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DEBT, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, AND DEFORESTATION: 
A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY

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ABSTRACT

We present cross-national models that examine the determinants of deforestation from 1990 to 2005 for a sample of sixty-two poor nations. We test dependency theory hypotheses that both debt and structural adjustment affect forests. We find substantial support for this theoretical perspective. The results indicate that both factors increase deforestation. We also find support for world polity theory that international non-governmental organization density decreases deforestation. We conclude with a brief discussion of the findings, policy implications, and possible directions for future research.

INTRODUCTION

It is generally thought that high levels of debt in poor nations should lead to increases in deforestation (e.g., Barbosa 2001; George 1992; McMichael 2004; Rich 1994). The logic behind this assumption is that poor nations are under constant pressure to service their foreign debts. Thus, governments attempt to increase export earnings in order to finance interest and principal...
payments. This, in turn, may increase deforestation because the sectors targeted for export include forestry, agriculture, cattle ranching, and mining, all of which involve extensive tree removal. Nevertheless, cross-national research on this topic has yielded mixed results. For example, Kahn and MacDonald (1994) find that debt service increases tropical deforestation. Marquart-Pyatt (2004) finds no relationship between debt service and deforestation in a sample of both non-tropical and tropical nations. Capistrano (1994) observes that debt service decreases deforestation ostensibly by reducing capital available for investment for a sample of tropical and non-tropical nations.

These contradictory findings suggest a need for additional study of the relationship between debt and deforestation. Therefore, one goal of this research is to reevaluate this relationship within the framework of a cross-national model of deforestation. However, we expand upon previous research by considering the impact of structural adjustment lending. We do so because structural adjustment requires indebted nations to adopt certain macro-economic policy reforms to receive the loans. These policy reforms include boosting exports, liberalizing trade, and cutting government spending, which all may increase deforestation. The suggestion that structural adjustment increases deforestation is generally rooted in dependency theory. Thus, we now turn to a review of dependency theory and its prediction regarding deforestation. We also elaborate upon the reasons for including other relevant predictors in our cross-national models. We conclude with a discussion of the findings, brief policy suggestions, and possible directions for future research.

DEPENDENCY THEORY

The dependency perspective argues that international economic exchanges and unequal power relationships between rich and poor nations are detrimental to the poor nations of the world. In essence, rich nations become wealthy by exploiting the cheap labor and resources of poor nations (cf. Amin 1976; Evans 1979; Frank 1967). In recent years, a substantial body of cross-national research has been produced in an attempt to provide empirical tests of propositions drawn from dependency theory. This research has noted the changing nature of economic exchange relationships among nations. The earliest studies tended to incorporate measures of "classical" trade dependence such as commodity concentration or export partner concentration. Research focusing on a later period – roughly the 1970s and early 1980s – tended to focus on multinational corporate penetration (i.e., Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985). Another strand of studies shifts the focus to various types of debt dependency generated by the "debt crisis" (i.e., Bradshaw and Huang 1991); Walton and Ragin 1990). Our study follows in this tradition.

The debt crisis highlighted the inability of many poor nations to generate enough revenue to make payments on their foreign debt. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank responded to the debt crisis by providing structural adjustment loans designed to resolve the

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2 There is a substantial literature in the tradition of dependency and world system theories. Given its familiarity, we do not present a detailed synthesis of this body of literature here for sake of space. Further, the emphasis of this research is on debt and structural adjustment. However, see Peet (1999) for a detailed overview of the origins and evolution of dependency theory.
balance-of-payment issues by rescheduling payments, renegotiating loan terms, and providing new loans (McMichael 2004). However, the new loans required indebted nations to institute a variety of economic policy reforms in return for the money (Rich 1994). These policy reforms include devaluing currency, reducing government spending, liberalizing trade, and privatizing government assets (Peet 2003). The underlying logic behind these reforms was an attempt to stimulate economic growth and generate hard currency for debt repayment by increasing exports and decreasing spending. While the "earn more" and "spend less" model may facilitate debt repayment, it also has the potential to increase deforestation (George 1992).

First, structural adjustment programs require that governments promote economic activity consonant with their "comparative advantage" (Peet 2003). This often involves the export of whatever available natural resources may be in demand on the world market. Put differently, nations attempt to increase export earnings in order to finance interest and principal payments (McMichael 2004). The most common way to achieve this is currency devaluation, which creates a demand for a nation’s exports on the world market (Mohan 2001). Generally, poor nations meet increased demand by expanding production and extraction for export (Rich 1994). The sectors that may increase deforestation include logging, ranching, mining and agriculture (George 1992; McMichael 2004). In fact, most exports are destined for the rich nations of the world (Peet 2003). This idea corresponds with Jorgenson’s (2006) insight regarding the theory of unequal ecological exchange (i.e., deforestation is higher in the poor nations of the world because they produce forest product for richer nations).

Second, structural adjustment loans usually require deep cuts in government spending to correct for budgetary imbalances (Barbosa 2001). The nature of the cuts has varied from nation to nation, but a common theme has been the reduction in the budgets and staffs of environment and conservation departments (Tockman 2001). These cuts often hamper enforcement of environmental regulations, impede efforts to prevent illegal logging, and hinder demarcation of protected area (Rich 1994). In other words, structural adjustment reduces the regulatory capacity of governments to deal with causes of forest loss. It is also important to note that budgetary cuts reduce or eliminate government subsidies and credit for agricultural inputs (Rudel 1993). These subsidy cuts often force small-scale farmers to expand production into marginal land areas, especially forests, in order to maintain crop yields (Rudel 2005).

Third, structural adjustment loans require governments to liberalize trade by removing barriers to foreign investment. This involves a variety of regulatory concessions and financial incentives as well as privatizing government assets (Walton and Ragin 1990). Regulatory concessions may include exemptions on logging harvest quotas, exporting raw logs, logging protected species, and logging in protected areas (Hurst 1990). The most notable financial incentives are "tax holidays" that involve exemptions of export duties, import duties, and corporate income taxes (Leonard 1988). The purpose of the regulatory concessions and financial incentives is to stimulate investment within a nation to generate currency to meet debt obligations (Clapp 1998). However, regulatory concessions and economic incentives often result in deforestation. Tax cuts and environmental law exemptions make cattle ranching, logging, and export agriculture more profitable. Thus, investment in these areas tends to increase and, consequently, deforestation increases as well (Mohan 2001). In addition, tax breaks and selling off of public enterprises often yield additional reductions in spending by eroding the tax base because there is little new revenue being collected by the government (George 1992). This hampers the regulatory capacity of governments to monitor forestry mandates and implement
conservation projects, which are already limited by mandated cuts (Deacon 1994). Further, small-scale producers, who are thrown off the land when export agriculture is expanded by large corporations, may turn to logging for survival (Culas 2006).

Fourth, structural adjustment exacerbates poverty, which also may increase forest loss. In this regard, a focus on raw material exports prevents increases in the sort of value-added industries that employ the poor (i.e., manufacturing and services) (Mohan 2001). By slowing the creation of jobs in sectors other than agriculture, fewer jobs are available to urban workers who, lacking alternatives, put more pressure on forests (Ehrhardt-Martinez 1998). Finally, cuts on social service expenditures for the poor also increase incursions into forests as people extract resources to supplement their incomes (George and Sabelli 1994).

As noted previously, cross-national research has not considered the impact of structural adjustment (e.g., Capistrano 1994; Kahn and MacDonald 1994; Marquart-Pyatt 2004; Rudel and Roper 1997). However, structural adjustment has been included as a predictor in cross-national research on a variety of other topics. For example, Walton and Ragin (1990) examined structural adjustment in models of political protest. Bradshaw and Schafer (2000) considered the impact of this variable on urbanization, economic growth, and access to safe drinking water. Schafer (1999) utilized this variable in cross-national models of education, while Buchman (1996) examined the relationship between structural adjustment and women's education. It is important to note that these studies also examined debt service at the same time. Thus, as suggested by dependency theory, we seek to test whether structural adjustment and debt service increase deforestation.

WORLD POLITY THEORY

Scholars writing in the world polity tradition hold that international organizations play an important role in constituting and reinforcing world cultural norms (e.g., Boli and Thomas 1999). In fact, Meyer and his colleagues (1997) describe the existence of the "world environmental regime" composed of international non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, and treaties that are part of this process. The role that international non-governmental organizations play is of particular interest here. First, international non-governmental organizations intervene in global political processes and help shape the language of international treaties dealing with the environment, thereby influencing the normative content of global institutions (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Smith 1995). In the absence of resources and formal mechanisms of enforcement, international non-governmental organizations monitor compliance by nations with environmental treaties (Clapp 1994; Frank 1999). Consequently, international non-governmental organizations are in a position of pointing out embarrassing failures and hypocrisies of nations, which puts pressure on governments to adapt their behaviors to international norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Shor forthcoming).

Second, international non-governmental organizations also help mobilize support for problem-solving initiatives when national level avenues are either inadequate or blocked (Smith 1995). It has become increasingly common for these organizations to provide support for conservation efforts at sub-national levels (Schofer and Hironaka 2005). In doing so, international non-governmental organizations directly fund local environmental protection efforts. Furthermore, they often serve as intermediaries, bridging disparate community groups under the
rubric of "grassroots" development (Schafer 1999). This involves facilitating conservation efforts by integrating financial, technical, and organizational resources from abroad with local knowledge and community participation (Bradshaw and Schafer 2000).

Third, international non-governmental organizations support social movement activity at the local level (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer (2000) found that nations strongly linked to world society (e.g., more international non-governmental organizations within a nation) experience a growth in domestic environmental social movements (e.g., more domestic non-governmental organizations within a nation). These ideas can be observed in practice when international non-governmental organizations (e.g., Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and Conservation International) employ frames and discourses that encourage domestic social movement activity and, in turn, environmentalism within a nation (Frank 1999). In such instances, governments are "squeezed" from above and below to attend to environmental problems like deforestation (Schofer and Hironaka 2005). Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to this process as a "boomerang effect." Recently, Shandra and colleagues (2008), Shandra (2007a, b), and Schofer and Hironaka (2005) found support for world polity theory. As such, we seek to further evaluate the hypothesis that international non-governmental organizations decrease deforestation in the context of a model that also takes into account both debt service and structural adjustment.

NEO-MALTHUSIAN THEORY

Neo-Malthusian theory argues that demographic factors, especially population growth, are prominent causes of environmental degradation. Such ideas, rooted in Malthus's (1983 [1826]) well-known assertion that "geometric" growth in population would outstrip "arithmetic" growth in the means of subsistence, led to the pessimistic conclusion that "carrying capacity" problems would be inevitable if population size outpaced finite environmental resources such as land and food. Ehrlich and Ehrlich (2004) among others have extended this line of reasoning. Their general argument holds that increases in population growth drive extraction, consumption, and production.

These processes have the potential to increase deforestation—for a recent discussion of the literature on population dynamics and deforestation, see Carr, Suter, and Barbieri (2005). Rudel and Roper (1997) describe how deforestation comes about in their "immiserization" and "frontier" models of development. They see deforestation as the result of growing populations of peasants and shifting cultivators carving small farms out of forests. The economies of poor nations provide few livelihoods for poor peasants other than agriculture. Moreover, low levels of economic activity and the fiscal austerity associated with large foreign debts prevent the creation of jobs in sectors other than agriculture that otherwise might attract people to cities and relieve the human demand on forest resources (Burns, Kick, and Davis 2003). The absence of alternative economic opportunities and the increase in the number of people competing for these opportunities compel individuals to expand agricultural production by clearing forests (Burns et al. 2003). This often occurs when an "army of surplus laborers" moves to obtain property by clearing land when road building opens up a region for development (Rudel 1993). Jorgenson (2006), Ehrhardt-Martinez (1998), and Rudel (1989) among others find support for the hypothesis that population growth increases deforestation.
York, Rosa, and Dietz (2003) argue that it is important to "decompose" population in cross-national research. That is, researchers should examine not just overall growth rates per se, but also the impact of growth in different contexts. Accordingly, Jorgenson (2006) finds that rural population growth increases deforestation. Further, Jorgenson and Burns (2007) find that rural population growth should contribute to deforestation while urban population growth reduces it. They argue that expanding urban centers often create economic opportunities other than agricultural ones, which attract people to cities. This process relieves the demand on forest resources and reduces deforestation. Thus, we seek to examine the differential impact of rural and urban population growth on deforestation. However, we again would like to note that this will be in the context of a model that includes international non-governmental organizations, debt service, and structural adjustment.

We have provided the rationale for including these variables in our models. We also take into account several other factors. These variables include gross domestic product per capita, economic growth, domestic economy structure, democracy, government spending, forest stocks, and data quality. We provide below a brief justification for including these variables in a model of deforestation.

NATIONS INCLUDED

We include nations located in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean that are not classified as high income according to the World Bank's (2003) income quartile classification scheme. We exclude high income nations because they do not receive structural adjustment loans. We also do not include nations formed following the collapse of the Soviet Union because there are no data for them in 1990. This yields a sample of sixty-two nations for which complete data are available. We follow the standard practice to report and remove any influential cases from the analysis (Jorgenson 2003). In this analysis, we remove Indonesia because it is an influential case.

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3 The following nations are included in the analysis: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Columbia, Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad, Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Deforestation

The dependent variable for our analysis is the average annual percentage change in natural forest area from 1990 to 2005. Please note that deforestation is signified by a positive value for interpretation purposes. The data may be obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization (2005). This measure includes land greater than half a hectare in size with trees higher than five meters and a canopy cover of more than ten percent. A natural forest consists only of native forest species with the possible exception of small areas of natural regeneration or assisted natural regeneration. This measure excludes forest plantations, which are areas established through planting or seeding (Food and Agricultural Organization 2005). Most cross-national research (e.g., Burns, Kick, and Davis 2006; Jorgenson 2006; Shandra 2007a) examines the average annual percentage change in total forest area, which includes natural forest areas as well as forest plantations. A forest plantation often involves relative homogeneity in the types of species grown for commercial purposes (World Resources Institute 2005). We use natural forest area data because we are interested in the potential effects of debt and structural adjustment on land that is not already being intensively managed for commercial production. We provide descriptive statistics in Table 1 and bivariate correlations in Table 2.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Gross Domestic Product Per Capita

As is standard in such analyses, it is incumbent on us to take into account a nation’s level of development in order to make sure that any effects discovered are independent of a nation’s level of wealth (London and Ross 1995). In this regard, we employ a measure of gross domestic product per capita at parity purchasing power for 1990. These data may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). We log this variable to correct for its skewed distribution. Shandra (2007b, c) and Jorgenson (2006) find that economic development reduces deforestation. Burns and colleagues (2006) attribute this finding to wealthier nations externalizing their environmental costs by importing natural resources from poorer nations. Thus, we anticipate that gross domestic product per capita should decrease deforestation.

Economic Growth

We also include the average annual economic growth rate from 1980 to 1990. These data may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). It is generally thought that economic growth should increase deforestation. This is because there are large amounts of capital available for investment in activities that accelerate forest loss during periods of economic growth (Rudel 1989).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=62)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
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<td>11.061</td>
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Table 2. Bivariate Correlation Matrix

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<td>(6) Democracy, 1990</td>
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<td>(14) IMF-WB Debt Service, 1990 (ln)</td>
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<td>(15) Structural Adjustment, 1990 (ln)</td>
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<td>(16) INGO Density, 1990 (ln)</td>
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Service-Based Economic Activity

We also include the value added from service-based economic activity as a percentage of gross domestic product for 1990. These data may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). We include this variable because it has been suggested that the structure of the economy within a nation may be related to levels of deforestation (Ehrhardt-Martinez, Crenshaw, and Jenkins 2002). Jorgenson (2006) argues that poor nations largely rely on export markets to stimulate economic growth. In this regard, nations often export primary products and agricultural goods, which increase deforestation (Burns et al. 2003). However, forest loss may be mitigated to the extent that nations have something other than raw materials to export like services and manufactured goods. Thus, we hypothesize that nations with high levels of value added in services should have less deforestation.

Manufacturing-Based Economic Activity

We also include value added from the manufacturing sector as a percentage of gross domestic product in 1990. These data may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). We include this variable as another control for the structure of a domestic economy. As explained above, we hypothesize that nations with a larger amount of economic activity from manufacturing should have less deforestation.

Democracy

We use the average of Freedom House's (1997) political rights and civil liberties scales for 1990 as our measure of democracy. Political rights reflect the degree to which a nation is governed by democratically elected representatives and has fair, open, and inclusive elections. Civil liberties reflect whether within a nation there is freedom of press, freedom of assembly, general personal freedom, freedom of private organizations, and freedom of private property (Freedom House 1997). These variables are measured on a seven-point scale with the following codes: free (1-2), partially free (3-5), and not free (6-7). We multiply our index by negative one so that high scores correspond with high levels of democracy. York and colleagues (2003) use these variables in a cross-national study of ecological footprints.

We anticipate that democracy should decrease deforestation because of political activism and electoral accountability (Li and Reuveny 2006). In general, democratic nations have higher levels of political activism than repressive nations because democracies guarantee certain rights including freedoms of speech, press, and assembly (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2002). Leaders in a democracy must be responsive to such activism because of electoral accountability (Midlarsky 1998). Further, greater freedom of the press and assembly leads to wider diffusion of information, which, in turn, raises public awareness. Therefore, environmental groups are often more successful at informing people and organizing them to act in democratic rather than in repressive nations (Li and Reuveny 2006).
Government Expenditures

We also include a variable to assess the effect of state strength on deforestation. This variable is the total amount of central government expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product for 1990. These data may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). Deacon (1994) argues that weak governments lack the ability to enforce forest protection and, consequently, forests tend to be treated as open access resources. This leads to increased deforestation. Thus, we hypothesize that government spending should reduce deforestation. However, it may well be that governments are spending money on projects that increase deforestation such as infrastructure and rural resettlement programs (Rich 1994).

Population Growth

The neo-Malthusian perspective suggests that demographic factors shape deforestation. Therefore, we include a measure of population growth from 1980 to 1990 in the analyses. These data may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). We log this variable to control for its skewed distribution. We hypothesize that population growth should increase deforestation.

Rural Population Growth

We note above that Jorgenson and Burns (2007) find that it is important to "decompose" demographic factors. That is, researchers should examine not just overall growth rates per se, but also the impact of population growth in different contexts (York et al. 2003). Therefore, we include the rural population growth rate from 1980 to 1990. This variable is logged to correct for its skewed distribution. These data may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). We hypothesize that rural population growth should increase deforestation.

Urban Population Growth

We also include the urban population growth rate from 1980 to 1990. These data may also be obtained from the World Bank (2003). We log this variable to deal with its skewed distribution. The discussion of neo-Malthusian theory suggests that urban population growth should reduce deforestation by removing excess population from rural areas and relieving pressure on forests (Jorgenson and Burns 2007).

Natural Forest Stocks

It is necessary to include a measure that controls for the potentially biasing effects of relative abundance or scarcity of forest resources (Rudel 1989). Therefore, we include natural forest area for 1990. We log this variable to control for its skewed distribution. These data may be obtained from the Food and Agricultural Organization (2005).
Data Quality

We also take into account data quality of the deforestation estimates. These data may be obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization (2005). We classify forestry statistics as being highly reliable if they are based upon remote sensing survey or current national field sampling estimates. We classify forestry statistics as having low reliability if they are based upon expert estimates, which often involve extrapolation from an outdated national inventory. As such, we include a dummy variable for reliability of deforestation measures, identifying those nations in which forest cover measures are based upon remote sensing surveys or current national field sampling estimates and should, therefore, be of higher quality (1 = high data quality). The reference category includes nations whose forestry estimates are based upon expert estimates or an outdated inventory (0 = low data quality). This coding has been used previously by Shandra (2007b, c).

International Non-Governmental Organization Density

We also include the number of international non-governmental organizations working on environmental and animal rights issues in a nation per capita for 1990. The data were collected by Smith (2004) from the Yearbook of International Associations. It is important to note that the data exclude labor unions, institutes, and foundations (Smith and Wiest 2005). Note, too, that a measure of international non-governmental organizations per capita is, in effect, a density measure. The population data (our denominator) may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). This variable has been used recently by Shandra (2007a). We feel this measure is an improvement over using the total number of international non-governmental organizations of all types because it specifically gauges the density of international non-governmental organizations concerned only with the natural environment. This is of particular importance because some organizations listed in the Yearbook of International Associations and included in the overall measure may not be concerned with the environment (e.g., labor unions). World polity theory hypothesizes that international non-governmental organization density should reduce deforestation.

Structural Adjustment

To capture the effects of structural adjustment, pressure, and conditionality required by the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral lenders, Walton and Ragin (1990) developed a conditionality index. It has been used previously by Shandra, London, and Williamson (2003), Bradshaw and Schafer (2000), Schafer (1999), and Buchman (1996) among others. This index is the sum of four variables which include (1) the number of debt renegotiations between a country

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4 We would like to thank one of the reviewers for pointing out that the data quality variable may be a proxy for level of development. We do not think this is the case because the bivariate correlation between these two variables is .122. However, to be certain, we ran the analysis again removing the data quality dummy variable from the analysis. The results are similar to the ones presented in Table 2. Of particular note, gross domestic product per capita still does not explain any significant variation in deforestation. We do not present the results for sake of space, but they are available upon request.
and an international financial body, (2) the number of debt restructurings experienced by an indebted nation, (3) the number of times a country utilized the International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility, and (4) the total International Monetary Fund loans received by a country as a percentage of its allocated quota. The variables are measured in 1990. The four components of the index are converted to z-scores and summed. We log the variable to deal with its skewed distribution. The index effectively approximates structural adjustment because the International Monetary Fund imposes conditions in each of its negotiations and renegotiations with indebted nations (Walton and Ragin 1990). See Bradshaw and Wahl (1991) or Walton and Ragin (1990) for a more detailed discussion. Dependency theory hypothesizes that structural adjustment should increase deforestation.

**Total Debt Service Ratio**

In addition to the pressure to adjust their economies under structural adjustment, indebted nations must continually service their foreign debts. Therefore, it is also important to control for debt service as well as structural adjustment. This approach has been used previously by Bradshaw and Schafer (2000), Schafer (1999), and Buchman (1996). Thus, we also include the average sum of principal and interest payments in foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term public and publicly guaranteed private debt with maturity of one year or longer as a percentage of goods and services exports in 1990. These data come from the World Bank (2003). We log this variable to deal with its skewed distribution. According to dependency theory, total debt service should also increase deforestation.

**International Monetary Fund and World Bank Debt Service Ratio**

As an alternative measure of debt dependence, we also include the average debt service ratio that covers long-term public debt and repayments only to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. These data are measured as a percentage of exports of goods and services for 1990, and may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). This variable is logged to control for its skewed distribution. Like total debt service, this variable should be associated with more forest loss.

**FINDINGS**

In Table 3, we present the ordinary least squares estimates of deforestation. In odd-numbered equations, we include the gross domestic product per capita, economic growth, service-based economic activity, manufacturing-based economic activity, government expenditures, measures of population growth, democracy, forest stocks, data quality, international non-governmental organization density, structural adjustment, and a measure of debt service. In equations (2.1) through (2.4), we include total debt service while in equations (2.5) through (2.8) we include debt service to only the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. We "decompose" population growth in equations (2.3), (2.4), (2.7), and (2.8). In even-numbered equations, we remove non-significant predictors from the previous equation in order to demonstrate the robustness of our findings.
### Table 3. OLS Estimates of Deforestation (1990-2005) [N=62]

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<tr>
<td>Structural Adjustment, 1990 (ln)</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>.354</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.339</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Debt Service, 1990 (ln)</td>
<td>.390</td>
<td>.478***</td>
<td>.576***</td>
<td>.428***</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund and World Bank Debt Service, 1990 (ln)</td>
<td>.414***</td>
<td>.494***</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organizations Density, 1990 (ln)</td>
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<td>-.268</td>
<td>-.387</td>
<td>-.306</td>
<td>-.333</td>
<td>-.251</td>
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<td><strong>Intranasional Variables:</strong></td>
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<td>Gross Domestic Product, 1990 (ln)</td>
<td>-.082</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>.169</td>
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<td>Economic Growth Rate, 1980-1990</td>
<td>.010</td>
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<td>Service-Based Economic Activity, 1990</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.061</td>
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<td>Manufacturing-Based Economic Activity, 1990</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>-.033***</td>
<td>-.023*</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>-.031*</td>
<td>-.021*</td>
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<td>Democracy, 1990</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>.014</td>
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<td>Population Growth Rate, 1980-1990 (ln)</td>
<td>.901</td>
<td>.977</td>
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<td>Rural Population Growth Rate, 1980-1990 (ln)</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.238</td>
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<td><strong>Control Variables:</strong></td>
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<td>Natural Forest Stocks, 1990 (ln)</td>
<td>-.330</td>
<td>-.287</td>
<td>-.347</td>
<td>-.291</td>
<td>-.315</td>
<td>-.259</td>
<td>-.317</td>
<td>-.261</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data Quality, 1990 (1= High Reliability)</td>
<td>-.520**</td>
<td>-.617**</td>
<td>-.649**</td>
<td>-.573**</td>
<td>-.524**</td>
<td>-.619**</td>
<td>-.646**</td>
<td>-.568**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-Square</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>.316</td>
<td>.358</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.323</td>
<td>.360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highest Variance Inflation Factor Score</td>
<td>3.073</td>
<td>1.689</td>
<td>3.934</td>
<td>1.721</td>
<td>2.983</td>
<td>1.625</td>
<td>3.987</td>
<td>1.650</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Variance Inflation Factor Score</td>
<td>1.995</td>
<td>1.053</td>
<td>2.227</td>
<td>1.126</td>
<td>1.872</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>2.276</td>
<td>1.092</td>
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Notes: * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, and *** p < .001 for a one-tailed test. The first number is the unstandardized coefficient, the second number is the standardized coefficient, and the third number is the t-statistic.
We organize our analysis in this way for several important reasons. First, we want to avoid potential problems with multicollinearity. When we include both measures of debt service in the analysis at the same time, variance inflation factor scores are greater than ten. This is likely due to the high bivariate correlation between these variable (r = .980). However, the highest variance inflation factor score is less than four in models where we examine the effects of these variables separately. Second, the sequential use of "cognate" but "distinct" indicators of more than one independent variable should shed considerable light on the complexity of dynamics involving the issue under investigation (London and Ross 1995). If both debt service indicators maintain similar effects on deforestation, for example, then confidence in the general finding (i.e., debt increases deforestation) is enhanced. Third, multiple indicators help guard against potential problems associated with measurement error, because one indicator may be imperfect but several measures are less likely to have the same error (Paxton 2002).

Let us begin by considering the overall fit of our model to the data. The adjusted r-square values range from a low of .188 to a high of .360 in equations (2.2) and (2.8) respectively. The lowest of these values, especially equations (2.2) and (2.6), are problematic, even for cross-national research and, most likely, reflect the complexities of modeling deforestation. Note, however, that the lowest values are in the "trimmed" equations that do not decompose population growth—see equations (2.2) and (2.6). In other words, as should be expected, the equations without the significant rural population variable have the lowest adjusted r-square values. Moreover, all of the equations that include rural population, and, therefore, are more properly specified, have adjusted r-squares of .316 or higher. These r-square values are similar to those published by Shandra (2007a, b).

Now, let us turn our attention to statistically significant findings. First, we find substantial support for dependency theory in that both debt and structural adjustment increase deforestation. The coefficients for structural adjustment are positive and significant in every equation. The coefficients for the two debt service ratios are also positive and significant in every equation. Second, we find support that international non-governmental organization density reduces deforestation. The coefficients for this variable are negative and significant in every equation. Third, we find support for one particular aspect of neo-Malthusian theory. The coefficients for the rural population growth rate are positive and significant in every equation in which it is included. Fourth, we find some support for the claim that nations with a greater share of manufacturing have less deforestation. The coefficients for this variable are negative and significant in four of the eight equations. Fifth, the coefficients for both data quality and forest stocks are negative and significant in every equation.  

A problem that commonly arises in cross-national research is that of missing data. Statistical procedures such as multivariate regression analysis generally assume that each country has complete data. However, for numerous reasons, countries may be missing values on one or more of the variables under investigation. When this is the case, questions may emerge about the extent to which inferences about the parameters and tests of statistical significance are influenced by the presence of incomplete data. When using listwise deletion, for example, the effective sample size only includes those nations with complete records, and, consequently, this number can be substantially smaller than the original sample size if missing observations are scattered across many nations. Further, nations that are excluded will often be the poorer countries that have fewer resources to allocate toward record keeping. Thus, the final sample may not be representative of
There are some other non-significant findings that also should be mentioned. First, we find no support for the idea that democracy affects deforestation. The coefficients for this variable do not reach a level of statistical significance.\(^6\) Second, we do not find that economic development decreases deforestation. The coefficients for gross domestic product per capita are not statistically significant.\(^7\) Third, we do not find support for the hypothesis that economic growth increases deforestation. The coefficients for this variable are positive but do not reach a level of statistical significance. Fourth, no support was found for other aspects of the neo-Malthusian theory. We do not observe that urban population growth reduces deforestation by luring people to cities and lessening demands on forest resources. The coefficients for this variable are negative but not statistically significant. Likewise, the coefficients for total population growth are not significant. Fifth, we do not find that nations with a large service sector have less forest loss. The coefficients for service-based economic activity are not significant.\(^8\) Sixth, we find no support for hypotheses that government spending affects forests.\(^9\)

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\(^6\) Bollen and Paxton (2000) argue that non-random measurement error arising from the subjective perceptions of judges affect all cross-national measures of democracy to some degree. This bias may distort comparisons across nations, undermining the empirical results that ignore it. Therefore, we also estimate our models using the level of democracy or autocracy in a nation using data from the Polity IV Project (2005). This measure ranges from –10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). The results using this measure are very similar to the results reported for the measurements of democracy in Table 1. We do not present these results for sake of space.

\(^7\) Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2002) found that an environmental Kuznets curve exists between gross domestic product per capita and deforestation. We test this hypothesis using a quadratic polynomial equation in which the gross domestic product per capita and its square are entered into the same model. If this relationship exists, the sign of the coefficient for the level of development should be positive and the sign of the coefficient for the squared term should be negative with this term being statistically significant. To reduce problems of multicollinearity, we begin by centering the linear term around its mean. We then square the centered term. Finally, we include the centered linear term and squared term in our models (York et al. 2003). The coefficients for the squared term are negative but fail to achieve statistical significance.

\(^8\) Ehrhardt-Martinez (1998) tests for the presence of an inverted u–shaped curve between urbanization and deforestation. We use the same procedure described in the previous footnote to test this hypothesis. The squared urbanization term is negative but fails to predict any significant variation in deforestation, indicating no support for an environmental Kuznets curve between urbanization and deforestation.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study extends cross-national research on deforestation in a couple of novel ways. First, previous research that considers dependency theory hypotheses only examines how various forms of debt service impact deforestation. However, they do not consider the effect of structural adjustment on forest loss. We address this gap in the literature by examining the simultaneous impact of both factors on deforestation. In doing so, we find substantial support for dependency theory. The results indicate that both debt service and structural adjustment significantly increase forest loss. The reliability of these findings is demonstrated by their statistical significance across alternative model specifications and techniques for handling missing data as described in footnote five. Clearly, it is important to consider debt service and structural adjustment together when testing dependency theory hypotheses in a cross-national research design regarding the natural environment.

Second, we use a more nuanced indicator of deforestation as our dependent variable (i.e., average annual change in natural forest area) than previous studies. As noted above, this measure excludes forest plantations, areas established through planting or seeding, which are widely used to generate forest-related exports (Food and Agriculture Organization 2005). Using a deforestation measure that includes forest plantations may overestimate the impact of debt service and structural adjustment precisely because debt-related pressures and conditions are largely aimed at stimulating primary exports. Thus, this study provides a more conservative or precise test of the impact of debt service and structural adjustment on deforestation.

We also found that it is quite important to consider insights from other theories. In this regard, drawing on insights from neo-Malthusian theory, we found that rural population growth increases deforestation, while total population growth and urban population growth do not. This finding highlights contentions by Jorgenson and Burns (2007) and York and colleagues (2003) about the need to "decompose" demographic factors in cross-national research. It is clearly important to consider not just overall growth per se but also growth in different contexts. Furthermore, our analysis supports the hypothesis drawn from world polity theory that international non-governmental organization density decreases deforestation. This finding corresponds with research by Shandra (2007a), Schofer and Hironaka (2005), and Shandra et al. (2003).

Some important policy implications originate from the main findings. First, it may serve international non-governmental organizations well to focus their efforts on projects that decrease debt and deforestation. A "debt-for-nature" swap is a very good example. The procedure usually entails an international non-governmental organization paying off a portion of a nation's debt in return for that nation setting aside a certain amount of land for permanent protection (Cartwright 1989). Nevertheless, debt-for-nature swaps can be criticized for being "reformist" in that the

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9 Bradshaw and Schafer (2000) argue that it is not only important to examine overall government spending but also how governments allocate their resources. Therefore, we replaced total government spending with total government expenditures for health and total government expenditures for education. These variables are measured as a percentage of gross domestic product for 1990, and may be obtained from the World Bank (2003). The coefficients for both variables are negative but not statistically significant.
swaps do not address the causes of increasing debt among poor nations (Newell 2000). Bryant and Bailey (1997) write, "If the argument is that fundamental change is the only way in which to solve the environmental crisis," then international non-governmental organizations "may be part of the problem and not part of the solution" (143). Accordingly, international non-governmental organizations should also focus their efforts on lobbying leaders of lending institutions for greater debt forgiveness and elimination of structural adjustment loans. This process could also involve lobbying leaders in rich nations to withhold funding to multilateral institutions until such changes occur (Rich 1994).

These policy suggestions also point to some promising avenues for future research. First, there has been no systematic research that examines the impact of debt-for-nature swaps on deforestation. Thus, one potential avenue for research includes conducting a study along these lines. Second, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank's Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative offers debt forgiveness and low interest loans to reduce debt repayments to "sustainable" levels. However, governments must meet a range of economic management and performance targets to qualify for the aid (Peet 2003). The HIPC Initiative targets usually involve liberalization of trade and fiscal policy (e.g., tax holidays, firing workers at will, and weakening of government regulations), which are quite similar to structural adjustment loan conditions. Thus, future research could also consider if debt relief provided under the HIPC Initiative decreases pressure on forests or if the economic targets that must be met to qualify for the program promote it. Third, it may be helpful to use a series of structural equation models to test the pathways by which structural adjustment increases deforestation. This could involve examining the impact of structural adjustment on deforestation via government spending, forest exports, and poverty. Fourth, we note previously that the contradictory findings regarding debt service may be related to the forest type (i.e., tropical versus non-tropical). Future research could examine if the effects of structural adjustment are more pronounced in tropical than non-tropical nations.

REFERENCES


CORE AND PERIPHERY RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE MAYA

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ABSTRACT

How do indigenous peoples relate to the core over the longue duree? In this paper, we explore the implications of colonialism from a world-systems perspective, examining interactions in the economic and political structures in addition to the effects of landlessness for indigenous peoples in one case: the Maya. After reviewing world-systems theory and applying it to indigenousness, we discuss Ragin’s (1992) conceptualization of cases and the comparative historical method. Then we introduce the relational concept, a tool that allows us to employ both the comparative historical method and world-systems theory in our analysis of the Maya and their relationship to the state of Mexico. We then present our data, which consist of the economic and political conditions, along with the cultural implications of landholding across time among the Maya and in Mexico. We analyze these data using the relational concept to understand the consequences of colonialism and globalization for the Maya people.

Indigenous peoples have been marginalized by the processes of globalization, as many noted on the commemoration of Columbus’s journey to the Americas. Yet more recently these communities, many of which lie in the periphery of the world-system, have become vocal opponents of globalization and agentic members of a community seeking change in the world-

1 A previous draft of this manuscript was presented at the Southern Sociological Society’s annual meeting in New Orleans, LA (2006). We would like to thank the audience at this conference and the reviewers and editors of this manuscript for their thoughtful comments on this research. We would also like to thank Bonnie Troupe, Kathleen Conroy, and the Stonehill Undergraduate Research Experience program for supporting this research. Direct correspondence to Stephanie M. Teixeira, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, North Carolina State University, P.O. Box 8107, 1911 Building, Raleigh, NC 27695-8107. Phone: (919) 515-0443. Fax: (919) 515-2610. E-mail: Stephanie_Teixeira@ncsu.edu.
system. How do indigenous peoples relate to the core over the longue durée? In this paper, we explore the implications of colonialism from a world-systems perspective, examining interactions in the economic and political structures in addition to the effects of landlessness for indigenous peoples in one case: the Maya. Throughout the paper, we will be using the terms Maya and Zapatistas deliberately. “Maya” is used to refer to the indigenous group, or to indigenous peoples of Mayan descent. “Zapatistas” is used to refer to the broader movement composed of Maya people, peasants, and others who are aligned with this movement for autonomy and democracy. The Zapatistas movement has a unique history, utilizing the tools of globalization to promote rights for indigenous peoples, particularly the Maya people, and peasants. Although not solely an indigenous community, we focus on the indigenous aspect of the movement here to analyze the conflict between the Maya and three structures: the Spanish colonial empire, Mexico, and the emerging global political structure.

After reviewing world-systems theory and applying it to indigenousness, we discuss Ragin’s (1992) conceptualization of cases and the comparative historical method. Then we introduce the relational concept, which is a tool that allows us to employ both the comparative historical method and world-systems theory in our analysis of the Maya and their relationship to the state of Mexico. We then present our data, which consist of the economic and political conditions, along with the cultural implications of landholding across time among the Maya and in Mexico. We analyze these data using the relational concept to understand the consequences of colonialism and globalization for the Maya people. This analysis of the relationship between the core and periphery over time allows us to begin to understand the relationship between indigenous peoples and the core political structure. Our conclusion reviews the findings, considers the weaknesses of our study, and explores potential future analyses to better understand the role of indigenous peoples and other periphery groups in the world-system.

WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY

World-systems analysis is a method of study with a specific unit of analysis: the world-system, which is an historical social system that encompasses the entire globe (Wallerstein 2000). World-systems research is historic and systemic. Capitalism is the economy of the world-system. In the world-system, there are three structural positions: core, periphery, and semi-periphery. Wallerstein (2000) describes each of these three positions. Countries in the core of the economic structure are generally more sophisticated industrially, diverse in agricultural production, and specialize in skilled labor, using wage-labor to control labor. Countries in the periphery of the economic structure tend to specialize in agriculture (especially grains, cotton, sugar, or wood) and bullion production, which favor harsh labor controls such as slavery and cash crop labor. Countries in the semi-periphery of the economic structure tend to specialize in high-cost industrial products, credit, and specie transactions using share cropping and minimizing of exports to control labor. Entities other than countries can also fall under the three economic positions in the world-system, such as international regions or sub-state regions. Anti-systemic movements are working within the state and international systems while attempting to shape an alternate framework for attaining political power within the State and internationally (Wallerstein 2000). The world-system is currently in a structural crisis, and is moving into a period of transition (Wallerstein 2002). It is unknown what form the new system will take.
Several researchers have applied world-systems theory to indigenous peoples. Fenelon (1997) studies how periods in the world-system, namely “[…] the 19th century semi-peripheral domination over the Lakota by the U.S. government, and the 20th century imposition of internal colonialism, especially with the B.I.A. and modern tribal councils” (Fenelon 1997:259) impact the identities of Lakota-Sioux. Dunaway (2000) applies world-systems analysis to another indigenous case, the Cherokee. She explains that Cherokee women are both economically and politically disempowered and, as a result, lose their voice. Ward, Stander, and Solomon (2000) also apply world-systems analysis to indigenous women; they uncover several reasons for alcohol abuse among Cheyenne women, including “[…] conquest, forced assimilation, suppression of important integrative cultural traditions and spiritual activities, and political oppression” (Ward et al. 2000:229).

Instead of applying world-systems analysis to a specific indigenous case study, Friedman (1999) uses world-systems analysis to illustrate that although indigenous peoples live in a globalized world and utilize international media, they are not necessarily globalized. Ayres (2004) also argues that indigenous peoples do not engage in globalization; he explains that indigenous peoples, like the Zapatistas, participate in anti-globalization movements. Hall and Fenelon (2008) argue that these anti-globalization movements are not new. Instead, they contend that these are just old movements utilizing Transnational Social Movements tools: “Rather than seeing the Zapatistas as recent joiners of the anti-globalization movements, might we better see them as a recent manifestation of half a millennium of resistance to Spanish, later Mexican, and now global onslaughts” (Hall and Fenelon 2008:4). Hall and Fenelon (2004) examine the past, present, and future resistance of indigenous peoples against global capitalism and globalization. Specifically, they argue that indigenous peoples’ survival represents resistance against global capitalism and globalization. Hall and Fenelon (2005) characterize indigenous peoples’ survival and movements promoting indigenous peoples’ survival as inherently antisystemic. They explain that indigenous peoples and movements “promote the legitimate right of groups of humans to organize and live their lives in ways other than those permitted or favored by the practices encapsulated under the term capitalist” (Hall and Fenelon 2005:206). Despite their continued resistance against global capitalism and globalization, indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities remain vulnerable in the world-system, particularly due to the core’s repression (Dunaway 2003). Similar to Hall and Fenelon (2004), Buttel and Gould (2004) examine the future of anti-globalization movements – concluding that these movements will decide either to emphasize restructuring, crippling the globalization movement, or to reduce economic inequalities through a global social justice movement.

Our research follows these studies of indigenous groups within the world-system. Like Ayres (2004) and Fenelon and Hall (2008), we examine the resistance of indigenous peoples against capitalism, imperialism, and globalization. Dunaway’s (2000, 2003) work identifies the peripheral status of indigenous groups. We also recognize the role of indigenous groups from within the periphery of the world-system structure. However, we agree with Buttel and Gould (2004) that anti-globalization movements are a powerful force within the world-system. Here, we seek to explore the role of indigenous groups, representative peripheral groups, in disrupting the hierarchical structures of the world-system. Beyond being another case study of indigenous groups from a world-systems perspective, with this research we offer an analysis of the role of the periphery within the world-system. We focus on the ways that the periphery challenges the core
and the response to these challenges. Thus, our examination of an indigenous case is also an examination of the periphery in general.

**INDIGENOUS**

The concept “indigenous” is a social and historical construct with high stakes politically, socially, and economically. Definitions of indigenous in international governing organizations (IGOs), in indigenous communities, and in the academic literature are highly contested.

Corntassel (2003) cites definitions from the World Bank and the International Labor Organization (ILO) as influential in the IGO community. The World Bank’s definition (quoted in Corntassel) includes:

- close attachment to ancestral territories and the natural resources in them;
- presence of customary social and political institutions;
- economic systems primarily oriented to subsistence production;
- an indigenous language, often different from the predominant language;
- and self-identification and identification by others as members of a distinct cultural group (2003:86).

The ILO’s definition (quoted in Corntassel) follows:

- tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural, and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community…regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization…retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions (2003:88).

Note that the definitions written by IGOs are fairly broad, including cultural and social practices. They allude to tradition and both include a discussion of the relationship between indigenous peoples and territory. While the World Bank’s definition does not mention the relationship between indigenous peoples and the dominant group, the ILO does note that indigenous peoples are distinct from others in the country. The ILO also mentions both conquest and colonialism, both of which are excluded from the World Bank’s definition. Self-identification policies in some IGOs allow indigenous peoples to define themselves as indigenous. States contest this as too open, but a stricter approach is generally rejected because it risks disregarding reality, does not permit a dialogue between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, and would obstruct the process of community building (Corntassel 2003).

The International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) are two organizations working to reconceptualize the meaning of indigenousness. The IWGIA defines indigenous peoples as:

The disadvantaged descendants of those peoples that inhabited a territory prior to the formation of state. The term indigenous may be defined as a characteristic
relating the identity of a particular people to a particular area and distinguishing them culturally from other people or peoples (cited in Corntassel 2003:89-90).

The WCIP definition states that:

indigenous peoples shall be people living in countries which have populations composed of different ethnic or racial groups who are descendants of the earliest populations which survive in the area, and who do not, as a group, control the national government of the countries in which they live (cited in Corntassel 2003:90).

Indigenousness, as defined by indigenous peoples, focuses on the relationship with the community in which they live. In each definition the distinction between the communities is cited. Both definitions also highlight the relationship of indigenous peoples to the power structure within the state, noting that indigenous groups are disadvantaged or lack control. Territory is also essential in the definitions. Being indigenous is about “continuity of habitation, aboriginality, and often a ‘natural’ connection to the land” (Clifford 1997[1994]:287). In the cosmology of Native Hawaiians, the land is an ancestor who gave birth to Hawaiians (Trask 1999). Thus, the relationship to the land is a form of kinship. There is a sense of stewardship and of duty to not only use the resources that the land gives for sustenance, but to do what each generation can to perpetuate the health and fertility of the land.

Academic definitions of indigenous can be found in the work of Alfred (1999), Wilmer (1993), and Anaya (1996). Academic definitions focus on the following elements of indigenous identity: living in tradition-based cultures, having political autonomy prior to colonialism, and seeking to preserve cultural integrity in the present (Corntassel 2003). They also recognize the role of land to indigenous peoples—noting that they are descended from inhabitants of the land they occupy (Corntassel 2003). Hall and Fenelon use the term indigenous “to refer to people who ‘were in that place’ when some others came and usurped some or all of their political control and power and their economic resources” (2004:163). They also note that indigenous communities are evolving, and thus their culture is not static (Hall and Fenelon 2004). The assertion that indigenous communities are evolving is essential to protect groups from being dubbed non-indigenous due to assimilationist policies imposed on them by the state.

Combining definitions, Iyall Smith (2006) defines indigenous peoples as follows: living descendants of the pre-contact (generally contact by Europeans) aboriginal inhabitants (Anaya 1996; United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations 1994), who were living in tradition-based autonomous communities (Guibernau 1999). Indigenous nations are culturally distinct (Anaya 1996; Guibernau 1999), and often live as internal colonies, “engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest” (Anaya 1996:3; United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations 1994). In the present day, indigenous nations have incorporated elements of the outside society, while remaining rooted in local traditions (United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations 1994). Indigenous peoples are “indigenous because their ancestral roots are imbedded in the lands in which they live, or would like to live” (Anaya 1996:3; see also Clifford 1997[1994]).

Under the saltwater thesis, indigenous is defined by transoceanic relationship. The colonial power exercises control over a distant, external indigenous group. As it is defined here,
indigenous includes European ethnic groups (such as the Basques, Irish, or Welsh) in addition to New World indigenous nations (such as the Native Hawaiians, Tamils, or First Nations of Canada). Limiting the application of indigenous to the conventions of the saltwater thesis can oversimplify the term, which is general enough to apply beyond the saltwater limitation. This definition of indigenous calls for a broader application of rights due to indigenous peoples that already exist within the international governing system: for example, mechanisms for the attainment of sovereignty. Instead of watering down its meaning, asserting the breadth of indigenous brings out the more technical expression of the term.

Indigenous peoples occupy a political position, in relation to states. Indigenous communities should not be confused with minority groups, because their status is not dependent upon the number of people in the community (Trask 1999). Instead, it is rooted in a political relationship to the outside society, based upon treaty or negotiated relations which existed in the early colonial era. Additional freedoms, within the state apparatus, are often granted to indigenous groups because of their historical and contemporary ties to the land. For instance, the United States federal government provides legal rights to indigenous peoples – including legal rights relating to gaming, hunting and fishing, and selling commodities without charging state taxes (Hall and Nagel 2006; see also Fenelon 2006; Hall and Nagel 2000).

Indigenous groups and the state share a relationship of clashes and compromises. Because they rarely meet on equal footing, indigenous peoples tend to find themselves disadvantaged in the negotiations. As non-capitalist societies or communities that value the collective over the individual, indigenous groups differ greatly from the state. Their status as numerical minorities or disadvantaged disempowers indigenous groups in their negotiations with the state. Thus, the indigenous-state relationship is dominated by the influence of the state. Tension results with indigenous groups seeking freedoms from the state, disputing land rights, and using the weight of morals to motivate the state. However, some authors suggest that the state structure might also enable indigenous groups to attain freedoms and rights.

Indigenous groups clash with the state over the use of territory. For states, territory defines the physical boundaries and is an economic resource. There are important symbolic and tangible powers given to the state that governs its own territory: most indigenous nations lack these powers. Territory shapes group identity and difference, in particular for indigenous peoples who are defined in part by their relation to territory. Indigenous nations without political power watch as the meaning of land shifts to match the will of the outsiders.

Legal, conceptual, and normative objections exist between the state and indigenous peoples. Indigenous claims against the state call into question moral, legal, or political theory (Poole 2000). Thus, the claims of indigenous peoples potentially weaken the state by illustrating the weaknesses of the dominant culture and political structure. Moral claims come from the usurpation of land via force and deception (Poole 2000). The continuation of this usurpation only strengthens claims, yet the state can use forced evictions as evidence that indigenous peoples are no longer tied to lands. Appropriate compensation to indigenous peoples could rectify the injustice, but the compensation must be sufficient – beyond the exchange of commodities (Poole 2000). Indigenous peoples prefer to regain access to the land, even when financial incentives are offered by the state (Hall and Fenelon 2004). Liberal political theory must figure out a way reconcile with the past historical wrongs (Poole 2000) which recognizes the contemporary culture and lifeways of indigenous peoples. Calling upon the liberal value of equal freedom, indigenous peoples can attain their cultural rights as individuals and as collectives (Ivison 2003).
METHODOLOGY

This project explores the social phenomenon of indigenousness using a case-study approach. In identifying a conceptual map for cases, Ragin (1992) identifies four understandings of cases. Cases are: found (specific-empirical), objects (general-empirical), made (specific-theoretical), or conventions (general-theoretical). Cases that are found “are empirically real and bounded, but specific” (Ragin 1992:9). If a case is an object, it is also empirically real and bounded, but does not require verification “because cases are general and conventionalize” (Ragin 1992:9-10). In the third instance, cases that are made, researchers “see cases as specific theoretical constructs which coalesce in the course of the research” (Ragin 1992:10). Finally, cases are conventions when cases are examined “as general theoretical constructs, but nevertheless view these constructions as the products of collective scholarly work and interaction, and therefore as external to any particular research effort” (Ragin 1992:10). In this project we use the Maya, specifically the Zapatistas organization, as a case to make analytical contributions to the study of indigenous groups around the world. This project exemplifies a process of casing as exemplified by the notion that cases are found and made.

The Maya are a relevant group to study because they have a clear history of ties to the land and they possess all aspects of the definition of indigenousness. The Maya are living descendants of pre-contact aboriginal inhabitants who were living in tradition-based autonomous communities. The Maya are culturally distinct and now live as an internal colony in a Mexican society born out of the Spanish empire and conquest. They have incorporated elements of the Mexican society, yet the Maya remain rooted in their local traditions. The history of the Maya people illustrates this as a case of an indigenous group that is empirically real and bounded, but specific. We also examine the Zapatistas movement, a political group that is made up of, and advocates for the Maya people, peasants, and landless people in Mexico. Their embodiment of the definition of indigenousness emerged through the course of research on the history and present day experiences of the Maya people. This research is presented in greater detail in our analysis of the political conditions, economic conditions, and landholding.

We also use comparative logic to explore the breadth of indigenousness and the potential application for this research. This technique involves first identifying historical sources and texts. Then we analyze the sources, to gain perspective on the relations between the state and international governing bodies. And then we step back from the case study to compare and contrast what different scholars observe about the relationships (Skocpol 1988). This enables us to begin to understand indigenous groups as they related to other governing bodies.

THE RELATIONAL CONCEPT

Indigenousness is in part reliant upon the relation to another power or body in order to be established. Being colonized is about being taken advantage of, about losing freedoms: it is an invasion. As a result of the colonial experience, lands were stolen, cultures were assimilated, the language was nearly lost, the right to self-govern was taken, and people now live in the shadow of what they once were. To understand the ways that indigenousness relates to the core, we employ the relational concept, which is developed by Iyall Smith (2006) to analyze the concept of indigenous and human rights for indigenous peoples (Iyall Smith 2006; Iyall Smith forthcoming).
There are three key ways that indigenous is a relational concept: Indigenous to Newcomers, Internal Colony to the Settler State, and Indigenous to “In Formation” (see Figure 1). These relationships can be described as three different systems. In the first system, indigenous and newcomers both have reciprocating directional arrows to indicate some level of reciprocity between the two. In the second system, the internal colony and the settler state have a less egalitarian relationship, which is illustrated by a dotted arrow running from the internal colony to the settler state and a solid arrow running in the opposite direction. In the final system, the indigenous and “in formation” are again opposing each other in an unequal relationship, but this time there is a solid arrow running from indigenous to “in formation” and a dotted arrow running in the reverse direction.

All of the systems exist within a setting of the capitalist world economy. The first system is during the era of mercantilism and primitive accumulation, which separates people from the means of production (Robinson 2004). Classical capitalism and the rise of corporate (monopoly) capitalism are dominant in the second system (Robinson 2004). In the third system the economy is globalized (Robinson 2004) and is in a state of transition. Each system exists in an era dominated by one type of political body: for the first system this is the empire, an expansion of political conquest via colonial rule, with a powerful center. For the second system the liberal state, the bordered power container (Giddens 1999[1985]) guided by democratic principles, is dominant. In the third system, the empire and the liberal state merge to form the liberal empire, a political structure that is expansive with a powerful center or core that is guided by democratic principles. When system one becomes politicized it shifts to a relationship as described in system two. When system two becomes globalized it shifts to a relationship as described in system three.

Figure 1. The Relational Concept: Three Systems

System 1

Indigenous  
Newcomers

System 2

Internal Colony  
Settler State

System 3

Indigenous  
In Formation

The colonial period began with the shifting of populations around the world following the explorations of the 1400s. There was not a concept of indigenous in advance of European expansion. Prior to this experience, indigenous groups were independent nations, tribes, or bands,
and did not share a collective identity such as Pan-Indian or indigenous. In the early days of interaction between Europeans and Indians, neither side identified any difference within the population of the outsiders (Wilmer 1997[1993]). That is, Indians did not recognize the different nationalities of the explorers, and the explorers did not recognize different tribal identities among the Indians. Since then, pan-European and pan-Indian subconscious has become a source of identity in the global context (Wilmer 1997[1993]). This is a relational concept: between the original peoples of the land since recorded history, to the later arrivals to the land – now the colonial powers (Maaka and Fleras 2000).

Following the initial era of colonialism, the majority of indigenous peoples live as internal colonies. They are citizens of the state, but this state is the creation of the settler societies that formed as a result of colonialism. It is in many ways a foreign state that grew up around them. The colonial era continues, with both internal colonies. The indigenous peoples-settler state relations “confirms indigenous policy as a ‘contested domain’ involving the struggle of opposing interests for definition and control” (Maaka and Fleras 2000:96). For indigenous peoples their context, internal colonies living within settler states, illustrates another relational aspect of indigenousness.

This is an interesting time to be in the core, periphery, or semi-periphery of the world-system. Many other indigenous nations find themselves in the periphery of the world-system, as they most likely embraced capitalism later and experience oppression that inhibits their achievements. While this is a disadvantage in the capitalist world economy as it exists today, indigenous nations may emerge in a different position following the age of transition. Embracing pluralism, an increasingly international voice, along with a distinct worldview might enable indigenous nations to navigate the conflict with success. Exactly what structure indigenous groups will find themselves in relation to at the end of the crisis is still in formation.

The relational concept merges the comparative historical method with world-systems theory to systematically analyze the relationship between indigenous peoples and the different political bodies that are dominant in the world-system at varying time points. This model might also be useful for analyzing other core-periphery relationships within the world-system (e.g. Iyall Smith 2006; Iyall Smith forthcoming). Here, we assemble the political, economic, and territorial histories of the Maya. Then we apply the relational concept to these data. In doing so, we analyze the relationship between the Maya people and the three political systems that they confront: the colonial empire, the state, and the emerging global liberal empire.

**POLITICAL CONDITIONS: THE MAYA**

After the Mayan conquest, the Spanish forced the Maya to pay tributes and engage in migratory and slave labor (Higgins 2004; Lusk 2003). On November 20th, 1542, Spanish Emperor Charles V signed the New Laws, which “forbade future enslavement of Indians” (Womack 1999:64). Despite this, the Spanish continued to enslave the Maya. Then in 1824 Chiapas seceded Guatemala and sought Mexican statehood (Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Stephen 1997). By 1910, the Spanish “had effectively deprived most native communities of their land, transformed many highland families into lowland fieldhands, and compelled Indians who remained in their towns to pay rent and the capitación [poll tax]” (Wasserstrom 1983:151-152). In the 1920s, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) took power. The PRI maintained this power for the

**The 1400s to the Late 1700s**

In 1517, the Spanish conquistadors traveled to the Americas. Upon meeting the indigenous people, the Spanish forced them to relinquish their lands and to engage in migratory labor (Womack 1999). Soon, the Spanish became more aggressive toward the indigenous people; the Spanish captured many Maya and brutally murdered them by beating them with clubs or by throwing them in lakes with weights tied to their feet (Marcos 2001a). Then in 1524, the Spanish began the official Mayan conquest (“Mayan Archaeological” N.d.). During this conquest, the Spanish divided highland Chiapas into “[...], small, warring principalities or petty states, called **provincias** in early accounts” (Wasserstrom 1983:9). After separating the Chiapas region into petty states, the Spanish implemented the **encomienda** and **repartimiento** systems in order to further control the indigenous people. The **encomienda** system forced the indigenous to pay tributes to the Spanish. When the indigenous people could not pay the steep tributes, the **repartimiento** system permitted the Spanish to enslave the indigenous and make them engage in hard labor (Higgins 2004; Lusk 2003).

On November 20th, 1542, Spanish Emperor Charles V signed the New Laws which “[...] forbade future enslavement of Indians, ordered all officials to give up their **encomiendas**, prohibited the grant to officials or private subjects of any new **encomiendas**, and barred the transfer of current grants, including by inheritance” (Womack 1999:64). The Spanish in the New World strongly opposed the New Laws. In fact, the Spanish rebelled against these laws; they continued to require the indigenous to pay tributes, to enslave those unable to pay the tributes, and to restrict their rights (Wasserstrom 1983).

**The Late 1700s to the Middle 1900s**

In 1824, Chiapas seceded from Guatemala and sought Mexican statehood. Because of this late unification with Mexico, the Mexican government never allowed the Chiapas region to reap the benefits of political and economic reform (Stephensen 1995). Although Mexico did not offer reforms in Chiapas, the state did offer them. In 1849, the Chiapas state legislature forbade excessive forced indigenous labor. Unfortunately, this measure did not decrease forced labor in Chiapas; indigenous tenants had to work for their landlords in order to survive (Wasserstrom 1983).

By 1910, the Spanish “had effectively deprived most native communities of their land, transformed many highland families into lowland fieldhands, and compelled Indians who
remained in their towns to pay rent and the capitación [poll tax]” (Wasserstrom 1983:151-152). On October 30, 1914, General Jesús Agustín Castro executed the Ley de Obreros to right the inequities between the Spanish and the indigenous people. The Ley de Obreros “[…] abolished debt servitude and tiendas de raya, established a minimum wage, and granted finca workers the right to medical benefits, vacations, and free education” (Wasserstrom 1983:158).

In the 1917 Constitution, Article 27 promoted land redistribution and protected indigenous properties from sale or privatization. However, these reforms did not reach Chiapas (Earle and Simonelli 2005; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; Midnight Notes 2001; Ross 1995; Stephensen 1995; Wasserstrom 1983). In the 1920s, the PRI took power. The PRI maintained this power by bribing officials and by utilizing exemptions for themselves (Wager and Schulz 1994). In 1924, Plutarco Elías Calles won the presidency. After Calles’s term expired, he chose successors that he knew he could manipulate. Thus, although Calles was not formally in office, he still ruled Mexico. In 1934, Calles picked Lázaro Cárdenas to become the next presidential candidate. Unfortunately for Calles, Cárdenas was not intimidated. After winning office, Cárdenas arrested and deported Calles and many of his associates (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2007a, b). Then Cárdenas implemented sweeping reforms; he promoted land redistribution, started a federal bureau of Indian Affairs, nationalized the oil and railroad industries, and created unions such as the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) and the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) (Rus et al. 2003; Womack 1999).

Although many believe that Cárdenas was Mexico’s most progressive president, others contest that Cárdenas utilized the unions to oppress indigenous workers and peasants. Unions linked indigenous people to the government. In this corporate-like structure, the government directed the redistribution of land to the indigenous people. Thus, in essence, the government controlled the indigenous people (Rus et al. 2003). Later, the government interfered with indigenous government structures. Traditionally, an elder governed the indigenous communities. However, the government assigned a “young bilingual Indian scribe” to work alongside the elder in the presidency (Higgins 2004) – thereby threatening the indigenous communities’ sovereignty (Fenelon 2002). Besides changing the indigenous governmental structure, the government also involved the indigenous people in politics as the proletariat (Higgins 2004).

The Middle 1900s to the Present

As the Spanish continued to repress the indigenous, the indigenous people sometimes rebelled. For instance, the Spanish imposed repartimientos on the indigenous. In 1963, the indigenous people revolted against these repartimientos and killed Manuel de Maisterra, the province’s judge. In another example, a pastor demanded that indigenous people work for him without receiving pay. The indigenous people refused to do so and forced the pastor out of the community (Wasserstrom 1983).

As the 1988 presidential election approached, PRI members sought to buy votes; “[…] the government suddenly raised the guaranteed price it would pay for corn by 32 percent – but only in the northern states, where several gubernatorial races were closely contested” (Collier and Quaratiello 1994:126). This not only upset the northerners who thought the PRI was bribing them, but also upset the southerners who did not receive the price increase (Collier and Quaratiello 1994). Besides utilizing bribes in the 1988 election, PRI members also employed electoral fraud. The PRI removed polling places from settlements, registered PRI voters six to
seven times and did not register opposition voters at all, burned ballots and stole identification cards from people voting for the opposition, and fiddled with ballot tallies (Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Ross 1995; Russell 1995). Not surprisingly, PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari defeated opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (Ross 1995).

In the last sixth months of 1992, the “[…] independent organizers and the groups they represented in Chiapas experienced five assassinations, violent evictions from two ranches, the destruction of an entire peasant town, and fifty-nine kidnappings” (Collier and Quaratiello 1994:78-79). Although peasants committed a few of these crimes, ranchers, paramilitaries, and public officials committed most of them (Collier and Quaratiello 1994). After experiencing this oppression, the marginalized peasants decided to protect themselves; ejidos worked together to organize self-defense squads and immediately began to fight back against the ranchers, the paramilitaries, and the government. As communities built alliances, the roots of the EZLN formed (Hayden 2002; Marcos 1995).

The Department of Social Development, the Center for Research and Security, and the State Security Council all secretly distributed resources and money to paramilitary groups (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; Nadal 1998a). Along with governmental organizations, the caciques utilized paramilitary groups to provide protection and to enhance control (Russell 1995). Both the government- and cacique-employed paramilitaries used similar tactics; They stole, imposed taxes, ransacked and burned the homes of peasants that fled, shot at the homes of incompliant peasants, and even murdered incompliant peasants (Nadal 1998a).

According to a report by the Miguel Agustin Pro Human Rights Center, Chiapas had the most human rights violations in Mexico; “the sector most affected was the Indian peasant. The most frequent violations were assaults and injuries, followed by arbitrary arrest, threats, torture, and murder” (Russell 1995:12). For example, soldiers raped indigenous women and beat indigenous men (Ross 1995). In a more horrifying example, when indigenous women gave birth at hospitals, the doctors either made them leave without their babies or told them that their babies were dead when they were not. Then the doctors gave the babies to the generals who sold them for sex or for their organs (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004).

Initially, the penalty for participating in a political movement was a jail sentence for up to 60 years. However, the state legislature changed the sentencing law, reducing the penalty for joining a political movement (Womack 1999). Although the state legislature progressed in regards to this law, it also moved back in regards to the mass protest law. Under the new legislation, mass protest was a criminal offense. By implementing this law, the government legally subdued all opposition (Russell 1995). It is no wonder why six states in Mexico exhibited both a high marginalization level and a high indigenous population (Marcos 2001a).

In 1992, President Salinas reformed Article 27 of the Constitution, ending land redistribution. Salinas further suppressed the indigenous population when he squashed indigenous economic and health programs (Autonomedia 1994). After clearly provoking the indigenous population, Salinas tried to prevent an uprising; he offered $50 million in National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) aid to Chiapas (Womack 1999). Unfortunately, local leaders stole the PRONASOL funds and, thus, the funds never reached the peasant communities (Autonomedia 1994; Ross 1995). In addition to doling out PRONASOL funds, the government also offered Program of Direct Rural Support (PROCAMPO) funds. In essence, PRI members gave voters PROCAMPO assistance in exchange for PRI votes (Autonomedia 1994; Stephen 1997).
Then in 1993, the EZLN adopted the Mayan principle of “command obeying” which means having direct democracy and the ability to revoke commanders (Midnight Notes 2001; Holloway and Peláez 1998) – thereby reasserting its sovereignty (Fenelon 2002). Under this new model, the EZLN elected the CCRÍ, but retained the power to impeach them. Because of this structure, the EZLN community became a polis or political community (Holloway and Peláez 1998; Midnight Notes 2001). In December of the same year, the EZLN announced its Revolutionary Laws. The Labor Law asked for a wage equal to that of international workers, while the Social Security Law encouraged children under thirteen and the elderly to receive protection and food (Autonomedia 1994).

On January 1, 1994, the EZLN offered its First Declaration of the Selva Lacandona. This document announced that the EZLN was declaring war against the Mexican government (Clarke and Ross 1994; Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Hayden 2002; Marcos 2001a; Nadal 1998a; Ross 1995, 2000; Rus et al. 2003; Russell 1995; Stephen 1997; Weller 2000; Womack 1999). The EZLN realized that the declaration of war was a “last – but just – resort” (Marcos 2001a:15). In fact, the EZLN utilized Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution to justify their actions. This article gave citizens the right to change the government’s structure (Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Marcos 2001a; Womack 1999).

Through “military repression and the limitation of press coverage,” the Mexican government tried to contain the war to Chiapas (Holloway and Peláez 1998). Mexico was not the only country to regulate media exposure of the conflict; the United States also regulated it to minimize coverage of Mexico’s role in the counterinsurgency (Hayden 2002). Although Mexico and the United States restricted media coverage, the EZLN spread their voice via the Internet, e-mail, and fax. Since the EZLN used emerging technology, they reached a global audience and received international support (Holloway and Peláez 1998). Thus, the United States Congress and the European Parliament had to address the Chiapas rebellion. Both parties denied playing an active role in the counterinsurgency and questioned Mexico’s call for First World membership (Hayden 2002; Ross 1995).

Because of international demonstrations in countries like the United States, Spain, Canada, and Germany, the Mexican government called for a cease-fire and initiated peace talks (Clarke and Ross 1994; Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Hayden 2002; Marcos 2001a; Nadal 1998a; Ross 1995, 2000; Rus et al. 2003; Russell 1995; Stephen 1997; Weller 2000; Womack 1999). The following day, Salinas broke the cease-fire when he had the army advance on an EZLN unit in the community of Carmen Pataté in Ocosingo (Autonomedia 1994).

In late January, the EZLN kidnapped General Absalón Castellanos Domínguez who “[…] was responsible for 153 political murders, 692 arbitrary detentions, 503 cases of torture, and 327 disappearances of activist campesinos” (Ross 1995:158; Russell 1995). Because of these offenses, the EZLN charged General Domínguez with engaging in crimes against humanity. After trying him and finding him guilty, the EZLN sentenced General Domínguez to a life of servitude (Autonomedia 1994; Ross 1995; Russell 1995). However in February, the EZLN and the Conciliator decided to make an exchange: General Domínguez for “all the Zapatista combatants and civilians unjustly imprisoned since the war began on January 1” (Ross 1995:184). Later that month, the EZLN followed through with their previous agreement and released General Domínguez (Ross 1995; Russell 1995). Directly following General Domínguez’s release, EZLN
member Aaron publicly denounced the General’s actions on television. Since public dissent was not allowed on Mexican television, this unique event caused mass attention (Ross 1995).

In March of 1994, the EZLN announced its 34 demands. Two of these demands were the center of much debate: returning to the version of Article 27 from the 1917 Constitution and granting autonomy to indigenous communities (Autonomedia 1994). In regards to autonomy, the EZLN pleaded for internal governance and organization, recognition of their culture, and rights to the natural resources on their lands (Midnight Notes 2001; Rus et al. 2003). The EZLN justified their demand for autonomy by citing the International Labor Organization’s Convention Number 169 that the president signed in 1991; “As defined in articles 7 and 15, the treaty states that in the case of developmental plans, the interested pueblos have the right to decide for themselves their own priorities and have the right to control economic, social, and cultural development” (Earle and Simonelli 2005:192).

In the Second Declaration, the EZLN proposed the creation of a National Democratic Convention (CND). The purpose of this convention was to peacefully change the governmental structure of Mexico. Specifically, the CND was aimed at creating democracy, liberty, and justice for all people, including marginalized people (Marcos 2001a). Shortly after proposing the CND, PRI candidate Eduardo Robledo ran against opposition candidate Amado Avendaño for the governorship of Chiapas. Unlike in other elections, the opposition was the clear favorite to win. However right before the election, an unmarked trailer-truck smashed into Avendaño’s Suburban, critically wounding him. Despite this incident, Avendaño refused to withdraw from the election. Shortly after, the EZLN sensed heightened military activity and went on Red Alert. In spite of this, the elections went smoothly in their territories and the EZLN claimed that Avendaño definitely won. However, the PRI claimed that Robledo won the election. As Robledo prepared to take office, the EZLN announced that Robledo’s inauguration would coincide with an EZLN-initiated bloodbath (Ross 1995).

In February of 1996, the government and the EZLN signed the San Andrés Accords on Indian Rights and Culture. This agreement consisted of four documents: an agreement on a range of points, a statement of legislative changes that the federal government needed to enact, a similar list detailing the legislative changes that the state government needed to enact, and an addendum listing the demands that the government rejected (Ross 2000). Soon after, President Zedillo retracted the Accords (Burke N.d.; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Hayden 2002; Holloway and Peláez 1998; “The Indigenous Rights Law” N.d.; Marcos 2001a; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; Midnight Notes 2001; Nadal 1998b; Rosen 1996; Ross 2000; Rus et al. 2003; “Zapatista Timeline” N.d.). After this, the EZLN hosted the meeting “For Humanity Against Neoliberalism” which was also called the Intergaláctica (Holloway and Peláez 1998; Ross 2000). While participating in this meeting, countries defined the term “Zapatista”.

The EZLN utilized a network of resistance and communication (Marcos 2001a). Through this network, the EZLN proclaimed that their struggle was not only against the Mexican government, but also against neoliberalism. The EZLN claimed that the proliferation of neoliberalism would hurt indigenous communities, because it would exaggerate the economic disparities between the rich and poor (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). Subcomandante Marcos also explained that global corporations tried to control markets. By doing so, nation-states became “mere departments of the corporate order”; thus, the EZLN needed to defend nation-states in order to defend against the global corporations and neoliberalism (Hayden 2002:270).
Since the EZLN applied a global concern to the struggle, the struggle became international in scope (Marcos 2001a; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). Because international organizations could relate to the conflict, they now took an active role in protesting against it (Marcos 2001a). In fact, many organizations supported the EZLN: “Amnesty International, Americas Watch, Global Exchange, Mexico Solidarity Network, the National Commission for Democracy in Mexico – USA, Pastors for Peace, Humanitarian Law Project, Doctors of the World, Bread for the World, Doctors without Borders” (Marcos 2001a:197). Conversely, some organizations worked against the EZLN: the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations. For instance, the United Nations attacked Amparo Aguatinta, beating the community’s children and imprisoning the community’s people (Marcos 2001a).

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS: THE MAYA

Chiapas is rich in natural resources, such as “oil, electricity, timber, cattle, corn, sugar, coffee, and beans” (Collier and Quaratiello 1994:16). Business people remove these resources from Chiapas in order to make a profit. After doing so, they do not replenish the Chiapas economy (Marcos 2001a). For this reason, only two percent of Mexico’s population controls the majority of Mexico’s wealth. Meanwhile, 70 percent of the Chiapan Maya live below the poverty line (Marcos 2001a; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). On top of this, the business people exploit the indigenous laborers; they only pay the Maya four or five pesos per day. If the Maya do not finish their assignments, they do not receive any payment (Midnight Notes 2001).

Globalization is on the horizon. President Zedillo believes globalization will create economic prosperity in Chiapas. However, this idea is faulty because “[n]eoliberal integration of Mexico in NAFTA, will deepen the regional inequalities, by prioritizing areas with a competitive edge, neglecting less favorable regions and thereby the gap between marginal and prosperous regions” (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004:293).

The 1400s to the Late 1700s

In 1524, the Spanish began the official Mayan conquest (“Mayan Archaeological” N.d.). During this conquest, the Spanish divided highland Chiapas into “[…] small, warring principalities or petty states, called provincias in early accounts” (Wasserstrom 1983:9). After separating the Chiapas region into petty states, the Spanish implemented the encomienda and repartimiento systems in order to further control the indigenous people. The encomienda system forced the indigenous people to pay tributes to the Spanish: “At first, they [provisional governors] simply demanded that indigenous communities pay their tribute in commodities such as cacao, cloth, or corn; when such imposts were not met, these officials paid themselves with funds from local cajas de comunidad” (Wasserstrom 1983:43) or enslaved the indigenous people, making them engage in hard labor (Higgins 2004; Lusk 2003).

The Late 1700s to the Middle 1900s

The Spanish continued to economically oppress the indigenous population; they forcibly seized indigenous lands to raise cattle and to produce sugar. By doing so, they forced the indigenous
people into the mountains. Meanwhile, the Spanish still expected the indigenous people to pay a
tribute in cacao, chickens, and maize. The indigenous people were also repressed in other ways.
They had to pay a tribute of up to seven pesos per year to the Crown and, in addition, had to pay a
tithe to the Church (Wasserstrom 1983).

In the 1917 Constitution, Article 27 promoted land redistribution and protected
indigenous holdings from sale or privatization. Although Article 27 promised reforms, few
actually reached Chiapas; greedy Spanish landowners and ranchers prevented indigenous people
from occupying their newly awarded land. As before, the indigenous people remained repressed
(Earle and Simonelli 2005; Marcos 2001a; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; Midnight Notes 2001;
Ross 1995; Stephensen 1995; Wasserstrom 1983; Womack 1999). Land distributions that did
occur at this time were strategic, given to buy loyalty to the state and divide indigenous
communities (Collier and Quaratiello 1994).

In 1934, President Lázaro Cárdenas started a program of “oil nationalization, land reform
and industrial expansion” (“Timeline” N.d.). Cárdenas designed the land reform to redistribute
ejidos to indigenous people. Despite his efforts, the indigenous livelihood suffered; rich
landowners now forced indigenous people off their lands and pushed them deep into the
Lacandón jungle (Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Ross 1995).

The Middle 1900s to the Present

Chiapas is rich in natural resources, such as “oil, electricity, timber, cattle, corn, sugar, coffee,
and beans” (Collier and Quaratiello 1994:16; Rus, Castillo, and Mattiace 2003; Russell 1995).
Business people remove these resources from Chiapas in order to make a profit. After doing so,
they do not replenish the Chiapas economy (Marcos 2001a); “In Chiapas, the national oil
company Pemex sucks out enormous quantities of barrels of petroleum and cubic feet of gas
every day. They take away the petroleum and gas, and in exchange leave behind the mark of
capitalism – ecological destruction, agricultural plunder, hyperinflation, alcoholism, prostitution,
and poverty” (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004:28). For this reason, only two percent of Mexico’s
population controls the majority of Mexico’s wealth. Meanwhile, seventy percent of the Chiapan
Maya live below the poverty line (Marcos 2001a; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). Benjamin offers a
great explanation of this phenomenon:

Chiapas is rich, in fact – rich in fertile farmlands, pastures, and forests; in coffee,
cattle, cacao, and petroleum; and in productive enterprises owned by a few
families. Yet most Chiapanecos remain very poor despite the wealth of the land,
the reforms of the Mexican Revolution, and the modernization policies of
successive state and federal governments. Natural plenty, of course, does not
necessarily create social plenty. Modernization and reform need not lead to
progress for all. That is the paradox of Chiapas, a rich land of poor people

On top of this, the business people exploit the indigenous laborers; they only pay the Maya four
or five pesos per day. If the Maya do not finish their assignments, they do not receive any
payment (Midnight Notes 2001).
In 2003, the EZLN developed the Caracoles and the Good Government Juntas. These committees distributed economic support to the indigenous communities (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). Around the same time, the EZLN proclaimed that their struggle was not only against the Mexican government, but also against neoliberalism. The EZLN claimed that the proliferation of neoliberalism would hurt indigenous communities, because it would exaggerate the economic disparities between the rich and poor (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). The spokesperson of the EZLN, Subcomandante Marcos, also explained that global corporations tried to control markets. By doing so, states became “mere departments of the corporate order”; thus, the EZLN needed to defend nation-states in order to defend against the global corporations and neoliberalism (Hayden 2002:270). Globalization is on the horizon. President Zedillo believes globalization will create economic prosperity in Chiapas. However, this idea is faulty because “[n]eoliberal integration of Mexico in NAFTA, will deepen the regional inequalities, by prioritizing areas with a competitive edge, neglecting less favorable regions and thereby the gap between marginal and prosperous regions” (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004:293).

**LANDHOLDING: THE MAYA**

There is political power attached to territory: it is the base of power and the container for the State (Giddens 1994[1985]). Territorial boundaries establish the boundaries of State sovereignty. The government oversees relations that take place on its soil: political power is attached to boundaries and the territory within. Land is a source of power for the State: as it defines itself and as it enables the State to have a strong economy. For the indigenous, land has spiritual and symbolic meaning: it is the root of their community, and sometimes a member of the community. There is a sense of stewardship and of duty to not only use the resources that the land gives for sustenance, but to do what each generation can to perpetuate the health and fertility of the land. Land has value for its spiritual importance and the resources it yields.

Territory and the construction of unique historical roots empower and authenticate both states and nations. Community and territory interact to create a sense of place that is important to many groups, cultures, and individuals. The homeland is invented, yet the status of the territory can have real consequences (Anderson 1991). For states, territory defines the physical boundaries and is an economic resource. There are important symbolic and tangible powers given to the State that governs its own territory: nations without States lack these powers. For Nations territory holds symbolic, sometimes familial, and religious meaning. Territory shapes group identity and difference, because groups are defined as Nations in part by their relation to territory (Oommen 1997). States and Nations have different types of claims to the physical boundaries and the resources within. Indigenous Nations without political power watch as the meaning of land shifts to match the will of the outsiders. Territory can become politicized when there are disputes over the right of access to sites, the use and management of the land, or the power to govern the territory.

After the Mayan conquest, the Spanish claimed the most arable indigenous lands. Although the indigenous people fought to reclaim their lands, the Spanish subdued them each time (Collier and Quaratiello 1994). Then Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution guaranteed the redistribution of land to indigenous peasants. Unfortunately, Spanish and Mexican landowners and ranchers prevented the indigenous people from occupying their newly awarded
The 1400s to the Late 1700s

The Maya have an uncontested indigenous heritage; the Maya trace their history to the beginning of history (Hayden 2002; “The Maya Civilization” N.d.). The Mayan civilization grew and, finally, reached its peak from the second to ninth century. To our knowledge, Columbus was the first to challenge Mayan sovereignty in 1493 (Higgins 2004). Upon his arrival in the Americas, Columbus claimed indigenous lands by presenting deeds of possession. Then in 1517, Mayan sovereignty was again challenged; Hernández de Córdoba led the Spanish to the Yucatán (“Maya Civilization” N.d.) and Diego de Mazariegos began colonizing the Chiapas region (Wasserstrom 1983). During this colonization, the Spanish imposed taxes on the indigenous people, seized their lands, and enslaved them (Higgins 2004).

In 1524, the Spanish defeated the Maya in the battle of Xelahuh, beginning the official conquest of the Maya (“Mayan Archaeological” N.d.). During this conquest, the Spanish claimed the most arable indigenous lands. The Maya fought to protect their way of life and their dignity. They rebelled against the Spanish in 1532 and 1534 to no avail (Russell 1995). Then in 1712, the Spanish raised tribute demands. Fearing further oppression, the Maya mounted their first major rebellion. Despite Mayan efforts, the Spanish subdued them (Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Hayden 2002; Higgins 2004; “Maya Civilization” N.d.; Ross 1995; Russell 1995; Womack 1999).

The Late 1700s to the Middle 1900s

During the era of state formation, Chiapas was initially drawn within the boundaries of Guatemala as a part of the United Providences of Central America (existing from 1828-1832). Guatemala was the core of this organization until it disbanded. In 1824, Chiapas seceded from Guatemala (Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Stephensen 1995), becoming a part of Mexico.

During the early history of Mexico, there were multiple redistributions of land. In 1910, Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa fought for land reform (Hansen and Marcos 2001; Hayden 2002; “The Maya Civilization” N.d.; “Timeline” N.d.). Four years later, the first reforms occurred; General Jesús Agustín Castro “[…] promulgated the Ley de Obreros, a far-reaching measure which abolished debt servitude and tiendas de raya, established a minimum wage, and granted finca workers the right to medical benefits, vacations, and free education” (Wasserstrom 1983:158).

As mentioned above, the 1917 Constitution also brought reforms. In particular, Article 27 of the Constitution promoted land redistribution and protected indigenous holdings from sale or privatization. Although Article 27 promised reforms, few actually reached Chiapas; greedy Spanish landowners and ranchers prevented indigenous people from occupying their newly awarded land. As before, the indigenous people remained brutally repressed (Earle and Simonelli 2005; Marcos 2001a; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; Midnight Notes 2001; Ross 1995; Stephensen 1995; Wasserstrom 1983; Womack 1999). Land distributions that did occur at this time were
strategic, given to buy loyalty to the state and divide indigenous communities (Collier and Quaratiello 1994).

In 1934, President Lázaro Cárdenas started a program of “oil nationalization, land reform and industrial expansion” ("Timeline" N.d.). Cárdenas designed the land reform to redistribute ejidos to indigenous people. Despite his efforts, the indigenous livelihood suffered; rich landowners now forced indigenous people off their lands and pushed them deep into the Lacandón jungle (Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Ross 1995).

The Middle 1900s to the Present

In 1994, the EZLN called for economic, social, and political equality. The EZLN made two demands regarding land: the right to own land and the redistribution of landholdings (Autonomedia 1994; Clarke and Ross 1994; Hayden 2002; Marcos 2001a; Ross 1995, 2000; Russell 1995; Stephensen 1995; Wager and Schulz 1994; Womack 1999). Then in 2003, the EZLN reasserted their landholding rights by forming Good Government Juntas (Burke N.d.; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). The EZLN implemented several measures to protect land: They worked to end tree removal and prevent forest fires. They took redistributed land and machinery to poor indigenous people in order to facilitate cultivation (Holloway and Peláez 1998). In addition, they sought to protect the cultural and historical meanings and linkages to land (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004).

FINDINGS

Assembling the political, economic, and territorial histories of the Maya produces a database that can be applied to the relational concept. These data allow us to apply the relational concept to the Maya across time. It also allows us to begin to understand how this peripheral group interacts with the core, how they might now be shaping the core of the future. The sections below consider each of the three institutions: political, economic, and landholding in detail.

Political

In System One (see Figure 2), the indigenous and the newcomers have an unequal relationship; as mentioned above, the newcomers dominate the indigenous by stealing their lands and enslaving them (Higgins 2004; Lusk 2003; Womack 1999). After the Mayan conquest, the Spanish forced the Maya to pay tributes and engage in migratory and slave labor (Higgins 2004; Lusk 2003). On November 20th, 1542, Spanish Emperor Charles V signed the New Laws, which “forbade future enslavement of Indians” (Womack 1999:64). Despite this, the Spanish continued to enslave the Maya. A dotted arrow illustrates the influence of the indigenous on the political structure and a solid arrow illustrates the influence of the newcomers on the political structure.

In System Two, the internal colony and the settler state still have an unequal relationship. The settler state controls the distribution of land and, thus, decides whether to give the internal colony the resources necessary to survive (Autonomedia 1994; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; Midnight Notes 2001; Ross 1995; Stephensen 1995; Wasserstrom 1983). The settler state also tries to change the governmental structure of the internal colony by
assigning a bilingual scribe to share the internal colony’s presidential responsibilities with an elder (Higgins 2004). By 1910, the Spanish “had effectively deprived most native communities of their land, transformed many highland families into lowland fieldhands, and compelled Indians who remained in their towns to pay rent and the capitación [poll tax]” (Wasserstrom 1983:151-152). In the 1920s, the PRI took power. The PRI maintained this power for the next 70 years by bribing officials and by utilizing exemptions for themselves (Wager and Schulz 1994). PRI rule coincided with political murders, arbitrary detentions, torture, disappearances of activist campesinos, and fraudulent elections (Ross 1995:158; Russell 1995). Finally, the Maya formed the EZLN and rebelled against this inhumane treatment (Burke N.d.; Clarke and Ross 1994; Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Earle and Simonelli 2005; Halleck 1994; Hayden 2002; Holloway and Peláez 1998; Larson 2001; Marcos 1995, 2001a, 2001b; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; “The Maya Civilization” N.d.; Midnight Notes 2001; Nadal 1998a; Neumann 2001; Ross 1995; Ross 2000; Rus et al. 2003; Russell 1995; Stephen 1997; Stephensen 1995; “Timeline” N.d.; Wager and Schulz 1994; Weller 2000; Womack 1999; “Zapatista Timeline” N.d.). A dotted arrow illustrates the influence of the internal colony on the political structure and a solid arrow illustrates the influence of the settler state on the political structure.

**Figure 2. The Relational Concept: Political Application**

**System 1**
- **Indigenous**
- **Newcomers**

Newcomers dominate the indigenous by stealing their lands and enslaving them. Introduce foreign political structure.

**System 2**
- **Internal Colony**
- **Settler State**

State controls land resources, political structure. Mexican state is formed and corrupt political elections continue to prohibit the Maya from participating. Bilingual scribes share governing power in local communities.

**System 3**
- **Indigenous**
- **In Formation**

Globalization allows the Zapatistas to spread their message, indigenism—a global indigenous movement—emerges. Global media allows Mexico to be more closely watched by outsiders, states weaken due to international governance.

In System Three, a transition is occurring. The indigenous and the “in formation” are engaging in globalization. For instance, the indigenous are spreading their voice via an international network of resistance and communication. This network gives their struggle a global scope (Marcos 2001a; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). The Zapatistas are both a part of globalization and a part of anti-globalization protests seeking the development of a new system of
governance. Hall and Fenelon discuss these anti-globalization protests: “Legal, socioeconomic, and cultural factors driving mountain indigenous peoples to take up arms are perfectly representative of how world-systems affect microeconomic relations, especially when hegemonic decline changes their positions and the activities of dominating elites” (2005:218). Generally speaking, when nation-state systems are in hegemonic decline, indigenous movements have opportunities to create new political relationships that are more favorable for indigenous peoples. Although the hegemonic decline of nation-states provides opportunities for indigenous peoples, nation-states may further oppress indigenous peoples if they take advantage of these opportunities. Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty, autonomy, and minority status may influence their experiences of hegemonic transitions (Hall and Fenelon 2005). A dotted arrow running from the indigenous to the “in formation” and a dotted arrow running from the “in formation” to the indigenous illustrate this relationship.

Economic

In System One (see Figure 3), the indigenous and newcomers oppose one another in an unequal relationship; the newcomers implemented systems to control the indigenous people. After the Maya conquest, the Spanish implemented the encomienda and repartimiento systems to control the indigenous people. The encomienda system forced the indigenous to pay tributes to the Spanish. When the indigenous people could not pay the steep tributes, the repartimiento system permitted the Spanish to enslave the indigenous and make them engage in hard labor (Higgins 2004; Lusk 2003). A solid arrow illustrates the transfer of resources from indigenous to newcomers and a dotted arrow illustrates the transfer of resources from newcomers to indigenous.

In System Two, the internal colony and the settler state again oppose one another in an unequal relationship. The settler state controls the redistribution of land and threatens the economic livelihood of the indigenous people. Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution promoted land redistribution and protected indigenous holdings from sale or privatization. Although Article 27 promised reforms, few actually reached Chiapas. As before, the indigenous people remained brutally repressed (Earle and Simonelli 2005; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; Midnight Notes 2001; Ross 1995; Stephensen 1995; Wasserstrom 1983). Then in 1934, President Lázaro Cárdenas started a program of “oil nationalization, land reform and industrial expansion” (“Timeline” N.d.). Cárdenas designed the land reform to redistribute ejidos to indigenous people. Despite his efforts, the indigenous livelihood suffered; rich landowners now forced indigenous people off their lands and pushed them deep into the Lacandón jungle (Ross 1995). A solid arrow illustrates the transfer of resources from the internal colony to the settler state and an arrow without a line illustrates the lack of transfer of resources from the settler state to the internal colony.

In System Three, a transition occurs; the indigenous people are fighting against globalization and neoliberalism. In 2003, the EZLN developed the Caracoles and the Good Government Juntas. These committees distributed economic support to the indigenous communities (Burke N.d.; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). Around the same time, the EZLN proclaimed that their struggle was not only against the Mexican government, but also against neoliberalism. The EZLN claimed that the proliferation of neoliberalism would hurt indigenous communities, because it would exaggerate the economic disparities between the rich and poor (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). Subcomandante Marcos also explained that global corporations tried to control markets. By doing so, nation-states became “mere departments of the corporate
order”; thus, the EZLN needed to defend nation-states in order to defend against the global corporations and neoliberalism (Hayden 2002:270). Globalization is on the horizon. President Zedillo believes globalization will create economic prosperity in Chiapas. However, this idea is faulty because “[n]eoliberal integration of Mexico in NAFTA, will deepen the regional inequalities, by prioritizing areas with a competitive edge, neglecting less favorable regions and thereby the gap between marginal and prosperous regions” (Marcos and Vodovnik 2004:293). A dotted arrow illustrates the transfer of resources from indigenous to “in formation” and the absence of an arrow illustrates no transfer of resources from “in formation” to indigenous.

Figure 3. The Relational Concept: Economic Application

System 1

Indigenous \[\rightarrow\] Newcomers

Trade between explorers and Maya, capitalism enters. Newcomers implement systems to control the Maya.

System 2

Internal Colony \[\leftarrow\] Settler State

Mayan land and resources taken without compensation, first by the colonial powers and then by the Mexican government. Economic inequality develops and deepens, leaving Maya

System 3

Indigenous \[\rightarrow\] In Formation


*The arrows do not necessarily indicate an agentic choice—in some/most cases there was a usurpation of land and resources.

Land

In System One (see Figure 4), the indigenous and newcomers have an unequal relationship; the newcomers claim indigenous lands. In 1493, Columbus arrived in the Americas and claimed indigenous lands by presenting deeds of possession. Then in 1517, Diego de Mazariegos began colonizing the Chiapas region (Wasserstrom 1983). During this colonization, the Spanish imposed taxes on the indigenous people, seized their lands, and enslaved them (Higgins 2004). Although the indigenous fought to reclaim their lands, the Spanish subdued them each time (Collier and Quaratiello 1994). A solid arrow illustrates the transfer of land from the indigenous to the newcomers and the absence of an arrow illustrates no transfer of land from the newcomers to the indigenous.
In System Two, the internal colony and the settler state still have an unequal relationship. The settler state restricts the redistribution of land to the internal colony. Both Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution and President Cárdenas promised land reforms. However, these land reforms actually exacerbated the indigenous condition (Earle and Simonelli 2005; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004; Midnight Notes 2001; Ross 1995; Stephensen 1995; “Timeline” N.d.; Wasserstrom 1983). A solid arrow illustrates the transfer of land from the internal colony to the settler state and a dotted arrow illustrates the transfer of land from the settler state to the internal colony.

In System Three, a transition is occurring; the indigenous people are reasserting their landholding rights. In 1993, the EZLN made 34 demands to the Mexican government. Among other things, the EZLN demanded the right to own land and the right to have political independence. Then in 2003, the EZLN developed the Caracoles and the Good Government Juntas. These committees distributed economic support to the indigenous communities (Burke N.d.; Marcos and Vodovnik 2004). By doing so, the EZLN is rejecting the power of the Mexican government to control landholding. A dotted arrow from indigenous to “in formation” and the absence of an arrow from “in formation” to indigenous illustrate this relationship.

**Figure 4. The Relational Concept: Land Application**

System 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Newcomers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonial forces begin co-opting indigenous lands. Illness, technology, and other factors limit the ability of the indigenous communities to defend their territory.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

System 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Colony</th>
<th>Settler State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continued co-optation of lands by colonial powers and then the Mexican state. Some land reform, but this is weak.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

System 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>In Formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zapatistas reassert land-holding rights and political independence, form Good Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The arrows do not necessarily indicate an agentic choice—in some/most cases there was a usurpation of land and resources.*

**CONCLUSION**

Indigenous peoples have been marginalized by the processes of globalization, as many noted on the commemoration of Columbus’s journey to the Americas. Yet more recently these communities, many of which lie in the periphery of the world-system, have become vocal opponents of globalization and agentic members of a community seeking change in the world-
system. How do indigenous peoples relate to the core over the longue durée? In this paper, we explored the implications of colonialism from a world-systems perspective, by examining interactions in the economic and political structures in addition to the effects of landlessness for indigenous peoples in one case: the Maya.

After reviewing world-systems theory and applying it to indigenousness, we discussed Ragin’s (1992) conceptualization of cases and the comparative historical method. Then we introduced the relational concept, a tool that allowed us to employ both the comparative historical method and world-systems theory in our analysis of the Maya. We then presented our data, which consist of the economic and political conditions, along with the cultural implications of landholding across time among the Maya and in Mexico. We analyzed these data using the relational concept to understand the consequences of colonialism and globalization for the Maya people. Our findings suggest that indigenous peoples, although disadvantaged by their peripheral location within the world-system from the late 1400s to the middle 1900s, are able to successfully challenge the powerful core and are beginning to take back political and economic power and reassert their rights to land. Peripheral protests against the hierarchical distribution of power within the world-system are experiencing success and gaining powers to influence a shift in the shape of the world-system.

Our study utilizes the comparative historical methodology, which has several limitations. First, the comparative historical methodology is difficult to employ because of its logic. Second, this method misleadingly assumes that cases are independent of one another (Skocpol 1988). Moreover, the comparative historical methodology “is no substitute for theory” (Skocpol 1988:39). One must utilize theoretical concepts and hypotheses in order to employ the comparative historical methodology. Despite these limitations, the comparative historical methodology is the best method to utilize: it allows researchers to compare and contrast across multiple cases and to qualitatively evaluate historical phenomena.

Along with having methodological limitations, our study is limited in scope; we focus on a particular case: the indigenous Maya. To further this discussion, researchers can focus on other cases. By doing so, future researchers can gain a better understanding of both indigenousness and the core-periphery relationship. Other types of peripheral communities might be analyzed in the future to understand both what it means to be indigenous in the world-system and the core-periphery relationship.

In spite of these weaknesses, this analysis of the relationship between the core and periphery over time allows us to begin to understand the relationship between indigenous peoples and the core political structure. This expands the analysis of indigenousness within world-systems theory literature. Our research also contributes to a body of world-systems literature that analyzes the role of the indigenous periphery, which has been resisting the core and global capitalism for centuries (Hall and Fenelon 2008). According to world-systems analysis, the world-system is currently in a structural crisis, and is moving into a period of transition. After applying the relational concept of world-systems analysis to the Maya, we discover that our findings supported this assertion. The first and second systems are marked by unequal relationships, however the third system is marked by a period of transition. Politically, a transition occurred when the Maya utilized a global movement; economically, when the Maya protested against globalization and neoliberalism; and culturally, when the Maya reasserted their landholding rights. Communities on the periphery are beginning to shake up the core, producing a transition to a political structure that will be more egalitarian than the existing liberal empire. These findings highlight the role of
periphery groups within the contemporary world-system. Indigenous peoples hold an influential position within the world-system, a position that might be occupied by other types of periphery communities, bringing radical change to the world-system.

REFERENCES


Four Primary Indicators of Systemic Change


ANCIENT CORE-PERIPHERY INTERACTIONS: LOWER NUBIA DURING MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT (CA. 2050-1640 B.C.)

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ABSTRACT

This paper applies the core-periphery theoretical framework as an attempt to explain the nature of the Egyptian intervention in Lower Nubia and the subsequent sociopolitical status the region acquired during the Middle Kingdom (ca. 2050-1640 BC) through consideration of the ideological bias held by the Egyptian State along with its economic and political goals.

INTRODUCTION

Since the publication of The Modern World System the categories that Wallerstein (1974) generated in order to explain the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe have been tested to describe pre-modern world-systems. Critical observations made to the original model – like those of Schneider (1977) – and theoretical accommodations to particular historical situations also began a few years after the publication of the original theory. In fact, Wallerstein’s three assumptions: of core dominance on the peripheries; of inherently asymmetrical exchange between regions; and of trade as the prime mover of social development could not always be proven to take place in pre-modern societies.

Several of these theoretical approaches were related to the ancient Near Eastern polities’ relationships (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991; Kardulias 1996; Kohl 1987; Rowlands 1987; Stein 1999). In particular, Rowlands (1987) called attention to the anachronisms that could arise in the applications of these categories to non-capitalist societies and proposed an analysis based on the exchange of luxuries rather than staples. Kohl (1987), on the other hand, argued that multiple core areas co-existed and made direct contact with each other. In addition, he pointed out that in ancient societies the dependence relationships between cores and peripheries were rather weak.

1 I wish to express my gratitude to the Journal of World-Systems Research’s anonymous reviewers, for their useful comments and bibliographic suggestions. I thank Juan Manuel Tebes for reading an earlier draft of this paper. It is also my pleasure to thank Tracy Musacchio for correcting my English. All errors are, however, my responsibility. Direct all correspondence to: Roxana Flammini, Centro de Estudios de Historia del Antiguo Oriente, Universidad Católica Argentina, Av. Alicia Moreau de Justo 1500PB (C1107AFD), Buenos Aires, Argentina. Phone: (54-11) 4349-0200 ext. 1189.
and unstable, and that peripheries possessed a great deal of technological innovations. In this regard, Kohl was against diffusionist hypotheses in which cores are visualized as large cultural and technological givers, and peripheries as mere receptors of such “developments” (Kohl 1987). In fact, technology spread fairly quickly in the Ancient Near East, and there were not extreme differences between cores and peripheries in regard to this aspect. Occasionally, technological innovation occurred in a peripheral area and reached a core area afterwards.

One of the main issues is that many ancient core-periphery relationships do not fit into a core-driven model. In this regard, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1991) introduced several revisions to world-systems theory, defining two types of core-periphery relationships: first, core-periphery differentiation “in which societies at different levels of complexity and population density are in interaction with each other within the same world-system,” without exploitation by the core; and second, core-periphery hierarchy “which will be understood to mean the existence of political, economic or ideological domination between different societies within the same world-system” (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991:19). They also introduced a more specific definition for the category of semi-periphery. To them, semi-periphery is any area geographically located between cores and peripheries that acted as mediator in the relationships between the core and the periphery. One related aspect is that its political organization showed a complex mixture of aspects from both cores and peripheries (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991).

Furthermore, they developed a preliminary typology of world-systems based on the neo-Marxian modes of production (Wolf 1982): (1) kin-ordered, normatively-based; (2) tributary, politically coercive, state-based; and (3) capitalist, economically coercive, state-based (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991; Hall 1999).

Besides the attempts to adjust theoretical issues, specific research from the world-system framework that could be applied to ancient Near Eastern societies was carried out on the expansion of Mesopotamian Uruk during the third millennium B.C. by Algaze (1993). He argued that primary states involved in processes of external expansion could be characterized as early examples of economic imperialism (Algaze 2001). Algaze’s conclusions regarding an early Mesopotamian Empire comparable to the modern world-system were revised by Stein (1999) who suggested instead two different theoretical frameworks to analyze the Uruk expansion, namely the distance-parity and the trade-diaspora models. Others, like Rothman (2001), disagreed with Algaze’s interpretation of the data.

Egyptologists are not often amenable to this kind of explanation, although many researchers of Nubian-Egyptian relationships have explained the link by using some variety of the core-driven core-periphery model (Adams 1977; Emery 1965; Kemp 1978; Trigger 1976). In these approaches, typically the core (Egyptian) dominion extended over a subordinated (Nubian) periphery. In fact, the idea of the superiority of Egypt comes from the oldest approaches, which considered mistakenly Kerma – an important node of exchange during the period under consideration, located at the Third Cataract – to be an Egyptian colony founded by the kings of the 12th Dynasty (Reisner 1923a, b; for the new dates of the Kushite elite’s tombs see Gratien 1978). As Smith (2003) rightly points out, theoretical models that emphasize the core dominion downplay native agency. Nevertheless, Kerma is a completely Nubian site as its material culture demonstrates (Bonnet 1986; Bonnet 2000).

To be certain, it is extremely difficult to define the political status of Kerma because of the lack of textual sources. Many researchers define Kerma as a state as early as the Middle Kerma period, but more research is necessary to define this specific issue. It is highly plausible
that Kerma exhibited a highly stratified kinship society during the Middle Kerma period and that the state emerged in a later historical situation (perhaps during the Classic Kerma phase).  

Whenever Kerma began to meet our definition of a state, this does not stop us from focusing on the characteristics of the relation between Egypt and Kerma as a core-periphery relationship. Following the Chase-Dunn and Hall (1991) schema, this relationship fits into a core-periphery differentiation for a long period, then shifts to a core-periphery hierarchy in later times. In the period we shall consider here, Egypt’s Middle Kingdom, their relationship was a core-periphery differentiation since the core (Egypt) did not exert any kind of exploitation or domination on the periphery (Kerma).

Moreover, a point that deserves serious consideration and that possibly may help to understand this situation is the idea of an asymmetrical relationship between cores and peripheries. Certainly, this relationship should not be understood to mean that the core performs an active role, whereas the periphery is just a passive agent – which, as it has been noted, may lead to simplistic explanations – but rather this relationship is one in which both partners mutually influence each other. The particular features of this asymmetry would exist because many economic, ideological, or even political practices had a different level of relative impact. In other words, these practices originated from the core area and reached the periphery, while the same is not true for the inverse situation.

In this schema, Lower Nubia played a key role as an intermediary during the Middle Kingdom. Here we shall consider two main dimensions regarding this point: first, a reconsideration of the role that the state ideology played in the core area and its involvement in the way Egyptians considered Lower Nubia; and second, the sociopolitical status Lower Nubia acquired through its relationship with the core and the periphery. These considerations are based on a reevaluation of the archaeological remains and the (Egyptian) textual evidence.

THE EGYPTIAN ADVANCE OVER LOWER NUBIA DURING THE MIDDLE KINGDOM

The Nile was the main axis of exchange in northeast Africa during ancient times. At the southern limit of the ancient Egyptian State, the Nubian territory began and extended from Elephantine to the lands south of the Fourth Cataract, or perhaps even farther. These territories were crossed by the Nile, which provided a natural corridor from the heart of Africa to the Mediterranean Sea. The ancient Egyptian territory, named Kemet by the ancient Egyptians, had very specific geographic boundaries: to the North, the Mediterranean Sea; to the South, the First Cataract, at Elephantine; to the East, the Red Sea; and to the West, the mountains of the western desert. Also, Egyptians recognized two “sacred lands”: one to the South, Punt, and another to the North, Lebanon (Hornung 1992:74). The borders of the Egyptian State were not fixed as the king had the capability to establish new boundaries.

2 O’Connor (1991; 1993) defines Kerma as a highly developed kinship society or even a state. But in fact, the mode of social articulation of kinship societies is quite different from that of state societies. The first articulates through inner consensus, while state societies articulate upon the legal monopoly of the force sustained by a segment of the society (Campagno 2002).
The ancient Egyptian texts distinguish many spatial ambits to the south of Elephantine, but we shall focus on two of them: Wawat and Kush, identified in a simplified way as Lower and Upper Nubia respectively (Adams 1977). The advance of the Egyptian State during the Middle Kingdom took place over the first of the two.

Lower Nubia (Wawat) extended between the First Cataract and an area named Batn el-Hagar (The Belly of the Rock), which is a narrow river strait located south of the Second Cataract. The area was inhabited by the sedentary Nubian C-Group, identified with the nehesyw mentioned in Egyptian sources (Schneider 2003).

Another Nubian group, the medjayw of the Egyptian texts, was semi-nomadic and lived in the Eastern desert. This group is commonly identified with the Pan Grave cultural remains (Lacovara 1997; Sadr 1987, 1990; Schneider 2003). Upper Nubia (Kush) likely extended south of the Batn el-Hagar to the Fourth Cataract or farther and, as we mentioned before, the main city of the area was Kerma, located at the Third Cataract.

The relationship between Egyptians and Nubians is documented from the Early Dynastic period through the exchange of prestige goods (Campagno 2004b), but it is difficult to reconstruct the way in which the contact took place. During the Old Kingdom (ca. 2800-2200 B.C.) information becomes more abundant. The Egyptian State sent peaceful commercial expeditions into Nubia (for instance, that of Herkhuf), and carried out punitive actions (such as those registered in the Palermo Stone). Egyptians also built a settlement near the Second Cataract, Buhen, (Adams 1977) probably during the 2nd dynasty but it is not known if it was continuously occupied. Most of the evidence comes from the 4th and 5th dynasties, when the names of many kings appeared at this settlement. The settlement could be related to copper smelting during that time; in fact, it was a walled enclosure surrounding a terraced town with magazines and workshops (Morkot 2000). It does not seem that there were polities in Nubia (neither Lower nor Upper Nubia) menacing the Egyptian presence in the southern territories, so the Egyptians could travel freely through the southern lands without strengthening their presence through a permanent and articulated control over the Nubian population. At that time, Lower Nubia was inhabited by the Nubian A-Group while Kerma was probably a reduced sedentary settlement without the sociopolitical connotations it acquired in later times. Anyway, Kerma was a stratified society which maintained exchanges with Egypt and the territories located to its south, as the prestige objects found in its necropolis demonstrate (Bonnet 1986). During the disruptive period known as the First Intermediate Period (ca. 2200-2050 B.C.), the Egyptian State suffered a decentralization process which led to a sociopolitical crisis. During this time, Egypt did not maintain relationships with its southern neighbors.

But once the recentralization process succeeded after the First Intermediate Period, the Egyptian State initiated an effective and permanent occupation of Lower Nubia. This is attested from the beginning of the 12th Dynasty through the reign of Sesostris III (ca. 1975-1850 B.C.), when a chain of fortresses were founded from Elephantine to Semna South. These fortresses were maintained under Egyptian control until the late 13th Dynasty.

In addition to constructing fortresses, Egyptians rebuilt preexisting sites (such as Buhen) and erected other constructions, such as the walls that extended between Aswan and Konoso (Philae) (Gardiner 1916) and between Uronarti and Semna (Mills 1967-68). It is plausible that some of the buildings inside the fortresses were temporary palaces, like the structures found at Kor and Uronarti that followed a ritual orientation to the north. Others are plausibly temples, as the building found under the temple built at Buhen during the reign of Hatshepsut seems to be
Additionally, there was a system of communication between the fortresses, demonstrated by many outposts found near the Nile banks (Fig. 1).

In addition to these building activities, it is worth mentioning the opening of a channel known as “Beautiful are the ways of Khakaure, eternally” in the vicinity of the First Cataract during Sesostris III’s reign (Inscription of the Keeper of the Treasure Senankh, year 8 of Sesostris III). This channel made it navigable for Egyptian boats to sail the Nile during the whole year (Vandersleyen 1995; see also Quirke 1990).

We can reconstruct two different stages in the advance over Lower Nubia: first, the 12th Dynasty’s early kings reached the Second Cataract; and second, Sesostris III advanced beyond this point, on the section of the river known as Batn el Hagar, reaching as far as Semna. With Sesostris III’s ascent to the throne, a new stage in the policy of tightening Egyptian control over Nubia was inaugurated.

Fortunately, our knowledge of the fortresses system is not restricted to the archaeological remains, which disappeared once the Aswan High Dam was erected. In fact, the Egyptian fortresses in Lower Nubia were mentioned in the so-called Onomasticon Papyrus, a document that lists fourteen toponyms from Semna South to the North. Many of these sites were identified with the archaeological remains of the fortresses, particularly Semna South, Semna, Kumma, Uronarti, Shelfak and Askut. Beyond the narrow passage at the Second Cataract, it mentions the Egyptian names of the fortresses identified as Mirgissa, Buhen, Faras, Serra, Aniba, Kubban, Bigeh and Elephantine (Gardiner 1916; Jaritz 1993).

In fact, the fortresses were built with the aims of controlling the access of Nubian people into Egypt, managing the exploitation of the natural resources located in the eastern and western desert in the vicinity of Nubia, and especially supervising the exchange with Kerma and the African heartland (Adams 1977; Bourriau 1991; Trigger 1976) through a decided advance into the Second Cataract with the effective establishment of a boundary. These objectives appear in the various boundary stelae. The earlier one, Sesostris III’s stele of year 8 found in Semna (possibly the location named Heh in the document), specifically indicates that this king established the limit:

In order to prevent all nehesyw passing it in traveling downstream by water or by land with a ship or with all cattle of the nehesyw; except when a nehesy will come in order that trading might be done in Iqen (Mirgissa) on or a commission. Any good thing may be done with them; but without allowing a boat of the nehesyw to pass in traveling downstream by Heh, forever. (Smith 1995:40; see also Adams 1977)

From this time on, the maintenance of the new boundary was considered a legitimizing act of kingship. Direct evidence of this can be found in Sesostris III’s stele of year 16, found also at Semna, which indicates:
Year 16, third month of winter: the king made his southern boundary at Heh. I have made my boundary further south than my fathers, I have added to what was bequeathed me. (…) As for any son of mine who shall maintain this border which my Majesty has made, he is my son, born to my Majesty. The true son is he who champions his father, who guards the border of his begetter. But he abandons it, who fails to fight for it, he is not my son, he was not born to me.
Now my majesty has had an image made of my majesty, at this border which my majesty has made, in order that you maintain it, in order that you fight for it. (Lichtheim 1973:119-120)

During the New Kingdom, Sesostris III was worshipped at Semna. His cult was increasingly sustained by Tuthmosis III, who also reopened the aforementioned channel of Sesostris III in the First Cataract and clearly associated himself with the Middle Kingdom king (Spalinger 2006).

Furthermore, the trade in the Lower Nubia region, and therefore its infrastructure, were organized and supervised by Egypt. Egyptian interest in exchange activities is evidenced by the hundreds of seal impressions found at Mirgissa and Uronarti (Gratien 1994), as well as by the inscriptions found in the area of the Second Cataract that make reference to individuals related to navigation and exchange activities (Žába 1974). The exploitation of the local resources is further attested by the presence of workshops at Buhen and granaries and manufacturing areas in almost all of the fortresses, i.e. Kubban, Semna, Kumma, Mirgissa and Askut (Anderson 1999; Kemp 1986). Specifically, it seems that the fortresses at Batn el Hagar were also erected to impede a Kushite advance over Lower Nubia.

Amongst the most notorious evidence regarding the Egyptian administrative control of the fortresses are the Semna Dispatches which dated from the late 12th Dynasty, probably during the reign of Amenemhet (III), the son and successor of Sesostris III. These dispatches contain information about activities at Semna and other fortresses, particularly concerning the interaction with the local Nubians, both nehesyw and medjayw (Smither 1945). The fact that these documents were found at Thebes is an indication that the fortresses’ local affairs were directly delivered to the central authorities based out of the Egyptian city (Gratien 2004). In fact, the picture which emerges concerning Sesostris III and Amenemhet III’s reigns is one of energetic attempts to tighten the Egyptian hold on Lower Nubian affairs.

Moreover, evidence coming from Uronarti corroborates this fact and suggests that the residence itself was informed of the fortress activities (Smith 1995). Since much of this evidence is dated to 13th Dynasty times, it demonstrates that the control of the Egyptian State over the fortresses did not disappear with the end of the 12th Dynasty.

Additionally, another group of evidence sometimes dismissed by researchers can shed new light on these specific points. The Execration Texts (Koenig 1990; Posener 1940; Sethe 1926) enlist the “enemies” of Egypt – mainly Libyans, Asiatics and Nubians – on figurines or bowls which were interred or destroyed in ritual actions. By means of these ritual actions, enemies were defeated. Of course, and beyond this ritual fact, the Execration Texts provide an enormous amount of information regarding those “enemies” who came from foreign regions.

There are three main lists of Execration Texts, named the Berlin, Brussels, and Mirgissa groups. There is also a smaller group named the Cairo figurines. Fortunately, it is possible to establish a chronological sequence for these groups, although many questions arise when comparing the sources.

It is important to notice that in the earlier group, the Cairo figurines, Wawat was listed between the execrated names in the first place and Kush in the second. But Wawat disappeared from later groups (Berlin, Brussels, and Mirgissa) where the sequence is headed always by Kush (Posener 1958). This is an interesting issue that by itself means little; however, when it is connected with other sources it obtains a different dimension and leads to a possible interpretation
connecting the disappearance of Wawat from the late Execration Texts with the status Lower Nubia acquired during the Middle Kingdom.

Finally, another source that can help us delineate the status of Lower Nubia comes from the late Second Intermediate Period. The stele of King Kamose is a document from the late 17th Dynasty. In a very well-known passage, King Kamose states, referring to the situation of the Theban kingdom:

To what end do I know my (own) strength? One chief is in Avaris, another in Kush, and I sit (here) associated with an Asiatic and a Nubian! Each man has his slice in this Egypt and so the land is partitioned with me! (Kamose I) (Redford 1997:13; emphasis added).

During the Second Intermediate Period, an Asiatic kingdom emerged in northeastern Delta. Its main city was Avaris (Tell el Dab’a) (Bietak 1996; Bietak 1997). At the same time, the Kushites advanced over the Egyptian chain of fortresses located in Lower Nubia. The Egyptians’ influence was limited to the area between Elephantine and Kos (Cusae). In fact, recent estimates of the economic situation of the Theban kingdom during the Second Intermediate Period indicate a diminishing level of wealth among its population, which lost its access to former prestige goods (elite funerary items include sarcophagi made of sycamore – an Egyptian wood – and not of the “prestigious” foreign cedar wood) (Yurco 2004:446).

The territories north of Kos were under the dominion of the king of Avaris, and the territories south of Elephantine were under the dominion of the Kushites from Kerma. The quote from Kamose leads one to understand that Lower Nubia once was considered “Egypt.” This claim, made by an Egyptian king, adds to the information of the Execration Texts and the boundary stelae of king Sesostris III and is indicative of the possible incorporation of Lower Nubia into the Egyptian State, not only in an administrative, economical, or political sphere, but also in an ideological one.

In addition to the textual evidence, archaeological remains also shed light on this aspect. In fact, a change in the occupation pattern in the Egyptian fortresses can be discerned, as the fortresses shift from rotating military garrisons to permanent Egyptian settlers from the late Middle Kingdom.

If most scholars agree on which goals the Egyptians pursued through the construction of the fortresses, different explanations arise regarding the change in their mode of occupation. Most of these explanations consider only an economic motive.

Years ago, Smith (1976) established this change as taking place at Buhen. He attributed the establishment of the permanent occupation there to a new situation in which the Egyptian State could not confront the steadily increasing costs that resulted from the rotating occupation in the fortress at Buhen during the 13th Dynasty. Among the high costs, he mentioned the practice of sending sick people and dead bodies to Egypt because of the ideological feature related to “die in Kemet,” a religious belief expressed in the Tale of Sinuhe (Smith 1976:69).

The change in the mode of occupation was observed also at Mirgissa and Askut. The evidence at Askut showed that the change took place during the late 12th Dynasty, exemplified through new spatial arrangements in the buildings and the establishment of a cult to ancestors (Smith 1995). Smith (1995) came up with an original and cohesive approach to the interrelationship between Egypt and Nubia from the Middle Kingdom to the New Kingdom (ca.
2050-1050 B.C.), basing his conclusions on an exhaustive analysis of the archaeological remains. He made use of several analytical terms borrowed from other fields of study to explain the Egyptian advance over Lower Nubia, proposing the use of Horvath and Bartel’s matrix specifying the differences between “colonialism” (occupation with settlers) and “imperialism” (occupation without settlers). Further, the matrix uses these terms in relation to the strategies of “eradication,” “acculturation” and “equilibrium,” which create a series of different situations.

Under this matrix, the specific situation in Lower Nubia during the Middle Kingdom is defined as “Equilibrium/Imperialism.” This means that it was an “indigenous cultural maintenance with only small imperial presence” (Smith 1995:8-9) through the building of the impressive fortresses system. Local inhabitants (Nubian C-Group) were allowed to remain in the territory, but there was no interrelationship with the Egyptians. Finally, Smith (1995) adds a primarily economic explanation based on the postulates of Alcock’s (1989) model which scrutinized the specific mechanisms of “imperial” decision-making by means of an economic approach, namely a strategy to minimize costs by the dominant state.

To this, Smith argues that the local system established in Lower Nubia was inadequate to meet the Egyptian needs, so the Egyptian State created a new system to fit its own necessities: the system of fortresses. But, in order to lower the costs of the imperial infrastructure and to create a more self-sufficient one, the Egyptians created “a system of local finance to help to diminish the costs of wealth extraction” (Smith 1995:80). In this regard, the de-militarization of Lower Nubia and the settlement of Egyptian colonists there took place as a result of the search for a diminution in the costs of maintenance of the Egyptian imperial system, thus making it more “profitable” from the late 12th dynasty on. Smith (1995, 1997) argues that the search for greater revenues may have been motivated, in this case, by the increasing influence of the Amorites in the Delta, which would have required a drainage of the state resources towards that area.

This last point is questionable, since by the end of the 12th Dynasty (and even in the early 13th dynasty), when the first permanent settlers arrived to the fortresses, there is not evidence in the Eastern Delta of military actions against the Asiatic settlers located at Tell el Dab’a (Bietak 1997); however, it is possible that a reduction in the costs of maintenance of the fortresses system would have allowed those resources to be redirected towards other areas in which the state had interests.

Besides, Smith (2003) states that the Egyptian colonists could have been led by conspicuous consumption, or a need to obtain prestige goods to improve their social status, through their position as mediators in the exchange between the Egyptian State and Kerma. It is possible that the colonists tried to obtain some kind of benefit, since these practices were not strange at all in ancient Near Eastern societies as the Old-Assyrian network of exchange established between Kanish and Assur during the early Second Millennium B.C. demonstrates. But the rules of the exchange – in the Egyptian and in the Old-Assyrian network examples – were established and maintained by the state’s administration. Hall (1999) explained that with the emerging of state-based societies, the amount of wealth involved in commerce was increasing. This is the underlying motive that researchers have found supporting the existence of “capitalism” in the ancient world: “it was there. The key, however, is that it was always embedded in a large tributary logic.” (Hall 1999:12). As a matter of fact, “conspicuous consumption” could have taken place among the colonists of Lower Nubia, but it was immersed into a dominant state-driven logic of exchanges, based on the obtaining of prestige goods to reproduce social ties.
As a matter of fact, Egyptians controlled the exchange with Nubia and imposed their rules over it from the late Middle Kingdom on. In this way, there was an asymmetrical relationship between both polities, since specific Egyptian features appeared in Kerma, such as the numerous imported Egyptian seals and sealings (Markowitz 1997; Smith 1998) or the Egyptian pottery from Upper and Lower Egypt found in the Kushite necropolis (Bourriau 2004). In this way, seals, sealings, and pottery found at Kerma demonstrate the strong influence of the core practices on the periphery, and the asymmetrical relationship between one and the other.

Seals and sealings, these important artifacts of ancient exchange, were found in very different contexts at Kerma. Several appeared in the necropolis and were dated to the Classic Kerma period (late 13th dynasty). These objects were considered objects of prestige to the local elites due to their occurrence in funerary contexts (Smith 1998). But recently, Bonnet (2001) announced the finding of “seals fragments and seal impressions, as well as stocks of fine-grained clay ready to be used, it being already worked into small balls, cylinders or rolls and stored in ditches or shallow pits” (Bonnet 2001:31) in an area near the port of the city, clearly with a meaning related to economic activities. These findings were dated earlier than the findings at the cemetery, probably to Middle Kerma – contemporaneous to the Egyptian Middle Kingdom.

Egyptian pottery has been found in the necropolis of Kerma. Recently, Bourriau (2004) demonstrated through marl analysis of the pottery that, firstly, there was a greater amount of pottery originating from Upper and Lower Egypt during the Middle Kerma period than during the Ancient Kerma and, secondly, that until the middle of the 12th dynasty there was a higher proportion of Upper Egyptian pottery, but this reverted to a higher proportion of Lower Egyptian pottery during the middle of the 12th through the 13th dynasty. Finally, by the end of the 13th dynasty, there was only Upper Egyptian pottery in the Kushite cemetery (Bourriau 2004).

In short, Egypt and Kerma participated in an extended network of exchanges during the Middle Kingdom, principally of luxury goods, and they both benefited from this exchange. But during the Middle Kingdom, we possess explicit evidence indicating that the terms of trade were managed and imposed by the Egyptian State and not by the Nubians from Kerma.

Given the core-periphery interactions we have defined in this instance, how can we characterize the status of Lower Nubia during Middle Kingdom Egypt? To be sure, Lower Nubia was geographically an intermediary between Egypt and Upper Nubia, and it acted as a mediator between both areas. However, Lower Nubia did not possess a “mixture” of organizational forms, at least during the Middle Kingdom, like the characterization of a semi-periphery established by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1991). In fact, the organization, administration and control of the Nile area in Lower Nubia were in the hands of the Egyptian State through the control of the fortresses. The Nubian C-group inhabited the area and maintained relationships with the Egyptians, but they controlled neither the river pass nor the core-periphery goods exchange. Consequently, we can argue that the concept of semi-periphery is not an adequate characterization of the status of Lower Nubia, at least as reflected by the 12th and 13th Dynasties’ control over the area. Additionally, we can argue that Lower Nubia was a part of the Egyptian State although it did not share the same characteristics the core possessed: there is no evidence that the Egyptian State built chains of interrelated fortresses in the core area itself.

In fact, the primary role of the area, as mentioned above, was to intermediate between Egypt and Upper Nubia. Accordingly, we suggest that in this specific historical situation, a better concept to define Lower Nubia’s status would be that of a linking area. This definition emphasizes the condition of Lower Nubia as a mediation area between a core and a periphery,
thus avoiding the “transitional” bias that the term semi-periphery certainly possesses, and also takes into account that, in fact, Lower Nubia was part of the core and was not politically related to the periphery. In addition, the concept allows us to establish the differences between the linking area, the core, and the periphery.

First, we can discern an asymmetrical relationship between the core and the linking area since many of the practices the core implemented in the linking area were not present in the core itself. In fact, the core operated on the linking area in an asymmetrical way. The particular modes that this asymmetrical relationship took were both through the building of fortresses (and other constructions in the area), the establishment of rotating garrisons in an initial militarized phase, and the establishment of Egyptian colonists once the state dominated the area and the boundary stelae were erected.

Second, there is no evidence of cultural features coming out of the periphery in the fortresses. The Egyptian fortresses were completely Egyptian in architectural features and material culture, and they were managed by the Egyptian State from Thebes. Finally, they constituted a defensive and integrative system given that they had a means of communicating between them.

In fact, from the late 12th dynasty on, the Egyptian core established a trade colony of Egyptians in a recently controlled territory as a way to emphasize that the terms of the exchange were controlled by the core. Furthermore, the existence of a world-system relation between a core and a periphery was strengthened when the fortresses changed from rotating military garrisons to permanent settlers. These colonists acted as delegates of the Egyptian State to carry out exchange activities. This network, headed by the Egyptian terms of trade, was so enduring that when the Egyptian State decentralized during the Second Intermediate Period crisis, these Egyptian colonists worked for the ruler of Kush. When the Egyptian King Kamose recuperated Lower Nubia they returned to the sphere of influence of the Egyptian State (Smith 1995).

Of course, the main goal of the Egyptian advance over Lower Nubia was to control the exchange of prestige goods between Egypt and Kerma. It can be read as clearly and exclusively an economic goal, but what can be discerned from this exchange? Moreover, why did Egyptians need such goods? In the following sections, we shall explore some ideological aspects that can be used to explain the nature of the Egyptian intervention in Lower Nubia and the social and economic changes related to it. As Kemp has clearly stated, “ideology shapes decisions as much as it legitimizes them. Indeed, a useful rule for addressing the question of imperialism might be: first find the ideology” (1997:131). Accordingly, we consider that the economic factors did not act in isolation. The study of other aspects, most notably the state ideology, which was biased by the Egyptian “worldview” (as Weltanschuung), may enrich and complement our understanding of the status of Lower Nubia during the Middle Kingdom.

RECOGNIZING THE EGYPTIAN “WORLDVIEW” IN THE EVIDENCES

Several difficulties arise as soon as we approach the specific situation of the relationship between Egypt and Nubia during the Middle Kingdom, specifically concerning the archaeological and textual sources and the theoretical frameworks used to explain this interrelationship.

Regarding the material evidence, there are several features to emphasize. The potential for Nubian and Egyptian archaeological remains from Lower Nubia disappeared once the Aswan
High Dam was finished. Since then, our material sources have been reduced to archaeological reports of the excavations which took place there more than forty years ago. This material presents several difficulties. On occasion, the excavations were completed in an extremely short time, so control over the material remains was not done cautiously (like in the case of Buhen) (Smith 1976). Sometimes, there is no complete information in the case of a site excavation but only survey reports. In the case of Askut, the complete archaeological work remains unpublished and we have access only to preliminary reports (Badawy 1963, 1964a, b, 1965, 1966) and to the work of Smith (1995), who had access to the unedited papers of Badawy.

The other kind of evidence, ancient Egyptian texts (there is no Nubian written evidence), also has several specific characteristics to be mentioned here. First, many of the texts disappeared forever, especially those written on perishable material like papyrus. Second, the extant texts for the most part refer to the local or central elites’ affairs, so the information we have regarding peasants and non-elite people is substantially poor. Finally, while archaeological remains sometimes allow us to establish ethnic differences and similarities (Smith 2003), texts and images are biased by the Egyptian “worldview,” a feature difficult to discern only through archaeological vestiges.

Many researchers have pointed out the importance of state ideology in relation to the expansion of the Egyptian State over Nubia as expressed in textual sources, such as Kemp (1997) or Smith (2003). Certainly, these scholars hold different opinions on the role of ideological statements and the “historical rigorousness” textual evidence possesses. Kemp’s (1997) explanation relies on the importance of the Egyptian State ideology in extending its borders, giving textual evidence great importance, since texts reflect ideologically biased features that archaeological remains do not. Smith’s (2003) conclusion is that textual evidence is embedded with some form of propaganda, since the messages tried to convey to a specific audience or a set of audiences the great wealth and power the Egyptian king possessed. In fact, he mentions the “fictitious” battles of king Ramesses III against Asiatics and Libyans, concluding that their “real” existence was irrelevant to ancient authors. We agree with this last point, but not for the reasons Smith (2003) advocates as the main factor of this lack of “historical rigorousness.”

In fact, our concern is not with material culture and textual evidence as a correlate of state ideology, but rather with how state ideology shaped and modified the behavior of the Egyptians in relation to Lower Nubia.

First of all, we need to recognize that our own “worldview” impacts the way we understand and explain political, economic, and religious matters, and that our own worldview sometimes lies at the bottom of our explanations without us being aware of its existence. In fact, in a critical analysis of the ideological basis of the modern world system’s theoretical framework, Burch pointed out that liberalism “is a distinctive intellectual tradition (or worldview or ideology)” with many basic characteristics that were at the foundations of world system theory (1995:16). In a similar way, the ancient Egyptians had their own “worldview,” which biased much of their textual and iconographical evidence. Nevertheless, the quality of information we can obtain from the sources is significant in many ways.

A point of departure is to reevaluate the way we approach this ancient society, recognizing that the ancient Egyptians shared a worldview of their own. Of course, this way of

3 In this regard, we shall cite Hobsbawn’s reflections: “the discovery of otherness is important. It is important to see, for instance, how different the sense of time was in the pre-industrial period
understanding the relations between men, nature, and the gods was not irrational, but expressed another kind of rationality different from ours, and it possessed many specific characteristics we shall elaborate upon here. Obviously, it does not mean that we have a complete understanding of the ancient Egyptian worldview, but instead that we recognize its existence and try to understand Egyptians through their own lens, to the extent we can. Our knowledge of this field is still small, but further research – mostly from anthropologists – will generate new concepts and categories for better understanding this different worldview.

Nevertheless, we can define some of the characteristics of the Egyptian worldview. First, it was an extremely self-centered worldview, expressed through a particular kind of discourse which was categorized as expression of an “integrative” or “mythical” thinking (Cervelló Autuori 1996; Frankfort 1976). The recognition of this different logic allows us to establish that ancient Egyptians were immersed in what Eliade called the “religious man” thinking. Ancient societies (and modern ones who are not exposed to the ideology of Western culture) conceived of the world as an integrative “sacred” place. Of course, differences exist between diverse societies but they share several aspects.

Second, the recognition of these ideological features does not signify that these societies lived in a peaceful way, which is as unreal as it is impossible. This subject, in fact, is much more complex that the brief reference we shall present here and deserves a profound examination.

The ancient Egyptian society conceived of creation as an act that had taken place in no-time or primeval time – the Egyptian “sep-tepy” (the “first time”) – so actions which took place in the “real” world are just repetitions of the acts from primeval time (Dunand and Zivie Coche 2004:37) in a cyclic conception of time. The archetypical conformation of kingship is also related to this particular worldview: we have depictions of the powerful Egyptian king smiting his enemies extending over an extremely long period of more than 3,000 years. Of course, this evidence refers to the always triumphant archetype of the Egyptian king-god and cannot necessarily be correlated with “historical” or “real” events. In this way, these are not “fictitious” facts but instead are references to the archetype of the king-god, who has never been defeated. Misunderstandings are generated if we explain Egyptian sources exclusively from our way of understanding time, space, history, and the past.

In that way of thinking, myths occupied a central place. They were the linguistic narrative form which allowed the remembrance and transmission of the archetype and constituted the “only valid revelation of reality” (Eliade 2001:22), while rituals acted as the “sacred actualizing action of the acts of the primeval time” (Cervelló Autuori 1996:20).

In effect, mythical literature derives from the original myth which is unattainable directly (Assman 1977). Each realization of the original myth is different from others but all of the derivations have to remain between the limits of the main signification of the original myth (Campagno 2004c). In addition, as myths and rituals dealt with the sacred world of gods and goddesses, there were secret aspects never revealed to massive audiences but known only to initiates. The oral transmission of myths is a fact that impedes our reconstruction of them and reduces considerably our knowledge of them.

as Edward Thompson and others have tried to show, to discover how different the sense of history was, as Moses Finley has tried to point out in analyzing the classics. This is very important, and until we have discovered this we can’t really do very much with the past” (1997:183-184).
All these characteristics of the Egyptian “worldview” not only appear in the iconography, but also bias the Egyptian textual discourse. In this way, a worthwhile characteristic of the Egyptian discourse is the “multiplicity of approaches” or “poliocularity” (Frankfort 1976:19-20, ch. 3; Iniesta 1992:78). This particular characteristic refers to the fact that, on occasion, each premise of the discourse is not necessarily related to the next, not recognizing the Aristotelian principle of logical contradiction. In a well-known Egyptian example from the Pyramid Texts, Horus is mentioned as the son of Osiris and the son of Hathor. To our discourse, it would be a paradox since Osiris and Hathor never constituted a hierogamy. But in this kind of discourse, each premise refers to a different aspect of Horus: as the son of Osiris in kingship’s terms, and as the son of Hathor from the point of view of his divinity (Cervelló Autuori 1996; Frankfort 1976).

As we stated before, the Egyptians conceived their world as the center of the Universe; they tried to keep a delicate equilibrium between the constant action of two forces of opposite and complementary value, named maat or “order” and isfet or “chaos.” These two concepts are of key importance to our understanding of the ideological conception of the Egyptian advance over Lower Nubia during the Middle Kingdom.

Maat was the ordered world that resulted from the act of creation out of the primeval chaos. In other words, maat was the created realm or the center of the Universe and was identified with the Egyptian territory – Kemet, the palace and the king. In effect, this “order” was maintained by the Egyptian king-god who had to limit the constant menace of “chaotic” forces. This meant that the Egyptian king had to perform actions that concerned the opposition order/chaos: one was to expand the order’s forces; and the other was to limit the advance of chaos’ forces.

As the act of creation established a division between those forces, everything that lay outside the ordered core belonged to the realm of chaos. This dualistic conception of the world translates to the conception of space. As we stated before, Egypt, the center of the universe, was identified with “order.” It was where the gods inhabited, a sacred space. While everything outside its limits, such as things, people, and territories which were not clearly defined as “Egyptian,” belonged to the realm of chaos and were “chaos bearers.” In this self-centered worldview, forces of chaos were constantly trying to defeat maat, and ritual actions performed by the kings and priesthood were attempts to impede its advance. Certainly, this does not mean that sometimes “chaos invaded and defeated maat.” Textual sources like The Admonitions of Ipuwer, among others, refer to the effective invasion of the chaos forces into the Egyptian order – criticizing the king for not performing his role properly. Others proclaim the return of the order after a period of dominion of the chaotic forces, as in the Prophecies of Neferty.

Of course, we are far from those explanations that suggest only propagandistic reasons (in the modern sense of the concept) for the ruling class in the textual and iconographical sources. In the same way, we do not agree with explanations based on some kind of elite class consciousness that allowed for appropriations and manipulations of religion as a means of obtaining power, maintaining political ties, or acquiring class prerogatives.

Taking into account all of these considerations, we can attempt to delineate the ideological bias that existed in the relationship between the Egyptian State and Lower Nubia during the Middle Kingdom.
TRADE IN LUXURIES

Scholars tend to agree that the origin of the contacts between the diverse regions of the ancient Near East can be attributed to the demand of luxuries by the local elites (e.g., Sherratt and Sherratt 1991, 1998). This has been shown, for example, in the case of Egypt, where in pre-state and state times, elites allegedly developed relationships with other regions with the aim of providing themselves with luxuries (Campagno 2004a): gold, ebony, ivory, incense, electrum, malachite, aromatic plants, and animal skins that came from Upper Nubia and beyond (Shinnie 1991). In this regard, we can assume an economic goal underlined by ideological features.

In point of fact, prestige goods possess certain qualities: high demand (most notably, from the upper-ranking social strata), low supply (a relatively high value compared with the small amounts transported), and circulation networks over long distances (Sherratt and Sherratt 1991).

However, if one looks to define what a luxury good is and what is not, one realizes that the limit between both categories is of a rather diffuse character. For example, there are certain raw materials and manufactured products that can be included within the category of luxury goods, but there are other raw materials and manufactured products that cannot. What factors played a part in the qualification of a good as a luxury? In ancient societies, luxury goods provided the individual that carried, accumulated, or gave them with certain socially established qualities that differentiated the individual from the rest of the society, that is to say prestige (Campagno 1998; Clastres 1981). Peregrine (1999) – following Habermas’s hypothesis that a crisis in a socio-cultural system, a “legitimation crisis” is a more likely source of political collapse than an environmental calamity or a crisis in the subsistence economy – stated that prestige goods play a key role in a “prestige economy” where social reproduction is clearly linked to those goods (Peregrine 1999:39). We emphasize this statement, given that in ancient Egyptian society prestige goods played a key role in the reproduction of social ties in and between social strata. As Peregrine points out: “By guiding this system, the elites effectively ensure their own status, but they also provide opportunities for status enhancement to their followers, the non-elites in the system. The non-elites, in return, provide loyalty to the elites” (1999:40). That is to say, prestige goods produced and reproduced inter-social strata practices. In this way, the capacity to obtain luxury items (to accumulate and distribute them), made possible the institution of certain attributes that further developed internal social hierarchies. In other words, these kinds of goods originated and complemented the process of conformation and maintenance of the ancient elites’ infrastructures. These strategies might appear in social relationships such as patronage or gift giving. In societies where there are clear social differences, but where legally coercive institutions do not exist, the giving of these goods as “gifts” form actual contractual forces between the giver and the receiver (Graziano 1975:25-27; see also Schneider 1977).

In addition to these qualities, luxury goods possessed a socially established value of another kind. Here we can mention their sacred quality, their power to cure, their physical properties (for example, certain colors or shapes), their character of being “gifts of the king,” or their use during rituals as “sacra.” As Simmel (1978) pointed out, a good’s value does not constitute an inherent property of the object, but rather is a property attributed to them by subjects. To Mauss, luxuries were imbued with a “spiritual matter (...) part of the nature and substance of oneself” (1954:10). Consequently, luxuries had a social meaning and underwent transformations in their values, because they were indicative of the community’s relationships at
both an external and internal level. This socially shared value often had a greater incidence than the scarcity of the goods in the sector that demanded them (Appadurai 2003; Simmel 1978).

In summary, the main characteristic of luxury goods is the social value that a certain society attributes to them. This explains why some of these goods crossed over long distances to arrive at their destination, which probably initiated the long-distance exchange networks.

What kind of luxury items did the Egyptians obtain from Nubia? Gold was an extremely important precious metal to the Egyptians due to its symbolic resemblance of the flesh of the gods which were made from it, as related to the solar god Re. But, beyond its symbolic bias, this precious metal – like silver – had a different status than others since it was used in pre-monetary economies as a patron of exchange. The Egyptian State probably had to obtain silver through exchange with the city-ports of Syria, given that the source of that precious mineral was in Anatolia, as the Old Assyrian trade-system evidence clearly proves.

Besides gold, Egyptians imported ebony, ivory, myrrh, incense, and panther and leopard skins from Nubia. What products did Egypt send south? There is scant evidence of the products sent by Egypt. These could include items which degrade quickly, like unguents, oils, perfumes, and textiles. Egyptian pottery was found at Kerma, and it shows a patron of exchange that suffered changes over time, as we stated before.

In short, control over Lower Nubia can be explained not only by pure economic necessity on the part of the Egyptian State to assure the arrival of certain luxury goods; but also, and perhaps more importantly, this arrival was compelled by questions of ideological character that had much to do with the role played by luxuries in the conformation of the Egyptian society.

THE CONCEPT OF BOUNDARY TO THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS

For ancient Egyptians, the border was neither a stable element nor did it have the connotations by which we define a “border” today. As Quirke pointed out, we can differentiate between the concepts of “border” and “boundary” or limit. “Border” can be interpreted as “an indefinite zone to a state entity” while “boundary” (or “limit”) can be understood as a “line which demarcates the state sovereignty” (1989:264).

In the idea of boundary, there are elements that have a lot to do with the particular conception of the world that the Egyptians shared. As we have stated before, Egypt was a territory ruled by a king-god and governed by maat (“order”), which extended over an area that originally included the Nile River’s south-north section between Elephantine and the Mediterranean Sea. Everything outside of such limits, exceeding the territorial materialization of the concept of Kemet, was considered to be a land of chaos, and its inhabitants were chaos bearers. This can be seen in the case of the Libyans (to the West), the Asiatics (to the East), and the Nubians (to the South), neighboring peoples that were considered the enemies par excellence; they were characterized in texts and represented as such in the iconography and, thus, they became objects of the “ritual death of the enemy.” In addition, it is worthwhile to focus attention on the necessity for the Egyptians “to die in Kemet,” the ambit of the order, as is expressed clearly in the Tale of Sinuhe when he returns to Egypt to die (Sinuhe B197-199) (Blackman 1932:32; Lichtheim 1973:229-230).

Egyptians utilized two terms to refer to the concept of frontier: tash and djer-a. The idea of tash was intrinsically related to the concept of the limit that the king could impose and modify
in historically precise situations. On the other hand, *djer-a* was a term related to the limits of the cosmic world. As Hornung puts it:

Djer-a refers to the absolute, unalterable limit that is part of the cosmic structure itself... The Egyptians used *tash* for structuring devices and measures of all kinds. The term might refer to the boundary of a field or piece of property, or to district or state borders. (1992:73)

The king was the ruler and god responsible for order (*maat*) and, as such, “he who extends the boundaries (*tashw*)” of *maat* (e.g., the Hymns to Sesostris III) (Flammini and Gestoso 2003:29). The political boundaries of the state – both those established between the nomes and those between the state and the neighboring areas – fluctuated. Since it was the king-god who instituted these limits, it is very difficult to establish a sharp distinction between the concept of a political boundary established by the king and the boundary “of the ambit of the order (*maat*)” established by the god. Both elements together composed the concept *tash*.

This opposition sheds new light on the Egyptian conception of the Nubian “boundary.” In the Egyptian *topos*, there is an opposition between the Egyptians and foreigners: the latter are bearers of chaos, and therefore opposed to *maat*; accordingly the king is forced to fight Egypt’s enemies (Assman 1990; Loprieno 1988).

Regarding this point, Smith (2003) argues that the C-Group people exerted a kind of resistance to the Egyptian presence in Lower Nubia by avoiding any kind of contact, but other researchers have pointed out that there was some kind of exchange between them given the appearance of Egyptian objects as luxury items related to prestige in many tombs of the C-Group (Anderson 1999). Furthermore, research on archaeological material in Lower Nubia reveals that the Nubian C-Group people and the Egyptians coexisted peacefully in Areika, a Nubian site which presented features of both societies (Wegner 1995).

The relationship between the description of foreigners in the ancient Egyptian texts and the material remains related to them would appear to be paradoxical. But, in fact, both aspects concern different spheres of interpretation. As the first suggests an ideological explanation of the position of Egypt as center of the Universe and the land of cosmological “order,” the opposite of “chaos,” the second refers to daily life situations. Given that, we can ask ourselves if a land belonging to the “chaos realm,” as did Lower Nubia, could be incorporated into the king-god’s dominion.

Hornung named the permanent expansion of Egypt and Egyptian features – including the state’s limits – as the principle of the “extension of the existing” (1992:82; see also Kemp 1985). Rowlands (1987) also refers to this specific feature, in terms related to the continuum between the “lands of order” and the “lands of chaos.” The latter were conceived of as a failed cosmos, “one not yet realized but one that could be eventually” (1987:9). In this regard, space is a variable wherein territorial disruptions, like mountains, deserts, or seas, could act as natural borders between the lands of “order” and “chaos.” In the same way, continuations in certain territorial features allow that a territory could be ideologically incorporated in an easier way. This could be the case between Egypt and Lower Nubia, who were linked by the Nile (Adams 1977). This fact would have allowed a different ideological conception of the foreign lands that extended to the south, and this particular situation has no correlation in Syria or Palestine who were clearly
separated from Egypt by the Mediterranean Sea and the desert of Sinai. The construction of Egyptian buildings, like fortresses, temporary palaces, and temples, could have been a way of transforming a land of chaos into a land of order. In fact, although we have no explicit references to this specific issue, it is possible to think that the Egyptian idea of “expanding the existing order” can effectively be correlated with the economic and political expansion of the Egyptian core over Lower Nubia.

In this way, the installation of boundary stelae at Semna could imply that the section of the Nile that extended between the First Cataract and Semna was included in the Egyptian State (Vandersleyen 1971) as the Execlation Texts and the stele of King Kamose confirm. Thus, through the establishment of the boundary stelae and the building of Egyptian structures, Lower Nubia would have been integrated into the order of the Egyptian world, a zone gained out of chaos and incorporated into the dominions of the king-god.

This is why the de-militarization and change in the mode of occupation of the fortresses can not be attributed only to a purported search for a reduction in the costs of the “imperial” infrastructure through the generation of economic self-sufficiency.

In other words, we are suggesting another explanation, in addition to the exclusively economic one. The effective pacification and incorporation of Lower Nubia into the Egyptian “order,” once the boundary stelae had been erected, meant that the war against the chaos had been temporarily won, at least in Lower Nubia. It is possible that this was the underlying reason behind the decision – after the reign of Sesostris III and the establishment of the boundary stelae – to not construct new fortresses in the area and to maintain the border that the king had established.

Our evidence, then, clearly indicates a correlation between state ideology and social practice. This new situation of inclusion of Lower Nubia into the Egyptian State would have led the Egyptians to use a different mode of occupation in the area. As we stated before, the tightening of the Egyptian grasp over Lower Nubia is illuminated by the archaeological research and textual data. The change in the mode of occupation consisted principally in the settlement of Egyptian colonists in the area, as the foundation of cultic places to worship ancestors and other architectural changes in the original plan of the fortresses demonstrate. These changes were dated by the end of the 12th Dynasty. Clearly, these new customs are a consequence of the inclusion into the Egyptian “order”: it was no longer necessary to return to Egypt to die, because in Lower Nubia one was already in Egyptian territory, within the boundaries of the state, inside the dominions of the order established and guaranteed by the king-god. In fact, political and ideological factors are at least as important as economics in structuring political interaction (Edens 1992).

A key argument in support of our idea of the Egyptian advance on Lower Nubia would be to establish that this specific situation was repeated in Egyptian history. In fact, in later historical situations like that of the New Kingdom, Egyptian kings also erected boundary stelae (i.e., Tuthmosis I and III at Kurgus, although they do not have the legitimizing bias the Sesostris III’s boundary stela has) (Arkell 1950; Davies 2003). Egyptian kings built huge temples and administrative structures in Nubia as far as the Fourth Cataract, but we can not infer directly from the sources the existence of a “greater” Egypt. Syrian, Palestinian, and Nubian territories

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supported an administrative, political, and economic advance of the Egyptian reunited core, but we can figure that those territories also were seen as dominions of the king-god obtained by his own right to “extend the boundaries of the ordered world.” A close approach to the Egyptian ideological statements could lead us to evaluate different hypotheses. In effect, the Egyptian advance over Nubia – and of course, over the Levant – during the New Kingdom was of a different kind that that of the Middle Kingdom (Kemp 1997). As a consideration of the situation during the New Kingdom exceeds the goals of this paper, we shall only present a brief possible explanation that would deserve a more extensive approach.

We can hypothesize that between the Middle and the New Kingdom an extremely profound state crisis took place, namely the Second Intermediate Period. During this difficult period, the Egyptian State lost its centrality to, precisely, the hands of foreigners or “chaos bearers.” In ideological terms, chaos forces defeated order, reducing the “ordered world” to the small region between Kos and Elephantine, the Theban kingdom. In fact, the Egyptian kings who reigned during the crisis were unable to impede this situation. The northeastern axis of the Nile came under Asiatic rule and Lower Nubia fell under the dominion of the ruler of Kush. In addition, we have information regarding the close connection between the Asiatics and Nubians, which allied to defeat the Egyptian king of the Theban kingdom (Second Stela of Kamose) (Habachi 1972). Given this, it is possible to argue that the historical, ideological, and social situations were extremely different in the Middle Kingdom from those of the New Kingdom, and that the Second Intermediate Period crisis imprinted its consequences upon the Egyptian consideration of foreigners and foreign regions.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have argued that the ideology of the Egyptian State should have the same level of analytical importance as the purely economic considerations of the Egyptian advance over Lower Nubia, since these later aspects were biased by the Egyptian worldview. This process is one of expansion of state ideology, namely, an order that legitimates occupation by reference to an overarching identity.

During the Middle Kingdom, the Egyptian State advanced into Lower Nubia – that section of the Nile that extends between the First Cataract and the Batn el Hagar – and founded a chain of fortresses with the purpose of controlling the flow of goods towards Egypt, controlling the entrance of people, and exploiting the natural resources of the region. The Egyptian State maintained control in the area until the very late 13th Dynasty. A change in the mode of occupation in the Egyptian fortresses can be discerned by the end of the 12th Dynasty, from rotating to permanent. This feature was ideologically related to the incorporation of the territory into the Egyptian State, evidenced by the installation of boundary stelae in the vicinity of Semna by Sesostris III. Further, it explains the subsequent de-militarization of Lower Nubia and the settlement of Egyptian colonists in the territory. We have characterized the status of Lower Nubia as a linking area between a core (Egypt) and a periphery (Kerma). This categorization is a model generated to understand the role developed by the area during the Middle Kingdom Egypt.

The development sketched above is, of course, somewhat simplistic, but it shows that the Egyptian State’s policy abroad should be seen not only from a purely economic point of view.
The state’s ideology played an important part in the new social order imposed upon this linking area.

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ANCIENT CORE-PERIPHERY INTERACTIONS

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Book Review Essay: Capital Resurgent? The Political Economy of Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy

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Written from a broadly Marxist perspective, *Capital Resurgent* proposes a sweeping interpretation of nearly one hundred and fifty years of capitalist development, illuminating the ‘neoliberal revolution’ of the past quarter century through comparisons with earlier periods. French economists Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy have produced an ambitious book, replete with useful data and provocative hypotheses, that summarizes and synthesizes their growing œuvre.

At the center of their story is the rate of profit: the return on capital investment. Reinforcing the findings of Robert Brenner (1998, 2002a) and others (e.g. Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison 1991; Chan-Lee and Sutch 1985; Poletayev 1992; Shaikh 1999; Webber and Rigby 1996; Weisskopf 1992), Duménil and Lévy show that the ‘golden age’ of post-World War II prosperity in the U.S. and Europe depended upon high profit rates, which permitted rapid capital accumulation and stable employment. As profit rates declined during the late 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s – by about 45 percent, according to the authors’ calculations – investment slowed, unemployment rose, and governments faced chronic budgetary problems.

Duménil and Lévy argue that the most important cause of the declining rate of profit in both the U.S. and Europe during this period was stagnant productivity. Between the mid-1960s and early 1980s, capital productivity (output per dollar of fixed capital investment) declined by about 30 percent. Though hourly labor compensation increased relatively slowly, labor productivity (output per hour of labor) increased even more slowly, resulting in a decline in the profit share (profit per dollar of output) of about 25 percent.\(^1\)

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1 Throughout most of the book, data on three countries – Britain, Germany, and France – is aggregated and treated as representative of Europe as a whole. More problematic is the paucity of data on Japan and other major Asian economies.

2 The mathematical relationships among the abovementioned variables are as follows: rate of profit = capital productivity X profit share; profit share = 1 - (hourly labor compensation / labor productivity). For the purposes of these calculations, profit is measured gross of interest payments and taxes.
Based on an original data series they have compiled, Duménil and Lévy distinguish several major phases in the evolution of American capitalism since the Civil War. Over the very long run, the profit share in the U.S. has remained quite stable, so profit rate trends have tracked capital productivity trends. The first phase, extending from roughly the 1870s through the 1900s, was characterized by falling capital productivity and profit rates. The second phase, stretching from roughly the 1910s through the 1950s, was characterized by rising capital productivity and profit rates. The third phase, spanning roughly the mid-1960s through the early 1980s, witnessed falling capital productivity and profit rates, much like the first period. Finally, it appears that a fourth phase, reversing the negative trends of the third, has already begun.

Duménil and Lévy posit that capitalist economies have difficulty sustaining rapid productivity growth. As a result, when labor costs rise and firms attempt to economize on labor, increases in labor productivity are likely to be offset by decreases in capital productivity, dragging the profit rate down. This pattern corresponds to the aforementioned first and third phases. But while slow productivity growth is the norm, waves of radical, interrelated innovations – in firm structure, production technologies, and the labor process – periodically occur, raising productivity and profit rates significantly. In the second phase, the authors identify several key innovations that played this role, including the improvement of accounting and forecasting techniques and the adoption of assembly line production methods. They link these advances to the growing prevalence of the modern corporation, in which owners delegate managerial responsibilities to a bureaucracy of salaried professionals (Chandler 1977). They attribute the apparent rise in capital productivity over the past two decades to the ongoing ‘information revolution.’

There are several problems with the analysis described above. Firstly, the authors’ explanation of productivity slowdown is underdeveloped. They briefly mention the following free-rider problem, which is a staple of mainstream economics: innovation typically requires costly investment in research and development, but ideas readily diffuse; competing firms can

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3 Duménil and Lévy portray their explanation of falling profit rates as a refinement of Marx’s ‘law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.’ But there are important differences. Duménil and Lévy reject the key causal mechanism in Marx’s analysis. (This is only implicit in the book, but see e.g. Duménil and Lévy (2003a), which maintains that Marx’s argumentation was logically flawed. For a refutation of this view, see Kliman (1996).) In their formal models, it is not the substitution of capital for labor per se that causes the rate of profit to fall. Rather, as suggested above, the culprit is a rate of total-factor productivity growth insufficient to fully offset the negative impact of rising hourly labor compensation (Duménil and Lévy 1995 and 2003a). Unlike Marx’s explanation of declining profit rates, Duménil and Lévy’s alternative does not assume the validity of the labor theory of value, though Duménil has elsewhere (1983-4) defended the latter; see also Duménil and Lévy (1989 and 2000:142).
therefore expect to reap the benefits of each others’ research gratis, which undermines their willingness to make the necessary investments. The upshot is that competitive markets systematically underinvest in R&D (Arrow 1959). Unfortunately, the authors do not present data on long-run trends in R&D expenditures. A cursory examination of trends in the volume of patent applications does reveal a demonstrable slowdown in the third phase and a surge in the fourth; however, for earlier years the data do not correspond as neatly to Duménil and Lévy’s periodization (United States Patent and Trademark Office 2008). Nor do the authors examine trends in variables that might be expected to affect R&D investment levels, such as the degree of product market competition, the intellectual property rights regime, government funding of research, and firm size. As a result, they fail to explain how the R&D free-rider problem was more readily overcome in the second and fourth phases. In future work, perhaps they will expand upon their suggestive observation that the early years of both expansionary phases coincided with business merger waves.

There are also problems with the general periodization of U.S. economic history that Duménil and Lévy propose. Their second phase, supposedly characterized by rising capital productivity and profitability, includes the Great Depression of the 1930s – during which both productivity and profitability plummeted to unprecedented lows. Duménil and Lévy recognize this prima facie contradiction and attempt to resolve it. They argue that the causes of the Great Depression were, on the one hand, lax regulation of growing financial activity, and on the other, a highly uneven diffusion of new technologies and organizational forms among competing firms that left the economy especially vulnerable to shocks. Because they believe productivity was steadily improving (albeit unevenly), the authors maintain that the Depression could have been averted had the government been more willing to reign in financial excess and encourage the adoption of cutting-edge industrial practices. However, Duménil and Lévy provide little evidence of unusual technological or organizational heterogeneity during the 1920s, and their data suggest that most of the productivity and profit rate gains posted during the period 1910-1950 occurred during World War II. A plausible alternative periodization would treat the Depression as the culmination of a single long phase of declining profitability that began in the last quarter of the 19th century. The spectacular recovery of the early 1940s, premised on the substantial

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4 Duménil and Lévy themselves (1999a) once accepted such a periodization, but later dismissed it on questionable grounds (Duménil and Lévy 1992, 1993:Ch. 14). In their most detailed treatment of the issue (Duménil and Lévy 1992), they omitted the years 1930-45 from their data series altogether, apparently because the resulting truncated series proved a better fit with their hypothesis of a gradual improvement in productivity in the decades leading up to World War II!

Despite their different theoretical perspectives, both Shaikh (1992) and Arrighi (1994:215) treat the period from the late 19th century through the 1930s as one of deepening systemic crisis, though Shaikh’s data begins in the 1890s and Arrighi’s analysis is centered on Britain. Poletayev (1992) and Li, Xiao, and Zhu (2007) discern two full cycles of expansion and contraction between the 1870s and 1930s. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982:41-7) propose a periodization similar to Duménil and Lévy’s, based on data on growth rates.

On the dramatic increase in profit rates and productivity during World War II, compare Duménil, Glick and Lévy (1988) and (1993). The authors’ analysis of the Great Depression is elaborated in much greater detail in Duménil and Lévy (1995b) and (1994).
The devaluation of capital that occurred during the 1930s and on a massive increase in military expenditure, would thus constitute an interregnum separating two long phases of declining profitability.

Duménil and Lévy’s case for an emerging fourth phase, characterized by rising productivity and profit rates, is also debatable. They pass lightly over a substantial body of empirical research questioning whether recent productivity increases in the U.S. have diffused beyond a small subset of industries, and the extent to which information technology accounts for these increases (e.g. R. Gordon 2000). They offer no evidence in support of their contention that improvements in information technology are facilitating a reduction of managerial personnel, which is dubious in the U.S. case (D. Gordon 1996:Ch. 2). Furthermore, Duménil and Lévy’s data reveal that the profit rate of the U.S. non-financial corporate sector has remained stagnant since the mid-1980s, once interest payments are taken into consideration. Although profit rates in the financial sector rose dramatically during the 1990s – enabling the rate of profit in the U.S. economy as a whole to recover over half of the ground lost since the mid-1960s – financial sector profits collapsed precipitously during the stock market decline of 2000-1, and they are once again being hammered by the crisis in the sub-prime mortgage market. Extrapolation from this turbulent trajectory is a hazardous undertaking.

Duménil and Lévy may also underestimate the centrality of worker exploitation to the late 20th century recovery. They clearly recognize that a major corporate offensive took place during this period, in which unions were crushed, wages repressed, the welfare state gutted, and corporate taxes slashed. But Duménil and Lévy report that the profit share in the U.S. has increased by only about 10 percent over the past two decades. By contrast, economist Fred Moseley (1997) estimated that the rate of exploitation in the U.S. increased by about 35 percent between 1975 and 1994, and Simon Mohun (2005) found that by 2001 the rate of exploitation in the U.S. had increased some 50 percent compared to its 1964-1982 average. Duménil and Lévy’s reliance on the conventional profit share measure, which elides the Marxian distinction between productive and unproductive labor, would seem to account for these discrepant results.

For the purposes of these comparisons, Duménil and Lévy use net worth, rather than fixed capital, in the denominator of the profit rate. This is important because, for the financial sector in particular, fixed capital is a poor measure of total capital invested. For further discussion, see Duménil and Lévy (2004a).

Many Marxist economists have maintained that the labor of ‘unproductive’ workers – such as managers, advertising and sales personnel, financial sector workers, and civil servants – does not generate surplus value. Because unproductive workers must nevertheless be compensated, it follows that as the unproductive workforce grows relative to the productive workforce, the rate of exploitation of productive workers must increase in order to prevent a decline in the rate of profit. Several studies suggest that the unproductive share of the total workforce in the advanced economies grew substantially over the course of the 20th century. On the distinction between productive and unproductive labor and its empirical application, the locus classicus is Gillman (1958:Ch.7); for more recent treatments, compare e.g. Gouverneur (1983), Freeman (1991), Mohun (2005), Moseley (1991, 1997), Shaikh and Tonak (1994), Smith (1993:Ch. 8), and Wolff (1987); for a critique of this literature, see Laibman (1992:Ch. 4). Though Duménil and Lévy do
In support of their analysis of the recent U.S. experience, Duménil and Lévy can point to their data for the core European countries, which reveal a complete recovery of both profit rates and capital productivity from their low points in the mid-1980s. But the data also show a 50 percent increase in the profit share over the past two decades, which suggests that intensified worker exploitation was a critical dimension of the European recovery. And if the abovementioned erratic movements and sectoral divergences in the U.S. data give reason for pause, unfortunately the authors do not provide data on financial sector profitability for the European core as a whole, and their data for France cuts off just before the millennial stock market tumult. For a host of reasons then, it is difficult to know whether the productivity and profit rate gains experienced by the advanced economies over the past two decades represent the underpinnings of a new long phase of expansion or merely an interlude within the long downturn of the late 20th century.

Much of Capital Resurgent is devoted to an analysis of the marked ‘financialization’ of the economy since the 1970s and the aggressive ‘neoliberal’ approach to economic policy that accompanied it. The authors see both of these phenomena as part and parcel of an attempt by the capitalist class as a whole to reassert its power over subordinate groups and reverse the trend of declining profit rates.

A key episode in this wider process was Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker’s campaign of interest rate hikes, begun in late 1979 – which Duménil and Lévy dub ‘the neoliberal coup.’ Volcker’s rate hikes, which helped provoke a deep recession, succeeded in achieving their primary goal of throttling inflation. This was a godsend to major creditors, whose interest income had been steadily devalued by rising prices during the 1970s. The U.S. government actively maintained relatively high real interest rates throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s. Among the lasting domestic effects was mounting household indebtedness. Chief among the international repercussions was the debt crisis of the less-developed countries – which redounded to the benefit of U.S. corporations after the IMF and World Bank imposed ‘structural adjustment’ plans on bankrupt governments.

High interest rates, banking deregulation, and the development of asset price bubbles fueled the explosive growth of the financial sector. Throughout the 1990s, the profitability of financial corporations was roughly double that of their non-financial counterparts. As a result, investment in the financial sector increased dramatically: in 1980, the net worth of U.S. financial corporations was equivalent to roughly 14 percent of the net worth of non-financial corporations, but by century’s end that proportion had reached well over 20 percent. Meanwhile, the distinction between the financial and non-financial sectors became blurrier, as non-financial corporations increasingly engaged in financial operations of their own, ranging from the extension of...
consumer credit to speculative trading. In 1980, the value of U.S. non-financial corporations’ financial assets was equivalent to about 45 percent of the value of their tangible assets, but twenty years later that ratio was 90 percent.

One of the authors’ most provocative findings regarding ‘financialization’ is that the expansion of financial activity has retarded capital accumulation (the growth rate of the fixed capital stock). In both the U.S. and Europe, non-financial corporations’ investment in plant and equipment continues to be funded overwhelmingly through profits generated by their own non-financial production activities. Very little capital invested in the financial sector is ultimately routed to the non-financial sector, and non-financial firms’ own financial operations contribute virtually nothing to their productive capacity. In this respect, finance functions as a parasitic drain on the “real” economy.

There are several weaknesses in Duménil and Lévy’s account of financialization. One is terminological: they use the word ‘finance’ somewhat loosely, sometimes to refer to the financial sector, elsewhere to denote the capitalist class. A second weakness, which is compounded by the first, involves cavalier attributions of agency such as the following (p.77): “Finance decided to stop inflation in order to protect its revenues and investments, whatever the cost might be for others.” Since the authors acknowledge that a substantial swathe of the financial sector – most notably the savings and loans – suffered crippling losses as a direct result of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate hikes, the suggestion that the ‘neoliberal coup’ was the work of ‘finance’ seems like an oversimplification. William Greider’s (1989) depiction of a motley of conservative bankers and economists at the Fed reacting to conflicting pressures and unforeseen events is a useful corrective here.

Building on their analysis of the past, Duménil and Lévy draw attention to both dangers and opportunities that lie ahead. Rising productivity opens up the possibility of sustained profitability and growth. But in the absence of a politically powerful opposition to the capitalist class, the rich will continue to reap most of the benefits of future prosperity. If financialization continues, it will slow the pace of capital accumulation, to the detriment of output and employment. More ominously, if financial activity is not brought to heel, the economy will remain vulnerable to violent crises, regardless of otherwise favorable trends in productivity and profits.

Nevertheless, the authors believe that with adequate government regulation, serious crises can be averted in the coming period – a conclusion consistent with their account of the Great Depression. Despite their evident hostility toward capitalists and capitalism, they end the book on a decidedly moderate note, describing Keynesian reform as “the only alternative to a more radical road – that of real socialism and social-democratic alternatives – that we have known for decades to have gone wrong, everywhere” (p.204). If by ‘real socialism’ Duménil and Lévy are referring to the undemocratic centrally-planned economies of the Soviet type, their negative judgment is warranted. But with tens of millions of Americans lacking health care, paid parental leave, and many other state-guaranteed benefits currently enjoyed by their European counterparts, we should not concede the failure of social democracy so readily. In any event, do social democracy and Stalinism really exhaust the range of conceivable radical alternatives to neoliberal capitalism?

Contributing to the authors’ pessimism regarding alternatives is a particular view of the development of class relations over the past century, according to which the most persistent challenge to the capitalist class in the developed economies has come from managers and
technocrats.\textsuperscript{7} Neoliberalism, seen from this perspective, represents the attempt by a weakened capitalist class to re-assert control over a rising managerial elite. This is a distorted picture, and it rests on some questionable historical judgments, such as the authors’ claim that managers constituted a critical base of support for the New Deal.

Despite my reservations and criticisms, \textit{Capital Resurgent} is a major leftist intervention into debates over the past and future of capitalism. Duménil and Lévy have attempted a bold synthesis of economic theory and history that deserves to be widely read and discussed.

REFERENCES


\textsuperscript{7} Though this analysis bears resemblance to ideas advanced by Berle and Means (1933), Burnham (1941) and Galbraith (1967), Duménil and Lévy’s views are distinctive in several respects. They assert that managerial ascendance was facilitated by a political alliance with the working class: managers and workers together imposed a ‘Keynesian compromise’ on capitalists during the middle third of the twentieth century. They also stress that the capitalist class retained a distinct identity and a significant degree of power notwithstanding this compromise. By contrast, in the Soviet Union capitalists were thoroughly dispossessed and managers rose to the position of ruling class. Duménil and Lévy clarify their relationship to prior scholarship on the ‘managerial revolution’ in their (2001), (2002c) and (2005). Their interpretation of the Soviet and Chinese experiences is developed in several French-language writings (e.g. Duménil and Lévy 1998). In Duménil and Lévy (2004b), the authors conclude that the U.S. capitalist class has won the top tier of managers over to the neoliberal project by granting them lucrative retirement packages composed of financial assets.


James Yunker’s *Political Globalization* is the outgrowth of over 40 years of work on the need for and implementation of a world government. According to Yunker one of the aims of this book is to show how resistance to democratic market socialism can be countered with his model for world government (the Federal Union of Democratic Arguments). He also presents a model to counter fears that there would be a massive redistribution of wealth from the First World to the Third World (though some may find these terms dated). The World Economic Equalization Program would transfer investment resources (not finished consumer products) to the Least Developed Countries. Although the book’s ideas are directed primarily to the interests of economists and political scientists, sociologists will also find them valuable.

The book has three parts of three chapters each. “A New Approach to World Government” begin with “Federal World Government: Introduction and Overview” which focuses on the pros and cons of world government. Next “A Pragmatic Blueprint for World Government” focuses on Yunker’s blueprint for World Government including three branches of the proposed world government as well their limitations and authorizations. Chapter three, “Some Historical Background on World Government,” presents an historical background on world government which also includes postwar western designs for a world state.

The next part, “Overcoming the Economic Impediment,” begin, with “World Economic Inequality” devoted to a discussion of the global economic gap and its impact on world peace. “World Economic Inequality” follows with a history of foreign development assistance and an evaluation of its effectiveness. Chapter six, “A World Economic Equalization Program,” focuses on his model of the World Economic Equalization (WEEP) and includes model policy simulations as well as his evaluation of them.


Although Yunker touts *Political Globalization* as addressing the shortcomings of his earlier works, its arguments lack support, conflates history, makes assumptions without empirical evidence, uses some outdated terms, and repeats arguments. These weaknesses undermine the book’s attempts to change opinions on the feasibility of a world government. The appendices for the chapters do elucidate the material to some extent but do not provide a link or support for what the author has proposed. For example, the Appendix to Chapter 1 (Table 2.A.1) gives the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 1995 US dollars and Gross Domestic Product for 207 nations in 2000 does provide potential voting weights for the proposed world government but does not examine why he chose these weights.

The construction of the book does not mesh well with its organization as it does not clarify or define all of its terminology. Yunker examines each argument, but his analysis lacks
continuity. While some of the chapters could stand by themselves, they do not contribute to his overall thesis. The book includes several tables, but it is not entirely clear why. There is a thorough bibliography after each chapter, but many sources date from the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s. There are very few citations in the text.

Yunker’s *Political Globalization* conforms to an academic curriculum. While the book adequately elucidates his vision of world government, it fails to offer a logically structured argument for his claims. Several claims are made that are not substantiated, i.e. p. 10…”the expected rate of future progress of human civilization will be higher if a world government along the lines of the Federal Union of Democratic Nations is established than if no such government is established”. He also states on page 377 “now that ideological conflict within humanity is in sharp decline consequent upon the collapse and dissolution of the USSR….the economic gap between rich and poor nations…has taken over as the single most impediment to the long term…and stability of world government”. Although Yunker does discuss terrorism (p.358), he also argues that if the Cold War had not ended, the consequences of 9/11 could have been far worse – that nuclear conflagration would have been more likely to occur. An emphasis on nuclear strikes ignores other forces that would benefit from a world government, in terms of environmental concerns. In another section, he compares the American Revolutionary War to the world government, stating that with a world government, there would have been no taxation without representation, thusly, it would not have occurred.

Yunker compares the United Nations to his proposed Federal Union of Democratic Nations, credits the UN for making an appreciable contribution to economic and social progress, but not an extraordinary contribution. He maintains that nations would have the right to secede and to maintain their own military, but he does not explain how the right to secede is different in its full effect from the fact that any nation can veto an action.

There is a distinct dearth of scholarship in *Political Globalization*. Yunker presents an economic model for WEEP, but does not defend it against the conventional viewpoint -- namely, that a “large scale economic development system would be an expensive failure.” He does refute some of the objections to the numerical aspect of the WEEP system. Like his blueprint for a world government, he states that the WEEP system does not prove that the system would work, only that it could work. A consistent theme throughout the book is that world government is worth trying even though there is a lack of evidence supporting its benefits.

While this book might be useful to world-systems theorists in terms of bringing together an historical background of attempts to form a world government, the lack of empirical evidence limit its utility. Yunker states that this book is an attempt to bring his proposal from the abstract to the specific, and presents considerable historical and political detail. Still he presents little evidence to support why the Federal Union of Democratic Nations might work where other attempts to create an effective world government have failed.

*Political Globalization* could contribute more to the discussion of world government if much of the extraneous material had been omitted and if the author had used more of an academic tone rather than a colloquial form of presentation. More empirical evidence would have made his arguments more persuasive.
Bringing geopolitics back into the study of international relations is a worthwhile goal. In many ways, Jakub Grygiel’s *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change* does more than this, as Grygiel brings back not only geography, but world history as well. Grygiel’s short but informative study serves as testament to the fact that today, no serious work of political theory can ignore the perspective of the *longue durée*, and even more specifically, the historical experience of non-Western regions and states. Relying on such writers as Fernand Braudel, William McNeill, Frederic Lane, and Owen Lattimore, Grygiel, Chair of International Relations at Johns Hopkins’ Nitze School brings into the political science mainstream a knowledge base that has long formed the mainstay of world-systems analysis. Notwithstanding recent claims regarding the irrelevance of geography in a globalized world dominated by free markets and instantaneous communication, Grygiel argues that the experiences of Venice, the Ottoman Empire and Ming China in negotiating the sixteenth century geopolitical shift from the Eurasian continent to oceanic lanes are directly relevant to current US efforts to adjust to a similar geopolitical shift to the Pacific. However, Grygiel’s overestimation of current US strength and possible misreading of history and of the nature of the ongoing systemic transition also point to significant weaknesses of the new geopolitical paradigm he outlines.

Significantly, Grygiel’s analysis begins with a historical overview of geopolitics from a ‘structures of knowledge’ perspective. The decline of geopolitics in the study of international relations, he contends, was caused by a widening rift between the social and natural sciences. Given its emphasis on environmental factors, geography was increasingly forced out of the social sciences, which focused on the impact of human agency. A complicating factor was the geographic determinism of classical geopolitical theory, especially in its Nazi iteration. As a result, realist theories that have dominated the postwar period in the United States came to eschew geographic factors as largely irrelevant, as they became increasingly abstract and divorced from pragmatic formulations of foreign policy. Ultimately, Grygiel avers, the decline of geopolitics has much more to do with the paradigm change in the field of international relations in the 1930s and 40s than with any purported eclipse of geographic factors by new technologies (p. 3).

In calling for a return to geopolitical models, Grygiel wants to avoid the traditional “geography is destiny” approach of classical theorists such as Mahan, Mackinder, and Haushofer. To this end, he proposes a tripartite conceptual apparatus that distinguishes between *geography*, which includes geological and climatological features that, for the most part, remain unchanged on the scale of human activity; *geopolitics*, which constitutes the human factors in geography, including resource centers and trade networks; and finally, *geostrategy*, which is the geographic
direction of a state’s foreign policy. Whereas geopolitical change occurs very slowly on the level of interstate systems and cannot be effected or predicted even by the strongest or best-informed actors within such systems, geostrategic change can and does take place in the short- and medium-term on the level of individual states and decision-makers. Thus, agency has a palpable impact on policy, and is not overdetermined by either geographic or geopolitical factors, but when a state’s geostrategy is based on a misreading of the underlying geopolitical environment, that state begins to decline as a Great Power (p. 24). In this way, a state’s geostrategy may be affected by the ossification of state bureaucracies, the temptations of short-term gains, or simply by disinterest in hegemony, but geopolitics remains the key variable in a state’s successful pursuit of Great Power status.

The bulk of the book is devoted to demonstrating the accuracy of this contention through three historical examples of states that had become Great Powers by following a sound and balanced geostrategy, but failed to adjust to the sixteenth century geopolitical shift by becoming undisciplined, complacent, or fearful. In the case of Venice, the doges initially made good use of the city’s favorable location between Latin Christendom and the Byzantine Empire to become the western terminus of Eurasian trade networks and the main supplier of Asian goods to the whole of Western Europe. By establishing control over a network of bases and harbors in the Adriatic and the Aegean in the eleventh century, Venice ensured its rise as the premier Great Power in the Mediterranean. But increased competition from the Genoese after the conquest of Byzantium in the Fourth Crusade put pressure on Venice to directly intervene in the power struggles on the Italian terra firma, and ultimately led to its attempted construction of an Italian territorial empire in the fifteenth century. This geostrategic reorientation was, according to Grygiel, also driven by an ideological penchant to support republican governance in Italy (p. 81), but it proved too costly, made too many enemies, and resulted in the neglect of Venice’s eastern interests, and in the failure to modernize its navy. As a result, Venice was outflanked when Iberian powers in possession of oceanic-going vessels gained direct access to Indian Ocean markets and New World mines, and lost its strategic primacy as the importance of the Mediterranean receded. However, despite his emphasis on misguided policy decisions, Grygiel admits that Venice’s geographic position made it very difficult for it to adapt to the geopolitical reorientation of the late 15th and early 16th centuries (p. 86).

In the Ottoman case, Grygiel attempts to demonstrate that, no less than maritime powers, the geostrategy of territorial actors must also be guided by the underlying geopolitical situation. In contrast to traditional analyses, he maintains that the core of the Ottoman Empire was located in the Balkans, and the thrust of its geostrategy was directed toward accessing trade routes in Central Europe and defending its frontier on the Danube (pp. 88-89). Subsequent Ottoman expansion into the Mediterranean and toward the Persian Gulf was therefore conditional on having a stable land border and the absence of serious territorial contenders in the northwest. However, the failure to inflict a decisive defeat on the Portuguese at sea, or on the Safavids on land forced the sultans to reorient their geostrategy back toward Eastern Europe, where they now faced formidable enemies in the form of Poland, Russia, and especially, the Habsburg Empire. For Grygiel, the main reason for the onset of Ottoman decline was the failure to effectively colonize the Balkans by establishing a line of forts and a standing army to defend the Danubian frontier (p.119). This failure to safeguard its main land border doomed efforts to control maritime trade in the Arabian Sea, and the defeat on the outskirts of Vienna in 1683 consigned the Porte to its long-term status as the “Sick Man of Europe”. Yet here, too, the early (and logical) choice to
build the Empire as a territorial power forced the Sultans to defend extensive land boundaries at a time when a maritime strategy in the East would have allowed them to check European expansion (pp. 121-122).

The predicament faced by Ming China was somewhat similar, although it possessed a greater structural capacity for maritime expansion than did the Ottomans. The expulsion of the Mongols in 1368 and the subsequent securing of the ‘perilous frontier’ enabled the Ming emperors to pursue maritime and commercial expansion in Southeast Asia. In this regard, the famed voyages of Cheng Ho in the first half of the 15th century, which established control over the strategic entrepôt at Malacca and then pushed out to control the whole of the Indian Ocean trade were no anomaly, but the pinnacle of a long-term, geopolitically sound geostrategy geared toward the control of the spice trade (pp. 147-149). According to Grygiel, the subsequent Chinese abandonment of this maritime strategy had less to do with the ideological dictates of Neo-Confucianism than with the failure to attain a decisive victory over the Mongols in the north. The high cost of defending the new capital at Beijing, the primarily military strategy toward the steppe nomads, and the ineffective fortification constituted by the Great Wall could have been avoided by adopting a more commercial relationship with the Mongols (p. 136). Failure to do so resulted in the failure to pacify them, and the Mongol annihilation of the Ming army in 1449 proved so disheartening that China abandoned its previous geostrategy in favor of an overwhelmingly defensive posture on all fronts. This change initiated a two-centuries-long decline, as China proved unable to contain a rising threat from the new Jurchen state in Manchuria and the predations of European colonizers in the south (pp. 151-152; 159-160).

For Grygiel, these three historical cases underline the importance grounding of geostrategic decisions in geopolitical reality for today’s policymakers in the US. In opposition to globalizationists, he contends that greater economic interdependence render control of key resources like oil more, not less, important (p. 165). US power continues to be limited by such geopolitical factors as dependence on maritime trade (40% of total US trade), and the need to protect vital sea-lanes by military power. Most importantly for Grygiel, the US is confronted by the recent geopolitical shift to the Pacific, and the accompanying rise of China. As the Chinese pursuit of energy security constitutes a potential threat to US maritime dominance, Grygiel calls on the US to respond by abandoning its Eurasian-oriented anti-Soviet territorialist strategy in favor of a maritime strategy based on smaller but more maneuverable naval and air power, control of the Middle East to threaten China’s energy supply, and increased pressure on Chinese land frontiers through the formation of new regional alliances (pp. 169, 174-175). Though in Grygiel’s view, such a reorientation would be difficult, the fact that the US already provides security to most of its trade partners in East Asia makes its position more analogous to that of the upstart Atlantic powers and not the established 15th century Great Powers (pp. 171-173).

Whatever the superiority of Grygiel’s geopolitical approach over that of the realists and globalizationists, it is clear that his own historical analysis does not fully support his geostrategic recommendations. None of the three Great Powers he examines succeeded in coping with the geopolitical transition of the sixteenth century. The existing pressures and commitments, and the unfavorable geographic location in each case simply proved too overwhelming for Venice, the Ottoman Empire or Ming China to retain their dominant position in their respective regions, and the claim that a change in geostrategy could have led to qualitatively different results remains on the level of counterfactual history. Moreover, Grygiel’s own evidence clearly demonstrates the degree to which the ideological and epistemological structures within each of the states in
question militated against a rapid geostrategic shift. Despite his initial emphasis on knowledge structures, he does not consider the long-term impact of abstract and ahistorical political theory on postwar US policies. Had he raised this question and examined US geostrategy in recent decades in more detail, he would likely have noticed the fundamental weakening of American positions during the Clinton and Bush administrations, which recognized no geopolitical limits on US power. As such, his appraisal of the favorability of the current US situation relative to that of declining Great Powers in the sixteenth century may have been considerably less sanguine. Compared to Grygiel’s suggestions for the US, the Ming inward turn may have been a considerably more rational response to the geopolitical transition, because it preserved the dynasty for another two centuries, and because it maintained China’s status as the premier global commercial center for an even longer period. An anti-China geostrategy, even if based on sound geopolitical principles, may simply be impracticable given the increasing financial and commercial dependence of the US on China. Furthermore, as recent readers of this journal will be aware, it is not yet clear whether the current geopolitical shift heralds a Pacific, an Asian, or a Eurasian age. Thus, Grygiel’s reading of the underlying geopolitical situation may prove to be wrong or premature. The real choice before the US today (as before the Great Powers of the past), as some world-systemists have pointed out, may be between that of a graceful exit from hegemony, and a precipitous decline. In this regard, and in affording greater attention to financial and epistemological factors, the new geopolitics could considerably broaden its scope by fully engaging with world-systems analysis.

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