis and Kamper 2000; Fenelon 2000). By exploiting the contradictory desires for access to gambling and a desire to forbid it, American Indians have begun to turn considerable profits. But for other groups, such as the Choctaw, this success is fragile and volatile and subject to federal redefinition (Faiman-Silva 1997).

The question remains, how much they have had to give up to win these victories. By fighting European civilization on its own turf, they have had to accept some of the premises of that turf. Thomas Biolsi argues that the law is “a fundamental constituting axis of modern social life—not just a political resource or an institution but a constituent of all social relations of domination” (Biolsi 1995, p. 543). Thus, courts have been a leading institutional means of commodifying everything; especially land (Biolsi 1995, 2001). Still, indigenous peoples continue to use legal systems to resist incorporation and global capitalism, when they are available with direct access. Here we must note an important difference between indigenous struggles in the core or “first” world and those in the “third world” or peripheral areas. The rule of law carries much more force in the first world, or core, and so is a more useful tool there. This difference holds as a “rule of thumb” but finds exceptions in both directions. Most notable when making this distinction is acknowledging temporal analysis, since North American genocides were common well into the second half of the nineteenth century (Thornton 1987), even as Canada and U.S. indigenous “sovereigns” were internally recognized (Fenelon 2002).

There have been many forms of symbolic resistance. For instance, political pressure has led to several national and/or state parks reserving some areas for traditional Native American ceremonies, such as Bear Butte, Devil’s Postpile, Medicine Wheel, etc. (McLeod 2001). Another example has been the movement against the use of Native American images as sports mascots (Fenelon 1999), or the national movement to remove the term “squaw” from many place names. The expansion of the Powwow circuit is also a vital form of asserting Indianness that

both reinforces Indian identity and presents Indianness to a general audience (Mattern 1996; Lassiter 1997).

In recent decades there have been movements that have challenged globalizing capitalism (Wilmer 1993). These movements have included those by NGOs such as Cultural Survival, International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, the Center for World Indigenous Studies, or the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. There are also several Indigenous organizations (see Wilmer 1993: 227–229; Smith and Ward 2000). Most of these movements and organizations represent indigenous peoples on both the social group level and collectively, with great variation in their approaches toward issues, the nature of resistance, and the amount of their participation in political spheres.

The Zapatista movement centered in Chiapas (EZLN) has been one of the most dramatic. The Zapatista ideology, and to a large extent Zapatista practices, contradict the logic of capitalism. They reject modernization and development (Ross 1995; Katzenberger 1995; Collier 1999). Mignolo (2002) argues that the Zapatista movement constitutes an alternative to greco-roman legacies of state making. The Zapatistas seek to maintain traditional life ways in the face of overwhelming forces to assimilate to capitalist culture and practice in opposition to NAFTA and FTAA. The recent march to Mexico City and the demonstrations in the Zocalo, (March 13, 2001) accompanied by a huge outpouring of civil society in support of the Zapatistas, are some indication of the growing impact of such movements.

To facilitate further discussion of indigenous survival we present some definitions, concepts, and observations. All these are backed by extended arguments, made elsewhere, but not recapitulated in detail here.

#### DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS, OBSERVATIONS

The category, “indigenous peoples,” itself is a gross simplification of an immense variety of types of social organizations (Champagne 1999a; Stavenhagen 1990; Wolf 1999). This diversity is arguably greater than the diversity of types of state organizations found throughout the 500 year history of the “modern world-system,” or even the 5000 year history of all states (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997, 1998; Frank and Gills 1993; Hall 1989b: ch 3; Sanderson 1999; Smith 1999).

Either term, “indigenous peoples” or “non-state society,” lump this diversity into an overly simple category that emphasizes these differences from states, but little else. Yet, these differences are key. First, these are **not** state-based organizations. This, however, does not mean that they did not have identities and political structures. Nor is this to deny that there were indigenous states in North and South America prior to European contact—there were: Aztecs, Maya, Inka, etc.

(Chase-Dunn and Hall 1998; La Lone 2000). Furthermore, some indigenous societies took on, and sometimes lost state-like qualities, including the Cahokia (Forbes 1998; O'Brien 1992) and the Haudenosaunee peoples (Iroquois, see Snow 1994). The point is, differences in social organization are crucial, but they are avowedly not assertions about claims to rights, or international status, which we will discuss later. Second, all these forms of social organization are non-capitalist, a term often glossed as "pre-capitalist." The latter term has two unfortunate connotations. On the one hand, it refers to organizations that preceded the advent of capitalism, taking for the moment that capitalism, as a mode of accumulation is less than 500 years old. A second, dysfunctional connotation is that such organizations are precursors of capitalism. Thus, at best they are "primitive" forms, and at worst outmoded and outdated. Our point is that these forms of organization are fundamentally rooted in modes of organization, production, and accumulation that have little to do with capitalist accumulation of capital, and thus resist assimilation into those kinds of systems.<sup>6</sup>

That said it is critical to recognize, as Eric Wolf argued so persuasively (1982), that these peoples do, and did, have histories separate and distinct from those of European states, and, indeed, all states (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997, 1998). Furthermore, indigenous peoples have been forced to deal with waves of European expansion and the increasing globalization of capitalism over the last 500 years. Many peoples have been incorporated into the capitalist world-system, but far from completely. Many have resisted incorporation heroically, and untold numbers have died doing so.<sup>7</sup>

A key aspect of this argument is that indigenous peoples who struggle to preserve much, or some, of their noncapitalist roots—for example, communally held property rights—constitute, by virtue of their continuing existence, a form of anti-capitalist resistance to incorporation into the world-system, and a challenge to the assumption of the state as the basic political unit of human social organization. This is yet another way in which the claim to sovereignty by Native

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<sup>6</sup> Capital accumulation refers to amassing wealth in any form, capitalist accumulation to "the amassing of wealth by means of the making of profits from commodity production" (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997, p. 271). For more elaborate discussions of the changes over last 5,000 years see Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) and Frank and Gills (1993).

<sup>7</sup> For detailed examples of such resistance see Dunaway 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997, 2000; Faiman-Silva 1997; Fenelon 1997, 1998a; Hall 1986, 1987, 1989a, 1989b; Harris 1990; Himmel 1999; Kardulias 1990; Mathien and McGuire 1986; Meyer 1990, 1991, 1994; Peregrine 1992, 1995; Peregrine and Feinman 1996; Pickering 2000.

American groups is a challenge to the capitalist conception of states. However, the challenge is not only political-economic, but also cultural.

Culture and identity politics have become very highly contested issues in recent decades. Within these debates, the names of indigenous peoples are particularly contested.<sup>8</sup> Thus, it is useful to explain why we use some terms and eschew others. Such things can become especially insidious when their roots are lost. In order to avoid both reading the past into the present and the present into the past requires distinctions that enable us to describe changes with some precision. On the one hand, some argue that to label chiefdoms "nations" confounds a profoundly modern form of social organization with a much older, and very different form of social organization. On the other hand, others argue that variations among "nations" are sufficiently distinguished by differentiation from the concept of "nation-state."<sup>9</sup>

The term "indigenous" is inherently troublesome and should be accepted as such, (Snipp 1986, 1989, 1992; Stavenhagen 1990: Ch. 8; Hall and Nagel 2000). For instance, in mainland Southeast Asia almost everyone is both indigenous and usurped, and typically several times in each role. It is a region where peoples have crossed and recrossed, conquered and reconquered each other for millennia. An ethnic map of Southeast Asia looks like a Jackson Pollock painting (Lebar et al. 1964). Who is indigenous cannot be settled by conceptual parsing. History is complex and messy. If we are going to construct theoretical accounts to deal with it, they must recognize that complexity and messiness.

We use "indigenous" to refer to people who "were in that place" when some others came and usurped some or all of their political control and power and their economic resources. They should have been there for several generations. However, this, too, is politicized. At times, apologists for usurpation of indigenous territory by the U.S. have argued that this or that "tribe" had just recently conquered their traditional territory from some other "tribe." This argument is conceptually inaccurate, often factually wrong and sometimes downright bogus.

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<sup>8</sup> This discussion draws extensively from Hall and Nagel (2000), Chase-Dunn and Hall (1998:25-27), Nagel (1996: xi-xiii; 3-42), Riggs (1998a, 1998b, 1998c) and Hall (1998a). Stephen Cornell (1988) emphasizes political incorporation in his discussions. Other general literature on identity politics includes: Benedict Anderson (1991), Jonathan Friedman (1994, 1998, 1999), Mike Featherstone (1990); Featherstone et al. (1995), Anthony D. King (1997), Roland Robertson (1995).

<sup>9</sup> On the former see: Hall 1998a, 1998b; Riggs 1994, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c. On the latter see: Fenelon 1998a; Deloria and Lytle, 1984; Deloria and Wilkins 2000.

For instance, with respect to the founding of the League of the Iroquois see Mann and Fields (1997); or with respect to Lakota claims for the Black Hills see Goodman (1992).

All this is compounded by the political/ideological use of such terms. This, of course, is what some of the postmodernist critique is about, the power to make and enforce names. This is compounded by at least two uses of the term "tribe": (1) a generic term that is more-or-less synonymous with "nonstate"; (2) a technical legal term that refers to treaty-sanctioned and recognized peoples in the U.S. With respect to usage (1), but definitely not (2), "tribes" (1) are not states. Rather, they are different forms of social organization (see, for example Fried 1975 or Hall 1989b: Ch. 3). A good deal of confusion is generated by the popular and persistent, yet erroneous, use of "nation," "state," and "nation-state" as synonyms. With respect to "tribe" (2) most of the treaties made by the U.S., and in most cases by those colonizing forces of expanding world-systems entering into such agreements, were made with "nations" and not tribes. That is, the treaties recognized them as political equivalents, regardless of social organization.

Finally, all of these social structures have, themselves, evolved over considerable time. They transform from one thing to another. An indigenous group that continues to exist today is **not** a "living fossil." Rather, it too has evolved, often having changed and adapted to a context in which it has been surrounded by one or more, typically hostile, states (Smith and Ward 2000). Indeed, one of the powerful insights from world-system theory, modern or ancient, is that the fundamental entity evolving is the system itself and that the evolution of any component of a system must be understood within the context of system evolution. Indeed, Rata argues, for the Maori people; their very concept and especially the practice of indigeness is changing. The salient context today, and into the 21st century is that it is a capitalist world-system that is continuing to evolve and change.

### *Genocide, Ethnocide, and Culturicide*<sup>10</sup>

Within these evolutionary processes there are many ways an ethnic or an indigenous group might be destroyed. Genocide, ethnocide, and culturicide share an element of intentional destruction of a group. Genocide is probably the most familiar, and certainly the most brutal: the outright murder of all members

<sup>10</sup> This discussion draws heavily on the work of James Fenelon (1995, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) who developed the concept of culturicide. Clastres (1980) makes the earliest use of the term ethnocide, albeit not with this precise meaning.

of an identifiable descent group, or the attempt to do so. In contrast ethnocide and culturicide involve attempts at to destroy a group's identity, and/or culture, without necessarily killing individual human beings.

Ethnocide is an attempt to destroy the identity of a group. In its ideal-typical form it would entail full assimilation of individuals into the dominant group, although some cultural elements might still persist.<sup>11</sup> A key feature here, besides the obvious internal contradiction of destroying an identity but allowing some of its "content" to remain, is that the group, qua a group, disappears. In contrast, culturicide is an attempt to kill a culture, whether or not its members survive, and whether or not they retain a separate identity (Fenelon 1995, 1997, 1998a). A notorious example is that of Richard Pratt, founder of the Carlisle Indian School, whose explicit goal for the school was "to kill the Indian, but save the man" (Adams 1988, 1995). While Pratt seems seriously retrograde at the beginning of the 21st century, he was a humanitarian reformer in the context of the late 19th century, when many still called for outright genocide (Hoxie 1984; Adams 1995). Here the separate identity may survive, but the cultural content is eliminated.

Ethnocide and culturicide are somewhat overlapping processes. Each process, and indeed which process operates, are largely conditioned on the degree to which group distinctions are racialized. Obviously, to the degree that readily visible phenotypically distinctive features mark a group, maintenance of identity in face of destruction of the culture is more possible. Ethnocide, and especially culturicide, are often intimately intertwined with racialization processes. These interconnections warrant further analysis, but we leave that task aside for now.

As already noted, ethnocide is closely similar to the older concept of assimilation; in which one group adjusts its culture to become progressively more like that of another group. The difference is the clear intent to eliminate the group identity. Culturicide, on the other hand, does not need to destroy the identity as long as the "content" of the identity becomes nearly the same as that of the dominant group, and thus subordinate to the socio-economic goals, practices, and ideologies of those in power.

<sup>11</sup> Ortiz (1985, 1984) analyzes relations in Central and North America using a rubric of ethnocide, reflected in analysis by Stavenhagen (1990). While ethnocide has been practiced extensively in Central America, except where resistance has been more successful, culturicide appears more closely related to policy constructs in modern states that do not want to appear genocidal to the external world. Culturicide also applies to non-indigenous people, connected as policy to racially subordinated groups and race-based slavery in the United States.

So how is it that indigenous peoples have resisted attempts at ethnocide or culturicide? As already noted, one way is by remaining small, and therefore relatively nonthreatening, at least to the point that the costs of pursuing ethnocide or culturicide have not been worth while. Another form of resistance has been via relative isolation. This, however, is most often an accident of history—being located within a region of little interest to the state or world-system, owning or controlling resources seen to have no or little value to the larger system. Building upon, or using, a recognized land base to keep the community viable are also resistance forms, but these forms are more of the order of passive resistance.

We listed many other more active forms of resistance at the start of this paper. How effective they will be in the long run (whatever we mean by “long”) remains unclear. Clearly, resistance that focuses on symbols runs the risk of allowing culturicide to proceed; in that the identity, via the symbols, is maintained while its content becomes progressively more assimilated to the dominant culture.

However, some of the other forms noted above preserve not only symbols, but also material practices that contradict how capitalism is practiced. They represent alternative ways of organizing human life. What is far from clear, however, is whether these too can ultimately become “merely symbolic.” Is an American Indian nation which insists on tribal sovereignty, which administers resources according to principles of collective rationality, yet, which externally participates in a capitalist world-system according to capitalist principles, resisting globalizing capitalism, or slowly evolving into an alternative form of capitalism? This, it seems, is the key question in the survival of indigenous peoples everywhere. However, such processes are not exclusively modern, but have, as we noted, occurred since states were first invented some five millennia ago.

#### INCORPORATION INTO WORLD-SYSTEMS: ANCIENT OR MODERN

When a world-system expands, new areas are incorporated, and boundaries are formed and transformed.<sup>12</sup> Incorporated areas and peoples, even when incorporation is relatively limited in degree, often experience profound effects from incorporation and occasionally devastating ones. They also react against and resist these effects to whatever degree possible. Thus, the study of incorporation entails close attention to local conditions, actors, and actions as well

<sup>12</sup> Major discussions of the concept of incorporation may be found in: Wallerstein 1974, 1989; Hopkins, et al 1987; Markoff 1994; Carlson 2001; Hall 1986, 1989b; Hall 2002b. Herein, “land” issues including control and sovereignty are obscured by Manifest Destiny ideologies, often erasing knowledge of land tenure systems of indigenous peoples.

as system-wide processes, and especially the complex interactions between the two (Hall 1989b). Incorporation is a two-way, interactive process. To label this entire range “incorporation” masks important variations and makes it more difficult to understand different processes and outcomes that occur on the frontiers of world-systems.<sup>13</sup>

Some changes induced by incorporation may be reversible, others are not, or only with great difficulty. For instance Dunaway cites comments by a Cherokee chief who lamented in the 1700s that young men had become so dependent on guns that they could no longer use, not to mention produce suitable bows and arrows. Another common result is that indigenous peoples are relocated to “reserve” areas. These go by many names: reservations, reserves, domestic nations, *establicimientos de paz*, etc. These are often “temporary,” where “temporary” can be a century or more (for a global survey see Perry 1996). States seek to abolish such reserves for a variety of reasons. Frequently reserves become attractive for further development especially when some formerly unknown or “useless” mineral, such as oil or uranium, becomes valuable due to new technological developments. States may tire of the administrative and economic overhead of such special status areas and/or peoples. Both have been common in the United States where the special legal status of American Indians generates all sorts of legal and political problems. Eras when a drive for a “national culture” increases can create extensive pressures for assimilation to the dominant culture. One legacy of the obsession with nation-building, common in 20th century third world countries, is for states to become “embarrassed” by the continued existence of “backward” or “primitive” population segments. Their typical response is vigorous, often coercive, drives for assimilation (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Hall 1998a).

The extension of world-systems theory into precapitalist settings suggests additional refinements of the analysis of incorporation, which shed some light on commonalities of incorporation in the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Hall 2002b). First, incorporation is not one-dimensional, but multi-dimensional, reflecting four types of world-system boundaries. Thus, incorporation can be economic (for either bulk goods or luxury goods), political/military, or cultural. The latter assumes that culture, however defined, is a type of information. Second, incorporation often creates multiple frontiers, corresponding to each of the boundaries (see Hall 2000, 2002a). Third, *ceteris paribus*, incorporation will begin at the furthest boundaries, information and luxury goods, and

<sup>13</sup> The analysis of frontiers as zones of incorporation may be found in: Hall 1986, 1989b, 2000, 2002a; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: Ch. 4.

proceed to narrower, more intense forms along the political/military boundary and finally along the bulk goods dimension. Fourth, relations among the dimensions of incorporation are complex theoretically and empirically.

For instance, many of the American Indian groups we know today were built from an aboriginal base of loosely connected living groups during the process of incorporation, e.g., the Diné (Navajo) (Hall 1989b, 1998b). While language, customs, and a sense of being the same “people” predate the arrival of Europeans, Diné-wide institutions such as the Navajo Tribal Council were developed only well into the incorporation process. Stephen Cornell (1988) argues that in early stages of United States expansion, identity for Native American groups was typically larger than any political organization (as among the Diné or Lakota) and subsequent political incorporation often reversed this relationship typically creating sub-group as well as supra-group identities.

Just how and why this works is problematic. To illustrate, the Lakota were not just loosely connected groups, but quite literally had different sets of socio-political connectedness that allowed for greater fluidity of local and regional decision-making. That is, Lakota peoples may not have been bands, but had an organization more akin to a segmentary lineage system. These systems allowed Lakota to successfully fight U.S. intrusions, and forced the U.S. to use the term “nation” during treaty-making. The same pressures further forced designation of “chiefs” (since they did not exist in that manner earlier) who would head up “tribal councils” that ultimately turn into the form designated in 1934 Indian Reorganization Act reconstructions (Biolsi 1992). Identity and political organization are undifferentiated for the Lakota until after 1868, when their divisions became a form of cultural domination (Fenelon 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1999).

In other parts of the world, the process of attempted incorporation and resistance to it is much older. Indigenous resistance to expanding world-systems, empires, states, and individuals is ubiquitous and has been continual since states were first created. This carries several important implications for analysis of resistance to world-systemic processes. First many of the putative evolutionary sequences and/or so-called pristine forms of organization are highly suspect. They are, more often than not, themselves products of long interactions. Second, this suggests caution in always attributing the deleterious consequences of incorporation to “capitalism.” Rather, there is more continuity in this area between tributary and capitalist world-systems. Third, what does seem to be different in the capitalist world-system is the overwhelming power of states relative to indigenous groups, its truly global reach, and the preponderance of capitalist reasons for expansion. The latter include expansion especially for resources, labor, and markets. Fourth, the concomitant rise in nation building in the modern world-system, as noted above, has led to much stronger attempts at assimilation of

incorporated groups than was common in tributary world-systems (Hall 1987, 1998a). Finally, following Eric Wolf (1982), the histories of these encounters are almost exclusively written from the point of view of expanding state systems. Almost universally, these histories take as axiomatic that state-based systems are inherently superior to nonstate systems, and that transforming the latter is “helping” them.

Incorporation into the modern world-system can also have divisive effects. For the White Earth Anishinaabeg (Chippewa or Ojibwa), increasing incorporation fractured old clan and band distinctions and created a new division between more and less assimilated Anishinaabeg, or in local parlance, between full- and mixed-bloods (Meyer 1994). Sandra Faiman-Silva (1997) finds much the same processes among the Mississippi Choctaw. Indeed, the full-blood/mixed-blood distinction is an important consequence of incorporation into the European world-system with far-reaching legal consequences. That is, blood quantum becomes covertly connected with development of highly racialized policies (Smedley 1999) that act directly and institutionally indirectly, as agents of domination and subordination. Even splitting into factions can be the result of the policies, actions, and resistances to incorporation and domination.

Partial incorporation can simultaneously transform indigenous peoples and contribute to state building. Kristine L. Jones (1998) argues that trade among indigenous peoples and between indigenous peoples and Spanish settlers in the Pampas helped in the process of state-building by fostering increased trade. Pekka Hämäläinen (1998) makes a similar argument for the role of Comanches in the southwestern Great Plains. He argues that trade with indigenous peoples helped strengthen New Mexico while also building a tribal political structure among Comanche bands.

Gender roles and gender relations are also reshaped by incorporation. Women are often harmed by incorporation even while men may at times benefit, although the entire group usually suffers. There are gender and class differentials in contraception (Bradley 1997), fertility (Ward 1984), labor force participation (Ward 1990), and household structure and function (Smith et al. 1988). The key process here seems to be that new resources are differentially accessible by gender, usually giving increased power to men, and decreasing social power and changing the social roles of women, although that is not always the case (see studies in Bose & Acosta-Belen 1995). Both Dunaway (1996a, 1997, 2000) and Faiman-Silva (1997) find this to hold for Cherokee and Choctaw. The impacts of incorporation on the social construction of gender and gender relations remain poorly studied. Clearly, however, studies of incorporation and resistance are an excellent venue for taking gender issues seriously, as called for by Ward (1993), Misra (2000), and Dunaway (2001).

## THE PUZZLES OF INDIGENOUS SURVIVAL AND PERSISTING ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Even though resistance to incorporation is old, survival of indigenous groups remains problematic. This survival is one of two persisting puzzles: 1) the persistence of ethnic groups and 2) the persistence of indigenous groups. Both are distinctive in that they are organizations not based on capitalist relations. Let us hasten to say, before someone jumps up to beat us about the head and shoulders with the “primordialist” or “essentialist” bludgeons, that we claim neither. Rather, we claim that both types of groups have their fundamental social links around kinship and community, irrespective of how they make their livings. Here we must confront a basic misunderstanding by Marx, that ties of common work experiences—relations of production—are often **not** sufficiently powerful to overcome completely ties of kinship and face-to-face community. This is why both nations and movements adopt metaphors of kinship to build solidarity; or to invert Benedict Anderson, that is why the “imagined community,” the nation-state, must be imagined. This is not to gainsay that such a transformation might happen, but rather to note that it has not happened completely.

When these ties of kinship and community coincide with ways of making a living, they become extremely powerful in binding people together and in maintaining a sense of solidarity. This is precisely what happens within most indigenous communities. Even where members participate in the wider capitalist economy and its wage-labor processes, they remain tied to their indigenous communities. Thus, it is no accident that the most successful of such groups are ones with a continuously existing land base—even if it is a land base from which they have become widely dispersed. In the homeland, means of making a living, or of surviving, are tied to that land base: tribal identities linked to reservations in the U.S.; to traditional lands elsewhere.

Phrased alternatively land still maintains for many indigenous peoples meanings that preceded what Polanyi called the “Great Transformation.”<sup>14</sup> Again, we are not asserting some sort of “primitiveness,” but alternative ways of viewing land, not as a commodity, but as something much broader. This comes out again and again in the resistance statements of indigenous peoples, especially those called “Indians” on the North and Central American continents.

Keeping the particular in mind as the ultimate reference point of Indian knowledge, we can pass into a discussion of some of the principles of the Indian

<sup>14</sup> The literature by and on Polanyi is enormous. We base our comments on the following writings: Dalton 1968; Polanyi 1944, 1957, 1977; Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957.

forms of knowledge. Here power and place are dominance concepts—power being the living energy that inhabits and/or composes the universe, and place being the relationship of things to each other (Deloria 2001:22–23).

Deloria is referencing, in Lakota, power as “*wakan*” (as a living mysterious energy), and place as “*maka*” (the earth, but used in sacred language as “*unci maka*” or the earth as our grandmother, now the direct reference to “*ina maka*” or “mother earth”), thus establishing connectivity and relationships. Experientially and theoretically, commodification of land and resources is the polar opposite of these philosophies.

Indigenous peoples were not so much unable to understand private property or land boundaries and established monetary value, but were in fact rejecting those concepts as invalid along both spiritual and social value systems. That rejection continues, whether found in Crazy Horse’s statement: “One does not sell the land which the people walk upon”, to the Zapatista’s rejection of private ownership of the plantations, and is exemplified, for the White Mountain Apache, in Basso’s (1996) “wisdom sits in places.” Each of these traditions, represents resistance of the highest order to early globalization, (Lakota, 1860–1990; Apache, 1870 and on, and the EZLN contemporary).

Indian accumulation of information is directly opposed to the Western scientific method of investigation, because it is primarily observation. Indians look for messages in nature, but they do not force nature to perform functions that it does not naturally do... [Indian students] must always keep in mind that traditional knowledge of their people was derived from centuries, perhaps millennia, of experience. Thus stories that seem incredible when compared with scientific findings may indeed represent that unique event that occurs once a century and is not likely to be repeated. Western knowledge, on the other hand, is so well controlled by doctrine that it often denies experiences that could provide important data for consideration (Deloria 2001: 28).

Here we see how knowledge systems are constructed, defended and expressed by both dominant groups and those in resistance. This is profound and demonstrates even deeper issues, though they certainly relate to the land and the cosmos. Fenelon’s experience with the Spirit Lake Nation (Devil’s Lake Sioux) in the Dakotas exemplifies this well. Apparently, “traditionalists” had been telling engineers, especially the Army Corps, “the waters” (*minnewakan*) rose every seventh generation (approximately one hundred years) and cleansed the land for renewal. The Corps called that “old Indian talk” until the waters did indeed, rise in the 1990’s, and rise all the way to state and federal governments requesting massive intervention. In response, the Corps proposed to build huge pumping stations on the trust reservation lands and dump the excess (some would say polluted runoff) over the ridge into the Cheyenne River, which flows into the

north-running Red River, which goes through Fargo and Grand Forks and then into Canada. Although the coalition defeated the project (primarily through sovereignty issues) and the ridiculous notion of dumping water into one of the nation's worst flooded river basins, experiential knowledge known only through the oral tradition not only predicted this water run, but also observed the beneficial qualities. In this respect, both resistance and cultural survival are important resources, albeit mostly at odds with a system of capitalist accumulation and values based on monetary worth.

By extension, we can learn a great deal from studies of pre-modern-world-system ethnic relations. States, since they were first invented, have necessarily been poly- or multi- ethnic. The ethnically unitary nation-state is a chimera—in the ancient and the modern world (McNeill 1986; Gurr 1993, Hall 1998a, Laczko 2000). States, or more properly the world-systems within which they are located, always expand. Hence, even if states and world-systems are ethnically homogeneous at their first formation, they quickly incorporate new peoples and become diverse. In tributary world-systems, constituent states often do not attempt to assimilate those who are ethnically different to the dominant ethnic culture, though some do, they never succeed completely. Rather, they are concerned with the collection of tribute. Clearly, the constituent ethnic groups, within any one state, are hierarchically organized. Egalitarian situations are rare. They are artifacts of peculiarly balanced social forces. Over time, groups do, however, change, transform and transmute into different forms. In tributary systems, such changes are typically slow, often imperceptible in the short term, so identities are easily conflated with both territory and biology. In recent times these processes have generally sped up, so that situational, reactive, or socially-constructed ethnicity is now not only obvious to most observers, but all too typically perceived as “normal,” or “natural.” There are also abundant examples of the content of identities converging even while the boundaries between them are reinforced (Barth 1969). Barth argues, “that a drastic reduction of cultural difference between ethnic groups does not correlate in any simple way with a reduction in the organizational relevance of ethnic identities, or a breakdown in boundary-maintaining processes” (Barth 1969: 32). But a closer look at most ethnic changes reveals that they typically take generations or centuries to occur, and are often accompanied by much conflict.

One consequence of the space-time compression (Harvey 1989) associated with increasing globalization and the various cyclical processes of the modern world-system, especially in recent decades, has been that these pressures for change of identity have become more overt, explicit, and obvious. Hence, not surprisingly, so too have the efforts to resist those pressures become more overt and explicit. The clashes and conflicts seem to be most extreme when the incor-

porated or encapsulated groups are, or recently were, organized according to the logic of a different mode of accumulation.

The point we wish to emphasize here, while in some ways obvious, is in other ways obscure. Because such groups are organized according to a different logic, they are more of a threat to the overall system than challengers who are more powerful—economically, politically, or militarily—because they are proof that the logic of the dominant system is not “natural,” “normal,” “manifest,” or “inevitable,” but rather has been constructed by human beings, whether consciously or not. In short, by their very continued existence, indigenous peoples are concrete empirical proof that shouts of TINA [There Is No Alternative (to global capitalism)] are patently false (see Bennholdt-Thomsen et al. 2001, for further examples). More germane to this discussion is how “manifest destiny” ideologies have informed, if not distorted, much social analysis of indigenous peoples in North America and elsewhere.

Currently, with the end of the cold war and the collapse of any sort of immediately viable socialist alternative to capitalism as an organizing principle for human society, these challenges increase in salience. This, of course, makes the puzzle of their continuing survival all the more puzzling. If they offer such a threat to ideological hegemony of the current system, why have they not been summarily crushed? In part, the answer is that many have. But within capitalist culture's self-conception, wholesale slaughter of human beings for the “crime” of being different has become unacceptable, or at least “gauche.” Discriminatory treatment, ranging from death to social isolation, follows a similar pattern.<sup>15</sup> Thus, other techniques have been tried, most have failed miserably, and often have backfired, strengthening oppositional identities. But also, as in tributary states where the primary concern was that ethnic “others” deliver tribute, not conform, the same is true within the capitalist system where the primary concern is that “others” enter the market and play by capitalist rules. Furthermore, even when such challengers use whatever they gain from “playing the capitalist game” (as with Native

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<sup>15</sup> In early August 2002 the Turkish Parliament, after vociferous debate, abolished the death penalty and gave greater rights to the Kurds. Both moves were prompted by a desire on the part of a thin majority of members to join the EU. Presuming the law stands and is enforced [which may be rash assumptions], this will incrementally improve the lives of Turkish Kurds, but is not a move to a “golden age” of Kurdish autonomy. Yet, this is an example of how changing global climate can change the playing field in the struggle for indigenous rights. However, regional and perhaps global concerns about Iraqi Kurds' insurrection sit within four states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria) all of which are vested in not having any form of a Kurdistan.

American gaming operations) to preserve their non-capitalist organization (such as when Native Americans use profits from gaming operations collectively for collective goals) they have not been perceived as a severe threat to the overall system. There are at least two aspects to this. First, they do not challenge the system in an attempt to replace or overthrow it. Rather, they seek to carve out a niche within it. Second, most are relatively small—demographically, politically, economically, in resource endowments, etc. Thus, the threats of their existence as alternatives to the dominant mode of organization are outweighed by the self-contradictions that would be made manifest by overt attempts to destroy them.

Within this, however, we should not lose sight of the very skillful efforts of indigenous leaders to play upon precisely these contradictions to defend their niches within the world-system. Franke Wilmer (1993) has observed that one source of indigenous survival in the latter part of the twentieth century, derives from the skills of indigenous leaders to articulate that any justification for eliminating their existence as separate groups, is also a repudiation of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and such “treaties” and therefore the entire interstate system in the modern world. So far, this has been too high of a price to pay. Following Biolsi (2001), we further note that the law can also increase local animosities because it can obviate locally developed *modi vivendi* and force groups into stronger contention than might otherwise have occurred.

However, other processes are also at work. In order to discuss them more precisely it is useful to introduce a few more distinctions.

#### STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY

Wallerstein (2002) has identified the strong reliance of global capitalism on the nation-state system, and its multitude of connections to military-political networks (Chase-Dunn et al. 2002; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997) that prop up and enforce the economic systems and domination. Sklair (2002) argues that now the global system is more important than states. While recognizing that world-system analysis has many insights into the global system, he still faults it for relying too much on the state as a unit of analysis. While the disagreement is relatively mild, our position is intermediate. Even as transnational capitalism and the emerging transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001) seeks to subvert and/or transcend the state in many ways, they also use it extensively. While the processes remain far from clear, the world is in the midst of a considerable shifting of rules and processes that derived from the peace of Westphalia (1648). These changes will require further modification of our analysis of sovereignty.

We argue that the efforts of indigenous groups, as individual groups and as collectivities, are part and parcel of these changes and will play a significant role

in them—a role that cannot be ignored. This is because most indigenous peoples represent an alternative to capitalist accumulation (we pointedly do not mean Marx’s primitive communism, but a literal and real distributive political-economy) that by its very nature poses a perplexing problem, if not a fundamental challenge, to formal state sovereignty. Even as the dialectic outlined above plays out in terms of conflicts between states, indigenous peoples resist from outside the system, often while forced to enact political solutions within individual state structures and regimes.

The United States arguably has the most well-developed and codified relationship with its indigenous peoples, “Indians” who have survived wars and conquest under the treaty system, with Canada following closely over the last two hundred years. Some analysts argue that the Canadians have surpassed the U.S. by recognizing the oral traditions of their “First Nations” (Perry 1996). While nearly all colonial systems conducted forms of genocide, extending over a five hundred year period well into the nineteenth century, most did not develop treaty based legal systems, but many in Central and South America incorporated American Indian peoples into systems of racial subordination, segregation and partial assimilation as minority groups.

As the state system moved throughout its violent growth and development, it utilized two important concepts in its expansion over the western hemisphere, the Doctrine of Discovery and the Princes Rights to Conquest (Deloria and Lytle 1984; Wilkins 1997, 2002; Fenelon 1997; Deloria and Wilkins 1999). These colonial to Indian relationships were at first with very strong Native Nations, including the early U.S. Some were predicated on treaties and various “non-intercourse” acts, meant to contain and control indigenous peoples with a state actor in the expanding world-system. Within the United States such relationships were known as “tribal sovereignty” for those indigenous peoples surviving the conquest eras, and being able to demonstrate political presence over the next two hundred years.

What then evolved in the United States was a complex set of doubled-up Dual Sovereignty relationships (Fenelon 2002) with Federal sovereignty supreme, first with 13 and later up to 50 individual states’ sovereignty, along with the contested notions of tribal sovereignty. The newly developing nation-states of the western hemisphere, including the United States, believed they could extinguish tribal claims to sovereignty at a later date. That has not proven to be the case. However, indigenous resistance to sovereign and capitalist domination has taken on many forms, which generally relate to hegemonic systems in their classic world-systems typologies.

In reviewing the many examples and cases of indigenous peoples in the western hemisphere, we have observed that there is a relationship between the legacy

**Table 1 – Levels and Types of Indigenous Survival within Hegemonic Nation-State Systems**


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<b>Level 1: Sovereignty Recognized – SR</b>
Political – systems recognized by nation-state and even by hegemonic regimes
Economic – limited or in some cases full control over internal institutions
Cultural – intact or assimilated, no longer under strict cultural domination
<b>Level 2: Sovereignty Contested – SC</b>
Political – quasi- or no recognition by nation-state or by hegemonic regimes
Economic – trade and land tenure contested externally, internally controlled
Cultural – assimilated or hidden, under legalized cultural domination (policies)
<b>Level 3: Autonomy Bounded – AB</b>
Political – boundaries noted internally by nation-state or by hegemonic regimes
Economic – all trade and land tenure under external controls, contested internally
Cultural – segregated, assimilated or secreted, legalized cultural domination
<b>Level 4: Autonomy Contested – AC</b>
Political – boundaries shaped and penetrated by nation-state / hegemonic regimes
Economic – trade, land tenure, and property under external and internal controls
Cultural – segregated, assimilated, suppressed or secreted, cultural domination
<b>Level 5: Minority status Defined – MD</b>
Political – no boundaries, relations defined by nation-state / hegemonic regimes
Economic – trade, land tenure, and property under total dominant group policies
Cultural – dominated, suppressed or secreted, (language policy, group property)
<b>Level 6: Minority status Subsumed – MS</b>
Political – no separate legal status, as defined by nation-state / hegemonic regimes
Economic – trade, land tenure, property dominated by elites & nation-state law
Cultural – distorted, suppressed or secreted, (discriminatory systems encouraged)

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of systemic domination type, individual socio-political statuses (tribe/nation/minority-group) and their contemporary socio-political position in the world-system (especially as that may be connected to any hegemonic system decline, presented in Table 2). These relationships may be fairly tightly circumscribed within the Americas, although it is speculative as to how strongly they may be held with various indigenous peoples in other parts of the world, with differing histories and political systems.

This is illustrated in Table 1, where we identify six levels of indigenous survival and resistance, within hegemonic state systems. The key concerns arise in the aforesaid relationships between systemic domination (historically located as a “legacy”), socio-political statuses (individually noted in each system by its own nomenclature) and contemporary socio-political position (discussed earlier as within the world-system of states, perhaps as “third world” and “industrialized” or “first” world). These levels include three primary distinctions:

- ♦ Presence or absence of sovereignty claims by indigenous peoples and recognition by states within the existing hegemonic systems;

- ♦ Nature of any autonomous relations over political, economic and cultural realms of social life, again with states and hegemonic systems;
- ♦ Status as “minority” peoples relative to cultural domination and claims to differential treatment, again within nation-states and hegemonic systems.

The effects of hegemonic cycles in core areas are different than those in peripheral areas. They are mediated through cycles of nationalism and nation-building and also are part of the larger tributary to capitalist shift. Survival is also highly problematic, especially in the contemporary world-system (Hall 1987; Carlson 2001). We elaborate on applications to Table 1 later.

In Table 2, “Eleven Indigenous Societies in Comparative World-Systems Analysis” we identify eleven indigenous peoples from the western hemisphere and suggest levels of domination, current status, and world-system position. Based on earlier work (Hall and Fenelon 2000, 2003), we argue that these cases represent the legacy of systematic domination and resulting socio-political status of colonized and conquered societies. These historical and contemporary socio-political positions in the world system are tightly connected to hegemonic system decline, discussed on a case-by-case basis.

Until two decades ago when the Canadian courts and political processes gave more credence to both historical treaty rights and contemporary laws concerning separatist sovereignty, the Mohawk of Canada (referred to now as a “First Nation”) have been relegated to a subsumed and segregated reserve status following the U.S. policy treatment. During their three or four hundred years of cultural domination, they experienced the full range of relationships, including an exchange of gunfire with the military as late as the 1990’s. The Mohawk exist under different laws but similar status on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border, and thus make a fascinating case of transnational historical ethnicity divided by artificial political borders imposed on them by the dominant groups.


The Lakota (Sioux) represent about two hundred years of conflicts ranging from war, (regionally until 1890 and on smaller scales well into the 1970’s) to formal treaty-making with the United States in spectacular negotiations clearly and primarily revolving around claims to sovereignty and control over land (see Plate 1). The Lakota were forcefully broken up into six different reservation groups only roughly conforming to tribal relationships and without recognition of the 1868 treaty lands or rights. Recently, anti-hegemonic social movements, from the 1960’s have brought these agreements, broken by the United States on multiple occasions, back to the table, and the courts.

The Cherokee were militarily removed under genocidal conditions by the U.S. military; this move was orchestrated by President Jackson in direct opposi-

**Table 2 – Eleven Indigenous Societies in Comparative World-Systems Analysis**

Society, People or "Nation"	Legacy of Systematic Domination	Socio-political Statuses (i.e. tribe/nation)	Historical and Contemporary Socio-Political Position in the World System (connected to hegemonic system decline)
Mohawk U.S.A. (Canada)	Treaty – US Brit.Colonial Reserve - FN	segregated Canada (US) reserves	First Nations sovereignty claim in Canada, internal semiperipheral status, mixed self-determination controlled by state structure
Lakota regional (Dakotas)	Treaty – US Int.-Colony Reservation	reservations (separated) 6 tribe/nation	Indian tribal sovereignty in the United States, Treaty-based claims with self-determination, state-controlled internal semiperiphery
Cherokee removal (U.S. – S.E.)	Treaty – US Relocation Reservations	spatial tribe segregation 2 tribe/nation	Indian tribal sovereignty in the United States, self-determination, state-controlled internal colonial, assimilated semiperiphery
Puyallup urban (U.S. – N.W.)	Int.-Colony Treaty with US	reservations (separated) tribe/nation	U.S. tribal sovereignty, with some treaties, current self-determination, state-controlled, internal assimilation as "minority"
Pequot Wampanoag (U.S. – N.E.)	Genocide, dependence after US	reservations (separated) tribe/nation	U.S. tribal sovereignty, lost and recognized, current self-determination, state-controlled, assimilated as "minority" special legal claim
Yaqui Tarahumara (U.S. – S.W.)	Colonializing Int.-Colony Mexico/US	Y-US "tribe" status unclear in Mexico	U.S. tribal sovereignty, some later treaties, Mexico ejido system, all state-controlled, non-assimilation & "minority" status
Mayan Guatemala (in Chiapas)	Colonial, I.C. genocidal, conquests	suppressed rural groups w/o legality	Subordinated status with little recognition, revolutionary struggle in Chiapas gaining limited autonomy,
Miskito Honduras (Nicaragua)	Int.-Colonial conquest by colonializing	recently won autonomous status – legal	Subordinated "minority" recently winning limited autonomy under armed struggle, socio-economic inclusion as internal colony
Yanomami Brazil (Venezuela)	"Genocidal" Int.-Colony current	Separated territory few protections	Recent conflicts mediated by state controls, Brazil genocidal, Venezuela limited "tribal" protections, isolated territories
Quechuan Ecuador (Peruvian)	Colonial long-term, Int.-colonial	Suppressed minority populations	Dispersed broadly based general population, recent separatist movements increasingly mediated by state structures
Hawaiian Native	conquered neo-state, Int.-colonial	Suppressed minority, factionalized	Submerged "minority" assimilation, recently reinvigorated indigenous sovereignty, treaty-like claims U.S. constitutional law

**Plate 1 – Reservations Boundaries in North / South Dakota**



Reservations boundaries (yellow) in North / South Dakota, United States of America. Outside the bounded areas, American Indians have no "special" rights as a group or class. Inside bounded areas, both non-Indians (whites) and "Indians" contest for territory, jurisdiction, rights, land claims and sovereignty issues. While "trust" status would seem to confer special protection, within the bounded areas, in fact that becomes something negotiated with dominant and elite groups, often as a matter of law. Therefore, weak as the bounds may appear, they are important in terms of maintaining an historical presence of cultural traditionalism and social difference.

tion to Supreme Court rulings and all legal and moral constraints of the time in respect to the Five Civilized Tribes, forcing what many analysts believe to be the single best example of a constitutional crisis, in that all three sovereigns were in play—federal, tribal, state—and all three divisions of the U.S. government were at odds, with raw power to remove Indian peoples winning out. The primary result was the United States ignoring its manufactured crisis over sovereignty, mainly for the purposes of expanding its realm of control and limiting Indian Country.

The Puyallup make another good example of what starts out as another treaty-tribe (essentially over the environs of what is now Tacoma) and though driven out of existence, make a stunning comeback in the late twentieth century to reclaim portions, albeit small, of their earlier claims. The Pequot make an even more compelling story, though eliminated for over three hundred years before the creation of the U.S.A., receive formal recognition partially by Congressional fiat, and then build a legal anomaly entirely on sovereignty into a stunning economic success through Indian Gaming. Wampanoag people represent the flip side of that story, from once great nations first supporting and then warring with English colonists, and then only getting a limited partial recognition through the court system, with little claims and only nominal sovereignty.

The Yaqui complete the United States examples, straddling the border with Mexico, sometimes warring with both countries, and ultimately getting a forced recognition, although growing substantially in the last two decades in terms of its territorial claim. Mexico, although historically an assimilative nation toward indigenous peoples, treated most of their "Indians" with segregated and discriminatory repression. The Tarahumara peoples, (Chihuahua) having often difficult relationships within the *ejido* system of rural land tenure, represent nation-state control over these bounded peoples.

Further to the south, and into Guatemala, Mayan descent Indian peoples in Chiapas, Mexico, represent combined armed and socio-political resistance to U.S.-led globalization, stating their struggle has been for "500 years" and is against transnational capitalism, hemispheric hegemony, and the repression of the peasant Indian for economic profits. Primarily with sovereignty and claims to the land as its basis, revolutionary struggle has linked with indigenous resistance and has percolated over hundreds of years under various regimes and economic domination. Legal, socio-economic, and cultural factors drove mountain indigenous peoples to use arms, illustrating how world-systems shape micro-economic relations, especially when hegemonic decline changes their positions and the activities of dominating elites.

The Miskito in Nicaragua perversely show these contentions in a reverse, namely, that a socialist armed revolutionary government also tries to impose conditions, boundaries, and in a late-stage forced removal, modernized conditions in the world-system, albeit not capitalist. The Sandinistas were, no doubt, responding to hegemonic forces that attempted to employ Miskito people in Honduras to support the Contras. However, the central concerns were against incursions over a limited but existing sovereignty, or in the Miskito case "autonomy" over their lands and socio-political life. While the capitalist systems tend to be more invasive of both cultural and political forms of autonomy, socialist systems are also attempting to exercise their sovereignty over societies, and therefore over

indigenous peoples, making it incumbent on them to resist the corrosive effects of dominating systems. When hegemonic systems are in decline, these patterns become more apparent.

Reacting to an artificially imposed state political border with real effect, the Yanomami people in Venezuela demonstrate similar issues of an "internal colonialism" spreading out as an arm of a predatory economic system, markedly in Brazil, where it is mostly genocidal. Venezuela, on the other hand, has developed bounded reserve areas, similar to North American patterns, with limited protections but a still invasive market economy with trading posts and timber companies. Gold mines and mineral companies operate freely in Brazilian economic expansion, building peripheries out of Yanomami land where they cannot even be a minority group. Hegemonic decline seems to hasten these activities, and put reserved lands and laws in Venezuela into contention, over sovereignty or limited autonomy. This has been contentious since the IMF accords influenced Amazon development strategies.

The Quechuan people in Ecuador, and in a more complicated set of relationships in Peru, maintain a sizable demographic presence that at times must be taken into consideration. For example, in the recent elections followed by a near military coup, indigenous groups were key to swinging political parties behind one side or another. However, once the immediate objective, always associated with political machinations connected in some manner or form with natural resource extraction, has been achieved, defeated, or no longer matters, the Quechuan peoples are subsumed into the general population again. Separatists' movements, as in Peru, Venezuela and Colombia with different tribal groups, attempt to make short-lived coalitions similar to the above dominant groups operating as nation-states.

Finally, the Native Hawaiians, who have achieved limited sovereignty and in one case territorial autonomy through the practice of legal and political recognition. In this case, we also observe that states believe the international system of trade forces them to recognize minority separatist groups with documented claims, such as a treaty or formal agreement. Ironically, core countries such as the United States, find themselves no longer able to forcefully eliminate or assimilate indigenous peoples undergoing incorporation processes, instead they enter into negotiations that abide by previous contractual or treaty-like rules, similar to the contracts of international trade and economic development.

What remains to be sorted out is how these patterns are shaped and affected by changes in the hegemonic cycle. A key component to this survival is the degree of autonomy or sovereignty. As we noted above and in Table 1, sovereignty is a complex legal-political relationship.

When systems are in hegemonic decline, there are opportunities to take the

relationships described above, primarily of sovereignty/autonomy with a nation-state in a world system governed by international laws and economic agreements upon which capitalism relies, and force (or tease out) new political relationships more advantageous to indigenous peoples. However, states may also contract and respond with greater oppression toward indigenous peoples if they will upset an existing status quo, or simply to nail down those parts of their society under their total control. When indigenous peoples straddle borders these issues become more acute, depending on the particular states involved and the relative strength of the region. Thus hegemonic decline provides **both** potential opportunities and sometimes grave threats for indigenous groups.

In Table 1 six levels of indigenous survival were identified with respect to sovereignty, autonomy, and minority status. Table 1 further analyzes three distinct social spheres of domination—political, economic, and cultural. Levels 1 and 2 (sovereignty is formally recognized or at least legally contested) seem to offer the greatest opportunity during times of hegemonic decline, with some caveats. The primary observation herein is that the nation-states appear to be core countries or their close affiliates who benefit from the international system of trade and economic dominance. Another factor seems to be that existing treaties or legal documents can be put into play. The Mohawk, Lakota, Cherokee, Puyallup, Pequot, perhaps Yaqui, and Native Hawaiian cases appear to be operating in all three spheres on these levels.

Levels 3 and 4 (with autonomy in two or more of the social spheres bounded, or at least when undergoing formal contestation) are both fraught with peril and are loaded with opportunity. These peoples are much more likely to be involved in an armed struggle, when assets such as land and mineral rights, or labor and trade rights, are being determined by an internal struggle that is characterized by extreme domination. They often break laws and mores of the society itself. Levels of development and position in the global economy of the particular nation-state, regionally defined, seems to also have an affect, with poorer countries much more likely to employ military forces against their indigenous peoples. The Mayan and the Miskito cases appear to be on these levels, with high degrees of violent conflict.

Because a “minority status” is dependent on the dominant policies of the state, levels 5 and 6 hold the most dangerous possibilities for indigenous groups, unless they can engineer movement to the higher levels by gaining some form of autonomy or even limited sovereignty. (Miskito against the Sandinistas in the 1980’s achieved this). Historically, being forced into an oppressive minority status was a common feature in the European expansion over the western hemisphere, but currently, less developed or poorer countries are most likely to oppress their indigenous peoples through such definition, or a complete subordination

of political, economic and cultural rights. Among the cases we consider in this analysis, the Yanomami and Quechuan peoples appear to be on this level, and are thus in highly vulnerable positions.

This brief discussion suggests that the consequences of degree of sovereignty can differ in political, economic, and cultural spheres. Obviously, these three areas overlap and interact. We further question whether and to what degree these various effects are different in core, peripheral, or semiperipheral regions. While it will take further research to confirm this, we also suggest that core states have developed highly codified laws relative to the nation-state system (witness the UN’s International Peoples Working Group [IPWG], [http://www.un.org/partners/civil\\_society/m-indig.htm](http://www.un.org/partners/civil_society/m-indig.htm); see too Biolsi 1995, 2001) that they must acknowledge on some level. Thus, they are more likely to offer recognition of some form of autonomy or sovereignty. However, in peripheral states, the reverse appears to be the case. Indeed, extralegal and state violence (direct or indirect) is much more common.

While the relations are not entirely clear, this evidence supports an observation that a pattern of relationships does appear, suggesting that a global historical survey will be necessary to tease out the nuances of the relations among indigenous survival, indigenous movements, hegemony, and world-system position. We suspect that these relations are quite sensitive to world-system time. That is, location in a declining hegemon in the late 18th century is very different from location in a declining hegemon in the late 20th or early 21st century.

With all these suggestive findings we draw some provisional conclusions.

#### CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

What then can we learn about resistance to globalization from this examination of the survival of indigenous peoples? First and foremost, we must recognize that the issues of resistance and survival are immensely complex. As both the world-system, and possibly its underlying logic, continue to evolve, so too do its various constituent units. Here we confront the age old conundrum of—if something is changing, is it still “the same thing?” When does adaptation and change shift from quantitative adjustment to qualitative difference? The key issue seems to be persistence of forms of social organization that are non capitalistic, or that reject capitalism, development, or modernization explicitly.

Will indigenous peoples continue to be such alternatives? If they are a threat, we can expect that pressures on them to change or to assimilate will mount. Based on what has already happened, some or many will succumb. But equally important, we might expect some to continue to survive. This is most likely when they exist as encapsulated enclaves somehow walled off, or at least partially sepa-

rated from global capitalism. To the extent that human rights remain key issues for global middle classes, the likelihood of any complete destruction of indigenous peoples is lessened. Furthermore, the 9-11 inspired war on terrorism, which already has become the rationale of choice for a large number of actions that have little or no connection with terrorism, may indeed foreshadow a resurgence of “manifest destiny” on a global scale (Wickham 2002).

It is tempting to dismiss this as a minority issue. Indigenous peoples are some 350 millions, approximately 5% of the world’s population. But here we should take note of both biological and sociocultural evolutionary processes (Sanderson 1990). New forms typically evolve from precisely such “minority” populations. Note that even in fictionalized accounts, change is seen to come from small groups (Wagar 1999). The array of surviving indigenous populations is a range of alternatives to capitalism. Furthermore, it is a range that is far broader than the narrow range of oppositions that have grown up inside the capitalist world-system, which are, more often than not, either negations of one or another aspect of capitalism, or “kinder, gentler” redistributions of its resources. Indigenous peoples present a panoply of alternatives.

In this paper we have drawn heavily on examples and experience in North America. While much of the resistance and survival discussion is similar for indigenous peoples globally, experiences of colonization, or sometimes simple nationalization projects, for other indigenous peoples varies widely. For instance: the Warli people in India have only recently become recognized as colonization effects of England are only now being transformed; the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Iran have contended with colonization and constructed state structures by European powers; and so on the complexities go, whether discussing the Saami in Scandinavia, the Maori in New Zealand, Iban in Sarawak, Malaysia, or perhaps even the Pashtun in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Five hundred years of experience with colonization followed by nationalization projects in the western hemisphere, as complex and diverse as they are, remain somewhat more open to analysis because of the shared parts of their experiences, than attempting to describe indigenous peoples globally. Nonetheless, it is our contention that very similar processes occur wherever globalization meets resistance by indigenous peoples. We readily acknowledge that many more detailed studies are needed to delineate the entire range of alternatives and resistances that indigenous peoples present. Our key conclusion here is that these resistances are multiple. The EZLN is **one** form of resistance to globalization. There are many more in North America, in Central and South America, Australia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe, and East Asia. All need to be studied more fully.

It is also reasonable to expect that to the degree that indigenous peoples do succeed in resisting capitalism, they will call down stronger attempts to change or

Plate 2 – March 13, 2001, Zocalo, Mexico City Zapatista arrival in Mexico, D. F.



Photo b Glen Kuecker, Department of Histor , DePauw Universit

destroy them. The most successful, however, are not likely to be frontal attacks, but more invidious erosions via media exposure, increasing dependence on the products of capitalism, and incremental increases in participation in the global economy.

This is why the EZLN may be so prophetic. It is addressing such forces directly. Thus far, it has succeeded in gaining converts and fellow travelers among the middle classes of the world, and linking with other anti-globalization forces. Indeed, as Plate 2 indicates, they may be moving into a position of global leadership in resisting globalization. The banner, “*todos somos indios del mundo*” [we are all Indians of the world] seeks to build solidarity with others on the basis of recognition that all individuals are being crushed by global capitalism.

Whether this, or any other movement will succeed remains unknown. Predictions of the imminent demise of capitalism are only slightly less frequent than predictions about the impending demise of indigenous peoples. Both are still here. If one takes a short-run view, over the era of capitalist domination of the last few centuries, evidence would suggest capitalism will win in the end. If, however, one takes a very long-run view, many types of indigenous organizations have withstood assaults of states, not for centuries, but millennia. Hence,

the evidence would suggest indigenous peoples will survive. If one looks further into the rise of the capitalist world-system, seeing capitalism coming to dominate from little pockets scattered here and there for millennia, and recognizes that modern capitalism is an amalgam of older forms and newer forms, then one might expect that whatever the world-system transforms into will be built on the various models that already exist. And here, clearly, indigenous peoples represent the widest range of alternatives, and continuously adapting forms from which to build a more inclusive new world.

Now we can return to the issue of the impacts of recent events—the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iraq war, and especially the attacks on 9-11. The preceding analysis and discussion suggests that to ask about the impacts of these events is to ask the wrong question. Why should such events, spectacular though they have been, impact these centuries, and even millennia long processes? At most we would expect slight perturbations in a trajectory of resistance, along the lines of those documented by Podobnik (2002). Our argument follows that of Dunaway (2003a) and Wallerstein (2003) that such events are part and parcel of the normal processes of capitalist dynamics. Here we are seeing the fruits of globalization beginning to ripen. As Clark (2002) argues, the intensification, the speeding up, the increasing interconnectedness of global capitalism makes a large variety of “normal accidents” more, not less, likely. Indeed, precisely because they so often try to exist outside the system, many indigenous groups may be better insulated from such “normal accidents” than members of societies fully integrated into the capitalist world-system. Furthermore, as ethnic conflict has become more costly to the system, there may well be less pressure to integrate indigenous peoples more fully into the capitalist world-system. Indeed, to the degree that global elites increasingly attend to the rising risk of “normal accidents” they may pay even less attention to indigenous peoples. If so, the impact of 9-11 and other such recent events may actually enhance the probability of their continued survival.

There are many contingencies in the foregoing analysis. Depending how they become manifest in concrete social terms, our guess and predictions will of necessity need modification. In the scale of centuries and millennia, it is far too soon to draw any firm conclusions on the impacts of these recent events.

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
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#### ABSTRACT

What is the role of Brazil's Workers' Party (PT) in its sponsorship of the World Social Forum, and what is the significance of this relationship to the struggles to build a more just social order? Some have criticized the presence of the PT in the Forum, juxtaposing its partisan motives to the democratic impulses of the "multitude." This article challenges this reading by tracing the development of the PT in the last decade, bringing to light the ways the party's development challenges traditional narratives about leftist parties. In particular, this article discusses the way that the successful resolution of the challenges of governance in local and regional levels through "participa-

tory solutions" has progressively transformed the party towards a party of radical democracy that values non-instrumental relationships to social movements and unorganized sectors of civil society. This radically democratic stance is represented in the way that the PT sponsors, but does not control or seek to control, the WSF or its proceedings. Re-imagining the relationship between social movements and political parties is an urgent task in the struggle for global social justice and the PT serves as a useful model. Abandoning this relationship as implicitly suggested by advocates of the "multitude" would be to the detriment of the struggle for global justice.

## THE PARTY AND THE MULTITUDE: BRAZIL'S WORKERS' PARTY (PT) AND THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING A JUST SOCIAL ORDER IN A GLOBALIZING CONTEXT\*

Gianpaolo Baiocchi

### INTRODUCTION

Ironically, the star attraction of the Third World Social Forum, in 2003 in Porto Alegre, Brazil, was a president. The world-wide gathering of social justice activists had grown in its third edition to a plural meeting of over 100,000 participants from more than 150 countries, most of whom, as according to the WSF charter, had come as representatives of entities in civil society and not governments or political parties. But on the evening of January 24, Luis Ignácio da Silva, Lula, the former metalworker and founder of the Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT), walked on to the stage at the Forum's single largest event as Brazil's president. He told the electrified audience of tens of thousands on that late afternoon that he had pondered whether to attend the Forum at all. As one of the Forum's early advocates, Lula himself defended the position that the World Social Forum ought not to be a space for government or political party officials. Now, as Brazil's president, he considered his presence inadequate at the Forum as a *participant*, but decided to attend anyway as its host.

Flanked by well-known PT leaders, like Benedita da Silva (the ex-governor of Rio de Janeiro) and Tarso Genro (Porto Alegre's ex-mayor), Lula gave an impassioned speech that called for international solidarity for his mandate and

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the tough times it would no doubt face in the coming years.<sup>1</sup> Lula then publicly defended his decision to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos as one of a series of pragmatic decisions that would foster dialogue to solve common problems. He likened his term as president to the role of a soccer coach at a match; while there will no doubt be difficulties, his record ought to be examined at the end of the term rather than at its start. He closed by promising he would not deviate “one comma” from his socialist ideals. The crowd went wild and started to chant, holding up two hands to signify the number eight, a call for Lula’s re-election barely three weeks into his first term.

Lula’s attendance at the Forum and the number of contradictions it represented was not devoid of symbolism. The World Social Forum has been hailed by many as one of the most important innovations in global social justice activism; the “popular alternatives to globalization” discussed there are part of emergent utopias that guide the growing and diverse movement against neoliberal globalization.<sup>2</sup> Activists and scholars alike have recognized the World Social Forum as a completely novel “movement of movements” that transcends traditional narratives of social movements: it is an internationalist North-South gathering without hierarchy, unified ideology, or leadership unlike any previous nationally or internationally-based movement (Wallerstein 2002). The decentered meetings at the Forum evoke well the notion of “the multitude,” the new plural political subject brought forth by globalization to resist Empire and “whose desire for liberation is not satiated except by reappropriating new spaces (Hardt and Negri 2000:396).”<sup>3</sup> But Lula’s victory in October of 2002 also represents something

<sup>1</sup> A description of the speech is found in *The Economist* (2003), “Lula’s Message for Two Worlds” January 30<sup>th</sup> 2003.

<sup>2</sup> See for instance, the resolutions collected in Cattani (2001; Fisher and Ponniah 2003), which read as “contemporary Cahiers de Dole ance (Hardt and Negri 2003:xvii).” For a discussion of the Global Social Justice movements, see, among many others, Brecher (2000) and Ancelovici (2002). See also the site of the World Social Forum: <http://forumsocialmundial.org.br> and the “movement of movements” series of articles in *New Left Review*, at: <http://www.newleftreview.org>.

<sup>3</sup> The multitude is brought forth by deterritorialization and displacement, and constitutes itself through radical new forms of self-organization and cooperation that transcend national politics and struggles while affirming its many singularities and constructing new demands. “The constituent power [of the multitude] makes possible the continuous opening to a process of radical and progressive transformation. It makes conceivable equality and solidarity, those fragile demands that were fundamental but remained abstract during the history of modern constitutions (Hardt and Negri, 2000:406).”

quite novel. In addition to the rupture it represents with traditional Brazilian electoral politics, it is not an exaggeration to describe it as the beginning of a new era for the electoral left, in Latin America and elsewhere. The history and trajectory of the Workers’ Party transcends traditional narratives of political parties and is difficult to capture by using the distinctions between “social democratic and socialist” (or “reformist and revolutionary”) usually drawn to describe leftist projects. Lula’s mandate as president holds the promise to be a wide-ranging experiment in deepening Brazil’s democracy while expanding the “boundaries of the possible.” This challenge includes the construction of a socially just order at the level of the nation-state, reversing many of the negative terms on which globalization has taken place.

In a sense, Lula and the Workers’ Party officials who shared the podium with him stood in front of their social movement mirror image while facing the multitude of global justice activists. In a real way, Lula had in the past been “one of them”, a social movement activist turned president. And while the gulf in power separating the PT from social movements is indeed real, the distance is compressed by a number of equally real, if contradictory, connections.

Analysts, however, whether in academic journals or other sources, have operated with an artificially rigid distinction between the “multitude” and the “party,” particularly when describing the WSF. These observers tend to either downplay the role of the PT or to take its presence within the WSF as evidence of the colonization of social movement spaces by rigid and hierarchical political parties. Either way, they operate with a misunderstanding of the PT and its relationship to social movements in Brazil, as well as a lack of imagination about the concrete possibilities that exist between parties and other actors in the global social justice movement. For example, even while admitting that the WSF would not have been possible without the party that hosted the event, Hardt (2002) expresses misgivings about the PT presence in Porto Alegre and traces a divide between the “parties vs. networks” present at the WSF. For Hardt this dichotomy embodies the gulf between hierarchical, national, and centralized parties and horizontal, decentralized, and post-national movements. Klein (2003), reflecting on the third WSF, claims that the large attendance at Lula’s speech is evidence of the “hijacking” of the WSF, now destined for “the graveyard of failed, left political projects.” Adamovsky (2003), complaining of the PT presence in the organizing committee of the WSF, warns that it threatens the autonomy of the WSF, as “the politics of the traditional left-wing [has been] to domesticate and co-opt the movement of movements.”

This brief article offers a needed corrective to these perceptions, by discussing the PT and its history of relationships to social movements and civil society. The objective is to shed light on the PT’s relationship to the World Social Forum, and

to offer some valuable lessons from the PT's history about crossing the "movement-party divide." To foreshadow my conclusion, the World Social Forum is far from the "deathbed of traditional actors like political parties" that some have described (Hardt 2002: 116). The Workers' Party has continued to develop since its first forays into electoral contests in the early 1980s. It has evolved through the 1990s into a political party known for good governance, and for radically widening the scope of civic participation in local public administration. . The PT's radical participatory stance has continued to reinvigorate the party, while transforming its relationship to social movements and civil society. These factors are at least partially responsible for the PT's national victory in late 2002. As the party embarks on its first experiment with national power, its relationship to social movements via the WSF offer a critical opportunity to bring new energy and imagination to its domestic policies, while fostering international solidarity and legitimacy for its platforms abroad. Of course, as time passes the exigencies of national governance are likely to produce more and more fissures within the PT-social movement alliance, and may even provoke divergences between the party and the multitude.

#### The Party<sup>4</sup>

Analysts of the WSF have sometimes expressed misgivings about the overt presence of the PT within the forum's structures (Hardt 2002; Klein 2003), while some of the best-known figures involved in the planning of the WSF have attempted to distance the event from the PT (Cassen 2003).<sup>5</sup> Whether implicitly relying on traditional narratives about political parties, such as those invoked by the "Iron Law of Oligarchy" (Lipset 1997; Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956; Michels 1962; Piven and Cloward 1979) or reacting to the actual history of leftist parties and their relationship to civil society<sup>6</sup> (Bengelsdorf 1994; Kertzer 1980),

<sup>4</sup> This section draws upon the Introductory chapter of Baiocchi (2003).

<sup>5</sup> Bernard Cassen, for instance, writes that, "at first, the PT was a bit uneasy about the Forum, because its tradition is quite 'vertical', and it was afraid that a Forum organized in Porto Alegre, which it did not control, might somehow be used against it" (Cassen 2002:47).

<sup>6</sup> The disappointing history of formerly socialist or social-democratic parties in power in Western Europe over the course of the twentieth century seems to confirm some of these expectations (Przeworski and Prague, 1996). The example of the Communist Party in Italy in the mid-twentieth century has been cited as that of a democratically inclined party that nonetheless occupied civil society organizations. The democratic-centralist Communist Party maintained control over organizations in civil society that were ultimately understood to be appendages of the party and bound by its political directives

analysts have been unable to imagine the relationship between the PT and civil society as anything but an instrumental one. As such, these scholars to the on have misunderstood the PT's relationship to the WSF.

The history of the Workers' Party shows a clear evolution—from an oppositional pro-democracy and socialist party with a more "traditional" relationship to social movements<sup>7</sup> through the 1990s—to a political organization seasoned through successive turns in government. More importantly, over the course of this evolution, the party's successes could often be attributed to its new and non-instrumental relationships toward civil society and participation. While the PT represents a rupture with Brazilian politics long characterized by patronage and personalism (Keck 1992b; Löwy 1993; Mainwaring 1992–93; Meneguello 1989), the significance of the PT rests on its relationship to civil society, one that breaks with traditional molds of leftist electoral parties.

While formally founded in 1980, the idea of the PT emerged around the 1978–79 strikes in the Scania plant in São Paulo's ABC region, where Lula was one of the strike's prominent leaders.<sup>8</sup> The idea of a new and genuine 'party of and for workers' became increasingly influential among the then-burgeoning trade union movement, as well as among intellectuals returned from exile (Singer 2001). Brazil at the time did not have the independent trade unions, and autonomous political organizations were largely illegal. Dissatisfaction with the populist

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and hierarchy. As Kertzer notes in his ethnography, the party in Bologna controlled all forms of civic life, where '[t]he authority and prestige of the party are reinforced through the "independent" associations in which Party positions are extolled and the various party officers' high status is validated' (Kertzer 1980: 48).

<sup>7</sup> By a traditional relationship I mean here that there were two opposing positions in the PT about its relationship to civil society: one was the minoritarian vanguardist position held by some tendencies, that PT activists ought to occupy positions in social movements and civil society and "bring them along" ideologically. The other position, and the one that won out initially, was one that the PT ought to be the "reflex" of social movements – which turned out in practice to be an equally difficult position to adhere to because it assumed society was "always already" organized. Such an attitude also tended to privilege certain social movement sectors *vis-à-vis* other sectors of civil society and the unorganized. The latter position still has the difficulty that it prevents reflection and criticism of the party itself.

<sup>8</sup> We are fortunate to have a wealth of documentary and historical evidence available. The history of the PT has been well documented by a number of insightful scholars, including Meneguello (1989), Keck (1992a; 1992b), Harnecker (1994), Sader (1986), and Singer (2001). The history below largely relies on their accounts as well as my own interviews in the process of reconstructing the history of the PT in the South of Brazil.

Brazilian Labor Party, the PTB, as well as with the country's 'old left' (largely disfigured as a result of the violent repression of the previous decade) also fueled the search for a new political space. The crisis of 'real socialism' in Eastern Europe also united this disparate group of activists. The vibrancy of emergent social movements, such as those linked to the progressive Catholic Church, also compelled activists to form a party where 'social movements can speak' (Oliveira 1986:16). Rejecting 'bureaucratic socialism' and a one-party system as well as democratic centralism, the new party was united under the principles of autonomy, a commitment to democratic institutions and internal democracy, a mass base, and socialism (Garcia 1991; Singer 2001).

According to Margaret Keck (1992a), PT founders started from a broad conception of class, and early on linked class struggle with the struggle for citizenship. Instead of 'occupying social movements,' most of the PT founders envisioned the party as a 'reflex' of social movements (Ozaí 1996). This is not surprising, given that the party's founders included leftist Christian activists, sympathetic intellectuals, and pro-democracy activists from a number of social movements, in addition to the industrial union workers and leftist agitators traditionally identified with the PT (Lowy 1987). The party over the years came to house a broad spectrum of positions, including an open structure of internal 'tendencies' who compete inside the party to shape positions and program, but that ultimately unite in electoral contests.<sup>9</sup> In 1983, the party gained prominence once again as part of the national movement for direct elections, the famous *Diretas Já* mobilizations. In addition to two municipal victories in 1982, the party registered two more victories in 1985 as well as disappointing results in the 1986 elections for Congress. According to Meneguello (1989), it was in this period that the PT started to decisively broaden its discourse beyond workerism, putting greater emphasis on social issues. Previous slogans such as 'work, land, and liberty' and 'workers vote on workers' were considered too restrictive (Beozzo and Lisboa 1983; Lowy 1987). In the late 1980s the party renewed its positions on civil liberties, and the right to autonomous association, distancing itself from Eastern European models, while choosing Lula to run for president in 1989 under a policy of broader alliances.

<sup>9</sup> Some of the existing tendencies, such as Democracia Socialista, a Trotskyist group affiliated with the Fourth International, predate the PT and continue to act in concert within it, as one of the strongest groups to the party's left. Other political parties, such as the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party, the Partido Revolucionário Comunista (PRC) dissolved within the PT, and a majority of its members formed the tendency Democracia Radical. A majority faction, Articulação, was formed in 1983 at the party's 'center' to hold the PT together. (Keck 1992a)

### Local Strategies, Global Aims: The Party in Power

What would transform the party, however, would be its successive turns in government, particularly local government, throughout the 1990s. These experiments in local administration would eventually forge the party's new relationship to civil society. As a national protest against austerity measures and hyperinflation, the national electorate chose PT mayors in 36 cities, including São Paulo and Porto Alegre, bringing roughly ten percent of Brazilians under local PT administrations. Once in power, PT administrators faced a number of difficult choices in their quest to carry out progressive platforms once in office. Administrators were constrained by a number of factors both internal and external to the party: the administration's fiscal standing, reprisal from higher levels of government, pressures from local elites, electoral pressures, as well as pressure from the party's own bases.

A principal difficulty for the PT was how to negotiate the political demands of the party's base on the new administration in a way that did not jeopardize the party's ability to govern. In early administrations, for instance, the difficulties caused by 'the *petista* imaginary, [in which] our governments are seen as governments of popular mobilization' (Trevas 1999: 54) were severe, as factions of the party tended to clash with administrators who were not perceived to be radical enough. Newly elected administrators, according to Utzig (1996), faced a choice between defining a PT administration as an administration for workers or for the whole city. One of the recurring problems of many administrations, particularly where the local movements and public sector unions comprising the PT's base were strong, centered around the inability of administrations to distance themselves from demands that could not possibly be met given current finances: 'It was thought given the affinity of interests, [...] the *petistas* "in the government" would not be able to refuse demands that they had defended until yesterday' (Couto 1994: 154). The PT was 'deeply rooted in existing organizations in civil society; many of which were against traditional institutions, but also, against the state itself' (Couto 1994: 148).

While many of the PT municipal administrations in the 1989–1992 period often ended in disastrous conflicts (with a full third of the mayors in question abandoning the PT before the end of their term and another third failing to gain re-election for the party), this period also marked a turning point in the PT's capacity to govern. By the time of the 1993–1996 administrations, the PT had become more adept at solving certain recurring problems and had given up the view that its bases of electoral support would be the most natural allies once administrators came to power. As such, PT administrations learned how to seek out broader bases of support among the underprivileged (Jacobi 1995: 160;

Pontual and Silva 1999). The "laboratories" provided by early PT administrations showed that negotiating these political conflicts would be as important as good policies and programs.

One lesson that emerged from the first large cohort of PT administrations was that where administrators successfully implemented broad-based participatory programs, these programs helped city administrators navigate the web of demands placed on them by the party's base. These programs also helped legitimate the PT platform across a broad segment of the population at large, which also helped avert some of the earlier conflicts. This approach to popular participation represented a departure from the two principal positions within the party concerning its relationship to social movements. It was a break, first, with the minority Leninist position that the party ought to exert hegemony over movements (and use administrations as "trenches" in a larger struggle against capitalism), as well as with the second position that the party is simply a reflex of movements. The latter position implicitly narrowed the spectrum of participants: 'We imagined that it was enough to say that the channels of participation were open to people to come intervene in the governance of public affairs. And [this was] wrong because it expressed a certain narrowness about who should participate, that is, by privileging, implicitly or explicitly the participation of our social bases, forgetting that society is complex' (Filho 1991: 129). While almost all administrations of the 1989–1992 cohort invoked participatory reforms, many did not manage to institute broad-based participatory programs that extended beyond already organized sectors, and as a result, they were not able to shield themselves from severe conflicts.

In the best-case scenario, broad-based participation provided a solution to some of the principal dilemmas of PT administrators. It created a setting where claimants themselves could be part of the negotiation of demands, while generating legitimacy for the party's redistributive platform, if not improving governance directly. By bringing conflicts into these participatory settings, administrators found ways to generate consensus around a redistributive platform, and helped forestall opposition to the administration. The crucial issue was that successful programs were those that relied on broad-based participation that went *beyond* already organized social movements, unions, and neighborhood associations.

The city of Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting (PB) reforms became the model for many subsequent administrations because of its successes in governance and reelection [the PB didn't have success in governance and reelection per se, right? It was the fact that the PB enabled better governance, and enhanced electoral success. Within the first four years the administration had succeeded in balancing municipal finances and incorporating several thousand active participants into various public fora on city investments. Largely as a result of the

success of these citizen participatory forums, the administration has kept local opposition at bay and carried out a number of ambitious reforms, such as introducing land-use taxes targeted at wealthier citizens. These taxes, have in turn funded many of the PB's subsequent projects.

Since its first round of meetings in 1989, the PB has evolved into a complex structure of meetings throughout the city where elected delegates from civic groups such as neighborhood associations meet regularly to discuss, prioritize, and eventually monitor the types of investments needed in each district. The projects can include anything within the scope of municipal government: street pavement, water, sewage, social services, health care, housing, and primary and adult education. In addition, the structure has evolved to include thematic forums where participants can debate city priorities that are not necessarily specific to one district or neighborhood, such as culture and education, economic development, or health. Decisions are passed on to a budget council composed of two counselors from each district and two for each thematic forum who meet to "fit" the demands to the yearly budget. At the end of the year the budget is passed on to city council, where it is approved. Once projects begin, citizens are responsible for forming commissions to follow the construction.<sup>10</sup> This experiment has been very successful, and many other PT cities have adopted similar programs. The overarching political conclusion that the PT has drawn is that broad-based participation, under a clear system of rules, has the potential of generating legitimacy for a broad-based, redistributive governmental agenda.

Participatory reforms have often served the party well, and contributing to the steadily increasing number of administrations under PT control (over 170 for the 2001–2004 term). These measures have also transformed the party, including its practice, make-up, and relationship to social movements. In the course of its twenty years of experience in government, (with over two hundred terms at the municipal level) the PT has shifted its ideology away from staid socialist slogans toward its current emphasis on radical democracy. The party has, utilized local administration to incorporate (and validate) the demands of social movements and unorganized citizens without co-opting them. The base of support for the PT today is much broader as result (Trevas 1999: 52). The PT itself has experienced a significant renewal in leadership positions as many new activists in civil society have risen "through the ranks" to become party leaders.

<sup>10</sup>. Discussions of the PB in Porto Alegre can be found in Abers(2000), and Baiocchi (2002).

But by pursuing participatory reforms as a successful political strategy, the PT has also engendered an appreciation for the inherent value in public participation and citizen debate, recognizing the need to creating spaces for such participation and debate as both the means and ends of political contestation. Such participatory reforms have created unique spaces for public debate and for the practice of citizenship, otherwise historically rare from the Brazilian political landscape (Avritzer 2002). Most PT administrators today have become wary of letting participatory programs degenerate into simple public works programs. For example, the administrations in Belem, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, and Porto Alegre (among others) have fostered participatory programs not directly tied to service provision, convening municipal conferences on topics such as AIDS, human rights, and racial discrimination. As a result of its renewed relationship to civil society, the PT has developed a record of advancing a number of new issues, beyond what might be associated with a “workers’ party.” These include advancing legislation in congress around reparations and racial equality, as well as a number of bills in congress on areas considered priorities by the women’s movement.

The history of the PT in power, therefore, is somewhat counterintuitive. Rather than repeat the rightward turn of European social democratic parties in power, the history of the PT (particularly at the municipal level) shows that the party can successfully govern, not by shifting its policies so much as by deepening its legitimacy via broad-based popular participation. Original attempts at simply going to the party’s own bases of support, such as sympathetic unions, proved disastrous, while broad participatory programs that also rallied unorganized citizens were much more successful. This broad-based participation has also transformed the party itself, renewing its relationship with and attitude towards new and plural social movements. This novel kind of party practice—relating to organized and unorganized sectors via the sponsorship of autonomous participatory spaces—would deeply influence the party’s relationship to the WSF.

### The Multitude

The World Social Forum, first held in Porto Alegre in January of 2001, represents one of the most vibrant and exciting developments among global social justice movements. It is one of the most successful efforts at coalescing transnational civil society actors and networks in modern history. According to Bernard Cassen, leader of ATTAC and one of the editors of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, the idea of the World Social Forum emerged from European anti-globalization activists who approached the Porto Alegre administration about hosting such an event (Cassen 2002). While neither of Brazil’s two largest social movements were present among the organizing committee, then made up largely of European

anti-globalization groups and Brazilian NGOs, the Forum quickly grew into a participatory space where civil society organizations are able to collectively imagine “another world.” In addition to workshops, lectures, testimonials, and other public events, the Forum included innumerable opportunities for the 10,000 activists present to network and build bridges among their various causes.

After the first edition, the forum’s charter was approved, and its rules now more explicitly de-emphasized the participation of those in government and those representing political parties. The Forum’s charter describes the WSF as “an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and linking up for effective action [...] by groups and movements in civil society that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism” seeking to build global relationships. Furthermore, it is a “plural, diversified, non-confessional, non-governmental and non-party context” that brings together organizations and movements (Fisher and Ponniah 2003:354–356).<sup>11</sup>

By the 2003 edition, the WSF had expanded in numbers and in themes, as participants attended at least 1,500 official workshops. The six-day gathering opened under the shadow cast by possible US invasion of Iraq, but nonetheless retained a festive atmosphere. The Forum opened and closed with a march for peace and its last panel was dedicated to the theme. By the time of this third edition, a number of Social Fora had come into being: European, Asian, and African versions had taken place in earlier months. Also, a number of allied events now took place along side the WSF: the World Education Forum, the Forum of Local Authorities Against Social Exclusion, and the World Judicial Forum, not to mention the innumerable parallel meetings that took place, such as the meeting of the US-Based “Life After Capitalism” group.

The city of Porto Alegre was chosen by the organizing committee for the third time times partially because of practical concerns. It was, after all, a sympathetic municipal government with the capacity to host such an event and the experience to carry it off, given its years of successful participatory meetings. The city also contributed significant resources (as did the state government in the first two editions when it was run by the PT). But the choice was also symbolic on the part of organizers: the city had by then become celebrated as a model of par-

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<sup>11</sup> Indeed the collected resolutions between the first and second editions of the Forum show significant differences. Gone from the second are the resolutions of government officials and resolutions authored by prominent PT politicians.

ticipatory governance, and as anti-globalization activists were hard pressed for “alternatives” (given the disappointing prospects of state socialist regimes), Porto Alegre’s style of governance stood in for that alternative. It was a city run by progressive administrators based on real participatory input by the city’s least privileged. It was also a city where the left’s redistributive mission had been guided and transformed by a style of radical democracy and discussion from below.

But the PT administrators also chose to host the event, committing significant city resources in a financially difficult time. One reason is no doubt that such a gathering offers the administration some international publicity and solidarity. It is possible to imagine, for instance, that a global network of activists, inspired by their experiences in Porto Alegre, could be summoned to defend the Lula administration against international pressure from agencies such as the IMF. But another concrete reason the party chose to host the third World Social Forum is that it had evolved to a point where open-ended discussion and participation by broad sectors of civil society were highly valued as ends unto themselves. Just like the rules for the Participatory Budget,<sup>12</sup> for instance, the WSF is an autonomous, self-regulating, non-partisan space for discussion open to broad sectors of civil society that is sponsored by an administration run by the PT. This kind of radical democratic vision places a premium on fostering spaces for discussion which are not controlled by the party. The commitment of the PT to this perspective is amply demonstrated by the large number of political issues which the PT advocates in a non-instrumental fashion, and which may even be counter-productive in terms of electoral results. One particularly salient example is the current discussion on reparations legislation. Interaction with transnational social movements and civil society via the WSF promises to create new kinds of non-instrumental relationships between these movements and the PT. These also promise to bring into the party new demands and political identities, much as local reforms have done for the PT’s municipal chapters.

The sponsorship of the WSF also shows the evolution of the party over the 1990s. In July of 1990 the PT administration in São Paulo sponsored an international, but mostly Latin American, meeting of leftist organizations which eventually became known as the “Foro de São Paulo.”<sup>13</sup> Co-sponsored by the Cuban

<sup>12</sup> Whether the standard rules for the PB served as a model for the WSF charter or not, there is a striking similarity in the prohibition of party activity within these spaces as well as on the autonomous and self-regulating character of participation. (Abers 2000; Baiocchi 2002)

<sup>13</sup> It was originally known as the meeting of Parties and Organizations of the Left in Latin America and the Caribbean. For some history, see the site <http://forodesaopaulo.org>

Communist Party, and modeled on previous Internationals, it counted with 48 communist and socialist parties, as well as unions and allied social movements from throughout the region. The Foro has continued to meet yearly, growing with each edition, and promoting a significant and on-going venue for debate and discussion among leftist organizations, at least as evidenced by its resolutions. While the Foro de São Paulo has nowhere the size or scope of the WSF, its resolutions and goals share some affinity with it: they affirm the value of citizenship, democracy, social justice, and resisting neoliberal globalization. The principal difference is on participants and privileged subjects: the Foro de São Paulo’s emphasis on organized sectors and parties reflects the PT’s earlier stance toward civil society, while the WSF reflects a decade of experiences with participatory democracy that had radicalized the party’s stance toward civil society. The practical experience of the PT in power has shown that to foster non-instrumental relationships to civil society can reinvigorate the party and generate new kinds of political visions.

### **The Party, the Multitude and the Contradictions of the Good Governance Road**

The distance between the party and the multitude may be a lot smaller than appears at first sight. The radical participatory stance of the PT, honed through its turns in government, is one that neither seeks to bring social movements under the tutelage of the party (as its appendages) nor is it predicated on subsuming governance to the mandates of the party’s ideology. Rather, this participatory stance, as I have discussed, is one that mobilizes the instruments of government to facilitate discussion among organized and unorganized sectors in local settings so as to better negotiate their relationship to government, to the party, and to each other. This form of radical democracy turns social movements and unorganized citizens alike into discussants, and its quality depends precisely on the autonomy of these participatory spaces from party control. At Participatory Budget meetings, for instance, PT members do not participate as “party members” but rather as independent citizens or, as the case may be, as members of civil society organizations. It is not a surprise that in many cities PT members are heavily present at PB meetings because the PT has its roots in social movements. But even in those cities, rules strictly prohibit the meetings from being turned into partisan spaces.

Similarly, at the World Social Forum, PT members are heavily represented, and according to Cassen (2002), it may even be that the whole of the Brazilian organizing committee belongs to the PT. However much like with Brazilian NGOs, social movements and unions, the fact that the majority of activists in these areas are PT members does not imply that the PT “controls” their activi-

ties, or has any desire to. In like fashion, the PT did not seek to control the WSF in being its host. Rather, the party has paradoxically developed a radically participatory stance that values the autonomy of civil society and the sources of innovation it may bring.

As the PT embarks on its sojourn at national power, the relationship between the party and social movements in Brazil and abroad will likely experience tensions. The economic proposals advanced by the PT are much less radical (or more pragmatic) than the familiar calls by activists in Brazil and elsewhere to break with various international agencies and trade agreements. Rather, as Lula announced at the start, his government's position will be for "better terms on international trade." Several of the other economic choices announced by the Lula government are likely strike some movements as too moderate. The decision to raise interest rates in order to prevent capital flight, as well the choice to comply with IMF conditionalities, may be perceived as necessary within the administration, but certainly is at odds with the calls of many in the international social justice community. Nonetheless, maintaining a relationship with transnational social movements via the WSF can be politically productive for both the PT and those in the struggle for social justice. On one hand, learning about the challenges of progressive national governance can be a useful education for all of those who oppose the current parameters of globalization. But one can also imagine that in 2005, when the next WSF is scheduled in Porto Alegre, that Lula's government will be taken to task by sympathetic but critical observers in a way that will be impossible to ignore within the party.

Ultimately, the relationship between progressive party and social movement as currently exemplified in the WSF, as well as in PT experiments in governance, may serve as a model for those involved in global justice causes. One of the truly novel features of the WSF is in fact this relationship: a leftist party involved in governance investing resources and energy to foster autonomous spaces of discussion in which it does not even participate. It is not, as Hardt writes, that party leaders craft "resolutions[...] but can never grasp the democratic power of movements," and that parties will be eventually "swept up in the multitude (Hardt, 2002:118)." Rather, the relationship between party and movement is founded on very different terms, and not predicated on opposing logics. Social movements and the multitude would not have a space to appropriate in the WSF were it not for the institutional resources and projects of the party. Most of the multitude also realize that until a very different framework for globalization emerges, social justice struggles will have to go through an institutional moment when the regulatory power of states will be called upon, and when "traditional" actors like parties will need to be set in motion. Re-imagining the boundaries of this relationship, even while acknowledging that it is full of contradictions, is an urgent


task for those the struggle for global social justice. Creating an artificial distinction between party and multitude in this context ignores the history and context of the relationship between the PT and social movements. But worse, it irresponsibly offers as a prescription the abandonment of the institutional contest and the engagement with political parties. To follow such a prescription would indeed guarantee that party and multitude stand apart, which would lead not to parties being "swept up in the multitude" but to the sweeping away of both parties and multitude by stronger and much less democratic forces.

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#### ABSTRACT

First suggested in the Netherlands, in the late-1980s, the notion of “Social Movement Unionism” was first applied in South Africa, where it had both political and academic impact. The South-African formulation combined the class and the popular: a response to this combined class and new social movement theory/practice. The “Class/Popular” understanding was, however, more widely adopted, and applied (to and/or in Brazil, the Philippines, the USA, internationally), receiving its most influential formulation in the work of Kim Moody (USA). A “Class/New Social Movement” response to this was restated in terms of the “New Social Unionism.” The continuing impact of globalization and neo-liberalism has had a disorienting effect on even the unions supposed by the South African/US

school to *best exemplify* SMU, whilst simultaneously increasing trade union need for *some kind* of such an alternative model. Use and discussion of the notion continues. The development of the “global justice and solidarity movement” (symbolized by Seattle, 1999), and in particular the World Social Forum process, since 2001, may be putting the matter on the international trade-union agenda. But is *this* matter a Class/Popular alliance, a Class/New Social Movement alliance? Or both? Or something else? And are there other ways of recreating an international/ist labour movement with emancipatory intentions and effect? What is the future of emancipatory or utopian labour strategy in the epoch of a globalized networked capitalism, and the challenge of the Global Justice and Solidarity Movement?

## ADVENTURES OF EMANCIPATORY LABOUR STRATEGY AS THE NEW GLOBAL MOVEMENT CHALLENGES INTERNATIONAL UNIONISM\*

Peter Waterman

### INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO A DIALOGUE

First suggested by myself, in the Netherlands, in the late-1980s, the notion of Social Movement Unionism (SMU) was first *applied* by Rob Lambert<sup>1</sup> and Eddie Webster, in South Africa where it had considerable political and academic impact. Unhappy with their Class/Popular-Community understanding, I then (re-)conceptualised SMU in Class+New Social Movement terms, with a distinct international/ist dimension. This was meant not to oppose but to surpass the South African understanding. However, the Class/Popular-Community understanding was more widely adopted in, and/or applied to, Brazil, the Philippines, the USA, Sri Lanka and at international level. It received its most influential formulation in the work of Kim Moody (USA):

In social movement unionism...[u]nions take an active lead in the streets, as well as in politics. They ally with other social movements, but provide a class vision and content that make for a stronger glue than that which usually holds electoral or temporary coalitions together. That content is not simply the demands of the movements, but the activation of the mass of union members as the leaders of the charge—those who in most cases have the greatest social and economic leverage in capitalist society. Social movement unionism implies an active strategic orientation that uses the strongest of society’s

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<sup>1</sup> Lambert’s latest contributions (2003b,c) arrived too late for commentary. But they are certainly pertinent and they move a long dialogue forward.

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oppressed and exploited, generally organised workers, to mobilise those who are less able to sustain self-mobilisation: the poor, the unemployed, the casualised workers, the neighbourhood organizations. (Moody 1997b: 276).

Moody also gave the term a clear international/ist orientation, though the model internationalism he offered was also problematic: it treated industrial workers within transnational corporations as the vanguard of labour, it presented theirs as a vanguard internationalism, and it was over-identified with a particular network more familiar to himself than it was influential internationally (Pp. 227–310, see Waterman 2000).<sup>2</sup> We will see that over-identification with organizations, or over-generalization from cases, is a more general problem amongst SMU believers (Lambert and Webster 2003).

Within discussion of SMU, the most conceptually-sophisticated and empirically-informed contribution is, perhaps, that of Karl von Holdt (2002). Von Holdt critiques the SMU concept (1) for its over-generality, (2) for its failure to recognize the historical/communal determinants of worker consciousness and action and (3) how these might militate against, or at least significantly qualify, the heightened class-consciousness the criticised authors assume within the workplace and the nation (and, by implication, the world). He expresses scepticism about the “transferability of union strategies across national frontiers” (2002:299) and proposes to rather concentrate on the relationship between the institutional and movement aspects of trade unionism (nation by nation? workplace by workplace?). Von Holdt’s identification of the chasms and leaps in SMU are important, his stress on history and community, on considering the institution/movement tension, is valuable. Whether, however, his strictures apply equally to Moody *and* Waterman, I would like to question. This because his discussion is of the Class/Popular-Community interpretation, rather than the Class/Social-Movement one. Thus, whilst he makes a gesture toward social-movement theory (but only, curiously, of the US liberal-democratic variety), he

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<sup>2</sup> This network is the Transnationals Information Exchange (TIE). TIE was the pre-eminent promoter of shopfloor worker internationalism in the 1980s, when it also produced publications that pioneered in both content and form. Its Amsterdam office today confines its activities to project formulation and fund-raising, having abandoned its previous consciousness-raising and mobilising activities. TIE has, however, offices and activities in North America (in the same building Kim Moody long worked from), South-East Asia and elsewhere. Like SIGTUR (see below), it has no visible presence within the World Social Forums. It does, however, have an excellent website, <http://www.tieasia.org>. It is notable that these two networks exist in apparent ignorance of each other.

understands the new movements generically as “non-class” (185). The failure to consider these positively and autonomously—and as political equivalents in the struggle against neo-liberalism and globalization—limits the force and extent of his conclusions:

This argument implies that globalization is unlikely to produce the conditions for a globalized SMU as advocated by Moody and Waterman...National reality counts. (299)

Von Holdt, it seems to me, here abandons both the ambition of social theorists to produce general (universal, global) theory, and of socialists to develop general (international/ist, emancipatory) strategies. Moreover, as I will later argue, and despite his doubts, SMU has a frail but not-insignificant presence within and around the Global Justice and Solidarity Movement.<sup>3</sup>

In any case, around 2001, I conceded the concept of SMU to the Class/Popular interpretation, whilst attempting to further my original understanding as the “New Social Unionism,” and to extend it by spelling out the meaning of networking and the role of communications and culture here (Appendix 1).

Now, the continuing impact of globalisation and neo-liberalism has had a disorienting effect on even the supposed Third World exemplars of SMU (explaining Von Holdt’s pessimism?), whilst simultaneously increasing international trade union need for *some kind* of ISMU/NISU. Use and even discussion of the notion has not ceased. On the contrary, it appears to be increasing (see bibliography). The development of the “global justice and solidarity movement” (GJ&SM, symbolized by Seattle, 1999), and in particular the World Social Forum (WSF) process since 2001, is beginning to put the matter on the trade union agenda. But is *this* matter a Class/Popular-Community alliance, a Class/New Social Movement alliance? Or both? Or something else? And is this still a useful concept for development?

A couple of final notes about terminology and coverage. In what follows:

- SMU = Social Movement Unionism, the umbrella term for the ongoing dialogue or debate;

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<sup>3</sup> It apparently has, moreover, a growing presence in the writings of socially-committed researchers. A case would be the draft PhD of Biyanwila (2003), which includes an extensive chapter on SMU. This not only provides a more-detailed discussion of the literature than can be given here. It also puts this literature within the context of social-movement theory more generally. And, whilst bracketing the debate on SMU, the PhD work of Mario Novelli (2003), suggests that something very much like this is developing even under the extremely union-hostile conditions of contemporary Colombia.

- ✦ ISMU = International Social Movement Unionism, the Class/Popular or Kim Moody interpretation;
- ✦ NISU = New International Social Unionism, the Class/New Social Movement version, my own interpretation.

In-text references will be limited. The interested reader can find most of the relevant sources in the extended bibliography. Disgruntled contributors to the debate, who feel they have been misrepresented—sometimes without being recognized or named—should feel free to reply, as also, of course, those I have failed to even mention.

The argument proceeds as follows: Part 1 deals with the paradox(es) surrounding the trajectory of the concept, and the two tendencies identifiable within the debate; Part 2 deals with the opportunity and challenge to SMU represented by the GJ&SM; Part 3 presents evidence from the 2003 World Social Forum concerning SMU; Part 4 reviews relevant literature, either critical of the concept, or outside the debate, yet still contributing to an emancipatory alternative for the international labour movement. The Conclusion argues that it is within the orbit of the new movement that a new emancipatory understanding of labour and its internationalism will develop.

## 1. A PARADOX, A PARADOX, A MOST INGENIOUS PARADOX

Alberto Melucci, generally recognized as the man who coined the phrase and developed the theory of “new social movements,” was sufficiently unhappy about the (mis)use of the concept to wish to disown it. I have related feelings about SMU. I am delighted to see that it is in the use of labour specialists and union leaders (see below), but uneasy about the way it is being understood or applied. Despite various efforts over the years, and despite often friendly reference to my own writings, users of the concept of SMU have just as commonly misunderstood and/or misapplied it. As a later quote from the International Metalworkers Federation (IMWF) reveals, however, this has not rescued even NISU from a workerist understanding! Let us work our way through the paradox.

### Misunderstanding

My formulation was, I would have thought, clear, even simple or schematic. It was a synthesis of socialist trade-union theory with that of “new social movement” (NSM) theory, as the latter was shaping up in the 1980s. To this I added ideas on informatization drawn from radical sociologists and communications specialists. From socialist trade-union theory I took the significance of capitalist work, of class contradiction, of worker self-organization; and of class struggle as both subversive of existing capitalist relations, and essential for international solidarity and human self-emancipation. From NSM theory I took the significance

of radical-democratic identity movements, the equivalence of different radical-democratic struggles, of networking as movement form, of the socio-cultural as an increasingly central arena of emancipatory struggle. From radical communications theory I took ideas on the potential of the information and communication technology for emancipatory movements. The kind of internationalism with which this was articulated was a post-nationalist kind, which I eventually conceptualized as the New Global Solidarity. Evidently this amounted to a critique of socialist trade-union theory, in so far as that school proposes, as does Kim Moody, the vanguard role of the working-class amongst social movements—and in advancing internationalism. But it also amounted to a reminder, to the often class-blind New Social Movement theorists, of the continuing importance of work and unions to social emancipation.

Yet most of those who have used the SMU concept have understood it not in terms of an articulation between the two or more bodies of theory, or two complexes of practice, but in that of an alliance within the class (waged/non-waged), and/or between the class and the popular/community (workers/people, labour/nationalist). And, in most cases, they have understood it in terms, as earlier suggested, of the workers/unions as the vanguard of the popular or emancipatory movement. In so far as most application was to or from the nation-state (the state-defined nation), it sometimes assumed the new internationalism to be primarily that between *national* SMUs (e.g. between the national trade union centres of South Africa, South Korea, Brazil, the Philippines).

This was a progressive understanding but not a *radical* one. It was progressive in so far as it was an implicit or explicit critique of Leninist, Social-Democratic or Liberal theories and practices, and a move toward a broader understanding of a labour movement. It was not radical because it failed to go to the roots of the crisis of trade unionism. These roots lie, surely, in the transformation from a national-industrialising capitalism (NIC), whether imperial or anti-imperialist, into a globalised networked capitalism (GNC), in which production and services, work-for-capital and the working classes are undergoing the most massive de- and re-construction, and unions are being reduced in size and politically marginalized. Furthermore, the understanding was *not radical* because of its failure to recognize the significance of the NSMs, national and international, in emancipatory theory or practice. Thus, for example, where recognition was given to women’s struggles, this was customarily with “working women” and not with women’s struggles in general, nor with feminist theory. The crisis lies, finally and fundamentally, in the union *form*, which is still primarily organizational/institutional in a period in which both capitalism and the global justice and solidarity movement are taking the *network* form. Or, to put this theoretically, it is that the inter/national labour movement is still being understood in *organizational/institutional*

tutional terms when it increasingly needs to be understood in *networking/communicational* ones.

It seems to me that the problem here is that most of the writers concerned have been over-identified with one or more of the following: the waged working class; the union form; socialist ideology/theory. This means, in practice, an over-identification with the national-industrial (even the specifically Fordist) working class, union form and ideology/theory. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Waterman 2001b), this is the most difficult site from which to develop an emancipatory labour internationalism.

### Misapplication

My original conceptualization was a theoretical synthesis, but simultaneously a generalization and projection from new experiences of social struggle and internationalism developing in the 1980s–90s. It was, however, also intended to function as a critique of actually-existing unionism and union theory. It was not meant to be a *description* and even less a *justification* of any existing union experience. It was utopian, in the dual meaning of this term: nowhere and good place/process (Panitch and Leys 2000).

The original understanding, moreover, was intended to be both international and internationalist. In a terminology more specific to the era of globalisation, it was intended to be both global in relevance and to express and further global solidarity. It was, finally, meant to provoke theoretical discussion and development. Most, if not all, of the uses of SMU were, however, simultaneously descriptive and positive—if not celebratory. The quotation below may be a caricature but, like a caricature, it may bring out something that a conventional representation would not:

The ABCD Confederation of Trade Unions is a social movement union and it is good. Other unions please follow.

Thus was it used in the 1980s–90s of the new radical and militant unions in South Africa, Brazil and the Philippines. When it was used more internationally, critically or futurologically, this was still in Labour/Popular-Community form, and with the vanguard clearly represented by the Fordist working class and Left, Socialist or even Communist trade unions—and related parties. In so far as certain unions were taken as *exemplifying* SMU, the concept was, by this token and to this extent, deprived of critical function. Where it was used *strategically* or *futurologically*, but still of the national-industrial union institutions, it became incapable of surpassing a form of worker self-articulation linked to a passing period of capitalist development. Where it was seen as relevant to only a *particular place* (“the South”) or a *particular period* (of struggle against authoritarian, imperial, racist power), it was deprived of universality (the aspiration, I have

suggested, of any emancipatory theory or strategy).

Finally, it has to be said that those most-energetically promoting SMU, and most-closely working with trade unions, failed to define or redefine the concept, leaving it with the most general (and unconceptualised) characteristics: “democratic”, “shopfloor”, “non-party”, “allied to other popular movements.” These limitations have, I recognize, also enabled it to continue and even spread amongst actually-existing inter/national unions. But the limitations just as evidently have a price tag attached.

### The end of SMU as we have known it?

The limits placed on SMU, by tying it to particular unions, limiting it to a passing period of capitalist development, or by presenting it as a left or socialist policy/practice for institutionalized unionism, have been severe. The leading exemplars offered—COSATU in South Africa, the CUT in Brazil, and the KMU in the Philippines—have lost much or all of their SMU characteristics, being increasingly entrapped within neo-liberal industrial relations dispensations that make it difficult to carry out even traditional collective-bargaining functions for diminishing numbers of members. In the case of South Africa, the country in which it was first applied and in which it has been most discussed, SMU appears to have been one of a series of models which have less led the unions out of a systemic crisis than accompanied their decline in autonomy and dynamism—and their continuing lack of articulation with a rising wave of social movements (Bramble 2003, Bramble and Barchiesi 2003)! In the case of the COSATU-supported Southern Initiative on Globalization and Trade Union Rights (SIGTUR) it may explain why this is *trailing* rather than *leading*, why it is *marginal* rather than *central*, to international labour movement engagement with the GJ&SM.<sup>4</sup> By attaching SMU to specific times/places/cases, the concept follows an institutional trajectory, is constrained by national/regional frontiers, and,

<sup>4</sup> SIGTUR is a leftist network of national unions, which finds itself, willy-nilly, somewhere between the institutionalised trade union internationals and the global justice and solidarity movement that is increasingly attracting unions (see below). It has been energetically and repeatedly championed by Rob Lambert and Eddie Webster (see Bibliography) who, whilst occasionally revealing problems within the network, nonetheless insist on its exemplary representation of the new international social movement unionism. Whilst its Korean and South African affiliates have been present and active within the World Social Forums (2001–3), SIGTUR, as such, has not. Furthermore, whilst Lambert and Webster have repeatedly claimed for it an internet existence, it has so far no website, nor more than a minimal presence on the web. Moreover, as indicated below, its national-union constituency obstructs its reach to unions unaffiliated to its

therefore condemned to the fate of traditional left utopianism (Beilharz 1992). This is, inevitably, to become a “conservative utopianism:”

“What characterizes conservative utopias and distinguishes them from critical utopias is the fact that they identify themselves with the present-day reality and discover their utopian dimension in the radicalization or complete fulfillment of the present” (Sousa Santos 2003).

This may seem a somewhat brutal fate to be visited upon *any* attempt at labour internationalism. But I would consider that the notion of a conservative utopia applies equally, if differently, to the Social-Democratic as to the Soviet utopia. And the quote does identify two elements within the projects I have treated as progressive rather than radical. Firstly, that they attach their utopia to the “radicalisation or complete fulfillment” of actually-existing unionism. Secondly, that they are not *critical*, in the sense of not applying a critique of the dominant social order to the unions or networks that they are describing—and promoting.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. THE CHALLENGE OF THE “GLOBAL JUSTICE AND SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT”

The “Anti-Corporate”, “Anti-Capitalist”, “Anti-Globalisation” movement, the “Movement of Movements” is, as these various names might suggest, an amorphous or changing political or theoretical object. Indeed, the question has been

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members, as well as to the burgeoning inter/national networks of the non-unionised. One has to note, finally, that whilst Lambert and Webster add new conceptual notes and empirical information to their pieces, they fail to provide any comparative perspective (concerning other new labour networks) and also avoid confronting at least my challenges to their argument (Waterman 2001b). One is bound to fear that, even if it eventually attends the Fourth World Social Forum, in India, 2004, it is going to be inevitably constrained, in its relations to other internationalist networks, by its dependence on its two Indian member organizations. (Update March 1, 2004: I have as yet no evidence of the promised SIGTUR participation at WSF4).

<sup>5</sup> For the current face of conservative utopianism amongst South African labour specialists, see Harcourt and Wood (2003). Whilst implicitly conceding, in a footnote, the possibility of SMU in the long run, their immediate preference is for a neo-corporatist social partnership between COSATU and the ANC-dominated state. In so far as this would imply both the abandonment of such autonomy of thought and action as COSATU still enjoys, and in so far as it would institutionalise its isolation from the overwhelming majority of the unincorporated labouring people, this is surely a counsel of despair. The authors, additionally, also take a passing swipe at the self-isolated South African “ultra-left.” All this seems somewhat out of date in the light of the rising wave of social protest in South Africa since around 2000, a wave, incidentally, which those we must surely call simply “the left,” has been both engaged in and reflecting upon.

raised of whether it is a “movement,” or a “field” (which latter term lack, I think, both bark and bite). Liberal pundits and national-industrial socialists worry about the GJ&SM’s lack of traditional movement characteristics: an organization; a leadership; a programme; an aim; an ideology.

My feeling is this: if it looks like a movement, barks like a movement, wags its tail like a movement, and *moves* people like a movement, then it *is* a movement.<sup>6</sup>

Whilst each of the earlier terms above captures an aspect of this amorphous movement being/becoming, the “Global Justice and Solidarity Movement”—the name given it by the World Social Movement Network (WSMN) within the Second World Social Forum, early 2002—seems to me as good a characterization (of its present stage of development) as any. Given the discredit from which liberalism, populism and socialism, reformism and insurrectionism, currently suffer, this name should be acceptable, and even attractive, to not only the old activists but to those just now becoming aware and active. It simply has to have more appeal than “One Solution: Revolution!” of the Socialist Workers Party, UK, or the “Third Way,” of Tony Blair-Giddens, also in the UK.<sup>7</sup>

“The Battle of Seattle” and the World Social Forums are perhaps the best-known emanations of the GJ&SM. But the movements provoked by neo-liberalism and globalisation began with the “Food Riots” or “World Bank Riots” in the Third World of the 1980s. And, in so far as we are speaking of a network—of understanding the GJ&SM in network/communication/ cultural terms—then

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<sup>6</sup> This is a remark of such reprehensible levity that it is guaranteed to raise hackles, or groans, amongst any social movement specialist of my acquaintance. I have taken the concept somewhat more seriously in my last monograph (Waterman 2001: Chapter 7). And I recommend readers to a serious re-consideration of the matter in the light of globalisation and social protest (Edelman 2001).

<sup>7</sup> Alex Callinicos (2003), who is from the former and against the latter, has called the movement “anti-capitalist,” whilst simultaneously admitting the problematic nature of his descriptor. This is, surely, a teleological procedure: reading causality backwards from an inevitable final condition (his gender-challenged and political-economistic concept of socialism), Callinicos foists this term on people who are not socialists or may be even anti-socialist (because of Stalin? Social Democracy? The SWP?). He thus implies (1) that these non-socialists are lacking in, I suppose, “class-consciousness,” and (2) that the SWP has this. In so far as the GJ&SM *may* become an anti- or post-capitalist movement, and even become socialist, this is likely to be through a process of (a) collective self-education and (b) a 21<sup>st</sup> century re-invention of socialism, which may owe a limited amount to previous holders of the keys to the kingdom.

“it” has no fixed shape or borders (institutional or political-geographic), requiring repeated assessment of: (1) its places and spaces; (2) its forms of expression; (3) its political, socio-cultural, ideological, economic impacts at any of three or more levels (local, national, regional, global); and (4) in terms of its reach at each of these, and the inter-relations between such.

Whilst recognizing the absence of institutional or socio-political borders of this movement, we still need to evaluate the meaning, weight, and dynamism of its varied forces at varying times and places. These matters are now subject to energetic conceptualization and evaluation. It may be easier to recognize what the GJ&SM is *not* than what it *is*: it is not a replay of the 1968 movement (though this is one forebear); it is *not* a labour or socialist movement (though unions and socialists are active within it and affected by it); it is *not* a 1980s-type New Social Movement (though many of the movements and ideas of the 1980s find expression within it); it is *neither* a creature of the (inter)national non-governmental organizations, *nor* does it represent global civil society (though certain NGOs have a major weight within it, and the WSF is *one* representation of a Radical-Democratic GCS in formation).

This is, evidently, the first major radical-democratic movement of the epoch of a GNC (for the major radical but *undemocratic* ones, consider the various religious and national-communal fundamentalisms). It is a *radical-democratic* movement, in the sense that it represents a response to, against and beyond the hegemonic globalization project known as neo-liberalism. It is radically-democratic in so far as it seeks out the roots of that project and suggests, increasingly, alternatives to such. It is radically-democratic also because it seeks for democracy-without-limits, as an alternative to the low-intensity-democracy+neo-liberalism, being presently promoted, alongside war-without-end, by the imperial and global hegemons. It is also potentially *holistic*, in so far as it addresses, centrally political-economic issues, linking these with the needs of repressed or under-represented identities and minorities (these sometimes being such *majorities* as women and the South). It is potentially holistic, also, in so far as it represents a dialogue of cultures and is open, potentially, to other epistemologies (Sousa Santos 2003). This is, finally, a movement of the *present epoch* because it is networked/communicational/cultural, thus inhabiting and disputing not only the national industrial (anti)colonial capitalism (NIC) of the continuing past but the globalized networked capitalism (GNC) of the unfolding future.<sup>8</sup>

The challenge of the GJ&SM must increasingly, however, be seen not only in terms of an external challenge from the new movement to the old institutions but from the new movement to *itself* (within which workers' movements are assumed). What is at issue here is a challenge of new to old *understandings* of labour and other social movements (and NGOs), and, therefore to an under-

standing of SMU that is embedded (to use a suggestive military/media relationship) within traditional labour movement and labour studies paradigms. The new understanding is again well expressed by Sousa Santos (2003):

[D]eepening the WSF's goals requires forms of aggregation and articulation of higher intensity. Such a process includes articulating struggles and resistances, as well as promoting ever more comprehensive and consistent alternatives. Such articulations presuppose combinations among the different social movements and NGOs that are bound to question their very identity and autonomy as they have been conceived of so far. If the idea is to promote counter-hegemonic practices and knowledges that have the collaboration of ecological, pacifist, indigenous, feminist, workers' and other movements, and if the idea is to go about this horizontally and with respect for the identity of every movement, an enormous effort of mutual recognition, dialogue, and debate will be required to carry out the task [...]

The point is to create, in every movement or NGO, in every practice or strategy, in every discourse or knowledge, a contact zone that may render it porous and hence permeable to other NGOs [and movements? PW], practices, strategies, discourses, and knowledges. The exercise of translation aims to identify and potentiate what is common in the diversity of the counter-hegemonic drive. Cancelling out what separates is out of the question. The goal is to have host-difference replace fortress-difference... [Examples of such translations could be those] between the indigenous movement and the ecological movement; between the workers' movement and the feminist movement. To be successful, the work of translation depends on demanding conditions. Nonetheless, the effort must be taken up. On it depends the future of counter-hegemonic globalization.

It is such an understanding of the interpenetration and transformation of understandings and practices, the opening-up of movements and movement institutions to each other, and the self-transformation of the parties thus mutually engaged, that the New International Social Unionism implies.

### 3. TIUIs, WSF3, SMU, etc

I must here limit myself to one place/space/event/aspect: the presence of the traditional international union institutions (TIUIs) at the Third World Social Forum (WSF3), Porto Alegre, in January 2003. The WSF is not, of course, the GJ&SM as a whole. But, then, the TIUIs are not the international trade union

<sup>8</sup> Such positive generalizations are not only open to challenge but have been questioned in my own writings about the WSF (see Bibliography). The generalizations can be—and should be—criticized as expressing a desire, a strategy, rather than a critique. They will, nonetheless, serve a purpose here, that of considering the relative fit between the WSF and the SMU concept in general, as well as its two variants in particular.

movement—even less the international *labour* movement—as a whole. However, the TIUI-WSF dialectic here should provide a further basis for reflection on SMU more generally.<sup>9</sup>

WSF3 saw a growth and deepening of the relationship between the TIUIs and the Forum.<sup>10</sup> There are already about a dozen inter/national unions on the International Council (IC) of the Forum, most of which are anti-*neo-liberal* but not *anti-capitalist*, and many of which are, due to neo-liberalism and globalisation, in considerable crisis. There is no evidence that they have tried to act within the IC as a bloc. With one or two exceptions, they may have been primarily concerned with finding out what kind of exotic animal—or zoo—this is.

The increasing interest of this major traditional movement institution in the Forum was demonstrated by the presence, for the first time, of the General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). But top officers of Global Union Federations (GUFs, formerly International Trade Secretariats) were also present, either prominently on platforms or quietly testing the water. Also present were inter/national union organizations/networks from beyond the ICFTU family (now formalized as Global Unions). This year there were, in addition to the radical union networks from France or Italy, an independent left union confederation from the Philippines, two left mineworker activists from India, and, no doubt, hundreds of movement-oriented unionists from other countries. I noted also an increasing openness to the new movement amongst even the most traditional of TIUIs.

Whilst the first big union event at the Forum was a formal panel with only gestures in the direction of discussion (here, admittedly, reproducing a problematic Forum formula), a major panel on the union/social-movement relationship saw the platform shared between the Global Unions, independent left unions and articulate leaders of social movements or NGOs heavily identified with the Forum process. The unions, moreover, seemed increasingly prepared to recognize that they *are* institutions and that it is *they* that need to come to terms with a place and process that, whilst lacking in formal representativity and often inchoate, nevertheless has the appeal, dynamism, public reach and mobilizing capacity that they themselves both seriously lack and urgently need. The formal represen-

<sup>9</sup> The following is drawn from Waterman 2003b

<sup>10</sup> I did not attend all major union events. And, notably, I missed a session on relations between old and new social movements, within which unions were represented and union-movement relations discussed. This was, fortunately, attended by Nikhil Anand (2003), who sets discussion of this matter within a discussion of social movement theory, and who develops a conceptual approach of considerable originality and purchase.

tativity of the TIUIs conceals the ignorance or passivity of most union members internationally. The TIUIs know they have 157 to 200 million members. But how many of these members know that the TIUIs have *them*?<sup>11</sup>

The question, however, remains of *what kind of* relationship is developing here. From the first big union event, patronized by the charismatic Director of the International Labour Organization (ILO), veteran Chilean socialist, Juan Somavia, I got the strong impression that what was shaping up was some kind of understanding or alliance between (1) the Unions, (2) the Social Forum and (3) Progressive States/men. The latter were here evidently represented by the universally and unconditionally-praised PT Government and President Lula. Somavia, who had just met Lula formally in Brasilia, made explicit comparison between the ILO's new programme/slogan of "Decent Work" and Lula's election slogan "For a Decent Brazil" (in both cases "decent" suggests something better whilst avoiding confrontation with, or even identifying, something clearly worse).

In so far as the TIUIs appear to have swallowed "Decent Work"—hook, line and two smoking barrels—what is surely suggested here is a global neo-keynesianism, in which the unions and their ILO/WSF friends would recreate the post-1945 Social Partnership model (or ideology), but now on a global scale—and with the aid of friendly governments!<sup>12</sup> The model seems to me problematic in numerous ways. The main one, surely, is whether the role of the

<sup>11</sup> This is not simply a rhetorical question, nor a cheap shot. It raises a serious issue for research. Why have not the many union-oriented and internationalist NGO, and academic research and support, groups, not done this? I would suggest it is because, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, most such groups of which I am aware have ceased expanding the limits of institutionalised unionism, and are today, rather, subordinating themselves to such. (For the 1990s crisis of solidarity NGOs, see GlobalXchange 2003). The rhetorical question then arises of whether they are not failing to ask the question because they already know the answer.

<sup>12</sup> I fear that "Decent Work" may prove to be the successor to the "Social Clause." After being pushed quietly for 15 years, it became *the* major international campaign of the ICFTU and its associates at the turn of the millennium. The "Social Clause" was the fanciful idea of obtaining labour rights with the help of the World Trade Organization, one of whose functions was to remove them. It was forwarded by an equally fanciful strategy, that of quietly lobbying national and inter-state institutions. Finally abandoned, or eclipsed by the rise of the GJ&SM, it has been given no funeral, far less an autopsy. Commenting on the ICFTU in the light of this expensive disaster, Stuart Hodgkinson, who is doing a PhD at the University of Leeds, has uttered, in conversation, an appropriate epitaph: "No Seat at the Table; No Street Credibility." His research is also likely to show that the Social Clause was promoted to star billing by ICFTU General Secretary,

WSF, or the more general Global Justice and Solidarity Movement, is going to be limited to providing a platform for a project aimed at making capitalist globalisation “decent,” or whether the movement is going to have a project for labour that might be simultaneously more *utopian* (post-capitalist) and—given present conditions—more *realistic* (making work-for-capital an ethical issue, treating “non-workers” as equals of wage-earners, addressing the closely inter-related civil-social issues such as useful production, sustainable consumption). There surely needs to be a discussion about the political, theoretical and ethical bases of the two labour utopianisms, one within and the other beyond (Waterman 2003a) the parameters of capitalism.<sup>13</sup>

When an old institution meets a new movement, somethin’s gotta give. Thus has the trade-union movement been periodically transformed during two centuries of existence. But who, which or what is going to so give during the current transformation of capitalism? Bearing in mind that decision-makers of both the TIUIs and the WSF could have quite instrumental reasons for relating to each other, one cannot be certain that the openness within the Forums guarantees that the principles at stake will be continually and publicly raised. (Which of the two international leaderships, for example, is going to even *mention* the extent to which the other is dependent on (inter-)state subsidies, direct or indirect?).

Two marginal emanations of SMU, at the panel on union-movement relations, seemed to me, nonetheless, straws in the wind.

1. The event itself revealed the extent and limits of TIUI knowledge and understanding of contemporary social movements. The General Secretary of the International Metalworkers Federation (IMWF), Marcello Malentacchi (a Swedish national, whose name reveals an immigrant background) confronted

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Bill Jordan, now *Lord* Bill Jordan. Jordan, a trade-union promoter of British industry, was persuaded that this campaign would not only meet the needs of Northern unions confronted by globalization but could be sold to Southern ones. The latter met it with scepticism or opposition, suspecting the Northern unions of protectionism or at least paternalism. “Decent Work” may prove to be the stillborn child of a deceased parent. And, in the meantime, a desperately needed international campaign on labour rights remains on some back burner (Waterman 2001c).

<sup>13</sup> Somewhere between these two utopias can, perhaps, be found the work of another contributor to the dialogue, unjustly ignored in my paper. This is Ronaldo Munck (2002), whose masterly synthesis of relevant issues and literature, comes over as an attempt rather to conciliate between the old institutions and the new movements than to confront the former with the latter.

Trevor Ngwane. Ngwane is a South African socialist who is the most prominent and articulate leader of a recent wave of urban and even rural protest in South Africa, bitterly opposed by the regime, and with which the COSATU has only the most cautious of relations. Malentacchi’s response to Ngwane’s presentation was that the Swedish unions had had a long solidarity relationship with the African National Congress during the anti-apartheid struggle, and that he could not accept that it was now a neo-liberal regime! Yet, in the IMWF report on this event, the following was also stated:

[A] man from the audience met with much approval by claiming that trade unions were increasingly transforming themselves ‘from the inside,’ more and more relating to a changing society with less manual workers, more non-manual workers and with atypical workers—part-time working, or in the informal sector—becoming the norm. He called this phenomenon ‘the new social unionism’ (International Metalworkers Federation 2003a).

Here some comments are in order: (1) it was not a man, it was a Waterman; (2) this is, as far as I recall, a somewhat selective presentation of Waterman’s argument; (3) it was used by Malentacchi in *defence* of COSATU and *against* Ngwane (a comrade-in-arms with whom I had been discussing tactics at the panel). The incident suggests the ambiguous, not to say schizophrenic, condition of the TIUIs. In so far, however, as the identification with a party/state/organization expresses traditional labour inter/nationalism (as well as a failure to follow media reports on South Africa), the *positive* attitude toward the NSU represents *movement*...even if it was still understood in ISMU terms!

2. At the end of the panel I was approached by a union friend I had made whilst researching international labour communications and the left unions in the Philippines, 10 years or more earlier. Now a leader of a left Alliance of Progressive Labour (APL), he pumped my arm, thanked me for my contribution to his organization and then thrust into my hand a trade union handbook entitled *Fighting Back with Social Movement Unionism!*

Despite the title, however, SMU is confined to some 15 of 94 pages, is not sourced in the bibliography, and is understood largely in terms of the Moody variant:

Social movement unionism is a strategy directed at recognising, organising and mobilising all types of workers and unions for engagements in different arenas of struggle. This strategy is not limited to ‘trade union’ organising and has been developed precisely to respond to new work arrangements where employee-employer relationships do not exist or are not clear...[I]t is geared toward the struggle for workers’ rights in all aspects—economic, political and socio-cultural—and at all levels: local, national, global (Alliance of Progressive Labour/Labour Education and Research Network 2001:74).

Here too some comments are in order. Firstly, the APL represents a left union initiative that is attempting to surpass the party-unionism of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). This was the major left Filipino trade union organization of the 1980s–90s. But, due in large part to its subordination to the (Maoist) Communist Party of the Philippines, the KMU had reproduced its splits and decline following the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. Secondly, the brochure recuperates SMU from previous application to, and identification with, the KMU (Lambert 1990, Scipes 1992). Thirdly, it seems to me, APL use of the concept involves the organization, at least potentially, in international discussion around the concept. (Turning a potentiality into a reality here, admittedly, might require someone to set up an electronic discussion list on SMU!).

Let me summarise and conclude.

Given the growing presence of the traditional international union institutions within the World Social Forum, given, further, their growing presence within the wider global justice and solidarity movement, it is becoming increasingly difficult to set up the TIUI-GJ&SM relationship in binary-oppositional terms. The old unions are both inside and outside the new movement. Furthermore, though this requires demonstration, the new movement is increasingly inside as well as outside the old international union institutions!

The debate/discussion/dialogue on SMU cannot be seen in terms of a binary opposition between left and right, old and new, GJ&SM and TIUIs. It should now be understood as a dialogue/dialectic *within* the GJ&SM. The debate around SMU can nonetheless also be understood as a dialogue/dialectic within and amongst left unions, the broader labour movement, and labour specialists; and this can be done independently of the Forum or the GJ&SM (though unions and networks ignoring the latter are likely to further marginalize themselves locally, nationally, regionally and globally).

I earlier suggested that the ISMU variant of SMU was more influential, precisely because of its closeness to the unions, the movement, and traditional labour discourses. As far as I am concerned this represents a welcome step forward and opening up. I have, however, also suggested that the NISU interpretation is closer to the spirit of GJ&SM/WSF—and is therefore likely to have the longer breath? Furthermore, even though I continue to carry a torch for SMU in general and NISU in particular, this should not be taken to mean that contemporary discourse on labour and international emancipation either is or should be confined to SMU. There are other discourses in existence that are, could be, or should be heard within the movement. Let us look at some of these.

#### 4. OTHER ROADS TO OTHER UTOPIAS

At the time of Bob Hope, Bing Crosby and Dorothy Lamour there was only one “Road to Utopia” (it was a movie, released, appropriately, in 1946). Stalin, Attlee, Peron, Mandel, Mao, Nkrumah and Tito would have agreed with the *pensée unique* (correct thought), if not with the particular road or the point of arrival. As a result of the failures of such labour or popular utopias many left thinkers abandoned the idea of utopia considering it essentially totalitarian. Others today are trying to re-invent social emancipation and utopian thinking in the light of both the past failures and the new possibilities, not to speak of increasingly urgent necessities (Panitch and Leys 2000).

Because of the failure of the old labour utopias one needs to recognize that any left claim to *pensamiento unico* (correct thought, again) is unlikely to get us anywhere except up a one-way dead-end street. It is, in any case, clear to me that a single model or strategy such as ISMU or NISU can be no more than a contribution to a dialogue amongst emancipatory movements and thinkers, within and around the labour movement. In considering other approaches, I will limit myself to two or three recent ones. “Recent” means they have appeared in a world profoundly marked by both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalization.<sup>14</sup>

#### **Back to Marx/ism (or: don't let go the hand of Marx for fear of finding something worse)**

Gregor Gall (2002) and Michael Neary (2002) will certainly complain about being put behind the same banner (the first identifies with a particular Trotskyist-Vanguardist tradition, the second with the radically-democratic school of Workers' Autonomy). Indeed, they may have only these two following things in common: (1) that they take issue with my particular understanding of SMU; (2) that, in doing so, they appeal to traditional Marxist theory. I am not going to deal with their specific criticisms—gross in the first case and subtle in the second. This is because I agree with much of what they say of my conceptualization, particularly about its lack of depth. But I do consider an appeal to Marx

<sup>14</sup> I am embarrassed at not having included Paul Johnston's work in this section (1994, 2001), especially since he discusses social movement unionism in relationship to citizenship theory and movements—another way of articulating labour with emancipation. To the originality of this contribution must be added that Johnston is a labour organizer as well as a theorist/analyst. Moreover, whilst he has not been part of debates about labour internationalism as such, he has addressed himself to at least “transnational” unionism, i.e. that across the US-Mexican border. My concluding quote will have to represent the homage vice occasionally pays to virtue.

or Marxism (two centuries ago) a religious procedure if unaccompanied by a (Marxist?) critique of such in the light of the significant transformations of capitalism that have occurred in the meantime. What I am interested in considering here are the alternatives they propose to SMU or, perhaps, their failure to spell out such alternatives. Gall (2002) concludes:

[T]here is no credible reason to downplay the potential of the workers' movements as a mass based representation of a distinctive social group with power at the points of production, distribution [and] exchange, and with quite distinct interests from other classes and groups. Put another way, previous and present severe difficulties need not and do not invalidate the historical project [that] these workers' organs of collective representation can assume. We should not rush therefore to embrace the notion of social movements and social movement unionism quite so much and quite so keenly because the original formulation of trade unionism has much mileage left in it, albeit with acknowledged and inherent weaknesses. It is [the] transformatory potential of organized labour that we need to keep hold of. But in doing so we must...address the issues of both dominance of conservatism and the paucity of socialist consciousness and leadership within trade unionism. Only in this...may the potential ever become actual.<sup>15</sup>

In both its optimistic and its pessimistic notes, Gall reproduces 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century Marxist rationalizations for problematic Marxist theoretical assumptions about or interpretations of the working class, trade unions and working-class leadership (c.f. Hyman 1971). In relationship to religious belief, such an appeal to original and eternal truths or prophets is called fundamentalism. This is, of course, impervious to either empirical evidence or rational argument (as demonstrated by my unsuccessful attempt to engage the Socialist Workers Party in dialogue on international labour, Waterman 2002).

Neary (2002) represents both a more general and more theoretical critique of recent left writing on labour, and a more careful one. He distinguishes between ISMU (Moody) and NISU (myself). However, what he is primarily concerned to do is to recover and spell out the implications of Marx' understanding of the category/relationship "labour" (as distinguished from Marx' understanding of "class struggle," "labour movement," and "trade unionism"?). He then attempts to exemplify this understanding with the ups and downs of the South Korean case.

It is not clear however why Marx' understanding of labour is taken to throw light on contemporary Korean (also Mexican, Argentinean and European) protest, whilst his understanding of labour movements—and labour internation-

<sup>15</sup> I am dependent on a draft of his article, kindly made available to me by the author.

alism—are ignored. (Was Marx, as he himself once declared, not a Marxist?). Moreover, Neary's understanding of Zapatismo in Mexico, or of Argentinean roadblocks, as contemporary expressions of the labour-capital contradiction, seems to me seriously reductionist or, at the very least, partial. While he argues, of these contemporary national/regional cases, that they are distinguished by their "determination to confront global capital at the global level" (175), he does so without conceptualizing or even describing the relations between such protests, which Marxists have customarily considered under the rubric of internationalism. Neary concludes on the responsibility of Marxists to develop, on the basis of such cases, a "new transformatory paradigm." But then tells us that "the theory for such a paradigm does not have to be invented: it already exists in the work of Karl Marx" (176). There are, in this argument both chasms and leaps. It appears, finally, that the role of contemporary labour-cum-popular social protests in Neary's argument is to illustrate a 150-year-old theoretical position on labour. This may explain why the nature of the new transformatory paradigm remains both invisible and, to this reader, unimaginable.

Within this church there is no salvation. The Marx and Marxism represented by these two takes on contemporary international labour struggles seems to me both partisan and scholastic. They are *partisan* in imposing the understanding of a specific party or tendency on the evidence—in confining possible explanation to that of their party/tendency (and of this party/ tendency pre-existing globalisation). They are *scholastic* in so far as their interpretations are addressed more to their fellow academics than to the labour movement itself. By this I mean that they are out of touch with either the traditional international trade union institutions or the myriad new labour movements that are occurring beyond these worldwide—something difficult to say of Kim Moody for example. They do not seem to me to engage with the contemporary international labour movement. A living Marxism would surely have to be one that went to school with both the new movements (even within the old unions) and with the new emancipatory theories (beyond Marxism), which is what the following authors attempt to do.

### Forward from Marxism (or: beyond a national-industrial Marxism)

In a series of papers, Richard Hyman has considered or reconsidered possible models or scenarios for unionism today (1999a), for labour solidarity (1999b) and the future of labour internationalism (2003). All of these are written in the light of globalization, with an awareness of the new social movements, and within a post-nationalist framework. Although his "five alternative trade union identities" are addressed to a (globalized) Western Europe, they may be recognizable more widely. (See Table 1)

**Table 1 – Five Alternative Trade Union Identities\***

Focus of Action	Key Function	Ideal Type
Occupational Elite	Exclusive Representation	Guild
Individual Worker	Services	Friendly Society
Management	Productivity Coalition	Company Union
Government	Political Exchange	Social Partner
Mass Support	Campaigning	Social Movement

\* Source: Hyman 1999a: Table 8.1

The last model is characterized as a “populist campaigning” type (1999a: 130). Hyman considers this to be reviving. And he considers that those unions suffering loss of constituency or membership and with unreliable power resources “seem impelled to embrace at least some elements of the social movement model” (ibid). His notion of union solidarity in the face of globalization (1999b) is obviously addressed to the international level but has just as obvious implications for the national, industrial, corporate or local ones. He understands solidarity not as something pertaining to workers as workers “mechanically,” nor as a heroic, if unachievable, myth, but as a new kind of collectivism “demanding new forms of strategic imagination” (94). Hyman considers the latter in terms of “a new hegemonic project” (ibid), involving a reassertion of the rights of labour against those of capital. And while he considers any radical transformation of historical union forms unlikely, he does consider possible and necessary a revival of organizational capacity, of internal democracy and of labour activism. These imply, in turn, both stronger central structures (level and constituency unspecified), grassroots participation, and new forms of articulation between (1) union levels, and (2) representation and action. Two points follow. One is

to reconstitute unions as discursive organizations which foster interactive internal relationships and serve more as networks than as hierarchies (112).

The other is recognition of the potential of information and communication technologies:

With imagination, unions may transform themselves and build an emancipatory potential for labour in the new millennium. Forward to the ‘virtual trade union of the future’ (ibid).

Hyman’s third piece (2003) is on the internationalism of the future. He argues that the international union organizations:

...are both repelled and attracted by the flexibility and spontaneity of alternative modes of intervention in an arena in which unions once claimed exclu-

sive jurisdiction. What were once known as ‘new social movements’—though by now many have become middle-aged and institutionalized—have been able to engage effectively in forms of ‘contentious politics’...which most trade union leaders until very recently considered signs of immaturity.

The growing attraction is explained by increasing union recognition of the changing world of work and the consequent necessity for unions to both ally with and find new forms for relating to new kinds of workers; by the collapse of inter/national cross-class compromises, thus leading unions to recognize the existence and enter the terrain of “international civil society”; and again by information and communication technology:

...The capacity of trade union activists to communicate directly across national borders (though language remains a problem, the quality of electronic translation systems is improving rapidly) means that many of the traditional hierarchical channels of official interchange have become obsolete. If the institutions of international labour do not become less like bureaucracies and more like network organizations, welcoming the opportunities for increased transparency and internal democracy, they are likely to be consigned to increasing irrelevance. There are many signs that this message is understood.

Although Hyman’s sympathy for either ISMU or NISU might be assumed, he does not use this language and has (regrettably!) not (yet?) entered the debate. Indeed, much of his argument makes reference to or uses traditional sociological, contemporary labour relations or socialist discourses. Whilst I could argue that he leans more in the direction of my own particular understanding, I would hesitate to identify him with it (particularly without asking him first). From Hyman’s contributions I draw two conclusions: 1) it is possible to articulate an emancipatory position on inter/national unionism *without* using the terminology of SMU; 2) it is nonetheless *preferable* to do this with a new theory/conceptualization. The reason for this is that:

The problem with new social movements is that in order to do them justice a new social theory and new analytical concepts are called for. Since neither the one nor the other [...] emerges from the inertia of the disciplines, the risk that they may be undertheorized and undervalued is considerable (Sousa Santos 2003).

**Marxism, feminism and environmentalism (or: the last may not be the first, but emancipatory theory and practice grows here too)**

What is particularly interesting about the paper of Dietrich and Nayak (2001) is the manner in which it expresses the concerns of the NISU interpretation of SMU without reference to the concept or dialogue.<sup>16</sup> What is further

<sup>16</sup> This argument is adapted from Waterman 2001b.

interesting is that it does so in the process of reflecting on the organization and struggles of artisanal fishworkers and their communities in Southern India in the period of globalization. Dietrich and Nayak open up the matter of an emancipatory labor movement and internationalism beyond the class, the national and the union form that gave it historical shape. This is not only because of its foci but also of its approach, in so far as this is synthesized from Marxism, Feminism, Environmentalism and other contemporary sources.

The case of the Indian fishworkers seems to reveal, one after the other, all the self-limitations of modern national industrial trade unionism. The authors' approach similarly reveals the limitations of those for whom the national-industrial working class and union provide the parameters. Concepts of the "traditional sector," the "informal sector" and of "a-typical employment" are here revealed to be highly ideological and increasingly conservative. A new labor internationalism cannot simply add-and-mix the growing number of women workers or those indirectly waged. It has to be rethought in a manner that no longer considers the traditional worker and union the norm.

The fishworker case also reveals, in open and dramatic form, most of the problems that have been ignored, or concealed, or marginalized, by the modern labour movement: the multiple identities of workers, women-workers/working-women, complex and conflicting notions of community, the search for work and production in harmony with nature, the increasing centrality of the global, the necessity of simultaneously building up an *international* community of workers+communities and, on this base, and in function of their self-empowerment, negotiating with inter-state institutions. Particularly interesting for me is the manner in which, and the form within which, their internationalism is being created. Excluded by traditional unionism from membership of the institutionalized union internationals *and the earlier-mentioned SIGTUR*, the fishworkers have found their internationalism with the support of an international/ist NGO and in the form of a network. These are, of course, the *social intermediary* and *relational mode* customary to new non-union labour internationalisms (which does not mean they do not themselves require critical evaluation).

In terms of approach, too, the study suggests the value of combining traditional Marxism (analysis of capitalism, national and international, the notion of class identity and struggle), Feminism (recognition of gender as a social structure; the necessity of gender-sensitive analysis and strategy), valorization of autonomous women's organization and struggle, and Environmentalism (analysis of the destructive dynamic of industrial capitalism, struggle for environmentally-friendly products, production methods and labour relations).

Let us here avoid two possible misunderstandings. One is that we have discovered *the* way to emancipation, national and international, the other that we

have discovered *the* vanguard thereof. These two errors, customarily combined, have been common to the left historically. And they reveal the continuing legacy of (1) ancient ideologies of human emancipation (that the last shall be the first, that there is a chosen people) and (2) of the modern Marxist one (the most oppressed modern class as the bearer of international emancipation, the socialist intelligentsia as its guide and teacher).

It is not *because* the fishworkers are the most oppressed (or the most marginalized, or that they represent the majority, or that they accumulate within their community the major forms of alienation under globalized capitalism), that they suggest the future of labor emancipation and internationalism. It is rather that systematic reflection upon these matters, made possible by collaboration with critically-minded and socially-committed intellectuals, *can* lead to the revelation of previously concealed truths or the surpassing of ingrained misunderstandings.

There is, finally, no guarantee that such emancipatory visions, desires or capacities, would survive any of the following assaults: (1) increased repression on the part of the state, inter-state policies and practices; commercial aggression on the part of inter/national capital; (2) a sophisticated and extensive reform policy by the same powers; (3) a similarly sophisticated proposal of marriage by an otherwise un-emancipated trade union movement, national or international (i.e. one still insisting on the male superior position); (4) a substitutionist, instead of an empowering, role by the intellectuals/professionals supporting (or leading!) the movement, whether at local, national or international level.

Let us again round up.

Whilst I have given short shrift to some of the literature mentioned above, I am cheered by the approaches of all these others in the dialogue on the global emancipation of labour—or on the contribution of labour to global emancipation. I repeat that I have never been satisfied with my own understanding of SMU, considering it schematic, lacking in a clear relationship to union and general social theory, and too radical to be effective amongst labour movement activists. I do not, either, cherish the role of the prophet in the wilderness, or the small, still voice of truth. So the revelation of other pathways to paradise, other roads to other possible labour utopias, is reassuring.

## CONCLUSION: THE APPROPRIATE AGORA FOR ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE

I do not want this paper to be read as self-justificatory (even if I press my own interpretation of SMU), nor apologetic (in so far as I repeat its deficiencies). What I would rather like to do is to see this kind of discussion, including the

other emancipatory discourses on labour internationally, continue in and around the global justice and solidarity movement.

Indeed, it now occurs to me that I should at least qualify my earlier dismissal of the concept of a “social movement field.” Because what we are witnessing is a shift of movement field, or the creation of a new movement pole, within a globalized, networked and informatized capitalism. The concept I have so far preferred for this new space/place is an “agora,” a Greek word meaning both meeting place (clearly) and market place (money and power operate here too). And whereas I have previously applied this only to the World Social Forum—which has been a geographical place as well as a social space—the notion could be extended to the GJ&SM as a whole. This agora, however, is a field and pole also in another sense, that of attraction (and repulsion or exclusion, including the self-exclusion of ultra-radicals).

It needs to be remembered that, in the Europe of the later 19<sup>th</sup> century, “the social movement”—the movement for the transformation of or in society—was customarily identified with the labour movement. There is a French journal, *Le Mouvement Social*, that commemorates this usage. This *assumed centrality* led to the understanding of *this* as the pole, field, agora around, under, or behind which were ranked the other social movements (in the old empires, and the new colonial world, the national movement played a related role). This assumption also implied that theories of labour such as the class-based theory of Marx either made others irrelevant, surpassed them, or could be eventually extended to cover the nationalist, anti-colonial, peace, women’s, democratic and other “non-class” movements.

It is another paradox—an even more ingenious paradox than our earlier one—that the penetration of capitalist relations into every social sphere, and its spread to both the Nepalese Himalayas and the Peruvian Amazon, has literally de-centred the labour movement. It had earlier, of course, and because of its then centrality, been subject to massive campaigns of both assault and seduction, to a narrowing down of its effective presence, from society to capital and/or state, from a multi-faceted class and popular movement to the institutional(ised) trade union form. At the same time, with the social penetration and geographic spread of capitalist relations and ideologies, “the social movement” has spread to society-in-general, thus making the women’s movements, the democratic movements, the communications movements, the indigenous and anti-imperialist movements—so many autonomous and subject-specific movements—part of the anti-capitalist movement. This at a time in which anti-capitalism—and certainly post-capitalism—is *at a discount within the traditional international union institutions!* However, the manner in which these new movements (some of them actually as old as or older than the labour movement) now become part of an

anti-capitalist one is radically different. It is not by a ranking of centrality, or a place in a hierarchy, and certainly not by a subordination of the movements to an executive committee, vanguard movement or master (“master” also in the sense of gender-blind) discourse. It is by affinity and dialogue. The notion I have mentioned in passing above, of the “political equivalence” of radically-democratic movements does not mean that the women’s movement = the labour movement. It is an expression of recognition and an act of solidarity. It says: “We will treat you as equals because we know (or expect, or hope that) you will treat us as such.” It also says: “We will take up your concerns within our movement and amongst our concerns because we know (or expect or hope) that you will do likewise.” And, finally, “This recognition and incorporation of your issues by and within ours will strengthen our movement.”

The increasingly recognized fact anyway is that the GJ&SM and the WSF are now the field, place, site, agora that aggregates and adds value to social protest. And it should be added that it does so in a manner that potentially surpasses the Westcentrism of the old *mouvement social*. The implications of all this for labour and its internationalism is that unions need—if they are not to be condemned to Richard Hyman’s four other perfectly possible and awful options—to be *here*, to be *open to* (not simply selectively and temporarily *allied* with parts of) the new movement. The same goes, I would have thought, for any left labour theory, national or international, at least if it has emancipatory pretensions.

I have earlier implied that the problem with the ISMU variant of SMU theory was precisely its entrapment within national industrial (anti-) colonial capitalism, and the identification of its proponents with institutionalised inter/national unionism in general, or with specific inter/national organizations in particular. My own variant, NISU, has one foot in the labour movement and one in the new social movements of the 1980s. In so far as the new social movements of the 1980s are now the middle-aged movements of the 2000s, the challenge is addressed simultaneously to these movements and to the WSF and GJ&SM themselves. In so far as both traditions are attracted to the new pole—or in so far as the trade unions are understood in terms of the new movement—then we have an agora within which the dialectic and dialogue between labour and the new social movements, between organization and network, between North and South (and the South within the North and the North within the South), between engagement with and autonomy from capital and state, between the real and virtual aspects or expressions of emancipatory movements, can be worked out.

Or possibly not, possibly not *this* time. In the meantime, however, it seems to me that this is the appropriate place, space and discursive terrain within which this particular discussion can be most fruitfully continued.

Now, somewhere in cyberspace there is an emanation called Cyberbrook (<http://www.brook.com/cyberbrook>). Is it a wo/man? Is it a bird? Is it a plane? Is it—as seems most appropriate—a cyborg? A Jewish cyborg? In any case, his/her/its signature includes this quote:

It is not our obligation to complete the task of perfecting the world, but neither are we free from beginning it.

Rabbi Tarfon, Pirkei Avot [*Ethics of the Parents*]

This is a nice thought from a more innocent epoch of human history—one in which the ethical had a much higher profile than today (when the best hope a UN spokesman can express about nation-states in general, and “President” G.W. Bush in particular, is that they might be “pragmatic”). But today when we no longer need to binarily oppose obligations and enjoyments, I would like to say to those labour activists and specialists within and around the movement, that there is no reason why beginning this should not be also considered both a privilege and a pleasure.

I may, here, have wandered somewhat from trade unions, the labour movement and labour specialists. Paul Johnson (2001:2) brings them nicely back together again, this time with a warning of danger rather than a promise of opportunity:

Social movement scholars typically consider social movement frames as the naive self-understandings of participants, or perhaps as interpretations that serve (or fail to serve) as strategic resources for the activists they study. Their own scholarly analysis, on the other hand, is framed as an objective outsider account. In fact however, and regardless of their *own* naive self-understandings, scholars have themselves long been for better and for worse active framemakers within the world of industrial relations, and the frames they have produced have reflected their own interests, identities and assumptions...

Today, however, not only our labour movement but also those whose work it is to study it are disoriented. So we lack not only social movement frames but also credible theories of the labour movement. And so here, on the assumption that neither scholar nor activist has monopoly on either insight or naivete, we collapse these problems together. We need social movement frames informed by our best social research; we need theories of the labour movement informed by the experience of practitioners. To achieve this—to open up our collective learning process—we need to challenge and reject assumptions widely held on each side of the divide between theory and practice regarding the irrelevance of theory, on the one hand, and the naivete of practitioners on the other. To the extent that we fail to do so, both scholar and activist will continue to fulfill each other’s pessimistic expectations.

The World Social Forums and the wider Global Justice and Solidarity Movement has already, as I might have suggested, proven to be a place where both activists and scholars (and scholar-activists or activist-scholars) meet together,

on an assumption of such interdependence. I would have thought it likely to be the agora within which the emancipatory discourse previously encompassed within the concept of Social Movement Unionism, will take off.

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\* This listing includes items beyond those referred to in the text above. It has been contributed to extensively by Michael Schiavone, of the Australian National University, who is completing his PhD on the notion of SMU in relation to the USA.

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## APPENDIX 1 – A NEW SOCIAL UNIONISM, INTERNATIONALISM, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE\*

A new social unionism. By this I mean one surpassing existing models of "economic", "political" or "political-economic" unionism, by addressing itself to all forms of work, by taking on socio-cultural forms, and addressing itself to civil society. Such a union model would be one which, amongst other characteristics, would be:

- Struggling within and around waged work, not simply for better wages and conditions but for increased worker and union control over the labour process, investments, new technology, relocation, subcontracting, training and education policies. Such strategies and struggles should be carried out in dialogue and common action with affected communities and interests so as to avoid conflicts (e.g. with environmentalists, with women) and to positively increase the appeal of the demands
- Struggling against hierarchical, authoritarian and technocratic working methods and relations, for socially-useful and environmentally-friendly products, for a reduction in the hours of work, for the distribution of that which is available and necessary, for the sharing of domestic work, and for an increase in free time for cultural self-development and self-realisation
- Intimately related with the movements of other non-unionised or non-unionisable working classes or categories (petty-commodity sector, homeworkers, peasants, housewives, technicians and professionals)

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\* This is an extract from Waterman 2001:13-16, 22–24. The references can be found in the general bibliography. The crossheads are added.

- Intimately related to other non- or multi-class democratic movements (base movements of churches, women's, residents', ecological, human-rights and peace movements, etc) in the effort to create a powerful and diverse civil society
- Intimately related to other (potential) allies as an autonomous, equal and democratic partner, neither claiming to be, nor subordinating itself to, a "vanguard" or "sovereign" organization or power
- Taking up the new social issues within society at large, as they arise for workers specifically and as they express themselves within the union itself (struggle against authoritarianism, majoritarianism, bureaucracy, sexism, racism, etc)
- Favouring shopfloor democracy and encouraging direct horizontal relations both between workers and between the workers and other popular/democratic social forces
- Active on the terrain of education, culture and communication, stimulating worker and popular culture, supporting initiatives for democracy and pluralism both inside and outside the dominant institutions or media, locally, nationally, globally
- Open to networking both within and between organizations, understanding the value of informal, horizontal, flexible coalitions, alliances and interest groups to stimulate organizational democracy, pluralism and innovation...

### A New Labour Internationalism

In so far as this addresses itself to the problems of a GNI capitalism (of which inter-state relations are but one part), this would have to see itself as part of a general global solidarity movement, from which it must learn and to which it must contribute. A new kind of labour internationalism implies, amongst other things:

- Moving from the international relations of union or other officials towards face-to-face relations of concerned labouring people at the shopfloor, community or grassroots level
- Surpassing dependence on the centralised, bureaucratic and rigid model of the pyramidal international organization by stimulating the self-empowering, decentralised, horizontal, democratic and flexible model of the international information network
- Moving from an "aid model" (one-way flows of money and material from the "rich, powerful, free" unions, workers or others), to a "solidarity model" (two-way or multi-directional flows of political

- support, information and ideas)
- Moving from verbal declarations, appeals and conferences to political activity, creative work, visits, or direct financial contributions (which will continue to be necessary) by the working people concerned
- Basing international solidarity on the expressed daily needs, values and capacities of ordinary working people, not simply on those of their representatives
- Recognising that whilst labour is not the privileged bearer of internationalism, it is essential to it, and therefore linking up with other democratic internationalisms, so as to reinforce wage-labour struggles and surpass a workerist internationalism
- Overcoming ideological, political and financial dependency in international solidarity work by financing internationalist activities from worker or publicly-collected funds, and carrying out independent research activities and policy formulation
- Replacing the political/financial coercion, the private collusion and public silences of the traditional internationalisms, with a frank, friendly, constructive and public discourse of equals, made available to interested workers
- Recognising that there is no single site or level of international struggle and that, whilst the shopfloor, grassroots and community may be the base, the traditional formal terrains can be used and can also be influenced
- Recognising that the development of a new internationalism requires contributions from and discussion with labour movements in West, East and South, as well as within and between other socio-geographic regions

Elements of such an understanding can be found within both international union pronouncements and practices. It is, I think, becoming the common sense amongst left labour internationalists although some still seem to consider labour (or even union) internationalism as the one that leads, or ought to lead, the new wave of struggles against neo-liberal globalisation. Yet others are beginning to go beyond ideal types to spell out global labour/popular and democratic alternatives to "globalisation-from-above" in both programmatic and relational terms (Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000).

### Internationalism, Labour Internationalism, Union Internationalism

We need to distinguish between the concepts of "internationalism", "labour

internationalism,” and “union internationalism.” Within social movement discourse, *internationalism* is customarily associated with 19<sup>th</sup> century labour, with socialism and Marxism. It *may* be projected backwards so as to include the ancient religious universalisms, or the liberal cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. And it *should* be extended, in both the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, so as to include women’s/feminist, pacifist, anti-colonial and human rights forms. In so far as it is limited to these two centuries, and to a “world of nation states,” we need a new term for the era of globalization. Some talk of *transnationalism*. I prefer *global solidarity*, in so far as it is addressed to globalization, its discontents and alternatives. As for *labour internationalism* this refers to a wide range of past and present labour-related ideas, strategies and practices, including those of co-operatives, labour and socialist parties, socialist intellectuals, culture, the media and even sport. As for *union internationalism* this is restricted to the primary form of worker self-articulation during the NIC era. Trade union internationalism has so displaced or dominated labour internationalism during the later 20<sup>th</sup> century as to be commonly conflated with the latter. Yet it is precisely *union internationalism* that is most profoundly in crisis, and in question, under our GNI capitalism [...]


### Networking, Communications, Culture

We really need an additional, even an alternative, principle of worker self-articulation (both joining and expression) appropriate to our era. In other words, we need one that would continually and effectively undermine the reproduction of bureaucracy, hierarchy, and dogma that occurs also within “radical” and “revolutionary” unions.

This principle is the *network*, and the practice is *networking*. There is no need to fetishise the network or to demonise the organization. “Networking” is also a way of understanding human interrelations, and we can therefore see an organization in network terms, just as we can look at a network in organizational ones. Nonetheless, it remains true that the movement from an NIC to a GNI capitalism is also one from an organised to a networked capitalism. It is from the international labour networks and networking that the new initiatives, speed, creativity, and flexibility tend to come. An international unionism concerned with being radical-democratic and internationalist will learn this, or it will stagnate. International union networking itself will stagnate if it does not recognise itself as a part of a radical-democratic internationalist project that goes far beyond the unions, far beyond labour problems.

“Networking,” relates to communication rather than institutions. International labour networking must be informed by and produce a radical-democratic style of communication and sense of culture a “global solidarity culture.”

Labour has a long and rich cultural history and has in the past innovated and even led popular, democratic, and even avant-garde cultural movements. Once again, international trade unionism has to either surpass its reductionist self-definition or remain invisible in the international media arena, which is increasingly challenging and even replacing the institutional terrain as the central site of democratic contestation and deliberation.



#### ABSTRACT

With the end of the Cold War, military security issues declined on the international agenda as environmental, economic, and social issues rose. As superpower conflict faded from the international agenda, space was created for new attempts at multilateral problem-solving. How have these changes affected the prospects for transnational organizing? Using data from the *Yearbook of International Associations* this paper explores changes in the size, issue focus, geographic makeup, and organizational structure of the population of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) in recent decades. While not the only form of transnational cooperation, these formal organizations

provide important infrastructures for sustained transnational political work. Key findings are that while the transnational social movement sector has continued to grow since the mid-20th century, its rate of growth has slowed in the 1990s. Also, human rights and environment predominate on TSMO issue-agendas, but during the 1990s more groups emphasized economic issues and adopted multi-issue organizing frames over single-issue focuses. Newer groups were more likely to be organized regionally, that is within the global North or South, which may reflect efforts to develop structures to better connect local settings with global networks.

## EXPLORING CONNECTIONS BETWEEN GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION\*

Jackie Smith

The Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization and subsequent resistance to global trade and investment negotiations highlight the growing centralization of economic and political power in entities that transcend nation-states. These protests challenge traditional understandings of social movements as bounded by national or sub-national political arenas. Globalization, or the expansion of social interactions across national borders, leaves few areas of social life untouched, and sociologists are beginning to pay closer attention to how it affects our understanding of social and political processes. While globalization is not new, its relatively recent acceleration and expansion to new social domains calls for greater sociological attention. This project builds upon existing sociological research and brings new data to the investigation of relationships between globalization, social movements, and political change.

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While many Americans were surprised by the size and vigor of the recent protests against the global trade regime, these events should be seen as part of a long and growing stream of protest against global financial institutions. This resistance has been most visible in the global South, where the effects of global financial policies have triggered the most violent responses. The protests have broadened geographically and gained momentum since the late 1970s (see, e.g., Keck 1998; Fox and Brown, 1998; Walton and Seddon 1994). The most recent protests are especially important in that they demonstrate strong opposition to global trade liberalization from a variety of constituencies within the countries that have benefitted the most from liberal trade policies. They also build upon a more extensive network of transnational organizational and informational ties among activists in a wide range of countries. This organizational infrastructure began to expand in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and its roots took hold and generated more rapid transnational organizational expansion in the 1970s and 1980s (Sikkink and Smith 2002).

#### GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION

How should we expect global integration to impact social movements? Social movement scholars have recognized various potential transnational impacts on social movement mobilization. First, the relative strength or weakness of a state and its degree of vulnerability to domestic political challengers is affected by the state's geopolitical position. For instance, World Systems theory holds that, because of stratification in the global labor market, core states will tend to be more democratic, while periphery states will tend to be more repressive. Thus, the political opportunities that movements in every country face are shaped by how the target government is integrated into the global political economy (see, e.g., Maney 2002; Anderson-Sherman and McAdam 1982; Skocpol 1979). Second, the ideas around which social movements mobilize have long flowed freely across political boundaries. Thus, civil rights activists drew inspiration and strategy from Mahatma Gandhi (Kumar 1992; Chabot 2000) and European and U.S. activists of the 1960s learned from each others' experiences and innovations (McAdam and Rucht 1993). More recently, transnational alliances of environmental activists and indigenous groups have generated a "political ecology" frame that relates environmental struggles to concerns for human rights and local empowerment (Rothman and Oliver 2002). Third, transformations in global communication and transportation technologies as well as the related development of global economic and political institutions facilitate the mobilization of transnationally organized social movements (Kriesberg 1997; Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald 2000).<sup>1</sup> They do so in part by fostering the development of shared

cultural and ideological frameworks that serve to legitimate certain collective values and goals—such as democracy, human rights, or free trade—that appeal to global or at least transnational constituencies.

Not only have social movements been affected by changes in the global political and economic order, but they have also played roles in shaping that order. For instance, Keck and Sikkink show how advocates working to abolish the slave trade, helped to advance transnational human rights norms (1998). In addition, numerous case studies have documented that the formation and strengthening of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) have been assisted by efforts of non-governmental actors to shape governmental policies and to codify universal standards for, among other issues, human rights (Hovey 1997; Smith 1995; Boli and Thomas 1999) and more humane military and national defense practices (Evangelista 1995; Finnemore 1996; Price 1998). The recent mobilizations around global trade institutions have built in part upon efforts to defend prior achievements in global environmental, human rights and labor law from growing challenges by the global trade regime (Smith 2002a).

Rates of change in the quantity and speed of economic, political, and other societal interactions have increased dramatically, particularly in more recent times. Forms of economic globalization can be traced back to the late 17<sup>th</sup> century or earlier (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Wolf, 1982). Political globalization—first characterized by the diffusion of organizational templates for state structures and political organization, and later evolving towards an increasingly organized inter-state polity—dates back at least as far (Boli and Thomas 1997). Socio-cultural globalization developed from the transnational human interactions manifested in economic and political integration. The technological and organizational innovations, particularly those of the late-20th century, have accelerated capacity for global integration of economic and political activities, and these same innovations have also served to advance globalization of the social and cultural realm.

The changes in all three dimensions of globalization all affect the variable political opportunities available to social movement actors (della Porta and Kriesi 1999). The economic realm is characterized by increasing income dispari-

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<sup>1</sup> Keck and Sikkink (1998) discuss the formation of less formally organized transnational "issue networks" promoting changes such as the abolition of the slave trade, an end to foot-binding in China, and expansion of women's suffrage. These issue networks resemble what sociologists call social movements, though there are some important conceptual differences, such as a distinction between governmental agents and actors promoting some form of political change (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997).

ties and concentrations of wealth in the hands of transnational corporate actors coupled with the strengthening—particularly during the 1990s—of international institutions designed to facilitate and advance free trade. These developments have important consequences both for the formation of new grievances and for the capacities of challengers to mobilize and to affect social change (See, e.g., Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997; Sassen 1998). In the political realm, the formation and strengthening of supra-national institutions has transferred important aspects of political decision making outside the nation-state. This undermines democratic accountability within states, thereby limiting the abilities of challengers to achieve their goals within national political arenas alone. It has, however, also created new opportunities for social movements and other non-state actors to access decision makers and seek influence in both national and transnational policy arenas (see, e.g., Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997).<sup>2</sup>

Finally, in the socio-cultural realm, the global spread of ideas (e.g., universal human rights) and cultural materials (e.g., films, music) may help lay the organizational and ideological foundations for transnational collective action. It also creates new incentives for contention as social movement actors seek to align the framing of local conflicts with those of global-level discourses (cf. Snow et al. 1986). By framing local struggles in global terms, local groups can gain legitimacy as well as new international allies.<sup>3</sup> These various aspects of globalization, in short, affect the political opportunities open to movements at both the national and international levels, the resources available to movement actors, and the interpretations or framings of conflicts. Nevertheless, efforts to understand how global economic, institutional, and social transformations affect possibilities for social movements remain relatively under-developed (but see Tarrow 2001).

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<sup>2</sup> Kim Reimann (2002) demonstrates how Japanese environmental organizations gained increased access to national politicians as a direct result of the Climate Change Convention negotiations in Kyoto. The international conference increased the salience of environmental issues on national political agendas, and it legitimated the claims of national environmental groups. Moreover, the United Nations practice of recognizing non-governmental actors socialized Japanese officials to expand the access of Japanese NGOs to national political arenas.

<sup>3</sup> This does, of course, mean that some of the most urgent struggles are ignored by the international community because they do not resonate with global mobilizing frames (e.g., Bob 2001).

## GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: HYPOTHESES

How are changes in international political and economic interactions likely to affect the mobilization of transnational social movements? Boli and Thomas (1997) documented the presence of a “world polity” that is evidenced by isomorphism in the organizational structures adopted by national states as well as by the global diffusion of ideas such as individualism, scientific rationality, bureaucratization, and citizenship.<sup>4</sup> They view international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as important conveyors of world cultural ideas and values, as they seek to promote common international standards for industries or to advance the goals of democracy, human rights, or respect for the environment. Kathryn Sikkink and her colleagues have done important work to demonstrate the ways that certain INGOs advance global norms and shape inter-state politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). This wealth of research supports the claim that transnational associations serve as key social infrastructures that help link individuals and national or sub-national groups with global-level political processes. Such a view is consistent with predominant perspectives in the sociology of social movements that treat social movement organizations as key actors within a fluid and loosely organized social movement field (See, e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Drawing from this work and others (e.g., Meyer et al. 1997), we would expect to find that:

**HI:** *The size and geographic dispersion of the formally organized transnational social movement sector will expand with increased global institutionalization.*

The second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has brought a dramatic expansion of supranational political institutions. Governments have been cooperating around an increasing number of issues—from the rules of war and humanitarian law to environmental practices to the policing of international narcotics trafficking. And they have established formal organizations to structure and routinize this cooperation. This pattern of increased formalization and bureaucratization of (inter-)state structures parallels that accompanying the rise of the modern state. Social movement analysts trace the rise of organized social movements to the

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<sup>4</sup> The world polity perspective, however, does not account very well for conflicts among these values and how power and politics might affect variation in the reinforcement of certain values (e.g., economic rationalization) over others (e.g. equity, human rights, environmental protection).

emergence of national states during the 18<sup>th</sup> century (see, e.g., Tilly 1984; Markoff 1996; Markoff 1999). We should therefore expect greater formalization within a social movement sector that seeks to influence the political contests being waged in emerging supra-national institutions. In other words, just as the rise of states brought with it the emergence of national social movement organizations (SMOs), we should expect an expansion of IGOs to generate new forms of transnational organization, or transnational SMOs.

Early states altered political contests between challengers and elites by bringing a new actor into what once were more regional and local conflicts. That state brought increasing amounts of resources to bear on those conflicts and served as either opponent or ally of local challengers, depending upon the context. The same dynamic is true when we think of the struggles in a global political context. International agencies are created and funded by national governments. They are charged with addressing specific international *problems*, and they therefore do not always reflect the specific *interests* of their government members. This creates opportunities for cooperation between international agencies and transnational social movement actors around problem-solving goals.<sup>5</sup> Such cooperation between SMOs and IGOs can contribute to movement mobilization as well as co-optation.

Once established, international institutions can stimulate growth in the transnational social movement sector by providing access to information and financial resources, by serving as a focal point or target for social movement energies, and by actively facilitating networking among individuals and groups participating in social movements. Beyond its contribution to the overall growth of the transnational social movement sector, we should expect that the character of global political interactions will influence transnational social movement mobilization:

**H2:** *The expansion (or decline) of a particular transnational social movement industry is affected by changes in the broader “world polity.” Specifically, growth in a particular transnational social movement industry such as the environment or trade will be associated with new or renewed transnational institutionalization*

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<sup>5.</sup> Thus we see that social movement actors promoting limits to greenhouse gas emissions often find ready allies and resources from governments that favor a stronger climate change treaty (including many European governments) and from international agencies (such as the Secretariat for the Climate Change Convention). These allies and resources are part of a broader struggle against other states (e.g., the U.S.) and industry (which created its own “NGO”—called the “Global Climate Coalition”—in order to resist stronger environmental accords).

*around issues relevant to that industry. On issues where little international cooperation exists, there will be minimal transnational social movement mobilization.*

The end of the Cold War meant that superpower rivalries no longer stymied negotiations in the United Nations, creating new optimism for multilateralism. It allowed new issues to achieve greater priority on international agendas, and it opened up space for the emergence of new political blocs. At least at first, this produced new levels of agreement within the UN and generated new treaty initiatives in several issue areas outside of the area of military security. By facilitating cross-national dialogue among actors from both within and outside governments, by focusing government attention and resources on problems defined through international negotiations, and by conveying legitimacy to some of the claims of social movements, international institutions influence transnational mobilization. We should expect, then, that an increase in the numbers of organizations, conferences, and treaties that help structure international political cooperation will affect the shape of the transnational social movement sector.

Another crucial trend in the post-Cold War period is the expansion of neoliberal ideology, including its institutionalization in the World Trade Organization and regional trade associations as well as in the policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The demise of the Soviet Union was seen as a victory for free market capitalism over socialist economic policies, and proponents of limited government and unrestricted markets enjoyed important influence in the global economic arena. The opening of the World Trade Organization in 1994 clearly altered the context of all multilateral policies, and as the organization took hold, it became clear that its operation could threaten other areas of international cooperation such as human rights and the environment. These developments should be expected to affect the character transnational social movement organizations, probably by attracting greater attention to trade and economic issues.

Economic globalization has important consequences for transnational social movement mobilization; and not least among them is the diffusion of inexpensive communications and transportation technologies which are essential to transnational corporate operations. Does the social movement sector replicate existing structures of economic dominance and marginalization? Are challengers to existing global inequities subject to the same economic forces that reinforce the gaps between the world’s rich and poor? The following hypotheses will help organize analyses that address these questions:

**H3:** *On measures of access to IGOs, survival, and legitimacy, TSMOs based in core regions will be more successful than those based in peripheral ones.*

Participation in most transnational political and social change activities demands highly specialized knowledge and skills. At the very least, one is required to speak at least one of the official UN languages. And more ready access to information and officials is available if a TSMO is based near a center of international decision making such as New York, Brussels, or Geneva. Those promoting international human rights must have some expertise in law, and many activists in this area hold advanced degrees in that field. Moreover, the domination of many global institutions by the agendas and interests of core industrialized countries would lead us to expect that the core/periphery pattern is replicated in the social movement sector.

However, the fact that TSMOs are, by definition, challengers to the existing political and economic order, we would expect that they would not simply mirror and reinforce structural inequalities, but rather that they would seek to transform them (Amin et al. 1990). Thus, we expect core/periphery differences in the social movement sector to be shrinking over time, particularly as the sector itself becomes more organizationally rich and diverse.<sup>6</sup>

**H4:** *Core/periphery distinctions found in global economic relationships are reproduced in the political realm, making TSMOs more populous in core areas. Over time, however, as access to transportation and communication increases, as the number of TSMOs expands, and as technology becomes more widely disseminated, the location of TSMOs will be less concentrated in the core.*

An additional area of concern regards the ways that changing technologies—particularly the expansion of electronic communications—affect transnational organizing. We should expect that expanding global integration of social, economic, and political relations both reflects and contributes to new opportunities for transnational organizing of all kinds. Technologies that facilitate transnational communication and routine exchanges of ideas as well as international conferences and exchanges that bring individuals and organizational representatives together help reduce the costs of building and maintaining transnational organizations. They therefore increase the feasibility of individuals' direct participation in transnational organizations, rather than indirect participation through national sections of a transnational federation. At the same time, globalization processes are fraught with uncertainties and rapid change. Anticipating the course of complex inter-state negotiations and the applications of interna-

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<sup>6</sup> I expect that increased competition for participants and resources among a larger number of TSMOs would encourage their geographic expansion.

tional law poses major challenges for transnational actors, including businesses as well as advocates for social change. In order to avoid unforeseen calamities or to take advantage of emerging opportunities, transnational actors must be able to respond quickly. They also must have the capacity to mobilize differently in different parts of the world. Just as businesses must tailor their marketing and industrial strategies to local contexts (see, e.g., Sklair 2001), so, too, must transnational social movement actors cultivate mobilizing strategies that are appropriate to local or regional cultural and strategic conditions. Thus, we would expect to find that transnational movement structures will become more decentralized and informal over the recent decades of expanding global integration.

**H5:** *The structure of transnational SMOs will become more decentralized and informal as new technologies and increasing global social, economic, and political integration facilitate participation by individual members and reduce organizing start-up costs.*

## METHODS

Formal organizations provide important infrastructures that aid activists in their efforts to mobilize and act collectively to promote social change. Earlier work suggests that social movement organizations that adopt transnational organizational structures play key roles in mobilizing, informing, and coordinating collective action on issues crossing national boundaries. Thus, this study examines the characteristics of formal transnational organizations advocating for social change. Indicators of this dependent variable—changes in the transnational social movement sector—come from the *Yearbook of International Associations* (1973, 1983, 1993 and 2000/01 editions).<sup>7</sup> The *Yearbook* is edited by the Union of International Associations (UAI) in Brussels, which is charged by an early UN Resolution with helping maintain a census of international associations of all kinds. The UAI defines international associations as those with members in at least three countries, and it identifies such groups through a number of mechanisms, including referrals from other organizations, website searches, and self-identifications. It then sends an annual survey to all identified international organizations to update each entry and to assess whether or not a group remains active.

Like any data source, the *Yearbook* has important limitations, especially when one is interested in tracking groups that may be minimally structured and

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<sup>7</sup> For more details of the *Yearbook* and coding procedures, see Smith (1997).

dependent upon volunteer labor. It also under-represents non-state groups that use violence as a political tactic, since these groups are unlikely to seek inclusion in the *Yearbook*, for obvious reasons. The *Yearbook* staff, nevertheless assembles the most complete census of international organizations, and its methods for continuously identifying new groups are rigorous. Moreover, *Yearbook* editors update their census annually, and they have incorporated Internet searching into their methods. They indicate both newly formed groups for which they have minimal information as well as indications that a group has ceased activity.<sup>8</sup> Each edition of the *Yearbook* was reviewed to identify free-standing non-governmental associations that were specifically organized to promote some type of social or political change goal.

In earlier years, the selection process excluded labor unions as well as “Institutes” and “Foundations” in order to limit the possibilities of including groups that may have government affiliations or whose work involves primarily research or funding activities outside the realm of social movement activity. In the 2000 collection process, we included all of these organizations in order to allow us to examine labor groups and to determine how the prior exclusion of such groups influences our understanding of the sector of organizations advocating social change. Of 1064 organizations identified in the 2000/1 *Yearbook*, 106 or 10% were either labor organizations, foundations or institutes. Most of these (71%) were labor organizations. To maintain comparability with earlier years, however, our analysis here is limited to groups that fall under our selection criteria for the earlier periods, thereby excluding these groups. The groups that are included, then are all nonviolent organizations with members in at least three countries that pursue any kind of social change goal. So they range from groups like Amnesty International to the Universal Esperanto League to anti-abortion organizations. Development organizations are included in the dataset only if their entry suggests that they advocate for poor empowerment rather than simply provide for the delivery of services.

Once the population of TSMOs was identified, each listing was coded to record information such as the location of the organizational headquarters, the countries of membership, issue-focus, membership structure, and ties with other

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<sup>8</sup> Such cases are included in separate sections of the *Yearbook*, including identification numbers to indicate whether a group seems to be an “internationally oriented national group” (e.g., no evidence of transnational decision making or governance), “recently formed” or “apparently inactive.” In our selection process, most of the groups in these categories were excluded, except when the author had additional sources of information on the group that warranted inclusion in the dataset.

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as with IGOs. Groups were also tracked between the two time periods so that we could identify which groups that were present in the earlier time period disbanded or were otherwise inactive by 2000. This tracking across time-periods also identified some groups that were missed in the 1993 selection process, leading us to update the previously reported figures for 1993.<sup>9</sup> Additional information about the funding sources of TSMOs was recorded for the 2000 period.<sup>10</sup>

Analyses of earlier editions of *Yearbook* entries showed dramatic increases in the numbers of transnationally organized SMOs, particularly since the early 1970s. They also revealed changes in the broad issues around which people organized transnationally and in the structure of transnational organizations (See Smith 1997; Sikkink and Smith 2002). But the 1990s witnessed some major changes in the global system that should have significant impacts on the ways people organize across political borders. The dissolution of the Soviet Union both expanded the number of states formally participating in the international political community and fundamentally transformed the geopolitical context. The Cold War conflict dominated the post-WWII era and severely restricted international cooperation on issues other than security and disarmament. With the end of the Cold War, other issues emerged on the international agenda, and more of the political discourse emphasized the interdependencies of security, environmental, and economic issues. The opening of new “emerging markets” in the former Soviet Union also fueled the expansion of neoliberal economic policies and contributed to the period’s rising levels of international trade and investment. At the same time, actors such as NGOs and corporations that had long been in the corridors of international negotiations were seen as growing in importance as global actors, alongside states. And analysts increasingly recognized an enhanced role for international institutions and political processes in shaping all levels of politics (see, e.g., Risse 2000; Risse-Kappen 1995; Tarrow 2001).

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<sup>9</sup> Similar tracking was done for the earlier periods recorded for 1953, 1963, 1973, 1983, and 1988. Roughly 8-10% of additional cases were identified by tracing each case from the lists generated in searches of the subsequent edition of the *Yearbook* back to earlier time periods. Missed cases appeared to be random errors resulting from the process of reading thousands of entries in the *Yearbook*’s small print.

<sup>10</sup> This information was not recorded from earlier versions of the *Yearbook* because we believed the reporting on this measure was too inconsistent, and it was not provided for a large number of entries. The entries for the later periods are much more consistent and complete.

**Table 1: Size and Geographic Dispersion of Transnational Social Movement Organizations\***

Year	Number of TSMOs		Numbers of Countries In Memberships	
	# Orgs.	% Change	Mean (st.dev.)	Median
1973	183	—	33.89 (23.17)	28
1983	348	90%	31.02 (26.03)	23
1993	711	104%	33.13 (29.55)	23
2000 (observed)	959	35%	34.39 (32.46)	23
2003 (estimate)**	1011	42%		

\* Data for 1973 were collected in collaboration with Kathryn Sikkink (see Sikkink and Smith 2002)

\*\* To allow for more accurate comparisons between these unequal time periods, the bold figures are estimates derived by calculating the average number of new groups formed each year between 1995 and 1999 and adding three times this average to the total observed in 2000/1.

The current paper asks how the transnational social movement sector changed during a period when the international system itself witnessed a dramatic transformation that included more extensive international and transnational engagement. I begin to explore the hypotheses outlined above using data the transnational social movement sector during the 1990s. While additional case study data are needed to fully test the hypotheses, we can begin here to identify patterns and develop lines of future inquiry into the dynamics of transnational organizing.

## DATA

Hypothesis 1 anticipates that increasing global integration will both necessitate and create opportunities for transnational mobilization. Given that the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by efforts to expand the agendas and jurisdictions of global political and economic institutions, we should expect to find growth in the numbers of new transnational organizations formed during this period. Also, we would expect that these trends would help already existing groups to mobilize members from more countries.

The data in Table 1 do not generally support the expectations in hypothesis 1. Although we expected to find an acceleration in the formation of new TSMOs during the 1990s, in comparison to the growth rates of previous decades, substantially fewer new groups were formed during this later period. Further confirmation of this slowing growth trend is that the average numbers of new organizations formed in the five years prior to each data collection point declined from an average of 21.8 in 1993 to 17.4 in 2000. Comparisons of the numbers of countries in

which TSMOs report members provide little support for hypothesis 1. Although the average number of countries with members increased slightly between 1983 and 2000, the median number of countries remains unchanged, as does the average number of continents in which groups report members. Moreover, the increase in the numbers of states in the international system during this time would lead us to expect some increase in the numbers of countries represented in TSMO memberships.

The most plausible explanation for this finding is that we have a saturation effect in the population of TSMOs (see, e.g., Minkoff 1995; Hannan and Freeman 1977). As the density of organizations increases, the competition for resources and members is expected to inhibit the formation of new groups. Given a limited pool of resources and the high costs of transnational organizing, activists seeking to take advantages of new international political opportunities may seek more cost-effective ways of doing this than starting a new international organization. Thus, although the 1990s brought a clear change in the “opportunity structure” defined by the international system, these changes could not sustain the high rates of organizational growth that we saw in the 1980s. Nor did they encourage existing organizations to expand significantly their geographic scopes. If the 1990s and expanding global integration did indeed provided impetus for more activists to engage in transnational activism, this new activism is not reflected in a growing rate of new international organizational foundings.

While the saturation effect would encourage organizers to find alternatives to starting up new transnational organizations, we could also infer from these data that pre-existing organizational structures were able to respond to the more favorable political conditions of the 1990s by expanding to incorporate new members and program agendas. I explore this interpretation further in the discussion of organizational structures below.

I also see an exogenous explanation for the slowed growth of the TSMO population during the 1990s. The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) led to an unprecedented move within the UN system to allow *national* and *sub-national* groups to perform tasks that were once the domain of transnational associations. Whereas prior to 1992 formal accreditation at the UN required a transnational organizational structure, the UNCED Secretariat allowed national groups to apply for formal accreditation to the conference, and this precedent led to the adoption of similar rules in other UN venues.<sup>11</sup> Before 1992, national groups seeking to work within the UN

<sup>11</sup> Formal accreditation at UN Conferences enables organizations to have access to official proceedings, provides access to official documentation surrounding the meeting,

**Table 2: Issue Focus of Transnational Social Movement Organizations**  
Number of Organizations (Percentage)

	1973 N=183	1983 N=348	1993 N=711	2000 N=959
Human Rights	41 (22%)	89 (26%)	200 (28%)	247 (26%)
Environment	17 (9)	43 (12)	126 (18)	167 (17)
Peace	21 (12)	37 (11)	82 (11)	98 (10)
Women's Rights	16 (9)	25 (7)	64 (9)	94 (9)
Development/empowerment	8 (4)	15 (4)	52 (7)	95 (10)
Global Justice/Peace/Envir.	7 (4)	13 (4)	30 (4)	109 (11)
Self-determination/Ethnic unity	13 (7)	26 (7)	25 (3)	20 (2)
Right-wing**	—	—	9 (1)	16 (2)
Multi-issue organizations*	18 (7%)	43 (12%)	82 (12%)	161 (17%)

\* This categorization overlaps some of the categories above- especially the global justice category.

\*\* Because many right-wing organizations are secretive otherwise averse to making information about their work widely available, such groups are likely to be under-reported in the *Yearbook*. The most recent issues of the *Yearbook* rely in part on searches of organizational websites, and therefore have been able to include more of these types of groups that are unlikely to respond to requests for information.

system needed to develop an affiliation with a transnationally organized group that had official accreditation. However, the UNCED process opened the door for national groups to develop direct contacts with UN offices. This change in the broader political environment certainly contributed to the slower growth of transnational associations by reducing the need for nationally based activists to join in formal international alliances.

The second hypothesis was that the changed global political context of the 1990s would shape the issues around which people organize transnationally. Specifically, as global institutions expand their scopes and as global conferences sponsored by the United Nations encouraged mobilization around particular issues,<sup>12</sup> we expected to find changes in the way social movement actors frame

and provides limited speaking rights in official, inter-governmental meetings. Immediately following UNCED, national and sub-national groups were granted the rights to participate formally in the annual Commission on Sustainable Development, whose role was to monitor national governments' follow-up to UNCED. Other UN agencies followed this precedent as they re-evaluated their NGO accreditation process.

<sup>12</sup> The UN sponsored an unprecedented number of such conferences during the 1990s on issues ranging from environment and development (1992) to women's rights (1995) to housing (1997) and population (1994).

their own struggles. Table 2 displays the issues around which TSMOs organized during 1993 and 2000.

We find here that human rights remains the major issue around which the largest numbers of TSMOs organize, and a consistent quarter of all groups work principally on this issue. The environment has attracted growing attention since the early 1970s. And between 1983 and 2000, development issues motivated a larger percentage of TSMOs. This parallels a growing international discourse on development and inequality that intensified with the end of the Cold War. Many analysts characterized the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War politics as one from East-West to North-South conflict, as negotiations on trade liberalization and development displaced attention to arms control. Most UN Conferences reflected the economic divisions between the global North and South, as many global problems were linked to enduring inequalities and development failures. A growing emphasis among TSMOs on development is consistent with the hypothesis that the sector is shaped by changes in the broader global polity.

A robust trend we see in the 1990s is a shift towards more multi-issue organizing by TSMOs. The number of groups adopting multi-issue organizing frames doubled between 1993 and 2000. Interestingly, groups organized within the global South were significantly more likely to engage in multi-issue organizing.<sup>13</sup> This would suggest that Southern TSMOs face different mobilizing opportunities and constraints from their Northern and trans-regional counterparts. Such differences may arise from more repressive political contexts that foster frames that approach highly contentious issues such as equity and human rights from less confrontational angles. One such example would be the Greenbelt Movement in Kenya, which originated as a women's tree-planting organization and subsequently expanded its frame to issues such as empowerment and equitable development (See, e.g., Michaelson 1994). Also, groups in the South often aim to cultivate ties with Northern counterparts in order to bring external financial and symbolic resources for their struggles. This may mean that they must adapt their frames to fit those that resonate with Northern audiences. Most prominent among these kinds of cases are indigenous rights groups that extend or bridge their issue-frames to demonstrate connections between human rights and

<sup>13</sup> Twenty-six percent of groups organized in the South indicated a multi-issue organizing frame, compared to 17% of North- only and trans-regional (e.g., both North and South) organizations ( $p < .05$ ). The North-South differences here are mirrored in two surveys of transnational human rights and environmental organizations (see Smith 2000).

environmental degradation (See, e.g., Brysk 1996; Rothman and Oliver 2002). Another possible explanation is that populations in the South face experiences that make the connections between global economic divisions and other issues much more obvious. Under such conditions, organizing for peace or human rights without explicitly identifying the underlying economic sources of conflict would be ineffective.

Another trend towards greater multi-issue frames is reflected in the growing numbers of groups organizing around a broad global justice/peace/environment frame. Such groups grew from just 4% in the early 1990s to 11% by 2000. This pattern may lend credence to my latter interpretation of the causes of more frequent multi-issue organizing in the global South, assuming that the intensification of global economic integration during the 1990s would more broadly reproduce the kinds of experiences faced in the global South that clarify connections between economic inequalities and other problems. This development also parallels expanding multilateral cooperation on trade issues that characterizes the post-Cold War period.

The issue of ethnic unity/ liberation drew declining attention as the organizing focus of TSMOs. The most recent period again saw a decline in the absolute numbers of such TSMOs from 26 to 20. This can signal two very different trends. One is that these types of movements are adopting—probably in response to the elimination of Cold War induced transfers of military aid—more militant, illicit tactics and therefore are less likely to report their activities in the *Yearbook*. Another possibility is that activists are framing ethnic struggles in new ways in response to changing issue priorities on the international agenda. Rather than advocating separatist goals, for instance, they may seek to create more inclusive, transnational identity categories such as indigenous peoples or refugees. Such identities allow groups to take advantage of opportunities in international institutions that legitimize individual human rights claims and challenge traditional notions of state sovereignty based on self-determination (see Sassen 1998:22). For instance, groups like the Federal Union of European Nationalities or the World Council of Indigenous Peoples may help focus the efforts of multiple different ethnic groups around the aim of using global institutions to protect minority groups' rights against infringements by states and other actors. The data here support this interpretation. About half of the groups working to promote indigenous peoples' rights were formed during the 1980s. Another organizing frame that may be displacing the ethnic unity/liberation one is the anti-racism/ minority rights frame. Half of the groups listing this as a key goal were formed after 1980, and one quarter were formed during the 1990s.

Peace issues continued to be the focus of organizing for a consistent percentage of groups, despite the dramatic changes in the geopolitical situation following

the Cold War. And women's issues are also the focus of a consistent percentage of TSMOs. Finally, I include in the table the groups organizing around right-wing issues, although the figures for these groups are much less reliable, given that many of them operate covertly and are unlikely to make information about their associations available to the *Yearbook* editors. The Internet has allowed the UAI to expand their own capabilities for identifying and including information about international associations, and this may be one reason why we identified more right-wing groups in the more recent period than in previous ones.

The next hypothesis begins to take up questions about how the structure of the international system may be affecting transnational organizing patterns. Hypothesis 3 anticipates that TSMOs operating in core countries will have greater access to IGOs and will reap advantages of greater legitimacy as well as higher survival rates. We measure legitimacy here in terms of the extent to which an organization maintains links with other NGOs well as with inter-governmental agencies. In addition, the number of different nationalities an organization incorporates into its membership also reflects and contributes to the recognition of the group's ability and its worthiness of respect. We distinguish between internal and external legitimacy, since recognition by one's peers may not translate into respect and recognition from outside actors (for a similar use of this concept of legitimacy see Edwards and Marullo 1996). Table three displays measures that will help us test this hypothesis.

The results in table three are mixed, and they don't allow us to either accept or reject hypothesis 3. The only finding that corresponds with the hypothesis' predictions is that groups whose members were only from periphery countries were less likely to survive between 1993 and 2000 than were groups based in core countries. Organizations that transcend the North-South divide were the most successful at gaining access to IGOs, legitimacy, and consequently at survival. Contrary to hypothesis 3, South-only groups were more likely than their Northern counterparts to maintain formal consultative status with IGOs and to achieve both internal and external legitimacy.<sup>14</sup> They had consistently higher numbers of links with other NGOs and with IGOs than their North-only counterparts.

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<sup>14</sup> Caution must be used when comparing these figures for country memberships, since South-only groups may draw from a much larger number of countries than North-only ones. We are in the process of developing a more comparable measure for this concept.

**Table 3: Access, Legitimacy and Survival: Comparisons of Core- and Periphery-based TSMOs**

Scope of Member Base	N	Formal Consult. Status w/IGOs	Legitimacy mean (s.d.)			Survival 1993–2000
			Internal	External		
			NGO links	IGO links	# Country members	
<b>1993</b>						
South Only	65	40%**	5.4 (6.1)**	2.3 (2.4)**	16.8 (15.5)**	
North Only	105	19%	3.1 (4.7)	1.0 (1.5)	10.7 (5.6)	
Both N. & S.	369	41%***	5.9 (8.3)****	3.1(5.3)***	42.0(30.7)***	
<b>2000</b>						
South Only	77	49%*	6.3 (6.4)	3.2 (2.9)**	16.3 (11.9)**	69%
North Only	182	34%	4.8 (6.8)	2.0 (2.4)	12.1 (7.3)	82%
Both N. & S.	491	46%	7.7 (10.0)***	3.7(6.4)***	44.9(34.4)***	87%***

\* T-test comparisons of means for North only vs. South only groups significant ( $p < .05$ ).

\*\* T-test comparisons of means for North only vs. South only groups significant ( $p < .01$ ).

\*\*\* T-test comparisons of means for “Both North and South vs. groups in North or South only significant ( $p < .01$ ).

\*\*\*\* T-test comparisons of means for “Both North and South vs. groups in North or South only significant ( $p < .05$ ).

Can this be taken to mean that TSMOs have been able to overcome structural inequalities that are entrenched in the global system? Probably not. Ties with international organizations or other external actors are a way for relatively weak groups to increase their access to resources and otherwise enhance their ability to act in the global political arena (see, e.g. Bob 2001). So, the data in Table 3 may nevertheless be reflecting weakness as much as strength. First, groups in the North enjoy greater direct access to and influence on the major power (e.g., core) governments, thereby affecting the course of most major policy decisions even without substantial ties to global institutions. Southern activists are doubly disenfranchised, since their home governments are often less open to democratic influences and less able to affect the course of international policy. They are therefore more reliant on transnational alliances.

Ties with external actors can also be interpreted as a weakness because they can undermine the autonomy of an organization. While no effective social movement organization can succeed if it seeks complete autonomy, organizational survival and, to some degree, effectiveness depends upon an organization's abilities to decide and pursue a course of action around which its members are united. If a

**Table 4: North-South Comparisons of TSMO Mobilization**

	1973	1983	1993	2000
<i>Headquarters Located in:</i>				
Global City*	(N=135)	(N=343)	(N=711)	(N=946)
Other Western Europe or U.S.	48%	31%	26%	28%
Global South	35	48	46	45
	12	17	23	21
<i>Members located in:</i>				
South Only	(N=132)	(N=210)	(N=539)	(N=750)
North Only	5%	9%	12%	10%
Both N. & S.	16	21	20	24
	79	70	68	65
	(N=132)	(N=214)	(N=534)	(N=750)
Western Europe	89%	87%	84%	86%
N.America (U.S./Canada only)	72	64	66	62
Eastern Europe	53	43	49	56
Any Global South Country	84	79	80	76

\* “Global City” is derived from Sassen’s term (1991) and refers here to Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, and New York.

group has to respond to financial incentives or other pressures from external allies or international agencies, its ability to define and pursue its original goals may be compromised. Also, while many international agencies share TSMO goals like environmental protection, equitable economic development, and demilitarization, they are still under the control of collections of states. They often aid groups by providing resources and information and by advising organizers about how best to influence multilateral negotiations. But they may also deliberately seek to co-opt or at least assuage challengers. At the very least they can serve to channel protesters’ energies towards institutionalized forms of action (e.g. efforts to monitor and/or shape international treaties), thereby displacing more radical critiques and disruptive forms of protest. The speculative nature of my interpretation of Table 3 suggests a need for more detailed case study research to uncover the complex relations between intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (e.g., Friedman et al. Forthcoming; Cullen 2003).

Another way to approach questions about how structural power impacts the transnational social movement sector is to ask whether organizations tend to be based in places that favor already privileged, core groups or whether they

are accessible to activists in areas outside the core. Hypothesis 4 anticipates that world system relations will affect the locations of TSMOs by encouraging the location of groups in core countries. Table 4 displays comparisons of TSMOs in 1993 and 2000 to determine the extent to which TSMOs are centered in core versus periphery countries.

The patterns in Table 4 generally support the notion that one's location within the world system affects access to TSMOs as well as other resources. The vast majority of TSMOs are headquartered in core countries, and even within those countries, they are concentrated in key cities that serve as headquarters for global political institutions and commerce. Just as Sassen (1991) found global cities emerging from the foundations of communication, transportation, and labor infrastructures that tend to be concentrated in important urban centers, we see a "global city" effect in the political realm as well, as transnational advocacy groups find advantages to being near the headquarters of international agencies. However, the tendency of TSMOs to locate their headquarters in one of five major global cities appears to be declining somewhat. In 1973 nearly half of all TSMOs were based in such cities, but this figure dropped to around one quarter by 1993. The 2000 figures show little change from 1993, but if anything they suggest a reverse, or at least a leveling-off, of the earlier trends towards more decentralization of TSMOs and a greater presence in the global South.<sup>15</sup>

The patterns of regional North-South organization suggest that there may be some movement towards greater intra-regional organization, and that this tendency is most pronounced in the global North. About a third of all groups were organized within either the global North or the South in 2000, whereas this figure was around one-fifth of all groups in 1973. There has been a parallel decline in the percentages of groups that organize across North and South. Comparisons of the mean age of groups that were intra-regional versus trans-regional amplified this pattern. Seventy-one percent of TSMOs formed before 1990, and just 51% of groups formed after 1990, were trans-regional ( $t=4.92$ ). The mean age of intra-regional groups was 18, while the age of trans-regional groups

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<sup>15</sup> This finding might be the result of a longer lag-time between Northern and Southern groups in the reporting of new organizations in the *Yearbook*. Because the *Yearbook* editors are based in Brussels and rely heavily on electronic communications and inter-personal networks to identify new groups, organizations in countries with less developed communication infrastructures and less contact with global institutional forums may not appear in the *Yearbook* until years after they have been founded. Further research must be done to determine the extent to which this is the case. (I am grateful to Gillian Murphy for raising this observation).

was 32 ( $t=7.59$ ). Of groups formed before 1980, 78% were trans-regional, but this figure declines to 56% for groups formed after 1980. The overall number of trans-regional groups, however, is growing, so we cannot say that regional organizations are completely displacing more universal ones. Rather, it suggests a shift in transnational organizing strategies.

Boli and Thomas's analysis of the more general category of INGOs showed a similar, growing tendency for these groups to organize along regional lines. They argued that regional organizing enjoyed the "practical advantages of shared language, culture, and history as tools for mobilization with respect to the larger world" (1999: 31). In their view, the broader world culture and its institutional artifacts define an overarching framework within which "world culture authorizes and compels organization at diverse levels" (1999: 31-2). Thus, the formation of regional groups has been shaped by the UN global conferences, where negotiating contexts encouraged efforts to build broad consensus among NGO participants. Regional organizing also facilitates consensus-building in global NGO arenas, since activists first work through their differences in more localized contexts where the interests of participants are likely to converge and where power differentials are minimized. In global settings, regional spokespersons can represent the views and interests of their regions as they work with their counterparts to achieve a broader consensus. This interpretation would suggest that regional organizations complement rather than compete with the work of broader TSMOs by helping to bridge local- and regional- level concerns with broader international processes. In other words, such groups appear to be mobilizing new constituencies into transnational political arenas.

The vast majority of TSMOs have members in Western Europe and North America. But a comparable percentage of groups have members in the global South, and these percentages have not changed significantly over the past few decades. Citizens from Eastern Europe and the Middle East remain least integrated into the transnational social movement sector, with participation in about half (or less in the case of the Middle East) of all TSMOs, whereas Latin American and Asian rates of participation rivaled that of North America in the most recent time periods.

I want to explore further the unanticipated finding of greater intra-regional organizing among TSMOs in the most recent time period. If this reflects a trend among transnational organizations, it could substantially influence the ways that global interests and conflicts are articulated, particularly if intra-regional groups are not, in turn, serving as bridges that help aggregate and process regionally defined interests and positions into trans-regional (e.g., North-South) groups. Table 5 examines the issue focuses and age of organizations according to their geographic scope.

**Table 5: Issue Focus of Sub-Regional vs. Trans-Regional Organizations**

	North-Only N=211	South-Only N=87	Both North & South N=531
Age (Mean, years)	18.6	17.5	32.6
(Median)	12	13	22
Formed during 1990s	45%	36%	20%
Human Rights	26%	28%	21%
Environment	18	7	16
Peace	8	5	11
Women's Rights	6	17	8
Development	8	16	9
Global Justice/Peace/Environment	11	17	10
Self Determination/Ethnic Unity	1	1	3

The results in Table 5 indicate that the tendency of groups to organize within their particular geographic region of North or South is a recent one. Of all groups formed during the 1990s, more than half adopted intra-regional organizational structures. Forty-one percent of groups formed during the 1990s were North-only groups, and an additional 13% were South-only groups. Forty-six percent of all groups formed during this recent decade transcend the North-South divide. Moreover, the shift towards more intra-regional organizing within both the global North and South may be reflecting more deep-seated cleavages across geographical divides. In areas where the North-South conflict is most pronounced, i.e., where the conflict centers most directly on resource-use questions, the tendency is that we find more intra-regional groups forming as opposed to trans-regional groups that include members from both North and South. Thus, higher percentages of South-only groups focused on development and economic justice, whereas a higher percentage of North-only groups focused on the environment, which is often portrayed as an issue that is at odds with economic development. More North-only groups also focused on peace issues, perhaps because for some Southern groups this may be seen as a lesser priority behind immediate material needs. The fact that a larger percentage of South-only groups focused on women's issues further supports this interpretation, as most women's groups tend to address the development inequities faced by women as a consequence of their differential legal protections.

The greater tendency of Southern groups to work within multi-issue frameworks suggests that such groups tend to favor a different strategic orientation from their Northern counterparts. Whereas Northern organizations may

prefer to organize around single-issues for the purposes of political expediency, Southern activists may see such compartmentalized approaches as avenues that avoid addressing fundamental questions about power and access to resources (see, e.g., Steiner 1989; Smith 2002b). A long-time scholar and activist from the global South, Walden Bello, makes a similar observation about these differences in how Northern and Southern activists frame their struggles (Bello 2001). Case studies of specific campaigns show that the North-South differences we observe here may be a changing feature of transnational organizations. Northern activists have had to alter the ways that they conceptualize conflicts if they hope to succeed in building ties with Southern activists, which they must do in order to increase their political leverage and legitimacy. Analysts have documented a slow and conflict-ridden process of dialogue and re-framing of conflicts as activists experience new opportunities for transnational dialogue and exchange. For instance, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and Rainforest Action Network have learned—through their contact with Southern activists—to emphasize the links between environmental degradation and the protection of human rights (e.g., Brysk 1996; Rothman and Oliver 2002; Warkentin 2000). And the experiences of organizations working for sustainable development show that interactions between activists in the North and South led to an “unmaking” of Western development framework and a remaking of an alternative (Warkentin 2000:139, see also Macdonald 1997). Annelise Riles's study of Fijian women's activists provides additional evidence of a learning process within transnational organizations:

Where delegates at previous meetings had been acrimoniously divided over whether structural adjustment or the Palestinian liberation were in fact 'women's issues,' ...at this meeting Fiji's participants in the academic women's networks from 'the South' who had led the fight for the expansion of what counted as women's issues at previous conferences found, to their own surprise, that most of the European and North American attendees at their sessions were in fact converts to their position (Riles 2001:182).

For their part, activists in the global South (as well as in the former Soviet Union) benefit from the transnational transfer of “the technology to unite us' [such as...] techniques for speaking in groups, listening to each other, forming networks around a concrete issue, thinking strategically at the grassroots level about specific actions” (Sperling et al. 2001: 1172). Transnational organizations help facilitate this kind of learning.

Factors external to TSMOs may also help explain the recent tendency to organize along regional as opposed to cross-regional lines. Specifically, the pattern may signal that TSMOs are finding more favorable political opportunities for affecting the issues they hope to address within more limited inter-

**Table 6: TSMO Structures**

	1973	1983	1993	2000
Federation	50%	38%	28%	18%
Coalition	25	31	43	60

state arenas that are defined by regional identities and interests. It may be that regional international institutions are seen as having more immediate impacts on local conditions than universal institutions like the UN, which is hampered by the diverse interests of its global membership. Or activists may have found through the experience of working at the UN that greater efforts to resolve intra-regional differences (particularly within the global South) are more effective at strengthening the capacity to negotiate for regional interests within this global setting. Regional international associations may also prove more responsive and accountable to activists' demands, particularly within the relatively highly developed setting of the European Union. And factors like greater media attention to regional international negotiations as well as institutional access or geographical proximity may provide incentives for regionally based organizations. Further research is needed to determine the relative effects of external political factors and population dynamics on this organizational pattern.

The final hypothesis addressed the way the changing technologies that have fueled globalization of economic, political, and social relations have affected the structures of TSMOs. We anticipated that the comparatively greater access to inexpensive travel and communications would produce more decentralized organizational structures. Table 6 displays analyses used to test this hypothesis.

Table 6 shows some support for hypothesis 5, that TSMOs would become more decentralized in structure over time. There has been a consistent decline in the percentage of TSMOs organized as federations, that is organizations with national sections that typically share a common organization name and a more formal and centralized decision making structure. Amnesty International is a prominent example of such a group. The coalition form seems to be replacing the federation, probably because it allows more autonomy for members/participants. While they vary quite a bit in how they operate, coalitions typically allow affiliates to maintain their own organizational name and affiliation and allow more diversity in goals and strategies of affiliates. Such groups are better suited to rapid decision making at local or national levels, and they encourage innovation by members. The decentralized organizational structure allows affiliates greater flexibility as they seek to address in a local context the organization's collective goals.<sup>16</sup>

This trend towards more decentralized or network-like structures may help to explain the pattern we found in Table 1 of a declining rate of growth in the TSMO sector. The less centralized coalition structure is able to incorporate a larger number of free-standing national and sub-national groups than is the more hierarchical federal structure. Thus, while the absolute numbers of new TSMOs reveal a slowing growth rate, the level of actual participation in transnational organizations could yet be on the rise. Additional evidence about membership size is needed to assess this, and such data are not available from the *Yearbook*.

## CONCLUSIONS

The 1990s witnessed dramatic changes in the global political system as the Cold War bipolar system gave way to greater efforts at multilateral approaches to a wider range of global problems. This study explored whether and how those changes affected the patterns of transnational social movement organizing. We also examined whether structural inequalities in the world system are mirrored in the transnational social movement sector and whether this has changed in recent decades.

We might expect that the political opening created by the end of the Cold War and the related expansion of multilateral institutions during the 1990s would have encouraged an expansion in the numbers of TSMOs. While the numbers of TSMOs continued to grow between the early 1990s and 2000, the rate of growth has slowed dramatically from that of recent decades. While the size of the sector more than doubled between 1983 and 1993, its growth rate was less than 50% of what it was during the 1990s. This finding may be the result of greater competition for members and other resources among this growing population, or it might also reflect changes in the broader political system that served to reduce the strategic advantage of transnational organizations. It may also reflect a greater ability of transnational coalitions to absorb a larger variety of local and national organizational adherents, thereby streamlining the interest aggregation process at the global level (cf., Murphy 2001). We need more localized data to assess the meaning of this macro-level trend.

A second expectation was that the end of the Cold War would allow for an expanded international issue agenda and would alter the issue focuses of TSMOs. The most dramatic change during the 1990s was that many more

<sup>16</sup> Gamson's study (1990) found that more formal, bureaucratized and centralized organizations tended to be most effective at achieving their goals. Further research is needed to determine whether this finding applies in the contemporary global political context.

groups are organizing around multiple-issues rather than as single-issue groups. This may reflect a greater recognition among activists of global interdependencies and of the relationships between issues such as human rights, environment, development, and peace. Certainly the opportunities for transnational communication and dialogue facilitated by transnational associational structures have helped shape these multi-issue frames. Also, the shift towards greater international trade and towards multilateral trade agreements is paralleled by an expansion in the numbers of TSMOs working on issues relating to economic justice.

Comparisons of core and periphery regions showed some important differences. We expected that periphery regions would be less integrated into TSMO memberships and that they would also have less access to intergovernmental agencies, lower levels of legitimacy, and lower survival rates. The organizational data we examine bore out some but not all of these expectations. Groups that organized in the global South only were less likely to survive between 1993 and 2000 than were groups in the North. However, groups that were organized across the North-South divide were most likely to survive, and they were also better able to establish ties with IGOs and with other actors in their environments. South-only TSMOs were also more likely than their Northern counterparts to have formal consultative status with an IGO, and they had consistently larger numbers of ties with both IGOs and NGOs. Whether these connections with external actors serve to amplify the influence Southern activists can have in the global political arena or whether they simply reduce the autonomy of such groups without giving them substantial political benefits is a question that further research should address.

Examinations of the organizing patterns of TSMOs revealed at least a leveling-off or possibly a reversal of earlier trends towards greater Southern participation in TSMOs. While earlier decades saw a growing percentage of TSMO headquarters in the global South, between 1993 and 2000 the percentage of groups based in the South declined. Similarly, the percentage of groups with members in any country of the South also declined slightly. One other finding that may have important consequences for the future course of transnational organizing is that a larger percentage of groups are organizing within regions rather than across the North-South divide. A larger percentage of new TSMOs are organized within the global North or South than was true in the past. This may create more opportunities for people to make connections between their local interests and global processes, but it could also complicate efforts to resolve the critical differences between the interests of people in the global North and South that hinder global cooperation on economic, environmental, and security issues. Further research is needed to determine how regional level organizing affects possibilities for broader, trans-regional cooperation.

Finally, we examined the ways that changing technologies have affected the organizational structures of TSMOs. The proliferation of comparatively inexpensive communication and transportation possibilities was expected to enable TSMOs to adopt more decentralized forms. This was indeed the case, and we found a shift from the more centralized federated structure towards more decentralized, coalition structures that allow TSMO affiliates greater autonomy. Future research should explore the implications of this trend for movements' success.

In short, we see some important changes in the growth and geographic makeup of the transnational social movement sector. These are likely to affect future possibilities for transnational mobilization, and in particular, the abilities of transnational groups to overcome differences in interests and culture that inhibit transnational organization, particularly across major structural divisions like core and periphery. While social movement organizations and their transnational counterparts are not the only actors in social movements, researchers have shown them to be important agenda-setters and mobilizers that provide the foundations for popular mobilizations during movement surges. Thus, efforts like this one to understand the dynamics of transnational social movement organizing can help us better explain and anticipate the course of social movements. These macro-level data offer some insights into the large-scale patterns of transnational organizing, but more localized and case study work is needed to test some of the interpretations of the data that I offer here.

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## FROM ANTISWEATSHOP TO GLOBAL JUSTICE TO ANTIWAR: HOW THE NEW NEW LEFT IS THE SAME AND DIFFERENT FROM THE OLD NEW LEFT

Robert J.S. Ross

### INTRODUCTION

In January of 1999 a new student movement announced itself on the campuses of American universities. It began a campaign for a “sweat free campus” and it did so in dramatic fashion—by occupying over the next four months Administration buildings on seven campuses—Duke (January 29), Georgetown (February 5), Wisconsin (February 8), Michigan (March 17), Fairfield (April 15), and North Carolina and Arizona (April 21). In each case, the students’ demands were focused on labor exploitation in the apparel industry—the sweatshop problem.

In the four years from that season to this writing, the antisweatshop movement and its participants have evolved into a broader “global justice” movement. In what follows I analyze the movement and its evolution with two goals in mind: first, to compare it to the nearest historic analogue, the white New Left and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) of the 1960s. The second axis of this analysis is an inquiry into the ways in which the growth of global capitalism (otherwise known as “globalization”) and some of its technological media have affected the evolution of the movement.

There are striking similarities in the ideological radicalization of USAS and SDS that seem to be driven by ongoing features of capitalist development and culture. Among the differences between that era and this are those produced by

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the emergence of the global variant of capitalism (“globalization”) in the generation that separates them in time.<sup>1</sup>

A word about the relevance of the comparison to SDS is in order. While in many respects the early focus and growth of USAS is similar to that of the civil rights movement of the early Sixties, its overwhelmingly white composition, (Featherstone 2002b) and its ideological drift make SDS the more comparable analogue. In addition, most of the founding leadership of SDS had first entered activism through civil rights activity, in particular support for the early sit-ins. (See Miller 1988) So the motion from the local to the international is roughly comparable for both groups.

### THE FORMATION OF USAS

The campus-based antisweatshop campaign has its origins in changes in the AFL-CIO that were signaled by John Sweeney’s election to that federation’s presidency in 1995. The new Sweeney administration created two programs aimed at reviving organizing activity in the labor movement, an effort made dramatically necessary by the decline of U.S. union density to fewer than ten percent in the private sector. (U.S. Census Bureau 2002: 412) The AFL-CIO created an Organizing Institute (OI) to train new organizers. The OI engaged in aggressive outreach, and this included recruitment among college students and recent graduates. Associated with the OI was a program called Union Summer.

Explicitly recalling the idealism of the Mississippi Freedom Summer of 1964 (inter alia Weisbrot 1990), Union Summer recruits young adults to “try out” the labor movement by way of summer internships as organizers and union staffers. In the summer of 1997, a group of Union Summer interns at the offices of the former International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) offices in New York<sup>2</sup> began to develop the idea of a “sweat free campus.” Their supervisor, Ginny Coughlin, a staffer with experience as a youth organizer for the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), helped them elaborate the idea. One of these interns was Tico Almeida, a student at Duke University. (Ginny Coughlin 2002, 1997)

Aimed at a bit over 1% of the U.S. apparel market, the campaign for sweatfree campus clothing targets an approximately \$2.5 billion market in clothing that

<sup>1</sup> For the specific theoretical formulation of the concept of a “variant” of capitalism, and the global variant of it, see Ross and Trachte 1990.

<sup>2</sup> Now the headquarters of the merged UNITE, (Union of Needletrades Industrial and Textile Employees) including the ILGWU and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU).

bears university and college insignia or logos. This market is structured largely through licensing contracts. A University licenses a company, say, Champion, a maker of premium sweatshirts, to use its logo and name on clothing. In turn, the company pays the University or College about 7.5–8% of revenue for that right. Clearly, some schools have national markets—the top three licensors in 2001–2002 were North Carolina, Michigan and Tennessee—others have regional markets, and still others have only campus sales. Some small schools are non-licensors—generally their campus bookstore contract calls for the store to have the right to sell logo apparel, and the stores’ rent or fee to the University includes consideration for this right.

The licensees, in another example, VF Corp. (the largest apparel maker in the world), behave as clothing “manufacturers” do—they find contractor factories to make the gear.<sup>3</sup> VF (and its label Lee Sport), for example, contracted for a variety of products for Michigan, North Carolina, Northwestern, Arizona State and other universities which were made by Sinha Apparel in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

About 180 of the largest schools use the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) to broker and manage their licensing deals. Much of the initial round of actions in the sweatfree campus campaign was directed at the CLC. In the Fall of 1998 it adopted de facto, the Code of Conduct that the Apparel Industry Partnership (later the Fair Labor Association) announced. Criticism of that code led students into conflict with Universities who made use of CLC services.

When he returned to Duke in the Fall of 1997, Tico Almeida organized a letter from student leaders to Duke President Nannerl Keohane, urging that Duke adopt a Code of Conduct governing conditions under which Duke licensees might produce Duke logo clothing.<sup>4</sup> Duke agreed.

During the next year Duke did adopt a code, but as it turned out, the Duke Administration’s initial agreement to Almeida and his fellow students’ initiative did not include an item that the student movement soon came to believe was critical to the overall effort to monitor labor standards—full disclosure of licensees’ contractor sites. This was a critical matter—for campus logo apparel as it is for retail chain store brand apparel.

<sup>3</sup> The top ten collegiate licensed apparel manufacturers for 2001–2002 were (1) Nike USA Inc., (2) Zephyr Graf-X, (3) Gear For Sports, (4) Top of the World, (5) Team Edition Apparel, (6) Champion Custom Products, (7) VF Imagewear (East) Inc., (8) Knights Apparel, (9) Colosseum Athletics, (10) Red Oak Sportswear. (Collegiate Licensing Company 2002).

<sup>4</sup> The general idea was based on Notre Dame’s pioneering 1996 code—a product of Jesuit social conscience, not a social movement outside of usual channels.

If a university licenses a firm to make t-shirts and sweatshirts, that firm will then contract with (potentially) hundreds of factories to make the garments. For the really large “manufacturers” and licensors a staggering number of contractors is involved in the commodity chain of their licensees<sup>5</sup>. Realizing that no particular monitoring protocol could guarantee 100% coverage of a vast, ever-changing list of factories, the students wanted to have “full disclosure” access to the list of contractor factories (vendors) that made logo clothing.

The demand for disclosure of contractor sites parallels two broader concepts that now have currency in public policy discussion of global issues: transparency (that is, visibility of transactions and openness to scrutiny); and accountability, that is, the means by which an actor can be made to accept to responsibility for its actions.

In support of their demand that the Duke Administration Code of Conduct include disclosure of vendor contractor locations, the students held a sit-in at the University Administration building. It lasted but one day, and by the time the sit-in ended, on January 29, 1999 Duke had agreed.

In an interesting regional convergence, a group of students at the University of North Carolina, “20 minutes” down the road from Duke, among whom Marion Traub-Werner was an active leader, had been actively addressing the major contract that Nike was in the process of signing with their own major college athletic teams. They too demanded a code of conduct. (Traub-Werner 1999)

While these two spearhead campuses were working on their local versions of the issues, earlier, in the summer of 1998 students from 30 campuses met in New York

as an informal but cohesive international coalition of campuses and individual students working on anti-sweatshop and Code of Conduct campaigns. The general goals of the group were: (1) to provide coordination and communication between the many campus campaigns and (2) to coordinate student participation and action around the national, intercollegiate debate around Codes of Conduct and monitoring systems. (USAS 2002)

By early 1999 United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) had been formed, and about 50 campus groups were involved. In January and then through April, groups loosely affiliated with USAS held sit-ins in seven places and held rallies for campus codes of conduct at many others. In the course of 1999, then, a

<sup>5</sup> There are almost 3000 entries in the University of Michigan database of factory locations for calendar year 2002; of these my estimate is that there are about 2000 discrete factories that produce everything from glasses to coolers to t-shirts to t-shirt printing. (Workers Rights Consortium factory database: <http://workersrights.org/fdd.asp>).

new activist movement was clearly in evidence on American campuses, recalling or provoking comparison with the movements of the Sixties.

Through academic year 1999–2000 USAS continued to grow, but it added a startling new dimension to its activity. In the Fall of 1999, reacting to the apparel workers union’s criticism of what was now called the Fair Labor Association (FLA) a group within USAS, centered at Brown University, devised an alternative plan for insuring University licensed apparel would be “sweatfree.”

The FLA had stemmed from a Clinton Administration initiative to bring together the “stakeholders”—firms, unions and human rights groups, and consumers—to form an industry-wide code of conduct that would enable consumers to “choose” sweatfree” clothing. It was (and is) clearly aiming at a certifying “fair labor” label.<sup>6</sup>

Among the principle criticisms of the FLA put forward by UNITE and USAS were these:

- The Code of Conduct called for obeying local law on (often inadequate) minimum wages, rather than a “living wage” standard; (UNITE 1998; USAS 1999)
- The monitoring protocol called for sampling only 10% of contractor locations per year;<sup>7</sup> (UNITE 1998)
- The original Code did not call for disclosure of locations.
- The original monitoring structure called for corporations to hire monitors; by 2002, though, FLA would pay and accredit monitors; the critics re-emphasized the need for monitors to be conversant with local workers’ needs and to include human rights groups. (USAS 2002)

Calling their proposal a “Worker Rights Consortium”(WRC) the USAS chapters around the country worked on their various campuses to get their universities to join the WRC and reject or leave the FLA. By contrast to the FLA the WRC board has no corporate members; it engages local human rights organizations to obtain information from workers about factory conditions; it responds to complaints rather than certifying factories.

<sup>6</sup> The original conference and working group was called, in 1996, the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). For a history see Ross (forthcoming).

<sup>7</sup> However sympathetic with the critics one might be it is clear that the student and union criticisms neither understood nor cared to understand modern sampling or statistical quality control theory. In the critics’ defense, the question of random selection and unannounced visits—central to a sampling model—have been consistently muddled by the FLA.

**Table 1: Sit-Ins on the Campus Logo/Sweatshop Issue 1999–2000**

Date	University	Arrests	Outcome	Source*
<b>1999</b>				
1/29	Duke		Code with Public Disclosure	Kreider 2000
2/5 (4 days)	Georgetown		Public Disclosure	SP/Chronicle
2/8	Wisconsin		Disclosure; living wage research; women's rights	Kreider 2000, PR
3/17	Michigan		Disclosure; living wage research; women's rights	PR
4/15	Fairfield		For Janitor's Union University. Dropped contractor	NYT
4/21–4/30	Arizona		Disclosure; living wage research; women's rights	Sp/PR
4/21	North Carolina		Disclosure; living wage research; women's rights	PR
<b>2000</b>				
2/7–2/15	U Penn		Join WRC	NYT
2/16–2/18	Michigan		Join WRC	AP
2/17–2/20	Wisconsin	54	Withdraw FLA join WRC	Milwaukee Journal
3/6–3/17	Macalester		Withdraw FLA	AP/sp
3/15–3/25	Toronto		Adopt a code	Tor Star
3/27–4/7	Purdue	Hunger Strike	Join WRC	sp
3/29–4/9	Tulane		Withdraw from both	Times Picayune
4/4	Kentucky	12		Lex Herald
4/5–4/8	Iowa	16	Join WRC/ lost FLA w/draw	sp
4/4–4/6	Oregon	14	Temp join WRC (rescinded later)	AP/sp
4/4	SUNY Albany	11		AP
<b>Other Labor Related Sit-Ins (2000)</b>				
	Johns Hopkins			
	Ohio State			
	Pitzer			
	Pomona			
	Wesleyan			

\* PR= University web site Public Affairs; AP= Associated press. Various newspapers by name. SP= Student paper web site.

The campaign for the WRC was most intense as the deadline for its first national founding convention in April 2000 approached. Against many predictions USAS was successful in getting over 50 universities and colleges to join the WRC, many of these leaving FLA. (By May 2002 the 100<sup>th</sup> institution joined the WRC; see Worker Rights Consortium 2002)

Whether the WRC can fulfill the students' hope for important change in the apparel supply chain is matter for both skepticism and patience. The college apparel market is but 1–2% of the entire apparel market. As such it is a niche market that may be exploited in a specialized way. As of this writing, however, many of the largest suppliers to this market were part of very much larger firms. College and licensed apparel are very small fractions of the sales of these firms, and a similar fraction of profits. The leverage of university licensors in relation to the largest suppliers in the market is only moderate.

There is however, another aspect to the question of creating labor rights bridgeheads in the apparel commodity chain. While campus logo licenses might be but one or two percent of the gross of a giant merchandiser like VF Corporation, the contractor factories that perform college logo work also perform other work. So, for example, when the BJ&B cap factory in the Dominican Republic acquiesced to pressure to recognize a union, the WRC and the brand name licensees (Nike and Reebok) used the college logo contracts as leverage on behalf of the workers; that factory was also making caps for the general market place. (See Ross forthcoming, Chapter 11)

Repeated public opinion surveys indicate that a substantial majority of U.S. consumers is willing to pay slightly more for apparel they are certain is "sweatfree." (Marymount 1999; Pollin et al 2001; Program on International Policy Attitudes 2000) This and the fact that the campus market is between \$1 billion and \$2 billion suggests that the "ethical" market is large enough to sustain some sizeable enterprises. This may be the logic behind SWEATX, a new unionized t-shirt maker, funded by "Ben" of Ben and Jerry's famous ice cream (Marc B. Haefele and Christine Pelisek 2002), and an East coast version, No Sweat apparel, made by Bienestar International.

The creation of the WRC and subsequent affiliations with it are major victories for the new student movement, and as of the summer of 2003 USAS claimed over 200 campus groups (133 actual affiliates). This rate of growth (from 1998–99 to 2003) is greater than that of Students for a Democratic Society until after 1965 (when it called the first March on Washington Against the War in Vietnam); or of the white and/or Northern support groups for the southern civil rights movement in the early 1960s. The comparison provides fascinating insight to the perennial question of historical analysis: what is the same; what is different; why?

## THEN AND NOW: METHODS AND SOURCES

The observations about USAS that follow are based on group interviews with students at Brown University, the University of Connecticut; Smith College, and my own Clark University in 1998–1999. In total, about 75 students were part of these snack and chat sessions. I talked informally with groups of USAS students at Northeast regional meetings in 1998 and 2003. The Worcester Global Action Network, which evolved in part out of the Clark USAS chapter hosted regional meetings on two occasions at which I was, as above, a participant observer. Repeated conversations with Harvard and Holy Cross University USAS leaders provided information about their evolution as well. The list serve at the University of Michigan of Students Organizing for Labor and Economic (SOLE) located at a former center of SDS has provided a steady source of information about activity there. From its founding (1998) to the present, the founders of Clark University USAS chapter and then the Worcester Global Action Network have been available for interviews and close observation.

These sources do not include New York or Los Angeles—where the garment industry is centered, where sweatshops are more than half of all workplaces in the industry, and where immigrants have overwhelming presence in it. Perusal of documentary sources (especially websites) and list serves indicates that this does not strongly influence the substantive observations.

The comparison to SDS was facilitated by the author's participation in the founding of the organization and close involvement with its subsequent evolution (Cf. Miller 1988; Sale 1973; Newfield 1966)

## DIMENSIONS OF COMPARISON

The two movement organizations can be compared along a number of dimensions. These are summarized in Table 2. Among the themes of the comparison that follows are the ways in which the globalization of capital over the last thirty years has affected the course of the two movements—and the way it has not.<sup>8</sup>

### 1. Who were and are the student boat rockers? (Otherwise referred to as “Demographics”)

In 1961, Tom Hayden, who had been editor of the *Michigan Daily* and was soon to be President of SDS wrote an article for *Mademoiselle Magazine*:

<sup>8</sup> I should note at the outset that these comparisons are mainly with the white young adult, campus based movement of the 1960s. There was obviously more to the New Left than just that; and there is more to the antisweatshop movement than its college based wing.

**Table 2: Comparing the Old New Left and New New Left**

Aspect	Same	Different	Comment
Demographics	Upper middle class initiating groups	Newer diffuses outward faster	
Institutional Types	Elite institutions, flagship state universities: Duke, Michigan, Wisconsin, Harvard.	Faster outward and downward diffusion Pattern not geographic	Measured for SDS v. USAS chapters or sit-ins of USAS Internet/email
Direct Action	Sweat Issue and Civil Rights	Now: On codes and the Workers Rights consortium, Administrations more responsive: more early local victories	Less cultural praise for current global justice activists. Early CR and antipoverty radicals had a certain level of praise; now: "senseless in Seattle." "Luddites."
	Same International Financial Institutions (IFIs - World Bank, International monetary Fund, WTO)	Response to antiwar movement more repressive by second year (1967-68)	
Ideological Development	Diffusion from Specific to Global: deepening radicalism in anti-capitalist analysis	Vaguer about socialism as THE or AN alternative	
	Extreme decentralist views of movement organization; Tendency to consensus decision making	Began earlier in 1990's, staying longer. Consensus procedures more formalized.	Much higher level of training, interpersonal sensitivity and multicultural sensitivity – perhaps to a fault. Not yet recoiled from the “tyranny of structurelessness.”
Relation to Labor	War (post 9/11/01) may be wedge	Now: much closer, more sympathy; work and job, not poverty and dependence	Vietnam v. Afghanistan and Iraq: different matters.
Global Scene	War opposition	Anti-imperialism (nationalism as referent) vs. global political economic justice (class referents; also gender and race)	Complexity: now: identity politics in fuller bloom. Current opposition relevant to controversy over the role of draft in creating antiwar movement.
Lifestyle/Culture	Counter culture	Veggie not druggie	Ghettoized anyhow
Political economic context	Affluent time	Debt burden on current cohort; part-time work pay is insufficient to support groups	Debt as social control

“Who are the Student Boat Rockers?” Later, in the opening of the Port Huron Statement he wrote, in answer to that question: “We are people of this generation bred in at least modest affluence, housed in the universities, looking uncomfortably to the worlds we inherit.” For white civil rights and antiwar students, and the New Left of SDS and other groups, the earliest movement participants came disproportionately from upper middle class homes.<sup>9,10</sup> Eventually however, by 1967, the movement and SDS membership spread among students of working class and lower white-collar families. Institutionally, the movement began at exclusive or elite private colleges, for example, Swarthmore and Harvard, but also at the cosmopolitan public institutions with long histories of radical colonies—like Berkeley, Wisconsin and Michigan.

Among the more striking findings of research on the backgrounds of student activists in the Sixties were these: generational conflict over political values was rare in activists’ backgrounds (See Flacks, 1971 and 1967). Most, especially leaders, were from homes where in the language of the times, they were red diaper (Communist) or pink diaper (Socialist) babies, or where their parents were New Deal liberals. Also distinctive was the egalitarianism of New Left activists’ families in comparison to their cohort. Activists reported more equal relations between their mothers and fathers and higher levels of education among their mothers than did non-activists.

This kind of detailed research with and about today’s campus movement has just begun. Nevertheless, it seems that initially the movement began among those of professional if not wealthy family backgrounds. One study of anti sweatshop activists finds that they are twice as likely to come from high income households as are the universe of college freshman; much less likely to come from lower income households; and roughly similar in the middle of the income distribution. (Elliot and Freeman 2000) There are interesting differences in the dynamics of class and region between the new movement and the old.

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<sup>9.</sup> What follows summarizes a great deal of research on the white New Left of circa 1960–1970—a topic which produced an immense literature. The best three places to find the research information summarized here are Flacks (1967, 1971) and Mankoff and Flacks (1971).

<sup>10.</sup> This has actually been exaggerated in the popular social science about the movement. While early SDS people did come from relatively more educated homes, these also included working class and modest professions—schoolteachers and therapists, not often wealthy business backgrounds.

The old New Left witnessed a progression from larger and/or more selective elite institutions, outward to more broad-based institutions. From Michigan, Swarthmore, and Harvard early on, for example, chapters later developed at places like Indiana, St. Cloud State, and Roosevelt University in Chicago. This process took five years and was speeded up after SDS was discovered by the national press around the time of the (first) March on Washington to End the War in Vietnam, in April 1965. By the late Sixties community colleges had chapters of SDS or other New left groups.

The current pattern of outward diffusion has some, but highly compressed similarity to the Sixties.<sup>11</sup> From 1999–2000 there was marked “outward” movement from more to less elite campuses. The first wave of sit-ins, in 1999, was at relatively “elite” or flagship state universities. In this regard, looking for initiating movement groups among young adults with higher income and/or educational family backgrounds is similar in both generations.

However, history is moving at warp speed. Despite the fact that the early and strongest presence of USAS was, as with SDS, at the most cosmopolitan institutions, outward motion is very rapid in comparison to SDS. During the next spring, 2000, sit-ins were much more representative of the national student body. (See Table 3) The speed with which chapter construction is moving to non-elite places—and growing—is faster than SDS before the War in Vietnam. It compares to the Southern students’ civil rights movement, which spread the sit-ins and lunch counter boycotts around the south within weeks, and created SNCC within three months of the first sit-in. It also compares to the tremendous growth of SDS after the March on Washington of April 1965. (For material on SDS chapter growth, see Sale 1973)

Already, by the fall of 1999 campuses in Alabama, Arkansas, and Georgia were involved and active. There were contacts at South Carolina, and a few community colleges. Acting in response to local demonstrations, or fear of them, or even a desire to do the right thing, 122 universities had joined the Fair Labor Association by June of 1999, 150 by Spring of 2000. Then when USAS initiated WRC, and campaigned against the FLA, membership increase slowed drastically. There are 178 college and university members of the Fair Labor Association (as of March 2003), a growth of only 28 in two years. In the meantime the WRC

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<sup>11.</sup> I have supplemented work first done by Aaron Kreider, then an undergraduate at Notre Dame University, who summarized the institutional rankings of campuses where major USAS actions occurred between 1999 and 2000. (Kreider 2000, 2002)

**Table 3: Institutional Status and Anti-Sweatshop Sit-Ins 1999–2000**

University	Ranking Among “National Universities”
<b>Spring 1999 USAS Sit-Ins – Chronological Order</b>	
Duke	7
Georgetown University	23
University of Wisconsin	34
University of Michigan	25
Fairfield	4 (Masters Universities – North)
University of North Carolina	27
University of Arizona	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier*
<b>Spring 2000: Not Chronological “National Universities”</b>	
University of Toronto	1(Canada)
Pennsylvania	7
Johns Hopkins	7
Michigan	25
Madison	34
Tulane	44
SUNY Albany	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier
Oregon	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier
Purdue	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier
Iowa	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier
Kentucky	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier
SUNY Albany	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier
Ohio State	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier
<b>Spring 2000 Liberal Arts Colleges</b>	
Pomona	7
Wesleyan	10
Macalester	24
Pitzer	2 <sup>nd</sup> tier

Source: Aaron Kreider. USAS Listserv. Monday August 8, 2000; supplemented by sources in Table 1 and U.S. News and World Report.

\* Second tier refers to those institutions ranked 51–120

membership is now one hundred twelve, having grown by 25/year in the same period.

To summarize the demographic picture on the basis of nonsystematic data, it appears the structure of membership and the geography of institutional diffusion is similar to the Sixties, but democratization is more rapid.

A simple hypothesis about participation among “conscience” (as distinct from beneficiary) constituencies of movements like the antisweatshop movement would predict concentration among affluent and professional families. (See McCarthy and Zald 1977 for the distinction; see Schuman 1972 for different class bases of opposition to the Vietnam War.) Attention to international issues—and activism about them—tends to be higher among the more highly educated population. These are the families too, where young people are taught that civic life is theirs to mold. Finally, more elite institutions tend to be those where “critical” thinking and certain kinds of dissent are more tolerated or even valued.

Diffusion towards more representative populations follows this track. Initiators in conscience constituencies are those with more time, more social space, more family support in a given political tradition; once begun, such activity attracts those akin to the initiators at the next level outwards. The initiators seek this outwards motion (they “organize”).

Even more than during the Vietnam War—which touched students’ lives through conscription—current movement participants have little personal stake in the issue. Countering that however is the possibility that new cohorts of students among sons and daughter of blue-collar workers may be more empathic with sweatshop workers, and may have a more positive sense of unions. The growing number of children of immigrants in higher education may make this issue more accessible to non-elite students, especially in places like California, for example, where large numbers of Latino students have entered higher education, and the largest group of sweatshop workers is Hispanic.

About these possibilities there is only indirect information and it conflicts. The institutional data above suggest, indirectly, that the current movement has the same elite initiation as the white New Left, with more rapid broad-based recruitment subsequently. On the other hand, a study of a sample of 233 students from four campuses showed that immigrant background makes no very large difference in their general attitudes toward sweatshops issues.<sup>12</sup> (Ross, Grandmaison and London 2000).

Elliot and Freeman (2000) report a study of 100 activists in which their parents are disproportionately activists; and their incomes are higher than average among college students. My own interviews showed that most parents were positively inclined toward or involved with these movements.

<sup>12</sup>. The study from which that conclusion is based was not about movement participation.

## 2. Geography and Diffusion

When Doug McAdam mapped the Southern student sit-ins of 1960, he found a strong geographic pattern of diffusion through time. (1982) The sit-ins spread from place to place through chains of physical proximity. While no similar mapping study has been done of SDS, my personal observation is similar. In each region, locally or self-designated “travelers” would set out to organize SDS chapters within driving distance from his or her base campus or city.<sup>13</sup> While new nodes might spring up, leap-frogging across distances, strong nodes became the geographic centers of organizing.<sup>14</sup>

Among activists and observers today there is universal agreement that email, the internet and cheap (er) long distance phone service has changed the way ideas and movements spread from person to person. Although the pattern of sit-ins does suggest a Midwestern concentration, it more strongly reproduces a profile of places with long traditions of progressive young adult activism (Madison; Ann Arbor; Iowa City). The extremely reduced friction of communication and information exchange means that new movements among those “wired” up spread with much less physical proximity than in earlier periods.

## 3. Strategy and Tactics: Direct Action

A fairly dramatic and obvious similarity between the two movements is the use of the sit-in to compel administration attention and attempt to win change. Important differences include the much higher rate of success of the early actions of the more recent group, and their greater focus on winnable goals. In this regard the new New Left of 1999–2000 was more like the early civil rights movement and its integration sit-ins and boycotts than it was like the more militant and diffuse radicalism of 1968.

The movements are entirely similar in their basic rejection of mainstream electoral action. Interestingly, the white (and black) New Left of the Sixties and the current movement both began with demands on private parties (integrating lunch counters; imposing codes of conduct on clothing labelers) not, in the very first instance, governments.

## 4. Dynamics of Action and Ideology

There was a dynamic in place in the new movement through the Spring of 2003 that was highly reminiscent of the *late* Sixties New Left. At the outset of

<sup>13</sup> I played this role in the Upper Midwest (Minnesota and Wisconsin) from a base in Chicago for a while in 1965.

<sup>14</sup> For some tales of Texas organizing see Robert Pardun (2002).

the civil rights movement, as many have noted, the emerging student movement’s demands were relatively modest reforms, e.g., integrate lunch counters. SDS began, in 1962, a process of broadening the scope of radical imagination, projecting a democratic critique and vision. In the earliest few years of the student antisweatshop movement it too had a focused agenda. The sit-ins of 1960 and the sit-ins of 1999–2000 were similar in the targeted nature of their agendas.

By 1969, radical student leadership saw immediate campus issues as more or less immaterial, and the real goal the creation of “revolutionary consciousness.” In Chicago, for example, what began, in 1969, as a sit-in over the firing of a Marxist professor reached its denouement with a list of demands including the use of University facilities by the Community, the hiring of minorities and women, and some foreign policy issues as well. The immediate causes of the sit-ins, and the student constituency’s initial understanding of the action, for some of the political leadership, were but pretexts for radicalizing students—if need be with the wrong end of a police baton.

The New Left experienced a process that widened the critique of society, leading it to envision a more profound structural change—socialism in some form—that would be required to meet a vision of justice and democracy. Student leftists then and now call this process “radicalization.” In addition to evolution toward a more sharply socialist or revolutionary vision, the New Left of the Sixties conflated three arguably separate matters: radical vision, radical strategy and militant tactics. Culminating in the Weather Underground embarkation on a campaign of bombing, there was a tendency to think that “proper radicalism” required each demonstration to make use of escalating militancy in tactics.

It is fascinating to observe a similar, recent evolution of campus activists away from focus on the sweatshop issue. Initially, that evolution was toward a focus on the IFIs (international financial institutions), the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. While not yet creating a hyper-revolutionary rhetoric, there is a similar dynamic to today’s young activist movement and that of the earlier generation. Then it was *from* the focused demands of the Civil Rights Movement, for example, *to* the more diffuse opposition to the forms of imperialism. Now it is from sit-ins about apparel codes of conduct, to (for many young activists), a “tolerance” of street vandalism against “neoliberalism.”

For the young people in Worcester, MA who went to the April 20, 2002 Washington, D.C. demonstration, their consensus evaluation was that (a) the demonstration was hijacked by pro-Palestinian presence (rather than pro peace); (b) it underemphasized the IMF and the other IFIs; and (c) it was too bad there was not civil disobedience. (Entin 2002)

## Ideology Then and Now

Summarizing ideological tendencies for truly mass movements is always hazardous. Students for a Democratic Society, the largest “radical” organization of the Sixties had a tremendous variety of ideological outlooks within it: populist liberals, anarchists, social democrats, Trotskyites, communists, radical Christians, and maybe a few Martians.

Starting out as red and pink diaper babies asking, the New Left’s young leaders thought, for the implementation of liberal promises (civil rights) they found themselves in the midst of a life and death struggle against imperialism, and saw their hopes for a war on poverty ground up in the dust of the war effort. They became more radical in that the vision, given their socialist and communist homes, did not change so much as became more imminent. Making a revolution seemed to many an actual project, not just a millennial yearning. Also, their view of appropriate means and the need for desperate measures—their tactics—became more militant.

The white radical leadership tended to drift, as the decade progressed, toward ever more explicit socialist models and despite an earlier repugnance for factionalism, their leadership groups fell into doctrinal disputes about big visions: socialism, communism, and anarchism.

At the base, though, the student movement was politically literal and culturally polymorphous. By literal, I mean that the people at the demonstrations on a given campus wanted pretty much what they said they did: an end to the war, more democracy at home, more resources to fight poverty, and racial equality, and more democracy in the communal life of higher education.

Culturally, the most bizarre images of the left have dominated memory. Yet, just as it is false to see most Seventies kids as punk, or Eighties young adults frumpy in torn jeans, or most nineties students as body pierced, hair dyed and brain-damaged on “speed,” so too is it wrong to understand most Sixties protesters as hippies, yippies or bomb throwers. Qualifications having been stated, by 1968 most white new leftists who were politically active were more or less anti-capitalist and radically democratic.

Today’s global justice movement has evolved from an antisweatshop movement to one whose leading cadres are more or less explicitly anti-capitalist, certainly “anti-corporate” in sentiment, but who approach only cautiously the historically burdensome term “socialist.” At its core the new young activists harbor a radical democratic impulse almost exactly similar to that of the young New Left of the early 1960s. The documents of today’s campaigners attack the corporations and their greed; they talk of a new society built around new ethical principles—but they do not talk about a different mode of production.

Here is an opening paragraph from a Mission Statement from a local “global action network.”

The people of WoGAN are feminist, partner preference supportive, anti-imperialist, anti-classist, anti-capitalist, anti-racist as well as being respectful toward all forms of life, all religions and the diversity of human experience. We believe that all should have equal access and equal voice in the global community. We view direct action as a viable method of decentralizing control and establishing autonomy. (Wogan 2002: #438)

At first glance I thought that this new movement was therefore—as radical, labor oriented, and non-socialist—the first authentically post-socialist left movement in American and even, given its equivalents abroad, world history. After all, movements built around community or race or gender demands do not test whether the vision of a new economy is socialist or not. If radicals without a socialist vision led a movement for **economic** justice, that really would signal a shift in the paradigm of the left. As usual reality is more subtle.

The vast majority of the USAS activists I interviewed in the late Nineties said, then, in some personal way, that they were socialists or sympathetic to socialist vision. They did not however think that they could communicate this vision successfully to their peers or to other Americans; and their view of what social justice means is so local, so close to identity politics, the traditional meanings of socialism do not excite their consciousness. If Sixties socialists were sociology students with economic ideas, this decade’s radicals are international studies students with vegetarian anarchist culture.

Thus, the current cohort of young activists, and their political evolution, is, for better and for worse, not so different from the radicals of SDS who began their journey in 1962. Emerging from the Cold War, SDS leaders knew that mainstream Americans could not hear the word socialism. The notion of participatory democracy in the Port Huron Statement of 1962, was a way of talking about social control of the economy with an American accent.

## Alliances – Relations to Labor

The biggest difference between today’s activists and those of the Sixties is the current cohort’s positive relation to the Labor Movement and to class issues. In the Sixties SDS was critical of the labor movement and invested in (residential) community issues.<sup>15</sup> In the Nineties the new movements, though not slav-

<sup>15</sup> This has been exaggerated in a legion of places. I do not want to distract from the main line of discussion to engage the matter in detail. Emblematic item: The Port Huron Statement was written at a Michigan AFL-CIO summer camp, use of which was obtained by a member whose mother was a UAW VP; one of three UAW VP’s

ishly devoted to it, were influenced by the reformers in the AFL-CIO, and more strategically, relate to working class issues through workers in their production roles not only or primarily in their community and consumption roles. Today's movement began not about the dependent poor but about those whose work is exploited. This was obviously expressed in the fact that sweatshop exploitation, not welfare reform was the central founding issue of the new activists. It was made into a literally millennial vision when the Seattle 1999 demonstrations seemed to bring about a golden alliance of "Turtles (environmentalists—symbolizing young middle class activists) and Teamsters (symbolizing diverse unionists)." This alliance with the labor movement, the most marked contrast between the old New Left and the beginning of the new New Left, was traceable to the emergence of global capitalism.

Although serious students of power rejected the notion of "Big Labor" by the 1960s, the desperate decline of the U.S. labor movement was not yet quite apparent. Many old New Left participants did not include the mass of blue-collar workers as a focus of concern or sympathy.<sup>16</sup>

By the year 2000 though, union density in the private sector was one third of what it was in the Sixties. While a radical egalitarianism united the movements of these two periods, that same egalitarianism in the context of globalized capital made the union movement more attractive to students, and it still is. Blue-collar workers, who *seemed* to be riding the crest of American expansion in the Sixties, have been losing materially and politically for thirty years.

The reversal of fortune of the labor movement also changed its attitudes toward community coalitions and to students in particular. As previously noted, at the peak of the AFL-CIO, John Sweeney's "new broom" swept out much of the provincialism of the Meany/ Kirkland era. The Organizing Institute and Union

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whose children at one time or another were leaders of the Michigan SDS chapter. At Port Huron numerous leading figures (not including Tom Hayden) came from union homes.

<sup>16.</sup> The obvious caveat to this interpretation of the New Left is the 1968 appearance in SDS of the faction organized by the Maoist Progressive Labor Party (PL) ostensibly devoted to a "worker-student alliance." Short-lived (many attribute SDS' demise to PL sectarianism), the worker student alliance "line" was indistinguishable from PL's preference for organizing among minority workers (i.e., it defined the revolutionary core of workers as black workers), and it took second place to PL's preference for China over Vietnam in strategic discussions for the US antiwar movement. Most veterans of SDS consider PL to have been an "outside" force, rather than an expression of the "new left."

Summer are examples. But even among middle and rank and file labor activists the years during and since the Reagan Administration changed labor movement attitudes to community partners. The development of Jobs with Justice metropolitan areas coalitions is an example: most of these welcome student allies and religious and other community linkages.<sup>17</sup> The pressures of the last twenty years have seen a revival, in some places, of "social movement" unionism. (Voss and Sherman 2000) To the extent that globalization forces the labor movement on the defensive, and impels it to seek out new allies, in community action and in politics, to that extent is globalization driving this change.

Some unions have put their money where their rhetoric is: and USAS has benefited from it. UNITE and the AFL-CIO have given major subsidies to USAS. (See Featherstone 2002)

There is another, even more profound way in which globalization has affected the young left and labor. Many of today's young activists, while sympathetic to low wage and immigrant workers in the United States, are primarily oriented to the problems of these workers in the low wage nations that supply labor-intensive imports to the United States. They also feel responsible for—or called upon to act against—the policies the United States puts forward in the International Financial Institutions.

So there is an analytical difference in the type of internationalism in the two movements. The earlier one was anti-imperialist and its subjects of sympathy were national liberation movements. The current movement is "anti-corporate" and the subjects of sympathy are workers' and others exploited by American corporations and their local agents around the world. Among the things these somewhat different approaches have in common, at the emotional level, has been noted by conservative critics: a tendency to attribute to the United States a substantial fraction of the world's woes.

More recently, however, the defeat of reformers in the Teamsters (i.e., the forced ouster of the errant reformer Carey and the election victory of Jimmy Hoffa, Jr.), the Nader candidacy of 2000, and now the "war on terrorism," have each in its particular way driven the new activists farther from the labor movement, and closer culturally, to the old New Left. So, in an entirely startling turn of the wheel, a movement that began with a very different relationship to labor,

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<sup>17.</sup> "Jobs with Justice is a national campaign for workers' rights. Our network of 41 local coalitions and organizing committees in 25 states bring together labor, community, faith-based, and student organizations to work together on campaigns that win victories for workers and their families." (Jobs with Justice 2003)

and the labor movement, now may be headed (though it is not entirely there yet) away from the mainstream labor movement. In part this is because the young radicals are much more militant than the mainstream labor movement is in opposition to the war in Iraq 2003. Another reason for the apparent divergence is mainstream labor's investments in (its perceived dependence on) Democratic party electoral success, in comparison to the deepening estrangement from the Democratic party among the new New leftists.

### Decentralization and Organizational Structure

The continuing and dramatic attraction of a democratic vision produces among today's campaigners a very similar organizational vision as that which animated much of SDS in the middle of the 1960s. Briefly, this vision assumes full participation by everyone, with little distinction between the responsibilities of leaders and others. It *prefers* consensus about decision-making, and it reserves to local groups important decision making about policy and action. The resulting forms of organization are typically networks and only imperfectly unified or representative political organizations.

Despite these careful generalizations about similarity, there are large differences between the organizational forms adopted by the current New Left and the old one. Contrary to much "pop-soc" commentary—and important contentions at the time—SDS actually had a rather conventional representational structure. Chapters were entitled to certain numbers of votes at conventions; conventions elected representative bodies with strong interim powers between conventions. Chapters were not compelled to carry out national programs however; most local chapters, until the very factionalized last year or two, understood that participation in programs was best maximized by having high consensus on decisions. Chapters did tend to have elected officers. Meetings ranged from highly informal to highly parliamentary—depending on size and the level of internal contention.<sup>18</sup> The preferred use of consensus decision-making was restricted to small groups and a limited period of time—roughly 1965–67.

By contrast, local groups of the new global justice movement have elaborately formalized consensus decision-making procedures; they eschew representative forms almost entirely. Jo Freeman's famous caution about the "tyranny of structurelessness" is unknown. (Freeman 1972–73; n.d.)

In this, USAS will rediscover the old problems of such open and unformed organizations: they are vulnerable to indecision and to factional intrusion by

<sup>18</sup> These observations are based on widespread and long-term personal observation. See also Rothstein 1989.

more disciplined outsiders. By the Fall of 1999 one of the older style socialist groups (the Independent Socialist Organization—ISO) had focused on USAS as a place to do its "mass work" and in response the USAS had a bit of internal factional controversy. In 2000 and then 2001 anarchist factions had disproportionate influence on USAS national conventions. By 2002–2003 the new antiwar movement, of which USAS was but one part, was confronted with the fact that an extremely small, arguably sectarian group, the Workers World Party, had seized control of the basic demonstration-calling apparatus (the ANSWER coalition) that had sponsored the biggest antiwar marches.

Despite these perilous similarities, one very strong difference between the internal workings of USAS and SDS is the sophistication of USAS training in and understanding of group process. Perhaps as a result of the influence of a kind of seasoned feminism, USAS meetings are characterized by teaching and emulation of fairly sophisticated techniques of group discussion and leadership. Repeated observation of USAS meetings at local and regional levels demonstrated their painstaking efforts to include all participants in discussion and active care to insure that women were selected as discussion leaders or representatives and spokespersons. This is reflected substantively in USAS Code of Conduct campaigns and WRC inspections: treatment of women workers is specifically focused upon (in an industry in which the vast majority of workers are female.)<sup>19</sup>

I observed one exercise in which the lead organizer from the Washington Office at that time, Eric Brakken, led a New England Regional group in a training exercise in resolving a community conflict. The problem was about community need for a playground and a nearby factory expansion. Impressive to an outside observer was the checklist of concerns (remembering that this was an undergraduate group being instructed by a person who had graduated from college six months earlier): the workers; the mothers; the children; the community need for play space and for jobs.

Observing USAS from the perspective of a campus at its periphery, in fact, one guess is that factional fights at its national center—at its annual conference, for example—has produced centrifugal force. Local groups are pretty much on their own, and the coordinating center has little authority. Thus, the decentralist logic of SDS' cultural progression, interrupted at the end of the Sixties by (plural) sectarian Leninisms, is reproduced in the campus based global justice

<sup>19</sup> See "Why are we concerned about women's rights?" at the USAS "Frequently asked questions": <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~fragola/usas/faq.html>.

movement. It has no real democratically empowered center; it runs locally on consensus and it identifies strongly with life-style definitions of radicalism.

### Globalization, Technology, and Organization.

Communication and coordination always has some relative cost—in resources or labor or both. Consequently there may be economies of scale and other ways of making the work of communication and coordination more efficient, less costly. The larger the distances among those communicating or attempting to coordinate their efforts the larger, potentially, are the costs. All this is obvious and in some ways obsolete. Among the most determinative differences between the global justice movement and those of the Sixties is impact on organizational structures and cross-border thought and action of technological change.

Imagine the task of discussion and coordination among a geographically spread membership of a few thousand in the mid-1960s. The means of print dissemination entailed the use of a low cost printing process called mimeographing which in turn required painstaking typing and extraordinarily slow error correction (each typing error would require minutes to apply a fluid erasure to an inked template). If an organization did not have a machine collator, volunteers would have to put together multiple page newsletters and hand staple them. Photocopiers with automatic collating extensions were rare and expensive. Printing services were expensive and slow. The internal cost of communication was very, very high.

Word-processing, email, the Internet, cheap long distance telephony, cell phones: these actually cut down on the need for central offices and for their cost advantages. The consequence is entirely paradoxical. A group like USAS can have 150 chapters with an extremely slender central office and very few employees. The recent largest antiwar marches in US history recruited people “electronically.” On the other hand, the possibility of movements without a strong center means that highly organized, homogeneous cadre groups can have disproportionate influence at the center.

Nowhere is the conquest of space and time by electronic communication more apparent than in the global aspect of contemporary movements. Phone service is of course much less costly than a generation ago; but email has almost no marginal cost and has in addition the virtue of carrying print quality publications, posters, etc. over it. Entire campaigns and organizations depend on email distribution lists to convey immense amounts of detailed information. However much digital technology has revolutionized finance capital, its impact on social movements is also profound.

### Life-style politics

A question for every social movement is who is in, who is out; who are one’s comrades, potential or actual, who are one’s adversaries? What categories are presumed friendly; which hostile? For example, as the old New Left crumbled in the early Seventies some women were torn by pressures from radical feminism. Within feminism were tendencies that argued that women who lived with men, in heterosexual relations—conventional or not—could not be true feminists. Some argued that women should not be in organizations with men, no less organizations dominated by men. In some circles, people in conventional marriages (heterosexual, legalized) were frowned upon. A slogan of the times “trash the nuclear family” comes to mind. Later, men who did not actively engage in child care during workday hours were seen as “evading” a responsibility. This array of distinctions and judgments was termed at the time, “life-style politics.”

Somewhat more broadly, the New Left, if not SDS per se, participated in what became known as “the” “counterculture.” The referent is to a range of symbolic and relational practices that evinced estrangement from bourgeois, profit-seeking culture and practice and also to aspects of the culture taken, however mistakenly, to be props of it. Sometimes included were rational analysis, scientific method, and positivism (i.e., empirical investigation in aid of hypothesis testing). Almost always included were the forms of etiquette and manners taken as conventional—in dress, grooming or speech. And of course, there was the symbolic role of drug use as a defining aspect of subculture membership.

Taken as a complex whole, the relation of the counter culture to the political movement of the late Sixties and early Seventies had a paradoxical element. On the one hand, it is probable that without the ebullience of the counter culture the more focused political movement of young adults would have been much smaller. On the other hand, the estrangement of the counter culture, and the life style politics reflected inside the political movement, were separated from all subcultures and classes—not just “bourgeois” culture. It created a cultural ghetto within which political radicalism could flourish but beyond which it could not grow. If hostility to the nuclear family and contempt for the coping strategies of working class families characterize a social movement, it is unlikely to make inroads to any class no less the working class.

SDS itself was complexly divided over the counter culture. On one hand it had a relatively “straight” atmosphere, so much so that figures like Abbie Hoffman and the notorious San Francisco Diggers had contempt for the “bores” in SDS.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> In 1966 the Diggers and Hoffman came to an SDS conference. The Diggers, an anarchist group of street organizers in San Francisco’s notorious Haight –

Much of its older leadership was repelled by the hedonism of the drug culture, and predicted its commercial cooptation. Thoroughly rooted in its constituency of young adults however, SDS was gradually permeated by all aspects of the counter culture—language, dress and yes, marijuana.<sup>21</sup> It was not possible to be entirely credible and effective as a young adult organizer from 1968 through the early 1970s without some of the trappings of the counter culture.

By comparison, today's young activists evince continuity with the cultural frontiers of the Sixties New Left, with some differences. There is a high level of gender consciousness and great care is taken to insure gender equity. This is part of broadly conceived identity consciousness in which inherited characteristics—race, ethnicity, gender—*ascribed* attributes, are taken to be political building blocks. USAS, for example, has four organized “official” caucuses: Working Class Caucus; People of Color Caucus; Women and Gender Caucus; Queer Caucus.

Among the more obvious developments, presaged but not yet fully explicit in the Sixties, is the acute consciousness of sexual orientation in today's movement. Thus the litany of affirmations from the Worcester Global Action Network:

The people of WoGAN are feminist, partner preference supportive, anti-imperialist, anti-classist, anti-capitalist, anti-racist as well as being respectful toward all forms of life, all religions and the diversity of human experience.

USAS' Principles of Unity include the following:

2. We struggle against racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, and other forms of oppression within our society, within our organizations, and within ourselves. Not only are we collectively confronting these prejudices as inherent defects of the global economy which creates sweatshops, but we also recognize the need for individuals to confront the prejudices they have internalized as the result of living and learning in a flawed and oppressive society. (USAS 2003)

Drug taking does not appear to be as central to identity and to cultural participation as it was earlier.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, vegetarianism has a strong and osten-

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Ashbury district, all identified themselves as Emmet Grogan—the person most well known among them. The act was akin to the more famous IWW claim: “we're all the leader.” They and Hoffman regaled the stunned SDSers about their stodginess. When the author noted that their presence was the perfect intelligence community ploy to disrupt a meeting, one of the Grogans attacked his appearance and his ugly nose. Some of those present understood it as anti-Semitic. See Hoffman's *Steal This Book* for his version.

<sup>21</sup> When the present author went to work as the founding staff member for a post-SDS graduate student and faculty new left group, the New University Conference, in 1968, he grew a beard; people were suspicious of him as he traveled clean shaven.

sibly political presence and privileged cultural position; and “animal rights”—including a doctrine of species equality—are assumed and declared rather than debated.

### International Context

Until the 9/11 attacks, there was an important difference in the ideological, or at any rate analytical frameworks of these two movements—almost entirely due to the development of global capitalism. As indicated above, one simple comparison that highlights differences: *from* internationalist support for nationalist revolution in the Sixties, *to* internationalist solidarity for international economic equity and in support of workers' rights in the Nineties. This fundamental difference—in line with the new movement's initial orientation to issues of work and working class empowerment—gave the opening years of the global justice movement a unique relationship to class conscious workers and to unions at the cutting edge of international solidarity.

Since the Bush Administration declared war against “terrorism” this dynamic has changed. The reasons are both simple and political but also profound and cultural. The simple, political reasons are that the response of mainstream American labor to the bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has not defined sharply a position critical of or separate from the Bush Administration. On the other hand, the global justice movement is “antiwar.” That is not insuperable—at any rate for the practiced political leadership of the American trade union leadership. After all, in its world famous pragmatism, the AFL-CIO never expected to find a youth movement with which it entirely agreed. On the part of the young activists, typically less compromising, the labor movement's position erodes its enthusiasm and sense of partnership. It is in this dimension, the matter of sympathy and empathy that the “war on terrorism” and the separate responses of young activists and the labor movement diverge so sharply as to threaten the new possibilities.

Most Americans feel personally involved, threatened and even angry about the attack of September 11 (Institute for Social Research 2001). By contrast, new New Left movement activists have focused on the ways in which U.S. policy has “deserved” the anger of the “wretched of the earth.” Although neither young nor American, the British journalist Robert Fisk expressed what many American war critics felt. Attacked and brutally beaten by a mob of Afghan refugees while working on a story during the bombing in Afghanistan, Fisk wrote:

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<sup>22</sup> I assert this with some caution. For the earlier period I am a witness participant; in this one I am separated by 35–40 years from the actors. I may know less than I think.

"If I was an Afghan refugee in Kila Abdullah, I would have done just what they did. I would have attacked Robert Fisk. Or any other Westerner I could find." (Fisk 2001; emphasis added)

Fisk's testimony of cultural self-hatred was widely circulated on movement list serves immediately upon its publication in Britain, and was quoted favorably in the leftist magazine, *The Nation*. The notion that the September 11 attacks were in some sense "just deserts" suggests an estrangement deeper than the pragmatic proposition that a "war on terrorism" is apt to be both eternal and ineffective.

The new face of antiwar activism tends to nudge the new New Left towards formulations of the older dialectic: Imperial America vs. dominated nationalities or cultures.<sup>23</sup>

In the early months of 2003 yet another dimension of this complex cultural and political relationship emerged. As the Bush and Blair governments moved toward war with Iraq the largest demonstrations in British and American history protested against them. In this period the AFL-CIO joined the British Trades Union Congress, not in war fever, but in a pointed note of caution. John Sweeney and his British counterpart John Monks wrote in a joint letter to their respective heads of government:

...the goal of our policy now should be to take every possible step to achieve the legitimate ends of disarming Iraq without recourse to war, and to win the fullest support of our friends and allies before the path of war is chosen as a last resort.

As we write to you today, we do not believe that this first path has come to an end, and urge you to continue to pressure all concerned to find a resolution to this situation that preserves peace and security for our countries and across the world. (Monks and Sweeney 2003)

In the meantime, USAS, even as its activists organized (or attempted) civilly disobedient actions on New York City streets during the anti war February 15, 2003 demonstrations, continued its close relationship to the AFL-CIO, announcing summer internships and organizing workshops with it.

By February 27<sup>th</sup> the AFL-CIO Executive Committee spoke against the US as "lone enforcer," complaining "The president has not fulfilled his responsibility to make a compelling and coherent explanation to the American people and the world about the need for military action against Iraq at this time." (AFL-CIO 2003)

<sup>23</sup> At a conference on Critical Globalization Studies at the University of Californian at Santa Barbara, in May, 2003, eminent scholars and intellectuals, Tariq Ali and David Harvey argued that globalization, in the current conjuncture, means imperialism.

USAS' opposition to the war in Iraq did *not* drive a wedge between it and the labor movement—in part because the labor movement had such a large component of antiwar sentiment itself. Besides the openly cool attitude evinced by Sweeney, dozens of union locals, metropolitan federations of the AFL-CIO, and a few large national unions openly opposed the war.<sup>24</sup>

## PARADOX

In the Fall of 1999 I asked activists at Brown University why they seemed to emphasize the plight of sweatshop workers in other countries to the exclusion (in rhetoric) of domestic sweatshop workers. The answer was that "It's more hard core" to advocate for workers in a developing country.<sup>25</sup> This raises a matter of some challenge to the current cohort of activists: are they willing or able to encounter working people as political peers?

Student activists of this cohort seem quite willing to travel to and advocate for working people in Indonesia or Mexico. The "founding" campaign of USAS was a UNITE sponsored tour of workers from a Dominican cap factory. Examples of community involvement in North America are fewer—but far from absent. The Harvard sit-in for a Living Wage for Harvard University employees in Spring 2001 is a notable example, and USAS supported a union campaign at a Derby, New York hat factory. The current group of activists has supported other living wage campaigns, as well. Nevertheless, despite these domestic examples, the new young activists do not dive into local community action in alliance with workers with the same verve with which they advocate for workers at a global level. Their examples of sweatshops in the apparel industry are highly concentrated in developing countries. While they do mention sweatshop examples from the Los Angeles and New York apparel industries on their website (USAS n.d.) their most intense campaigns in the last few years have been about Mexican, Dominican and Indonesian factories.

USAS members communicate through email listserves and conference calls. Among the standing interest-based listserves are: international solidarity; labor (i.e., building relations to labor in the US); and campus community coalitions. In 2003 (Jan 1–July 22) the message volume on these listserves was as follows:

<sup>24</sup> For a list of union bodies that passed resolutions see U.S. Labor Against the War: <http://www.uslaboragainstawar.org/resolutions.php>

<sup>25</sup> Translation: hard core—apparently derived from hip-hop and ska slang, now meaning more committed, more worthy of one's effort, tougher, i.e., stronger (more macho?) and braver, more fashionable.

International solidarity: 180  
 Labor: 112  
 Community: 108

Is this relative interest because privileged college students prefer to advocate for those to whom they can be moral and social superiors, figures of charity or beneficence? This would imply a colonial or patriarchal model of social reform. Alternatively, when considering broader examples of class issues in the US young people from the middle class may fear derision or hostility from white workers who are their ascribed status equals, but their class antagonists. I do not think that this implied paternalism or fear applies to the motivations of most of today's activists—though it is a provocative possibility.

Instead, it may be that the current student movement, like all of us, is influenced by media definitions of issues. Newspapers and magazines tend to define the sweatshop issues as external or immigrant, and these students are ultimately sensitive to media frames. My research shows that the media see the sweatshop issue as either an immigrant or external issue about 40% of the time. (Ross forthcoming, Chapter 10)

Thus, a major difference between the student anti sweatshop movement of the 90s and the student movement of the 60s is that in the Sixties leading cadres of the antiwar activists placed their challenge to the war economy in a context, for example, of defending a war on poverty. Carl Wittman and Tom Hayden wrote, in a 1964 pamphlet, *An interracial movement of the poor?*, that an effective movement of poor people making demands on the federal budget would compete with the military industrial complex for resources. They were right—and the war on poverty lost. Nevertheless, their strategic insight was to address the problem of the runaway war machine by pumping demand for domestic spending.

Today's students know workers in the U.S. have deep problems. But they rarely discuss the connection between the poverty of workers in San Salvador and poverty in LA.

## TWO THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS

In the course of the Sixties the national administration of Kennedy and then Johnson turned from one that could be called reform oriented to an administration besieged by its war on Vietnam and racial conflict at home. Only three years after Nixon was inaugurated the New Left was largely dispersed. What was left of the old movements turned to community organizing and union organizing, and on campuses much of it soured to a Higher Irrelevance. Then after only episodic upsurge (the campaign against cruise missile deployment - the "nuclear freeze" movement of the early 1980s and the antiapartheid divestment campaigns of the early mid-Eighties) there has been sustained social movement activity among

young adults since the mid 1990s—launched during a Democratic Presidency. I note too that the nuclear freeze began during a Democratic Presidency (Carter's) as well.

Recent social movement theory has developed a variant that appears to explain these timings. In formal theory it is called the political process model of social movement formation. The general idea is movements form when the following ingredients are present: resources that can be used in mobilization; social psychological conditions that allow participants to conceive of alternatives to their present condition; and crucially for our present purposes, political opportunities. In this instance the category "opportunity" corresponds to the informal lore that Sixties veterans mused about in their personal reflections and conversations during the Eighties: liberal Administrations make radical movements; conservative administrations make liberal electoral opponents.

Today's global justice movement traces its origins to the reformist opening of the Clinton Administration: the analogy is the antiwar movement whose momentum carried it past Johnson to the Nixon years. The specific "opportunity" was the unprecedented attention the Clinton Administration paid to the sweatshop problem under Secretary of Labor Robert Reich.<sup>26</sup> That the Clinton Administration was less "liberal" than the earlier Democrats is relevant to this proposition: it creates a rhetoric of reform but in fact disappoints the nascent activists.

This formulation is also consistent with an old, now somewhat discredited view of social movements having an origin in "rising expectations." In turn, this depends on a social psychology of "relative deprivation." In the newer framework movements arise when political conjunctures create structures of opportunity. The liberal Kennedy/Johnson moment creates, for example, a rhetoric of rights and a discourse about poverty that allows radicals to voice their concerns within an officially legitimatised framework. The government includes figures who are sympathetic to them and offers large and small resources to some. Common opponents, weakened by the reform surge are less able to harm those farther left.

This opportunity model, or even the "expectation" model, may explain timing; but it does not explain form. Why have college age young adults recreated such similar patterns of dissent 35 years apart? And what accounts for their differences?

In brief: the similarities are found in the characteristics of capitalism and its relationship to educated labor—characteristics that have not changed in the last

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<sup>26</sup>. For a critique of the Clinton/Reich strategy on sweatshops see "Firing Guard Dogs and Hiring Foxes" Chapter Seven in Ross (forthcoming).

generation; the differences are found in the emergence of global capitalism.

Advanced Capitalism is not able consistently or completely to motivate endless consumption. It produces amongst some—often the most accomplished in absorbing its values of civilization—a sense of moral emptiness and a need for the recreation of human community. This hypothesis does not depend directly on a globalization dynamic, but rather the interactions between the culture of consumption and the cultures of training (education) and production. Globalization does allow more acute contrasts between the styles of consumption in the rich countries and the deprivation of the poor. The sense of arbitrary good fortune haunts the imagination of the affluent and near affluent. The Sixties folk troubadour Phil Ochs expressed this for his generation, but unbeknownst to the global justice movement it haunts them too. Here is how Ochs put it:

Show me a prison, show me a jail,  
Show me a prisoner whose face has gone pale  
And I'll show you a young man with so many reasons why  
And there but for fortune, may go you or I

The protest movement of contemporary young adults—as well as those of the Sixties—is related to their likely occupational destinations: as functionaries in large organizations in which their own contributions will be as cogs in larger machines. They crave more personal sense of contact, impact and morality. This accounts for their cohorts' entrepreneurial efforts and their radical political responses to issues of their day.

To the extent however that today's activists are much more highly connected to issues of work and labor and understand the centrality of union rights to human rights, the difference from their earlier cohort lies in the ways in which globalization has stripped the labor movement of its strength. In the period that USAS and the global justice movement grew unemployment was coursing downwards; but working class incomes were too. The centrality of work, working conditions and globalization is unavoidable to those concerned with poverty.

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## ERRATA

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*The Journal of World-Systems Research* sincerely apologizes to the issue's authors and our readers for not including these articles in the original release. Pagination of the issue remains unchanged by the errata. Two additional editorial footnotes have been added to the introduction, and the table of contents has been updated.