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LAND DISPOSSESSION AND GLOBAL CRISIS: INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL SECTION ON LAND RIGHTS IN THE WORLD-SYSTEM

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INTRODUCTION

In April 2010 the Florida Atlantic University hosted the 34th annual conference of the Political Economy of the World-System section of the American Sociological Association. The theme of the conference was Land Rights in the World-System. The thought-provoking and well-researched papers that were presented at the conference stimulated a lively debate and exchange of ideas that encouraged us to publish a selection of these papers that linked globalization, capital accumulation, and land rights as a special section in this issue of JWSR.

From a world-historical standpoint, the history of capitalism begins with the transformation of land rights. In one sense, the modern concept of land rights denotes the establishment of bourgeois land rights in the countryside (leading to export-led commercial agriculture) and in the city (as “real estate”). Of course, from the perspective of/within the modern world-system, it is easy to take these forms of property rights for granted and as ever-existing. But this would be missing the massive social transformations that involved centuries of struggles for and against the establishment of bourgeois property rights in land and its usage. While the forms that this transformation took were complex and varied across time and space of the modern world-system, we can distinguish five of its salient features: (1) the transformation of a complex system of customary rights to land usage to legal and written titles to land ownership, (2) the transformation of the concept of property from jurisdiction over ambiguously defined areas to concretely defined (and enclosed) physical spaces, (3) the rationalization of the use of such demarcated landed property as a form of capital and at the service of “primitive” and expanded capital accumulation, (4) the increasing privatization of the earth’s surface through dispossession and displacement of peasants and Indigenous populations, and (5) destruction of nonmarket access to food and self-sustenance and creation of a (mobile) global proletariat that is massively concentrated at the urban centers of the world economy (and often living a life under a regime of “forced underconsumption”) (Araghi 2010a). The complex global history of this process of commodification of land rights can be divided into four historical periods: primitive accumulation, colonialism, developmentalism, and globalization.
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND LAND RIGHTS

This period, roughly between the 15th and the 19th centuries, marks the emergence of bourgeois conceptions of land rights (in the senses discussed above). While the Eurocentric analyses of “primitive accumulation” always focus on the forceful seizure of land from the British yeomanry and the enclosure of the common land by the commercially-minded, wool-exporting, feudal overlords in England, a global history of primitive accumulation and the transformation of land rights will include the violent confiscation of non-European lands and resources. Specifically, global primitive accumulation included the separation of Indigenous populations from the land and the alienation of their customary (communal or tribal) rights to land usage either through massacre (white settlements) or enslavement (physical removal from ancestral or tribal land) (Araghi 2009). Thus we may symbolically use the year 1492 as an expression of two expropriating movements, one inward and one outward; that is on the one hand the beginning of the systematic expropriation of the Americas’ Indigenous populations by conquest, expropriation, and settlements, and, on the other hand, racialized land seizures and population displacements within Castilian Spain (in which the thirst for land accumulation was connected with the emerging transformation of land rights in the world-system). This broad (and non-teleological) interpretation of “global primitive accumulation” links the global transformation of land rights to the rise of industrial capitalism proper in the 19th century.

CAPITALIST COLONIALISM AND LAND RIGHTS

The 19th-century reconfiguration of the global division of labor under British hegemony around the needs of the now dominant regime of industrial capitalism led to a reorganization of land use and land rights on a global scale. Reorganizing world trade in accordance with the law of value, Great Britain and its European competitors alike embarked on a massive global land-grab in their scramble for colonies (Araghi 2003). The colonial land grabs enforced various racialized and gendered regimes of forced labor as a way of constructing export-dependent monocultures that subsidized the reproductive needs of European labor and capital (McMichael 2012). The new incentive to expropriate whole nations for the expanding accumulation of profit and power vastly transformed communal, tribal, and peasant land rights in the colonial world. At the same time, expanding monocultures compromised local food security and ecological sustainability. When the inevitable agro-ecological crises took place, famines (and a liberal preference for the “invisible hand” to guide policy) resulted in massive out-migrations that separated the direct producers from the land. The Great Irish Famine of 1845 to 1849 and the Indian famine of 1881 are cases in point (Woodham-Smith 1991; Davis 2002).

LAND RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENTALISM

Both state socialist and pro-market developmentalisms brought major transformation of land rights via state-sponsored collectivization schemes or land reforms that laid the foundation for postwar waves of “dispossession by displacement.” While the agrarian trajectories of postcolonial nation-states were diverse and had various social histories and determinants, the
postwar developmentalist period saw the simultaneous expansion and contraction of land rights for the postcolonial peasancies (Araghi 1995). On the whole, the contraction of land rights was much greater than the expansion of land rights obtained via land reforms in the Cold War context. As a consequence, a massive number of people who were involved in subsistence agriculture were expropriated and displaced. As formerly self-sufficient agricultural peoples were pushed into the centers of urban capital accumulation, a global housing crisis emerged. A massive commodification of urban housing combined a real estate and construction boom for developers and a housing question for the dispossessed or semi-dispossessed. This was followed by social struggles for land rights in cities by the new and numerous proletarian class in formation.

GLOBALIZATION AND LAND RIGHTS

“Agrarian development in reverse” has been a core component of neoliberal globalization. With respect to land rights, this period has witnessed a vast expansion of bourgeois land rights at the expense of small/partial land-holder remnants of the developmentalist era on the one hand and the rise of powerful “counter enclosure” movements on the other hand (Araghi forthcoming). Specifically with the privatization of agrarian welfare states that operated to the advantage of transnational agribusiness and capitalist farms, the relative abrogation of public land rights and displacement of the postwar era has been followed by aggressive global enclosures and massive contraction of land rights for the world’s agrarian populations and absolute depeasantization on a world-scale (Araghi 2009; 2010a). Neoliberal attacks on rural and urban public land rights were based on the following developments: (1) the liberalization of land markets and total abandonment of land reforms that ostensibly proclaimed a land-to-the-tiller intention, (2) the expansion of price supports for the large agroexport corporations involved in bulk commodity production (and in recent years in biofuel), (3) drastic cuts in farm subsidies and price supports for petty commodity producers and the disengagement of both postcolonial states and the World Bank from irrigation support, (4) an aggressive expansion of the commodification of seeds and seed reproduction, (5) increasing dependence on hydrocarbon farm inputs, and (6) the promotion of agroexports modeled after the colonial division of labor discussed above (in particular, production for export of animal feed and agrofuels). Especially since the financial crisis of 2007, a “food bubble” has been in formation that is partly replacing the collapsed “housing bubble” (Araghi 2008, 2010b). Currently, a global land grab unprecedented since colonial times is underway as speculative investors—who now regard “food as gold”—are acquiring millions of hectares of land through the purchase of land in the global South (Henriques 2008). These land grabs often involve the eviction of local producers and forced expropriations under the rubric of confronting the global food and energy crises (McMichael 2011). According to the latest Oxfam study (2011), “in developing countries, as many as 227 million hectares of land – an area the size of Western Europe – has been sold or leased since 2001, mostly to international investors. The bulk of these land acquisitions has taken place over the past two years, according to ongoing research by the Land Matrix Partnership” (emphasis added).

The papers presented at the PEWS conference address many of the issues broadly outlined above. In the opening article Immanuel Wallerstein relates the emerging crisis of the world-system to the history of land rights, global ecology, group formation and social movements, and the dilemma of the global (developmentalist) left. Charles Geisler deconstructs the reemerging (neocolonial) discourse of terra nullius and land grabs in Africa. Phillip Hough
and Jennifer Bair critically consider the link between accumulation by dispossession and the Polanyian-inspired conceptualizations of counter-movements, offering an alternative, historically specific interpretation of the rise and development of the Unidad Cafetero Nacional (UCN) movement in Colombia. Similarly, Astra Bonini emphasizes the historical specificity of the global regimes of accumulation and their trade strategies in assessing the consequences of cash crops and extractive export orientation. Ganesh K. Trichur develops an interesting challenge to the accumulation by dispossession model in his examination of China. He argues China’s development unfolded on its own terms, and while land grabs did occur in China, the state selectively allowed foreign capital in its coastal zones, portending a future of more equitable land use. In his study of South Africa, Ben Scully suggests that a return to the land-labor-livelihood framework can help revive contemporary labor studies in South Africa and for our current global circumstances by knitting labor research with land rights and by recognizing households as units of resources, including wages, informal earnings, and land. In our only paper on urbanization, quite possibly an indication of the dearth of recent world-systems analyses of this process, Andrew K. Jorgenson and James Rice draw attention to the prevalence of slum dwelling and its impact on children’s health. Through a panel regression analysis, Jorgenson and Rice provide one of the first empirical studies that demonstrate urban slum prevalence as a distinct and statistically significant variable for explaining a rise in child mortality rates.

The 34th Annual PEWS conference was a pleasure to host. The papers presented in this special issue of JWSR capture, at least to some extent, the eventful and engaging discussions that occurred over the few days when PEWS colleagues met, presented, and socialized. We hope they make a contribution to the ongoing discussions and debates on this topic of vital urgency to so many people around the world. We sincerely thank the contributors of this section for their time, patience, and participation.
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LAND, SPACE, AND PEOPLE:
CONSTRAINTS OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY

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ABSTRACT

The coming into existence of the capitalist world-economy created new constraints on utilizing the land for productive purposes. The single most important change is that it established a systematic legal basis for what is called title to the land. Title to the land is fundamentally a political question masked by a legal veneer. The amount of land that is governed by title is, even today, not 100% of the global land surface. But it has grown as a percentage of the total global land surface throughout the history of the modern world-system. Population growth has led to two forms of expansion. There is extensive growth, the bringing of more and more land areas into the system of titled land. But there is also intensive growth, the ever greater concentration of the population of the world into close-contact areas. We call this urbanization. The world left faces a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, the world left has stood for measures that would reduce the enormous real north-south gap. On the other hand, the world left (or at least a growing portion of it) is standing against further commodification of land rights and further ecological degradation of the world. The two strategies are contradictory and incompatible one with the other. Land rights stand as the crucial deciding point.

INTRODUCTION

The land was there before the existence of a capitalist world-economy. And people lived on the land and off the land. The relationship different peoples had to the land they used in one way or another varied considerably. There were different customary rules about rights to utilize the land. The crucial point was that these rules very seldom existed in written form.

Some peoples were essentially nomadic, which meant they physically moved over time from place to place, although the range of places may have been constrained by customary agreements. Other peoples engaged in settled agriculture, which usually implied some right to land usage, and some possibility of inheritance of these rights. In many situations, there were persons who did not use the land themselves for production but claimed the right to receive

transfers of the usufruct in one form or another from the direct users. Generically, we may call them overlords, who often repaid these transfers by offering some kind of protection to the direct producers. It was seldom the case that individuals, either direct users or overlords, had the kind of title to the land that legitimated the sale of their rights to others. The coming into existence of the capitalist world-economy changed all this in fundamental ways, creating new constraints on utilizing the land for productive purposes. It is these constraints that I wish to explore in this paper, which raises more questions than it offers a series of analytic propositions about land rights in the world-system.

TITLE TO THE LAND

The single most important change imposed by the modern world-system is that it established a systematic legal basis for what is called title to the land. That is to say, rules were created by which an individual or a corporate entity could "own" land outright. Owning land—that is, property rights—meant that one could use the land in any way one wanted, subject only to specific limitations established by the laws of the sovereign state within which this unit of land was located. Land to which one had title was land that one could bequeath to heirs or sell to other persons or corporate entities.

How did one acquire title to land that previously had no title in this specific legal sense? The answer by and large was that one seized such land and simply proclaimed oneself owner of the land. Sometimes this occurred by legal authorization from a superoverlord (like a king). And sometimes it occurred in situations of conquest of a region by a state, which then authorized such seizures. Usually the conquering state initially authorized such seizures to participants in the conquest. And then later, this authorization might have been extended to anyone the conquering state in question wished to permit to seize the land. Generally, this was considered "development" of the land, or in that wonderful French expression, _mise en valeur_. Let us dwell for a moment on the French expression - in wide use until at least 1945. Literally, the word _valeur_ means "value." So if one put something (_mise_) into value, one means that it then acquired value within a capitalist economic system. Presumably, before the _mise en valeur_, it did not have such value; and afterwards, it did.

Of course, in almost every case, this land previously had been "used" for some purpose by someone. However, once title was granted to a seizer, the person or group that previously "used" the land lost whatever customary rights they had had, or thought they had had, to the land. Quite often, they were literally evicted from the land. Or else, they were allowed to remain on the land in some subordinate capacity, as defined by the person who now held title to the land.

Such seizure of previously untitled land has been going on for the past five centuries. It is still going on today in whatever units of land still remain somehow outside the domain of land to which there is legal title.

Seized land may, under certain political conditions, be reseized by persons who do not have legal title. This is largely done by what we call "squatting" on the land. There are today organized social movements which proclaim the moral and political right to squat, particularly if the land in question is not being used actively, or if the person who has title is a distant landlord.
In many cases, the squatters are actual cultivators of the land who, however, do not have legal title. For example, the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra* (MST) is a powerful social movement in Brazil that specifically works to permit reseizure of the land. They seek further, so far without much success, to get the Brazilian government to legitimate such reseizure. Squatting also occurs in urban zones in unoccupied buildings.

Of course, the government itself can reseize land, by a legal process called eminent domain. This has often occurred in various parts of the world. Normally to invoke eminent domain the government must proclaim some social interest of the state in preempting usage of the land. They may seize the land of small landowners in order to give it to larger landowners, in order that the latter "develop" it in some way that is deemed more productive. But the government may also do it as a political gesture, to take land from persons considered outside/foreign settlers and "restore" it to persons considered somehow indigenous to the state.

Both government seizure for "development" and squatting can, and do, occur not only in rural areas, where the land is used for some agrarian purpose, but in urban areas where the land is used first of all for housing. Government seizures on behalf of corporate housing developers occur with some frequency. But seizure by squatting is also commonplace. These days, large urban areas, particularly in the global South, have extensive zones of settlement (such as *bidonvilles*, *favelas*, etc.) in which there is such squatting - sometimes tolerated de facto by the legal authorities, sometimes repressed, provided the state has sufficient means to suppress it.

The basic point is that title to the land is fundamentally a political question masked by a legal veneer. Title to the land may or may not be enforced by legal authorities, who are thereby making a political decision. In this regard, Proudhon's famous slogan "property is theft" is no doubt the most apt description of land title.

The main ongoing legal and political issue is what happens after the initial seizure. If a piece of property is acquired by theft, and is passed down to descendants for multiple generations thereafter, or sold to others, does de facto continuity of legal ownership confer either moral or legal rights to the land? This is the issue raised today by movements of so-called Indigenous peoples that are laying claim either to recovery of land (full ownership) or at least to financial compensation for land that had been seized–in many cases, centuries earlier.

Virtually the entire land area of so-called lands of settlement was originally seized in this manner. This applies notably to areas of overseas European settlement–North America, Australasia, the southern cone of Latin America, southern Africa, and Israel. It applies, however, as well to the areas of purely land-based European expansion, as Russia into Siberia and the Caucasus. Actually, of course, the same process is to be found in the expansion in those areas wherein stronger non-European groups move into adjoining areas that are weaker politically. This is what has happened historically in China, in India, and in the many parts of Africa that were not White settler areas.

The main point is that the process of legitimating ownership by legal title is a fundamental process of the capitalist world-economy. And its origin almost always lay in seizure by force. But since it has been a virtually universal practice, undoing this process is akin to leveling the Himalayas or the Alps. I suppose it might be technically possible, but it is politically impossible. This does not mean that adjustments cannot be made as a result of pressure by social
movements. But any adjustments would necessarily constitute unsatisfactory compromises of mutually incompatible assertions of moral and legal rights.

Why do people seize land? The obvious primary answer is that it is economically profitable in some way to do so. It may be profitable because the land offers good possibilities for production for the market. But it may also be indirectly profitable because it pushes some people off the land, and such persons may then have to seek remunerative employment elsewhere and thereby serve the need of capitalist producers elsewhere.

Of course, some of the land seized may not in itself offer much opportunity for profitable production. It may be seized for "strategic" reasons - to defend the collectivity of owners from counterpressures or countermovements, to guarantee the possibilities for long-range transportation of merchandise, or simply to deny the use of the land to other states or their citizens.

SPACE

The amount of land that is governed by title is, even today, not 100% of the global land surface. But it has grown as a percentage of the total global land surface throughout the history of the modern world-system. Some people have always fought back, resisting the demand to create title on the land they have customarily used. And some people have escaped the consequences of their land having been seized by fleeing to other land areas that are more remote from the persons engaged in doing the seizing. This is what James Scott has called "the art of not being governed." It accounts for the emergence and creation of zones in, for example, high mountainous areas, which are considered both "traditional" and "primitive" by the holders of titled land rights. These same zones, however, are considered zones of libertarian resistance by those who have thus escaped. These zones are as doubtfully "traditional" (that is, pre-modern) as most other phenomena we like to brand negatively as traditional.

The basic pressure on those who have sought to escape the process of the assertion of restrictive land rights has been population growth. We know that the population of the world has been growing steadily for the past 500 years. With only marginal exceptions— the results of landfills—the area of the globe on which people can live has remained the same. So, there are continuously more people per square mile globally.

Population growth has led to two forms of expansion. There is extensive growth, the bringing of more and more land areas into the system of titled land. But there is also intensive growth, the ever greater concentration of the population of the world into close-contact areas. We call this urbanization. This is a process no one doubts and which, in the last fifty years, has accelerated at a breathtaking rate, such that we have moved into a world of multiple megalopolises, with the prospect of still more and still larger ones in the decades to come.

The two processes together - extensive and intensive occupation of land areas governed by the legal processes of the world-system - have created a whole range of additional constraints on the ways in which the capitalist world-economy operates. It seems elementary to observe that the situation of more people on the same amount of land creates a pressure on every conceivable kind of resource that humans need to survive. It also seems elementary to observe that if humans
appropriate more land, they inevitably have to eliminate competing users of the land—mostly fauna but also flora.

While these processes have been in operation throughout the history of the capitalist world-economy, they have become a cultural and political issue particularly in the last fifty years, as the ecological effects of the modern world-system have become more and more obvious and the negative aspects more and more blatant.

The first problem is water. Water is essential to life processes. The amount of usable water in the world is not unlimited. One of the controversial features of land title is the degree to which it involves total control of water resources that are accessible on the titled land in question. The water conflicts between settled farmers and ranchers are so central to the modern world that much modern fiction is devoted to discussing it. The conflict between rural users and urban consumers is equally notorious.

What happens as a consequence? Governments make decisions about allocations, which they then implement by various alterations of the land surface in order to ensure certain kinds of flows of water that give preferential access to water to particular groups. The construction of dams is one tried and true technique of doing this. When dams change the flow of water and access to the water, they of course affect most immediately the land rights of owners and users in or near the trajectory of the rivers that are being dammed.

There is, however, an additional, more long-term effect. The process of altering flows and access leads over time to more extensive usage of the available water and eventually to desertification. This thereby reduces the available water supply at the very same time as the numbers of persons seeking water worldwide has increased.

Furthermore, this is more than a question of the use of water that is located in rivers and lakes and in the water table underneath the land areas. The demand for food resources leads to more and more intensive usage of the ocean areas as sources of food supply. Title to ocean areas has been increasingly asserted by states. The historic claim that a three-mile zone at the edge of land frontiers falls under a state's sovereignty has escalated in recent decades into claims for a 200-mile zone. And tomorrow still wider zones will almost surely be claimed.

The commodification of water - by individuals, by enterprises, and by states - has expanded enormously, as the reality of worldwide water shortages has become more evident. Of course, commodification of a vital resource means that there results increasingly unequal allocation of the resource. Water struggles have thus become a central focus worldwide of the class struggle.

What is true of water is equally true of food and energy resources. If there are more people in the world, it means that more total food resources are needed. Since land is increasingly appropriated for human use, there is less room for animals that roam. The world has turned therefore to farming animal resources—that is, concentrating their location in small, enclosed areas, controlled by ever larger corporate enterprises. This not only polarizes distribution but has important negative health consequences both for the humans and the animals.

The interstate conflicts over access to energy have become the everyday story of the media. What is also much discussed these days is the ecological dangers resulting from the kinds of energy utilized, and its impact on world climatic conditions. This is in turn leading to one of
the last, but not least, commodifications, that of the air we breathe. Title to land meant initially
title to what was on the land surface. But quite quickly, it was extended to mean what lies
beneath the land surface, and more recently to what is in the oceans. Now it has begun to be
asserted to the air rights above the land surface.

As more and more goods are produced on less and less land area per person in the world,
the issue of the disposal of toxic waste has loomed heavily. Who has title to toxic waste, and
where can it be deposited in a system in which there is title to land? We know what is happening.
As the dangers of toxic waste to human survival have become more well-known, it has become
less and less legitimate to dispose of it in the public domain. This is not to say that such disposal
has ceased— far from it— but it has become less legitimate and therefore the disposers act more
secretively.

The alternative to disposal in the public domain is disposal by purchased access to land
(or water) zones to which others have title. Where this can be done is of course in direct
correlation with the relative strength of zones within the world-system. In wealthier zones,
political resistance to purchased waste disposal sites is strong and relatively effective. This is the
so-called NIMBY phenomenon. The purchase of rights tends therefore to mean increasingly
purchases in the global South, which further increases the polarization of the world-system.

Once again, this affects the land rights of those closest to the disposal areas. But it also
affects the long-term class struggle— in this case not over access but over non-access.

The basic issue can be readily summed up. More people equals more resource needs. To
the extent that resources are allocated within a system of title to land rights, the result is fewer
resources per person, more commodification, more ecological damage, and more acute class
struggle worldwide.

PEOPLE AND PEOPLES

After 500 years of the operation of a capitalist world-economy, where are we today, in terms of
both people and peoples? That is, what has been the impact on the lives of individuals? And what
has been the impact on the lives of groups? And perhaps most importantly, what can either
individuals or groups do about this impact? And what are they doing about it?

If we start with people as individuals or quite small groups like families, it is quite clear
that their options and their freedom of action is constrained in very important ways as the result
of creating a system in which the use of land is governed by so-called title, that is, by property
relations.

It is reasonably important to look carefully at the concept of freedom of action. At a
superficial level, acquiring title to land seems to enhance individual rights. The owner can
dispose of this property as the owner wishes, subject to a small number of legal limitations. The
owner, it is argued, benefits directly from the owner's work input, in that the owner can retain the
benefits of improving the property.

This is no doubt more or less accurate. However, it leaves out of the equation the unequal
strength of different property-owners, and therefore of the ability of larger, stronger owners to
outcompete smaller ones and in effect force a transfer of ownership. This is what we call concentration of capital.

An obvious simple example can illustrate this. Take two instances of where collective property without individual rights to title existed and then was transformed into individual rights to a small portion of the collective property. One would be a rural zone in the global South previously outside the system of titled land rights. A second would be collective property in the ex-Communist states in the period following 1989. In both cases, mandated privatization of the property created multiple small owners who, however, were unable to maintain the property in a market situation. They thereupon sold their rights to some larger entrepreneur. At the end of this process, they had lost all rights within the erstwhile collective property, and economically were likely to be worse off than before.

As we have seen, this is only a small part of the story. If we look at the demographic and ecological consequences of the system over 500 years, we observe a considerable and growing polarization of the world-system which, at an individual level, has translated into a vast growing population who live below what is considered the "poverty level." This is often masked by the considerably improved situation for perhaps 15-20% of the world's population.

What has happened to individual people is perhaps less dramatic than what has happened to peoples. Groups of people - peoples - all like to assert their eternal existence and their eternal moral right to exist and persist. This is of course mythology. Groups come into and out of existence all the time, and always have.

Is there something different about this process within the framework of the modern world-system? Well, yes and no. The answer is no if one emphasizes the fact that groups have lives, that they are constantly changing in structure and design, in values and boundaries, in size and importance.

But the answer is yes if we look at how groups come into and out of existence in the modern world-system, as contrasted with how they did so previously. It has very much to do with land rights. The modern world-system has made possible, via technological improvements, larger and more rapid movements of peoples. We lump all these movements under the vague cover label of migration. But this greater technological facility of movement has occurred at the same time that there has been created an historical system that is composed of so-called sovereign states within an interstate system. These states have boundaries (albeit changing ones). And by systemic definition, there are no zones outside this carving up of the world into sovereign states (except marginally, and perhaps not for very much longer, the once totally-unoccupied Antarctic).

Sovereign states, as part of their mechanism of survival as institutions, have by and large all sought to become so-called nation-states. That is, they have all (or almost all) practiced an underlying Jacobin ideology of integration. They have wanted to insist that the multiple peoples located within their borders become part of the one people that is being asserted as the legitimate expression of membership in the community of the state. In addition, in-migrants to the state have been regularly asked to surrender previous cultural identities and submit to the dominant one of the putative nation-state.
Once again, however, this is essentially a political question. And in the past half-century, there have been important movements of resistance to this process. The resistance first of all has been the work of groups that consider themselves somehow more indigenous to the region than others - for example, within the settler states. Or they have been the resistance of groups who have been conquered by more powerful neighbors and are seeking to "revive" their language or their autonomous institutions. Today centrifugal forces are coming to be at least the equal of centripetal forces within the political-cultural lives of the world's states. The virtues of being a pluri-national state or a multi-cultural state are now being proclaimed in some countries.

The hard, cold fact is that there is no real possibility of creating truly multi-national states with different policies in different zones concerning land rights, except possibly when the so-called Indigenous populations are an absolute majority of the population, as in Bolivia. The clearest instance of this impossibility is occurring right now in Ecuador.

Ecuador is considered by world standards a state governed by left forces, one of the most radical politically in Latin America. The current president, Rafael Correa, was elected with the strong support of the federation of Indigenous movements in Ecuador, CONAIE. He is today in deep conflict with CONAIE. What happened?

The policies that give Correa the image of a political radical in today's world is first of all that he takes much geopolitical distance from the United States, and secondly his stance in regard to the foreign mining companies that have held various kinds of concessions in mineral-rich Ecuador. He moved to revoke many of these concessions in order to force the mining companies to renegotiate the terms of their arrangements. He did this in order to obtain far greater revenues for the Ecuadorian government in order to "develop" in various ways the country. Such attempts to reduce the advantages of foreign corporations in favor of higher revenues for the states in which these corporations operate have been a standard element in world politics for at least half a century and have been generally considered to be a mark of a left position in world politics.

CONAIE is not opposed to reducing the power and advantages of foreign mining corporations. But they represent those parts of the population who are still largely living on land that is not titled. The groups they represent also are disproportionately located in the regions in which mining has been or will be undertaken. They therefore are the most immediately subject to the negative ecological consequences of such operations as well as to the land displacement consequences that have occurred or may occur in the future.

The position of CONAIE is that Ecuador should change its constitution to proclaim itself a plurinational state. Furthermore, they demand the right of the Indigenous communities to give prior consent before extractive projects occur in their region. In part, they intend to deny such rights, although it is possible they will also in part simply demand control over the income that may come from consent, control that would otherwise fall to the Ecuadorian state.

Correa and CONAIE have also come into conflict over water. In this matter too, the government wished to control access to water resources, including the possibility of privatizing it. CONAIE insisted on absolute public and community control over water resources.

Finally, there was a dispute over the prospection for oil in a national park area called Yasuni. Correa took the position that the government might renounce such prospection if countries in the global North compensated it for the loss of revenue, a proposal that did not go
very far. He has reserved the right to proceed with prospection, with the strong support of the national oil corporation, Petroecuador.

This account of recent events in Ecuador illustrates the fundamental dilemma of the world left. On the one hand, the world left, especially in the global South, has stood for measures that would reduce the enormous real gap with the global North. Correa is simply pursuing this objective. On the other hand, the world left (or at least a growing portion of it) is standing against further commodification of land rights and further ecological degradation of the world. CONAIE is simply pursuing this objective.

The two strategies are contradictory and incompatible one with the other. Land rights stand as the crucial deciding point. It is not at all clear today which way the world left, as social movement, intends to go. At the moment, collectively it seems to be trying to go in both directions at the same time. This is difficult, indeed probably impossible. The conflicts within the world left about their fundamental strategy of global change risks canceling all possibility of a successful outcome in the continuing struggle over the successor system to a capitalist world-economy that is in structural crisis.
NEW TERRA NULLIUS NARRATIVES AND THE GENTRIFICATION OF AFRICA’S “EMPTY LANDS”

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**ABSTRACT**

Extraterritorial ownership and control of sub-Saharan African land have a long and troubled history. This research investigates a much-studied practice—the recent enclosure of African land and resources—but asks a little-studied question: how are non-Africans reasserting terra nullius narratives of the past to justify the present transformation of African landscapes? The answer suggested here lies in a bulwark of *de facto* terra nullius claims couched in security needs of the global North and referenced to the low density of Africa’s rural population, its land and labor under-utilization, the ambiguity of its land tenure and related low yields, and its “arrested” civilization. *De facto* terra nullius is neither narrow in scope nor static in application. It is stirring again as a potent justificatory logic for north-south land relations.

Key words: *Terra nullius*, Africa, land grab, food security, Land Question

**INTRODUCTION**

Many African nations are today experiencing land annexations by off-shore interests, called investments by some and land-grabs by others. These enclosures entail millions of acres and affect millions of African lives. They are hastened by the mounting security concerns associated with production uncertainties in global food and energy supplies as well as by a new speculative mood arising from ashes of the prolonged financial crisis in the north. Broadly, the present work is about the spill-over effects of these twin forces as they cascade on Africa. My narrower interest is in narratives used to justify these annexations, in particular new strands of the old doctrine, *terra nullius* (“land of no one”). As a pretext for control if not ownership in distant lands, the doctrine survives as a legal tool of the global North; more importantly, it is reappearing in potent *de facto* forms that have yet to be acknowledged and which are facilitating the spread of African land claims by non-Africans.¹

¹The “global North” is defined here less according to geography than by high levels of per capita wealth and use of these assets to import needed food, animal feed, and biofuels. Complicating this, some of Africa’s newest land enclosures result from African investor initiatives or from collaborations between African and non-African interests (GRAIN 2008; Rice 2009).
The global North is increasingly adept at casting its security concerns in transboundary terms and at treating African land and resources as global commons awaiting legitimate and benevolent enclosure. Invoking security to justify intervention in the lives and property of others opens floodgates of legal power and precedent. Most familiar are the security concerns of war (Agamben 2005) and natural disasters (Buell 2003; Nolan and Rodriguez 2006). But insecurity narratives are expanding. The current historical conjuncture is distinguished by food and energy apprehensions driving land procurement through a variety of means and framed in security terms. Food security in capital-rich nations assumes mission-level necessity and self-justification on a global scale, following in the footsteps of former missions such as civilizing, evangelizing, and modernizing (Crosby 1986; Armitage 1998). Terra nullius narratives justified these missions in the past, and, as we shall see, are embroidering potent new security missions today.

The poorest continent by various measures, Africa is particularly susceptible to off-shore annexations. It has the lowest per capita income of any world region and is stricken with many barriers to change (Toulmin 2006). At least some of its small producers, who cultivate 80 percent of Africa’s farmland (IAASTDT 2009), might welcome a second green revolution and related investments (Cotula and Vermeulen 2009), if an enforceable international code of conduct accompanied them. Many non-Africans construe enclosure through market mechanisms as valid, long overdue, and mutually beneficial to Africans and non-Africans (e.g., Blumenthal 2009; Deininger 2011). Yet others are cautious if not skeptical, given the costs and involuntary transformations such interventions entail (Daniel and Mittal 2009; De Schutter 2011). This ongoing debate will not guide the present chapter so much as the following question: how do investors, mostly foreign, in Africa’s agricultural lands justify broad-gauged intervention in the court of global public opinion, given that food security in the south has at least as much gravity as that of the north?

THE LAND QUESTION

Against a background of high and on-going levels of hunger and malnourishment in the poorer countries of the world, 2007, 2008, and 2011 all saw severe perturbations in prices and a virtual end to the era of “cheap food” (McMichael 2009; Barrett 2011). Food insecurity was further fanned by biofuel production and other competing land uses. Investor-speculators lost little time in moving capital into the breach at levels few would have imagined in the previous decade (Mitchell 2009; Smaller and Mann 2009). Agro-industrial firms have, with encouragement from the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation and Foreign Investment Advisory Service, gone to ever greater lengths to vertically integrate the production of food and fuel (Daniel and Mittal 2009). This translated into aggressive land assembly strategies offshore and posed new issues of landlordism. Whereas “The Land Question” of the past riveted on landlordism within the global North, the central land question of today may well be who will manage Africa’s abundant land and resources in the future—non-African landlords or Africans themselves—and using what justification?

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2 For an overview of recent developments in such a code, see Meinzen-Dick and Markelova (2009).

3 Historically, The Land Question referred to the problems of landlordism in nineteenth-century Ireland and to tenant displacements that followed. Landlordism came with conquest and colonization by English and Scottish elites, as did crushing tenancy on a grand scale. The food insecurity of the Irish peasantry culminated in the famines of the
African nations depend on financial inflows from non-African nations consisting of official development assistance (ODA), investment flows (portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI), trade credits, and remittances. All have been negatively affected in the financial crisis recently emanating from the north (Naudé 2010). Rising export demand and commodity prices were vital to African economic viability until the crisis, but have plummeted since (IMF 2009). Since late 2008, African growth rates “came tumbling down with amazing speed,” spawning unemployment, income loss, and impoverization (Naudé 2010). Governments in the region sought to be proactive, negotiating assistance from the IMF, monitoring their economies, providing emergency financing for on-going infrastructure and development projects, and seeking new FDI (Fosu and Naudé 2009). In the process, large swaths of Ethiopia, Sudan, Mali, South Africa, Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, and other African nations went up for rent, sale, swap, speculation, or contract farming. Estimates are that, globally, between 37 and 49 million hectares were consolidated for export agricultural ventures between 2006 and 2009 (Daniel and Mittal 2009) and that another 30 million hectares were added during the first half of 2010 (Baxter 2010).

These land encroachments for Africa are estimated at “hundreds of square miles” (Rice 2009: page number?) and can consume large swaths of individual countries: the attempted purchase by South Korea’s Daewoo Logistics Corporation of 1.3 million hectares in Madagascar in 2009 would have reduced that country’s arable land by one-third had it been consummated (Cotula et al. 2009). But even the more generous estimates understate the extent of enclosure for several reasons: data inadequacy (EOE 2009); exclusion of transactions under 1,000 hectares in some studies (e.g., Cotula et al. 2009); and inattention to sub-surface “lands” and resources (minerals, oil, water), to forests and bioprospecting zones, and to areas set aside for carbon sequestration, waste-stream storage, foreign military bases, and other off-shore arrangements listed under the name of domestic business partners (e.g., Unruh 2008). In Africa and elsewhere, up to 90 percent of the enclosed land is the result of private land dealing and not subject to easy monitoring (Hall 2010), and many transfers are subject to drivers that impose considerable variability on total estimates (Meinsen-Dick and Markelova 2009).

TERRA NULLIUS NARRATIVES, OLD AND NEW

For centuries, empires have coveted lands beyond their boundaries to enrich and empower themselves (Wallerstein 1967; Armitage 1998). Invariably, they crafted ideological mantles to account for territorial expansion (Manifest Destiny, Divine Providence, White Man’s Burden, etc.), if not to “save” peripheral places from barbarism and savagery (Mehta 1999). In the process of civilizing, pacifying, and subduing, expansionary interests refined the theory of terra nullius in expanding their dominion (Weaver 2005). Australia is the best known laboratory of the terra nullius doctrine in both its colonial and post-colonial era. And, though ruled a legal fiction by the High Court of Australia in 1992 (Mabo vs. Queensland), the narrative has proven resilient in both its de jure and de facto forms. Surprisingly, even after 1992, terra nullius still officially applies to vast portions of Australia seen as “truly uninhabited,” held as freehold or leasehold, or

1840s (Pomfret 1930; Hugget 1975). For different treatments of The Land Question in Africa and African, see Havnevik (1997) and Williams (2007).
taken by the Crown for public works (Godden 1999:3). But informal expressions of *terra nullius* are thriving in other parts of the world, with immediate relevance to contemporary Africa. With little fanfare these narratives are surfacing as partial justification for what Araghi (2000) has called the “great global enclosure” of our time.

Scholars trace the beginnings of *terra nullius* a legal doctrine to the Roman law principle of *res nullius* (“a thing without owner”) (Banner 2005). Tellingly, as the Roman Empire grew, *terra nullius* came to describe all lands beyond the imperial boundaries. In Romano-centric jurisprudence, these lands were by definition not “owned” by anyone and were fair game for annexation. To the Roman mind, such lands awaited Romanization, a service the Empire was eager provide in Gaul, Germania, Britannia, Spain and, not incidentally, in its “granary” of North Africa (Mommsen 1974; Raven 1993).

The Judeo-Christian roots of *terra nullius* are relevant as well. Bauman (2009) investigates this tradition in her thorough genealogy of *ex nihilo* philosophy. In her view, *ex nihilo* was used to defend monotheism of the center against polytheism of the periphery as Rome became Christianized, and this became groundwork for *terra nullius* narratives during colonial conquests by later Christian monarchs (*ibid*:12). From this perspective, *terra nullius* faithfully re-enacted the Euro-Christian dogma of creation: something providential arising from nothing (*ex nihilo*). It was but a short and convenient step to inscribe ownerlessness on emptiness (*terra nullius*)—a void awaiting the dominion of monotheists and their laws.

As New World frontiers opened, *terra nullius* further cemented. The writings of John Locke depicted the world in its original state of nature as owned in common (Judge 2002); but as many have noted, ownership by all equates with ownership by none, the equivalent of *terra nullius*. More explicit attention to the concept appeared in the *Commentaries on the Laws of England* by Sir William Blackstone ([1765] 1979). The *Commentaries* were frequently referenced by colonial administrators and, even today, enjoy wide authority on matters of ownership. Blackstone ([1765] 1979) wrote:

> Plantations, or colonies in distant countries, are either such where the lands are claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desert and uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country; or where, when already cultivated, they have been either gained by conquest, or ceded to us by treaties. And both these rights are founded upon the law of nature, or at least upon that of nations. (107)

Blackstone’s emphasis on “desert” and “uncultivated” is relevant to today’s food security discourse. It suggests that under-cultivated lands (in Africa or elsewhere) might qualify as *terra nullius* or sites where insufficient labor and land have been mixed to yield real ownership (Reynolds 1996). Taking a page from the Romans, the British deployed *terra nullius* in Africa within 20 years of Blackstone’s *terra nullius* assertion (Banner 2005). Along with other Europeans, they pursued such claims well into the twentieth century (Adams and Mulligan 2003). “From Senegal to Malawi,” according to Berry (2002:7), “French and British authorities

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4 In 1992 Australia’s High Court upheld Indigenous common law rights (court-determined) to land title in *Mabo and Others v. State of Queensland*. However, “[p]opulist views to the contrary, the *Mabo* case did not grant land rights to indigenous Australians,” but rather determined the circumstances under which land had not been taken from them (Godden 1999:5). The *Wik* judgment of 1996 salvaged many of the land rights associated with pastoral leases granted by statute to non-Indigenous people, blunting the potential land recovery of *Mabo* for Aborigines.
claimed that ‘by right of conquest,’ all ‘vacant and ownerless’ land belonged to the colonial state.” The judgment of “vacant and ownerless” often rested on cursory (or no) inspection and applied to vast tracts that were then sold to European buyers and private concessionaires to “develop” the land, typically by exploiting and exporting resources.

Summarizing, *terra nullius* remains a viable international legal doctrine and is stirring again as a justificatory logic in north-south land relations. It is neither narrow in scope nor static in application. The line between what is “uncultivated” and “under-cultivated” is blurring, opening whole continents to new narratives and complex core-periphery interventions (Bauman 2009). In *de jure* as well as *de facto* terms, these narratives help frame market-led land deals in Africa as legitimate and necessary solutions to food insecurity in the north.

**DE FACTO TERRA NULLIUS**

Sub-Saharan Africa is under enclosure pressure from without for multiple reasons, including its ample and “underemployed” labor force, its “undervalued” lands and “surplus” waters, and hospitable ecological conditions for food production. *De facto terra nullius* assertions regarding these resources are no less instrumental than earlier *de jure* forms on other continents. As narratives, they are frequently expressed by non-Africans in describing Africa as under-populated and disease-ridden, as ambiguously owned and under-utilized, as intractably poor, and as a “civilization void.” Let us consider each in turn.

**Underpopulation**

Low population density is a keystone in enclosure logics in Africa and elsewhere (e.g., Raffles 2002; Bashford 2007; Grain 2008). But because few arable places attractive to investors are uninhabited, the demographic construct has shifted to relative rather than absolute population conditions. Where Africa is concerned, the case for food security in the north is explained by the north’s greater population (e.g., China, Germany, or South Korea) and/or in terms of relative purchasing power. Even the Gulf States with low population densities (e.g., Saudi Arabia) make the case that Africa is relatively empty and could profitably serve as their “plantation.” Cotula and colleagues (2009) defend northern entitlements in Africa as follows:

> On the demand side, population growth, increasing urbanization rates (which expand the share of the world’s population that depends on food purchases) and changing diets (particularly growth in meat consumption by middle classes in large industrializing countries) appear among the factors pushing up global food demand. For example, while cereal agriculture in the Gulf countries is in irreversible decline [due to water scarcity], the population of the region will double from 30 million in 2000 to nearly 60 million by 2030. (53-4)

Justifying land transfers using demographic imperatives, though widespread, is of course problematic. It fails to take account of society-wide densities that include rapidly populating urban centers and it skirts ethical issues such as unbidden human and animal diseases that have hollowed out African landscapes for generations (Crosby 1986; Adams and Mulligan 2003). Instead, the impression of Africa as a “continent off the grid” is reinforced by images of semi-vacant and under-cultivated rural zones inhabited by migratory animals, subsistence villagers,
and ever-mobile tribal herders. In this framing, poorly equipped small-holder cultivators are unlikely to achieve food security for themselves or others without injections of capital, education, health care, and land reforms. They live in chronic food deficit and face the perpetual trap of poverty that undermines their nutrition and health and keeps death rates high (FAO 2009). The narrative is often unmistakable: changes in ownership, technology, and business organization could stabilize population, rejuvenate the under-cultivated periphery, link it to prospering global commodity chains, and end the requiem for rural Africa.

Underutilized Land and Labor

A second narrative, overlapping with the first, is the ascription of under-utilized African land and labor (De Schutter 2011). This attribution assumes several forms. One is the broad-brush use of “wilderness” as fact and metaphor to describe Africa. For some, if not many, food security advocates, wilderness is a suspect land use category, whether in reference to the 1.5 million square kilometers in African parks and protected areas or to the underpopulated and “inefficiently” used zones referred to above. Wilderness protection, in this narrative, is a luxury the hungry world cannot afford.

Other proponents of this view focus on Africa’s productive potential, especially if water sources are present to “irrigate the garden.” Former Wall Street Journal reporter Roger Thurow (2010) recently put it this way in characterizing global demand:

Africa is the final frontier of food. We're going to need to double food production by 2050. Where's it going to come from? What country has this potential? The water sources in Africa are underutilized. There's land available for production. Wouldn't it be a grand irony if the continent now receiving emergency food aid becomes a continent that is helping to feed the world? That's Africa's potential.

In a similar vein, Eyisi (2009) reports:

Africa right now has comparative advantage in Agricultural production… According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) only 14% of the continent’s 184 million hectares of arable land is under cultivation. Agriculture also accounts for 17% of GDP and 57% employment. This represents underutilization of resources or, to put it in another way, virgin territory.

Such reasoning echoes the de facto terra nullius declarations of explorers and pioneers in Africa’s past (Adams 2003). “Underutilized” land and labor of Africa were themes of the 1884 Berlin Conference, which imagined it as a frontier awaiting settlement, improvement, commerce, and infrastructure. Today’s logic, but for the addition of food security, has changed very little (e.g., Bauer 1954; Schatz 1959). Africa’s land is abundant but “fallow” for reasons of

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5 See Smout’s (2000) account of English intellectuals visiting rural Scotland, dismayed by its “wilderness” and forbidding terrain begging to be civilized.

6 Protected area expansion in Africa in recent decades has been greatest in the poorest countries and, among these, 7 of the 38 studied had more land in protected area status than in croplands (Geisler 2003).
mismanagement, corruption, ethnic conflict, indifferent elites, failed land reforms, and a plague of social problems (World Bank 1995; Rothchild 1997; Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003). The excess-fallow argument is incessant. Starita (2010) claims that there are a billion acres of underutilized land in Africa, the ILO (2007) suggests that over 70 percent of the workers in sub-Saharan Africa are underemployed; the FAO (2009) and World Bank (2009) point to serious production lags (cereal yields around 1.2 tons per hectare compared to an average of some 3 tons in the developing world as a whole), and input bottlenecks (fertilizer consumption at 13 kg per hectare in the sub-Saharan region in 2002, compared to 73 kg in the Middle East and North Africa and 190 kg in East Asia and the Pacific). As for irrigation, only 3 percent of land in sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated, compared to more than 20 percent globally.

The solution is straightforward and self-referencing. According the FAO (2009), investment in agricultural research and development is acutely low in Africa and actually fell during the 1990s: “If Africa’s farmers can be helped to overcome these challenges and take advantage of new and improved market opportunities as the global economic crisis eases, it is widely agreed that the continent has enormous potential for growth in agriculture.” This terra nullius narrative is linked to a third—that of reformulated property rights and land reform.

Insubstantial Title

The affinity between resource under-utilization and ill-defined private property is organic to neoliberal development thinking. Only a small fraction of African farmers have proof of ownership, giving some the impression of a quintessential Lockean landscape “owned by all,” that is none, and awaiting immanent enclosure. As noted, the global commons that preceded private ownership was viewed by Locke (and his followers) as paleo-property, inferior to fee-simple ownership by individuals. Contemporary versions of the former, somewhat imprecisely called communal, customary, or common ownerships, are candidates for extinction, tragedies of the commons, and thwarted modernity (Landes 1998). Precisely for this reason, the Mabo decision in 1992, limited though it was in truly restoring aboriginal title, was an exceptional ruling. Citing numerous additional sources, Berry (2002) reminds us that suppressing indigenous property systems has a long history in Africa:

Colonial officials also waged long, often unsuccessful struggles to ban ‘shifting cultivation,’ limit movements of livestock and nomadic pastoralism, and concentrate scattered, mobile rural populations into permanent villages and towns—measures designed to strengthen colonial governance as well as to protect the environment against ‘primitive’ African methods of farming and foraging. (9)

More recent allegations that property lacking private title and “regularization” contributes to under-utilization are widespread in development agencies such as the World Bank (De Schutter 2011). In this view, even property that is nominally private but insecure due to weak or unrecorded title amounts to “dead capital” and is a barrier to the “highest and best use of land” (de Soto 2000; Cotula et al. 2009).

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7 Daniel and Mittal (2009) provide examples from Ethiopia wherein land wrongly assumed to belong to “no one” (customary title) was transferred by the government to agro-developers.
Much of rural Africa, by this description, depends on stagnant property beset by a gridlock of competing tenure claims, some formal and others informal. It is estimated, for example, that less than 2 percent of land in West Africa has any formal paper proof of property rights (Toumlin 2006). In addition to excess fallow and dysfunction, Africa has inadequate land records and abiding ownership uncertainties. Outsiders have long sought a regime change in Africa, that is, property regime change, and advocate land reform as the best way to regularize the irregular, clarify clouded titles, ease the credit void, and formalize the market for land (e.g., Holden et al. 2009). Such reform has the twin benefit, according to reformers, of addressing the age-old Land Question (land to African tillers) and enabling an expanding land market, economies of scale, and finally global food security. 

But such a progression might simultaneously exacerbate external landlordism in Africa. Privatizing the African landscape through neoliberal land reform may or may not spark development (Trebilcock and Veel 2008; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2009), or it may accomplish this at considerable cost to African sovereignty, traditional tenures, and local food security (De Schutter 2011). Title formalization can lead to land concentration, speculation, and greater corruption (Toulmin 2006; Musembi 2007; Bromley 2009) and be a bane to Africa’s women, urban poor, nomadic peoples/pastoralists, among others. Western-style land privatization can dispossess commoners of different kinds, forcing them to trespass when searching for water, pasture, thatch, firewood, minor forest products and the like (Adenew and Abdi 2005; Bassett 2009). Not least, titling is expensive and, by limiting access to newly privatized land, may put food (and other forms of social security among small farmers) at risk (Woodhouse 2003; Daniel and Mittal 2009).

**Lacking of Civilization**

A final *de facto* formulation of *terra nullius* is disturbing because of its cultural reductionism and apologetics. This construction hints at primitivism, backwards cultures, and racial inferiority. It retells a story of Africa as the “dark continent,” a “cultural wasteland,” and a “wanting civilization” that play out in failed states, rampant corruption, tribal and ethnic wars, famine, pandemics, and entrenched underdevelopment. These descriptors, separate or combined, unwittingly pose indictments and death sentences that nullify African people, places, and values. Interrogating agro-imperialism in Africa, for example, *New York Times* reporter Andrew Rice (2009) implicitly draws on such tropes:

> Throughout Africa, the politics of land is linked to the grim reality of hunger. Famines, typically produced by some combination of weather, pestilence and bad governance, break out with merciless randomness, unleashing calamity and reshaping history.

Herein, the meaning of the *terra nullius* shifts from “land owned by no one” to cultural wastelands—a phenomenon echoed in Australia (an "uninhabited or barbarous country") as well (Godden 1999).

Thus, in addition to the foregoing *terra nullius* narratives, African leaders and laypersons are met with a “civilization interruptus” script that translates into a “development crisis” that not merely allows but requires emergency interventions from without. They are informed that their

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8 As Daniel and Mittal (2009) observe, however, redistributive land reforms may suffer from land-grab frenzy in cases where governments terminate such reform and sell “unclaimed” and untitled land to foreign or other investors.
internal food security is hopeless without foreign assistance, investment, and new “green revolutions.” The combined effects of desertification, flooding, epidemics, and climate change along with human misadventure make foreign takeovers and partnerships helpful and necessary. Rice’s (2009) article echoes the accompanying despair by showcasing Ethiopia, where agro-investments are now intense (Makki and Geisler 2011). Ethiopia is the epicenter of recent famines, wars, and land reform debacles, but has peripheral lands to spare. Rice’s (2009) solution echoes the FAO and World Bank position:

Development economists and African governments say that if a country like Ethiopia is ever going to feed itself, let alone wean itself from foreign aid, which totaled $2.4 billion in 2007, it will have to find some way of increasing the productivity of its agriculture.

Extending the welcome mat, Ethiopian leaders seek to change the negative perception of their previously socialist society and to attract foreign investment. Rice (2009) goes on:

Ethiopia might seem an unlikely hotbed of agricultural investment. To most of the world, the country is defined by images of famine: about a million people died there during the drought of the mid-1980s, and today about four times that many depend on emergency food aid. But according to the World Bank, as much as three-quarters of Ethiopia’s arable land is not under cultivation, and agronomists say that with substantial capital expenditure, much of it could become bountiful... [Ethiopia’s President Zenawi] has publicly said he is ‘very eager’ to attract foreign farm investors by offering them what the government describes as ‘virgin land.’

To summarize, nuanced forms of terra nullius are taking hold across Africa and justifying a juggernaut of new agricultural investment. These narratives emphasize need and distress (“empty womb,” “inefficient management,” “inept governance,” “cultural backwater,” “imperiled ecosystems,” etc.) that outside investors can remedy, alone or in concert with Africans. These interests have found language, concept, and legal precedent with which to argue that there is only one answer to the continent’s current Land Question: a new and benign landlordism that will counter de facto terra nullius in its multiple forms. Herein, sub-Saharan Africa is an old frontier awaiting new capitalization. These metaphors and meta-realities subordinate Africa’s food and biofuel needs to those of offshore interests, sometimes with the blessing of African governments and elites.

Is the investment surge following on the heels of terra nullius bulwark inevitable and unstoppable? There are as many answers to this variant of The Land Question as there are countries in Africa. Certainly there are counter-narratives and counterfactual histories. In its de jure form, terra nullius has been dealt a qualified legal blow through the 1992 Mabo decision in Australia. Media and grassroots attention to land grabbing in its many forms have mushroomed (Zoomers 2010), and political resistance is present in the counter-hegemonic actions of the expanding World Social Forum. The Forum’s Charter of Principles explicitly declares opposition to all reductionist views of economy, development, and history. Two of its recent world meetings

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9 In 2009 the Ethiopian government approved land deals totaling around 1.5 million acres; its government investment agency reported approving 815 foreign-financed agricultural projects since 2007, nearly doubling the number registered in the entire previous decade (Rice 2009).
have been held in Africa, the Senegal World Social Forum of 2011 drawing 75,000 participants from 132 countries.\textsuperscript{10} The campaign to cancel a 1.3 million hectare agreement between the Korean Daewoo Corporation, mentioned above, and the government of Madagascar was intense. Indeed, grassroots outrage over this venture helped topple the country’s president. In England (where once the Levelers and Diggers challenged land usurpation), a 2011 conference at Sussex University on land grabbing yielded panels and papers on local resistance to enclosures and dispossession in the global South.\textsuperscript{11} A sequel to that conference will be held in 2012 on the explicit topic of resistance to land grabs, at least some of which will have been justified on \textit{terra nullius} grounds.

Scholarship on \textit{de facto terra nullius} as such remains incipient, despite the rapidly expanding attention to the theme of new enclosures (e.g., Araghi 2000; Blomly 2008; Vasudevan, McFarlane, and Jeffrey 2008) and accumulation through dispossession (Harvey 2003; 2009). World-systems theorists have provided insights into the “Great European Land-Grab” (Gotts 2007) and drawn attention to the cyclical nature of enclosure at different spatio-temporal scales. They have further acknowledged the importance of natural forces and population dynamics in food insecurity and famine, and certainly drawn attention to the doctrines contrived by empires before and during the capitalist era to naturalize and legalize their expansions amidst periods of rising and falling economic fortunes (Davis 2001; Anderson and Chase-Dunn 2005). Acute food insecurity thus becomes part of larger processes among core powers that institutionalize political coercion in peripheral settings to accumulate wealth. Empirical support for the world-system view is not wanting (e.g., Dirks 1993; Fulkerson and McKinney 2011).

There remains ample room for further research on exactly what new enclosures are (as initiated by nations as diverse as China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States), on whether the victims/beneficiaries of enclosure/investment in Africa and elsewhere include small holders holding title to their land (Harvey’s emphasis almost entirely skips this form of predation and world-system scholars assume that land in peripheral states is held in common or in private tenure by a small group of elites), and on what emergency master narratives are used to normalize the alienation of resources belonging to other nations and their citizens. Research on land rights, as MacPherson (1985) observed, needs to be re-embedded in the larger framework of human rights and vice-versa.

CONCLUSION

There is irony in the current rush to invest in Africa, aimed, as it is, at staving off actual and anticipated food shortages in other regions of the world. It comes at a time when land, water, and soil are at a premium globally. These are resources that abound in parts of Africa. They had been passed over, to some extent, when the global North was prospering and Africa’s needs were immense. Now, to persuade Africa to loosen its control of these assets, the north is crafting morality tales couched in security needs and folding them into new \textit{terra nullius} narratives. We should expect more such narratives to appear with the intensification of global climate change.

\textsuperscript{10} Accessed on 6/8/11 at \url{http://fsm2011.org/en}

\textsuperscript{11} International Conference on Global Land Grabbing occurred on 6-8 April as IDS, Sussex, UK, and was co-organized with Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC), PLAAS of the University of the Western Cape, Cornell University, and the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague.
As food insecurity becomes more severe in the north, new space will be needed at home and abroad to grow crops on a scale that keeps pace with population and consumption patterns of the world’s more fortunate citizens. This will be true despite genetic engineering and other interventions that intensify food and fuel production. In the absence of low-hanging colonies to supply such foods, new gentrification narratives will evolve to justify overseas investment and provide what William Catton, Jr. (1982) referred to long ago as ghost acres in distant places needed to satisfy appetites in the industrialized north. Whether this can be done without causing gross food insecurity, displacement, and loss of confidence in the global South—the stigma of terra nullius—remains to be seen. In the meantime, “worthless Africa” is becoming valuable real estate for non-Africans.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author extends thanks to three colleagues, Fouad Makki, Philip McMichael, and Shelley Feldman, for insights in this research effort and to anonymous reviewers for better rigor and reason.

REFERENCES


DISPOSSESSION, CLASS FORMATION, AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF COLOMBIA’S COFFEE PRODUCERS OVER THE LONGUE DURÉE: BEYOND THE POLANYIAN ANALYTIC

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ABSTRACT

For more than a decade, social scientists have been analyzing the implications of the neoliberal turn in development policy and the implications of market-led agrarian reform for agricultural producers in the global South. Among this work is a spate of recent scholarship celebrating a number of flagship movements, such as the Zapatistas in Mexico or the landless movement in Brazil, which are interpreted as efforts by rural communities to resist the threat posed by the commodification of livelihoods and the privatization of natural resources. In this article, we aim to problematize what we diagnose as the “Polanyian analytic” underlying accounts of the current conjuncture which emphasize the imminent potential of neoliberalism to spawn protective counter-movements of the sort described in The Great Transformation. We do so through an analysis of the Unidad Cafetero Nacional (UCN) movement, an organization of Colombian coffee farmers that effectively mobilized large numbers of cafeteros in the 1990s to protest the liberalization of the global coffee market and the decline of state support for the domestic coffee sector. While the UCN may be read as a struggle to resist the dispossession of Colombian coffee farmers, we argue that it represented a particular segment of rural producers who wanted, first and foremost, a restoration of their relatively privileged status within the political economy of Colombian agriculture. Our interpretation of the UCN suggests that whether movements emerge in response to neoliberalism depends on the political imaginaries of the social actors who would create them, and further, that these imaginaries are produced through processes of class formation over the longue durée that shape the meaning of dispossession in particular contexts.

INTRODUCTION

The abrogation of the international coffee agreement’s coffee export quota and pricing regulations in 1989 and the subsequent dismantling of the domestic price support system that was administered by the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia (Fedecafé) had a
devastating impact on the country’s small landowning coffee growers, a class of independent farmers widely depicted throughout the postwar developmental decades to be a bastion of Colombian political stability and social and economic progress (Bergquist 1986; Sánchez 2001; Rettberg 2010). The liberalization of the global coffee trade generated declining returns and increased insecurity for many of these farmers, and in response to the threat that neoliberal reforms posed to their livelihoods, a significant number fought back. Colombian coffee producers organized to form what became known as the Unidad Cafetero Nacional (UCN) movement, a protest organization that effectively mobilized over 100,000 cafetero militants onto the streets of the largest cities in the coffee-growing regions and eventually led a series of national civic shutdowns (paros cívicos) that forced the Colombian government to accept a number of their key demands (Robledo 1998).

At first glance, the social unrest triggered by the liberalization of Colombia’s coffee economy might be interpreted as yet another case of resistance to an intensified neoliberal capitalism. The mobilization of Colombia’s cafeteros resemble several other struggles against dispossession that are described in a recent spate of scholarship, of which David Harvey’s The New Imperialism is the best known example. These would include the efforts of peasants and agricultural commodity producers elsewhere to maintain access to the land (McMichael 2006; Akram-Lodhi 2007; Desmarais 2007; Walker 2008), those of organized labor to protect collective bargaining rights (Silver 2003; Barchiesi 2007; Lee 2007), and the many examples of popular-civic unrest triggered by the privatization of natural resources and the retrenchment of public services (Hart 2006; Dunn 2007; Spronk and Webber 2007).

In this article, we offer a different reading of the UCN movement—one that engages with the social and historical conditions of the Colombian coffee sector. In doing so, we aim to problematize what we see as a “Polanyian analytic” underlying the interpretations of the current conjuncture offered by Harvey and others, who emphasize the imminent potential of neoliberalism to spawn counter-movements that push back against the commodifying forces of the market. On the one hand, many scholars acknowledge that the sheer variety of such movements, their rootedness in specific lifeworlds, and the cultural and social distances that separate the protagonists make it difficult to see how these myriad struggles might aggregate to a collective, transformational force capable of challenging neoliberal hegemony. At the same time, much of this literature strikes an optimistic tone, especially when describing movements based in the global South that have emerged to resist accumulation by dispossession in rural communities (Swyngedouw 2005; Desmarais 2007; Spronk and Webber 2007).

While we do not mean to dismiss such optimism as necessarily unwarranted, our analysis of the UCN movement suggests that whether movements emerge in response to dispossession depends on the political imaginaries of the social actors who would wage such battles. Further, the political imaginaries that animate struggle cannot be directly inferred from the logic of accumulation that is driving dispossession, nor, contra the Polanyian analytic described below, can they be explained as reflexive efforts to protect society from the devastation wrought by novel forms of commodification. Rather, these imaginaries are produced through processes of class formation over the longue durée that shape the form and meaning of dispossession in particular contexts, as well as the kinds of struggles that do or do not emerge in response to it.
STRUGGLES AGAINST DISPOSSESSION AND POLANYIAN COUNTER-MOVEMENTS

Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of studies documenting struggles against the shift towards neoliberal economic policies and practices. While this work extends across multiple fields, detailing a variety of struggles in numerous countries and regions, much of it draws theoretical inspiration from David Harvey’s interpretation of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation, which he recasts as accumulation by dispossession. In *The New Imperialism*, Harvey (2003) advances two main lines of argument, and the concept of dispossession by accumulation is critical for each. First, Harvey links the expanded role of accumulation by dispossession during the waning decades of the twentieth century to the sustained period of crisis in the capitalist world economy dating from the collapse of Fordism. In this case, as has been the case throughout its history, “capitalism…requires a fund of assets outside of itself if it is to confront and circumvent pressures of overaccumulation. If those assets, such as empty land or new raw material sources, do not lie to hand, then capitalism must somehow produce them” (Harvey 2003:143). One way that capitalism can produce the assets it needs is to dispossess their current holders of them. It is in this sense, Harvey argues, that dispossession “breathes new life into capital accumulation” (151). Although it turns out that dispossession via privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and above all financialization have failed to reignite robust growth in the world economy, the neoliberal turn has proven far more successful in redistributing wealth, as episodes of dispossession transfer assets from their previous holders, especially the lower classes, to elites (Harvey 2007).

Harvey’s second main point follows from this claim about the centrality of dispossession in the current conjuncture: the threat that neoliberalism poses to the material well-being and cultural integrity of working people and their communities is spawning a “swath of oppositional movements,” which open up novel and potentially transformative “lines of social and political struggle” (Harvey 2007:40). Thus while neoliberalism creates new forms of deprivation and exclusion, it also engenders new political openings, as suggested by the proliferation of movements that have emerged to resist it. Harvey observes that only occasionally are these movements organized around the workplace or the work relation—that is, around the wage-labor relationship that is both the foundation of “normal accumulation” (or expanded reproduction) and the central axis of contention in historical struggles by labor to intervene in the process of capital accumulation. Rather than focus on the workplace or even the economy as the site of contention, anti-neoliberal or global justice politics tend to target processes of dispossession occurring in the sphere of reproduction. Such struggles, often motivated by identities and commitments that differ from traditional class-based forms of political mobilization, have greater potential for developing politically inclusive and broad-based forms of resistance because they are grounded in the daily efforts of individuals, families, and communities to ensure their social reproduction.

Harvey’s powerful indictment of neoliberalism has proven particularly influential among critics of neoliberalism. And his interpretation of the current conjuncture as a political-economic regime that is simultaneously generating increased insecurity and hardship for many alongside new forms of resistance is widely shared by scholars of globalization. While Harvey turns to Marx, other social scientists, and particularly sociologists seeking to understand the causes and consequences of the neoliberal turn, are revisiting the work of Karl Polanyi (1966) in order to draw parallels between the discovery of the self-regulating market in 19th-century Europe and the
new market fundamentalism of the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Munck 2002; Silver and Arrighi 2003). Here, too, the consensus is that the commodification of social provisioning and natural resources is proving devastating to working people and the environment, but that this second great transformation is unleashing counter-movements that push back against the market forces imperiling the social fabric (Mittelman 1998; Evans 2008).

In a recent article reflecting on contemporary labor studies, Michael Burawoy both notes the prominence of The Great Transformation as an analytical template for making sense of the challenges and opportunities confronting workers and workers’ movements in the neoliberal era, and takes issue with what he sees as a common refrain emerging from this scholarship regarding the political potential of laborist counter-movements. Social scientists influenced by Polanyi often refer to the pendulum-like dynamic of historical transformation that he described, whereby efforts to instantiate market relations in place of extant forms of social organization provoke resistance from forces opposing the conversion of land, labor and money into fictitious commodities. But Burawoy cautions against extrapolating from Polanyi’s analysis of the first great transformation to the present; specifically, he argues that we should not expect that today’s wave of marketization will be similarly met by a counter-movement capable of rolling back the tide of commodification. This interpretation amounts to a misguided optimism that ignores a qualitative difference between contemporary capitalism and the emergence of the market society analyzed by Polanyi, which is that neoliberalism is global in scope. Consequently, any movement to counter it “must begin at the global level for it is only at that level that it is possible to contest the destruction of nature, let alone tackle the global machinations of finance capital” (2010:311). Yet while Burawoy concludes that “[s]ome sort of global countermovement may be necessary for human survival,…there is no historical necessity for it to appear” (311).

It is possible to draw an analogy between the “uncompromising pessimism” with which Burawoy confronts the “Polanyian Pollyannas” of labor studies, and the concerns that David Harvey expresses in The New Imperialism regarding the possibility of political challenges to neoliberalism. Burawoy’s concern is that laborist counter-movements that are rooted in the experience of exploitation—what Harvey calls accumulation by expanded reproduction—are an inauspicious foundation for challenging the increasingly common and more salient experience of capitalism, which is commodification. When the normative status of regularized, waged employment is under assault by new and generally less secure forms of work, politics that center around exploitation resonate less than those that focus on commodification, with the latter “potentially bringing together not only wage labor and the great swaths of informal, precarious labor, but also joining them to movements against the commodification of nature, of money, and indeed of knowledge” (Burawoy 2010:75). Burawoy’s counter-movements against commodification are similar to Harvey’s struggles against accumulation by dispossession, and although Harvey considers it an urgent task to recognize the relationship between, and forge connections among, these struggles and those against expanded reproduction, he too seems more optimistic about the transformative potential of struggles against dispossession as compared with struggles against expanded reproduction (cf. Silver 2003).

This optimism is perhaps reflected most strongly in studies of rural communities that are experiencing dispossession in the form of land privatization and other forms of agrarian restructuring that threaten agricultural livelihoods. Chief among these are the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Workers’ Movement) in Brazil (Ondetti 2006), the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in Mexico (Harvey 1998; Vergara-Camus 2009), and the transnational peasants’ movement Via Campesina.
DISPOSSESSION, CLASS FORMATION, AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY

While scholars writing about agrarian movements acknowledge that rural communities are responding in a variety of ways to the challenges that neoliberalism poses to their prosperity, autonomy, and even ontological security, an optimistic tone runs through much of this literature; indeed, this tone is similar to the one that Burawoy decries in the labor studies literature, with some authors making explicit the Polanyian lens through which they view developments in the countryside (McMichael 2008; Gimenez and Shattuck 2011).

In the remainder of this paper, we consider one community of producers impacted by far-reaching changes in the political economy of agriculture over the past four decades. The liberalization of the global coffee market and the collapse of the developmentalist compromise between the Colombian government and the country’s smallholders that the regulation of that market had permitted has ushered in a wave of dispossession affecting many cafeteros and their communities. While coffee-growers did mobilize in response to these developments in the form of the UCN, they failed to arrest either the deterioration of smallholder livelihoods or the erosion of their collective power as an organized class of producers. Below we explain this outcome by showing how the content of the cafeteros’ counter-movement was shaped by a historical process of class formation that tied smallholding coffee farmers into a strategic alliance with the state, and simultaneously assured their structural dependence on the world coffee market.

LAND STRUGGLES, COFFEE PRODUCTION AND DISPOSSESSION IN VIEJO CALDAS

Colombia’s coffee export sector dates back to the 1820s, when large hacienda owners located in the eastern and central Cordillera Mountains began to convert portions of their fields to coffee in order to take advantage of the burgeoning market for coffee in the United States and Europe. It was the government’s decision to privatize large tracts of public lands (baldios) in the 1870s, a measure aimed at converting sparsely populated frontier regions into sites of capitalist production, however, that initiated the mass migration of settlers southwards from the department of Antioquia into the slopes of the western Cordillera region of Viejo Caldas. The migrants who settled the region (colonos) included minifundista peasants impoverished by the over-fragmentation of their properties, rural artisans displaced by the importation of cheap foreign manufactures, and Indigenous families dispossessed of their communal lands. They saw the availability of attaining land in the open frontier as a way to gain greater control over the means of their subsistence. However, most chose to settle in regions located nearby rivers, roads, and railroad lines so that they could supplement their subsistence agricultural production by producing commodities for the market, coffee being the most lucrative (LeGrand 1984; Christie 1986).

By the close of the 19th century, coffee had trickled down from being a luxury good consumed by elites to a mainstay of the North American urban-industrial working-class diet (Jiménez 1995a). This escalation in demand provided Colombian producers and exporters with an ideal opportunity to invest in the conversion of ever-greater portions of land to coffee cultivation with minimal risks to runs on their investments. In fact, by the first decade of the 20th century, coffee had become Colombia’s chief export commodity. And while coffee production in

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1 We use the term “smallholder” to include farmers who own between 5 and 15 hectares of land.
2 Viejo Caldas (Antigua Caldas) was the original name of the region that later formed into the three political subdivisions (departamentos) of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío.
Viejo Caldas amounted to a mere 4% of the coffee produced in Colombia, it escalated over the next three decades to roughly 40% of the total, becoming the largest coffee-producing region of the country (Vallecilla Gordillo 2001: 147).

The possibility of accumulating wealth through coffee production in Viejo Caldas, however, generated conflict between smallholders seeking to supplement their livelihoods through coffee, and large-scale planters seeking to force these colonos off the lands, thereby transforming them into permanent workers whose labor could be exploited on the coffee estates. The estate owners relied upon two key mechanisms of dispossession. First, since the colono settlers could not often afford to pay the surveying and titling fees required for formal title to the land, many ended up squatting on lands that were in fact owned by these elites. When this was the case, the landowners were able to use their influence over local courts and magistrates to legally force the squatters further out into the frontier, where the process would occur once again. However, given the political monopolies they typically held over local state offices, estate owners would also at times forcibly displace smallholders whether they held formal land titles or not. Lacking influence over the courts, many unfortunate title-owning smallholders were left with no other recourse than to leave the land they tilled. Some left to try their fortunes once again by carving out a new tract of farmland deeper in the agricultural frontier. Others, less willing or able to start from scratch once again, submitted to their displacement and became agricultural workers on the coffee estates (LeGrand 1984).

By the first decades of the 20th century, these struggles had produced a variegated landscape of coffee producers. On the one hand, the open frontier in Viejo Caldas facilitated the growth of a sizable number of small and medium-sized coffee smallholders who succeeded in cultivating modest plots of land along the most remote slopes of the western Cordillera. On the other hand, there were numerous large coffee estates worked by sharecroppers and renters (arrendatarios), who were permitted a small plot of land to grow their own subsistence crops in exchange for the payment of a specific amount of coffee beans or a set number of hours dedicated to the production of coffee for the land owners (Bergquist 1986:316-317).

The exponential expansion of the sector as a whole from the 1910s until the 1930s led to a substantial growth in the demand for labor on the coffee estates, which began to hire proletarianized yearly and seasonal workers to supplement tenant farmer and arrendatario labor arrangements. It also saw the emergence of large commission houses based largely in New York and London that purchased coffee from the estates (and smallholders) through local merchants and provided credit to the estate owners to finance the salaries of their workforces and subsidize the expansion of their plantations (Jiménez 1995b). The rise in prices during the middle years of the 1920s in particular emboldened the estate workers, who began to pressure the owners to liberalize the terms of their contracts so that they could convert greater portions of their own plots to the cultivation of coffee. As Bergquist (1986:334-336) notes, the estate owners were both willing and able to make these concessions because credit remained easy to attain and because the expansion of arrendatario payments of coffee ultimately bolstered the estate’s overall productivity without cutting into the owners’ profit margins. The smallholding farmers, for their part, also began converting ever greater portions of their own lands to coffee for the same set of reasons; the growing demand for coffee by workers and elites in the global North had created the possibility for smallholders, workers and estate owners in Colombia to milk this cash cow, despite the fact that it entailed a further marketization of their livelihoods.

The stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent drop in world coffee prices that followed dramatically shaped the historical trajectory of the region. To be sure, the crash in
prices did not fundamentally alter the nature of production on the small and medium-sized coffee farms of Viejo Caldas because these smallholding producers could internalize the costs by drawing upon family labor forces to convert their coffee lands back to subsistence agricultural production. The fact that they remained in control of the productive use of the land, formal title or not, granted them the possibility to move into as well as out of the market for coffee on more or less their own terms (Machado 1977).

The impact of the Great Depression on the large estate holders, in contrast, was catastrophic. The sudden drop in coffee prices propelled many planters into bankruptcy and debt to the commission houses. Many attempted to avoid ruin by externalizing costs onto their workers, squeezing more labor out of them for the same pay. This proved a daunting task because over the course of the 1920s the workers on these estates had become highly organized and increasingly militant under the leadership of communist and socialist activists. As mentioned above, the efforts of workers to liberalize the terms of their tenancy and labor agreements had been tolerated by estate owners during better times because the demand for coffee was strong enough to accommodate an increase in local supply. When the crunch in the world coffee market made itself felt, estate owners attempted to compensate by reversing those arrangements. The estate workers, however, had grown accustomed to using their land in this way. Moreover, the fact that they could internalize the drop in prices (by mobilizing the collective labor power of their families) without reducing the volumes of coffee grown gave weight to their claims that they could make better use of the land than the owners themselves.

Estate owners were further discomfited by the views being expressed by some officials within the Colombian government, who were flirting with economic planning as a way to confront the crisis. Sensing a dual threat of state appropriation and worker takeover, they began exploring ways to break their contracts with the arrendatarios in order to legally expulse them from the lands as a preventative measure. Rather than simply forfeit their plots to the estate owners, however, the workers began to follow the example of the frontier smallholders by simply squatting on the lands that they were already working and occupying. The estate owners countered this militancy by using their control over local politics to violently force the workers from estate lands using police and hired thugs (Machado 1977; Bergquist 1986: 339-343).

The outbreak of violence and terror that emerged on the coffee estates became a hot political issue in the presidential election of 1930, with the Conservative Party supporting the coffee planters and the Liberals advocating for land reforms. The election went to the reform-minded Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo who feared that the agrarian unrest would destroy the coffee export sector altogether. In order to end the crisis and save the coffee industry, Lleras Restrepo signed Land Law 200 of 1936, which facilitated governmental purchases of the bankrupt estates, subsidized the sale of parcels of these estates to the squatters that occupied them, and granted formal land titles to the smallholding squatters along the coffee frontiers. The Law was therefore able to forge a consensus between key players within the political establishment. Conservatives backed the government’s agreement to pay full market prices to estate owners for the appropriated land. Liberals were content to have the land out to productive use. And militants of the Communist Party were content with the transfer of land to the squatters. With this compromise came an effective end to the largest agrarian struggle of Colombian history.
SMALLHOLDERS AND FEDECAFÉ DEVELOPMENTALISM IN VIEJO CALDAS

The passage of Land Law 200 might have restored control over the means of subsistence to Colombia’s smallholders by providing the impetus for a massive conversion of the coffee fields back to subsistence agriculture on the newly formalized parcels. Instead, however, this land reform laid the groundwork for a series of developmentalist initiatives to stimulate the growth of the coffee export sector through the consolidation of a smallholder structure of coffee production. These efforts began in 1927, with the establishment of the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia (Fedecafé), a semi-private parastatal organization of commercial and financial capitalists authorized to organize and vertically-integrate the nation’s coffee industry. Fedecafé was granted the right to tax and regulate the sector through the creation of the National Coffee Fund (FNC) in 1940, which financed the establishment of a system of coffee storage and husking plants (trilladoras) throughout the diffuse geography of coffee fields. The FNC instituted a garantía de compra policy that guaranteed the purchase of smallholder beans that met quality standards set by Fedecafé as long as these smallholders became card-carrying members of the local chapter of the Federation. The FNC also subsidized a price floor system to guarantee that the price of beans sold by farmers at their trilladoras would not fall below a level necessary to sustain a typical smallholding family. Moreover, in order to ensure steady yields and productive farms, Fedecafé granted low-interest loans to farmers through their Banco Cafetero (created 1950), as well as regular technical assistance through the development of a broad extensions program attached to a science institute (Cenicafé) that hired a team of international scientists that studied the sector (London 1999).

These investments in the stable social reproduction of the region’s coffee producers through provisions of subsidies, credit, and market regulations proved successful in stimulating productivity in Colombia’s coffee industry in the period leading up through the years of the Second World War and into the so-called “golden decades” of the post-War period. It is also widely noted that smallholder coffee production, symbolized through the icon of Juan Valdez, became considered a nationalist enterprise bringing wealth, order, and a powerful national identity to the country (London 1999). Many smallholders began to convert larger sections of their land holdings to coffee production, even adopting new seed types that required more mechanized inputs of production, including expensive fertilizers and irrigations systems, and a shift away from shade-grown plants that intertwined coffee with subsistence produce in favor of sun-tolerant plants that yielded more beans per plant but could not be planted alongside other crops. These transformations provided the region’s coffee producers with the opportunity to attain greater income to purchase the bulk of their subsistence needs at the risk of further commodifying their livelihoods (Ortiz 1999).

Critical to our narrative is the fact that, to the degree that these initiatives were indeed effective in meeting (or even improving) the standards of living desired by these coffee producers, they also tended to generate bastions of support for the political status quo at the expense of those excluded from the benefits of the developmentalist politics of the state. With few exceptions, the smallholders of Viejo Caldas backed Fedecafé in its unwavering support for the elite-led and highly exclusive Liberal and Conservative Parties that monopolized the country’s highest political offices (Bergquist 1986). This support continued during the years of sectarian political violence called La Violencia (1948-1957), the years of military dictatorship
under General Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957), throughout the years of the National Front regime\(^3\) (1957-1974), and even following the writing of a new national constitution in 1991.

While the political conservatism of the cafeteros has been hailed by some as a “great transformative and integrating force” responsible for the relative stability of Colombia’s political regime (Sánchez 2001:3-4), it also meant that the traditional political establishment could implement radical industrialization and trade liberalization policies that caused social upheaval, over-urbanization, and rapid proletarianization of significant portions of the populace. The support that the cafeteros gave to such policies served as a continual wedge between the coffee smallholders and a larger and increasingly militant population of agricultural workers and peasants outside of the coffee sector, urban students, and industrial workers who were excluded from the benefits of the coffee-based developmental model (Bergquist 1986). The lack of availability of quality land for the majority of Colombia’s rural population, the hostile and oppressive working conditions characterizing the export sectors such as oil and bananas, and the former exclusion of third parties from participation in electoral politics gave rise to increasingly radicalized and organized sectors of the labor force. However, the coffee smallholders of Viejo Caldas not only refused to join national struggles for radical land and labor reform measures that emerged in those regions of the country marked by marginalized subsistence peasants and repressed proletarianized agro-export workers in the 1960s; they also proved impermeable to the sway of revolutionary guerrilla activities that emerged in those same regions in the 1970s once the agrarian movements were effectively repressed by the Colombian state (Zamosc 1986).

**NEOLIBERALISM AND THE UNRAVELING OF THE DEVELOPMENTALIST PACT**

The viability of a smallholding system of coffee production in Colombia rested upon Fedecafé’s capacity to finance the stable reproduction of these producers, which, in turn, rested upon the state’s ability to push competitive market pressures in the world coffee trade upwards via regulation of the world coffee market (Hough 2010). In fact throughout the developmental decades, the Colombian government (through the lobbying efforts of Fedecafé’s directorate) coordinated “cartel-like arrangements” with Brazil to secure higher prices by withholding coffee. During the Second World War, this strategy was accepted and institutionalized by the United States as a measure to thwart Axis influence in the hemisphere. Coffee importers and roasters in the United States were pressured to accept lower profit rates and higher coffee prices in order to maintain U.S. geopolitical legitimacy in coffee-producing countries. Similarly, during the years of the Cold War, as part of the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. signed onto a series of International Coffee Agreements (ICAs), which regulated world coffee prices and volumes, thus ushering in a period of protracted price stability and expanded growth for the sector (Krasner 1973; Talbot 2004).

The viability of the ICAs in generating social stability throughout the coffee-producing regions of Latin America, Viejo Caldas included, was no doubt a reflection of U.S. global hegemony in the postwar decades. However, by the 1970s, the success of the ICAs in generating spaces of “upward mobility” and development for coffee-exporting countries had begun to fundamentally challenge U.S. corporate control over the market. Fedecafé, along with Brazil’s producer-exporters, began developing its own marketable brands of instant coffees and coffee

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\(^3\) The National Front was a formal power-sharing agreement wherein the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative Parties agreed to rotate top political posts between them, appoint departmental and local positions by party leaders, and formally exclude the possibility for third parties to run for executive office.
products that threatened the monopolies held by North American and European roasting and marketing corporations over their national consumer markets. Moreover, the success of coffee production as a model of export-led development convinced other countries throughout the global south to establish their own coffee sectors, some of whom sought a piece of the market through the ICA system, and others who began producing outside of it. While a full elaboration of these struggles over the regulation of the coffee commodity chain is beyond the scope of this article, it is well-documented that by the 1980s U.S. policy had radically shifted away from supporting the ICA system, eventually leading to a political rift amongst participating countries that culminated in the abrogation of the ICAs’ quota and pricing system in 1989 (Bates 1997; Talbot 2004).

The termination of the ICA system in 1989 led to an immediate and drastic drop in the world price of Arabica mild coffee beans from almost $2.50/lb. in 1987 to just over $0.50/lb. by 1993 (Oxfam 2002). And despite a brief jump in prices in 1994-1995 due to coffee frost and drought in Brazil and in 1997 due to a speculative hike, the average composite price during this time remained 20% lower than it was during the closing years of the 1980s (Ponte 2001:11-13). Fedecafé responded to this drop by cutting the export taxes collected by the National Coffee Fund and using its accumulated reserves to subsidize growers for their losses. While this lasted for a short period of time, the depletion of these reserves, coupled with the appearance of a coffee berry borer worm (*la broca*) that spoiled close to 500,000 hectares of coffee fields by 1995, forced the FNC to sell off its interests in the *Banco Cafetero* and seek out loans from the central government, both to finance the control and extermination of the *broca* worm and to attempt to continue to subsidize the drop in coffee prices. By the closing years of the decade, the FNC had incurred debts of over $433.5 million dollars so that by 2001 it was forced to abandon the price floor mechanism. And without the price floor to assure producers a price pegged to the cost of living locally, the FNC’s ability to maintain its *garantía de compra* policies was also undermined, giving way to increasing competition between Fedecafé and foreign transnational conglomerates (including Kraft, Cargill, Neumann, Volcafé). Between 1989 and 1996, the share of coffee purchased from local producers by these conglomerates rose from roughly 8% to 52% of all purchases. With less to sell, Fedecafé’s revenues dropped over the course of the decade by 80% (Robledo 1998: 101-102; Talbot 2004: 128).

While Fedecafé’s developmentalist institutions were in shambles, it was the cafeteros who felt the impact most severely. The cost of coffee production skyrocketed at the same time that prices declined, leaving many farmers in debt. In the past, coffee farmers would turn to the *Banco Cafetero* for low-interest loans and to Fedecafé for technical support and assistance during hard times. However, the bankruptcy of the FNC meant that many farmers were forced to resort to the high-interest loans of private banks that did not have a public mandate to service the specific needs of the cafeteros. By the close of the decade, their indebtedness to private banks reached new heights.

Facing bankruptcy, many smallholders began to sell ever-greater portions of their farms, leading to a concentration in land ownership and a polarization in the size of landholdings throughout the region (Robledo 1998: 71). Some indebted coffee producers continued to cultivate coffee, though in this case as wageworkers on others’ coffee estates rather than as landowning farmers. Other indebted smallholders simply abandoned their fields to look for wage work in the region’s three largest cities, contributing to an estimated 8% per annum

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4 One study found a 32% drop in the number of farmers dedicated “full-time” to coffee cultivation between 1993 and 2001 (World Bank 2002).
increase in informal sector economic activities and an average rate of unemployment of 22% in the regions’ largest cities (Manizales, Pereira, and Armenia) (Ramirez et al. 2002:41). Still others, unwilling to move to the cities or work on large agricultural estates, ended up migrating to the coca-producing regions of the southern agricultural frontiers under the de facto control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. Here, at least they could maintain their ties to the land, even if it put them at risk of violence and repression from both the FARC as well as from paramilitary groups allied to the Colombian military (Hough 2011a, 2011b). Finally, some began to convert their own coffee fields into coca fields (Smith 2003). This conversion to illegal coca production brought the FARC, paramilitary groups, and organized criminal syndicates into a region that had hitherto been considered impermeable to the crime and political violence characterizing the rest of the country over the past decades (Rettberg 2010).

THE RISE OF THE UCN: A POLANYIAN COUNTER-MOVEMENT?

It was in this context of bankruptcy, falling prices, and economic instability that the Unidad Cafetero Nacional emerged. Mobilizing a large number of card-carrying cafeteros outside of the normal institutionalized channels provided by Fedecafé (extensions programs, local meetings, departmental and national conferences) was no small feat. In fact, historically independent protest movements were largely absent from the region due to the ability of Fedecafé to meet the demands of cafeteros, following the formation of the FNC in 1940. However, Fedecafé’s failure to deliver on its promise of protecting cafetero livelihoods precipitated the unification of two organizations that were marginal in Viejo Caldas prior to the coffee crisis: the Association of Coffee Producers (Aprocafé), an organization of large coffee estate owners formed in 1977 to argue against the “discriminatory treatment” they faced under the FNC’s taxation policies, and the Unión Cafetera Colombiana (UCC), a group of small and medium-sized farmers who organized in 1984 to pressure Fedecafé to invest more resources into combating a coffee rust fungus (la roya) that had broken out in the region. Anticipating the impact that the abrogation of the ICAs would have on the FNC, these groups fused under the leadership of Fabio Trujillo Agudelo of Aprocafé and Jorge Enrique Robledo Castillo, a militant from the Movimiento Obrero Independiente Revolucionario (MOIR) political party who had previously organized street protests with a group called Cafeteros en Alerta.

The unification of these two groups under the leadership of Trujillo and Robledo led to the formation of the UCN in 1992. The UCN’s goal was to pressure Fedecafé to fulfill its promises to protect the sector and maintain the stable livelihoods of coffee producers. Specifically, the UCN sought an immediate suspension of judicial claims against indebted producers, the refinancing of retirement pensions, and more reasonable interest rates on loans. Its leadership also argued more broadly against the encroachment into the coffee sector by foreign transnational corporations (Robledo 1998: 38).

A number of protests organized by the UCN soon followed. In February of 1992, the first National Coffee March was held. In December a “Day of Coffee Producer Resistance” was organized which resulted in numerous demonstrations throughout the region. By March of 1993, producers from six coffee producing states (departamentos) marched on Bogotá, carrying a letter with UCN demands to President Gaviria. In November, the Bishop of the coffee-producing state of Tolima, Monsignor Jose Luis Serna, organized an Episcopal Conference that called on all coffee producers to organize and defend themselves by demanding the state to forgive their
financial debts. From then on, debt forgiveness and open confrontation with the government and Fedecafé became central elements of the burgeoning coffee producer movement (Robledo 1998: 39).

In March 1994, President Gaviria met with the UCN leadership, who presented him with a petition demanding fulfillment of UCN demands and containing over 200,000 signatures. With their demands unmet, the UCN organized a national march that brought producers from 8 coffee-producing states to Bogotá to declare Gaviria “the most anti-coffee president in the history of Colombia” (Robledo, 1998:40). By March 1995, the UCN was actively organizing in nine departments and had roughly 25,000 active militants who ranged from smaller peasants to larger coffee hacendados. In May of that year, Fedecafé’s Comité Nacional de Cafeteros approved the forgiveness of 25% of banking debts (roughly 10 million pesos) and made available $40 billion pesos in subsidies to control an outbreak of a coffee berry borer worm (la broca), all of which was subsidized by the FNC (ibid:40).

Unsatisfied with debt forgiveness of only 25%, the UCN decided upon more militant protest tactics. In June of 1995 it organized the first Paro Cívico Cafetero Nacional (national coffee shutdown) in the history of the country. A twenty-four hour protest was held, with over 100,000 people from 151 municipalities and 10 departments participating. Participation was broad-based, as transport workers, local businessmen, teachers, students, and even some local politicians and clergymen joined with the UCN in a show of solidarity. The state responded with Law 223 of 1995, which granted total forgiveness of debts on capital and interests on loans from banks to coffee producers so long as they followed three conditions: (a) if those loans were used for the purchase of productive inputs; (b) if they occurred before December 31 of 1994; and (c) if they did not supersede 3 million pesos. The UCN felt that the 3 million-peso cap on debt forgiveness was not enough, and after a series of protests in 1996, it declared in February 1997 that coffee producers would step up their civil disobedience activities. By the end of year, the FNC finally caved, promising a full forgiveness on debts for 86,783 families (Robledo 1998:41-42).

The closing years of the decade brought another onslaught of protests by the UCN, this time due to the rapid expansion of the broca berry worm in the region in 1997, an earthquake in January 1999 that devastated large tracts of coffee fields in the department of Quindío, and the drastic drop in world coffee prices following a brief spike due to frost in Brazil. Given the financial insolvency of the FNC and Fedecafé more generally, the UCN instead turned its protests to the national government, which it argued was ultimately responsible for the protection of the coffee sector and the economic livelihoods of the cafeteros.

In an effort to help save the coffee sector from total collapse, the Colombian government agreed to finance an aid package providing producers with a direct subsidy pegging local prices of coffee to the international market price. They also agreed to help indebted cafeteros refinance their loans and access new loans to cover the cost of technical assistance and the purchase of new coffee trees. In essence, the government agreed to take on the responsibilities previously held by the FNC for a two-year period. In 2003, the FNC reassumed these responsibilities, announcing that the price floor mechanism would remain pegged to world prices, future access to credit would come through the private banking system, and access to technical provisions and extensions services formerly provided by Fedecafé (through Cenicafé) would remain limited (Giovannucci et al. 2002; CONPES 2004:6).

Despite the increasingly radical tactics of the UCN during the years following the abrogation of the ICA and the dismantling of Fedecafé’s developmentalist institutions, the UCN
remained staunchly developmentalist in its orientation. The organization’s primary goals were to reinstate a price floor mechanism pegged to local living costs, restore cafetero access to easy credit, and reinstate the extension services and technical support offered by Fedecafé and its auxiliary organizations (FNC, Cenicafé, Banco Cafetero, etc.) in order to maintain a viable regulated coffee export sector that benefited large and small domestic producers alike. The UCN was able to mobilize such strong support from small and medium-sized cafeteros precisely because the group’s leaders repeatedly and publicly stated that domestic coffee production was the key pillar of national development. According to this logic, Fedecafé was to blame for the current crisis precisely because it abandoned its commitment to the well-being of the cafeteros.  

However, while Fedecafé was criticized by the UCN for failing to support smallholding coffee production, Fedecafé’s directorate shared the very developmentalist vision advocated by the UCN. Its directors had been among the staunchest advocates of the International Coffee Agreement’s coffee quota and pricing system precisely because the ICA buttressed Fedecafé’s own pricing and market subsidy system. Thus, in their general orientations towards the political economy of the coffee sector, there was little difference between the UCN militants and Fedecafé directors. When confronted with UCN demands for the re-establishment of the regulatory market mechanisms of the past, Fedecafé’s leadership responded that it would reinstate them if it could, but that the global context had shifted in such a way as to make this impossible. In fact, Fedecafé’s directors made it clear that, from their vantage point, all of the actors involved in Colombia’s coffee economy were under assault by the new neoliberal politics of United States and the growing power of foreign coffee conglomerates (Hough 2007: 117). It comes as no surprise then that by the turn of the century, the UCN’s leadership had decided that the best hope for a return to the developmentalist compromise of the past would come by joining a broad federation of agricultural producers aimed at opposing any efforts to further liberalize the national agricultural sector. This organization, called the National Association for Agricultural Salvation (Salvación Agropecuaria), is a coalition of more than 50 regional and national groups, including large agribusinesses with interests in sugar cane, potato, and grains, as well as smaller and medium-sized producers. Fedecafé’s directorate, for its part, did not become formally involved in the activities of Salvación. Instead, it began to strategize how to best adapt to the shift in the world economic climate, beginning with an attempt to market its new Juan Valdez coffee products directly to consumers in the United States. UCN’s leaders, in turn, became further involved with Salvación over time, eventually organizing mass demonstrations against talks of a “Free Trade of the Americas” agreement in 2001, climaxing in a national day of protest in Bogotá in April 2004. By then, the UCN had ceased to exist as its own entity, though some of its militants remained active in Salvación.

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5 Sociologist Christopher London conducted research in the region between 1996 and 1998, surveying 446 smallholders in the departments of Caldas and Nariño and holding a series of roundtable discussions with 93 of those surveyed with the intent of finding out what the cafeteros considered to be the causes and potential solutions to the crisis facing the sector. He concluded that the “developmentalist orientation continued to provide the lens through which the growers perceive the crisis and their own place in it” (London 1999: 98, 110). Of those surveyed, 64% believed that the crisis was “out of their control” and any possible solution would have to come from Fedecafé and/or the central government (ibid 126-127, 134-135).
Insofar as the UCN was the clearest representative of Colombia’s smallholding coffee sector, claiming to represent the interests of the cafeteros who were struggling to maintain their livelihoods in the context of market liberalization, the organization’s trajectory is instructive of the political imaginary shaping cafetero resistance. The UCN was established in large part out of the remnants of Aprocaf, a group that emerged to advocate for the interests of large coffee estate owners against what it argued were discriminatory taxation policies that favored small- and medium-sized farmers. After a period of mobilization targeting Fedecafé and the rest of the Colombian government, the UCN became absorbed into Salvación Agropecuario. At no point in time did the UCN, or Salvación for that matter, articulate a radical alternative to a regime of market-oriented production on privately-owned land; rather, what they sought was a return to the status quo that had prevailed prior to the 1989 collapse of the International Coffee Agreement.

To be sure, this stance may have reflected a tactical choice rather than the contours of the cafetero political imaginary. However, it important to point out that the UCN’s decision to forge strong cross-class alliances between small and medium-sized cafeteros and large coffee estate owners around a domestically-oriented developmentalist agenda had a series of political consequences. First, while the UCN employed a nationalist discourse that downplayed differences among coffee farmers, the UCN’s agenda was effectively biased towards the largest and most fortunate coffee producers – those who were able to hold out over the course of the decade despite their direct exposure to the whip and whims of the open coffee market. In fact, during the same years that the UCN was mobilizing its members in the streets, a significant number of the most economically vulnerable cafeteros had already lost their land. These former growers became full-time workers on the large estates, or urban dwellers seeking employment in the informal sectors of the region’s cities. In its efforts to re-instate the status quo ante, the UCN ignored the demands of other possible constituencies who might have been enlisted in the struggle against liberalization. These include agricultural workers who sought more far-reaching labor legislation, urban slum dwellers who demanded more affordable housing and public services, and those calling for national agrarian reform to redistribute land to the most vulnerable segments of the agrarian population, including Afro-Colombians, indigenous groups, and women (Hylton 2006).

The possibility of mobilizing around these issues was not theoretical. During the 1990s a number of new social movements had emerged throughout Colombia in support of these goals, and it would have been possible for the UCN to pursue alliances with some of these groups. However, as we have shown, the cafeteros of Viejo Caldas enjoyed a unique status within the political economy of Colombia, as both the protagonists and the beneficiaries of a long struggle for land reform, which dated from the foundations of the Colombian coffee economy in the 19th century and culminated in the passage of Land Law 200 in 1936. Although the window of reform opened by Land Law 200 was brief, it was sufficient to create a smallholding sector of producers, who, over time, shifted from a mix of subsistence and cash crops to a more or less decisive dependence on coffee. This commitment to intensive coffee cultivation was buttressed by a parastatal coffee sector, headed by Fedecafé, which was the lynchpin of a national developmentalist project that rested on Colombia’s participation in a regulated world coffee market. When radical challenges to the hegemony of that project emerged from other sectors, particularly the peasant and agricultural workers’ movement of the 1960s, the student and urban civic movements of the 1970s, and the guerrilla movements in the 1980s, the cafeteros of Viejo
Caldas remained steadfast supporters of the traditional political establishment, comprised of the Liberal and Conservative parties, even when these governments implemented repressive measures against these movements. And yet throughout this period, even as the smallholders remained, for the most part, loyal to the political establishment in the face of popular challenges to its rule, the geopolitical and political-economic foundations of the developmentalist project were being undermined, a process that was crystallized in the 1989 abrogation of the International Coffee Agreement. What followed was a period of sustained crisis during which efforts to mobilize in defense of producer livelihoods co-existed alongside dynamics of differentiation (i.e. increasing land concentration) and displacement (i.e. former smallholders turning to wage work or informality).

CONCLUSION

In this article we have argued that the consequences of world market liberalization for Colombia’s farmers resemble the dynamic of dispossession that David Harvey describes as a central mode of accumulation in the neoliberal era. According to the Polanyian analytic described earlier, the effort to create a market society that is global in scope is calling forth counter-movements to resist the threat it poses to society. Advocates of this view expect that among such struggles, the most auspicious for challenging neoliberalism will be those that focus on the commodification of livelihoods and the privatization of resources. While the search for Polanyian counter-movements against the commodification of land, labor, and nature has produced celebratory accounts of flagship movements such as the MST, Via Campesina, or the EZLN, the analysis we have offered here raises a number of questions about how the UCN, as a different kind of agrarian struggle, should be interpreted. First, while Polanyi saw counter-movements as organic efforts to re-embed the market in society, Polanyi’s conceptualization of society as a constellation of different social forces was underdeveloped, as Burawoy (2010) has pointed out. The UCN was a movement representing a particular segment of rural producers, and the vision of an embedded market that it articulated was one that rested on an exclusionary developmentalist compromise. As demonstrated above, the class formation of the cafeteros was premised upon the establishment of a hegemonic political pact that stunted the mobilization of social groups and classes outside of it. In this sense, the “stable” class formation of the cafeteros was part and parcel of the “marginalized” class formation of those excluded groups and classes. And given the staunchly developmentalist political imaginary of the cafeteros, there is no indication that a return to a regulated/embedded coffee market would generate a dynamic any more inclusive than that of the past.

Second, interest in the re-embedding potential of counter-movements should not gloss over the very real social transformations that have been wrought by the movement towards neoliberalism. In the case of Viejo Caldas, we saw that the liberalization of the coffee market has given rise to a rapid concentration of land, the proletarianization of large sectors of the coffee labor force, and the growth of a new class of urban informal and illegal workers. Whatever forms of resistance are to confront the commodifying forces of neoliberalism, they will emerge from a social landscape that has already been altered by the disorganization and displacement of the cafeteros, whose historical formation as a class of smallholder producers we have analyzed here.

The transformations wrought by neoliberalism extend beyond the coffee fields of Viejo Caldas. Indeed, any evaluation of the UCN’s potential as a movement to re-embed the market must confront the fundamental changes that have occurred in the geopolitics of the world coffee
sector over the last decades. As we have argued, the developmentalist pact between Fedecafe and the cafeteros of Viejo Caldas was premised upon the perpetuation of the International Coffee Agreement’s pricing and quota system. Although one could interpret the ICAs as a kind of protective countermovement to regulate and thus re-embed the market in coffee-producing societies, it is worth pointing out that the ICA began as a pact between the United States (the largest coffee importer) and the largest coffee-exporting countries (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, among others) in order to ensure U.S. hemispheric influence over the region. As a regulatory mechanism, it excluded many coffee producing-exporting countries from the benefits of the pricing and quota system that the agreements established, while perpetuating the unequal distribution of profits for those countries that did participate in it. But even assuming that the reregulation of the coffee market by a new ICA would help at least some producers, such an outcome is extremely unlikely, precisely because the global conditions that gave rise to this form of regulation have fundamentally changed.

While we understand the appeal of the Polanyian analytic as a heuristic for interpreting the great transformation of post-Fordist neoliberalism, we want to conclude by calling for studies of the current conjuncture that draw on the tools and insights of world historical sociology in order to show how (and whether) this transformation is occurring in particular places, and with what consequences. In this article, we have demonstrated how a class of coffee-producing smallholders was formed in Viejo Caldas through a century long encounter with the Colombian state and the world coffee market. Although the UNC was formed in the 1990s to protest the liberalization of the global coffee market, the demands that it articulated were an extension of that process. Our goal, in tracing the trajectory of the cafeteros over the longue durée, has been to suggest that while dispossession by accumulation may be a defining feature of the neoliberal era as Harvey and others have argued, the extent to which it is challenged by alternative visions of the future will depend on the political imaginaries of those confronting it.
APPENDIX: MAP OF VIEJO CALDAS, COLOMBIA
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COMPLEMENTARY AND COMPETITIVE REGIMES OF ACCUMULATION:
NATURAL RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD-SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

During the post-war period, natural resource production has often been associated with peripheralization in the world-economy. This paper seeks to demonstrate that this association does not hold when examined from a long-term perspective, and explains the conditions under which natural resource production can support upward economic mobility in the world-system. First, this paper provides evidence that the production of cash crops and resource extraction has not always equaled peripheralization in the world-economy, as demonstrated by, among other things, the upward economic mobility of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand during the nineteenth century. It then puts forth a new hypothesis that the existence of opportunities for raw material producing countries depends on whether the hegemonic regime of accumulation at a given time structures the economy in a way that is either complementary or competitive to the economic development of raw material producing countries. By examining the British centered regime of accumulation during the nineteenth century, we find that it was comparatively complementary to economic development in raw material producing countries whereas the twentieth century United States centered regime was comparatively competitive with raw material producers. Based on a comparison with Britain and the United States, the paper also suggests that China’s increasingly central role in the world-economy may be comparatively complementary to economic development in raw material producing countries.

Key words: Resource curse, Natural resources, Terms of trade, Development

INTRODUCTION

From across the spectrum of development literature, the assumption is made that economic specialization in cash crops and natural resource extraction is a recipe for under-development and economic marginalization in the world-economy. In some circles this belief is referred to as the “resource curse,” a hypothesis that low- and middle-income countries more often than not fail to use their resource wealth to generate economic growth (Auty 1993; 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995; 1997; 1999). Others speak of the belief in terms of a world division of labor and unequal exchange where poor countries provide rich industrialized countries with cheap natural resources, thereby perpetuating a world hierarchy of wealth in which raw material producers...
remain at the bottom (Frank 1969; Amin 1977; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). The broadly accepted association between economic peripheralization and raw material-based economies is not surprising. One only has to compare the extraordinary economic growth of resource poor Japan and the East Asian Tigers (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore) during the second half of the twentieth century with the relatively slow growth of resource rich nations in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America to emphasize this point. However, from a long-term perspective, the relationship between national wealth and economic concentration in such sectors as agriculture, mining and forestry has not always been negative. Consider for example that raw material wealth supported the upward economic mobility of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand during the nineteenth century (Auty 2001; Wright and Czelusta 2007). Based on the historical record, it is possible that the negative socioeconomic conditions associated with raw material-based economies may be a late twentieth-century phenomenon rather than a general condition.

In this paper I examine this possibility using a world-systems perspective and conclude that, in fact, the production of cash crops and resource extraction does not equal peripheralization in the world-economy. Rather, I put forth a new hypothesis that the structure of the world-economy changes over time in ways that open up economic opportunities for raw material-producing countries at some times, while limiting economic development in such countries at other times. Whether or not these opportunities exist at a given time, be it the nineteenth century, the twentieth century, or a point in the future, depends on whether the hegemonic regime of accumulation at that time structures the economy in a way that is complementary or competitive to the economic development of raw material-producing countries.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section briefly reviews the hypothesis that raw material production is a cause of economic peripheralization, and then presents some evidence that refutes this argument. The second section examines the differences between historical regimes of accumulation and explains how the British regime of accumulation during the nineteenth century was comparatively complementary to economic development in raw material-producing countries, whereas the twentieth-century United States regime was more competitive with raw material producers. The third and final section discusses how this premise can be used to assess the implications of the changes we are seeing in the world-economy today for raw material-producing countries – namely the economic rise of China and increasing reports of “land grabs” and “neocolonialism” in resource rich countries.

PERSPECTIVES ON RAW MATERIALS AND DEVELOPMENT

In the body of literature that examines the relationship between natural resource wealth and economic development, there are two opposing perspectives about why countries that produce raw materials may be disadvantaged. There is significant disagreement between these two groups over causal mechanisms, but proponents of both perspectives agree that raw material producing countries are disadvantaged relative to manufactures producing countries. One side focuses on institutional level causes and argues that low levels of economic growth can be attributed to the way that natural resource wealth breeds bad state policies, ineffective governance, and corrupt and rent-seeking behavior. The other side focuses on structural causes like the declining terms of trade between raw materials and manufactured products and unequal exchange in international trade.
Orthodox explanations of the disadvantages of raw material producing countries focus on state level policy failure. These views take Ricardo’s (1817) comparative advantage thesis as their point of departure and reason that countries endowed with natural resources should take advantage of this gift from nature and trade their resources for goods produced in less resource endowed countries. Failure to convert natural resources into economic growth is explained by a lack of policies and institutions that facilitate resource based growth (Sachs and Warner 1995; 1997; 1999; Karl 1997). From this perspective, policies that slow exchange rate appreciation resulting from resource booms and minimize inflation in the non-tradable sector counter the phenomenon known as “Dutch disease” and help ensure that resource revenues support economic growth (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007).\(^1\) Given that policy recommendations allegedly exist for avoiding the “resource curse,” research from this perspective tries to explain why raw material rich states so often fail to implement these policies.

Corruption and rent seeking from political elites are popular explanations for policy failure. It is suggested that influential private actors and interest groups pressure state officials for access to funds causing resource revenues to dissipate across networks of patronage and corruption (Tornell and Lane 1999); in addition, state officials compete internally for control of resource revenues and the right to allocate rents (Ross 2001). Bad decision-making is another frequently cited reason for policy failure. The assumption is that windfall resource revenues induce ‘irrational’ behavior among state officials who are subject to social pressure to quickly improve national standards of living. Also, it is argued that this pressure results in uncoordinated, shortsighted spending and that the sheer amounts of money created during resource booms reduce the care with which policymakers handle seemingly unlimited funds (Auty 1993; Mitra 1994). While such policy failure arguments are frequently used, their utility is suspect since it is unclear that levels of rent seeking and corruption are higher in natural resource rich countries than in resource poor countries; or that resource rich countries with high levels of corruption have experienced lower growth rates than other resource rich countries. Indonesia, for example, has consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt nations in the world and yet has experienced one of the highest levels of economic growth among raw material producing countries over the past forty years. Perhaps a bigger weakness of this institutional perspective, however, is that it assumes that once state level policy failures are corrected, development will follow. This perspective ignores external structural constraints on development that have little to do with internal institutions and policies.

The other side of the development debate focuses on structural constraints, but the conclusion is the same: specialization in cash crops and resource extraction are bound to lead to underdevelopment and peripheralization. This is because the world-economy consists of a division of labor that places raw material producing countries in weak negotiating positions vis-a-vis the industrialized core and results in systems of unequal exchange in trade (Baran 1957; Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984).

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\(^1\) The term ‘Dutch disease’ became popular when natural gas was discovered in the Netherlands in the 1960s and the value of the guilder rapidly appreciated, leaving Dutch manufactured goods uncompetitive on the international market. As a general concept, ‘Dutch disease’ affects resource exporting countries when a boom in resource exports, set off by new domestic discoveries or increasing world prices, results in increased income in the resource sector and an accompanied increase in demand for domestic non-tradable and tradable goods and services (Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984). The prices for non-tradable goods rise to meet demand, but increased demand for tradable goods like manufactures and agricultural products are met by increased imports since prices are determined internationally. This process generates a tendency towards de-industrialization (or de-agriculturalization) as labor and capital move from the tradable sector into the more profitable resource-based and non-tradable sectors.
Furtado 1964; Frank 1969; Amin 1977; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Furthermore, as Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer contended in independent studies in 1950, the terms of trade between raw materials and industrial products have a tendency to decline such that countries exporting raw materials face increasing prices for imports of manufactured goods. This hypothesis, which became known as the Prebisch-Singer thesis on the declining terms of trade, has been used to explain the twentieth century divergence in wealth between rich and poor countries on the grounds that poor countries face ever increasing prices for imported manufactured products because of their specialization in raw material exports. This is a legitimate claim since, as Figure 1 shows, there is evidence of the decline during the twentieth century (Grilli and Yang 1988; Maizels, Palaskas, and Crowe 1998; Cashin and McDermott 2002).

**Figure 1: Terms of Trade for Primary Products, 1900-1986**

(1900 = 100)

Figure 1 shows that, although there were ups and downs, the overall trend was that prices of raw materials were dropping relative to manufactured goods for most of the twentieth century, making imports of manufactured goods increasingly expensive for raw material exporting countries. This figure only shows the trend from 1900 to 1986; a time period during which the terms of trade decline was about 0.5 percent per year for raw material exporting countries. However, after 1986 additional studies estimate that the decline increased to between two percent and four percent annually through the 1990s (Maizels et al. 1998; Cashin and McDermott 2002).

While there were clearly structural disadvantages for raw material producing countries during most of the twentieth century, it is not at all clear that this means economic concentration
in raw material sectors can be equated with underdevelopment as a general rule outside of the particular conditions of the twentieth century. Rather, I believe that what appears to be a structural linkage between raw material production and peripheralization is merely an outcome of the particular structure of the twentieth century world-economy. There is evidence in support of this claim. For one thing, the terms of trade between raw materials and manufactured goods has not always been declining. As Figure 2 shows, the terms of trade were actually moving in favor of raw materials for most of the nineteenth century.² In fact, between 1798 and 1913, Imlah (1950) found that the terms of trade for countries exporting goods to Britain, which were predominantly raw materials, improved by an average of 0.82 percent per year. Sarkar’s (1986) study produced similar results to Imlah’s showing that the terms of trade improved by an average rate of 0.87 percent per year between 1801 and 1881 for raw material exporters. By 1881 this meant that raw material producers were able to purchase twice the amount of imported manufactured goods as they had been able to purchase in 1800 with their export revenue (Cypher and Dietz 2004).

Figure 2: Terms of Trade for Primary Products 1798-1900
(1798 = 100)

Source: Imlah (1950).

² This trend is actually based on Britain’s import and export data, but this data set is generally accepted as representing the terms of trade for primary products against manufactured goods since Britain’s exports were predominantly manufactured goods and imports were mainly raw materials (Prebisch 1950; Sarkar 1986).
There is also evidence that raw material rich countries were able to take advantage of the increasing terms of trade. Figure 3 shows that in 1870, raw materials made up the bulk of exports from the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia while Britain exported only a minimal quantity of raw materials. Despite this specialization, however, these raw material exporting countries were some of the wealthiest countries in the world at the time. In fact, Australia’s per capita GDP actually exceeded that of Britain in 1870 (Maddison 2006).

Figure 3: Raw Material Exports as % of Total Exports in 1870

While the precision of nineteenth century trade and income data vary, the above patterns at least indicate that world economic conditions during the nineteenth century may have been better for raw material producers than conditions during the twentieth century. The widely accepted linkage between raw material production and peripheralization seems to be related to the twentieth century world-economy and does not seem to be a generalizable relationship outside of this particular time period. This raises the question of why raw material producing countries faced development challenges during the twentieth century whereas conditions were more positive for development during the nineteenth century.

COMPLEMENTARY AND COMPETITIVE REGIMES OF ACCUMULATION

Assessing how economic opportunities have changed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for countries specializing in cash crops and raw material extraction requires an understanding of how the macro-economic conditions of the capitalist world-economy have changed during this time period. Giovanni Arrighi’s 1994 book, *The Long Twentieth Century*,...
includes a useful vantage point for identifying how these conditions have changed. Arrighi develops a framework showing how the history of capitalism has been characterized by a succession of hegemonic powers that have each defined and made efforts to control regimes of capital accumulation on a world scale. Each successive “regime of accumulation” has taken advantage of periods of crisis and change in the world-economy to restructure and reorganize the world system to its advantage. “The strategies and structures through which these leading agencies have promoted, organized, and regulated the expansion or the restructuring of the capitalist world-economy is what we shall understand by regime of accumulation on a world scale” (Arrighi 1994:9). The most recent such regimes include: the British-centered regime of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the United States-centered regime of the mid- to late twentieth century; and an emerging 'new' regime that will likely be centered in East Asia, most probably in China. During the nineteenth century, Britain structured the world-economy to the advantage of the British economy and during the twentieth century the United States used its position of power to structure the world-economy to reflect the economic and political interests of the United States.

Arrighi’s framework is useful for examining how the structure of the nineteenth century British-centered world-economy may have opened up spaces for the development of raw material producing countries while the structure of the twentieth century United States-centered economy limited such opportunities. Based on a comparison between the United States and Britain, we can also use this framework to make informed forecasts about the structural opportunities and limitations natural resource rich countries may face in the twenty-first century with a China-centered regime of accumulation.

What were the differences between the British and United States regimes of accumulation in terms of their relationships to raw material producing countries? Broadly speaking, the British regime of accumulation was complementary to raw material producing countries while the United States regime was competitive with these countries. The British maintained their position as the center of the world-economy using trade and investment tools that were not only beneficial to the domestic economy, but also opened up development opportunities for countries specializing in cash crops, particularly cotton and grain which faced significantly lower British trade barriers than manufactured goods. Even prior to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 (at which point the duties on almost all imports were abolished); duties on critical raw material inputs were significantly lower than duties on manufactured goods. For example, in 1839 duties on raw cotton, wool and corn imports were on average only 6.9 percent (Imlah 1958:148). Such low duties stand in stark contrast to duties on manufactured goods which were on average as high as 40 percent in 1840 (The House of Commons 1840:6). Britain used unilateral policies of free trade to promote domestic economic growth, first exporting industrial goods to the rest of the world in exchange for raw material inputs, and later serving as the world’s financial and commercial entrepot, to secure its position as the center of the world-economy. “A large and growing number of states and territories were thus ‘caged’ in a world-scale division of labor that strengthened each one’s interest in participating in the British-centered global market, the more so as that market became virtually the sole source of critical inputs and sole outlet for remuneratively disposing of outputs” (Silver and Arrighi 2003:335).

In addition, the structure of business organization in Britain was highly decentralized and differentiated, making it impossible for British corporations to control all aspects of global production. This was to the advantage of raw material exporting countries. Take the case of
cotton as an example. Textile factory owners rarely attempted to vertically integrate the textile production process by incorporating raw cotton production and shipping into their business activities. Instead, “they were content to rely upon the Liverpool market for their raw material and had virtually no interest in its ultimate source so long as it arrived regularly and cheaply” (Farnie 1979: 16). As a result, unlike the vertically integrated commodity chains that emerged during the twentieth century; the cotton trade involved a myriad of actors operating at all nodes of the textile commodity chain including planters, merchants, brokers and spinners. The structure of the cotton trade was to the advantage of raw cotton exporting countries because they were able to retain a large share of the value added along the commodity chain vis-a-vis merchants, brokers and spinners. In the United States the bulk of the value of raw cotton was retained by the cotton planters while merchants and brokers in turn received small percentages of the final sale price. Ellison (1968) provides accounts of the cotton trade from 1816 where over 60 percent of the sale price of the raw cotton was retained by the cotton planter in the United States (245).

Essentially, Britain did not compete with raw material producing countries to control the production of raw materials but rather specialized in manufacturing and in those activities that facilitated the trade of raw materials for manufactured goods. Britain’s wealth was linked to manufacturing and commercial and financial activities and was not threatened by the development of countries specializing in raw material sectors. In fact, Britain made efforts to increase development in countries that provided its domestic economy with natural resources. To accommodate the expansion of the domestic manufacturing sector, the British regime provided raw material producing countries with access to the means of raw material production (capital, technology and knowledge). For example, Eric Hobsbawm draws attention to the long-term industrial benefits countries gained from railway iron and machinery exported by British industry even though the British benefitted disproportionately at the time of trade (1975:39). Colonies and countries committed to exporting primary products saw virtually unlimited exports and credits under the British regime and had very little incentive to industrialize given that the terms of trade, at least before 1914, seemed to be running in favor of raw materials (Hobsbawm 1987:64-65).

The imperial aspects of Britain’s hegemony and the series of colonial wars fought during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century most certainly did affect developmental outcomes in colonial territories. Hence, the British regime of accumulation was not necessarily complementary to all countries that were rich in natural resources. Just to be clear, however, the procurement of raw materials was never the primary motivation for Britain’s colonial expansion. As Paul Bairoch (1993) has shown, most of the raw materials consumed by industrial centers in Europe during the nineteenth century came from other developed countries not from southern colonies. As late as the eve of World War I developed countries acquired 98 percent of their metal ores, 80 percent of their textile fibres, and 100 percent of their energy resources from the developed world (Bairoch 1993:67-8). For example, during the nineteenth century Britain’s largest import, raw cotton, came predominantly from the United States which supplied on average about 67 percent of Britain’s cotton imports between 1800 and 1883 (Ellison 1968: 86). From the perspectives of the colonies, however, raw material exports to Britain and other developed countries were of the utmost economic importance. Exports of primary products represented more than ninety percent of their total exports, almost all of which were to developed countries (Bairoch 1993:68). Because these territories have long suffered from underdevelopment, and because many of these countries rely to a large extent on raw material
exports, a link is frequently drawn between their raw material economies and underdevelopment. To the contrary, Britain and other developed countries procured most of their raw materials from white-settler colonies like Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand leaving the raw materials in other colonies relatively underexploited. Of course there were some raw materials that were not available in the developed world—including rubber, natural fertilizers like guano, and tropical crops like coffee and tea—but these resources represent a small portion of total raw material imports to the developed world (Bairoch 1993).

If the conquest of colonial territories was not primarily for procurement of raw materials, it was economically necessary from the perspective of Britain because it helped to facilitate global trade. According to Eric Hobsbawm (1987), the primary purpose of colonization for Britain was securing control over various land and sea zones that were essential for the maintenance and expansion of Britain’s world-wide web of commercial and maritime interests (67). This required the establishment of a global network of coaling stations to support steam powered shipping, along with control of sea routes to the east like the Suez Canal. In particular, access to India was critical to British power and required

control not only over the short sea-routes to the subcontinent (Egypt, the Middle East, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and South Arabia) and over the long sea-routes (the Cape of Good Hope and Singapore), but over the entire Indian Ocean, including crucial sectors of the African coast and its hinterland. British governments were keenly aware of this. It is also true that the disintegration of local power in some areas crucial for this purpose, such as Egypt (including the Sudan), drew the British into establishing a much greater direct political presence than originally intended, and eventually into actual rule. (68)

In this sense, Britain’s geo-political interests during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did have a lasting impact on the socio-economic structures of colonial territories that may account for the relative differences in development outcomes between major raw material producing countries like the United States and Australia, and those territories that were exploited mostly for their strategic placement along Britain’s trade routes.

In contrast to Britain, the U.S. development path included an approach to trade and investment that increased the likelihood of underdevelopment in countries specializing in cash crops and raw material extraction. The U.S. regime is conceptualized as having a competitive relationship with the rest of the world-economy and in particular with raw material producing countries. With the continental size of its economy and the vertically integrated, transnational structure of its corporations; the United States could use means other than unilateral free trade policies to position itself at the center of the world-economy (Silver and Arrighi 2003:339-340). The United States has an expansive territory and abundant natural resources. As Stephen Bunker and Paul Ciccantell (2005) have pointed out, these factor endowments helped the United States evolve into a major raw material producer and a center of technological innovation in raw material sectors. The productivity of the U.S. raw material sectors subsequently supported the country’s emergence as a world leader in manufacturing (Wright 1990:658). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States was a globally competitive producer of commodities ranging from oil and grain to copper and cotton (Smith 1919:288-9), and recent data indicate that raw materials remain a large source of U.S. exports, with grain being among the top exports for much of the late twentieth century (OECD). While raw material production has supported the
growth of the U.S. economy, the high productivity of raw material sectors has increased competition among less productive raw material exporting countries for access to markets and intensified the decline in the terms of trade for those countries. Taking the case of grain as an example, subsidies and high levels of productivity have enabled U.S. grain producers to outcompete other grain producing countries in the world market because they are able to export excess grain at artificially low prices (Atkin 1992; Winders 2009). Cheap American grain exports have been associated with the economic decline of many lower income countries with large agricultural sectors (McMichael 2004:56).

The United States remains a major producer of many agricultural and mineral commodities, but levels of per capita raw material consumption are high enough that the United States also imports large quantities of most raw materials. Increasing U.S. imports of raw materials have not, however, translated into development opportunities for raw material exporting countries. U.S. corporations' vertically integrated multinational structures have enabled them to compete in all aspects of raw material production in locations around the world (Chandler 1990). This has reduced opportunities for other countries to benefit from the exploitation of their national resources. For example, U.S. oil companies have been able to exploit foreign oil reserves through favorable investment agreements. The contracts established are designed primarily by U.S. oil companies and give a minimum in profits to the host government or territory. As an example, U.S. oil companies operating in Venezuela in the 1930s were making five times more profit per barrel of oil extracted than the Venezuelan government (Philip 1994:60). Even after many countries nationalized their oil production during the 1970s, U.S. oil companies retained their technological advantage in exploration and drilling as well as their relatively high capacity to transport, refine and market crude oil. As recently as 2009, for example, 20 percent of the world’s crude oil was refined in the United States, more than in any other single country. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest producer of crude oil, only refined 2.3 percent of the world’s crude. Rather than supporting the development of other countries as independent raw material producers by providing access to its markets, capital, technology and knowledge, the United States has appropriated a large portion of the value added in foreign raw material production while also competing in raw material export markets. Essentially, the U.S. economy developed along a raw material-intensive path organized around large, transnational corporations that specialized in all aspects of raw material production and trade. This economic structure left little space for the emergence of competitive raw material sectors in other countries.

Just like the geopolitically motivated exceptions to Britain’s complementary relationship during the nineteenth century, there are exceptions to the general norm of the “resource curse” during the twentieth century that can be traced to U.S. geopolitical interests. Many of these exceptions can be linked to Cold War strategies of outcompeting the Soviet Union in terms of global influence by offering economic aid and investment relationships to those developing countries that were either sympathetic to U.S. interests or strategically located (McMichael 2004: 48). Take for example the case of Indonesia which is frequently referenced as a raw material producing country that did not succumb to the “resource curse” during the twentieth century. Andrew Rosser (2007) associates Indonesia’s developmental exceptionalism to its strategic location during the Cold War, made possible by Suharto’s capitalist friendly development policies. During the 1970s, the United States was engaged in the Vietnam War and there was

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3 Calculations based on data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 (http://www.bp.com/).
widespread fear that communism might spread throughout Southeast Asia. This resulted in a series of U.S. initiatives aimed at incorporating countries like Indonesia into the capitalist sphere of influence (50). When Suharto gained power, the United States quickly took advantage of his capitalist leanings with offers of aid and assistance in consolidating his rule. The developmental impacts in Indonesia cannot be understated. Indonesia became one of the top recipients of financial aid in the world and remained so until the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s (52). At the same time that oil and gas revenues were declining for many producing countries, large sums of aid were pouring into Indonesia because of its strategic geopolitical significance, making Indonesia an exception to the general rule of the “resource curse.”

Of course more often than not, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, intervention by the U.S. government in raw material producing countries has privileged its economic interests over these countries’ economic development. This is particularly the case with oil rich countries where the U.S. military supports U.S. oil companies’ access to foreign oil. For example, Chalmers Johnson (2004) draws attention to the U.S. push to establish military bases throughout Central Asia, where oil abundance has attracted U.S.-based oil companies. Johnson suggests that the U.S. military followed these companies to nations bordering the Caspian Sea specifically to protect private capitalist interests (169). The Caspian oil basin is the last large, undeveloped oil and gas field in the world, and is thus of great interest to oil consuming nations, namely the United States and increasingly China. U.S. companies including Chevron, Unocal, Amoco and Exxon all expressed great interest in building a pipeline to exploit these resources, but it was not until the United States began building a complex of military bases in the involved countries – Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan – that they were able to successfully negotiate their investments (172-3). The link between the U.S. military and access to foreign oil is not limited to this case either. The war in Iraq has been repeatedly linked to oil interests and, in fact, recent drilling agreements with the Iraqi government position U.S. oil companies at the forefront of the race for oil revenues (Kramer 2011).

In comparison to Britain’s overseas military activities during the nineteenth century which were primarily aimed at protecting trade routes, U.S. activities are in many cases directly related to procuring raw materials or to protecting the investments of U.S. raw material producing companies. In sum, while the trade and investment policies that Britain adopted during the nineteenth century provided opportunities for economic development in raw material rich countries, the trade and investment policies that enabled the U.S. economy to maintain its leading position in the world-economy during the twentieth century limited opportunities for the upward mobility of other raw material rich countries.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Let us now turn to the contemporary relationship between development and specialization in raw material sectors. Is it possible that the structure of the world-economy could once again become complementary to raw material producing countries? In the opening years of the twenty-first century, the global economy has been characterized by a boom in demand and prices for raw materials; particularly oil, gas and metals, but also agricultural commodities. This demand has

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4 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines 2002 as the start of this boom in commodity prices. Between 2002 and 2006 world commodity prices for non-fuel minerals, ores and metals increased 220 percent, and crude oil prices increased 158 percent. Before 2002 most of these commodities had
been accompanied by a surge of investments in mineral exploration and cropland expansion around the globe. The current wave of investment stands in stark contrast to past waves because most of the recent growth in demand has been from the global South and China in particular. In 2005, China alone accounted for 29 percent, 66 percent and 25 percent of the growth in world demand for oil, copper and nickel respectively (UNCTAD 2007:89). China’s investments have raised alarm from journalists, policy makers, academics and activists about the potential for a wave of “neocolonialism” and “land grabs” across the resource rich global South and in particular in Africa (see Geisler in this issue). As just one example, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton recently warned African countries to guard against the intentions of Chinese investment at a press conference in Zambia (Wonacott 2011). China is frequently depicted as the latest in a series of imperial powers seeking to plunder the natural endowments of poor countries while gaining access to new markets for cheap manufactured goods. However, it is not clear that the story is altogether negative, since some view China’s raw material demand as an opportunity for development in resource rich low income countries (Taylor 2006; Sautman and Hairong 2008). A comparison of China’s contemporary interactions with raw material producing countries with those of nineteenth-century Britain and twentieth-century United States can shed light on this issue from a longer-term structural perspective than is typically used to portray the impact of China’s search for natural resources on developing countries.

Britain and the United States clearly had very different types of relationships with raw material producing countries, and these relationships resulted in very different economic opportunities for the latter’s development. There are some indications that the structure of the world-economy may once again become complementary to the development of raw material producing countries, despite critiques of China’s scramble to procure natural resources around the world. As Figure 4 shows, the commodity boom at the beginning of the twenty-first century resulted in a reversal of the declining terms of trade for raw materials that characterized the twentieth century. This supports the possibility of a long-term reversal of the terms of trade in favor of raw material producing countries.

Even with the 2008 financial crisis, which brought a sharp drop in raw material prices, the overall trend has been positive since 1999 for all except agricultural raw materials. In 2009, raw material prices stabilized and began increasing once again. This indicates that the positive trend in commodity prices may be robust, particularly for non-renewable resources like fuels and metals. China’s demand for fuels and metals has accounted for much of the recent growth in world demand for metals like copper, lead, nickel, steel, tin, and zinc as well as for agricultural products (IMF 2006). This demand has helped to increase prices for raw material exporters and is transforming the terms of trade to move in favor of raw material exporters.

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Beyond the impact China is having on the terms of trade for raw materials, I would argue that a China-centered regime of accumulation would be more similar to the British regime than to the U.S. regime, and therefore relatively complementary to raw material producers. First, China’s economic specialization in consumer goods manufacturing and position as the new “workshop of the world” is similar to Britain and will likely require liberal trade policies on raw material imports to secure adequate supplies of raw material inputs for the economy. In terms of business structure, China is similar to Britain in that the small scale and decentralized nature of the manufacturing sector in China reduces China’s bargaining power against raw material suppliers. For example, recent negotiations over prices for iron ore imports have shown how the small scale of steel manufacturing in China has limited steel manufacturers’ power in price negotiations with iron ore suppliers. In 2008, after months of bargaining over iron ore prices, Australian iron ore producers Rio Tinto PLC and BHP Billiton Ltd. negotiated an 85 percent increase in the benchmark price of iron ore. This victory for iron ore producers came soon after Brazilian mining company Vale negotiated a similarly attractive iron ore price increase (Matthews 2008). Iron ore producers are able to take such hard line positions in iron ore price negotiations because they are dealing with a competitive steel sector in which individual steel firms have little leverage in the negotiations. Finally, like nineteenth century Britain, China has a capital surplus and has offered loans to raw material producers at very attractive terms (Sautman and Hairong 2008; Taylor 2009). These loans typically support infrastructure projects which are built by Chinese construction companies at a low cost rather than by higher cost Western companies. Chinese construction firms have completed much of the construction work associated
with these infrastructure projects, which is part of the attraction for the Chinese government in making these loans. While this arrangement has been criticized for not maximizing the use of local labor, the Chinese construction firms’ costs are low relative to those of Western firms. Thus, for example, oil producing countries are able to improve their infrastructures at a lower cost than would have been possible under Western investment.

Most importantly though, China’s economic specialization in labor-intensive manufacturing is complementary to natural resource rich countries because China’s wealth does not depend on its ability to crowd out raw material producers. Rather, China’s manufacturing economy creates demand for raw materials and provides raw material exporters with access to foreign exchange and cheap manufactured goods. China’s demand for raw materials is already affecting countries that are rich in natural resources. For Australia, Indonesia and Brazil, China is the largest market for exports of iron ore and timber, and Sudan exports the majority of its oil to China. Zambia’s copper mines were in decline for most of the 1990s, but China now offers a growing market for copper and Zambian mines are thriving. China’s imports of raw materials offer a welcome market for many countries that suffered from years of declining commodity prices, and there is little sign that the demand will decline anytime soon. All signs indicate that China is at the early stages of its raw material consumption growth and that growing demand for these commodities is not a temporary spurt such as those that resulted in the commodity price shocks of the 1970s and 1990s (Kaplinsky 2010:103). To the contrary, it is likely that rising prices and demand for most commodities will be sustained for some time—much to the benefit of raw material producing countries.

This brings us to the question of whether China’s geopolitical interests might create limitations for some raw material producing countries despite the general trend toward complementarity in trade relationships. There are signs that China treats certain raw material producing countries with preference over others based on political interests. This is primarily linked to the recognition of Taiwan as either an independent state or a province of China. China has threatened that it will cut ties to any state that establishes diplomatic relations with Taiwan and so Taiwan is officially recognized by very few states (Taylor 2009:28). Oil rich Sao Tome and Principe is one country that recognizes Taiwan, and while this has resulted in large aid transfers from Taiwan, China has looked elsewhere for oil investment opportunities.

In terms of military intervention, however, it is likely that China will not be as active in using force and territorial conquest to support economic expansion as was the case with Britain and the United States. This expectation is based in large part on Arrighi’s assessment of the differences between the European and East-Asian paths to development as laid out in *Adam Smith in Beijing* (2007). Arrighi contends that, in contrast to the Western (European) style of inter-state relations which have been based on military competition and territorial expansion outside of Europe, East Asian inter-state relations have been based around national economy building and an absence of overseas empires (315-17). Of course these two divergent development paths came together when East Asia was incorporated into the European system during the nineteenth century. Arrighi writes that the result was a “hybrid political-economic formation that has provided a particularly favorable environment for the East Asian economic renaissance” (313). Speaking to popular fears and expectations for a new Cold War between China and the United States, Arrighi contends that it would be in China’s best interest not to follow the military path of the West, but rather to wait for the United States to expend its dwindling resources on its military and financial commitment to the war on terror, and in the
meantime expand its national market to win allies and create a new market based global order to replace the European one that is based on force (312). If Arrighi is correct, there is little reason to be concerned that China has plans to use force or territorial expansion to gain access to raw materials. Rather, China’s interest lies in expanding trade and providing an alternative to Western military style dominance in the global system. This is evident when we observe that “China has played a leading role both in rerouting the Southern surplus to Southern destinations and in providing neighboring and distant Southern countries with attractive alternatives to the trade, investment, and assistance of Northern countries and financial institutions” (382). However, as with all things concerning China, it is too early to state emphatically that China will be able to maintain this approach instead of the other possibility that the East Asian path converges toward the Western approach of global domination via force and territorial expansion.

CONCLUSION

The world-economy has presented very different conditions for raw material rich countries at different points in time since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Theories and policies that are based on the assumption that raw material production is equivalent to peripheralization in the world-system, or that there is a “resource curse” whereby countries that produce manufactured goods will always outcompete countries that produce raw materials incorrectly assume that the structural conditions within which countries compete are static. The structure of the world-economy is shaped by the interests of hegemonic regimes of accumulation that have changed over time – Britain, the United States and China are diverse countries with significant economic, social and geographical differences.\(^5\) The innovations these countries have used to attain and maintain their positions at the center of the world-economy and to excel in a system of capitalist “creative destruction” reflect these differences. Britain, a small island nation with higher productivity in textiles than any other country at the time created a world wide web of trade and opened its borders to receive flows of raw materials from around the world. The United States took advantage of Britain’s demand for raw materials during the nineteenth century and went on to become one of the world’s most innovative centers of raw material extraction and agricultural productivity during the twentieth century. The United States innovated government support and oligopolistic business structures to maximize its revenues from global raw material production and consumption, effectively crowding out other raw material producers. China has maximized its extreme competitive edge in labor-intensive manufacturing. In addition, the business structures that make Chinese manufacturing flexible and competitive also shift the power in negotiating the terms of trade and investment toward raw material producers.

These shifting innovations and structures have had pronounced impacts on opportunities for economic advancement in raw material producing countries. The terms of trade patterns shown in section one support the view that there is has been a general trend in which countries

\(^5\) This paper treats China as an emerging world hegemon even though this assumption is contentious. I do not argue that this is the only path the world-economy could take; it is merely the path I chose to consider in this analysis as a means of assessing the economic effects of China’s rise on raw material producing countries.
producing raw materials were more likely to advance economically during the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first century than they were during the twentieth century. However, the conclusion to this analysis is not that all raw material producing countries will achieve rapid upward economic mobility during the twenty-first century, just as all raw material producing countries were not upwardly mobile during the nineteenth century. This analysis merely points out that the odds of upward mobility are better when the world-economy is structured by a complementary regime of accumulation like that of Britain or China than they are under a competitive regime like that of the United States. In reality, there are numerous factors that determine a given country’s economic outcome at a specific time in addition to the structure of the world-economy, including characteristics of specific types of raw materials, national social and economic structures and institutions, and geo-political relationships. This paper has clearly not given adequate attention to other intervening factors because the goal was to present variations in the structure of the world-economy and the implications for this structure on raw material producing countries. However, that does not mean that these issues are any less important.

I would like to conclude by restating the main point of this research – that raw material production should not be viewed as an economically inferior activity to manufacturing. The structure of the world-economy is not static, and it presents different types of economic opportunities depending on the characteristics of the leading regime of accumulation in the world. Hence, inequalities in the wealth of nations cannot be addressed by merely transitioning low income countries out of raw material industries, particularly at times like we are seeing in the twenty-first century when the world-economy provides these countries with opportunities to accumulate wealth through complementary trade relationships. Whether or not cash crops or extractive industries are peripheral activities is a question that depends at least in part on how the world-economy is structured and whether it is in the interest of hegemonic powers to adopt trade and investment policies that are complementary or competitive to raw material producing countries. What is clear is that raw material wealth cannot be equated with peripheralization in the world-economy across time and space.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank participants in the 2010 Political Economy of the World-System Conference at Florida Atlantic University for their questions and feedback on an earlier version of this article. In particular Farshad Araghi and Marina Karides provided valuable comments on previous drafts. I am also grateful to the late Giovanni Arrighi for his encouragement and guidance on this project, and to Beverly Silver and Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz for their feedback on earlier versions of the paper.
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Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 2010. SourceOECD Database.


ABSTRACT

This paper highlights contemporary China’s long-term continuities with the historical East Asian developmental path in relation to its post-1978 revival of market-economy traditions. The revival of market economy traditions does not exemplify the unfolding of processes associated with the “one-size-fits-all” Washington Consensus. Rural land reforms were driven from below and strongly influenced policy changes from above. Neither rural nor urban land use relations suggest a more general unfolding of neoliberal processes of capitalist accumulation by dispossession. Contemporary Chinese land relations reflect the effects of continuities with historical East Asian regional traditions more strongly than do some discontinuities and ruptures that emerged in the conjuncture of the mid-1980s. These continuities remain more important in understanding the future of the China-led East Asian region. Like the Ming and Qing dynasties, China’s Party-State is sharply focused on problems of governance. Retaining legitimacy and recreating a welfare state to promote harmonious development rather than growth fetishism appears to characterize China’s current trajectory.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper I relate the historical traditions that underlie an East Asian developmental path with the evolution of land use rights in post-1978 China. Marxist analysts like David Harvey (2005) claim that post-1978 land relations in China exemplify a more general unfolding of neoliberal processes of capitalist “accumulation by dispossession” from the land. I argue that although the neoliberal period facilitated China’s re-entry into the capitalist world-economy, China’s subsequent development unfolded by and large on its own terms and by its successful use of the U.S.-led neoliberal turn of the late 1970s and beyond for its own purposes, which had little use for the “one-size-fits-all” neoliberal Washington Consensus. On the contrary, post-1978 land relations in China reveal more continuity with general East Asian traditions than do some of the ruptures with East Asian land-use traditions that emerged after the mid-1980s. These discontinuities were a consequence of China’s opening its doors to foreign industries and their environmental downsides. Western industry wanted to relocate to China to increase profits from

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1 I would like to thank Marina Karides and Farshad Araghi for their incisive comments and suggestions, which have improved the quality of this paper.
capital accumulation. Nevertheless, China selectively allowed relocation of foreign capital into its coastal zones, and it did so only after these coastal zones had benefited from investments made by Overseas Chinese capitalist diaspora in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The long-term outcome of these and other decisions, which began to crystallize after the IMF lost credibility due to its role in the 1997-8 East Asian financial crises, enabled China to carve an autonomous approach to East Asian regional development independent of Washington. As Bin Wong argues in the context of the rising role of the renminbi in cross-border East Asian trade, “Washington is no longer in a position to limit the ways in which Chinese and Japanese develop financial markets in East Asia” (Wong 2011:160). Contemporary migrant workers’ struggles against exploitation in China’s eastern coastal economic zones and unemployed workers’ struggles for livelihood in the aftermath of the restructuring of the State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China are often claimed as evidence for the effects of processes of accumulation by dispossession promoted by neoliberal states following the Washington Consensus (Harvey 2005).

These claims, however, do not acknowledge the strong influence of historical East Asian regional traditions on late-Imperial and contemporary China. Nor do they take into account durable challenges of governance encountered by all of China’s political rulers, whether in late-Imperial times (Wong 1997), in the time of the post-1949 People’s Republic, or during the post-1978 phase of economic reforms. As Giovanni Arrighi has underscored, almost unique to contemporary China is “the fundamental problem of how to govern and develop a country with a rural population larger than the entire population of either Africa, or Latin America, or Europe” (Arrighi 2007:374-5, emphases in original).

This fundamental problem may be seen as a larger historical problem of governance in an East Asian region whose center was Imperial China until the mid-19th century. A uniquely East Asian developmental path that was labor-intensive and efficient in its use of land emerged as a response to governance problems of land and labor under late-Imperial Ming and Qing dynastic rulers. The Chinese revolution in the course of the first half of the twentieth century, influenced by the Russian revolutionary path (Anderson 2010), did deviate from the East Asian developmental path. At the same time, China’s peasant-based rural revolution and its leadership grafted new traditions onto the East Asian developmental path that addressed more effectively problems of governance of land and labor in a world dominated by U.S.-led Cold War politics. The post-1978 Deng Reforms revived many of the market economy traditions that were integral to the historical East Asian developmental path—suppressed during the Maoist years—thereby reinforcing Chinese continuities with that path of development.

Since the mid-1980s these continuities with East Asian traditions have come under strain as China’s export-oriented growth engine drives world-systemic growth. But the continuities remain far more important in understanding the future of both the China-led East Asian region and the capitalist world-system. These combined and related futures of East Asia and the world-system are closely tied to the nature of China’s development trajectory, and China’s support for development in the global South. Insofar as the Chinese growth engine reproduces East Asian developmental lineages, it also presents possible alternatives to the notion that ‘there is no alternative’ to the U.S.-led neoliberal developmental model imposed on Third World states in response to the Southern debt crises of the mid-1980s. IMF-imposed neoliberal structural adjustment programs (SAPs) for countries whose debts were a direct outcome of the 1979-1982 Volcker monetary shocks undermined welfare states in the Third World. SAPs also destroyed the viability of the Third World as a political group in the interstate system and later unleashed
uncontainable social strains on the former Soviet Union (through shock therapies) and on some Eastern European societies.

China, by contrast, (re-)entered the world-system in 1972 from a position of relative economic and political strength. As Perry Anderson (2010) argues,

at the gateway to their reforms, perhaps the most decisive of all the differences between Russia and China lay in the character of their political leadership. In command of the PRC was not an isolated, inexperienced functionary, surrounded by aides and publicists infused with a naïve Schwärmerie for all that was Western, but battle-hardened veterans of the original Revolution, leaders who had been Mao’s colleagues, and had suffered under him, but had lost none of their strategic skills or self-confidence... Collectively, they were in a strong position, enjoying not only the prestige of their roles in the Civil War and building of the nation, but the popularity of having brought the Cultural Revolution to an end, which was met with a surge of relief in the cities. (77-8)

This collective leadership of the Party-State led by Deng Xiaoping did not follow the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus centered on indiscriminate deregulation, liberalization and privatization. As a consequence, China emerged relatively unscathed from the traumas of the 1997-98 Asian financial crises that devastated many of those national economies that followed IMF instructions. More importantly, the PRC’s long revolutionary tradition of self-reliant economic development, context-specific domestic innovations, and a foreign policy commitment to self-determination make China’s developmental path especially appealing to nations of the global South (Zhengyue 2010).

Although considerable rural-urban and inter-regional inequalities emerged in China after the mid-1980s, Chinese economic growth was also accompanied by substantial upward social mobility (Wright 2010). The re-creation of a welfare state on expanded foundations followed strong pressures from the urban working classes (see for instance Frazier 2010), and the second rural land reform of the late 1970s and early 1980s responded to strong pressures from farmers in the countryside. Present evidence suggests that the Chinese developmental path continues to respond to popular demands from below. The vision underlying the current 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) is guided by principles of harmonious development that place less emphasis on growth per se (currently at around 9% per annum) and more emphasis on growth balanced by redistributive considerations. The Plan harshly penalizes corruption at the local governmental levels. Such a vision does not accommodate the pursuit of neoliberal accumulation by dispossession, if only because social stability and economic development are key sources of legitimacy of rule by the Chinese Party-State. But can China become more than a poor people’s welfare state? China’s future stability depends on the extent to which the Chinese development path draws sustenance from earlier East Asian development traditions. It also depends upon the extent to which Chinese developmental interests are able to combine with the developmental interests of the global South at a time of crisis of Western models of development (Arrighi and Zhang 2009). In this context, China’s foreign policy statement by Premier Wen is promising. China “welcome[s] the fast development of emerging economies, respect[s] different models of development,” and offers “increase[d] help to least developed countries to enhance their capacity for self-development, and promote strong, sustainable and balanced growth of the global economy” (Wen Jiabao 2011). A robust China-led world developmental path also depends upon sustainable reproduction of Chinese growth and development patterns. Positive signs in this
direction were signaled in the shift in priorities towards sustainable development at the turn of the millennium under the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership. Part of this shift in priorities is towards more equitable and welfare-oriented rural and urban land-use relations that have for long been a well-defined feature of the historical East Asian Developmental Path.

In the first section I outline some of the key historical features of the East Asian development path that I claim continue to operate in the new millennium. The sections that follow look at the implications for this development path during the post-1978 changes in Chinese rural and urban land relations. While there are environmental challenges to the East Asian developmental path, these challenges have not yet displaced more durable East Asian environmental legacies.

**HISTORICAL FEATURES OF THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENTAL PATH**

Kaoru Sugihara (2003a; 2003b) contrasts the nature of an East Asian developmental path from standard claims regarding the Western European developmental path. These claims see world industrialization as the simple outcome of a “chain of technological diffusion” that originated in Western Europe before spreading elsewhere. By contrast, Sugihara argues that between 1500 and 1820 a distinctive East Asian industrious revolution path developed independently of the Western path. More importantly it generated standards of living in the East that were at least comparable to, if not more favorable than, the Western developmental path. As China’s population increased to 400 million by the end of the 18th century, its economy also became much larger than European economies: England’s share of world GDP was around 6% in 1820 and Europe’s share as a whole remained less than China’s share of over 30% of world GDP. What is underscored is how China, and Japan under the technological influence of China, managed to reproduce such a large population without serious downgrades in its standard of living (Sugihara 2003b:79).

This East Asian miracle resulted from the region’s institutional and technological mechanisms for the full absorption of family labor, which were a response to land and natural resource constraints. The model mobilized human material power around community-based work ethics that absorbed labor, and employed labor-intensive technologies that privileged small-scale production based on the family farm as production unit. It also promoted flexible specialization by providing farmers with incentives to develop managerial and inter-personal skills. In short, fuller East Asian utilization of all existing labor resources in relation to available land points to a pattern of labor utilization at sharp variance with labor use patterns elsewhere. For instance, settler colonies in the Americas either forcibly exploited or eliminated Indigenous labor and imported Africans as slaves for work on large plantations for the accumulation of capital by European colonists. East Asia’s small-scale family farm based land utilization patterns developed in tandem with rapid commercialization of agriculture and proto-industrialization. Many small innovations and many sideline market-based activities multiplied throughout the region. In China under the Song Dynasty and beyond, local, regional and trans-regional market exchanges proliferated to allow “spectacular increases in total productivity, as all the advantages of specialization that Adam Smith later analyzed so persuasively came into operation” (McNeill 1982:29). Bin Wong (1997:17-32) in fact characterizes economic development in late Imperial China as unfolding under predominantly “Smithian dynamics.” Arrighi in turn points to these Smithian dynamics to underline the vibrant market-economy based lineages of East Asian development, as distinct from the lineages of capitalist development in the West (2007:40-96).
These lineages of market-based development combined with institutional transformations (the eighteenth century Chinese ‘miracle’) to not only create in China the largest domestic market economy in the world, but also to overcome what Elvin (1973) calls China’s “high-level equilibrium-trap” (321-33, 353-9). Although markets were suppressed during the Maoist interlude (1949-78), the post-1978 Deng reforms effectively revived these market economy traditions to facilitate a twenty-first century Chinese miracle.

To these features of the East Asian developmental path we may add the role of Confucian ideology—a crucial mechanism of governance through consent—in cementing civilian dominance within late Imperial China. In sharp contrast to autocratic Russian imperial-state traditions since the mid-16th century—consolidated through coercive concentration of resources gathered from a huge territory, disciplining the elites, and violent dispossession and deep enserfment of the peasantry (Derlugian 2011:213-29)—the imperial tradition in China had always placed more emphasis on consent rather than coercion as an instrument of rule (Anderson 2010:69). Chinese statecraft generally viewed both the organized resort to armed force and capital accumulation through ‘shrewdness in buying and selling’ as violations of Confucian propriety. While private merchants were tolerated and even encouraged insofar as their activity served official ends, “to allow merchants or manufacturers to acquire too much power, or accumulate too much capital was as unwise as to allow a military commander or a barbarian chieftain to control too many armed men” (McNeill 1982:34-6). Rich merchants were prevented from becoming too rich, and imperatives of social stability promoted benevolent centralized governance that had no comparable counterpart anywhere in Western Europe, where constant competition for power between rulers was often pursued at the expense of livelihood rights of subjects—a circumstance that lay at the roots of systemic chaos in European history (see Arrighi 1994: Ch.1). By contrast, the late Imperial Chinese state pursued the ideal of benevolence in its rule on the grounds that good government required supporting the people and regulating their livelihoods. “There is no early modern European government equivalent to the late imperial Chinese state’s efforts at dictating moral and intellectual orthodoxy…. Early modern European states did not share the Chinese state’s view that shaping society’s moral sensibilities was basic to the logic of rule” (Wong 1997:97).

Moreover, late Imperial China’s search for social stability led it to design policies that ensured regular supplies of necessities of various kinds, especially food. The Qing dynasty (1644-1911) created an elaborate system of food supply management whose centerpiece was “a granary system which stored several million tons of grain. Located mainly in county seats and small market towns, granaries represented official commitments to material welfare beyond anything imaginable, let alone achieved, in Europe” (Wong 1997:93, 97-8; see also Shue 2010: 46-51). In general, late-Imperial Confucian agenda for domestic order possessed a “fractal” quality: “at any level in late Imperial China we may find expressions of a Confucian agenda for social order.” Officials at all levels accepted the same long-run welfare agenda for social order. (Wong 1997:121). These long-run welfare agendas of Imperial dynasties prevented the formation of those synergies between military enterprise and commercial enterprise that were to take place in Europe between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries (McNeill 1982:40). In turn, the absence of these synergies between capitalism and militarism were closely associated with the promotion, formation, and consolidation in nineteenth century Imperial China of the largest market economy in the world. More generally, the strong promotion of impulses of market economy prevented capitalist development from taking root in the mainland. Late Imperial statecraft effectively exiled capitalists to the outer rims of the East Asian interstate system; in
doing so it also prevented capitalists from subordinating the general interest to their own class interest (Arrighi 2007:333-6). The invention of the Cultural Revolution at a later moment (1966-1976) would be used by Mao’s leadership to prevent a bureaucratic caste from subordinating the general interests of the revolution to their own class interest. Anderson (2010: 69) suggests that the Cultural Revolution may in fact have “owed more to Confucian than to any Marxist notions of historical change”. Such a suggestion complements Daniel Bell’s observation that ‘it is not entirely fanciful to surmise that the Chinese Communist Party will be relabeled the Chinese Confucian Party in a few years’ (cited in Eberlein 2009:273). Relabeled as Confucian or not, the post-2002 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao remains not only publicly committed to socialism; it also appears to be responding attentively to the accumulating social stresses and strains from continuously high economic growth through a newer emphasis on cultivation of a “harmonious society.”

Did East Asia’s incorporation under 19th-century British hegemony change the labor-intensive, resource-saving, market-based direction of its development? As Sugihara (2003a; 2003b) argues, late 19th-century Japanese industrialization basically reactivated traditional Asian local institutions, which were later to emerge as modern corporations, and in the first half of the 20th century the rest of East Asia followed suit. However, between 1830 and 1930 the East-West income and productivity gap widened in the West’s favor as the West used its military superiority to forcibly incorporate large parts of the East within its “extroverted” capitalist developmental path (Arrighi 2007). How did East Asia’s developmental path respond to its 20th-century incorporation under U.S. hegemony? Between 1955 and 1973 the Japan-led developmental path systematically introduced capital- and resource-intensive industries to Southeast Asian environments with cheap, disciplined, and skilled labor. This powerful fusion of Western capital-intensive technology and Asian human resources generalized high rates of economic growth across Japan and much of Southeast Asia. In China, by contrast, Cold War determinations not only isolated the PRC from the world market (1949-78), it also forced the PRC to invent distinctive revolutionary traditions. Although during the Yan’an phase of the Chinese revolution the CCP under Mao forcefully subordinated China’s market-economy legacies, it also championed revolutionary innovations that later complemented and revitalized the legacy of China’s industrious revolution during the post-1978 Deng reforms. These revolutionary innovations were based on a “two-way socialization process” in which the CCP both directed and was shaped by the aspirations and values of the mass of rural peasantry. The CCP’s land reforms during the Yan’an phase made the peasants the solid basis for the socialist transformation of the countryside (Selden 1995:37-8). Peasant-based revolutionary traditions combined with the modernizing thrust of Marxism-Leninism to qualitatively upgrade the life expectancy, adult literacy, and basic welfare of the masses (Arrighi and Zhang 2009:21-3). These revolutionary legacies of 1949-78 combined with the post-1978 revival of market-economy legacies in the 1980s and beyond to make the PRC-led East Asian region a “hybrid” engine of world economic growth dominated by East Asian developmental traditions.

CHANGING LAND-USE RELATIONS IN RURAL AND URBAN CHINA

How do land rights and land use relations in contemporary China relate with these legacies of the East Asian developmental path? I consider this question first in regard to rural land rights and then in regard to urban land rights, before situating the question within the context of long-run environmental trends and transformations in China. I seek to show how China’s land relations in
the course of the post-1978 Deng reforms did not encounter anything resembling the well-known crisis experienced by Third World developmental states that were forced into extensive privatization and liberalization. The rural land reforms remain a success story despite the proliferation of land disputes, and urban land relations have preserved the entitlements of urban dwellers despite the layoffs that followed the restructuring of state-owned enterprises and despite considerable urban land speculation promoted by local government officials and property developers. China successfully bypassed the processes of accumulation by dispossession that neoliberalism inflicted on a great part of the global South and the former Soviet Union. In doing so, China may also have helped speed up the crisis of the neoliberal model for world development.

**Rural Land Relations in post-1978 PRC**

In the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) introduced a ‘second land reform’ that entailed extensive de-collectivization of agriculture. Massive state-directed and spontaneous internal migration combined with the introduction in the mid-1980s of special economic zones in the eastern coastal areas to mark a turning point in the world-system in general, and in China’s political economy in particular. This was a turning-point in the sense that, unlike the rest of the global South where neoliberal structural adjustments of the 1980s devastated an indebted Third World, in China the mid-1980s marked the beginning of the sustained success of an export-led national and regional growth path accompanied by considerable upward social mobility for China’s rural population. Upward social mobility was in part an outcome of increased physical mobility of rural migrant farmers: over 130 million rural migrants left the farms in search of non-agricultural jobs, and most were productively absorbed into the newly created small-scale township and village enterprises (TVEs) which were not privatized until the late 1990s (Lee 2010:60). The spurt in growth of farmers’ non-agricultural sideline activities revived the market economy lineages of the East Asian developmental path. If the mid-1980s saw a “frenzied conversion” of land to non-agricultural uses (Ho and Lin 2004a:83), this happened mostly in China's eastern coastal provinces, “a region that has less than 10 per cent of China's territory but accounts for 22 per cent of its cultivated land and 39 per cent of its non-agricultural land” (Ho and Lin 2004b:760). Because the second land reform empowered farmers to raise productivity of farm land and levels of farm and non-farm incomes, the conversion of land to non-agricultural uses was not accompanied by any general dispossession of farmers from the land. Although all land in China is still owned by the State, the second land reform enabled the return to the farmer of the use-right to rural land through land-lease contracts in the form of the new Household Responsibility System (HRS). The hybrid tenure system that emerged out of these reforms did not privatize land ownership, but instead allowed private farmers the right to use land formerly held in common.

This second land reform itself was the outcome of a long period of rural class struggles between 1949 and 1978 during which Chinese farmers struggled against agrarian transformations that the CCP imposed upon the peasantry. Driven by Cold War geopolitics, these projects included the forcible collectivization of agricultural land for purposes of industrialization and strong restrictions on farmers’ markets and farmers’ mobility through the hukou (household registration) system. These measures yoked farmers to production decisions of large agricultural collectives whose surplus output was transferred to the industrial sector. As different scholars
have pointed out (Zhou 1996; Solinger 1999), the 1949-1978 Maoist regime actively facilitated an urban bias and sanctioned an urban public goods regime at the expense of the rural sector. Nevertheless, such forms of “primitive accumulation” never approached anything remotely resembling the processes of relentless accumulation through violent dispossession of the peasantry in the USSR in the late 1920s. The differences in mechanisms and consequences of Soviet and Chinese collectivization point to deep differences in the two experiences. The formation of people’s communes during the 1958-1960 Chinese Great Leap Forward was never intended—as it was in the USSR—as an attack on the peasantry. Along with land reforms of 1947-1953, the 1962 “Four Fixes Movement” granted permanent ownership of labor, land, animals and tools to the production team/the natural village (Ho 2010:105). Unlike in the USSR, where police ferocity was instrumental in the liquidation of the peasantry, in the PRC “bureaucratic blindness” was the immediate cause of the disaster that followed the Great Leap Forward. In contrast to the USSR, there was no comparable deep alienation of the peasantry in the countryside. “The countryside was not durably demoralized by the Great Leap Forward, village life in even the worst afflicted regions recovering with surprising speed,” and rural society could recover from the traumas of the Great Leap all those “centuries of market impulses” that were integral to life in the countryside (Anderson 2010:67, 76).

Moreover, rural farmers’ movements and farmers’ ingenuity circumvented many of the Collectivist era’s feudal and ‘caste-like’ regulations. Farmers in short succeeded in transforming China through the baocan daohu movement that forced from below, the formalization from above of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in the late 1970s (Zhou 1996). This second land reform was ‘as egalitarian as the first, but far more favorable to peasant production’ (Anderson 2010:83). By the mid-1980s a nationwide Household Responsibility System (HRS) – built in the form of contracts between state and rural farm households – was in place as the communes were broken up and small plots of land leased to households. These contracts were validated for fifteen years in 1984; in 1993 they were extended for thirty years; and in 1998 the Party-State legalized the contracts with households for another thirty years. Under the HRS, the state’s long-term leases of farmland to rural agricultural households made farm households responsible for making a fixed payment of grain or other agricultural items at below-market prices to the state. After meeting this obligation, rural households were free to use or sell surplus produce in the market (Perry and Selden 2010:4-5; Wright 2010:110).

As farmers responded to the new incentives, agricultural productivity shot up and the farm economy realized a series of bumper harvests. Sideline activities multiplied as farmers redeployed their surplus work time from tillage into rural industry, lifting peasant incomes from 30% to 44% of national income between 1978 and 1984 (Trichur 2009:109-110; Anderson 2010:83). At the same time, restrictions on farmers’ mobility—institutionalized under the Household Registration System (hukou)—were gradually relaxed, and rural farmers were encouraged to “leave the land but not the countryside” in order to participate in the countryside’s newly-formed township and village enterprises (TVEs). The innovative emergence and success of TVEs was in part an outcome of the decentralization of rule promoted by the Party-State in the reform period, although their origins extend to the Cultural Revolution’s fostering of local governmental initiatives (Anderson 2010:76). This earlier effort shifted resources and discretion to communities, localities, and lower levels of government to encourage localized strategies of growth and development (Shue 2010:45-6).

2 The Great Leap Forward’s restructuring of land use followed a policy of complete land collectivization (1955-56), which came within a few years of the original redistribution of land (1947-1953).
The success of TVEs, moreover, was partly an outcome of the entrepreneurship of rural farmers and farmer-migrants. The Chinese peasantry had never been “a listless, sullen rump of the class it had once been, as in Russia. It was neither tired not disaffected, but full of potential energy, waiting to be released” (Anderson 2010:76). Sponsored and subsidized by local governments, TVEs developed into a hybrid form of small-scale industrial enterprises that fell between state, collective and private property. They developed with great speed and dramatic success by harnessing the entrepreneurial energy of farmers. Those who migrated from the countryside often did so to work within the countryside TVEs where employment more than quadrupled from 28 million to 135 million. Rural industrial output increased at an annual rate of 20%, and TVEs’ share of national GDP increased from 6% at the onset of reforms to 26% in the mid-1990s (Anderson 2010:84). Rural migration to TVEs created powerful synergies between the pursuit of competitive economic growth by local governments and the exercise of entrepreneurship by rural households in non-agricultural sideline activities. These synergies injected sustained dynamism to Chinese economic growth; they also promoted sustained upward social mobility of China’s rural population. Between 1989 and 2005, using 2003 as a baseline-year, the yearly real per capita income of rural residents rose by 300%. As real rural purchasing power increased, rural per capita consumption of meat, eggs, and fish, increased by 50%-100% between 1985 and 1998, as did consumption of consumer durables like washing machines, refrigerators, color TV sets, and motorcycles (Wright 2010:115).

To these positive effects of growth without rural dispossession, there are of course negative instances of effects of “decentralized accumulation” (Lee 2010) by local government officials over-ambitious to fulfill Central Government growth targets. Although technically land is under the collective ownership of the village and subject to the control of Village Committees (VCs), expropriation of farmland by township and county level governments – ostensibly for development purposes – often occurred (Wright 2010:125). Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech in 2005 highlighted how the “reckless occupation” and appropriation of agricultural land by local governments for development purposes created large numbers of landless farmers which threatened sustainable development of the countryside (cited in Ho 2010:101). Policies that prioritized economic growth contributed to abuses at the local government level, including environmental degradation, abusive taxation by local cadres, widespread official corruption, and confiscation and sale of collective rural land.

To counter these abuses and to prevent social unrest within villages, the Party-State introduced ‘rule by law’ in the mid-1980s and encouraged Chinese citizens to take grievances against local cadres to the courts (Zweig 2010:124). China’s rural multitudes responded to ‘rule by law’ with street protests and collective petition efforts between 1993 and 2005 involving millions of farmers. The number of “collective incidents” of unrest nation-wide jumped tenfold from 8,706 in 1993 to 87,000 in 2005, with 40% of these occurring in the countryside (Li and O’Brien 2010:86). In 2005, out of the 13 million collective petition efforts recorded nation-wide, some 60-80% were initiated by farmers in relation to land disputes (Wright 2010:118). Protest leaders at the village level include well-established opinion leaders with moral authority in their community who use their knowledge of central regulations to frame grievances against violations of these regulations by local officials (Li and O’Brien 2010:88-92). An extremely powerful “rights-consciousness” spread throughout the countryside, reflecting “policy-based resistance” in which villagers have used the law to their advantage (Zweig 2010:128). Such protests activated by village leaders mobilizing “rights-conscious” farmers suggest that the Maoist legacy of rural militancy and resistance against local level corruption is alive and widespread. At the same time,
although the countryside deeply resents the abuse of power by local officials, it retains its trust in the policies of the Party-State. As Li and O’Brien (2010:95) observe, village protest leaders remain “confident in the Center’s ability to deliver justice” (see also Wright 2010; Shue 2010).

How has the Party-State responded to these rural claims and to its own concerns over instabilities in the countryside? To placate farmers’ assertions that local taxes were being misappropriated and to stabilize rural society, by 1988 the CCP promoted direct elections for Villagers’ Committees (VCs), and particularly for the director of these Committees, in order to shift economic authority to local levels (Zweig 2010:123-4). As a result, village elections have become more meaningful, especially after a 1998 law empowered Village Assemblies to discuss and decide village expenditures and revenues, plot allocations, family planning actions, and collective contracts. By 2003 it appeared that 40% of China’s villages were operating in accordance with central policies. Protests and petition efforts revolving around excessive taxation have virtually disappeared since the tax reforms of the first years of the new millennium.

In general, there is a consensus among researchers on rural tax and land conflicts that “what has encouraged peasants to undertake collective action…has been their belief that local authorities have not been implementing central policies designed to protect peasants’ interests” (Wright 2010:117-19). At the same time, an increasingly rights-conscious peasantry is forcing the Chinese Party-State to be more cognizant of its historical role and responsibilities towards the peasantry.

Farmers’ interests however are undermined by the “deliberate institutional ambiguity” in China’s contemporary land rights system inherited from the Collectivist era of 1956-78 (Ho 2010:103). At that time a three-tier system of land administration including the People’s Commune, the Production Brigade, and the Production Team prevailed. After the initial Land Reform (1947-53), the 1962 Four Fixes movement granted permanent ownership of land, labor, tools and animals to the Production Team (the lowest collective level) but there was no accompanying nationwide cadaster. Nor were titles to land ownership issued to villagers in any systematic way. All this made the question of farmers’ rights to use of collective land rest on ambiguous terrain. De-collectivization in the mid-1980s replaced the three-tier system of administration under Collectivization with another three-tier system represented by the Township/Town, the Administrative Village, and the Natural Village. And the Collective period’s policy of frequently requisitioning land from the Production Team (what is today the Natural Village) without proper procedures and financial compensation reappeared to some extent in the practices of local governments during the late reform period. Local governments have sought to generate revenues for economic growth through commercialization of suburban land. The majority of land-ownership disputes in the 1990s and beyond were concentrated in the peri-urban zone, and these land disputes were related to commercialization of suburban land and urban sprawl (Ho 2010:102; Zweig 2010:131). A further complication on farmers’ claims to land use-rights was “the vague definition of collective ownership and therefore, the collective’s inability to protect and represent its members” (Ho 2010:105). The collectivist period also introduced the largely unresolved issue of customary land-use rights, which included rights to forest, grassland and wasteland, especially in frontier zones inhabited by ethnic minorities (Ho 2010:116). As China “goes West” these customary rights suffer from varying degrees of infringements by the Party-State’s development priorities for China’s western and interior regions.

3 For instance, mountain tribes in Yunnan have used forests as a community right, and the Mongols and Kazakhs in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang have traditionally recognized community grazing rights on land.
In sum, on the face of it, some collectivist legacies appear to militate against the East Asian developmental path. The diversity in land management policies at every administrative level following decentralization of authority during the reform period enables Loren Brandt and his collaborators to remark that central or regional policymakers are not the final arbiters in land management issues (2002:81-2). Local government officials successfully sidestep centrally proclaimed edicts. They are able to do so in the absence of a general legal framework for land rights. To counter such local governmental autonomy, central policy makers have opened legal windows for redress. Farmers take local cadres to court and use customary claims on land use to protest abuses at the local level. Insofar as legal proceedings often work against farmers’ interests, this tends to produce more social unrest.

To address unrest in the countryside, central authorities abolished the rural land tax on farmers and created a hybrid and ambiguous property rights structure that has not hampered China’s agricultural development or its food security. The institutional ambiguities in China’s land rights system have not fostered fundamental challenges to the present land ownership structure. No widespread claims for private, common or other forms of rural land ownership have arisen since the mid-1980s, in part because the bulk of investments diverted to nonagricultural uses continue to bring benefits to villagers. Even in the highly urbanized coastal provinces, rural settlements and rural roads together accounted for nearly 64% of the land allocated to nonagricultural use in the coastal provinces (Ho and Lin 2004a:85). And the newer institution of Village Committees appears to empower village level democratic institutions. If rural discontent over land appropriations by local party cadres remains, it co-exists with a faith in the Party-State’s ruling ideology of a harmonious society. Li’s study of rural China argues that “the trust in the central state felt by many villagers suggests that the regime still has some breathing space because dissatisfaction with lower levels has not yet generated demands for far-reaching political reforms” (2004:229). Rural unrest is widespread: at the same time, it is not deep enough for farmers to demand a transformation of the existing rural land use structure.

Although growing spatial inequalities resulting from over-investment in coastal zones have been a consistent feature of China after the mid-1980s, these inequalities are not irreversible. The new shift in policy priorities away from coastal development to development of the interior western regions is a direct response by the Party-State to these growing inequalities. A more balanced pattern of rapid growth over the new Plan period (2011-2015) is central to the “populist orientation” of the Hu-Wen combination since 2002, and this is reflected in direct income subsidies to rural residents and increased public investment in inland and western provinces (Dickson 2010:34). This has the potential to reduce inter-regional and rural-urban inequalities over the new Plan period and beyond. Using 2004 data, Martin Whyte (2010) has argued that inequalities in China are not perceived by rural Chinese as either unjust or unfair. They are, however, the effect of local accumulation through displacement of farmers from the land. In the recent past, inter-local governmental competition for economic growth often prioritized industrial advancement at the expense of investments in agricultural land. In the process, many farmers have indeed been displaced from the land as the land has been converted into sites for industrial production. But displacement is not the same thing as dispossession from the land. Migrant farmers in the booming provinces of coastal China have in fact “voted with their feet” by returning to the countryside in millions rather than be exploited in the deregulated foreign-invested export-processing zones. But this ‘exit’ option for migrant farmers is exercised precisely because it is available as an option: no matter how destitute, they have a piece of farm
land to return to, from which they have not been dispossessed (Lee 2007:204-5; Trichur 2009:124).

**Urban Land Relations in post-1978 PRC**

Are the implications for the East Asian development path different when we shift our attention to urban land rights and urban land conflicts in post-1978 China? Since the mid-1980s, Chinese cities have expanded at a fast pace, but this intensified expansion of urbanization has not been accompanied by dispossession of urban residential dwellers from urban land. As in the case of agricultural land, all urban land is owned by the Party-State, and the economic reforms have led to some displacement. But this displacement has mostly been of migrant workers in the cities who are typically denied formal residential rights and whose ad-hoc residential constructions have often been demolished in favor of urban planning priorities (Solinger 1999). For instance, there was considerable displacement of migrant workers from Beijing during the 2008 Olympics. Nevertheless, urban born workers retain many of their privileges inherited from the Maoist period, most notably their claims to an urban *hukou* that entitles them to live in state-subsidized residential units and find work in urban areas.

Urban working classes have indeed suffered in the course of China’s economic reforms. The reform and restructuring of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the mid-1980s was associated with the ‘unmaking’ of Mao’s urban working classes in the 1990s. These reforms of the SOEs have also been seen as the end of the socialist welfare state of the Maoist era, just as the early 1990s were associated with the “shock therapies” that ended the socialist welfare state in the former USSR and some Eastern European societies (Solinger 1999; Lee 2007). However, the differences between the Chinese and Russian or Polish experiences are equally insightful. In China, unlike in Poland or Russia, the restructuring of the SOEs did not lead to the end of the welfare state. Tens of millions of urban workers were indeed laid off and displaced following the dismantling in 1995 of the system of permanent employment (the ‘iron rice bowl’) that the Maoist regime had offered to urban workers in SOEs. Severe setbacks in urban workers’ status and livelihood did accompany the end of the system of “organized dependence” and paternalism characteristic of state-labor relations under state socialism.

At the same time, these dislocations sparked a huge number of collective protests by urban workers against the material and psychological effects of restructuring of SOEs and relocation of workers. During most of the 1990s, urban workers protested against wage and pension arrears, inadequate unemployment and medical allowances, and embezzlement of funds by factory managers. In general, subsistence rights have been at the center of urban workers’ protests. Moreover, since the late 1990s urban Chinese protesters, like their rural Chinese counterparts, have made use of the emergent discourse of legal rights to appeal to the Party-State’s claim to ‘rule by law’ (Lee 2007; Lee 2010:60-1; 67-9). It is clear that urban working classes have held the government responsible for mass economic dislocation. It is equally clear that the Party-State has responded to the urban experience of economic dislocation by expanding pension coverage and other social insurance programs. The 1997 Pension Regulations stipulated that both part-time and full-time urban employees would have pension rights. Pension coverage has expanded since the late 1990s from 52 million urban workers in 1990 to 152 million in 2007. Between 1995 and 2007, the number of workers covered by unemployment insurance coverage rose from 82.4 million to 180 million. The 2008 passage of the Social Insurance Law also made room for welfare rights of migrant workers in urban spaces. In short, while China along with
Russia and Poland dismantled their socialist welfare states, only the PRC Party-State has, in response to urban worker protests, expanded the urban welfare state into the twenty-first century (Frazier 2010:259-62).

More importantly, the reform and restructuring of the SOEs has displaced workers but not dispossessed state-sector workers from their housing entitlement. There are no signs of homelessness even in the worst hit areas of China’s ‘rustbelt.’ The near universal provision of housing for state workers is central to understanding the stability of the Party-State. “No matter how destitute, they have a home to go back to at the end of the day” (Lee 2007:125-6; Trichur 2009:123-4).

It is true that urbanization has promoted land and property speculation: in 1988 a leasehold market for urban land was created to formally separate land ownership from urban land-use rights of central and municipal governments. In general, the central government’s representatives often control and occupy land in the core of the urban areas and maintain proprietary rights over the urban compounds that were the former socialist work units (the danwei). The remainder of the urban land in the city is used by municipal government officials who can lease the use of urban land for a fixed period of time. We may note two outcomes of this newer urban land-use rights regime. First, urban land tenure has indeed been commodified under the new post-1978 regime. Nevertheless, land tenure has not yet been privatized (Hsing 2008:57). Second, commodification of land-use has enabled urban central government officials to transfer land-use rights to newly emerging land development companies. Local municipal officials have also leased out urban land under their jurisdiction to a growing network of land brokers. Driven by a politics of productivity and growth, local officials try to demonstrate their capabilities to the center by making investments in large-scale development projects through pro-growth coalitions with local real estate developers and entrepreneurs (Li and Sheffrin 2008; Dickson 2010:28; Lee 2010:61; Zweig 2010:131-2).

Such “decentralized accumulation” (Lee 2010:75) has accelerated transfers of urban land-use rights, overheated urban real estate markets, and generated unsustainable booms in private housing prices. Inadequate mechanisms for supervision of the current land leasing system and speculative land-intensive investments in condominiums, hotels, luxury resorts and the like, distort the land saving legacies of the East Asian developmental path. On the other hand, the potential for redistributive and equalizing taxation remains very high in urban China: in 2002 property tax and urban land-use tax accounted for only 3% and 1% respectively of local governments’ tax revenues (Li and Sheffrin 2008:80). In the past year the Party-State has attempted to deflate overheated real estate prices through its trial property tax project in Shanghai and Chongqing (Anderlini 2011). Zweig (2010:131-2) observes that commercialization of suburban land remains “one of the most incendiary issues in Chinese society” in the absence of adequate legal institutions to regulate suburban housing markets. In this context Wen Jiabao’s March 2011 national address has sent an unambiguous directive to local governments, putting local officials on notice that they would incur a “firing offense” for failure to advance the Twelfth Five Year Plan’s priorities for building 36 million state-subsidized urban housing units over the plan period (2011-2015). As the chief China economist for Standard Chartered Bank says, “The quiet message to developers is clear: you’ve made your money, now it is time to serve the country” (quoted in Anderlini 2011).

It is also relevant to note that despite the rapid rate of net rural-urban migration of more than 14 million per year, China has largely avoided creating those huge peri-urban slums that proliferate in cities of the global South and which Mike Davis (2006) associates with the
imposition of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Policies. All over the global South, the withdrawal of the state from its commitments to urban and rural development was also associated, especially after the mid-1980s, with the widespread growth of the informal sector and the weakening of available urban social infrastructure. China’s relative autonomy from external pressure allowed it some latitude in its choice of economic reforms, and its urban planning has supported small- to medium-sized cities and labor-intensive industrialization in the countryside rather than concentrating development in larger megalopolises like Shanghai. This has helped China to absorb off-season farm laborers without agricultural labor shortages so that China’s development strategy has remained aligned with the general East Asian land-saving and labor-intensive developmental path. It has also meant enormous savings on infrastructure. Emphasizing rural industrialization and slowing urbanization has also contributed to social stability (Pomeranz 2008:93-4). There is little comparison possible between Davis’s “planets of slums” that dot the landscape of the global South and the Middle Kingdom’s relatively regulated urban environment. If the threat of urban dystopia is real enough, it is also within the regulatory capacities of the Chinese Party-State to adequately address these emerging problems associated with urbanization.

The Party-State’s active interest in land and housing relations was signaled in the March 2011 address to the nation by Premier Wen Jiabao. By 2015 the Party-State plans to have 20% of the 218 million urban households living in state-subsidized apartments, up from an estimated 11% at the end of 2007. Some RMB1300 billion was allotted in 2011 alone for the building of 10 million subsidized apartments. The Plan’s top priority is to rein in speculation and inflation in residential real estate markets and keep a watchful eye on local officials. The state-owned banks have been banned from giving mortgages to people with more than one property. The banks have also been exhorted to work with local governments to help channel investment funds into low-income housing projects (Anderlini 2011). These measures indicate the will and determination of the Party-State to bring under greater central control the land speculation effects of “decentralized accumulation” in urban spaces. Average transaction prices for land sales across China fell 51% since the start of 2011. Land sales are now actively discouraged as a source of local governments’ finances. Insofar as land sales continue, the new central policy requires that at least 70% of the receipts from all local land sales are invested in different forms of subsidized housing for urban dwellers (Sender and Anderlini 2011). The 2008 Social Insurance Law provides further evidence of the Party-State’s concerns for urban welfare. The outcome of the next few years will reveal the extent to which the Party-State has succeeded in prioritizing urban livelihood in the aftermath of the 2008-9 global financial crises.

**Environmental Legacies**

I close this section with an overview of China’s environmental legacies and transformations. Elvin has argued that China’s impressive pre-modern economic growth was often pushed beyond environmentally sustainable limits. He links the intensified exploitation of nature to “the drive to acquire the means of political, economic, and military power, at state and societal levels” (1996:733-56). Elvin’s narrative, however, leaves out many of the complexities that emerge when environmental projects and policies are seen as embedded in a late Imperial statecraft that had to address concerns of domestic order beyond just military matters. Concerns of domestic order and stability throughout the Chinese empire were central not just in creating huge food buffer stocks in the form of “ever-normal granaries” (Wong 1997); but also in reproducing and
managing late Imperial China’s ecological and economic differences. The shift of the capital of the Ming Dynasty to Beijing on the North China Plain was followed by the building of the Grand Canal. As Pomeranz (2009:123-7) argues, this not only ensured shipments of southern grain to Beijing; it also put in place a political and economic orientation driven by social priorities that lasted for over four hundred years until European incursions and social unrest undermined these policies and priorities. Three of these social priorities stand out as long-term continuities.

First, China’s social priorities helped keep large numbers of people in the countryside and encouraged rural industry. It continues to be part of contemporary Chinese statecraft which exhorts farmers to “leave the land, but not the countryside,” and invests in TVEs and rural development. By channeling migratory labor flows into rural TVEs, such an approach to development has controlled and regulated the pace of rural-urban migration as well as the rate of change of urbanization. One consequence of this regulated approach to urbanization is that unlike most of the global South, the growth of cities has not been accompanied by proliferation of urban slums and the pressures they exert on urban infrastructure.

Second the PRC’s emphasis on social priorities helped prop up ecologically vulnerable regions in the north with large minority populations (in Manchuria, Tibet, and Xinjiang) through land-tax rates, subsidies for family farming, and a strong civilian granary system landscape and economy, reshaping them with considerable gradualism. By contrast, the elites of the richer Yangzi delta were taxed to support the movement of the Grand Canal waters to the poorer north. The contemporary ‘go west’ policy may appear to go against such late imperial statecraft insofar as the western regions of China are modernized. As the dominant Han-ethnic settlements increase in the western regions they also create social tensions with China’s minority populations in these regions. However, the Twelfth Five Year Plan’s gradualist approach to modernization of the interior regions and greater inclusion of minorities in state-led development of the interior regions may moderate inter-ethnic tensions.

Third, the PRC’s promotion of rural market-based agricultural and other economic activity as the means for reproducing family life supported independent farming households and helped prevent rural displacement. Markets were a means to facilitate the Confucian good life – the ability to marry, bury parents, and celebrate the annual ritual cycle. Chinese statecraft in the reform era appears to have fully revived market-based economic activity after its eclipse between 1949 and 1978.

These continuities that framed late-imperial Chinese policies and reproduced East Asian developmental priorities into the post-revolutionary period were disrupted in the aftermath of Western incursions into China and in the course of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864). Between 1850 and 1930, Chinese rulers began to promote industrial development in the heavily commercialized, coastal areas. River-control funds were sharply reduced, and money was diverted to protect strategic coastal areas. Interior areas experienced a downward ecological spiral. Between 1930 and 1949, technocratic engineering responses dominated, and large, multipurpose dams were proposed alongside proposals for large-scale industrialization. However, populist responses encouraged implementation of some labor-intensive adjustments to restore farming, handicrafts, and petty commerce/sideline activities. Although the Maoists initially responded favorably to mass populist aspirations, after 1949 they developed greater affinity for technocratic and military approaches to economy and environment, as is reflected in their construction of the Three Gorges dam on the Yangzi River. The post-1978 Deng regime continued to prefer technocratic, engineering solutions to China’s environmental needs. However, it also favored market-based development by small farmers and entrepreneurs.
What is the environmental balance sheet in relation to the East Asian developmental path? Pomeranz points out that “the continuity that seems to be fading away fastest is the long-standing tendency to tread cautiously in minority regions” (2009:153). There is some truth in this claim. Second, the strong statist preference for capital-intensive and mega-projects continues. Both these tendencies go against the East Asian developmental path. However, there are other signs that we may note as well. During Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao’s tenure, the emphasis has been increasingly on balanced growth with harmonious sustainable ecological development. China’s “extraordinary surge” of investments in wind turbines, solar panels and low-carbon technology grew 76% over the preceding year to $11.5 billion in the second quarter of 2010, which was more than double the comparable investments made by either the United States or Europe. In 2010, China planned to install a record 18 gigawatts of wind power capacity (Bloomberg 2010). More recently, China and Germany, the biggest economies of Asia and Europe, signed $15 billion worth of trade deals for joint collaboration in the development of green technologies in energy saving, smart electricity transmission, carbon capture technology and sustainable traffic systems in the PRC. As Peel and Anderlini (2011) underscore, these deals represent “a big step by China...to deal with its huge environmental problems and reinforce the emphasis of its latest Five Year Plan on sustainable development”. Finally, despite the persistence of top-down technocratic projects, it is likely that heavy reliance on local water-supply projects run by ordinary villagers will persist alongside the valorization of rural life. The resilience of the populist current, embodied in many “small-scale, locally managed irrigation works, which have thus far survived the decline in local cadres’ ability to command people’s labor,” are “among the most impressive and unusual achievements of Chinese ecological management” (Pomeranz 2009:153, 142).

CONCLUSION

I have pointed to the changes in rural and urban land-use rights during the conjuncture of the mid-1980s when the Chinese Party-State banked on the popularity of economic reforms to push forward the reform momentum. The Chinese Communist Party completed the de-collectivization of the countryside, restructured state-owned enterprises to make them compete better, and it successfully created township and village enterprises and export-oriented special economic zones in coastal provinces to absorb migrant farm labor. These processes of social, economic and ecological transformation created substantial upward social mobility for millions of rural Chinese who, despite many instances of local corruption and infringements of central directives to rule by law, continue to retain trust in the Party-State’s claims to legitimacy. These processes also created rural-urban income inequalities and inter-regional income inequalities. At the same time the gradual relaxation of the hukou system opened numerous opportunities for farmers to benefit from China’s economic reforms. These benefits have not come at the cost of losing their access to farm land plots given to them by the second land reform’s Household Responsibility System. Farmer-migrant laborers who seek work in China’s booming coastal special economic zones and who often find themselves over-exploited also often vote with their feet. They have been successful in doing so because they have been able to take local cadres to the courts. When migrants fail, they return to the countryside where they still have a piece of land to which they can return. What Farshad Araghi (2000) calls the great global enclosure of our times remains an unfinished project in rural China. Incomplete proletarianization persists – not accumulation by dispossession of rural land. Second, laid-off urban workers who suffer from unemployment still
have durable housing rights to fall back upon. However cramped their urban spaces, they are not completely destitute. The evidence of displacement in China is not evidence for Harvey’s (2005) claim that accumulation by dispossession dominated post-1978 developments in China.

Adjustment processes are always drawn out. Karl Polanyi reminds us that that the *rate of change* is often a more important consideration than the *direction of change* (2001:39). In China the post-1978 direction of change has revived market-economy traditions. The rate at which economic change has unfolded has been controlled and regulated by the Party-State. Gradualism and experimentation with welfare-oriented growth policies continue to dominate Party-State priorities. Sustained economic growth rates, and local level corruption and inefficiencies associated with rapid growth, have indeed caught the attention of many observers. As Stephen Mihm (2008:278) points out, “to see China today is to glimpse, in a distant mirror, the nineteenth century American economy in all its corner-cutting, fraudulent glory,” of which Chicago is probably a good example. All kinds of economic and environmental excesses accompanied economic growth in the U.S. during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But unlike the evolution of U.S. business enterprises in the late nineteenth century in the direction of a small number of giant multi-unit, multinational vertically-integrated capitalist corporations wielding monopoly control over markets, the evolution of business enterprises in contemporary China is dominated by a large number of small-scale, competitive, market economy based firms regulated by the Party-State.

It is also not clear whether the direction of change spearheaded by Chinese farmers has lost its momentum. The most momentous transformations associated with the Deng reforms were in fact shaped by different varieties of farmers’ movements from below (Zhou 1996: 46-71). The success of these movements in making the Party-State implement reforms in the late 1970s indicates not only the power of farmers as political entrepreneurs, but also their role as successful rural economic entrepreneurs whose rising productivity determined the form taken by the TVEs. It is fair to suggest that China’s farmer-based economic growth will continue to reproduce an entrepreneurial vector that is small-scale, family-based, place-based and kinship-based. Although inequalities among rural residents has risen dramatically since the reforms, it may be starting to decline again, at least in the more successful regions, as wage-incomes become more diffused across an increasingly industrialized countryside. The greatest inequalities in China are between different communities and regions rather than between households in a given place (Pomeranz 2009:137).

Giovanni Arrighi (2007:359-60) has argued that China’s Party-State, unlike capitalist states elsewhere, does not represent the interests of either domestic or foreign capitalists. And Perry Anderson (2010) has drawn attention to the enlightened Party leadership that navigated China through unpredictable reform waters in ways distinct from that of Soviet leadership in the late 1980s and beyond. Like the Ming and Qing dynasties of Imperial China, the contemporary Chinese Party-State is sharply focused on problems of governance and legitimacy. Since late 2002 there has been a shift from the earlier focus of the Party on economic growth to a newer focus on redistributing the results of economic growth by raising domestic consumption levels and agricultural incomes while reducing urban-rural income differentials and expanding urban welfare programs. The Party-State appears acutely sensitive to concerns of farmers regarding violations of land-use rights. As Pomeranz (2009:137) observes, protecting subsistence, encouraging the spread of best economic practices, and providing support for rural family life, were not only concerns of traditional Chinese statecraft, they remain key concerns of the contemporary Party-State. The Party-State is even more sensitive to concerns of the unemployed
and laid-off urban working classes. At a time when neoliberal policies continue as the ‘default mode’ in much of the global North the re-creation of the foundations of a people’s welfare state dominates the Twelfth Five Year Plan’s priorities. How far and in what directions China’s leadership moves forward with these priorities remains to be seen.

REFERENCES


LAND, LIVELIHOODS, AND THE DECLINE OF WORK: SOUTH AFRICAN LESSONS FOR CURRENT DEBATES

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ABSTRACT

This article presents a comparison of central debates in South African labor sociology in the 1970s and the contemporary era. I argue that scholars can break through impasses in current labor sociology debates by reviving attention to the land-labor-livelihood (LLL) connections that inspired theoretical advancements in the South African literature of the 1970s. After an introduction and definition of LLL connections, the paper analyzes an exemplary work of the labor literature of the 1970s, giving special attention to the way in which the LLL focus shaped the questions asked by the authors. The article proceeds to a review of central debates from the current labor literature, which focuses primarily on issues of the labor movement. It is argued that this focus on movements has limited the scope of labor scholarship, resulting in an impasse in South African labor debates. An emerging literature that renews attention to the LLL connections is proposed as a model for moving beyond this impasse. I close the article by discussing the implications for this review of South African literature for global labor scholarship.

INTRODUCTION

Michael Burawoy (2008:378) has noted the irony that over the past few decades labor scholars have increased their focus on the labor movement, despite this being a period in which unions themselves have “seemed to be in free fall.” For Burawoy, this period of labor scholarship has been defined by a “public turn” away from questions about the experiences of workers in the factory and toward questions of labor as a social movement. Burawoy’s argument concerns scholarship in the United States, but the observation also applies to the labor literature of South Africa and many other countries in the global South. In South Africa, over the last two decades, labor scholars have focused heavily on the labor movement, analyzing unions’ political strategies (Webster and Adler 1999; Habib and Valodia 2006; Pillay 2006), their attempts to organize vulnerable workers (Webster 2006; Von Holdt and Webster 2008), and their participation in

Copyright ©2012, American Sociological Association, Volume XVIII, Number 1, Pages 90-102 ISSN 1076-156X
nascent international solidarity structures (Bezuidenhout 2000). Despite this intense focus on the labor movement, unions in South Africa, like those in many parts of the world, have been unable to counter the severe decline in the security of wage labor that the country's workers have experienced over the past two decades. The public turn has yet to yield theoretical or practical breakthroughs for scholars or unions in the country. Sakhela Buhlungu (2009) has gone so far as to characterize South African labor studies as a field in terminal decline.

While Buhlungu’s (2009) assessment may be overly negative (and this paper will argue that it is), it shows the stark contrast between the perception of contemporary South African labor studies and labor movements as compared with those of the past. In the 1970s and 1980s South Africa was the site of one of the most dynamic labor movements of the latter part of the twentieth century, as well as a site of influential labor scholarship. Innovations associated with scholars and activists working in the country and the region, such as social movement unionism and the subsidy thesis, have been influential for labor unions and scholarly debates throughout the world (e.g. Wolpe 1972; Burawoy 1976; First 1983; Seidman 1994). It is this work which this article proposes as a model for advancing contemporary labor scholarship in South Africa and elsewhere, through the impasse that has led to such pessimistic prognoses as Buhlungu's. This literature was marked by an attention to what Gillian Hart and Ari Sitas (2004) have called the links between land-labor-livelihood (LLL).

DEFINING THE LAND-LABOR-LIVELIHOOD CONNECTION

What is meant by the land-labor-livelihood connection? As Hart and Sitas explained, each of these issues is generally treated in the literature on the global South as a separate “question.” The “land question” includes issues of land tenure, agriculture, rural well-being, and rural development. The “labor question” includes issues of industrialization, the labor movement, and the urban middle-class. The more recent “livelihoods question” addresses informal work, household labor, and the survival strategies of the poor. Scholars who give attention to LLL connections recognize that these are not separate, but interrelated questions. For labor scholars, a focus on these connections involves a recognition that workers do not depend solely on wages for reproduction, but are embedded in networks that draw on multiple, interdependent sources of livelihood. While this is true even for workers in the global North (all workers depend to some degree on unpaid domestic labor for their reproduction), it is especially important to understanding workers in the south.

Of course, this insight is not unique to South African literature. In their introduction to the volume Creating and Transforming Households, Joan Smith and Immanuel Wallerstein argue

the appropriate operational unit for analyzing the ways in which people fit into the “labor force” is not the individual but the ‘household,’ defined...as the social unit that effectively over long periods of time enables individuals, of varying ages and both sexes, to pool

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1 The subsidy thesis was an argument that black workers in apartheid South Africa were paid below the cost of reproduction with the difference being subsidized by family members in the rural reserves from which workers were compelled to migrate. See below for a more detailed discussion of this argument.
income coming from multiple sources in order to ensure their individual and collective well-being. (1992: 12)

This insight points us to a broad conceptualization of labor, which extends beyond wages to include all sources of livelihood that contribute to social reproduction. In South Africa, like many middle income countries with relatively extensive industrialization, wages are an important component of household incomes. However, for the vast majority of South African households non-wage sources make up more than half of total income. These non-wage sources include subsistence production, informal market activities, government grants, and remittances (including cash and in-kind). Also, as in much of the global South, land is one of the most important resources on which households and extended kinship networks draw for livelihood.

In a country such as South Africa, focusing labor studies exclusively on wage workers and their collective action limits scholars to only one part of workers' livelihoods. This obscures not only important factors that shape workers' well-being (or lack thereof), but even blinds scholars to factors which shape the very labor movement which is their primary object of study. The interrelation between land, livelihoods and the labor movement are illustrated by the South African literature of the 1970s and 80s that put LLL connections at the center of class and labor analysis. The next section will present a discussion of the South African literature of this era, paying special attention to the way in which LLL connections shaped the questions asked and the scope of the research.

LAND, LABOR, AND LIVELIHOODS IN THE LITERATURE OF THE 1970s

South Africa during apartheid was a place and time that produced one of the strongest examples of a scholarly literature on labor that took the land-labor-livelihood connection seriously, and developed from it fruitful theoretical and empirical analyses. There are a handful of articles and lines of debate that became well known and influential even beyond South Africa, but this characterization applies to a wide body of work that was produced by scholars working on South (and Southern) Africa during the period from the late 1960s into the early 1980s. How this focus on the land-labor-livelihood connection was developed is probably best explained by the fact that the apartheid system made these connections unavoidable for scholars. Perhaps the defining feature of the system was an attempt by the state to control, along lines of racial and ethnic categories, the mobility of labor and the sources of income to which labor-producing households had access.

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2 Data from a recent nationally representative household survey (NIDS 2009) shows that wages constitute less than half of total income for households in each of the bottom seven income deciles. Wages only constitute more than two thirds of total income for households in the top two deciles. These numbers are based on the authors own calculations from the NIDS data.

3 This is the case despite the fact that small scale agricultural production is relatively less significant in South Africa as compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa and the global South. Even when land is not used for food production, it is a source of subsistence in that it provides housing and a base from which individuals may engage in non-agricultural income-generating activities, including searching for wage labor in urban areas (see, e.g., James 2001 for a discussion on the role that land ownership plays even in supplementing urban livelihoods.)

4 Ownership of land or business by Black South Africans was restricted outside of designated “homelands.” Black South Africans were prevented from seeking work except through a tightly controlled labor market aimed at keeping
Analyzing the role of labor in this system, scholars of South and Southern Africa like Harold Wolpe, Martin Legassick, and Giovanni Arrighi developed what came to be known as the subsidy thesis (Arrighi 1970; Wolpe 1972; Legassick 1975). This was the argument that wage laborers in South Africa could be paid below the cost of reproduction because their reproduction was subsidized by non-wage forms of income earned by members of their extended household. The non-wage forms of income in the South African case were typically, but not exclusively, earned in the rural homelands or reserves. This thesis was informed by a conceptualization of labor that connected labor's well-being (and capitalist profits) not only to struggles in the factory and in the labor market, but also to broader networks of non-wage labor, especially those dependent on connections to land in rural areas. It allowed a more nuanced view of labor than a factory or movement level focus could provide. For example, even during a period when Black workers’ wages were rising at unprecedented rates, the early 1970s, Wolpe (1972) foresaw a coming crisis of reproduction caused by the deteriorating economic conditions in the rural “homelands” on which wage earners depend for non-wage sources of income.

Like any theoretical or conceptual framework, this attention to the land-labor-livelihood connection shaped the sets of questions that scholars asked about workers in South Africa. Legassick and Wolpe’s (1976) article “The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa” provides a specific example to consider from the era. The authors contrast the sources of non-wage income that predominate in apartheid South Africa with those found wealthy northern countries. In northern countries, Legassick and Wolpe (1976) argue that the forms of non-wage income that households have access to and its distribution is shaped primarily by welfare state policies. In apartheid South Africa, they argue, since laborers are disproportionately resident in the nominally independent homelands, whose governments have no access to the revenues and assets of the apartheid state, "the physical maintenance of the members of the relative surplus population depends much more crucially on the forms of redistribution of income within the working class as a whole," that is, they go on to say, primarily among extended kinship networks (Legassick and Wolpe 1976:104). And since apartheid state policy put restrictions on both the types of assets Black South Africans could own and how and where they could transfer them, "the struggle over the forms of redistribution (within kinship networks) is an arena of class struggle, in both the cities and the rural areas” (Legassick and Wolpe 1976:105). In order to understand this struggle, and in order to understand the well-being and strength of the working class as a whole, Legassick and Wolpe (1976) argued, scholars had to pay attention to the institutions and networks that shaped redistribution of income, or livelihoods. In the South African case, this meant a specific focus on the rural-urban ties between largely male migratory wage workers in the cities and largely female agricultural and reproductive work in the rural apartheid homelands.

Legassick and Wolpe (1976) were primarily concerned with the role of organized labor in a revolutionary political movement which was gaining strength in the early 1970s. In their conclusion they lay out two scenarios that might take place depending on the forms that redistribution takes in the future. First, they say that existence of broad redistributive networks might create "common interests among large sectors of the African population in resisting the black workers in “low skill” positions. Black South Africans were also excluded from the state’s welfare system and received inferior basic provisions such as schooling and health care.
commonly experienced and shared effects [of apartheid] on living standards” (1976:105). They were writing just a few years after the first major upsurge of labor action among Black workers and just months after the eruption of the student and township movements in 1976. They posited that the emergence of these broad based movements was driven by the existence of such broadly shared common interests. However, they noted that there was also

the possibility for manifestations of sectional division in the black majority of the working class, through the rupture of redistributive links. Remittances by urban workers to the rural areas might decline or cease. Families in the townships might manifest greater individualisation or ruptures might occur in linkages between the families of workers organized in trade unions or other organizations. (1976: 105)

Their attention to land-labor-livelihood connections led them to argue that to understand not only the well-being of the working class, but the trajectory of labor movements, scholars had to pay attention to remittance flows, family and household structure, and rural-urban linkages.

These are the kinds of questions that the land-labor-livelihood connection guided scholars toward in the 1970s. If labor sociologists of subsequent years had continued to follow the indicators and processes that Legassick and Wolpe (1976) highlighted as important, they would have seen many significant changes. The residency restrictions and job classifications of apartheid have been removed. Social spending in former homelands has increased significantly. Welfare provisions like pensions, public health care, and nearly free primary education have been extended to all South Africans. But many services that were formerly free, such as electricity and water in urban areas, have now been privatized. Unemployment and casualization have risen to among the highest levels in the world. So there are some trends which have transferred the costs of reproduction to the state, but there are others that have increased the burden on workers’ own households. Understanding how these changes have affected workers’ households, and how households have responded, remains key to understanding the possibilities and constraints facing the labor movement today.

THE PUBLIC TURN IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE LABOR LITERATURE SINCE 1990

Despite their centrality to the labor literature of the 1970s and 1980s, these issues of LLL connections were, for the most part, absent from central debates of the 1990s and 2000s, the period of the public turn. This section will summarize the central debates of the contemporary labor literature, paying attention to how the focus on movements has shaped the types of questions labor scholars have asked. The paper will then contrast this movement-centered literature with the emerging body of work which returns to the LLL focus of earlier South African work.

In contrast to the United States, the initial public turn in South Africa was not a response to organized labor’s eroding power, but an attempt by scholars to explain its dynamism in the 1980s. The concept of social movement unionism was developed in this period to describe the country’s vibrant labor movement, whose struggles extended beyond the shop floor to include issues of economic policy and politics. However, despite their resounding success in achieving the political goal of non-racial democracy in the country, South African unions were unable to shield their members and the country’s workforce in general from the decreased security of wage work that has defined the South African labor market over the past few decades. During this
period, union density has declined while informal labor, casual labor, and unemployment have risen dramatically (Bodipe 2006; Buhlangu 2010: Chapter 4). It is widely recognized by both scholars and unions themselves that uniting formal workers with the insecure majority of the labor force is key to countering the negative effects of neoliberalism on South Africa’s workers.\(^5\) How (and even whether) such an alliance can be achieved has been a central debate among labor scholars over the past two decades.

In the first years after the fall of apartheid there was optimism about the role unions could play in constructing a pro-worker economic policy for the new government. An early expression of this optimism is a widely cited article by Eddie Webster and Glen Adler (1999). The article argued for a strategy that would build upon unions' formal alliances with the governing party to achieve a brokered tripartite class compromise that could lead to job creation and continuing profitability of South Africa capital. The authors recognized that a major obstacle to such a compromise is that unions would have to organize the large parts of the labor force that are unemployed, casually employed, or otherwise unorganized. While there were no prominent examples of such alliances at the time, the authors felt it remained a possibility.

As scholars have attempted to understand how such a broad coalition might be realized, they have turned their attention to analyzing the tactics and strategies of labor unions themselves. A section of the labor literature has examined organizing efforts and new organizational forms that target vulnerable and unorganized workers. One of the most prominent organizations of informal workers in the country has been the Durban-based Self Employed Women’s Union (SEWU), which modeled itself on the Self Employed Women’s Association of India. Annie Devenish and Caroline Skinner argue that one of SEWU's greatest successes was setting the precedent that it is possible to organize those working the informal economy (2006:273). However, they also note that the union never achieved financial viability, a fact that ultimately led to its dissolution in 2004.

A more successful example of independent organization among informal workers is Sikhula Sonke, a women’s farmworker’s union based in the winelands of the Western Cape. Fiona White (2010) describes the union's multilevel strategy that includes engaging with employers to challenge unfair labor practices on specific farms and appealing to the government to influence labor market policy that affects all farmworkers. Sikhula Sonke's victories include a first of its kind moratorium on evictions of farm dwellers in their area and influencing the national department of labor to remove the two-tiered minimum wage that set a lower rate for rural workers (White 2010:682-3).

Although unions like SEWU and Sikhula Sonke offer compelling new organizational models, the large amount of attention given to these and a few other modest examples of informal workers’ unions is evidence of how few successful examples of such organizations there have been. Initiatives from within existing unions to organize informal workers have been equally limited. Mark Bennett (2003) documents the enormous challenges faced by the South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union in acting on a conference resolution to organize informal workers in the industry. Challenges include locating informal factories, collecting dues,

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\(^5\) See for example COSATU's own “Report of the September Commission on the Future of Unions” which argued that if the unions failed to organize vulnerable layers of workers it “would find it mettles to contest market trends toward 'flexibility.' Ultimately, COSATU could end up being based in a shrinking section of the working class, as has happened to trade unions in a number of other countries” (September Commission 1997).
and designing a benefits package to attract membership (Bennett 2003). Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2007) discuss the difficulties the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has faced in organizing the growing numbers of contract workers in their industry. Not only has the NUM had little success (only 10% of members are employed by subcontractors) but the presence of large numbers of unorganized contract workers is “creating tensions within the workforce and threatening the solidarity that helped unite mineworkers to confront injustices in mining” (2007:255). Bridget Kenny (2005) describes a similar situation in the retail sector, where unions have been undermined by employers’ expanded use of casual and subcontracted workers. However, noting the examples of self-organization among non-union workers that Kenny reports, Karl Von Holdt and Eddie Webster (2008:342) conclude that “union weakness was not inevitable under these conditions, but resulted rather from a failure to adopt innovative and proactive organising strategies.”

While the goal of this “strategies and tactics” literature would seem to be to discover effective measures unions might take to strengthen their positions, it has in fact produced a rather dim view of union “innovation.” As Buhlungu (2009) bleakly concludes after a summary of unions’ attempts to organize casual and informal workers,

> while these efforts are laudable, they are clearly not adequate for the enormous challenges unions face. The restructuring of work that we have witnessed in the last twenty years or so threatens the very existence of trade unionism by fragmenting workings and undermining the basis for solidarity. [Unions’ efforts] are doomed to failure as long as they seek to cling to the notion of a unionism based on the full-time permanent worker. (95-6)

Buhlungu’s (2009) pessimism is matched by a number of labor scholars who have concluded that unions’ decline is not the result of poor strategies or tactics but of a fundamental shift in the class structure which has divided the interests of wage workers from the un- and underemployed majority. Jeremy Seekings and Nicolai Natrass (2005) argue that union members in South Africa have become a labor aristocracy. Analyzing the class structure in post-apartheid South Africa, they conclude that the employed-unemployed divide is the most significant driver of contemporary inequality. They therefore see the labor force as divided into two classes, “insiders” and “outsiders.” Seekings and Natrass argue that in this situation the most pro-poor strategy is not to protect wages and working conditions as unions attempt to do, but to expand employment, thereby transferring some outsiders to insider status. In order to do this, they argue, it is necessary to lower wages, which will decrease the quality of the average job available but increase the number of insiders, and therefore lower inequality.

Franco Barchiesi (2007) goes a step further in his pessimism about the jobs crisis in South Africa. He argues that an erosion of the quality of wage labor has even undermined the livelihoods of workers who Seekings and Natrass would consider “insiders.” Referring to the declining economic position of the “formal, permanent, mostly unionized” workers he interviewed for his research, Barchiesi (2007: 64) concludes that the “deterioration of their material conditions...confirms a growing body of research according to which, far from being a vehicle of social advancement and emancipation, wage labor is turning in South Africa into a reality of poverty and social exclusion.”

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6 See Von Holdt and Webster (2008) for a more comprehensive review of the literature on organizing vulnerable workers.
The scholars who see organized and unorganized workers as in conflict tend to focus on organizing among “outsiders” themselves. South Africa has become a center for research on “new social movements” (NSM) which unite the poor, usually un- or underemployed, around issues of livelihood, such as housing, health care, and service delivery. This NSM literature only rarely engages with or is engaged by the labor literature in South Africa.

The central divide in the literature summarized above can be characterized as one between optimists and pessimists. The optimists continue to see unions as important actors in efforts to realize pro-worker and pro-poor economic policies. They therefore search for the right strategies that will allow unions to regain their strength and to combat the erosion of formal wage work. The pessimists see unions as outdated and as obstacles to realizing pro-poor developmental outcomes. They therefore concentrate on weakening unions or strengthening organizations of non-workers. This literature has arrived at a sort of stalemate. Unions continue to experience declines and have little to show for years of research into “innovative” and “bold” new strategies. Yet they remain the organizations with the most institutional influence who can and do advocate for workers. NSMs, despite their vibrancy, remain issue-based, fragmented and, with a few notable exceptions, unable to achieve the organizational stability required to influence large scale policy shifts.

The South African literature of the 1970s presents a potential model for moving beyond this stalemate. While the current literature has thoroughly examined the effects of wage labor’s decline on labor organizations, there has been less focus on how workers, their households, and their livelihoods have been affected. It is noteworthy that both sides of the current debate accept that the erosion of formal wage work and of union membership has meant an erosion and fragmentation of the working class itself. That is, workers are seen as divided into classes of organized-unorganized or insiders-outsiders. Many of those who have fallen out of formal employment and union membership have also fallen out of the analysis of labor scholarship.

If scholars had maintained the South African literature’s traditional focus on LLL connections, it would have guided them toward different sets of questions about the effects of formal wage labor’s decline. Such a refocusing would push scholars to focus not simply on union strategies or on inequalities between employed and unemployed, but on the redistributive networks that are the core of the labor-livelihood connection. Renewed attention to the labor-livelihood connection would show that the relationship between organized and unorganized members of the labor force is not shaped primarily by strategies of labor organizations, as the optimists seem to assume, nor by their position of individuals vis-a-vis wage labor, as the pessimists argue. This is because the fact remains that, despite the removal of apartheid, individuals' reproduction and well-being is not determined solely by their wages, but by the diverse sources of livelihood that their household and broader social networks connect them to. In order to understand these, scholars interested in South African labor must look empirically to understand, given the decline of formal wage labor and the removal of apartheid legal restrictions on residency, job availability, etc., what has happened materially to the incomes of households and to the economic and social connections that shape the lived reality of South African workers. To determine this, scholars must analyze series of questions which are an updated version of those posed by Legassick and Wolpe in 1976.

Is there still a subsidy of urban workers by rural households and kin? Or has the decline of rural livelihoods meant that the subsidy has reversed directions? Or is there some other form
of subsidy not connected to land and rural household that is now more significant? Have there been a separation and a differentiation between wage earning households and non-wage earning households? Have households changed form, or increased in size? Have they become more or less geographically dispersed? Etc. These kinds of questions get at the heart of how the end of apartheid has affected the broad livelihood networks which South African labor sociologists of the 1970s argued were essential to understanding the well-being and collective strength of the country's workers.

A RE-EMERGING LITERATURE IN SOUTH AFRICA

In recent years a growing number of South African labor sociologists have begun to return to these issues. Gillian Hart and Ari Sitas’s piece “Beyond the Urban-Rural Divide,” cited above, was among the first to argue for the continuing centrality of land-labor-livelihood connections. Von Holdt and Webster (2005:27) have argued that the decline of secure wage labor is playing out as a crisis of social reproduction among South African households. To understand this crisis, they say, scholars must “reconceptualize the meaning of work to include [formal and informal labor] as well as social reproduction in households and communities” (33). A number of scholars working on South and Southern Africa are following the suggestions of these authors, examining the effects of this crisis of reproduction on the households of South African workers.

This emerging body of work demonstrates that the relationship between land, labor, and livelihood remains dynamic and important to understanding the well-being of workers. One of the most prominent examples of this new literature is Eddie Webster, Rob Lambert, and Andries Bezuidenhout's (2008) *Grounding Globalization: Labor in the Age of Insecurity*. The book compares the experiences of workers in White goods factories in South Africa, Australia and South Korea. The effects of work restructuring are compared not only in the factory and in the labor movement, but in the households of workers in each place.

Sarah Mosoetsa’s (2011) *Eating from One Pot* shows how households in two townships in KwaZulu-Natal province have coped with South Africa’s jobs crisis. The townships are sites of factory closings, and residents have dealt with the loss of wage income by relying on social support from households and community associations. However, this has not been a process driven entirely by altruism and reciprocity. Mosoetsa argues that older women, who are the most common recipients of social grants, bear the greatest burden and serve as the “fulcrum on which household survival turns” in the poorest households (1).

This is a finding confirmed by Khayaat Fakier and Jacklyn Cock (2009). Their case study of five townships found that women were increasingly migrating in search of work to replace income lost when male household members became unemployed. Since these migrant women's poor households depend on intense care work for survival, the departure of female migrants places additional burdens on the women who are left behind.

Bruce Frayne (2007) has found that poor households in Namibia’s largest city, Windhoek, rely on subsidies from rural households, particularly in the form of food transfers. This is a striking reversal of the typically assumed direction of urban-rural support. Ian Scoones and his collaborators, in their 10 year case study of Zimbabwe’s land reform program in the Masvingo province show that land recipients have not become full-time farmers, but many have used their new land as a basis for a diverse portfolio of income and livelihood generating activities, including off-farm employment (Scoones et al. 2010).
Even this brief sampling of new literature points to some weakness of the labor movements and movement-centered labor literature. Unions in South Africa (as in much of the world) are dominated by men, particularly at the leadership levels, and the decline of formal wage labor has had the most direct impact on male workers (Buhlungu 2010: 129-132). Yet the emerging LLL literature shows that it is women who have been left with the burden of sustaining livelihoods in the absence of wage income. If unions are to build a broad coalition with the un- and underemployed majority, this work suggests it must take up not only issues of wages and working conditions, but issues of gender inequality, policy support for child and elder care, and other issues which affect the women who struggle to support the most vulnerable working class households.

The work of Frayne (2007) and Scoones et al. (2010) highlights the complex and changing relationship between land and wage work. The urban unemployed have increasingly come to rely on rural connections as a support system while they search for work. For employed workers who have experienced a loss of benefits, especially pensions, the ties to land have become an important safety net for periods of unemployment and retirement. Yet, as with gender issues, the labor movement has not engaged with issues of land or migration in its attempt to broaden its coalition.

CONCLUSION

On the surface, a call for focusing research on households and livelihoods may appear to be a call for a localized and parochial labor studies that analyzes the specificities of workers' lives in each country or region. In fact, a focus on local livelihoods provides labor scholars a path to achieve that holy grail of globally oriented research, connecting the local to the global (and vice-versa). Smith and Wallerstein’s work on households was informed by the hypothesis that the structure and economic functions of households at a given time is shaped by global economic processes. Specifically they argued that in times of global economic downturns, households would become more important to processes of social reproduction. This proposition has never been fully engaged with by labor scholars, yet it seems to be borne out by the picture that emerges from the new South African literature cited above. Absent a global literature on LLL connections, however, it is difficult to say with confidence which aspects of South Africa’s crisis can be combated by unions and movements at the national level and which require a global response.

A global LLL literature would even push beyond the limitations that faced the South African work of the 1970s that this article has presented as a model. That literature connected workers to their households and to the land, but it did not give attention to the global economic processes that shaped the field upon which South African labor struggled. As a result, although South African workers were ultimately able to overthrow apartheid, they did not anticipate the rise of global neoliberalism that redoubled the burdens faced by workers and their households.

Yet a global LLL literature would also be valuable for providing clarity about how local conditions interact with “the global.” Unlike the 1970s, labor unions around the world today often see global processes (“globalization,” “neoliberalism,” etc.) as abstract forces against which their local struggles are powerless. Yet local conditions do make significant differences for workers. For example, Hart (2002: 224-5) has noted the puzzling fact that in 1995 South
African textile workers' wages were twice as high as their Chinese counterparts, but the Chinese workers’ wages provided a higher purchasing power. Hart (2002) finds the explanation in the fact that Taiwanese workers experienced land reform, which provides an almost universal social wage, whereas South African workers have experienced land dispossession, which undermines the ability of households to provide a basic livelihood except through the market. Such contrasts can help point labor unions toward issues that might have broad impacts on workers’ well-being, despite the persistent influence of global neoliberalism. In fact, the very local sphere of households and livelihoods might be the most effective level at which unions can combat the global processes that weaken their members and the broader labor force. But such struggles would depend on a labor studies that goes beyond the workplace and beyond the movements to analyze the connections between land, labor, and livelihoods.

REFERENCES


ABSTRACT

We utilize first-difference panel regression analysis to assess the direct effect of urban slum prevalence on national level measures of under-5 mortality rates over the period 1990 to 2005. Utilizing data on 80 less developed countries, the results illustrate increasing urban slum prevalence over the period is a robust predictor of increasing child mortality rates. This effect obtains net the statistically significant influence of gross domestic product per capita, fertility rate, and educational enrollment. Cross-sectional analyses for 2005 that include additional controls provide further evidence of the mortality / urban slum relationship. The results confirm urban slum prevalence growth is an important contextual dynamic whereby the social production of child mortality is enacted in the less developed countries.

INTRODUCTION

Slums have long been a dimension of the urban landscape, and the basic features of slum life have changed little over time. What has changed in recent decades is the increasing depth and magnitude of urban slum conditions in less developed countries (United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA] 2007). The “concentrated disadvantage” (Vlahov et al. 2007) characteristic of many urban slums, moreover, constitutes an increasingly prominent structural characteristic shaping population-level patterns of health and illness.

Worldwide the aggregate urban slum population grew 39 percent over the period 1990-2005 (United Nations Human Settlements Programme [UN-HABITAT] 2008). Currently the one billion individuals living in urban slum conditions comprise roughly one-third of the world’s total urban population, 43 percent of the urban population in the developing countries, and 78 percent of the urban population in the poorest, least developed countries (UN-HABITAT 2003a, 2006). Recent projections suggest the overall urban slum population worldwide will increase...
steadily in the coming decades by an estimated 27 million new slum residents annually from 2000-2020 (UN-HABITAT 2003a).

The remarkable growth of urban slums in recent decades is a reflection of the urbanization of poverty; such reorganization gives form to evolving “risk spaces” (Fitzpatrick and LaGory 2000) or areas in which a sub-population is disproportionately subject to a myriad of hazards relative to other segments of society. In stark contrast to the generally beneficial health consequences of urban social organization, urban slum conditions are characterized by an observable “urban penalty.” Indeed, urban slum areas often exhibit poorer health outcomes, lower life expectancy rates, lower levels of education, and diminished economic opportunities relative to non-slum urban populations (UN-HABITAT 2006).

While the living conditions within the urban slums in less developed countries seem particularly harmful for the health and well being of young children, little if any prior comparative international research exists on such associations. We contend this scarcity was due primarily to lack of data on urban slum size and prevalence in macro-comparative contexts. Fortunately, comparable national-level panel data on the percent of total populations living in urban slum conditions are now available for a moderate number of less developed countries, allowing for empirical assessments of the effects of urban slum conditions and their growth on the health of the youngest and most vulnerable segments of domestic populations. Thus, we analyze the extent to which child mortality rates in less developed countries are affected by the percent of total populations living in urban slum conditions, net of a variety of other factors.

THE BUILT URBAN ENVIRONMENT AND THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF UNDER-FIVE MORTALITY

Social epidemiology focuses on the social-organizational production of disproportionate illness among disadvantaged segments of a population (Berkman and Kawachi 2000; Krieger 2001; Link and Phelan 1996). This approach frequently adopts an individual-level unit of analysis but is increasingly embracing a population-level perspective (Macintyre and Ellaway 2000); this entails an effort to examine the socio-organizational patterns and large-scale structural arrangements that influence the health outcomes of a defined population. In turn, this often necessitates the consideration of poverty, discrimination, and various forms of inequality within society as factors influencing differential morbidity and mortality rates (Link and Phelan 1996; Krieger 1999).

The recognition that social factors shape health and illness has a long history (Engels [1845] 1968; Yankauer 1950), and yet social epidemiology is a relatively new and often contested branch of epidemiology as it challenges the overly narrow and “desocialized” biomedical model that focuses upon individual-level biological and behavioral risk factors (Farmer 1999; Berkman and Kawachi 2000; Farmer et al. 2006). The biomedical model investigates why a particular individual is sick, whereas social epidemiology involves inquiry into the societal dynamics shaping susceptibility to rather than the biomedical mechanisms of disease causation (Krieger 2001).

The objective of social epidemiology is to document the manner in which “societies shape patterns of disease” (Waitzkin 1981; Link and Phelan 1996). Such insights are more provocatively conceptualized as “structural violence” (Galtung 1969; Farmer 1999; Farmer et al. 2006).
Recognizing that overt and episodic violence is but one aspect of the injury suffered by the poor and marginalized, structural violence refers to the inequitable social structural and institutional patterns that predominantly disadvantage particular groups in society. Galtung (1969) argues embedded, systematic patterns that inhibit the fulfillment of basic needs of some members of society are less easily recognizable than direct violence and yet are more stable and durable; Farmer (1999) further notes that structural violence is expressed as individual level pathology and population level disparities in morbidity and mortality. Arguably, structural violence underlies the remarkable expansion of urban slums in developing countries in recent decades and the inadequate built urban environment is increasingly the site of the social production of disparities in health and illness.

The built environment consists of the “tangible settings which people create for repeated use” (Dunlap, Michelson, and Stalker 2001:1) and “that part of the environment constructed by human intention and effort” (Kilmartin 2001:167). The inadequate built urban environment arguably has a direct, though not deterministic, influence on health disparities that is not synonymous with or reducible to invocations of “urbanization” or “poverty.” It is an expression of prevailing social and economic organization and, in turn, the social production of uneven health and illness. Socio-economic processes contribute to the formation of urban slum conditions but it is the dilapidated, semi-permanent built urban environment in which inequities in health and illness are increasingly enacted. Poverty, overcrowding, malnutrition, insufficient garbage disposal, lack of adequate water drainage, and unsafe drinking water and sanitation coalesce around the social organization of marginalized populations in urban slums. The inadequate built urban environment within many developing countries, therefore, constitutes a key barrier to progressive social well being and even a catalyst of retrogression; this may be particularly the case for children (Satterthwaite 1993; Bartlett 2003). The five illnesses at the root of a majority of child deaths in the developing countries include pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, measles, and HIV/AIDS (UN-HABITAT 2007b). Each is prevalent in many urban slums due to substandard living conditions and overcrowding (UN-HABITAT 2007b). Inadequate access to clean water and sanitation, in particular, are a direct cause of a substantial proportion of deaths of infants annually (UNDP 2006). Poor water quality and quantity and inadequate sanitation are linked to a number of waterborne and water-washed diseases (UNDP 2006).

Greater morbidity and mortality among urban slum children is not simply the consequence of household level deficiencies (e.g., infrastructural problems, lack of access to basic needs) but also includes health issues arising within the context of the broader slum settlement (Awasthi and Agarwal 2003; Bartlett 2003; Agarwal and Taneja 2005). Inadequate water drainage and waste removal often creates areas of contamination extending throughout the surrounding community (Bartlett 2003); many slums lack safe places for children to play outdoors (Satterthwaite 1993; Bartlett 2003), and indoor and outdoor chemical pollutants that compromise the health of children are frequently encountered in low-income urban areas (Satterthwaite 1993). Although they often border and even roughly encircle urban areas, moreover, in general slums are socially, politically, and economically isolated from the broader urban setting and their residents lack access to many formal institutions in society.

Micro and meso-level medical science research indeed illustrates that infants and young children residing in urban slums are subject to a litany of diseases. Neonatal mortality, or death within the first 28 days, is commonplace in many urban slums and is generally preceded by sepsis, perinatal asphyxia, and prematurity (Fernandez, Mondkar, and Mathai 2003; Vaid et al. 2006).
Beyond the neonatal period infants residing in urban slums frequently die of diarrheal disease and respiratory infections (Vaid et al. 2007); high rates of diarrheal disease, in particular, is a stark reflection of the lack of clean drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities (Fotso et al. 2007; Vaid et al. 2007).

Home births not accompanied by a trained medical professional are also commonplace in many urban slums (Hoque and Selwyn 1996; Gulati and Jaswal 1998; Fernandez et al. 2003; Rahi et al. 2006); this contributes to late recognition of neonatal illness, inadequate antenatal care, and delays in seeking appropriate medical services (Fernandez et al. 2003). Further, many slum children are malnourished, increasing their susceptibility to illness (Bartlett 2003; Ghosh and Shah 2004; Wagstaff et al. 2004). Research illustrates children living in urban slums in India, for example, are more malnourished than non-slum urban and rural children (Ghosh and Shah 2004).

Rapid urbanization in many less developed countries since mid-century, it is important to note, is largely a response to exogenous factors rather than a natural, evolutionary transition along the path to modernity. As Davis (2006) highlights, urbanization in many LDCs is rooted in the colonial history and artificial repression of urban in-migration followed by generally rapid rates of urban growth after the cessation of colonial rule. Further, foreign direct investment patterns, external debt and associated structural adjustment programs, and consequent state retrenchment has profoundly reshaped the rural-urban character of developing countries. The concept of “overurbanization,” embodied in a higher than expected proportion of the total population residing in urban areas relative to concurrent level of economic development, has long been a concern of scholars embracing a critical political economy perspective (Kenton 1981; Timberlake and Kentor 1983; Bradshaw 1985; 1987; Smith 1987). The size and robustness of urban economies, in turn, is often remarkably disconnected from the size of the surrounding urban population, as rapid in-migration is induced by rural poverty rather than urban formal sector employment growth (Bradshaw 1987; Davis 2006).

The expansion of urban slums is not simply rooted in rapid urbanization, however. External debt burden in concert with rapid urban in-migration is argued to underlie the expansion of urban slums in the developing countries in recent decades (UN-HABITAT 2003a; 2003b; Davis 2006). Debt promotes substantial capital outflow and constrains productive investment in the domestic economy (Ferraro and Rosser 1994; UN-HABITAT 2003b; 2005). Debt service payments are a drain on state income that could alternatively be invested in the upgrading of urban public services, including housing and improved water and sanitation provisioning (UN-HABITAT 2003b). The external debt burden, in turn, constrains state planning efforts as well as inhibits the capacity of the state to mollify the deleterious effects of transnational corporate influence on the poorest segments of the population (Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Bradshaw and Wahl 1991); it also contributes to currency devaluation and a reduction in consumer purchasing power--all within a context of rapid urbanization. Managing urban growth in a manner that capitalizes on the advantages of urbanization, while minimizing the liabilities, is increasingly difficult within a context of external debt repayment and stringent structural adjustment requirements; such challenges ostensibly find expression in an urban penalty that impacts the health of children.
MODEL ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES

For the first analysis we estimate a first-difference model. In a first difference model, change in the dependent variable over time is regressed on change in the independent variables. To allow for more meaningful comparisons across nations, we calculate a “relative change” model, which, in essence, assumes that the percentage change in the dependent variable is a linear function of the percentage change in the independent variable, all else being equal. Technically, relative change models are “difference of logs models,” which means that the point estimates of the two time periods for the outcome and all predictors are first logged and then differenced. The first-difference model has many advantages. First, it requires only two point estimates that are reasonably distanced, allowing for change on both sides of the equation to be modeled accordingly. Considering that data are available for only two time points 15 years apart (i.e., 1990 and 2005) for our independent variable of interest (see variable description below), such an estimation technique is quite appropriate for this study. First-difference models tend to yield more robust results because potential outliers exert less influence; it avoids out of bounds estimates, and its coefficients have a ready interpretation as the effect of one rate on the other. Further, such an estimation strategy eliminates the impact of any time-invariant predictors since their difference scores are, by construction, zero, and first-difference models for two time points yield results identical to fixed effects model estimates. A first-difference model with time-varying predictors is as follows:

\[(y_{it} - y_{it-1}) = (\mu_t - \mu_{t-1}) + \beta(x_{it} - x_{it-1}) + (\epsilon_{it} - \epsilon_{it-1})\]  

Equation 1

Subscript \(i\) represents each unit of analysis (i.e., country), subscript \(t\) represents the time period, \(y_{it}\) is the dependent variable for each country at each time period, \(\mu_t\) is an intercept that may be different for each time period, and \(\beta\) represents a vector of coefficients. Predictor variables that vary over time are represented by the vector \(x_{it}\), and \(\epsilon_{it}\) represents purely random variation at each time point.

Adequate data are unavailable for two important control variables (health expenditures per capita and secondary education) for the year 1990, which precludes estimating first-difference models with their inclusion. Thus, in a sensitivity analysis reported in Table 2 we include these two controls and estimate a simple ordinary least-squares cross-sectional regression model for child mortality for the year 2005. Such models only allow for assessing static statistical associations between levels of outcomes and predictors, but given the potential importance of these two control variables we consider these sensitivity analyses to be crucial for accurately assessing the effect of urban slum growth on child mortality in less developed countries.

THE DATASET

We analyze a cross-national dataset consisting of countries for which data are available for the dependent variable and all independent variables included in the analyses. These countries would all be considered less developed, meaning that they all fall below the upper quartile of the World Bank’s (2007) income classification of nations. The key independent variable is only available for less developed countries, thereby restricting the analyses to such cases. In particular, the dataset consists of 80 countries, which we list in Table 1. Given the limited sample size and
degrees of freedom, we limit the number of predictors in each reported model to no more than six. Due to missing data for two control variables (health expenditures per capita and secondary education), the dataset is reduced to 64 less developed countries for the cross-sectional analysis.

Table 1. Countries Included in the Study

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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Angola*</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>Bangladesh*</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau*</td>
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<td>Belize</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia*</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Sri Lanka*</td>
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<td>Cameroon*</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Rep.</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Tanzania*</td>
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<td>China*</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Togo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo*</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.*</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>Egypt*</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Viet Nam*</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Gabon*</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Zimbabwe*</td>
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<td>Gambia*</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
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Note: * denotes countries excluded from the cross-sectional model

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is *child mortality rate*, which we obtain from the World Resources Institute’s online Earthtrends database (http://earthtrends.wri.org), who obtain them from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) online childinfo.org database. This measure refers to the probability of a child dying between birth and the age of five, expressed per 1,000 live births.

**Key Independent Variable**
Percent of the total population living in urban slum conditions is a relatively new measurement available from the UN-HABITAT UrbanInfo database (http://www.devinfo.info/urbaninfo/). Since they are newly available and thus not employed in prior comparative research, these data require a relatively more detailed description. All other measures used in the current study are common in prior research. For these estimates, an urban household is defined as a slum dwelling if it lacks one or more of the following: access to an improved water supply, access to improved sanitation, sufficient living area, and durability of construction. More specifically, an improved water supply is one that provides a sufficient quantity of water for family use (at least 20 liters/person/day), at an affordable price (less than 10% of total household income), without requiring extreme effort to obtain (less than one hour a day for the minimum sufficient quantity). In addition, an improved water supply consists of the following delivery systems: piped connection to house or plot, public stand pipe serving no more than 5 households, bore hole, protected dug well, protected spring, or rain water collection. Improved sanitation consists of a private or public toilet shared between a reasonable number of people. Improved sanitation consists of the following services: direct connection to public sewer, direct connection to a septic tank, pour flush latrine, or a ventilated pit latrine. A living area is considered sufficient if there are no more than 3 people per habitable room (minimum of 4 square meters of space). A dwelling is defined as durable if it is built in a non-hazardous location and exhibits structural qualities adequate to protect its inhabitants from the extremes of climatic conditions, including rain, heat, cold, and humidity. Point estimates for the data are only available for less developed countries for 1990 and 2005, which restricts the national representation and temporality of the current study.

Additional Independent Variables in the First-Difference Model

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is included as a control for level of economic development. These data, which we gather from the World Bank (2007), are measured in 2000 U.S. dollars. Prior research consistently shows a negative association between child mortality rates and level of economic development in less developed countries (e.g. Shen and Williamson 2001). We control for fertility rate, which is known to be a key contributor to child mortality (e.g., Heuveline 2001; Brady, Kaya, and Beckfield 2007; Jorgenson 2009; Rice 2008). Generally speaking, as fertility rates increase, so do child mortality rates, since more fertility means more chances for mortality, all else being equal. The measures of fertility rates, which we obtain from the World Bank (2007), represent the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates.

Exports as percent total GDP is included to control for a country’s level of integration in the world economy. These data are obtained from the World Bank (2007). Neoliberal perspectives (e.g., Gilpin 2001) would posit that greater world economy integration of this form will stimulate economic development and thus increase human well being, which would involve lowering child mortality rates. Conversely, critical globalization perspectives (e.g., Appelbaum and Robinson 2005) would posit that higher levels of exports as percent GDP for less developed countries is a structural mechanism that partially allows for more developed countries to
maintain favorable terms of trade, thereby suppressing domestic economic development and well being within the former, which could lead to increases in child mortality rates.

Additional Independent Variables in the Cross-Sectional Model

Health expenditures per capita is included in the cross-sectional analyses. This measure as well as the next (secondary education) is currently unavailable for an adequate number of countries for the year 1990, and their availability for 2005 is limited, especially for health expenditures per capita. Thus, the sample size is reduced to 64 countries in the cross-sectional analyses reported in Table 3. As would be expected, prior research links health expenditures to lower mortality rates (e.g. Shandra et al. 2004). These data, which we obtain from the World Bank (2007), measure the average amount of total health expenditures per person in U.S. dollars. Health expenditures are the sum of public and private health expenditures, and include the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities and emergency aid designated for health.

Secondary education is included as a measure of human capital in the cross-sectional analyses. More specifically, these data, which we gather from the World Bank (2007), quantify percent gross secondary school enrollment. Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. According to the World Bank (2007), secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers. Prior research links this form of human capital to lower levels of child mortality rates (e.g., Frey and Field 2000; Shen and Williamson 2001).

FINDINGS

The first-difference model and the cross-sectional model estimates are reported in Table 2. The first difference model includes percent total population living in urban slum conditions, GDP per capita, fertility rate, and exports as percent total GDP. The cross-sectional model includes health expenditures per capita and secondary education as additional statistical controls as well as percent total population living in urban slum conditions, GDP per capita, and fertility rate. For each predictor we provide unstandardized coefficients (flagged for statistical significance), standard errors, standardized coefficients, and variance inflation factor scores (VIFs). VIFs are a common measure used to detect multicollinearity in linear regression, which can potentially lead to spurious results. We also report the adjusted r-square for each model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First-Difference Model</th>
<th>Cross-Sectional Model</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Total Population Living in Urban Slum Conditions</td>
<td>.242** (.061)</td>
<td>.145** (.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.364 [1.027]</td>
<td>.170 [1.213]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.290** (.109)</td>
<td>-.330** (.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.262 [1.187]</td>
<td>-.443 [8.695]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td>.470* (.186)</td>
<td>.411 (.288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.245 [1.144]</td>
<td>.190 [6.008]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports as Percent Total GDP</td>
<td>-.084 (.068)</td>
<td>-.114 [1.036]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Expenditures per capita</td>
<td>.017 (.115)</td>
<td>.021 [6.772]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>-.400* (.174)</td>
<td>-.285 [5.215]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes: unstandardized coefficients flagged for statistical significance; *p<.05 **p<.01 (two-tailed); standard errors in parentheses; standardized coefficients in italics; variance inflation factor scores in brackets
As expected, the effect of GDP per capita on child mortality rates is negative and statistically significant. Contrarily, yet as expected, the effect of fertility rate is positive and statistically significant. These results are very consistent with prior research and illustrate the importance in controlling for both when studying the determinants of child mortality in less developed countries. The effect of exports as a percent total GDP is non-significant, which provides little support for neoclassical arguments or critical globalization propositions concerning the well being impacts of world-economic integration. However, such research questions and theoretical contestations are not the focus of this study. We note that in sensitivity analyses available upon request, we also control for urban population as percent total population. As a change score, this form of urbanization is weakly correlated with our urban slums change measure at only .19 for the sample of nations in the reported analyses. Thus, these two measures capture very different characteristics of the urban populations of less developed nations. In the sensitivity regression analyses the effect of urban population on child mortality is non-significant and close to null, while the positive effect of urban slum growth remains statistically significant.

Turning to the results of interest, the effect of percent total population living in urban slum conditions is positive, statistically significant, and moderately strong in magnitude. More specifically, cetiris paribus, from 1990 to 2005 a one percent increase in the percent total population living in urban slum conditions leads to a .242 percent increase in child mortality rates for the sample of less developed countries. Variance inflation factor scores are all well within acceptable limits, indicating the estimated first-difference model is not biased due to multicollinearity.

The results of the cross-sectional analysis indicate that child mortality rate is positively associated with percent of the total population living in urban slum conditions in 2005, and the association is statistically significant. Similar to the first-difference model estimates, the effect of GDP per capita is negative. However, the association between child mortality rate and fertility rate is non-significant. The effect of health expenditures per capita on child mortality rates is non-significant while the effect of secondary education is negative and significant. We speculate that the null findings (i.e., fertility rate and health expenditures per capita) are attributed to high multicollinearity. The variance inflation factor (VIF) score for health expenditures per capita is 6.772 while the VIFs for fertility rate (6.008), GDP per capita (8.695), and secondary education (5.215) are relatively high as well. The inflated VIFs are not surprising since all four point estimates are highly correlated with one another for the analyzed dataset. However, these characteristics do not influence the stability of the positive effect of percent total population living in urban slum conditions on child mortality rates in 2005. Elsewhere we also control for exports as percent GDP in 2005, and its effect is non-significant while its inclusion does not suppress the positive effect of percent of the total population living in urban slum conditions.

CONCLUSION

The growth of urban slums in the LDCs is a structural trend producing concentrated disadvantage (Vlahov et al. 2007) recognizable in the overcrowding and substandard living conditions enveloping nearly one billion people worldwide. Further, their historically unprecedented rise threatens to undercut the presumed public health advantages of urban life in ways many researchers have yet to fully consider.

The intent of the present study is to empirically examine the potential social production of child mortality by focusing on the direct influence of urban slum prevalence or proportion of
the total population living in urban slum conditions among the 80 developing countries with available data. This analytical focus is grounded in the meta-theoretical assumption derived from social epidemiology suggesting the built environment is not simply a container for social-organizational dynamics but has independent effects on physiological processes and is thus central to prevailing patterns of health and illness. Disparities in health and illness often follow from contextual social determinants shaping variance in risk encountered by differing segments of a population. Such patterns, in turn, constitute “biological reflections of social fault lines” whereby disease distribution is forged through relative power, privilege, and inequality (Krieger and Zierler 1996; Farmer 1999; Krieger 2001).

Findings for the first-difference panel regression analysis of less developed countries illustrate that urban slum growth, measured as the percent of the population residing in urban slum conditions, does indeed contribute to child mortality rates from 1990-2005, net of economic development, fertility rates, and other factors. The cross-sectional analysis of child mortality in 2005 that includes additional controls provide further evidence of the urban slum / mortality relationship. Overall, the results of the present study illustrate that urban slum prevalence exhibits a substantial impact on child mortality across a large number of less developed countries. Urban slum prevalence constitutes a dimension of the social production of mortality rooted in prevailing social inequities and economic organization that underlies the formation of urban slum settlements. Thus, child mortality is not simply reducible to individual-level biological and behavioral risk factors. Urban slums are a crucial context wherein susceptibility to disease and illness promote the disproportionate death of children in less developed countries.

REFERENCES


World Resources Institute. 2009. Earthtrends Database.


As peripheral states emerged from dictatorships and began to democratize in the neoliberal era, explicitly indigenous organizations and movements began to assert civil and legal rights as citizens. These indigenous movements were not new developments but received renewed attention in a post-dictatorship political atmosphere. The florescence of literature on indigenous politics and social movements that has arisen since the 1970s reflects an intellectual landscape which has broadened to recognize the interrelational characteristics of structurally divided societal groups, including those labeled indigenous. No longer relegated to the background in the intellectual and political fields, indigenous peoples are asserting a right to inclusion in the modern world. As an indigenous intellectual, Emilio del Valle Escalante’s presence in academia as a movement scholar and activist challenges modernity’s rigid hold on knowledge production.

Little has been written explicitly on the Guatemalan Maya movement (with the notable exception of Kay Warren’s Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 1998 Princeton). Emilio del Valle Escalante’s Maya Nationalisms and Postcolonial Challenges in Guatemala seeks to close this gap in the literature by articulating the unique intellectual character of the Guatemalan Maya movement. Del Valle Escalante does this through a literary analysis of the historical development of knowledge surrounding indigeneity, which at times is underdeveloped, and the ways the Maya movement challenges dominant constructions of indigeneity. Using Anibal Quijano’s theory on the coloniality of power, del Valle Escalante provides a textual analysis of several prominent indigenismo intellectuals of Guatemala, both Maya and non-Maya, to highlight the way indigenous peoples struggle to alter hegemonic discourse and at times fall prey to it.

The Maya movement in Guatemala is principally an intellectual endeavor, engaged primarily by journalists and academics that have obtained the social status to disseminate information widely. Writing forms the foundation from which the culturally dominant power in society disseminates information on the native. In turn, the Maya movement appropriates this knowledge in order to reconceptualize discourse on native peoples. Del Valle Escalante recognizes the challenges indigenous intellectuals face in gaining the ability to participate in the mass media and as such highlights the importance of how contemporary capitalism influences the political perspectives of individual authors in the movement.

The main questions the book addresses are what kind of nation is being (re)constructed in the challenges posed by the Maya movement and what kind of interethnic relationships does the Maya movement propose for Guatemalan society. Through these questions del Valle Escalante attempts to articulate a conceptualization of indigeneity that considers the indigenous as fully modern peoples whose locus of articulation is on “the other” side of the colonial divide. The Maya movement seeks intercultural exchange of knowledge on equal terms. Del Valle Escalante argues that through the development of a subaltern epistemology and knowledge exchange a more just and democratic society can evolve.

Part Two of Maya Nationalisms discusses attempts by the state to institute a project of interculturality and the reproduction of coloniality in the specific case of intercultural education.
Analyzing various authors that contribute to the debate surrounding interculturality, del Valle Escalante, a Maya K’iche intellectual, critically engages with other indigenous intellectuals arguing that the intercultural project is merely a recycling of the coloniality of power. While remaining within the text’s stated objectives, del Valle Escalante leaves the reader desiring a deeper analysis of how the coloniality of power pertains to the situation of the Maya movement beyond the discursive level. However, this only comes out in the conclusion. Confronting capitalist tensions and the coloniality of power, del Valle Escalante argues “the Maya movement should articulate a critical perspective that organically ties its situation to the historical processes that have produced the conditions of inequality we have been confronted with historically” (p. 158), which is consistent with the structure of this brief text.

This text highlights the ways indigenous intellectuals are engaging in the discursive transformation of Guatemalan society through the Maya movement. Through a critical analysis of literary texts, del Valle Escalante contributes to the reappropriation of Maya history by Maya peoples. Challenging the coloniality of power and those indigenous intellectuals whose imaginations conform to the patterns of knowledge of the dominators, del Valle Escalante offers the Maya movement a framework for decolonizing knowledge through historical analysis on the origins of inequality.

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Contemporary Shanghai is an amazing place! It is a mixture of old and new, Chinese traditions and cosmopolitan consumption, the staid architecture of the Bund and the post-modern skyline of Pudong. A dynamic fast-growing city, Shanghai was home to more than 23 million people, according to the 2010 census, making it one of the world’s most populated urban areas. But the city is also undergoing an incredible building boom, with skyscraping glass towers and multilane highways sprouting up everywhere, and seemingly endless economic dynamism, attracting twice as much foreign direct investment as all of India in recent years. In his introductory essay, Xiangming Chen provides an apt appraisal: quoting a US-based architect who does planning work in Shanghai, he observes that the city is undergoing “the greatest transformation of a piece of earth in history. It’s mind-boggling.”

Editor Chen tells us in his preface that this book is designed to place this transformation in comparative perspective and assess Shanghai as an emerging “global city.” Saskia Sassen’s first chapter lays out her global city model schematically and provides some evidence that the erstwhile “Paris of the East” is, once again, assuming “command and control” functions in terms of the spectacular growth of its increasing centrality in world transportation and telematic grids. For me, a comparative urban political economy scholar, an entire volume that really did focus on “Shanghai as a global city”—and systematically addressed the conceptual issues Sassen presents—would have been excellent. But that’s not exactly what this book provides. Instead, we
get some of that but also parts that are a bit broader and vaguer and not quite so theoretically
concise: the volume subtitle about a “global megacity” mixes conceptual categories, and both the
introduction and the conclusion describe Shanghai as a “global(izing) city.” This slight blurring
of the central focus may be necessary as the book is actually a product of multiple conferences,
beginning with one in Shanghai in 2002. (Indeed, as a scholar who has also organized “themed”
conferences and edited the volumes that resulted, I know how difficult it is to attract both top-
notch, interesting, engaged scholars and try to focus their attention on common issues.) The
editor has managed to attract a diverse array of intellectual talent for this volume: in addition
to Sassen, he has included Ann Markusen (a prominent regional and urban planning scholar), Jack
Kasarda (a former high profile urban sociologist now a business professor – and my MA advisor
many years ago!), several world-renown scholars of Asian and Chinese urbanization and
development (including Stephen Chui, Tai-Lok Lui, Fulong Wu), and some rising young stars in
this area. Chen did a fine job to keep this entire “cast” on board, and the result is a very valuable
compilation of research on “rising Shanghai.” With frequent cross-references to each other, the
chapters combine to create a coherent book that is more than just a collection of disparate essays.

The first half of the volume examines Shanghai in comparative perspective. After
Sassen’s exposition of the global city perspective, Markusen and Pingkang Yu’s essay explicitly
tries to draw lessons from the US urban experience. Their interest is in the “high-tech
metropolis,” and they see the growth of highly innovative, knowledge-intensive jobs as key to
urban and regional economic growth and resiliency. In this tightly argued but also data-laden
paper they maintain that Boston, Chicago, and Washington, DC rank high in this type of growth,
which serves their regional economies well. These cities avoid the over reliance on
manufacturing characteristic of “rust belt” U.S. cities of the mid-20th century, but also do not fall
into the “trap” of overspecialization in business and financial services—which makes New York
City “vulnerable to cyclical swings and structural changes.” The authors argue that Shanghai
ought to similarly promote diversified high-tech occupations and industries and explicitly warn
against following New York’s excessive reliance on “financial and management services.”
Implicitly, Markusen and Yu recommend that Shanghai avoid the kind of “command and
control” specialization that one expects in a top global city.

Next, Kasarda’s very accessible, if not too scholarly, essay focuses on the key role of
“speedy delivery” of products in today’s world of e-commerce. Kasarda sees airport
development as important for Shanghai, and he discusses “aerotropolis” (his term)—the idea of
building airports for regional development, an interesting concept that is certainly relevant to
Shanghai and other major East Asian cities. But the “build it and they will come” optimism may
be misplaced, especially if too many cities in the region try it simultaneously. And the simple
reality today is that China’s huge volume of low-value exports to the United States (the Wal-
Mart “stuff”) still travel by containerized ships—so, in fact, the recent development of
Shanghai’s massive Yangsan deep water port (the busiest container port in the world in 2010)
may be more critical than the new airport at Pudong.

The final two essays in this section return to Sassen’s “global city” framework,
comparing Shanghai to two other East Asian contenders. K. C. Ho’s view from Singapore
stresses the policy and planning issues inherent in that city’s rise and struggle to maintain
competitiveness in the global economy, with a nod to the key role of the local “developmental
state.” In the final chapter, Lui and Chiu offers a précis of their book, Hong Kong: Becoming a
Chinese Global City (Routledge, 2009). In this chapter-length version, they stress Hong Kong’s
long-term historical role as the gateway to China and the preeminent financial center for the
region. They also note the changes as the former crown colony becomes increasingly integrated into the People’s Republic and its political and economic systems (which themselves are, of course, simultaneously becoming more and more embedded into global capitalism). One aspect of this is the emergence of Shanghai as a potential rival, which has redoubled Hong Kong’s efforts to enhance its local connectivity in the Pearl River Delta and to the mainland. This is a very interesting theoretically-informed chapter (but much more about Hong Kong than Shanghai).

The second half of the book is all about Shanghai and attempts to focus on how global and local changes are linked. Wu’s opening essay on the state and local governance in Shanghai is probably the strongest in the volume. For anyone really interested in the growth dynamics behind the amazing transformation that is unfolding on the ground in the city, this chapter provides a lot of information, once again richly contextualized in the global city framework (and the debates about it). In recent decades Shanghai has been a magnet for western investment with explicit policies designed to move the city from manufacturing to a service-oriented economy. Although Wu does not think Shanghai has achieved global city status yet, his key insight is that a process of global city formation is underway that incorporates both national and local state governance. Here we are seeing seemingly paradoxical processes like the “state-led marketization of urban development” or the “re-engineering [of] entrepreneurial local governance” as key to the land development, infrastructure upgrading, and investment promotion designed to “remake” Shanghai as a global city. Complicated—but fascinating—processes!

The remaining essays focus on specific aspects of the changes sweeping Shanghai and their links to wider global dynamics. These essays, based on solid empirical research and a plethora of data, tend to be more descriptive than theoretical. Perhaps because of my own interest in urban ecology, Tingwei Zhang’s chapter on the spatial differentiation and restructuring of the city’s various urban districts was most interesting; the author documents rather dramatic population and land use changes in three different Shanghai districts and does a nice job of linking those to local factors like the particular political dynamics of the “growth coalition” and the history of each area. Other chapters describe telecommunications and information infrastructure and access in Shanghai (Zhenhua Zhou and Chen), community organization and cohesion (Hanlong Lu, Yuan Ren and Chen), and increased consumption of “fast food and brand clothes in Shanghai,” particularly among younger people (Jiaming Sun and Chen).

The editor and Anthony Orum (a prominent urban sociologist and founding editor of the journal City & Community) cap the volume with a conclusion that attempts to draw the lessons from these studies of Shanghai. Interestingly (but probably wisely) they highlight some areas that might have been slightly underplayed in the earlier essays: the key role of history in urban development, the complex way that states (at various “levels”—local, regional, national) are crucial to city-building, the key role of an urban area’s relationship to its tributary region (in this case the vast Yangtze River Delta), etc. All in all, this thoughtful essay is a fine way to close this excellent and extremely well organized volume. Understanding the process of global city formation in Shanghai and other burgeoning Chinese metropolises is a big challenge for urban sociology and global political economy – this book is forward progress.

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India is an interesting case for students of comparative politics: not only does it have a vibrant, more or less peaceful, democratic tradition in the context of significant religious and linguistic diversity, it also disproves the axiom that democracy is a luxury for rich countries. Authors Stepan, Linz, and Yadva develop the concept of the state-nation in an attempt to understand the peculiarities of Indian society and politics and shed some light on what types of democratic politics might be possible.

The authors open by arguing that, “state-nation policies stand for a political-institutional approach that respects and protects multiple but complementary sociocultural identities. State-nation policies recognize the legitimate public and even political expression of active sociocultural cleavages, and they include mechanisms to accommodate competing and conflicting claims made on behalf of those division without imposing or privileging, in a discriminatory way, any one claim” (p 4, emphasis in original). State-nations fall in a middle range of intensity of political activity by groups claiming to be “nations”; where intensity is low or confined to one group we see nation-states, and where intensity is too high democratic practice within a single state is not possible. If France and Japan typify what happens when one nation finds one state, the break up of the Former Yugoslavia typifies what happens when there are too many nations within one state. State-nations, like India, are able to balance the demands of different would-be nations within one democratic state.

The implementation of state-nation policies arise from an “unusual, almost counterintuitive” (p 17) set of elements that cohere into a policy “grammar” that facilitates the emergence and persistence of a state-nation policies. Briefly, the key elements of this grammar are: an “asymmetric” federalism in which sub-units have substantial, but not necessarily uniform, prerogatives; a parliamentary system that does not center political processes on an “indivisible” presidency; polity-wide and regional political parties that can channel the political energy of diverse cultural groups toward the center and, at the same time, allow for regional politics (both being alternatives to secessionist activity); and, politically integrated groups that, while not culturally homogenous, express identities that compliment, instead of conflict with, each other.

The second chapter presents evidence that four sets of individual political attitudes and beliefs the authors argue are part of the ideal type of state-nation are present in India. First, citizens of state-nations should show a high degree of positive identification with the state and pride in being citizens. Second, the authors expect that the citizens of state-nations would have multiple but complimentary political identities. Third, there should be a comparatively high degree of support for democracy in state-nations. Lastly, where state-nation policies succeed, there should be a high degree of institutional trust.

Here, and in the other chapters dealing with South Asia, the authors present data from large, representative, surveys (some of which the authors were involved in designing). For example, with regards to their first characteristic of state-nation above, upwards of 80% of Indians claim to be “proud” or “very proud” to be Indian and very few claim no pride at all. They present data on the complementariness of identities like India and Muslim as well as data on trust in institutions and democracy.
remarkably similar across religious or linguistic groups. (On this last point they find another peculiarity of India: voting is negatively correlated with income and education, in contrast to most other democracies where lower status groups tend to be disenfranchised.) Their use of these survey findings convincingly grounds what would otherwise be a somewhat abstract ideal type in the patterns of opinions and perceptions of individuals.

The third chapter reviews several events—demands for a Sikh state, unrest in the North East, and tensions in Kashmir—that might undermine the authors’ claims that India’s state-nation policies are effective. They find, however, that where the policies could be successfully implemented, sectarian violence was diffused and, conversely, the places where violence has persisted were places were such policies could not be effectively implemented.

The fourth and fifth chapters are given over to an analysis of something of a natural experiment in the significant Tamil population split between south Indian and Sri Lanka when those states were created. Tamils in south India, initially harboring secessionist tendencies, were successfully and peacefully drawn into India’s political system because state-nation policies allowed Tamil leaders to take part in politics at the center and, at the same time, diffused demands for an independent Tamil homeland by allowing for the protection of their language and culture within the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the Hindu Tamil minority and the majority Buddhist Sinhalese were involved in a bloody civil war within decades of independence, despite having lived peacefully together for hundreds of years prior to that. Sri Lankan politicians mobilized support from Buddhists Sinhalese-speakers to pursue policies designed to create a linguistically and cultural homogenous nation-state. The Tamils, now feeling that their culture was under attack and that avenues to political redress were closed, turned to increasingly bloody guerilla warfare tactics. In both chapters data from recent social surveys are again used to good effect in supporting the argument.

The authors then take their analysis of the state-nation beyond South Asia to Ukraine where they argue that much of Ukraine’s success in remaining unified, peaceful, and in the process of becoming the most democratic of the former Soviet Republics centered on the implementation of state-nation (as opposed to nation-state) policies, particularly with regards to language. At the same time, Ukraine does lack some elements of the state-nation grammar: an irredentist Russia has made pursuing any federal devolution of power unwise and Ukraine’s strong presidential system means that Ukrainian democracy lacks a strong parliamentary tradition.

The last two chapters sat oddly with the rest of the book for this reader. In the penultimate chapter the authors develop a new ideal type of a federacy, or an administrative sub-unit of an otherwise unitary state that enjoy extensive autonomy. They take a handful of examples of federacies—Greenland with Denmark and the Aland Island with Finland as just two—as well as address places where federacy-like policies have been pursued. They then speculate on why federacies have worked where they have and where else they might. In the final chapters the authors examine the nature of U.S. federalism, with some comparison to the handful of other developed, democratic federal states. Their major conclusion is that the U.S. would be a less than ideal model of democratic politics in many multi-national states: mal-apportioned representation in a comparatively powerful upper house and the indivisibility of a powerful president lead to high representative inequality and difficulty in amending the constitution.

In both of these chapters, it is clear that the authors are trying to develop alternative models to the nation-state to fill out the conceptual space in which they place the state-nation.
There is, however, no substantive discussion of how these concepts relate to each other. In what seems to be another shortcoming, the authors turn to analysis of legal documents to support their arguments with regards to federacy and US federalism, and away from the survey research methods that served them well in other chapters. (Their attempt to link high levels of economic inequality in the U.S. to shortcomings in the U.S. federal model in just a few pages was particularly unconvincing.)

Returning to the stronger first portion of this book, the authors do introduce an interesting problem in Indian democracy, suggest a new way to think about it and cite survey research that does convincingly ground an ideal type in observed reality. Even here, however, there are two problems.

First, the historical development of state-nation policies in India is only dealt with in a very limited way. While it is not discussed, one suspects that at least part of the genesis of state-nation policies may lie in the history of British colonization, which linked a number of princely states into a single political framework that asked little more than that taxes were paid. Certainly the British did not create modern India from whole cloth, and the struggle to rid the subcontinent of the British united India. While it is always possible to find something that a book left out, a more sustained focus on Indian history and the emergence of an independent, democratic state would give better analytic depth to the concept of state-nation.

Second, as for the breath of the state-nation, it is not clear how well the concept travels outside of India. While comparisons are made to other state-nations, the authors’ one extended case study, Ukraine, lacks some elements of the state-nation ideal type and is less convincing than the analysis of India. The remaining chapters introduce new concepts but do little to link them back to the state-nation. The concept of state-nation is an interesting way to think of modern India that may, or may not, have wider relevance.

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It is important to note that I am a long-time colleague and some-time collaborator with the editors of this collection, I edited the chapter from Frank’s unpublished manuscript for inclusion in this volume, I am especially thanked (by Frank) for my input in one of the chapters presented, and I provided a very positive blurb for the back cover. I stand by my suggestion on the back cover that this is a well-organized collection of the work of Andre Gunder Frank that will have enduring value. That said, there are both strengths and weaknesses in the present volume that should be considered, and as someone ‘close to the action’ I am perhaps well-placed to discuss them. Readers are free to be skeptical. I fear I am also compensating a bit by being tougher on my colleagues regarding editorial choices than I might otherwise be. The reader is duly warned about that as well. I want to make it clear that this is a fine collection that is being offered in an era when collections, if not ‘books’ of all sorts, are on the wane. As such, Chew and Lauderdale
as volume editors, and William Thompson as series editor, have done a true service by bringing this work to the public when the arguments presented are most relevant, but when its format is out of favor and under (what were quite likely) draconian production constraints.

The volume brings together some of the work of Andre Gunder Frank, a particularly prolific scholar who raised interesting and difficult questions across a half-century long career, and always refused to accept simple answers. It is surprising that his work did not appear in an ‘essential’ collection or comprehensive set of volumes. There are several thematic collections that Frank himself put together over the years, but nothing that contains the core of his work on world system history. In that sense the editors provide a critical resource by placing some of Frank’s earliest works on dependency theory and his penultimate works on global history into a context that helps make sense of both.

Both underdevelopment and global trajectories are of continuing importance. Underdevelopment has not disappeared. If anything it has gotten worse. We simply hide it with new terms like ‘failed state’. The prevailing ideology that underdevelopment is the result of bad policy, bad people, or both, is wearing thin. Frank never had time for either excuse. If we are going to face the problems of the coming age we must look at global inequality in non-trivial ways. Frank does so.

The challenges do not end here. Great powers rise and fall, and these can be traumatic events for all concerned. It is not that periods of hegemony are better than periods of rivalry, or vice versa. Periods of hegemony are characterized by order and stability (if you are favorably impacted) or by stultification and inertia (if you are not). Periods of rivalry are characterized by a flowering of new ideas and movements (if you are favorably impacted) or by chaos and disorder (if you are not). Either way, when great powers rise or decline the impact is global, not just local. We remain locked in a fierce debate as to why some powers rise or decline hundreds of years after the fact. Without such knowledge we are in poor shape to face the next round of change, which is likely to be fast upon us. Neither the declining core nor the rising powers are going to have a solid sense of what has led to their current situations or how others have coped, for better or worse, in their place. What a poor commentary on the ability of humans to be effectively self-aware. This is something Frank sought to remedy.

The first of three parts of this volume are introduced in a particularly short and cogent statement of only five pages, followed by iconic essays on the development of underdevelopment from 1966 and 1967. With little ado the national state model of underdevelopment is dispatched, as is the ideology that gave rise to it. “Underdevelopment” is not an original form, a function of traditionalism, nor did it ever exist in the core. It is an outcome of unequal relationships with core areas designed to advantage those areas at the cost of the periphery. The real question is one of how this dynamic proceeds, and Frank offers several mechanisms both in these works, and more importantly in the more complete and careful regional analyses that they are built upon. In re-reading the volume I was taken with the crisp and clear exposition of Frank’s attack on modernization theory. It is a model not just of what was ‘wrong’ with our vision of underdevelopment, but of how to assess it: with hard evidence; with trenchant analysis; and head on. Frank’s 1967 essay ‘The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology’ does an especially fine job of taking to task those that need to be taken to task, and teaching, by example, what kinds of errors to avoid. Readers who are unfamiliar with these works would do well to review these two chapters.

The second part of the volume is also introduced in a scant four pages that cover as much of the relevant contextual ground as can be considered in so brief a commentary. Here we skip
from the 1960s to work that appeared in 1991 and 2002. The essays are again well-chosen. ‘Transitional Ideological Modes’ draws an ideological line in the sand and challenges us to abandon abstractions and study really existing human history. It is perhaps the most ideologically controversial of Frank’s works. Here is an explicit argument for abandoning the better part of the western canon. In an earlier essay I argued that Frank was not attacking just one or two sacred cows, but the entire sacred herd. There were no modes of production as such, certainly not at the global level. And Frank further dismisses the search for key periods and epochal changes with the suggestion that ‘a transition is a transition from a transition to a transition.’ Robert Brenner once characterized Frank’s work on underdevelopment as ‘neo-Smithian’. Frank’s counter-attack is that standard ideological categories are simply an ideological charade. Another 1991 publication, ‘A Plea for World System History,’ is designed to challenge students of history to consider the evidence and the implications for a very different kind of social analysis. Twenty pointed questions (and preferred answers) are offered. This is a piece worth serious consideration.

I wonder why these two works are separated by the decade-later co-authored ‘Structural Theory of the 5,000-Year World System’. The ‘Structural Theory’, along with ‘The 5,000-Year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction’ that appears in Part III, form the core of the intellectual agenda that Frank, with Barry Gills, offered over a very fruitful decade-long collaboration. ‘Structural Theory’ introduces a world system (sans hyphen) that emerged long before 1500 and should be studied more for its continuity than in search of any alleged epochal changes. Capital accumulation is its motive force, and the core-periphery structure, the hegemony-rivalry cycle, and both long and short economic cycles make it tick. This perspective is contrasted with those of other important scholars. In the ‘Interdisciplinary Introduction’ the same model is introduced, but there is more of an emphasis on escaping Eurocentrism, and in an impressive show of intellectual breadth the implications of such a perspective are reviewed for over one dozen disciplines and sub-disciplines.

Chew and Lauderdale introduce Part III with the suggestion that it will be made up of essays that focus more on the politics and economics of world system history. I do not understand their argument. Frank’s work is explicitly political and economic, even when aimed at historians as some of the essays in Part II appear to be. Frank was always cognizant of the political nature of his arguments, along with their political implications. Regarding economics, capital accumulation is identified as the motive force of world system history. Nothing moves, and certainly nothing is correctly analyzed, without it. ‘Structural Theory’ and ‘Interdisciplinary Introduction’ belong together. They even share some passages. Presenting them together, and without a distinction that one is more concerned with politics and economics than the other, would have been more enlightening.

Part III also includes ‘The World Economic System in Asia before European Hegemony’. This is largely a critique of Braudel for his lack of attention to areas outside Europe, with special emphasis on the role of Asia. Here Frank continues his criticism of Eurocentrism. A better introduction to Asia might nonetheless have been ‘The Centrality of Central Asia’ (1992) or even a chapter from Frank’s remarkable volume ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (1998). Part III also includes an early edit of the first chapter of Frank’s unfinished ReOrient the 19th Century in which he outlines the litany of historiographical errors that beset the study of the 1800s. Correcting those errors was the project Frank was engaged in when he passed away.

Part III ends with ‘Social Movements,’ co-authored with Frank’s late wife, Marta Fuentes. This is an iconic work, but in a note tucked into the end of the essay the editors suggest
that it is included mostly to “underscore the fact that Gunder was always committed to encompassing issues of justice and freedom.” There would have been many ways to signal this commitment that might have been exercised. Freed of page constraints, the editors would have been wise to look at Frank’s work in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. While some of this work is a deepening of the dependency analysis that emerged at the end of the 1960s, there is a concerted effort to offer a more global political economy in his volumes of the 1970s. In the 1980s, with Frank back in Europe, there is also a wealth of political work dedicated to issues of justice and freedom. Any of the chapters from The European Challenge (1983) would have been useful. Likewise, Frank’s two volumes on global crisis offer an array of arguments that help clarify the social, economic and political implications of the existence of a single global economy. Among these, the chapter titled ‘Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor and West-East-South Political Economic Relations’ (published in Review in 1977 and reprinted in Crisis: In the World Economy, 1980) offers a clear picture of how a unified global political economy mocks ideology and disciplines states.

Even at the cost of some other pieces, there are some essays that might have appeared to provide a solid grounding in the application of world system history. Frank understood the part that polemics play in the inherently ideological nature of social analysis. He did not shy away from such work. Contemporary issues are covered in articles like ‘Soviet and Eastern European ‘socialism’: a review of the international political economy on what went wrong’ that was the focus of a debate in the summer 1994 issue of Review of International Political Economy that included one of Alec Nove’s final published comments. There is a powerful piece titled ‘Paper Tiger, Fiery Dragon’ (1993) on emerging relations between China and the United States, and the controversial ‘Coup d’Etat in Washington and Silent Surrender in America and the World’ (1993) concerning U.S. politics. ‘East and West’ (in Hermann and Tausch eds. Dar al Islam: The Mediterranean, the World System and the Wider Europe, 2005) solidified many of the ideas presented in earlier works and was published in a volume dedicated to Frank’s memory. Any of these would have established both the political applicability of Frank’s version of world system history to contemporary events, and Frank’s longstanding commitment to peace, freedom and justice.

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Across the social sciences, scholars have long debated how markets emerge and operate. Economic scholars emphasize the natural forces of supply and demand that regulate markets and commodity prices, while sociologists draw attention to the role of social relationships in actively creating and shaping market operations. In Market Threads, Çaşışkan contributes to this debate by using the case of cotton production to illuminate the complex workings of markets on the
local and global level. The breadth of the analysis in *Market Threads* provides a unique approach to cotton markets, as the book takes the reader from the cotton fields to the trading floors to present a complete picture of the market-making process. In particular, Çalışkan shows the complicated relationship between world cotton prices and the prices used by specific actors along the cotton commodity chain. He identifies three types of price models employed by cotton traders that inform the actual price of cotton: prosthetic, rehearsal, and associate prices. Prosthetic prices are produced in the market, but not directly used by buyers and sellers. For example, the World Cotton Price may be used by governments and researchers to approximate trends in cotton prices, but it does not correspond to the actual price per pound of cotton when sold from farmer to merchant. Instead, actors at each point of the chain use different prices according to localized logics of exchange.

These constructed price ontology categories serve to reveal the disjunction between prices at different points in the market. Although it is often assumed that the World Price represents the average global price of cotton, *Market Threads* shows how power relations in the market, both at the local and macro level, produce different prices depending on the existing institutional rules and power relations between the economic actors. For example, the World Price of Cotton, according to Çalışkan, represents the ideology and position of the U.S. in the political economy of the world system. Thus the actual manifestations of cotton prices at the local level similarly reflect localized systems of power and meaning.

Drawing on in-depth ethnographic data, the book begins by describing in great detail the interaction between cotton traders on the trading floor of the Izmir Mercantile Exchange. Çalışkan delves so deep as to describe the subtle gestures and linguistic practices used by traders to achieve ideal sales or purchases on the trading floor. Although seemingly irrelevant to global prices, Çalışkan reveals how the behavior of individual traders communicates crucial information about the volume, quality, and price of available cotton that can alter the global market. The book next addresses the point of production by moving to the cotton fields of Turkey and Egypt to provide a detailed picture of the production process from preparing the land all the way to harvesting the cotton. In conjunction with chapters on the New York Board of Trade and regional cotton mills, the book successfully presents a full picture of how the market for cotton is produced on a local, regional, and international scale.

*Market Threads* emphasizes the importance of social relationships in economic exchange by showing how concerted efforts by economic actors shape markets. The relative position of economic actors determines who has a voice in how, and at what price, cotton is sold. As Çalışkan concludes, “markets are neither asocial mechanisms of price setting, nor are they embedded in society,” but instead the book proposes to approach markets as fields of power (p. 188). In viewing markets as fields of power, *Market Threads* rejects existing neoclassical and institutionalist understandings of markets, instead drawing attention to the intermingling of power relations between economic actors and the role of existing rules, strategies, and market logics. In other words, the market is neither a path dependent institution, nor simply an arena governed by social arrangements, but a combination of the two. Market actors operate within the rules but also challenge and reconstruct existing market arrangements. Thus when examining how prices are made for a global commodity such as cotton, scholars cannot simply look at issues of supply and demand, but must also consider how power relations within the market operate, and how these power relations intersect with existing rules of exchange.

While his argument notes the importance of including local and regional actors when examining pricing and market mechanisms, Çalışkan himself sets boundaries around which
economic actors he considers significant players in market-making. For example, Çalişkan notes how cotton farmers are so occupied with producing cotton that they rarely concern themselves with the world price of cotton, nor the process of making prices, but instead see prices as something that just “happens” (203). While this may be true, Çalişkan himself suggests the importance of local power structures that shape cotton production, and in turn affect cotton prices. The ethnic relations between Kurds, Arabs, and Turks play a central role in the political economy of cotton production, particularly in the Turkish labor market.

Moreover, gender relations similarly shape this market; Farmers prefer poor female laborers who will work longer hours to ensure continued employment, and recruiting these workers is the job of gang leaders’ wives who have social networks that provide them access to these workers. Çalişkan recognizes the importance of this gender dynamic, noting that “wives of gang leaders play a role as central as that of their husbands.” However, he fails to conduct a deeper analysis of gender relations and the broader political economy of Turkey that grants such importance to the gang leaders’ wives. While the role of race, ethnicity, and gender is tangential to Çalsikan’s main research agenda, these issues represent an equally important field of power shaping market prices. Çalişkan mentions their importance, but they receive limited analytical attention.

Nonetheless, Market Threads contributes new insights into the active construction and maintenance of markets. And even though it is focused solely on cotton, the book presents an analytic framework useful for any widely traded commodity. The conclusions drawn from Çalişkan’s analysis of the cotton industry reveal the need to more closely examine the role of local power arrangements in shaping prices and market structures for any product, particularly in the context of increasingly globalized production systems that incorporate a wide range of economic actors.

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Miguel A. Centeno and Joseph N. Cohen have written, in Global Capitalism: A Sociological Perspective, a text book survey of the rise of global capitalism and a series of explications of issues attendant to the process now called globalization. With almost no theoretical spine nor original empirical research, nor a strong point of view, the work offers little to scholars or advanced students of political economy. The work can alternatively be judged as to whether it offers students an adequate introduction to the topic. Given a text-like synthetic project dedicated to a “sociological” perspective, numerous productive approaches are possible. One might, for example, relate the rise and functioning of global capitalism to the themes of the classic tradition of sociology.

Surprisingly then this “sociological perspective” on global capitalism has no discussion of Marx, Weber, or Durkheim. There are two brief mentions of Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction (one accurate, p. 86; one inaccurate, p. 206), none of Spencer. Karl Polanyi’s view of
the moral embeddedness of economies is reduced to the proposition that states help constitute
markets (p. 122). Although ideas about core and periphery lurk at the edges of this essay, and
Gunder Frank’s early “development of underdevelopment” thesis is summarized (p. 41),
nowhere is there an explication of world-systems analysis. Wallerstein’s name appears on two
pages (19, 24).

Alas, such cursory attention to classical themes or writers is not compensated for by
command of the relevant contemporary sociological literature. Illustratively, neither Sklair, nor
Robinson, nor Ross and Trachte, nor Chasse-Dunn appears to have affected Centeno and Cohen
and it shows.

After an Introduction that opens with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the declaration of
temporary capitalist victory, the work proceeds with a chapter on Global Capitalism – a brief
overview of what might otherwise be termed the rise of the modern world-system, and a series of
chapters on Trade, Finance, Marketing, Governance, Inequality, and Environment (“Living with
Limits”). A conclusion evinces stronger opinions then the excursions would have otherwise
justified, but still not much to chew on (p. 207): “…expecting global capitalism to manage itself
is not only wishful thinking but also…folly”. “[G]lobal capitalism cannot ignore the constraints
of the environment…” Global capitalism “made us much more dependent on each other. With
dependence comes responsibility to ensure the system takes care of all, not just the privileged
few.” One supposes students need to learn some such propositions before they learn others, but
of interest here is a decapitated system that nevertheless seems to have agency. It manages,
ignores, or ensures (or not) but nowhere in sight is responsibility.

The chapter on global capitalism adopts (without analysis or discussion) the
Wallersteinian proposition that capitalism “arose” in the Sixteenth Century. Its dating
mechanism is political, not structural. Neither enterprise size, structure, mode of competition
(Ross and Trachte), nor trading area or mode of surplus appropriation (Wallerstein and Chase-
Dunn), nor class formation (Robinson, Sklair) informs the developmental analysis. These each
complement or sometimes in alternatives give the current moment a history that is dynamic –
that is the product of struggles, classes, and regions. But in this global capitalism there are no
dynamics, only cycles (financial, by the way, not waves of accumulation) and descriptions.

The discussion of trade will introduce students to relevant data about the rise (late 19th
Century) and rise again (late 20th Century) of global trade. The relevance of the transformation of
what is traded and between who gets little conceptual attention but is partially depicted in a nice
graphic (p. 46). Thus the rise in exchange of manufactures from the poorer semiperiphery and
periphery to the rich core is noted but not understood as a turning point in the evolution of global
capitalism. Centeno and Cohen do know about commodity chain analysis but they do not use it.
The wealth of the rich core is attributed to momentum from the past (they do not use the phrase
“path dependence”, but they might).

The chapter on finance is perplexing. The essay correctly puts financial flows and
institutions at the head of the analysis. Lacking any class analysis however, the concept of
“finance capital” does not make an appearance, and thus the history of the idea of imperialism is
sublimated. Further, the explication of financial institutions lacks the clarity demanded of a text.
In Centeno and Cohen’s favor is their view that the financial bubble was a product of weak
regulatory mechanisms. This is buried in a somewhat meandering rendering of the positive

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1 This was clearly a strategic decision by the authors, since at least one, Centeno, teaches an impeccable classical
potential role of financial markets. The excesses are in the form of “But…” One notes that neither in this chapter nor in the one on trade is there an analysis of what Richard Peet et al. (2003) have called the “Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO.”

The link between the U.S. financial catastrophe and world economic slow-down is, properly, discussed as a matter of complex networks of financial dependence. Let’s call this the knock-on effect. What the chapter misses is the generative effect of the U.S. position in global capitalism as a cause. The story can be told briefly here.

The huge U.S. trade deficit is a product of U.S. manufacturing investors’ decisions to flee from their mid-Twentieth Century empowered working class. (There is one incidental mention of a race to the bottom in the book.) This has made the world awash in dollars. Dollar denominated investments are thus attractive to foreign holders of dollars. This leads prudent foreign investors to buy relatively safe but low interest U.S. Treasury Bonds—notoriously the Chinese government. Not all are so prudent. “Between 2002 and 2006 there was a three-fold increase in U.S. credit market instruments held by foreigners, from $2 trillion to more than $6 trillion. By 2006, international investors owned nearly a third of all U.S. mortgages.” The defaults on subprime mortgages spread quickly not just because big banks outside the U.S. held stakes in big U.S. banks, but also because those external institutions were (ignorantly, and literally from a distance) holding securitized mortgage paper that they bought because American consumers were buying way more goods than their employers were selling abroad.

The chapter on finance together with the opening and concluding ones illustrate a familiar puzzle and a common intellectual danger. Centeno and Cohen write as if the crash of 2008 was the end of an era—institutionally they expect more regulation and ideologically they seem to expect less legitimacy for the future of what is often called neo-liberalism. With a 2010 publication date, this seemed a reasonable expectation in 2009 when the work was under completion.

In the first instance the intellectual world should long ago have learned the fateful flaw in the old communist line: “the worse, the better.” During the Great Depression fascism was as likely a response to capitalist collapse as was socialism or social democratic reform. Under contemporary conditions of mass (particularly electronic) media, demagogic leadership has even more opportunity than it did eighty years ago. That the big financial institutions survived 2008-2010 with such little loss of power (maybe even gains) is a bit of a puzzle— but this is not the best venue for a thorough discussion. We all share with Centeno and Cohen however the danger of writing in the midst of intense crises about their meaning for the future. Sometimes we are right; and sometimes not. Right now global finance capital and its leading cadre seem more powerful than ever before. They brought the world to ruin, none went to jail, and many are richer than when it all started.

The chapter on marketing and consumption develops interesting but familiar data on the situation of Western Europe and its cultural offshoots in the pyramid of world privilege (though this is made somewhat more complex in the chapter on inequality). It also raises the aspiration...
and un-realism of a horizon of endless consumption on the rich country model. Leslie Sklair (1995) originally argued, successfully, that consumerism as ideology is the cultural carrier of global capitalism, but Centeno and Cohen do not seem to be familiar with him or his work.

The chapter on governance has one strong virtue and some glaring problems. The virtue is its insistence on the continuing relevance of states and their policies to both the mode of integration into global capitalism and the regulation of its effects on domestic economies. Beyond this the glaring problems include at least these. From the point of view of a teaching tool, Centeno and Cohen neglect to clarify the contradictory usages of the word liberalism in American political parlance and in global political economy. So countries high on liberalism scales (created by a free market think tank) have various relations to economic growth, but to an American student the discussion is apt to be murky at best. That can be compensated for by professorial instruction. What cannot be merely adjusted is that the International Financial Institutions – the unholy trinity – are not discussed as issues of governance.

The chapter on inequality is a review of some of the literature on within-country and between-country inequality. Its structure is “one the one hand, but on the other hand” with the work of Glen Firebaugh prominently featured. It is fair minded in a very complex field but it fails to thoroughly air support for the proposition that globalization produces more inequality within even relatively equal political economies. It does not explicate the meaning of a Gini index. More to the point for readers of this journal is the more or less casual acceptance of the Kuznets thesis on development and inequality (the U-shape with higher GDP/capita yielding lower inequality). The problem here is that the latest and brilliant work by Korzeniewicz and Moran (2005) requires a drastic revision of the path of inequality over time even in high GDP countries.

The chapter on environmental limits is a swift overview that reasonably asks whether the carrying capacity of the planet can accommodate universal consumerism. As Centeno and Cohen conclude, as mentioned above, they blandly articulate reasonably reformist concerns. Students with little or no exposure to political economy will learn many facts, little history, tiny amounts of conceptualization and a reasonably empirical background to pursue other matters. More advanced students and scholars need not bother. General readers will not be attracted to the text book style or the lack of a strong thesis.

Despite the shortcomings mentioned here, Global Capitalism: A Sociological Perspective would be useful in a course that supplied its own theoretical analyses. It is a clearly written summary of the basic information that any course with a central theme of globalization needs to cover.

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Ruth Mostern’s ambitious and wide-ranging study of the Song state emphasizes territorial analysis within the boundaries of the state. At the same time it conveys an interpretation of politics, administration, and warfare. The interpretation spills over the boundaries of the Song state to yield a picture expanding to all of China from the Tang of the seventh century to the end of the Yuan in the fourteenth century. In the course of her analysis, she develops the specifics of territorial analysis through reliance on Geographic Information Systems (GIS), conveys centuries of debate and historiography on governance within China, and teases out a remarkably precise set of cycles and long-term changes in styles of territorial administration.

The book is a “history of territory.” It is an analysis of over 600 years of administrative decisions (on spatial units and boundaries)—decisions that were intended to adjust tax revenues and military installations so as to maximize the efficiency of an immense realm and focus energies at key points. It emphasizes the perspective of the monarchy: “dividing the realm in order to govern.” It provides a constant reminder that, from the standpoint of the monarch, there were only so many bureaucrats and so many troops to deploy. The book begins with an elegant prologue that articulates the range of issues to be addressed. In this review, the issues will be discussed in the following order: the evidence; the perspective of the monarchy, its bureaucrats and historians; the analytical perspective of the author; and some world-historical comments by the reviewer.

The evidence, discussed in a detailed appendix and presented separately in an online database, was built out of a list of geographic names and descriptions. The database was drawn principally from a text document compiled by Hope Wright published in 1958, which itself drew on three major Song-era documents. Mostern, in collaboration with graduate student Elijah Meeks (to whom she graciously offers the lion’s share of the credit), created the Digital Gazetteer of Song China (DGSG) as the digitization and expansion of Wright’s alphabetical List of Geographical Names in Sung China. Construction of the digital dataset involved several sorts of transformations: from print to Word, from Word to Excel, and from Wade-Giles to pinyin in the transcription of Chinese (the original characters for place names were usually preserved). The text document was coded in terms of “events,” where each event was the establishment or abolition of a county or a prefecture—over a thousand events were coded, each of them with numerous variables. Mostern and Meeks used “entities” as digital representations of places and then associated their events with places; their work draws explicitly on the achievements of a series of digital projects—China Historical GIS, Chinese Civilization in Time and Space (Academica Sinica), and Robert Hartwell’s initial GIS analysis.

The dataset is organized principally in terms of three types of territorial units of expanding scale—counties, prefectures, and circuits. Counties were small, focused on populated centers, and served as gathering points for revenue; prefectures were larger, designed for stationing troops; circuits were still larger and served not as administrative units themselves but for encompassing groups of counties and prefectures. (Circuits were later known as provinces, but Mostern emphasizes that provinces were too large to be effective units of administration in Song times.)

Part 1 of the book includes three chapters on policy debate. It centers on a long discourse at the administrative and historiographical level, relying on textual and interpretive evidence
rather than the event-based and factual evidence of part 2. It begins with the modern, globally conscious political economy of spatial change, focusing on the analyses of Charles Tilly and G. William Skinner, then turns to the complex details of Song administrative structure. Counties were composed of subunits including households, garrisons, towns, and cantons: their variety is displayed in a pair of maps (p. 53) showing cantons per county and towns per county by region, generalizing for the Song era. Prefectures varied greatly in size—no parallel here to the Cartesian prefectures of revolutionary France—and were of three main types (see the map on p. 42). This introduction to Song spatial relations, phrased in terms of the organization of state power through county and prefecture, sets the stage for a deeper analysis.

In a debate traced back to the sixth century BCE but explored mainly within the Song era, Mostern traces the issue of “persistence and transformation,” in which scholars argued that only through detailed accounts of continuity and change in administrative structure was it possible to make adequate decisions on state policy. The depth of the discussion is symbolized in a table (pp. 64-65) which lists three dozen works of geography, most of them Song-era but some from earlier centuries. This section demonstrates the remarkable breadth and depth of administrative historiography in China’s imperial eras. Not only did Song-era scholars debate administrative policy but scholars in Ming and Qing times reviewed the Song-era gazetteers and dynastic histories. Recent historiography continues to review these historical issues, now with new technology and an accumulation of previous interpretations.

Part 2 convey the dynamics of Song administrative history, integrating the full range of policy analysis to set forth the author’s interpretation. These three chapters draw on the data (from the Appendix and the online dataset) and on the debate (as summarized in the initial three chapters) to present the author’s “history of territory” (Ruth Mostern and Elijah Meeks, “Digital Gazetteer of the Song Dynasty,” http://songgis.ucmercedlibrary.info/). This is a narrative and interpretation of the structure and dynamics of the spatial administrative order. It focuses in detail on the Song era yet, at a more impressionistic yet fascinating level, it reveals the contrasts separating the Tang, the 5 Dynasties, and three stages of the Song and Yuan. With the fall of the Tang, central government gave way to localized dynasties and regional warlords for a two-century period that Mostern calls “the fall and rise of the territorial state,” from 750 to 1105 CE. Competing administrations worked on techniques for containing the post-Tang wave of warlords, and eventually the Song put together a system effective in both conquest and administration, reaching its full extent in 960. The succeeding period of “the long eleventh century” (1005 – 1127) brought the high point of Song administrative activism. In it, the era of “New Policies” from 1068 to about 1085 brought “the most rapid and extensive redrawing of the political landscape to occur at any time in Chinese history other than the founding of a dynasty” (p. 184). Emperors Shenzong (r. 1068 – 1086) and Zhezong (r. 1086 – 1101), relying on the administrative procedures developed by Wang Anshi, merged prefectures in the imperial core and expanded them on the periphery, in efforts to adjust labor service and taxation. In the end, however, most of the administrative changes of the New Policies were soon reversed and the rate of administrative transformation declined. The sudden Jurchen conquest of the northern Song territories in 1127, followed by peace with Jurchen once the Song regime successfully shifted its core to the south, brought a long period of little administrative change.

In addition to this detailed narrative, Mostern sketches broader patterns of transformation: the alternation between warlords and bureaucrats; the contrast of early-stage and late-stage administrative practices for a realm; and the development of locally-based discourse, in which gazetteers come to be produced not only by imperial bureaucrats but also by local personalities
arguing for the advance of their region. This reader found it easiest to maintain contact with the multiple levels of argument by relying on the condensed presentation of data in five timelines showing the relative and absolute frequency of administrative “events”—creating and abolishing counties and prefectures. These timelines addressed three periods for the empire as a whole: 960 – 1279 CE (p. 13); 960 – 1040 CE (p. 108); and 1127 – 1279 CE (p. 223). In addition, timelines show administrative change for Sichuan, 965 – 1040 (p. 132); and six regions for 1068 – 1126 (pp. 184 – 185).

Reading this book leads one to acknowledge not only the contribution of the author but also the strength of previous work: the compilations and debates of Song-era scholars (reflected in the imperial map drawn in c. 1180); the reviews by their successors in later imperial times; the twentieth-century work of laborious compilation by Hope Wright; and the analyses of Tilly, Skinner, and Hartwell. What, then, is added by the twenty-first century digitization, GIS formulation, and interpretation in Mostern’s hands? It provides a way to link the full range of previous studies and to trace parallels and interactions among the data. It provides summary statistics but it also provides an arena for the author to scrutinize individual instances—as she does in several key cases—and then apply the lessons of the case study to the larger dataset. In reviewing her data from various perspectives, Mostern shows why a large historical dataset must preserve not only the completed results but also the raw and intermediate forms of data that enabled their preparation.

Part of the contribution of this study is to raise further questions about Song politics and administration. The Song regime focused intensively on adjusting its administrative units to the current problems in warfare and taxation. Song rulers succeeded well for much of their history but failed twice: with the Jurchen Jin of the North in 1127 and with the Mongol conquest, a long war that ended in 1279. In neither case was there much administrative reorganization: what would the emperor Shenzong and the official Wang Anshi have said about the Song response to these threats?

This is a study of empire—rather than a world-system analysis or a world-historical interpretation—yet the author has provided much that is relevant to these broader perspectives. The work conveys effectively the perspective and the life-course of an imperial administration, especially the intricate balance between reproducing the regime and defending it: China is not the only region to have such a history but is the only region to have recorded so much of it. Mostern shows gradual change in functioning of world-system and of empire at various levels. Beyond the Song frontiers she notes the inability of the Song regime to expand to the larger territory of the Tang because the surrounding peoples had developed strength in administration, warfare, and commerce with which to challenge them on all sides. Within the Song state, she traces the changes in administrative technology that made counties and prefectures into more effective units than the larger provinces. Throughout, the author conveys immense methodological and interpretive breadth. Any academic reader can appreciate Mostern’s multiple skills and the interest of her materials, but few will have the background to follow all of her points.

This detailed imperial overview provides a new perspective from which to ask where the Song state fits into the world. The Southern Song monarchy seems from this perspective to have been less energetic than that of the preceding Northern Song, despite the reputation of the Southern Song dynasty overall. This study, though appropriately focused on the Song, makes clear the need for studies of interactions among a wider range of East Asian polities in the Song era. And while this study explores Song administration and politics with unprecedented
sophistication, it implicitly suggests that social and economic studies may be just as important to understanding the place of Song China in the world a thousand years ago.

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World-systems analysts have argued for some time that archaeologists have both much to gain and much to contribute to the development of this approach. Since archaeologists deal with great time depth, they can display the origins, expansion, contraction, and cyclical nature of modes of societal interaction played out over millennia. While some archaeologists see world-systems analysis (WSA) as too coarse to deal effectively with regional and local variation, others have addressed this shortcoming and made important contributions to the continuing refinement of theory. In the book under review here, Alan Greaves skillfully adapts some important world-systems concepts to the study of Ionia, the central coastal region of western Asia Minor, in the Archaic period (ca. 8th-5th centuries BCE), a time of significant innovations in material culture, intellectual pursuits (philosophy and science in particular), and sociopolitical structure throughout the Aegean world. Ionia was particularly important as a contact zone between east and west after the area came under Persian control in the late 6th century BCE. One of Greaves’s central goals is to move away from the Helleno-centric viewpoint that has dominated scholarship and to place Ionia more fully in the broader context of Asia Minor and the eastern Mediterranean. It is in this effort to stress connectivity with the east as well as the Greeks to the west that the author makes use of WSA, although it is only one of several components to his more comprehensive approach.

Greaves lays out his position in ten well-organized chapters. Chapter 1 provides a cogent discussion of the types of source material available for the study of ancient Ionia: archaeology, ancient literary sources, and epigraphy. He carefully points out the positive and negative aspects of each data source. For example, while excavated material from key sites such as Ephesos provides important information, many objects are scattered among a variety of museums complicating their study, and the exposed remains of many sites date to the later Hellenistic and Roman periods. One could also add that until recently very little work was done at sites outside of the major urban centers, skewing our perception of ancient settlement patterns. Key literary sources perpetuate conventional perspectives that do not deal with important aspects of Ionian life. Greaves argues that various works, such as the histories of Herodotos and Thucydides, tended to be Atheno-centric and obscure “the diversity and regionalism that existed within the ancient Greek world” (p. 11). In subsequent chapters, Greaves systematically explores each line of evidence as it relates to specific topics (e.g., colonization, war, cults, and art).

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical foundations for the study. Greaves takes classical archaeology to task for its lack of explicit theorizing. He has two main goals in the book: (1) to demonstrate how the interaction between Aegean Greece and Anatolia contributed to the regional identities of Archaic Ionia through “conscious acts of creation” (p. 28); and, (2) to
explore the dynamic role of landscape in this process. To reach this level of interpretation, Greaves espouses the interdisciplinary and diachronic Annaliste perspective and provides a good discussion of how Braudel’s tripartite chronological framework can be applied as a ground-up approach. Greaves describes the environmental setting in Chapter 3, explaining how geomorphological forces such as alluviation filled in valleys and harbors, requiring people to shift occupational zones over time. Use of large and small islands near the coast enhanced local diversity and contributed to political separation.

Greaves examines the economic system in Chapter 4 in order to dispute earlier assessments of Ionians as primarily overseas traders whose success fueled colonization. He concurs that the region was prosperous, but argues that the movement abroad was due to demographic and political pressure. Agriculture clearly dominated the economy, as was true of all ancient societies. Timber and high-quality marble were important resources, but their bulk negated long-distance trade in these commodities, while decorated pottery and cloth also circulated largely within the region. In this section Greaves discusses world-systems analysis (WSA), especially the four types of networks defined by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997), as an approach that is useful in understanding how the ancient Ionian economy operated.

Chapter 5 begins with a survey of the Ionian cities, describing the location and individual features of 12, with Ephesos and Miletos the most prominent. However, Greaves notes that the landscape also contained rural temples, smaller settlements, and dispersed farmsteads, which, despite being distributed among the various poleis, formed a network of sites. In seeking to “understand how they [Ionians] experienced their cities”, he argues that we need to look to Anatolia, where small independent kingdoms developed in the centuries after the collapse of the Hittites, rather than the Greeks to the west. Several of these Ionian cities played major roles in the Greek diaspora that led to the establishment of colonies throughout the ancient Mediterranean (Chapter 6). In his discussion of this process, Greaves makes subtle use of WSA, identifying the network types (Hall 2006) that correspond with various phases: information network with pre-colonization, prestige goods network with emporion (trading post), political-military network with apoikia (settlement), and bulk goods network with full assimilation (rarely if ever happened in antiquity); his two-stage model of Ionian colonization focuses on the emporion and apoikia phases.

In Chapter 7 Greaves examines warfare as a product of choice and of the need to keep up with technology, making it “a useful indicator of common values, identities, and behaviors” (p. 146). In discussing fortifications, he suggests that walls were not just for defense, but that they were also political statements. The construction of walls and trireme ships often required the financial assistance of outside polities, including the Persians, thus drawing Ionians into larger systemic interactions at the military and diplomatic levels. Furthermore, payments required by mercenaries may have been the impetus for the creation of coinage. Service by Ionian mercenaries in Egypt and other regions reflects the complex nature of core-periphery relations in the first millennium BCE.

Religious practices in Ionia (Chapter 8) reveal elements of competition and similarity in Ionian life. Temples were located in many different locations, often where there is archaeological evidence of activity during the Bronze Age, suggesting a clear effort to link past and present in a cultural ethos. Egyptian objects in the Samian Heraion and Egyptian influence evident in kouroi statues suggest the adaptation of foreign items to fit native needs, a process of negotiation that is a nuanced form of incorporation. Greaves further argues that Greek cults introduced during the Archaic period “adapted to the pre-existing ‘Phrygian’ tradition of the region” (p. 200). This
statement mirrors what various world-systems analysts have said about the relationships between indigenous people and outsiders in other parts of the world. The main point in the discussion of art (Chapter 9) is that it indicates a system of “local production and consumption, with significant intra-regional exchange within Ionia and to other regional centers, and limited exchange with other regions, such as Lydia and Athens” (p. 214). There was, in other words, a tiered world-system with local, intermediate, and international components (see Kardulias 1999 for description of a similar system in the Bronze Age).

In addressing the question Who Were the Ionians? (Chapter 10), Greaves argues that Herodotos is of little help since he was writing in the 5th century BCE. He also disregards the myth of the Ionian Migration, which states that Ionian cities were populated by immigrants from Greece. Greaves sees this as politically motivated mythopoesis “designed to suit the contemporary Athenian political agenda which was in the process of claiming Ionia as part of its empire” (p. 223). Instead, he argues for a new methodology that avoids bias whenever possible and examines all the evidence critically.

In this book Greaves makes a strong case for revising our interpretation of Ionian history based on an array of data and an explicit theoretical schema. He skillfully blends elements of Braudel’s annales approach with contemporary WSA and applies the composite model in a manner that provides a richer understanding of Archaic Ionia. I think that other scholars will find much of value in this volume, both in terms of information about a specific area, and how to bring WSA to bear in comprehending other areas with multiple polities that share a common cultural identity. While there are some individual points in the book with which I disagree, it is overall an excellent study that is part of a growing literature on the use of WSA in archaeology. Technically, the book is very clean, with a modicum of typographical errors. With only several exceptions, the images are clear. Scattered throughout the text are useful boxes that deal with specific topics, such as alluviation of the Gulf of Latmos, and the cult statue of Artemis from Ephesos. A useful glossary accompanies a detailed bibliography and index.

References:


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