Editors’ Introduction

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This issue of the Journal of World-Systems Research reaches our readers at a particularly challenging world-historical moment. As we watch unfolding news about the policies of the Trump administration and its supporters, it is helpful to situate these events in the larger framework that world-systems analysis provides. We hope readers will take some time to reflect on some of the past content of this journal as it speaks to the nature of the systemic crises we face today (see, for instance, our 2013 symposium, “The Global System since 2008: Crisis of What”). We believe that the contributions in this issue can also contribute to new understandings of these crises and of possible responses that can advance a more humane and sustainable world-system.

Most of our readers will agree that we are witnessing world-systemic processes of U.S. hegemonic decline and rising competition for dominance in the global political and economic orders. As William I. Robinson points out in a recent essay, the tensions we’re seeing between the United States and China reflect the fact that U.S. hegemony is based on the post WWII inter-state order that marginalizes China as a political force. He observes that “the political scaffolding of world capitalism is hopelessly outdated.”

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Two articles in this issue are instructive for our thinking about China’s role in the changing world-system, and they can inform our understandings of the current context of growing tensions. In their opening article, “Territorial Contradictions of the Rise of China: Geopolitics, Nationalism and Hegemony in Comparative-Historical Perspective,” Sahan Savas Karatasli and Sefika Kumral point out that “Unlike the rise of the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States, however, China’s ascendancy does not coincide with attempts to restructure the existing configuration of the inter-state system. On the contrary,…China has been preoccupied with providing stability and preserving the global status quo.” They attribute China’s deviation from the pattern of past hegemonic transitions to the challenges it faces from the escalation of nationalist and secessionist movements within its boundaries.

While the conclusion drawn by Karatasli and Kumral directs our attention to the question of what is different about today’s hegemonic transition from earlier ones, the other papers in this issue address the broader structural changes in the world-system that impact today’s crises. Clearly, the spread of the military-industrial complex and unprecedented militarization of states is one critical difference affecting the distribution of power and the possible responses to systemic crisis. In “Intrastate Dynamics in the Context of Hegemonic Decline: A Case Study of China’s Arms Transfer Regime,” Zhifan Luo examines China’s arms transfer activities, arguing that in more recent years we’ve seen a global strategy that attempts to extend China’s economic, political, and possibly military outreach in areas where U.S. influence is weak.

Another key difference between the current world-historical moment and previous ones is the concentration of transnational corporate power and the consolidation of what analysts have referred to as the transnational capitalist class (TCC). As Robinson (2017) points out, Chinese elements of the TCC have been influential in shaping China’s global policy. Moreover, “the emerging TCC [has] acquired a stake in the stability and well-being of global capitalism.” It may well be that corporate rather than state actors are the decisive players shaping the struggle to define the global political and economic order. In light of this, Jeb Sprague’s “The Caribbean Cruise Ship Industry and the Emergence of a Transnational Capitalist Class” advances understandings of how this class has consolidated its influence in the cruise ship industry and how it wields its power over both states and people.

Is there hope? There is a third important structural change in the world-system that will impact how various actors respond to the deepening crises, and that is the strengthening of counter-hegemonic and anti-systemic movements. Anti-colonial struggles helped inform transnational alliances and visions among movements, which have long sought to advance alternatives to the global capitalist order (see Wallerstein’s “Antisystemic Movements, Yesterday and Today”). The restructuring of global labor markets, new communications technologies, and proliferation of transnational alliances and campaigns resisting the ravages of neoliberal policies have
strengthened antisystemic movements. Moreover, the ideas these movements advance challenge the ideological foundations upon which the legitimacy and stability of the current order rests. Advancing notions of liberty, equality, freedom, and human rights, activists point to contradictions between the purported values of our society and the outcomes of global capitalist policies.

World-systems scholarship thus includes work that explores world-systemic alternatives and their possibilities for emergence. Rebekah Burroway’s “Political Economy, Capability Development, and Fundamental Cause: Integrating Perspectives on Child Health in Developing Countries” argues for greater attention to the human impacts of capitalism, making the case for the concept of “fundamental cause” in research on public health. Her paper should advance transdisciplinary dialogues and encourage scholars working on public health questions to consider the influences of broader structural forces on the conditions that yield poor health outcomes. Burroway’s project is, we believe, a critical one in this moment of world-historical crisis, where we see increasing pressures placed on the factors of social reproduction—in other words threats to the very survival of humankind.

Jeffrey A Ewing’s paper, “Hollow Ecology: Ecological Modernization Theory and the Death of Nature” also points to the need for our research to confront more rigorously the dark realities of capitalism’s social and ecological crises. As his title suggest, the essay critiques approaches to environmental analysis that ignore the very real material constraints of the physical environment and makes a compelling case for the critical application of world-historical analysis to the study of environmental issues. By challenging the dominant discourses of climate denial and technological optimism and giving voice to the unavoidable reality of capitalism’s ecological crisis, scholars can help advance new thinking about alternative social and economic orders that will provide for the needs of future generations of all species.

Finally, we are exceptionally pleased to offer an excellent research note in which Patrick Ziltener, Daniel Künzler, and André Walter introduce new empirical tools for measuring the impacts of colonialism. Given contemporary debates about race and its historical basis in global capitalist oppression (See, e.g. JWSR’s recent symposium on race in the capitalist world-system), these methodological innovations should spur important new critical research that highlights yet another hypocrisy in the existing world-system’s geoculture. To help advance research on the long-term structural impacts of colonialism, these authors have made their data available to other scholars, and readers will find a direct link to the dataset along with the article.

Our book review section features a review symposium of Jamie McCallum’s book, Global Unions, Local Power: The New Spirit of Transnational Labor Organizing, which received the Distinguished Scholarly Book Award from the Labor and Labor Movements Section of the American Sociological Association. In addition to reviews from Fabiola Mieres, Stephanie Luce, Joel Stillerman, and Sarah Swider, the symposium features an essay by the author, Jamie
McCallum, who revisits his arguments about the political possibilities for effective transnational organizing in light of the changing political context confronting organized labor, particularly in the U.S. under the new administration. As always, please keep us informed about new books that are appropriate for review in JWSR. And if you know of foreign-language books that you believe would be of interest to JWSR’s readership, or if you would like to offer your services to review books in a foreign language, please contact our book review editor, Jennifer Bair at jlb5md@virginia.edu.

In closing, we remind our readers that the Journal of World-Systems Research remains one of the leading open access peer reviewed scholarly journals, and we are working to create a sustainable structure for the journal while supporting the Open Access movement more broadly. We invite readers to support the journal with financial contributions (see the “donate” link on our website), by promoting the journal to readers and scholars, or by assisting with copyediting or translating (email jwsr@pitt.edu to volunteer). As we witness new threats to free speech and democratic, truthful communications, scholars and readers play a critical role in helping keep access to information open and free. As one of the very first open access scholarly journals, JWSR is committed to helping our readers be part of the movement to keep our research free, truthful, and open to all readers.

Reference
Territorial Contradictions of the Rise of China: Geopolitics, Nationalism and Hegemony in Comparative-Historical Perspective

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Abstract
There is debate in the literature regarding whether China can become a new world hegemonic power in the 21st century. Most existing analyses focus on economic aspects of world hegemony-building processes and ignore its macro-political dimensions. This article starts with the premise that reshaping the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system is an important part of world hegemony-building processes. One of the ways in which previous and current world hegemonic powers established their world hegemonies was through the inclusion of new nations by co-opting, supporting or sometimes selectively leading a section of nationalist movements into independence. Our comparative analysis shows that, as of now, contemporary China has not been following this historical pattern. Compared to Mao-era China, which was perceived as a champion of national liberation—at least when colonial and semi-colonial areas were at stake—today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a champion of the global geo-political status quo. The current Chinese government is not actively pursuing the transformation of the inter-state system or seeking to create instabilities at different levels. This is because, unlike previous and current world hegemonic powers, during its rise to global preeminence, Chinese territorial integrity has been challenged due to rapid escalation of nationalist/secessionist movements within its own state boundaries. Hence, the PRC’s foreign policy has consistently been concerned with creating and preserving macro-political stability at national and international levels.

Keywords: China, world hegemony, world-systems, nationalism, secessionism
There is a major debate in the literature regarding whether China can become a new world hegemonic power in the 21st century. In this paper we provide a critical assessment of China’s possible rise to global political-economic preeminence with a focus on macro-political dimensions of world hegemony building processes. Although there is a flourishing literature, which discusses limits and prospects of China’s possible ascendancy (Ciccantell and Bunker 2004; Arrighi 2007; Jacques 2009; Lachmann 2010:202-206; Gulick 2011; Hung 2015), most existing analyses focus on economic aspects alone and ignore macro-political dimensions of world hegemony building processes.

Our analysis stems from two premises: (1) Until now, efforts to reshape the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system have been an important part of world hegemony-building processes. (2) One of the ways in which previous and current hegemonic powers—the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States—transformed the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system was through the inclusion of new nations by supporting, co-opting, and sometimes leading selected nationalist movements into independence. We argue that by leading a select group of subject nations to independence, rising great powers enhanced their hegemony-building capacities by (1) gaining the “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci [1971] 2003) of these new states, (2) weakening their rival great powers (e.g., formal empires or colonial/imperial powers) that previously controlled these subject nations, (3) containing rival and radical anti-systemic ideologies (e.g. republicanism in the late 18th and early 19th century; communism in the late 19th and the 20th century) which were spreading among these oppressed nations, (4) presenting their own political systems and state-society relationships as ideal-type political models that can be exported to these “new” nations, and (5) representing themselves as the pioneers of a new and a more “progressive” world order who helped dissolve the earlier “despotic” and “reactionary” inter-state systems.

So far, however, contemporary China does not seem to be following this historical trend. Although China during the Mao era was perceived as a champion of national liberation (Van Ness 1970: 77-94)—at least when colonial and semi-colonial areas were at stake—today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a champion for the preservation of the global geo-political status quo. Put differently, in contrast to previous and current world hegemonic powers, the contemporary Chinese government is not interested in transforming the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system and creating instabilities at different levels. The PRC’s foreign policy has consistently been concerned with preserving the inter-state system created by the declining world

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hegemonic power. Even if China maintains its economic strength and gains the economic leadership of the world in the 21st century by providing a temporary solution to the contemporary crisis of capitalist world-economy, it will not lead a new inter-state system. Instead, it will lead the existing inter-state system established by the United States.

In the current literature, it is possible to find arguments explaining China’s policy of preserving stability in terms of unique ideological and historically specific aspects of Chinese culture. In this paper, however, we offer another explanation that arises from our comparative-historical analysis. Our explanation focuses on a particular political problem surrounding China during its ascendancy that had not existed, at least on this scale, for previous rising hegemonic powers. We maintain that during its economic ascendancy, Chinese territorial integrity was challenged through a rapid escalation of nationalist/secessionist movements (such as the long standing Taiwanese problem, the Tibet movement, the East Turkestan/Uyghur movement in the Xinjiang region, and to a lesser extent the Inner Mongolia problem and growing dissent in newly integrated Hong Kong). While none of these problems are new, a complex set of factors that are also related to the rise of China—including multifaceted domestic transformations during the reform period (e.g., liberalization and “opening up” policies; and its growing energy needs) and complex international transformations of the U.S.-centered world hegemonic order (e.g. decline of U.S. hegemony, intensification of inter-state rivalries, and growing social and political instability in the world)—made China more and more vulnerable to these internal threats and challenges.

We argue that escalation of nationalist/secessionist movements during China’s ascendancy have been pushing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to utilize a two-dimensional strategy that is closely related to China’s growing political-economic strength. The first dimension is the heavy reliance on development and welfare policies to contain nationalist problems at home and abroad. The second dimension, made possible by China’s growing bargaining power in bilateral and multilateral relations, is the skillful use of international diplomacy against forces of secessionist nationalism. Both dimensions of this strategy require and favor global stability. Consequently, contrary to previous hegemonic powers, China has emerged as a global power, which does not attempt to alter the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system but one, which attempts to preserve the status quo.

In pursuit of discussing various implications of this “anomalous” development in a comparative-historical perspective, this paper is organized as follows. The first section explains the comparative-historical rationale behind our premises by discussing trajectories of the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States with a focus on the macro-political aspects of world hegemony building processes. The second section examines the historical trajectory of nationalist movements in China before and after the reform period to describe the historically-
specific context the PRC finds itself in the early 21st century. The third section discusses the two-dimensional strategy the PRC utilized to contain nationalism in the reform period and explains how and why China has emerged as a champion of the global status quo. The fourth section concludes by comparing the trajectory we observe in China today with the trajectories of the previous rising hegemonic powers in world history.

**Macro-Political Aspects of World Hegemony Building Processes**

The concept of “world hegemony” refers to “the power of a state to exercise functions of leadership and governance over a system of sovereign states” (Arrighi 1994: 27). In this Gramscian re-conceptualization, power is associated not only with dominance but also with the exercise of intellectual and moral leadership. At the world-systemic level, as Arrighi explains, a particular state exercises this hegemonic function when it leads a system of states in pursuit of a perceived general interest. Although terms like general interest are extremely ambiguous because of their ideological nature, historically, claims of this kind tend to increase their credibility under conditions of “systemic chaos,” where rising hegemonic powers, and their rivals, contend to be the leaders in resolving a multiplicity of crises whose devastating economic, social and political consequences are faced by many actors in the inter-state system (Arrighi and Silver 1999).

Among these crises, we can count catastrophic economic and social upheavals which signal that existing regimes of capitalist accumulation are no longer sustainable, escalation of inter-great power (and inter-imperialist) warfare which quickly turns into a negative-sum game for all of its participants and intensification of massive social conflicts, revolts and revolutions (Arrighi & Silver 1999; Silver & Slater 1999; Boswell & Chase-Dunn 2000; Amin et al 1982; Arrighi et al 1989). In this chaotic atmosphere, rising hegemonic powers attempt to resolve these crises by offering new configurations for historical capitalism, state-society relationships and inter-state systems (Arrighi 1994; Arrighi & Silver 1999; Silver & Slater 1999). These reconfigurations and transformations help rising hegemonic powers not only climb the ladders of global political and economic preeminence but also assert and advance their “intellectual and moral leadership” capacities.

One of the important—yet relatively much less studied—aspects of these transformations is related to the integration of new nations into the inter-state system. Historically, the rise of social and political movements demanding independent statehood, recognition and integration into the inter-state system have been an integral part of the systemic chaos which had marked each hegemonic transition period (Karataşlı 2013; Silver & Slater 1999). Using the opportunity structures created by economic, social and political crisis conditions of the hegemonic transition periods, state-seeking movements challenge their rulers in a much stronger way (Karataşlı 2013). Historically, climbing the ladders of global-economic preeminence, rising hegemonic powers have
led a particular section of these movements to independence by supporting them either directly or indirectly. This helped these great powers increase their consent-making capacities, gain the leadership of a new system of states and constitute themselves as hegemonic powers.

The Rise of the United Provinces to World Hegemony

For instance, the rise of the United Provinces to global political-economic preeminence—which occurred between the mid-16th and the mid-17th centuries (Arrighi 1994)—coincided with the emergence of various state-seeking movements within Europe and the partial dissolution of the Spanish-Habsburg Empire (Elliott 1970; Elliott 1997; Elliott 2002; Kamen 2005; Karataşlı 2013). The seventeen provinces of the Low Countries—which later became the Dutch Republic—were the pioneers of these state-seeking movements when they started a revolt against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire which is currently known as the Dutch War of Independence. The eighty-year long struggle of the Dutch against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire and the establishment of the United Provinces as a de facto independent state in the course of this struggle became an admired model for various regions of the Spanish-Habsburg Empire (Silver & Slater 1999; Elliott 1970). By 1640 different forms of social revolts aiming at establishing independent political units took place in Catalonia, newly incorporated Portugal, Andalusia, Sicily and Naples, and Eastern Europe (Elliott 1970; Boswell & Chase-Dunn 2000; Tilly 1994). Within the social and political turmoil of the late 16th and early 17th centuries, many Protestant revolts also turned into state-seeking movements (Karataşlı 2013).

In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the Dutch provinces contributed to the existing systemic instabilities by actively leading the revolts against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire, riding the tiger of Calvinism, and financing the Protestant popular revolts all over Europe (Parker & Smith 1978: 18; Parker 1978: 65; Lachmann 2000: 161-162; Arrighi 1994: 47). The Dutch statesmen quickly realized that in order to gain their independence and to advance their political-economic power they needed to polarize international politics by leading a large coalition of dynastic states against the Spanish-Habsburg empire and towards the liquidation of the medieval system of rule (Parker 1978; Arrighi 1994: 43). Furthermore, in the course of their struggle for independence, the Dutch made their best effort to sap Iberian power in Asia. For example, after the establishment of the V.O.C. (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) in 1602, the Dutch made agreements with Spanish/Portuguese occupation forces (i.e. King of Kandy, Coromandel coast of India, Indonesia, etc.) in order to expel the Iberian forces from Asia (Parker 1978: 71). The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which marked the end of both the Eighty Years' War and the Thirty Years' War, not only created the inter-state system of the modern world but also forced the defeated great powers to recognize new states—such as the United Provinces and Switzerland—as independent units of this system.
This strategy helped the United Provinces in a number of ways. For one thing, it contributed to the partial dissolution of the Spanish-Habsburg Empire and weakened the Holy Roman Empire, which were among the primary rival great powers for the United Provinces. While weakening its rivals, the same process had integrative effects on the Seventeen Provinces. Previously the “Seventeen Provinces” were nothing more than a loosely coordinated, heterogeneous collection of autonomous city-states. Thanks to its long struggle against the Habsburgs and the extremely high level of capital it started to accumulate, “the United Provinces” became a hybrid kind of organization. It incorporated characteristics of both a collection of city-states (which it was much more than) and that of a centralized nation state (which it was still less than) (Arrighi 1994: 36-47). Moreover, in the course of its struggle against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire, the United Provinces advanced its leadership capacities over a large number of states—especially the Protestant ones—in Europe. Bringing together new sovereign states of Europe under the Westphalian system and dissolving medieval system of rule in Europe helped the United Provinces to become the hegemonic power in the 17th century.

The Rise of the United Kingdom to World Hegemony
The transition from Dutch to British hegemony, which took place between the late 18th and early 19th centuries, coincided with the development of another wave of state-seeking movements in the modern world-system. This time, state-seeking movements were concentrated especially in the settler colonies of the Americas (Karataşlı 2013:228-241). Thirteen colonies in North America revolted against the British Empire and gained their independence in 1776. The American War of Independence was a major event signaling the upcoming crises in the geopolitical and macroeconomic sphere (Silver and Slater 1999:159-160). From 1780 onwards, creole settlers and native Indians in Central and South America also started to revolt against their Spanish and Portuguese imperial rulers. With the slave revolt of 1791 led by Toussaint L'Ouverture, the black population in Saint-Domingue started a struggle against the French Empire, and in 1804 they successfully established a state of their own. Furthermore, during this hegemonic consolidation period, utilizing the opportunities created by the Napoleonic wars, all settler colonies in the Americas accelerated their fight against the Spanish Empire, gained their independence and established contemporary states such as Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. As a whole, the period from the 1770s to the 1820s marked the first major wave of decolonization in modern world history (see Figure 1, below). In that era, the rise of nationalist movements was not confined to settler colonies. In the late 18th and early 19th century, the Serbian, Greek and Romanian populations of the Ottoman Empire and the Irish in the British Empire also started their wars of national liberation.
Figure 1. Major Waves of Decolonization


Compared to the United Provinces, which had to gain its independence and move toward further integration during the crisis of the late 16th and early 17th century, the British Empire was more concerned with protecting its territorial/imperial integrity against forces of nationalism in the midst of the crisis of the late 18th century. It was more hesitant than its counterpart to support national liberation movements that could trigger instability in the world, a tactic that could have backfired, and harmed the Empire. In its rise to world hegemony, the British Empire had already lost an important part of its American colonies and was struggling to suppress the revolt by the United Irishmen. Hence, in Europe, the British statesmen quickly realized the benefits of a conservative coalition with the Holy Alliance in suppressing the nationalist, patriotic revolts that started to accelerate after the French Revolution.

Still, in its rise to global-economic preeminence, this new hegemonic power played a significant role in leading a section of nationalist movements to independence. Many British naval and military officers, sailors and soldiers took part in the independence movements of the settler
colonies in Latin America. The Austrian and Russian monarchies were extremely concerned about these state-seeking movements in the Americas and wanted to restore monarchical order in Spain by quelling these rebellions. But their plans for “intervention and restoration in Spanish America [were] effectively barred by Great Britain—and the United States” (Hayes 1959:631). As Arrighi put it “what later became the Monroe doctrine—the idea that Europe should not intervene in American affairs—was initially a British policy” (Arrighi 2007: 242). The British government was the first to recognize these new nations as independent political units, in spite of the opposition they received from Spain, Russia and Austria. In doing so, they not only weakened these powers (especially the Spanish) but also established strong commercial relationships with the new American nations, which were hitherto under the monopoly of Castile. All these nations, in exchange, welcomed British leadership and acted in accordance with British commercial interests. Incorporation of these new nations into its sphere of influence was an important step for the establishment of British hegemony.

Likewise, despite the reactionary and conservative coalition it established with the Holy Alliance in Europe to protect the integrity of its empire and to smash existing nationalist movements (Polanyi [1944] 2001: 7), the British Empire also strategically supported liberal national independence movements such as the Greek uprising of 1821 and Belgian Revolution of 1830 during its hegemony. This policy helped British statesmen in three respects. First this strategy contributed to “the slow eating away of the Holy Alliance by embarrassing it where its principles were most shaky” (Wallerstein 2011: 55). Furthermore, this policy helped British statesmen to advance their indirect rule over these new nations of Europe. After all, the majority of monarchs of these new nations of the nineteenth century were chosen, suggested, or directly appointed by the British government itself (Anderson 2012). Finally, by exporting its own political regime—constitutional monarchy—to these newly independent nations of Europe, the British statesmen also countered the “disruptive” effects of the revolutionary threat posed by the French Revolution.

2 British policy regarding the independence of colonies was extremely pragmatic. The British government was by no means a defender of colonial independence. On the contrary, during the Napoleonic Wars, the British did not set Cape Colony or Ceylon free. They took these colonies from the Dutch Empire and made them their own possessions (Rapport 2005:100). When the Boers—former Dutch settlers—established the Republic of Natalia in 1839 in South Africa, as another example, the British did not hesitate to annex them either. Thus if the British supported independence movements of the South American colonies, it was because they were liquidating massive colonial possessions of the Iberian powers. It is not surprising that “by the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, it appeared as if European overseas imperialism was waning rather than waxing, with only the British overseas empire actually experiencing any growth” (Rapport 2005:101).

3 In 1815, for instance, British statesmen installed William I to the newly established Dutch throne. After the Greek War of independence in 1833, the Convention of London chose a Bavarian prince -Prince Otto—as a monarch. When Belgium revolted against the Kingdom of Holland and gained its independence in 1830, Leopold I was chosen as the monarch. This new king of Belgium, who was initially married to the heiress of the British throne and later married to Louis Phillip's daughter in law, was a key figure in further intensifying the British-Belgium relationship in the 1830s.
Hence this was a strategy of “co-optation.” These examples may suffice to show some of the relationships surrounding the “liberation” of nations and the strengthening of British hegemonic power in the early 19th century.

The Rise of the United States to World Hegemony

A similar process took place during the rise of the United States to world hegemony as well. The period from 1870 to 1918/45—the transition period from British to US hegemony—marked the height of state-seeking nationalist movements in world history (Karataşlı 2013:293-304; Hobsbawm 1992: 101-130). In this hegemonic transition period, forces of nationalism proved to be an extremely strong force that neither communists nor liberals were able to ignore. Suddenly, in the first half of the 20th century, the United States became the champion of national liberation and decolonization (Karataşlı 2013:312-342). In its rise to world hegemony, the United States became actively involved in the restructuring of the world political-economic space.

Pragmatic involvement with the liberation of subject nations helped the United States advance its leadership capacities in a number of different ways. First of all, it was a strategy to contain the danger of communism. Within the systemic chaos of the early 20th century, the Bolsheviks incorporated the idea of national-liberation into their revolutionary strategy, which became one of the most important factors in the success of the communist revolution in Russia. The Bolsheviks saw the liberation of all subject nations and oppressed colonial peoples as an important asset for world revolution as well (Hobsbawm 1992: 148). The right of nations to self-determination was a main theme of the East People's Congress in Baku (1920) and this soon became a principle of “the (Third) International” (Blunden 1977 [2013]).

Containment of the Bolshevik threat was an integral part of the United States' attempt to support national liberation movements in Europe. Wilson's principle of self-determination was a card that the Allies played against the Bolsheviks (Hobsbawm 1992:131). Wilson promised to give oppressed nationalities—currently living under the Ottoman, Austria-Hungarian and Russian empires—Independence and security. And it was this principle that dominated the peace negotiations after World War I. After these treaties, the number of states in Europe rose to twenty-seven, and the number of states in the world rose to sixty-five. Between 1914 and 1945, thirty-three new states joined the modern inter-state system. Furthermore, in the course of the Second World War, “the United States was able to pose itself as the natural ally of the emergent nationalism in the colonial empires, and as the guarantor of the promises of self-determination and national independence through which the colonial peoples were mobilized against the Axis powers” (Arrighi 1978:94).

The United States' support for national liberation movements after the First World War helped liquidate remaining formal territorial empires such as Ottoman Empire and Austrian-Hungarian
Empire. Likewise, its support for decolonization movements after 1945 helped liquidate colonial possessions of the British Empire and French Empire. In addition to liquidating territorial/colonial possessions of formal and colonial empires, through this strategy, like previous hegemonic powers before them, the United States was able to present its political system as a model for the new world. “Immediately after the war, the model of the ‘Revolution of 1776’ was not merely American propaganda for use in the colonial world, but also a spontaneous source of inspiration for the colonial peoples themselves. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, for instance, modeled its 1946 Declaration of Independence on the American document of 1776. In reality, U.S. support, or at least neutrality, in the struggles of the national liberation movements did accelerate the tendency toward decolonization in certain areas of particular economic and strategic importance (the Middle-East, India, Indonesia)” (Arrighi 1978: 94).

The United States’ decolonization policy was also related to containing the forces of communism. During the U.S. world hegemony, both the USSR and the United States competed with each other in order to penetrate their sphere of influence into the colonial world and apply their notion of self-determination to the colonial nations. Gradually, “national liberation” turned into a synonym for anti-colonialism. From 1945 onwards, the world saw the second wave of decolonization in modern world history (see Figure 1). Because the United States was not a major colonial power itself, it did not have much to lose in defending the decolonization of former imperial powers. On the contrary, this was an integral part of U.S. hegemonic consolidation. In addition, through admitting the newly independent nations into the freshly established “United Nations,” and promising them economic growth and development, the United States not only increased its intellectual and moral leadership within the non-Western world, but also created a favorable environment for capitalist development. The period from 1945 to 1970 became a period of material expansion, whose two main pillars were decolonization and the development project (Silver & Slater 1999: 209; McMichael 2012; Harvey 2003:58).

**Trajectory of State-Seeking Nationalist Movements In China During The Long Twentieth Century**

Unlike the rise of the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States, however, China’s ascendancy does not coincide with attempts to restructure the existing configuration of the inter-state system. On the contrary, as of now China has been preoccupied with providing stability and preserving the global status quo. Of course, this trend is not yet complete and, thus, there is no guarantee that China’s policies will not change in the near future.⁴ Although large

⁴ A number of U.S. policy makers, including Robert Kaplan (2005), believe that rise of China cannot be and will not be a peaceful one. Likewise, in the Chinese Communist Party too “there are people who feel that speaking of a peaceful
generalizations and deductions out of a yet-unfolding process would not be wise, there are also reasons to believe that a combination of structural macro-political dynamics have been pushing China to preserve the status quo in the world. These dynamics are complex and multifaceted. Within the limits of this paper and following the framework we introduce below, we will mainly focus on one of these aspects: increasing vulnerability of Chinese territorial unity due to the rise of state-seeking nationalist movements—within China and around the world—during the reform era.

The nature of this vulnerability cannot be properly conceived without understanding the nature of the “unfinished businesses” of national problems in China (Kumral 2013). As discussed above, transition from British to U.S. hegemony witnessed an upsurge of state-seeking nationalist movements, which liquidated almost all large continental empires. The Qing Dynasty was not immune to this global upheaval. It witnessed two revolutions and a civil war. In this process, various state-seeking movements managed to secede from China and establish new political units. After the Revolution of 1911 and the fall of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, the Dalai Lama declared Tibet (Schai 2011:189-191) and Bogd Khan declared Mongolia independent from China.\(^5\) Xinjiang was also dismembered in 1911 (Gladney 2003:4). Furthermore, in the tumultuous period from 1911 to 1949, two independent East Turkestan Republics were established in the region: An Islamic Republic entered in the city of Kashgar in 1933 and a Soviet-backed Turkic People's Republic in 1944. After the invasion of Manchuria, the Japanese declared inner Manchuria an independent state and established “Manchukuo” as a puppet state.

Yet while the Imperial system was shattered in this period (Skocpol 1979:80), the territorial unity of China was re-established to a great extent by the 1950s. The Kuomintang (KMT) started the process of re-expansion; later, control over minority regions which had enjoyed full or partial independence (Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet) was re-gained by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1947, 1949 and in 1950, respectively. The trend of territorial contraction was reversed and territorial re-unification was by and large completed with the 1949 revolution (see Figure 2). In short, China entered the period of U.S. hegemony as a unitary (yet multinational) republic.\(^6\)

The contradictions of governing a multi-national republic while introducing socialist transformation reforms continuously unfolded throughout the CCP’s rule. The contradictions manifested themselves as sporadic eruptions of nationalist unrest in minority regions and successive policy changes by the CCP to contain these forces of separatist nationalism (Kumral rise gives the message to the United States and Taiwan that they can impudently push China around” (Arrighi 2007:292).

\(^5\) Tibet became a de facto independent state from 1913 to 1951 but its sovereignty was never internationally recognized (Nathan & Scobell 2012:199).

\(^6\) This was unlike the USSR (United Soviet Socialist Republics), which was a federal republic that (at least theoretically and ideologically) depended upon the “voluntary” union of “independent soviet republics.”
2013). Right after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the principle of the right of nations to self-determination—which had been defended by the CCP against the KMT in its revolutionary struggle in the course of the 1940s—was abandoned in favor of a system of Regional Autonomy of Minority Nationality Regions in a Unified China (Connor 1984; also see Xingwu 1988:136-7; Bockman 1992:186-7).

**Figure 2.** Territorial Expansion, Contraction and Re-expansion of China, 1750-1950, thousand km²

![Territorial Expansion, Contraction and Re-expansion of China](image)


In this period the CCP offered a wide range of socio-economic, political and administrative privileges to the autonomous regions. It was careful not to impose a one-size-fits-all system which ignored regional differences and “sensitivities” in the implementation of the socialist transformation (Moseley and Chang 1966). However, partially because of the disputes regarding the exact boundaries of the autonomous areas⁷ and partially because of the CCP's desire to start implementing socialist reforms in these areas, in the course of the 1950s, revolts by resident minority groups erupted sporadically.

⁷ For Tibetans, as an example, Tibetan boundaries are not confined to Tibet Autonomous Area (TAR) but it encompasses the entire Tibetan-populated area Cholka-Sum, which includes Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces as well (Nathan and Scobell 2012:198-199; Lafitte 2013).
The radical transformations of the Great Leap Forward era brought existing grievances among the minorities to a very high point, and a series of major rebellions occurred in Xinjiang and Tibet starting from 1958. The strongest and the most well-known among them was the Tibetan uprising in Lhasa on March 1959, when Tibetans not only rebelled but also went on to establish a provisional government⁹ (see Figure 3).

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⁸ Note: ‘Years with Peripheral Nationalist Warfare in China’ is from Wimmer and Min (2006). Years in which there was a nationalist secessionist warfare in China is shown with light grey shades. ‘Frequency of Major Nationalist Movements’ is from State-Seeking Nationalist Movements (SSNM) database by Karataşlı (2013). Karataşlı (2013) uses the Guardian and the New York Times newspaper archives to estimate the peaks and troughs nationalist mobilization. Hence, while interpreting the frequency of major nationalist movements indicator, the attention must be paid to relative peaks and troughs rather than their absolute levels. Three year moving average is used in the frequency of major nationalist movements. The information provided for the waves are examples of important events that take place during these periods. Taiwan is not included in the figure.

⁹ In 1959, more than 30,000 Tibetans—including the members of the Tibetan army, Lhasa’s monks, and members of the general public—took the streets upon a rumor that the Dalai Lama would be kidnapped during a secret meeting that he would hold with the Chinese authorities (Norbu 1979). The uprising was suppressed after 13 days and the
This rising tide of nationalist unrest was countered with the launch of the Cultural Revolution (Bockman 1992:190). In Tibet, the Lama monasteries—which also served as the organizational centers for the national movements—were destroyed and religious activities were proscribed (Donnet 1994; Nathan & Scobell 2012:200). Likewise, in Xinjiang, thousands of mosques, shrines and Koranic schools were closed, public prayer was banned, and religious and cultural leaders were removed from their positions (Minahan 2002:1962).

**Nationalist Unrest in China During the Reform Era**

Launch of the Cultural Revolution heralded a period of decline in nationalist movements in China’s minority regions but it did not end nationalist aspirations in these contentious regions for good. On the contrary, while impeding nationalist-secessionist movements, the Cultural Revolution also had a long-term impact of creating memories of repression, which has been important in the organization of the post-1980 wave of nationalist movements in China.

For this reason, when the Chinese government abandoned the policies of the Cultural Revolution and launched reforms in 1978, two opposite developments took place. On the one hand, China started to move rapidly as a global-economic power, and on the other hand, nationalist movements in minority regions started to strike back. Tibetan uprisings between 1987 and 1989 and re-escalation of the Uyghur secessionist movements after the collapse of the USSR in 1989 (Bovingdon 2004) marked the first revival of secessionist movements in China. In the course of the 1990s, these protests continued in both Tibet and the Xinjiang region, using different strategies for gaining independence. These events, however, were merely predecessors of an upcoming riot that coincided with the 2008 Olympics Games (Barnett 2009). In March 2008, annual pro-Tibet demonstrations turned into a series of riots where thousands of Chinese (Han) shops and offices were burned, and hundreds of vehicles were set on fire. The scale of the March 2008 anti-Chinese demonstrations and riots was the highest since the 1989 protests (Smith 2010:2). Since then, Tibetan protests have started to take the form of self-immolations. From March of 2009, more than hundred and fifty Tibetans have set themselves on fire to protest Chinese rule. The self-immolations continue in Tibet today. Between 2008 and 2009, Uyghur's state-seeking activities took the form of ethnic riots and state-seeking nationalist unrest is still highly active in the region.

Rising state-seeking nationalist movements in China today are not simply confined to the Tibetan and Xinjiang regions either. Arguably, Beijing's greatest problem today is Taiwan. In contrast to other national problems, “Taiwan is more than just a problem of territorial integrity: it is the site of a rival Chinese government” (Nathan & Scobell 2012:212). While existing tensions...

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Dalai Lama had to flee to India. After the suppression of the revolt, local government was dissolved and martial law was declared in Tibet.
between China and Taiwan have temporarily been contained under the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) administration of President Ma Ying-jeou since 2008, these problems have not been permanently solved (Cabestan 2011:484). Given the January 2016 victory of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—which has a strong stand for *de jure* Taiwanese Independence from Mainland China—we might see a return to hostilities of the former era. Furthermore, China is also extremely unhappy about the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, including arms sales to Taiwan by the United States.  

In addition, there is “Inner Mongolia,” which is a relatively less problematic region compared to Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. State-seeking separatist movements in Inner Mongolia declined dramatically since the early 20th century. This is mostly related to the massive resettlement policy China pursued over the last 200 years. Today the ratio of the Han population to ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia is around 6:1 (Kristof 1992). However, this does not ensure that the Inner Mongolian problem has been resolved for good. There are still political and military organizations in the region that struggle for independence, and Chinese authorities are doing their best to stop these organizations from mobilizing the society. Similar to the mobilizations in the Xinjiang region, the rise of nationalist movements in the USSR in the early 1990s also triggered the Inner Mongolian pro-independence organizations, upon which Chinese authorities immediately cracked down (WuDunn 1991; Husmann 1994:149-150). Various sorts of protests and ethnic problems continue in the region.

Finally, the recently incorporated Hong Kong is emerging as another source of unrest for China. Initially the PRC did not think that the return of Hong Kong to China would be a source of tension. Beijing “expected the Hong Kong people to be as pragmatic and apolitical as they had always been” (Nathan & Scobell 2012:210). But the 1989 Tiananmen protests sparked the development of a bourgeois-democratic movement in Hong Kong, which was supported, for the first time, by the British government. Hence, Beijing started to see the transfer of Hong Kong to China as a Trojan horse nicely packaged by the British government. Although the Chinese “one country, two system” approach tied Hong Kong to the mainland with relatively few problems initially, grievances against the Beijing government since 1997 have been rapidly increasing. After 2014-2015 Hong Kong electoral reform, a new independence movement has emerged in Hong

10 Not without reason, China is worried about closer U.S.-Taiwan relationships that could emerge under Donald Trump’s administration. During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised that he was going to take a tougher stand against China, and signaled that he was going to support Taiwan to gain leverage against China. In December 2016, Trump’s surprising phone call with Taiwan’s president Tsai became a matter of controversy. While Beijing managed to convince Trump to back down on his promise to review Taiwan’s status, tensions have not been solved for good. After all, Trump’s support for arms sales to Taiwan is not new. As early as 2011, Trump criticized the Obama administration in his tweet: “Why is @BarackObama delaying the sale of F-16 aircraft to Taiwan? Wrong message to send to China. #TimeToGetTough.”
Kong. Especially the failure of the 79 days long occupation protest—known as the “Umbrella Revolution of 2014”—strengthened the pro-independence and self-determination movement among the youth.

**Understanding China’s Strategy of Containing Nationalism**

“Even as China's global influence increases,” Nathan and Scobell observe, “it is bedeviled to an unusual degree for a major power by what political scientists call 'problems of stateness’” (2012: 195). These problems are further aggravated by the geo-political-economic significance of and variation within these nationalist movements. Claimed territories by Tibet and Xinjiang alone, account for almost one-third of the PRC's total area. With a GDP per capita level of $4,200, Tibet is among the poorest provinces in China. Xinjiang's GDP per capita level ($6,000) is slightly below mainland China's average per capita income ($6,700). Although these regions are not among the better off regions, they contain important mines and energy sources that China increasingly needs (Dreyer 2003:412; Becquelin 2004:365). For China, losing Tibet and Xinjiang means losing access to major gold, copper, coal and oil reserves as well as gas reserves and major potential for hydroelectric energy (Lafitte 2013; Nathan & Scobell 2012:199). In contrast to Tibet and Xinjiang, Taiwan and Hong Kong function as the cash-boxes of the 21st century. With GDP per capita levels of $21,000 and $38,000 respectively, these two major trading partners have huge economic and strategic importance for China.

Vulnerability of China to nationalist unrest is further complicated by the fact that these contentious regions are also influenced by an unparalleled number of foreign actors. With twenty neighbors, no country in the world—except for Russia—has as many contiguous neighbors as China. Furthermore, some of China's neighbors—such as India, Pakistan, Russia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Myanmar/Burma—have a very high number of militant and organized state-seeking nationalist movements (Karataşlı et al 2012). Put differently, the region surrounding China is extremely vulnerable to state-seeking nationalist upheavals. These upheavals are likely to affect movements within China as well. With the dissolution of the USSR in 1989/91, a number of Turkic republics had already emerged in Central Asia, which deeply affected the Xinjiang movements. Although current nationalist-secessionist movements in China and a number of territorial disputes with neighboring countries—first and foremost with India—are among the “unfinished businesses” of the 1911-1949 period and the “Cultural Revolution,” the unfolding of these events in the recent decades is not totally independent from global developments.

Because of these complexities, the Chinese government’s strategy to contain these rising nationalist forces in the post-Mao reform period radically differs from its earlier policies. This is

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11 All values are Nominal US dollars and they belong to the year 2013.
a two-dimensional strategy, which is closely related to China’s rising economic strength in the last decades. The first dimension is related to the heavy reliance on development and welfare policies to solve these nationalist problems. Especially in its peripheral regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang, China has been trying to gain the consent of rebellious ethnic minorities through its “Go West policy.” This includes the introduction of development projects, construction of roads, highways, airports and the promotion of policies friendly to businesses and foreign investors, along with the provision of various services, gifts, and privileges (Goldstein 2004; Latiffe 2013:40; Wang 2002:152; Mingxu 1998: 372; Yeh 2013; Smith 2008; Working 2001; Nathan and Skobell 2012; Becquelin 2004:360; BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2007; Kumral and Karataşlı 2013). The second dimension is related to the establishment of an inter-state coalition—which is also a South-South relation in the political sphere—and the skillful use of international diplomacy against forces of secessionist nationalism. In 2001, China pioneered the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—to foster cooperation and combat terrorism (including secessionism) in the region (Rosenthal 2002:12; Nathan and Skobell 2012:164-168; Stern 2008:10). In addition, Beijing started to apply pressure to countries that are sympathetic to the Tibetan movement (like the United States and India) or to the Uyghur movement (like Turkey) in bilateral trade agreements. And since the 2008 global economic crisis, China has been gaining leverage in these areas due to its key position in the global political economy and the concessions and promises it makes to other semi-peripheral and peripheral states in pursuit of containing secessionist movements in their own territories (Calmes 2011:8; Nathan and Skobell 2012:204-207; Sharma 2009:169; Van Schaik 2011:238-265; Shichor 2006; Shichor 2009; Gargan 1991).

**Preserving the Global Status Quo?**

Of course, China is not the first country to use international diplomacy and bilateral trade relations to promote stability at home. All states are pragmatic actors that engage in various sorts of coalitions and agreements to prevent international support of nationalist secessionist movements, any kind of revolutionary activities, anti-governmental movements or terrorism directed at themselves. Yet in most cases, the same pragmatic interests and consequences of bilateral negotiations also push states not only to condemn these sorts of movements but also to support some of them in different places. As we discussed in the first section of the article, this was true in the case of rising hegemonic powers.

This is why the case of the PRC is interesting. China’s efforts to build a coalition of anti-secessionist movements have consequences that transcend its territorial boundaries. This is due to the complex set of relationships between the political-economic transformation in China, the rise of secessionist nationalist movements in Chinese territories, and the global macro-political context.
These structural conditions seem to push China to preserve the global status quo in a very consistent manner.

When Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence in February 2008, for instance, more than 90 countries including the United States and most members of the European Union went ahead and recognized Kosovo, while China—together with Serbia, Russia, Georgia and Spain—did not (Freund 2012; Richter & Baum 2008). China not only denounced the independence of Kosovo but also made one of the strongest criticisms, stating in the international arena that sovereign states have the right to protect their integrity and prevent unilateral secessions. China's position against Kosovo cannot be understood merely in the light of pragmatic Chinese-Russian relationships.

During the Olympic games in Beijing in 2008, for instance, Georgia attacked Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which seceded from Georgia in the early 1990s, creating an international crisis. And this time Russia recognized the independence of these two countries and brought the issue to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia demanded that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization support the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, China, together with other members, declined to back Russia on this issue.

Similarly, issues surrounding South Sudan were another interesting test for Chinese international policy regarding secessionist movements. Originally, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA; South Sudan SPLA as of 2011) was supported by the USSR and other communist countries, such as Cuba. But after 1989, when an Islamic fundamentalist government—represented by Omar Hassan Al Bashir—came to power with a coup d'etat (Kock 2011:506) and the USSR and the communist bloc collapsed, this support has changed in profound ways. In the same time period, the South Sudanese rebels managed to gain most of the territories with oil supplies. The U.S. oil giant, Chevron, first discovered oil in Sudan in 1979. Since then, possession of and/or control over oil reserves have been a major impetus of war in both the Southern capital, Juba, and Khartoum (Kock 2011:506). From 1989 onwards, the U.S. government has placed Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Sudanese government sided with Iraq during the Gulf War and became a close ally of Libya (Njoku 2010:354). In 1998, the U.S. government bombed Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in North Khartoum, assuming that the place was used for chemical weapons and connected to Al Qaeda.

In the midst of all these tensions, another element was becoming critical. Sudan was becoming a key location for Chinese economic growth. China obtained 10% of its oil from Sudan and owned multi-billion dollar investments, which were concentrated mainly in the oil sector. As in the case of Iran, Chinese energy needs and deals were creating further tensions with the United States (Harvey 2003:139). As the South Sudanese secession movement was becoming more powerful, China became increasingly nervous about the separation of Sudan. Since 2001, the secession of South Sudan was on the global agenda (Kock 2011:506). Parallel to these
developments, the atrocities in Sudan were becoming a global human rights problem with "Save Darfur" campaigns and strong Western coalition support of the South Sudanese right to self-determination. The UN Security Council planned to organize a military intervention to Sudan but China thwarted these plans, using its veto power against these operations (Njoku, 2010:354). From the beginning to the end, China attempted to preserve the unity of Sudan. In 2011, during the height of the conflicts, China first tried to play the role of the mediator. After the 2011 referendum when South Sudan seceded from Sudan, China tried to do its best to establish trade relationships with South Sudan as well.

As also confirmed by the most recent Crimean crisis, contemporary China is not willing to support any secessionist or irredentist activity that would create further instabilities. It is unclear whether China will continue to pursue this policy. As of now, however, the CCP appears to see little merit in supporting nationalist movements and encouraging a re-configuration of the interstate system. Its rising economic power already provides China an important degree of bargaining power vis-a-vis other great powers.

This tendency is the diametrical opposite of the tendency of the United States since the 1990s. Paradoxically, in the most recent hegemonic crisis period, it is not the rising economic power but the declining hegemon that has been trying hard to alter the political geography of the inter-state system in order to regain its hegemonic position. Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has been using all opportunities to demonstrate that it is still the greatest military power in the world (Harvey 2003; Arrighi 2007). That is probably why, starting with the First Gulf War, the U.S. government led a number of "humanitarian missions" and interventions around the world (Arrighi 2007:178-180). From then until 9/11, U.S. forces enthusiastically took part in the First Gulf War of 1990-91, the "Humanitarian Crisis" in Somalia 1992, the "Humanitarian Operation" in Bosnia (1992-95), the Kosovo War (1998-99) and many others. After 9/11, the U.S.-led “War on Terror” led to the war in Afghanistan (2001-present) and the invasion of Iraq (2003-Present). As a part of the “War on Terror,” since 2000 the U.S. government has conducted a series of military operations in Pakistan, Yemen, Kashmir, Northern Mali, and in the Horn of Africa. Although the United States was not at the forefront, we can also add the Libya intervention of 2011 to this long list. For our purposes it is important to underline that without exception in all of these territories, we can find strong nationalist or autonomist movements. Some of these movements managed to gain their independence (e.g. Kosovo), de facto autonomy, or control over federal governments (e.g. Kurds in Northern Iraq) after the U.S.-led military operations, and they established closer relationships with the U.S. government afterwards.
Not surprisingly, in most of these cases, the United States also found its interests in direct conflict with those of China.\(^\text{12}\) Hence, China's support for the global status quo can also be seen as direct resistance against U.S. interests as well. As Arrighi (2007) pointed out, the imperialist ambitions of the United States—such as the “War on Terror”—have already provided a space for China not only to advance its economic power but also to increase its consent-production capacities. It can be argued that the ability to counterbalance U.S. imperial ambitions and to provide international macro-political stability would itself be evidence of China’s increasing intellectual and moral leadership (hence “hegemonic”) capacities. In his “Rising Star: China’s New Security Concept,” for instance, Bates Gill (2007) argued that through a combination of pragmatic security policies, growing economic clout, and increasingly deft diplomacy, China has established productive and increasingly solid relationships throughout Asia and around the globe, to include new partnerships in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Europe, Africa and South America. While these developments predate September 11, 2001, they have unfolded at a time of strategic preoccupation on the part of the United States, both in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the global counter-terrorism campaign. This last, in turn, has opened strategic space for China to expand its influence at both regional and global levels (Gill 2007:1).

This can be seen as an example for how China advances its intellectual and moral leadership capacities through protection of the global status quo.

**Conclusion**

It was Mao who once said “the world is in chaos, the situation is excellent.” Today, the world seems to be in a period of chaos once again, but the contemporary CCP's evaluation of the situation is quite the opposite. This is more evident when we consider the escalation of nationalist movements in recent decades. Similar to previous hegemonic transition periods, during the decline of the U.S. hegemony, the world experienced rapid intensification of state-seeking nationalist movements (Karataşlı 2013). However, China considers these movements neither as a potential for revolution nor as a tool to gain global supremacy.

\(^{12}\) A similar tendency—to alter the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system in order to gain power vis-a-vis its rivals—is also clear in the case of contemporary Russia, which has been supporting independence movements in many post-Soviet states, including Georgia (e.g. South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and Ukraine (e.g. Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk) in order to incorporate them or to expand Russia’s influence over these regions. Indeed, annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 became the first instance of annexation by a European power since the end of World War II.
In the literature, one can find a wide spectrum of explanations for China's desire to protect the status quo ranging from existence of ancient philosophical traditions, to the dissolution of communist ideology; from a conscious strategy of a “peaceful ascent” (heping jueqi), to the memories of its historic humiliation during the Opium Wars. In this paper, however, we offered an alternative perspective by examining the complex set of relationships surrounding the revival of nationalist movements in China and the PRC’s attempts to contain them nationally and internationally. We argued that if China is slowly emerging as a protector of the integrity of the existing sovereign states of the current inter-state system, this is because China's own domestic problems and vulnerabilities—combined with its global trade networks and economic growth strategy—have been pushing it to play this role globally. After all, global political-economic stability is a key both for sustaining China’s economic growth and its territorial stability.  

In this concluding section, we discuss the possible implications of this trajectory for hegemony-building processes. As we argued in the first section, in their rise to world hegemony all previous hegemonic powers—the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States—aimed to reconfigure the world by leading a particular section of these movements to independence by supporting them directly and indirectly for very pragmatic purposes. These strategies helped them increase their leadership capacities on the one hand and present themselves as champions of a “more progressive” inter-state system reconfiguration on the other hand. If China is rising as a great power that attempts to preserve the status quo in a highly consistent manner, what does this trend mean in terms of the prospects and limits of China’s ascendancy? First, we must note that none of the previous hegemonic powers (or rival great powers for that matter) were faced with increasing centrifugal forces within their nation during their respective ascendancies on the scale China is facing today. For the United Provinces and the United States, the tendency was the opposite. In the course of their rise to world hegemony, they became more united than before. In the course of the Eight Years' War, the United Provinces became a new unit, which was no longer a collection of seventeen city-states. Likewise, on the eve of U.S. material expansion and before its bid for world hegemony, the Northern states of “the United States” crushed secessionist movements in the South. The American Civil War not only smashed state-

13 We must note that these processes are also reinforced by other global-level political-economic developments that we cannot address here due to space limitations. Let us suffice to mention that Chinese corporations are still the beneficiary of the existing capitalist world economy hence they do not want any instabilities that would risk their profits. Considering that the current world hegemonic power does not have vast colonies to be liquidated, China does not have much to gain economically or politically by using the same liquidation strategy of the previous and current world hegemonic powers. Furthermore, the contemporary phase of “globalization” and “financialization” seems to have intensified socio-economic linkages and interlocked U.S. and Chinese corporations in the global commodity chain, making China very unwilling to disturb existing relationships.
seeking aspirations by brute force but also made “the United States” more united than before. As they say, “before the war, it was said ‘the United States are’” but after the war, ‘the United States is.””

The case of the United Kingdom was rather different. As we already discussed, the loss of the thirteen colonies in the last quarter of the 18th century and simultaneous escalation of nationalist movements within its mainland territories (i.e. the Irish movement) made the United Kingdom more vulnerable to nationalist movements than its counterparts and pushed it to establish a conservative coalition with the *Holy Alliance* to suppress nationalist and patriotic forces in Europe. However, the level of nationalist movements in the United Kingdom was not as high as contemporary China and the existence of vast overseas colonial possessions helped the U.K. contain the Irish problem to a large extent. Thus, when necessary, the United Kingdom was still able to selectively and pragmatically support a large number of national liberation movements on both sides of the Atlantic in its rise to world hegemony.

In contrast to all previous rising hegemonic powers, however, throughout its ascendancy China is facing strong centrifugal forces and secessionist movements on its mainland. In contrast to the United Provinces and the United States, China is not gradually becoming a more unified political entity during its ascendancy, and it feels the need to implement very elaborate containment mechanisms, policies and principles—such as the “One Country, Two Systems” principle—to maintain its territorial unity. In contrast to the British Empire, which had lost the Thirteen Colonies at an early period of systemic chaos, China has not lost any of its territories but even gained new ones such as Hong Kong and Macao. Also, considering that it is not a core state like the United Provinces, the United Kingdom, or the United States, but rather a peripheral state rapidly becoming a semiperipheral one, one can see how the structural conditions surrounding contemporary China are categorically different from previous and current world hegemonic powers. Therefore, containing secessionism is a more serious problem for China, than it was for the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States.

China’s territorial vulnerability is not independent from its rapid rise as well. As China climbs the ladder of the world power hierarchy, the United States’ policy-makers (and those of other great powers as well) are becoming more preoccupied than before with how to counter-balance Chinese power. In this discussion of *realpolitik*, nationalist problems in China such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, its territorial disputes with neighbors, and rival claims in South China are at the forefront. Although Mearsheimer’s (2001) or Kaplan’s (2005) foreign policy proposals have their differences,

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14 Interestingly, today, when Chinese authorities talk with US authorities on “sensitive matters” such as the Tibet or Taiwan problems, they often underline that they are taking the United States of the 1860s as their role model and they are doing nothing but following the teachings of the United States, especially those of Abraham Lincoln (Wong 2009; Wong 2012; Wachman 2010).
they all focus on the same question: how to use these territorial vulnerabilities to contain the rise of China.

In our analysis, we explained how these problems have been pushing China to increase its leadership capacities in the international sphere to contain secessionism at home. What does this mean for the possibility of China’s rise to world hegemony from a macro-political perspective? Of course, our analysis does not tell us whether or not China can rise to global political and economic preeminence in the following decades or sometime in the near future. However, we underline an interesting puzzle. If China continues its political-economic rise in the medium run but fails in coordinating the existing sovereign states for the preserving the global status quo, we argue, it would probably be more difficult to keep its political-territorial unity in the long run. Put differently, although Chinese policy makers make it clear that they do not seek hegemony, these rising territorial vulnerabilities have been pushing China to play the role of a hegemon. Preservation of territorial unity is the primary drive. Without its territorial unity, it will be very difficult to sustain its economic strength. Thus failing to reestablish and to preserve international stability will be a limit to its rise. To contain its internal problems, territorial unity and economic strength, China needs a more stable international order. This requires leading a large number of states in pursuit of providing international stability, and countering acts of imperialist aggression (primarily the ones increasingly implemented by the United States), which create macro-political instability in the world.

We are skeptical about the plausibility of this scenario where China becomes a new world hegemonic power, as we understand the term today. The current path China follows is akin to the path followed by Genoese merchant-traders of the mid-fifteenth century who established a “political exchange” with the Iberian kings. In this Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle of accumulation, which was a non-hegemonic period of capitalist world economy spanning from the mid-fifteenth century to the mid-sixteenth century, the Genoese “capitalists” were the economic motor of the capitalist world economy. The Iberian powers were the geopolitical and territorial motor (Arrighi 1994). Of course, China’s current path is also different from the Genoese merchant-traders in key respects. For one thing, the state apparatus and military power of contemporary China is extremely strong in direct contrast to the Genoese in the 15th century. Consequently, in contrast to the Genoese-Iberian “political exchange,” contemporary China does not leave world affairs completely at the hands of the United States, but it also pressures the United States not to alter and disturb the geopolitical configuration of the current inter-state system. Still, however, when territorial configuration of the inter-state system changes—as in the cases of South Sudan and Crimea—China tries its best to avoid conflicts with great powers.

From this perspective, then, even if China became a new hegemon, the inter-state system it will be leading would not be a new (i.e., a more “progressive” and more “democratic”) system. On
the contrary, instead of altering the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system, it will be leading the former inter-state system established by the previous hegemonic power. Still, even if this scenario occurred, from a macro-political perspective, China’s rise to world hegemony will not be a replica of the previous instances of hegemonic transitions but will be a radical and major rupture from the existing patterning we have observed so far. It will be a perfect example of a stalemate in which, if we may borrow from Antonio Gramsci, “the old is dying but the new cannot be born.”

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Intrastate Dynamics in the Context of Hegemonic Decline:
A Case Study of China’s Arms Transfer Regime

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Abstract
The decline of a hegemon can create openings for lesser powers to expand their influence in the world-system. Is this what China is currently attempting to do? This paper contributes to this on-going debate by examining China’s arms transfer activities from a historical perspective. Using data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arms transfer database and the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers database, I argue that the Chinese arms transfer regime has evolved through three phases. In Phase One, China used gifts of arms to compete with the Soviet Union and to expand influence among Third World countries. In Phase Two, China used arms exports mainly to assist national developmental projects. Only evidence in Phase Three supports the emergence of a global strategy that attempts to extend China’s economic, political, and possibly military outreach. This paper suggests that though China has not yet become a contender for world hegemony as Arrighi argues (2007), China has formulated a globally-focused agenda which, in the medium-term, could extend its influence in regions where U.S. domination is relatively weak.

Keywords: China, Hegemonic decline, intrastate dynamics, arms transfer, global agenda

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U.S. Decline and China

In the view of many scholars (Arrighi 1994[2010], 2007; Arrighi and Silver 1999; Gowan 2004; Go 2011; Lachmann 2014a; Roxborough and Levy 2014), the United States is in decline. Even if this decline is not terminal and the United States remains the world hegemon for the foreseeable future (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008), its relative decline opens space for lesser powers to expand their influence. In The Long Twentieth Century, Giovanni Arrighi argues that the decline of the Netherlands opened a struggle between Britain and France, from the outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch Wars to the end of the Napoleonic Wars; and, from the 1870s onwards, the decline of Britain triggered competition between the United States and Germany, which was finally resolved through the Second World War (1994). Along this line of thinking, the relative decline of the United States today also creates an opening for new powers to emerge and compete. This competition unfolds in forms and to extents impossible at the peak of U.S. hegemony.

Arrighi and other scholars contend that China is the country most likely to vie for hegemony under the circumstances of U.S. decline (Arrighi 1994[2010], 2007; Rapkin and Thompson 2003, 2013; Goldstein, A. 2003, 2005). The world’s second largest economy since 2010, China has also been the second largest military spender since 2003. Today, China is one of the largest contributors to the United Nations peacekeeping missions (U.N. Peacekeeping Resources), assessed by some as part of Beijing’s efforts to expand its global outreach (Campbell-Mohn 2015; Clover 2015). Nevertheless, even Arrighi admits that it remains debatable whether China will emerge as a challenger to the U.S.-led world order (2007). China could become an assertive great power, clash with U.S. interests, and possibly lead the world towards a catastrophic Sino-U.S. war (Kaplan 2005). However, it is also possible that the nature of China’s ascent is peaceful and could be accommodated in the current international system (Kissinger 2005). Alternatively, China’s growing influence could be resisted by other Asian powers, such as India or Japan. If two or more Asian countries contend for regional domination, the United States could play them off against each other so as to maintain U.S. supremacy (Pinkerton 2005).

Although not necessarily agreeing with Arrighi’s argument that China is the most likely hegemon-in-waiting, this paper does view China as a lesser power that could compete for influence in an opening created by U.S. decline. But is this currently happening? If so, how is China accomplishing this? Or, if it is a future possibility, what future plans could make this a reality? Many authors have attempted to answer these questions (e.g. Swaine, Daly, and Greenwood 2000; Goldstein, A. 2003, 2005; Hung 2008, 2014). This paper contributes to this ongoing debate by examining China’s arms transfer activities from a historical perspective. I argue that the way in which China uses arms transfer has evolved through three phases, reflecting changes in its grand strategy from a nationally-focused agenda to a globally-focused one. Specifically, in Phase One,
from the 1950s to the late 1970s, China used gifts of arms to compete with the Soviet Union and to expand influence among Third World countries. Limited within the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system (Wallerstein 2010), this strategy was mainly driven by the newly-born regime’s concern over its relative isolation. In Phase Two, between the late 1970s and the end of the 1990s, China retreated from this strategy and used arms exports mainly to assist national developmental projects. Only in Phase Three, beginning in the 2000s, does evidence support the emergence of a global strategy that attempts to extend China’s economic, political, and possibly military outreach. This strategy does not mean that, due to space opened by U.S. decline, China has fully cemented itself as a global power vying for hegemony. However, it does illustrate that China has organized itself internally to formulate a globally-focused agenda. In the medium-term, China could extend its influence in regions where U.S. domination is relatively weak. China’s political institutions’ growing capacities to formulate, carry out, and maintain a coherent global strategy, as shown in Phase Three, contrast with the decline in such capacities on the part of the United States, as some recent work has argued (Mizruchi and Hyman 2014; Lachmann 2014b).

**Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics of World Power**

Scholars have long sought to explain the changes in a state’s position in the global hierarchy, and World-Systems Theory has made important contributions to this dialogue. To understand the interstate division of labor and political centralization and decentralization, world-systems analysis focuses on the international dynamics that determine a state’s position in the world. It divides the world-system into two major components: a world economy based on a division of labor between the core and the periphery, and an interstate system through which the core politically dominates the periphery (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967; Arrighi 1994; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Wallerstein 2010). Although the core-periphery hierarchy cannot be reduced to economic relations, the logic of capitalist production and accumulation is usually viewed as the key driver for changes in a state’s structural position within the world system (Arrighi 1994; Wallerstein 2010; Babones 2015). Therefore, from a world-systems perspective, signs of economic contraction (e.g., falling rates of profit, rise of unemployment) are indicators of a deteriorating structural crisis within the world economy.

This crisis could upset the preexisting order of the interstate system, cause upward or downward mobility in the world system hierarchy, or even shake the primacy of the current hegemon and lead to the transition towards a new power center (Wallerstein 1984, 2002; Arrighi 1994). Meanwhile, processes in local societies matter only when integrated into the macro-level
world system.\(^2\) Actions by various social groups are seen mainly as responses to structural dynamics of the world economy and the interstate political system, rather than as being endogenously generated in the local context. Consequently, the world-systems perspective has difficulty accounting for policies and strategies that are generated by internal social and political relations, yet impact a state’s position in the world economy and the interstate system.

However, later research has demonstrated that domestic economic and political dynamics are not merely reflections of and responses to international dynamics. Instead, they also matter in shaping a national actor’s structural position and leading to its changes in the global system. Focusing on the decline of the United States, researchers have found that the endogenous dynamics of falling domestic productivity (Knudsen 2014), growing elite fragmentation (Mizruchi and Hyman 2014; Lachmann 2014b), and the heterogeneity of American political culture (Roxborough and Levy 2014) each have contributed to U.S. decline. These domestic social processes help remake the national balance of power among political institutions, capitalist factions, and labor, which reconstruct the U.S. state’s capacity to make and carry out coherent and effective strategies to defend its supremacy. One important contribution of this strand of research is that it underscores that even a world hegemon should not be assumed to be a monolithic national actor. On the contrary, a global power, similar to Julian Go’s conception of empire, should be viewed as containing “conflicting tendencies, tactics and techniques, and multiple modalities of power” (2011:240).

Therefore, even as a world hegemon, a national actor’s capacity to formulate and coherently pursue a global agenda may not be taken for granted. Instead, it should be examined under the assumption that this capacity is continuously being threatened by alternative tendencies and agendas of multiple local, national, and international actors. These actors choose their next moves in response to specific local and international contexts that are only partially shaped by world power relations. Meanwhile, their actions may contribute to reconstructing the international context in which world powers are situated and to which they must respond.

Thus far, the literature emphasizes the politico-economic sphere of world power relations. But as some authors have contended, a dimension of global militarism is also important to the dynamics. For example, global wars are usually generated by structural changes in the world system, or “civilization” in David Wilkinson’s terminology (Modelski and Thompson 1988; Hardt and Negri 2005; Wilkinson 1987, 1995). Furthermore, from a world-systems perspective, power transitions are always punctuated by global war. Triumph over the competitor gives the winner a chance to shape (and benefit from) a new world order, until the economic cycle of growth is

\(^2\) Christopher Chase-Dunn and his coauthor do strive to modify this tendency or add a societal dimension into the formation and transition of modern world systems (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1993; Chase-Dunn 1998).
exhausted again, and a new round of global military competition is triggered (Goldstein, J. 1985; Boswell and Sweat 1991; Nakajima and Thompson 1988, 1996; Thompson 1999; Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995). Additionally, it is argued that military power is in play in the formation and arguable disintegration of U.S. hegemony. As the iron curtain descended at the end of World War II, military aid was wielded by the United States to construct a global capitalist order, so as to advance U.S. supremacy in Western Europe and East Asia (Block 1977). However, the legitimacy of this order diminished with the end of the Cold War, especially given the extensive presence of U.S. military forces around the world. From this perspective, the assertive use of force by the George W. Bush administration was the neoconservative political elites’ strategy to rebuild U.S. supremacy under new circumstances (Gowan 2003, 2004). However, the rise in U.S. militarism itself may have signaled a decline in U.S. influence in the economic, political, and ideological spheres.

By comparing imperialistic activities of the United Kingdom and the United States, Julian Go argues that the reliance on military actions as a “last resort” is a desperate move to compensate for a superpower’s declining economic and political control in the world-system. This can only destabilize world order and undermine the current hegemon (2011). This body of literature helps address the roles played by global militarism in the historical conjuncture of hegemonic decline, which is usually overlooked. Meanwhile, an empirical gap remains in explaining how the military sphere matters, especially in regards to the intrastate dimension of how military policies and strategies are formulated and how military resources are mobilized. In this respect, examining more data will help researchers to better understand the military dimension in the current global context of U.S. decline.

In this paper, I argue that changes in a state’s position in the world power structure is a product of interactions between the interstate dynamics of power relations and the intrastate dynamics of policy-making. In so doing, I contribute to the literature by filling an empirical gap in our understanding of China’s arms transfer activities, which has rarely been examined. These data provide a window into the changes in China’s internal organization to boost its position in the world-system.

**The Chinese Arms Transfer Regime: Why is it Relevant and How Can it be Analyzed?**

Conventionally, scholars view arms transfer as determined by the international hierarchy of power relations and technological innovation. Keith Krause contends that a state’s arms transfers are primarily determined by its structural position within the global hierarchical system of arms production and transfer (1992). Furthermore, major powers have routinely used transfer in the form of arms sales and aid to forge and strengthen subordination on the part of a client country and to shape the world order to advance one’s national interests (Sorley 1983; Krause 1991, 1992).
However, this paper argues that arms transfer is also a sphere impacted by and reflecting a national actor’s internal decision-making and resource mobilization. In this regard, the arms transfer regime provides a lens to see how China organizes itself internally and how it may attempt to extend its outreach and become a world power.

I use two databases to reveal the patterns of Chinese arms transfer: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms transfer database and the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) database.\(^3\) SIPRI is an independent, international institute dedicated to research on conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. It records data about international transfers of conventional arms from 1950 onwards, and is updated every spring. SIPRI uses published sources to gather information and to produce statistics on the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons. SIPRI arms transfer data use a common unit, the trend-indicator value (TIV), which represents the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons, rather than actual sales prices for arms transfers. There are two major strengths of using SIPRI. First, it provides one of the most systematic databases of arms transfer in the post-World War II era. It records the flows of major conventional weapons around the world from 1950, making it possible to analyze the trend in international arms transfers over a period of time. Second, SIPRI records the value of arms transfer by supplier and recipient country. Therefore, it can be used to calculate the share of the global market by supplier and recipient countries, and to analyze the evolution of specific arms-transfer regimes. Despite the strengths, SIPRI has one major limitation. The common unit (TIV) that SIPRI uses only presents the transfer of military resources, instead of the monetary value of the transfer. Therefore, it cannot be directly compared to gross domestic product (GDP), military expenditure, and the monetary value of exports.\(^4\)

The WMEAT reports are generated by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US-ACDA). WMEAT records estimates of the value of conventional weapons delivered annually within reference years from 1964 to the present. The major strength of WMEAT measures is that they present the monetary value of arms transfers, which is missing in SIPRI. Also, WMEAT data provide statistics on the value of arms transfers by recipient economic, political, and geographic groups, which can be used to analyze the patterns of a major supplier. However, WMEAT has two limitations. First, the time period of its records is restricted. It only goes back to the year 1963, and the annual WMEAT reports have not been published for 2001-2004 and 2006-2011. Therefore,

\(^3\) In both databases, arms transfer from the People’s Republic of China and from the Republic of China based in Taiwan are treated separately. This article only deals with arms transfer from the People’s Republic, because transfer from Taiwan is likely to follow a distinctive logic and needs a separate article to address.

\(^4\) For more information about the SIPRI arms-transfers database, visit the official website: www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
analysis of arms transfers in these periods has to use the SIPRI statistics. Second, WMEAT reports only provide cumulative statistics on arms transfer by major supplier and recipient country within a specific time period (e.g., in 2007-2009 and 2009-2011), which makes it difficult to systematically analyze the relationships between a supplier and a major recipient over a period of time.5

Given these unique features of SIPRI and WMEAT data, I utilize SIPRI to analyze the trend of arms transfer from China between 1950 and 1962, dates for which WMEAT statistics are unavailable. I also use the SIPRI data to identify major recipient countries to which Chinese arms are supplied and to analyze the evolution of the recipient-China relationships. Meanwhile, I rely on WMEAT to present the patterns in Chinese arms supply by geographic and economic groups. Also, the WMEAT statistics are utilized for comparison to other coefficients such as GNP and monetary values of exports.

For other trade and investment statistics used in this paper, I obtained China’s annual imports and exports from the official source: the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of the PRC. The statistics of Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) are available from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This paper also relies on secondhand literature that collects information about the transformation of China’s foreign policy, defense industry, and practices of trade and arms transfer.

The Three Phases of the Chinese Arms Transfer Regime
Phase One: “China will never be an arms dealer”: Arms transfer in the Mao era
In the early decades of the People’s Republic of China, the regime was isolated not only by the ideological divide in the Cold War, but also within the communist bloc. With U.S. support, the Republic of China, based in Taipei, was recognized in the United Nations (UN) as the only lawful representative of China. Within the communist bloc, China claimed to have discovered a unique road for underdeveloped Asian countries to achieve communism in the 1950s. This was regarded by Moscow as a challenge to its traditional position “as the undisputed leader and arbiter of doctrine within the Communist bloc” (Bradbury 1961:16; see also Zagoria 1960). The Sino-Soviet split fermented throughout the 1950s, and finally erupted into the open at the June 1960 Bucharest Conference (Chŏng 1978). The split with the Soviet Union marginalized China in the communist bloc, leaving it with only a few communist regimes on its side (for example, Albania and North Korea6). To break out of the diplomatic blockade, China sought to establish itself as the new leader

5 For more information about the WMEAT reports, visit the official website: www.state.gov/t/avc/rsls/rpt/wmeat/
and “thought center” in a “world communist revolution” against not only the old enemy, American imperialism, but also the new rival, Soviet “modern revisionism.”

In a paper published in 1965, Lin Biao, who at that time was designated by Mao as his “revolutionary successor,” called for Third World countries to unite and committed China’s support for a world revolution against the West (Chen 2005). The arms transfer regime was crucial in China’s support of a “world communist revolution.” Instead of selling weapons, China chose to send weapons as gifts to these Third World countries. The principle that “China will never be an arms dealer” was articulated by Mao in the 1950s (Yu 2003). Qiao Guanhua, China’s U.N. delegate and Foreign Minister, elaborated this principle in his speech at the Plenary Meeting of the twenty-sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1971. In the speech, Qiao said, “It is our bounded duty to support the just struggles of the people of various countries…We provide free military aid to countries and peoples who are fighting against aggression. We will never become munition merchants, nor attach any conditions or ask for any privileges” (from Barnouin and Yu 2011:169). According to the official record, China did not engage in arms sales until 1979 (Yu 2013).

Mao’s strategy of not selling weapons but offering military aid served the strategic goal of defending and securing China’s position in the international system shadowed by the Cold War. In this strategy, the arms transfer regime was given priority in Chinese domestic and foreign policies. Before the Sino-Soviet split broadened around 1958, annual arms transfers from China never exceeded 9 million TIV, and China was only the world’s fourteenth largest supplier (SIPRI). However, after 1958, China became a major arms supplier to North Korea. For instance, between 1958 and 1960 China provided aircrafts worth 1.1 billion TIV to North Korea, which was the first significant case of the Chinese arms transfer regime (SIPRI). Both SIPRI and WMEAT show that arms transfers from China rose notably after the mid-1960s, and peaked around 1972 and 1973 (Figure 1.1 and 1.2). China was reported as the fifth largest arms supplier by SIPRI in 1973 and by WMEAT in 1972. However, arms transfer is not merely about “how much,” but also “to whom.” From 1950 to 1977, the top four recipients of Chinese conventional weapons were North Korea, Pakistan, Albania, and Vietnam, constituting 87 percent of the total transfers from China (SIPRI). Three out of the four regimes were governed by a left-wing party at that time, and all except Albania shared a border with China. In Table 2, 66 reflects the percent of arms transferred from China that went to other communist regimes from 1950 to 1977. Here, we can see an ideological and geographical preference for Chinese arms transfers in the first phase, which favored nearby regimes that were politically and ideologically sympathetic to China’s position.

7 North Korea has been governed by the Workers’ Party of Korea from 1949 to the present. Albania was governed by the Party of Labour of Albania from 1945 to 1991. Vietnam (North Vietnam before 1975) has been governed by the Communist Party of Vietnam from 1945 to the present.
To some extent, Mao’s strategy succeeded in expanding China’s diplomatic space. Albania, the third largest recipient of Chinese weapons in this period, initiated a motion, supported by Algeria and fifteen other countries (most of whom were recipients of China’s weapons), finally leading to
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 in October 1971. In this Resolution, Beijing replaced Taipei as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN (United Nations 1971).

However, this was also a costly strategy. First and foremost, it placed a heavy financial burden on China’s national treasury, especially through foreign aid programs (Zhang 2006; Yang 2009; Yang and Chen 2010; Che 2012). As shown in Figure 2, the weight of foreign aid on the Chinese government’s public expenditure rose drastically in 1960, the year of the Sino-Soviet split, in spite of China’s own struggling economy. In the heyday between 1971 and 1975, expenditure of foreign aid accounted for more than 5 percent of China’s public expenditure, and more than 1.5 percent of its gross national product (GNP). In comparison, during the Marshall Plan period, expenditure on foreign aid never exceeded 0.2 percent of U.S. GNP.\(^8\) Mao’s pledge to “never be an arms dealer” was kept even when the Chinese economy was under stress. From 1959 to 1961, the failure of the “Great Leap Forward” developmental programs led to the three-year Great Famine in China, causing around 40 million deaths (Lardy 1987).

**Table 2.** Ideological and geographical distribution of arms outflows from China (1950-2014)

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<tr>
<td>distribution</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist regimes</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-communist regimes</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>distribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0%</td>
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Source: SIPRI

Meanwhile, between 1958 and 1964, China transferred 67,000 submachine guns, 920 cannons, over 700 broadcasting stations, and 1,223 military vehicles to North Korea, without asking for payment (Hao, Song, and Luo 2013). At the peak in 1973, China signed foreign aid agreements worth 4 billion RMB and spent more than 5.7 billion RMB on foreign aid, which even exceeded the amount of U.S. foreign aid that same year (Yang 2009).\(^9\)

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\(^8\) Source: Economic Report of the President 1980, United States Agency for International Development.

\(^9\) Using foreign aid programmes to boost one’s political allies is not a Chinese invention, but mainly a Cold War creation. Since the Marshall Plan, both the United States and the USSR had held large foreign aid programmes to
Second, the high level of arms transfers was maintained in a way that was sometimes detrimental to China’s own defense forces. During the Mao era, the Chinese defense industrial base was too underdeveloped to sustain arms supplies at a high level. To ensure guaranteed delivery, some military equipment initially manufactured or purchased for the active forces of Chinese troops was instead given to China’s “Third World brothers.” For example, among the weapons that China gave Vietnam in support of its anti-French Resistance War from 1950 to 1953, some were taken directly from the active forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, and others were purchased from the USSR and other foreign suppliers when China itself ran short of foreign reserves (Zhang, Y. 2006). Also, after the Korean War, Chinese troops left the North Korean army with enough weapons to equip ten divisions before departing for home (Hao, Song, and Luo 2013).

Lastly, as the Chinese leadership later found out, arms transfers were not always an effective and efficient way to strengthen connections and political loyalty. North Korea and Vietnam together received 40 percent of Chinese arms transfers from 1950 to 1976, but neither country firmly sided with China in the Sino-Soviet split. Skillfully, Pyongyang kept a delicate balance serve political purposes. However, due to the heavy fiscal burdens, both regimes had begun to cut foreign aid programmes beginning in the late 1950s, while China’s foreign relations remained largely dependent on foreign aid (Krause 1995).
between the two communist powers, leaning towards one when its interests fit (Chŏn 1978). Vietnam, with Soviet support, even became a regional competitor to China in Southeast Asia in the 1970s, and tensions between the two countries finally gave rise to a border war in 1978 (Ross 1988).

After the mid-1970s, it became clear that it was unsustainable to finance a high level of arms transfers by the public budget. Indeed, the weight of foreign aid had already seen a sharp decline in the years before Mao’s death in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s return to power in 1977 (Figure 2). Meanwhile, easing of tension in the international sphere also made it possible for China to enter the global society. In 1971, the People’s Republic of China was recognized by the UN. In 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China, and the two countries officially established diplomatic relations in 1979. However, China’s warming up to the United States upset and alienated it from its traditional allies such as North Korea and Albania. This further dissolved the previous mode of China’s arms transfer. From the mid-1970s, the amount of arms transfers receded dramatically and had fallen to pre-1966 levels by the end of the decade (Figures 1.1 and 1.2).

In summary, from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, under Mao’s principle that “China will never be an arms dealer,” the Chinese arms transfer regime was strategically employed by the top leaders to exchange for diplomatic space and to secure China’s position in the world. Political institutions in this period showed a strong capacity to mobilize a considerable proportion of domestic resources to finance this strategy. However, they also generated a heavy financial burden on China’s public budget, which became severe towards the end of the Mao era. Finally, this phase ended around the late-1970s as arms transfer declined, along with China’s outgoing foreign aid.

Phase Two. “China has no choice but to become an arms dealer”: The rise and fall of a profit-driven regime

While the weight of foreign aid in China’s public expenditure had been in decline before Mao’s death, fundamental redirections and new policies were introduced a few years later. In 1978, the Chinese Communist Party’s Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee took place in Beijing. At the conference, the new CCP leadership signaled an embrace of economic reform. In the following year, Deng reframed the idea of the “Four Modernizations.” According to Deng’s reframe, the defense sector was relegated to the last priority, after the agriculture, industry, and science and technology sectors (Frankenstein 1999). In other words, the defense sector lost its privileged status in the national economy, and most importantly, its priority access to national resources. Between 1979 and 1981, defense expenditures were cut by one-fourth, declining from 22 billion RMB to 17 billion RMB (Mulvenon 2001). From 1980 to 1990, China’s gross national product (GNP) swelled forty-fold, from 447 billion RMB to more than 17,686 billion RMB, while its defense expenditure merely doubled (China Statistical Yearbook 1991).
Under these new policies, how did the political authority make up for the military’s reduced access to national resources? While the defense sector was not left all alone, it was called on to engage in commercial activities, so that it would not completely rely on the state’s budget. In spite of the shortage of capital, know-how, and technology, military enterprises utilized their politically-privileged status in society and access to cheap natural resources, raw materials, and the national transportation network to generate notable financial rewards for themselves (Mulvenon 2001; Mulvenon and Tyroler-Cooper 2009). Between 1985 and 1990, the profits of PLA factories grew by 700 percent. At its height in the late-1980s, the military controlled nearly 20,000 ventures, whose business ranged from large farms to world-class hotels and multinational corporations (Karmel 1997). While producing for the domestic civilian market was one way to earn revenue, China had already proven its capacity as an effective arms supplier. Yet, the defense sector had not been allowed to profit from arms sales, as doing such was forbidden in the Mao era.

Mao’s pledge had to be overturned, and the call could only come from the top. It finally came in 1978, when Deng announced to the defense sector, “China has little choice but to become an arms dealer.” One year later, arms sales were introduced for the first time via the directive, the Instructions on Foreign Military Aid in the Future, issued by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. On the 30th anniversary of the regime, China finally became an arms dealer. Correspondingly, the quantity and value of arms transfer from China climbed from the late-1970s. Following a period of growth marked by mild fluctuation, China’s arms sales hit a peak in 1988 (Figure 1.1 and 1.2). Both SIPRI and WMEAT databases report China as the world’s fifth largest arms supplier between 1985 and 1989. In geographical terms, based on WMEAT statistics, over 70 percent of these conventional arms were delivered to OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) member states between 1981 and 1985, and this proportion rose to 83 percent between 1985 and 1989. This pattern indicates several fundamental changes in China’s arms transfer activities that result from the changes in China’s grand strategy. An examination of the major recipient countries in this phase can further clarify this connection. In the 1980s, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, and North Korea were the top five recipients of conventional arms from China, with Iraq and Iran accounting for a 42 percent share.

Both countries, plus Egypt, only increased arms imports from China after the Mao era. Moreover, none of the three countries fit China’s previous geopolitical and ideological preferences. In the Mao era, China’s clients were mainly countries with limited access to advanced

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10 For instance, at the All-Army Sideline Agricultural Production Conference held in Beijing in 1983, the military headquarters urged the military sector to further relieve the burden on national finance (Mulvenon 2001). Also, in a report by the China News Agency in 1992, the PLA’s pharmaceutical conglomerate was urged to “play a positive role in developing the army’s production and in making up for the inadequacies in military spending” (Frankenstein 1997:194).
military technology. However, as the largest arms importer in Africa in the 1980s, Egypt had well-established access to major Western suppliers, and its market was dominated by the United States, which had a 70 percent share (SIPRI). In the cases of Iraq and Iran, both turned to China for arms supplies after the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. From 1980 to 1988, China’s arms transfers accounted for 64 percent of arms that Tehran obtained from Asia, and was Baghdad’s only Asian supplier during the war (SIPRI). By trading with both belligerents, China directly profited from the conflict, which was a sharp contrast to the image of a benevolent “big brother” to all of the Third World countries that it had tried to present during the Mao era. Furthermore, from 1978 to 2000, only 21 percent of Chinese arms transfers were supplied to communist regimes, in comparison to over 60 percent during the first phase (Table 2).

The strategy to ease the financial burden facing the defense sector through commercial activities, including arms exports, worked to some extent. A proportion of foreign currency obtained through the selling of arms was used to fund defense development projects such as the reform of the aviation industry (Cheng 2011; Yu 2013). On the flip side, this mode of defense production and transfer generated problems in resource distribution, defense innovation, and military discipline. In spite of a lack of know-how and advanced technologies, the defense sector was in a position to reap profits through its extensive political connections in the domestic market (Mulvenon 2001). By the end of the 1980s, more than two-thirds of the workforce employed by the defense industry had worked for the civilian market, instead of defense production, and by 1994, civilian products accounted for 80 percent of military-owned production (Karmel 1997). This focus distracted the military from professional duties and the defense producers from genuine defense production and innovation. The development of weapons slowed in the late 1980s, and many defense products in this period failed to meet the quality requirements of military end users (Karmel 1997; Medeiros et al. 2005). It also generated disciplinary issues. One anti-corruption campaign in the early 1990s led to the closure of hundreds of military enterprises (Mulvenon 2001). Even frequent political campaigns failed to stop rampant corruption and the other illegal economic activities11 that continued to trouble the defense sector throughout the 1990s (Karmel 1997). The problem eventually penetrated into the national economy as a whole. By the early 1990s, the defense industry had become “one of the worst laggards in the economy” (Cheung 2009:111).

As recorded in both databases, the quantity and value of China’s arms exports dropped drastically in the late 1980s. From 1990 to 1991, arms sales shrank 36 percent (WMEAT 1992)12

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11 These illegal economic activities include but are not limited to speculative ventures such as speculation in foreign currency and real estate, smuggling, and misappropriation (Mulvenon 2001).
12 The SIPRI data does not accord with the US-ACDA data for the year 1991. However, both data sources support the general pattern of decline in the 1990s.
and continued to decline throughout the 1990s. By 1999, China’s share of world arms exports had shrunk to less than 1 percent, from 4 percent in 1990 (WMEAT 1999-2000). The end of the First Persian Gulf War and the UN arms embargo of Iraq may have been one factor causing this shift. However, domestic dynamics mattered as well. Since the 1970s, China had been Pakistan’s major supplier, and its share of annual arms delivery to Pakistan had never been below 40 percent for a five year period, with only one exception: 1996-2000 (SIPRI). During the same period, China lost the Egyptian market to the United States (SIPRI).

To sum up, in the Deng era, China changed the focus of national policy from security to economic reform and development. Consequently, the defense sector lost its priority in accessing national resources and was urged to be partially self-financed. This policy shift opened the door for the defense sector to sell arms and to provide civilian goods and services. This strategy generated short-lived momentum for the Chinese arms transfer regime in the mid-1980s. After that, problems inside this profit-driven regime became obvious and dragged down not only the defense sector, but also the economy as a whole. As a result, the quantity and value of arms sales dropped sharply in the late-1980s, with the depression in the arms transfer regime lasting through the 1990s.

Phase Three: The “Chinese Marshall Plan”? Arms Transfer in the New Century

On 22 July 1998, an enlarged session of the Central Military Commission was held in Beijing. At the session, Jiang Zemin, the head of the CCP in the post-Deng era, announced that the military sector would be prohibited from commercial activities. Jiang also urged the PLA to refocus on its professional tasks and military modernization (Mulvenon 2001). After that session, a series of reforms was introduced to the defense sector to clear organizational obstacles to technological innovation and to bolster defense research (Cheung 2009; Mulvenon and Tyroler-Cooper 2009). Although researchers have different opinions about the extent of the military’s resistance to the reforms, they generally agree that this wave of reform set the stage for the later development of China’s defense industry (Scobell 2000; Mulvenon 2001; Cheung 2009). Also, the government increased the share of the defense sector in the public budget after 1998. From 1994 to 1998, military expenditure accounted for 1.7 percent of China’s gross national product (GNP). That proportion rose to 2.1 percent for the period between 2001 and 2005 (Figure 3). This increase generated immediate consequences. In 1998, China was still the world’s 7th largest military spender; five years later, China was second only to the U.S., though its military spending was only one-tenth of the latter’s. However, this massive gap is also narrowing. In 2015, China’s military spending was approximately one third that of the United States (SIPRI).

With its strengthened economic and military capacities, what is the main goal of China’s grand strategy in the twenty-first century? How does the new leadership plan to fulfill this goal?
In a 2013 trip to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Xi Jinping, the present head of the CCP, announced China’s “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative, a development framework to boost trade, shipping, tourism, and maritime infrastructure in South Asia and Africa. Based on the blueprint, the Maritime Silk Road starts at the South China Sea, travels through the Strait of Malacca into the Bay of Bengal, crosses the Indian Ocean and reaches the African continent in Nairobi. From Kenya, the proposed Maritime Silk Road then turns north, traverses the Suez Canal, and finally arrives at its European destination, Venice. This initiative is one half of China’s “One Belt, One Road” development strategy. The other part, the “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative, starts in Northwest China, travels across Central Asian countries to reach the Middle East, then turns to Eastern Europe, and finally meets the Maritime Silk Road in Italy.13 This “belt” aims to link China economically and culturally to Europe through Central and Western Asia and to strengthen China’s influence in these regions.

**Figure 3.** China’s Military expenditure, 1988-2012

![Military expenditure of China (1989-2014)](image)

Source: SIPRI

Why is China promoting the “One Belt, One Road” initiative? As some scholars have pointed out, despite China’s drastic economic development over the last three decades, its capital accumulation regime has recently experienced several structural problems in terms of its sustainability. China’s export-dependent economy has internalized the global crisis of over-accumulation and falling profits (Hung 2008). Without a robust domestic market, Chinese investors have to look abroad for

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more trade and investment opportunities. According to the Ministry of Commerce, China’s outbound foreign direct investment has maintained steady growth for a decade. However, the need for foreign markets is only one reason. Indeed, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative also offers a roadmap for further extension of China’s influence, which, as *The Diplomat* commentator William Yale argues, is “intended to serve diplomatic, economic, and strategic purposes” (2015). This is the reason why several analysts have already called this strategy the “Chinese Marshall Plan” (Stokes 2015; Pitlo III 2015).

This “plan” has been well supported by the arms transfer regime of the new century. After 2000, the quantity and value of Chinese arms transfers climbed, though with fluctuation (Figure 1.1 and 1.2). Growth became more stable after 2006. According to SIPRI, China replaced the United Kingdom as the world’s fifth largest arms supplier between 2008 and 2012, accounting for 5 percent of world arms transfers. According to WMEAT, China was the sixth largest supplier between 2008 and 2011. While the growth rate and ranking may exaggerate the actual size of China’s arms exports, what is more relevant is the distribution. According to WMEAT, between 2001 and 2011, 38 percent of arms exports from China were delivered to South Asia, 19 percent to the Middle East, 12 percent each to North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, and 6 percent each to East Asia and South America. Specifically, between 2007 and 2011, the five largest Asian recipient countries of China’s weapons were Pakistan, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Sri Lanka. In Africa, they were Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad. SIPRI statistics show a similar geographic pattern. According to SIPRI, between 2001 and 2014, three fourths of Chinese arms exports were delivered to other Asian countries, with Africa receiving another fifth. The remaining arms exports were delivered to Latin America. Indeed, while Asia was the largest outlet for Chinese weapons, Africa had most of China’s clients.

A closer examination of the recipients exposes the deeper connection between China’s arms exports and its strategic interests in trade, energy, and raw materials, as well as geopolitics in Asia and Africa. As mentioned above, one goal of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative is to extend foreign markets for Chinese products. The major recipient countries and regions of Chinese weapons appear also to be important trade partners for China. For example, in 2012, South Asia took a 13 percent share of China’s exports; this number grew to 17 percent in the first two months of 2015 (MOFCOM). In 2009, China became Africa’s largest trade partner, and China’s exports to Africa grew by 16.7 percent over the following two years. According to SIPRI, Egypt is the largest African recipient of Chinese arms and one of the largest African importers of Chinese goods in general. In 2011, Egypt accounted for 12 percent of Chinese exports to Africa, second only to the Republic of South Africa (Rahal 2014). In Southeast Asia, Myanmar is the largest importer of

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14 WMEAT statistics on global arms transfers for 2012 had not been released at the time of writing.
Chinese weapons. In 2011, China also became Myanmar’s largest trade partner and its largest source of foreign investment (MOFCOM). Indonesia (second largest arms importer in Southeast Asia), Bangladesh (second in South Asia), and Pakistan (first in South Asia) are also important foreign markets for China’s civilian goods and investment (SIPRI).

Several major recipient countries of Chinese weapons are also the main suppliers of energy and raw materials for China. Observers in Western societies have always been interested in Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) in Africa, which have been expanding since the mid-1990s. Today, crude oil is China’s top imported product from Africa (MOFCOM). In 2009, for example, 70 percent of African exports to China were crude oil (Lin 2013). Sudan is China’s largest oil supplier and the third largest importer of Chinese weapons in Africa (SIPRI; Downs 2010). In 2006, Chinese NOCs’ oil production in Sudan accounted for over 80 percent of its total in Africa (Downs 2007). Indeed, China’s entrenched interests in Sudan have caught much criticism from Western observers. Some have criticized Beijing for selling arms to Sudan in spite of its ongoing civil war, and news was released that Khartoum had used Chinese fighter planes and military trucks for ethnic cleansing in the Sudanese rebel South (Taylor 2006). Indonesia and Tanzania are two other cases in which China’s interests in natural resources are intertwined with weapon sales. Indonesia is the second largest recipient of Chinese weapons in Southeast Asia (SIPRI) and a major exporter of minerals to China. In 2014, 33 percent of China’s imports from Indonesia were minerals (MOFCOM). According to SIPRI, Tanzania is China’s second largest arms importer in Africa and one of China’s major trade partners on the continent. Since 2004, ores have dominated the Chinese import profile from Tanzania (Jansson, Burke, and Hon 2009).

China combines arms sales with participation in UN peacekeeping missions and diplomatic initiatives to strengthen its geopolitical position. Until 2009, more than half of China’s peacekeeping forces were deployed in Africa (Zhao 2009). One example of this synergy, mentioned above, is the Sino-Sudan connection. Several times in the 2000s, Beijing helped Khartoum obstruct United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intervention (Taylor 2006; Tull 2008). Sudan was confirmed as China’s “all-weather friend” in 2007 (Large 2008). Pakistan, the biggest importer of China’s weapons in the world, has kept close ties with China since the 1970s. During the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Pakistan was one of the only two countries (the other being Cuba) that supported the CCP’s actions. In 2015, the two parties brought Sino-Pakistani relations to a new height. During President Xi’s visit to Pakistan in April, China proposed an infrastructure project that would connect a major land route in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region to the Chinese-developed Pakistani port at Gwadar. According to Washington Post commentator Ishaan Tharoor, this project served as a key cog in China’s vision of a new land and maritime “Silk Road” (2015). Also during Xi’s visit, an announcement was made elevating the Sino-Pakistan relationship to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” the highest level in China’s diplomatic relations.
In short, with strengthened support from political institutions and the burgeoning economy, the military sector was prohibited from commercial ventures and was reoriented towards its professional tasks in the late-1990s and early-2000s. Unlike in the previous phase, GDP growth was quickly transformed into growth in military spending after 2000. A grand strategy aimed at extending China’s global outreach mainly based in Asia and Africa gradually took shape and was finally formulated as the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, in the twenty-first century. During this phase, arms exports bolster this grand strategy. Specifically, arms exports are connected to China’s interests in trade, energy, and raw materials, as well as geopolitics. This new pattern of arms transfer has both similarities and differences from that of the Mao era. Both regimes are globally-focused, unlike the nationally-oriented regime in the second phase. Each has served one of China’s grand strategies and strengthened its connections to the outside world, though to a degree more limited than in the Mao era. Also, both regimes are led and fueled by political institutions, which are willing and able to mobilize national resources to plan and support outbound arms transfers. However, arms transfer in the third phase differs from that in the Mao era in important respects. In the Mao era, China’s support, in various ways including military aids to “communist brothers” and other Third World countries was framed and declared as a moral obligation. It had the goal of securing China’s position in a world shadowed by the Cold War. On the contrary, in the current regime, the narrative of “benevolent brotherhood” has been replaced by one of mutual benefits and articulation of China’s interests. In the third phase, rather than a financial burden on the state, the arms transfer regime has become an organic component of China’s globally-focused grand strategy.

Towards a World Order after U.S. Decline

I argue that from the 1950s to the present, changes in China’s arms transfer activities have primarily resulted from its evolving grand strategies. In Phase One, Mao’s regime used gifts of weapons to compete with the Soviet Union in the communist bloc and to extend its influence among Third World countries. This strategy, though putting a heavy burden on the state, helped to expand the diplomatic space of the new regime, which was isolated at the time. Nevertheless, after the late-1970s, China retreated from this strategy so that it could concentrate resources on national developmental projects. Arms sales, therefore, were introduced in Phase Two to generate revenues that compensated for the reduction in monetary support from political institutions. This profit-driven arms transfer regime was put to an end in the late 1990s, when China restored its monetary support for its military and used arms transfer to extend its regional ties, mainly in Asia and Africa. Only in this phase, a globally-focused agenda to boost China’s presence and connections with local agencies in terms of trade, natural resources, and geopolitics began to emerge. Such a strategy has been the result of constant interaction between the evolving global context and the domestic
dynamics that have framed the way China today deploys, mobilizes, and promotes its power and influence in the global system.

These findings only partially support Arrighi’s perception that U.S. decline could lead to China’s ascent (1994[2010]). The decline of the current hegemon has not yet created an opening for the most likely aspirant to world hegemony. Until now, China has only been able to expand its networks in regions that are marginal in the U.S.-led world order. Furthermore, Chinese arms sales have been disproportionately concentrated on the low-end market. However, evidence supports the emergence of a globally-focused agenda on the part of China as the United States declines. Such an agenda was absent when U.S. supremacy was at its peak during the Cold War and when the United States became the single superpower after 1989. It suggests that U.S. decline has created an opening for China to engage in world politics in ways it could not before, and China has organized itself internally and formulated a grand strategy to contend for more power and influence in the world.

Whether or not China’s current strategy will lead to world hegemony remains unknown. However, one implication of this paper is that, while the absolute size and capacity of the U.S. economy and military enjoys a notable edge over any other potential competitors, the United States may find itself at a disadvantage when it comes to the capacity to formulate, carry out, and maintain a coherent global strategy. Admittedly, this paper does not deliver a comparison of state capacity between the United States, China, and other potential contenders for world hegemony. Further empirical research is needed in this regard.

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Political Economy, Capability Development, and Fundamental Cause: Integrating Perspectives on Child Health in Developing Countries

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Abstract
Several dominant theoretical perspectives attempt to account for health disparities in developing countries, including political economy, the capability approach, and fundamental cause. This study combines the perspectives in a multi-level analysis of child malnutrition and diarrhea in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of who faces increased health risks and who is shielded from them. Using the Demographic and Health Surveys and World Bank data, I estimate a series of models that predict the likelihood of child malnutrition and diarrhea, based on a set of country- and individual-level explanatory variables. Results suggest that at the individual-level, household wealth and maternal education are the most robust predictors of child health. These social factors are even more important than more proximate factors like clean water or sanitation. At the country-level, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita reduces malnutrition, but does not significantly affect incidence of diarrhea. Contrary to the predominant economic development paradigm, health care and education are more important in accounting for the prevalence of diarrhea than GDP. Finally, trade in and of itself is not harmful to well-being in developing countries. It is when countries become too dependent on one or a few commodities that trade starts to have detrimental costs. Thus, a synthesis of theoretical frameworks best illustrates the complex web of social structural factors that manifest as unequal life chances for children.

Keywords: multi-level analysis, health inequalities, child malnutrition, child diarrhea, economic development, trade, sanitation, clean water, health care, education, household socioeconomic status
More than 17,000 children under the age of 5 die every day, mostly from preventable causes and mostly in the developing world. Malnutrition accounts for up to half of those deaths, and diarrheal diseases account for another 10 percent (UNICEF 2014). More than one half of stunted children live in Asia and more than one third in Africa. Despite a worldwide decline in stunting prevalence over the last twenty-five years, the number of stunted children in Africa is actually on the rise (UNICEF 2015). In addition, the majority of all diarrhea deaths among children worldwide (more than 80 percent) occur in poor countries (Parashar et al. 2006). Yet, malnutrition and diarrhea have been relatively overlooked in the sociology literature to date, despite the fact that they remain two of the largest causes of child mortality in developing countries today.

Social scientists have long been interested in the social determinants of health more broadly. Nonetheless, this vast literature reveals much disagreement on indicators and modeling. Several dominant theoretical perspectives attempt to account for disparities in well-being across countries, including political economy, capability development, and fundamental cause. But each perspective has a different emphasis and different measurement approaches. In addition, each is examined within literatures that are not typically in conversation with one another. The goal of this study is to compare and contrast these literatures in a multi-level analysis of child malnutrition and diarrhea in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of who faces increased health risks and who is shielded from them. The analysis utilizes indicators from each theoretical framework to illustrate the complex web of social structural factors that manifest as unequal life chances for children. Furthermore, it goes beyond traditional methodological approaches by recognizing that such factors operate at multiple levels simultaneously.

The political economy perspective includes several schools of thought: economic development, neoliberalism, and dependency/world-systems. Economic development is habitually used to explain variation in health outcomes between countries. In fact, the conventional wisdom in much social science literature is that increasing gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is the most effective way to improve well-being in developing countries. At the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the optimal path to economic development. Neoliberals claim that integration into the world economy boosts economic development and therefore well-being. Trade and foreign investment bring innovation, financing, and capital to periphery states, which allow them to catch up to core states in income and health. Dependency/world-systems theorists caution that integration into the world economy impedes economic development and well-being in low-income countries. Export-led production benefits foreign-owned transnational corporations (TNCs) who monopolize capital and do not reinvest in local communities. TNCs undermine social welfare policies that are not in their interests and diminish state capacity to decide how resources are used. In contrast to these political economy perspectives, the capability approach emphasizes improvements in education, sanitation, water, and health care over the maximization of GDP. This
approach to development stresses the expansion of freedoms and enabling people to live the kinds of lives they value. Its proponents recognize that wealth may be a means to achieve well-being, but that it does not necessarily guarantee well-being. Finally, the fundamental cause perspective suggests that health inequalities are best understood by examining the individual-level social factors that enable and constrain one’s ability to reduce health risks. This perspective underscores the enduring importance of wealth and education in particular because such resources can always be used to combat illness, especially preventable diseases with known treatments like malnutrition and diarrhea.

This study adds to extant cross-national scholarship on well-being in several key ways. First, I draw on insights from all of the above perspectives, using the lessons learned from each to ameliorate the limitations of the others. The political economy perspective emphasizes between-country disparities in trade and GDP. But it neglects within-country disparities in socioeconomic resources, which has been the focus of fundamental cause. The capability approach broadens the scope of what is important by bringing sanitation, water, education, and health care to the fore, underscoring the idea that non-economic resources are just as important, if not more so, than wealth alone. However, the capability approach perhaps overlooks the fact that wealth still continues to be a prominent predictor of variation in well-being. The political economy perspective and the capability approach provide a more global and comparative lens through which to view health disparities, one which the fundamental cause perspective lacks.

Second, I use these perspectives to inform a modeling strategy that goes beyond the traditional emphasis on either individual- or macro-level predictors of health. Instead, I use multi-level models that examine the country-level factors that effect individual-level child health, while also taking into account within-country variation in household and maternal characteristics. Previous findings on the effects of GDP per capita are largely limited to ecological-level associations. This study provides a more robust test of those effects by determining whether the findings still hold after taking into account the compositional characteristics of countries. Multi-level models demonstrate how children are affected not only by the characteristics of their own households, but also by the larger social structures of which those households are a part, including their country’s location in the world-system hierarchy.

Third, using health data from a collection of standardized, population-based surveys in developing countries, I assess three indicators of child malnutrition: stunting, wasting, and underweight. These are derived from height and weight measurements taken by carefully trained survey teams in the field. I also assess whether a child has had a recent episode of diarrhea, as reported by the child’s mother. These child health indicators are more valid and reliable than the more commonly used country-level indicators of infant mortality and life expectancy. Thus, using a novel approach to pooled data collection and multi-level modeling techniques, this study
examines the contributions of multiple theoretical perspectives for explaining both within- and between-country variation in child malnutrition and diarrhea in developing countries.

**Perspectives on Health Disparities**

Drawing from several lines of scholarly inquiry, I briefly summarize three theoretical perspectives below. Each perspective highlights the explanatory potential of different variables, but together they provide a comprehensive framework for understanding health disparities.

**Political Economy**

*Economic development.* The prominent demographer Samuel Preston (1996: 531) remarks, “The major emphasis during the last half-century…has been on explaining movements in aggregate-level indices of mortality by reference to economic factors.” Indeed, the dominant paradigm across the social sciences has been that economic growth and development are the most significant predictors of cross-national differences in health and mortality, particularly in developing countries (Brady, Kaya, and Beckfield 2007). This view has been widely popularized by leading economists like Jeffrey Sachs (2005) and Paul Collier (2007) who stress economic development as the primary concern and most effective way for improving well-being.

A significant body of empirical research substantiates these claims with comparative, country-level analyses of GDP per capita. For example, in their highly influential *American Sociological Review* article, Firebaugh and Beck (1994) examine the effect of GDP on male and female life expectancy, caloric intake, and infant survival in developing countries. They persuasively demonstrate just how powerful economic development is by showing that GDP is the only variable with consistent and robust effects on all health outcomes. Jenkins and Scanlan (2001) similarly contend that economic development increases the food supply and reduces child malnutrition, even controlling for an extensive set of relevant variables. Numerous other scholars orient their analyses around economic development and find that it significantly influences well-being in developing countries (e.g., Pritchett and Summers 1996; Hertzman and Siddiqi 2000). An even greater number of scholars include economic development as a control variable and similarly find robust effects. The frequency with which GDP is included in cross-national studies of health demonstrates the conventional wisdom of its paramount importance (Brady, Kaya, and Beckfield 2007).

Critics contend, however, that GDP does not necessarily benefit all segments of a population equally, and that GDP should be evaluated *alongside* other aspects of development to fully understand well-being (e.g., Blumberg 1995; Parpart et al. 2000). Proponents of the economic development perspective include GDP per capita in regression models to explain variation in well-being *between* countries. However, national statistics on GDP per capita neither reveal the
distribution of income within countries, nor the real beneficiaries. They also do not take into account other aspects of development that people need and want, like access to health care or education (UNDP 1990). Fostering economic development alone will not necessarily provide for other central human needs (Nussbaum 2004).

For example, despite substantial economic growth in recent years, Nigeria has not experienced the broad-based improvements in well-being outcomes that typically correlate with higher GDP. Nigeria outperforms other lower middle-income countries in GDP per capita, yet experiences higher poverty rates and lags farther behind its counterparts in life expectancy, literacy, and gender equality (World Bank 2014). Some countries achieve better health than expected relative to their level of economic development and vice versa (Ragin and Bradshaw 1992; Shen and Williamson 2001). Recent cross-national research documents persistent health inequalities despite economic growth (Grimm et al. 2008). In fact, while global economic inequality converged from 1980-2005, infant mortality actually diverged (Eloundou-Enyegue and Rehman 2009). This suggests that something other than economic development is at work and that GDP per capita is an imperfect predictor of well-being in developing countries (Robeyns 2000). Nonetheless, substantial cross-national research shows the positive effects of economic development for health, and this remains the prevailing prescription for developing countries.

**Neoliberalism.** Although the benefits of economic development may be widely agreed upon, the primary route to economic development, and therefore better well-being, is disputed. Neoliberalism suggests that integration into the world economy through trade liberalization and the facilitation of foreign investment is the optimal path to economic development (Haque 1999, Hall 2011). In theory, trade liberalization lowers prices, increases national efficiency, and increases national wealth by enabling countries to specialize and export the goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Foreign investment provides product innovation, technology, and financing that can be leveraged to bring increasing returns to the host country. Thus integration into the world economy, through export-led production and foreign investment, “provides developing economies with the opportunity to catch up in income and productivity with more advanced economies” (Gilpin 2001: 198). In turn, everyone benefits from increased social mobility and better health and well-being (Haque 1999; Firebaugh and Beck 1994).

**Dependency/world-systems theory.** Dependency and world-systems theorists, on the other hand, argue that trade and foreign investment decelerates economic growth and impedes well-being in poor countries. The expansion of global capitalism created a world market in which nations are involved in dependent, but unequal exchange relationships that favor the powerful core states (Wallerstein 2004). Transnational corporations (TNCs) monopolize internal capital, accumulate a
disproportionate share of local sources of credit, repatriate profits instead of reinvesting them in local economies, and displace many local businesses. Furthermore, foreign investors hamper health and well-being by discouraging social welfare policies that are beneficial to the local population but that don’t serve TNC interests (Beer and Boswell 2002; Shen and Williamson 2001). Through tax evasion and disguising taxable profits, TNCs reduce the government resources that would otherwise fund health and social services (Wimberley 1990). For these reasons, many scholars show that foreign trade and/or investment adversely affect mortality and food security (e.g., Shen and Williamson 2001; Jenkins and Scanlan 2001; Wimberley 1990; Wimberley and Bello 1992).

Moreover, as a result of the global division of labor, developing countries risk concentrating too heavily on one or a few export commodities (Burns, Kentor, and Jorgenson 2003). The more a country’s exports are concentrated in a small number of products, the more vulnerable that country is to fluctuations and disturbances in the global market. Countries with more diverse export portfolios, however, can better weather economic downturns because they have more options in responding to those fluctuations (Beer and Boswell 2002; Shen and Williamson 2001). Export concentration also tends to correlate with trade partner concentration. That is, one country depends on trade with a few other countries that, in turn, depend on a few products. This leaves periphery countries vulnerable to economic and political pressures from major trading partners (Hirschman 1945; Babones and Farabee-Siers 2012). As a result, export concentration adversely affects economic growth, health care, and the physical quality of life (e.g., Shen and Williamson 2001; Ragin and Bradshaw 1992).

All of this suggests that location in the world-system hierarchy affects a country’s freedom to assert its own governance priorities that, in turn, affects population health. As economic transactions cross national boundaries at an ever-increasing rate, the growing wealth and power of TNCs undermine the power of the state and marginalize the state as an actor (Evans 1997). TNCs gain control in economic, political, and social domains and limit the capacity of periphery states to implement policies in their own long-term interests (Kentor and Boswell 2003). For example, periphery countries are under intense pressure from international funding agencies and TNCs to privatize their healthcare systems. However, privatization creates inequities in access and quality of services and to rising out-of-pocket costs, which further exacerbates the poverty of the most marginalized (Johnson and Stoskopf 2010; Whitehead, Dahlgren, and Evans 2001). Lacking the technology and capital to effectively run state-owned enterprises, many governments feel as if they have no choice other than allowing foreign investors to take over (Ramamurti 1992). In this way, dependence on exports and foreign capital allows foreign investor countries to co-opt local politics and pursue their own interests. On the other hand, periphery countries with more diversified distributions of export production and trade partners allows them to better maintain their autonomy.
(Kentor and Boswell 2003). Thus, variation in periphery states’ relative levels of dependency and strength in global trade networks may, in part, account for their varying power to provide the capabilities people need to ensure good health.

Following convention, the present study includes GDP per capita, trade, foreign investment, and export concentration at the country level to test the political economy hypotheses. However, the multi-level modeling technique employed here goes beyond traditional analyses in this field by including individual-level variables as well. In doing so, it overcomes the limitation of focusing on aggregate wealth measures alone by also considering the way in which wealth is distributed within countries. Political economy perspectives are criticized for overgeneralizing and for concentrating exclusively on external forces, neglecting the role that internal forces can have in shaping well-being (Farmer 1999). The present study addresses this limitation as well, by including internal factors (e.g., education and sanitation) that may be equally or more important for explaining disparities in child health.

**Capability Development**

In contrast, the capability approach to improving health disparities emphasizes development that expands the freedoms that people have and the things they are able to accomplish, rather than the maximization of income and wealth (Sen 1999). The key feature of the capability approach is its emphasis on what people are able to do and to be (i.e., their capabilities) (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000; Robeyns 2005). According to this perspective, then, development is a process of broadening people’s choices (UNDP 1990). As such, development entails eliminating major sources of “unfreedom,” such as neglect of public facilities, and lack of access to health care, clean water, basic education or gainful employment (Sen 1999). The capability approach to development is a human outcome-oriented approach that underscores basic rights as the most important means to improve well-being. Of course, people typically want higher incomes, but “income is not the sum total of human life” (UNDP 1990: 9). Economic development can be an important means for improving well-being, but well-being depends on other factors as well (Sen 1999).

In his first empirical application of the capability approach, Amartya Sen (1985) shows that the gross national product (GNP) per capita of Brazil and Mexico in the early 1980s was more than 7 times the GNP per capita of Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka outperformed Brazil and Mexico in terms of life expectancy and infant and child mortality. Sen concludes that public policies concentrating on food distribution and public health services allowed Sri Lanka to achieve remarkable improvements in well-being without the concomitant increase in economic development. Slottje (1991) compares a well-being index for 126 countries and finds that well-being varies across levels of economic development. A number of other studies further suggest that country rankings based on GDP per capita are quite different from rankings based on human
capabilities and that, consequently, GDP should not be automatically equated with a growth in living standards (see Robeyns 2000 for a review).

The biggest critique of the capability approach lies in the problem of defining capabilities and operationalizing them in empirical research. Sen develops the idea over several decades and many publications, but never offers a concrete index of the most important or relevant capabilities. He views well-being as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that is contingent on individual choice and definition (Sen 1999). For this reason, some argue that the approach has not been sufficiently specified and that the idea is too broad to be operationalized in a meaningful way (Sugden 1993; Roemer 1996). Still, a review of the ways in which capabilities are measured in studies of developing countries reveals basic agreement on the most central aspects: education, sanitation, clean water, and health care (Saith 2001). Thus, the present study concentrates on these variables as indicators of the capability approach.

Martha Nussbaum (2004) claims that education is the key to all other capabilities. A considerable literature suggests that education at the macro-level has important consequences for population health, and some even find that secondary school enrollment has a larger direct effect on well-being than GDP per capita (Brady, Kaya, and Beckfield 2007; Burroway 2010). Inadequate access to clean water and sanitation facilities accounts for a large part of the burden of illness in developing countries (World Bank 2003). About half of the developing world (2.6 billion people) lacks even a simple latrine and about one-sixth (a little over 1 billion people) lacks clean water (WHO and UNICEF 2004). Furthermore, many developing countries experience human resource shortfalls that hinder the capabilities of local medical facilities to administer health care. Some estimates suggest that Africa needs approximately 1 million more health care workers to adequately care for its people (Garrett and Rosenstein 2005). The demand for health care exceeds the supply worldwide, but shortfalls in low-income countries are far worse than those in rich countries (Clark, Stewart, and Clark 2006). Additionally, physicians migrate from periphery to core countries in order to advance their careers and improve their socioeconomic status. This “brain drain” contributes even further to the global imbalance of health personnel (Hagopian et al. 2004).

In the analysis that follows, I first examine these variables separately, treating them as distinct aspects of capability development. However, I also create a new measurement of capability development: a composite scale that combines these four variables. This technique has the advantage of treating capability development as the multi-dimensional concept that Sen imagined it to be (Slottje 1991). The scale can be thought of as a broad measure representing the environment in which one lives and access to non-economic resources that may be just as important as GDP for reducing malnutrition and diarrhea.
**Fundamental Cause**

The fundamental cause perspective maintains that health disparities are best understood as a function of social factors, like wealth and education, that determine the extent to which individuals are able to avoid risks for morbidity and mortality (Link and Phelan 1995). Although epidemiological studies have been tremendously successful in identifying the risk factors for major diseases, they focus almost exclusively on proximate causes of illness, such as diet or high blood pressure. The fundamental cause perspective argues that such individual risk factors must be contextualized by examining “what puts people at risk of risks” (Link and Phelan 1995: 80).

The essential feature of fundamental social causes is that they embody important access to resources that allow individuals to prevent disease or minimize the consequences once it occurs (Phelan, Link, and Tehranifar 2010). Diseases, knowledge of risks, and treatments change over time. However, the association between socioeconomic status (SES) and health remains the same because people with more resources will always use them to garner a health advantage. The mechanisms between SES and health may change, but “when a population develops the wherewithal to avoid disease and death, individuals’ ability to benefit from that wherewithal is shaped by resources of knowledge, money, [and] power” (Link and Phelan 2002: 730). Thus, SES should have particularly strong effects on preventable health conditions with known measures of treatment (Phelan et al. 2004), such as malaria, malnutrition, or diarrhea.

For example, education and wealth influence whether people know about or can afford particular treatments. Use of bed nets is the most proximate cause of malaria in developing countries. But wealth and education influence the likelihood of ownership and use of such nets and are therefore the fundamental causes of malaria (Dickinson et al. 2012). Poverty and ignorance limit the distribution and effectiveness of health enhancing technologies, thus shaping vulnerability to disease (Stratton et al. 2008). Even if bed nets were distributed evenly across the population, those with more wealth and education would still have a health advantage by finding other ways to ameliorate malaria risk, like antimalarial drugs. Artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) are extremely successful in reducing malaria incidence, but the high cost and the lack of public awareness about ACTs prohibits their large-scale use (Stratton et al. 2008).

Similarly, water and sanitation are two of the most proximate causes of child malnutrition and diarrhea. However, household wealth largely determines access to water and sanitation. Even if all families had clean water and a flush toilet, wealthy families would still be better able to prevent these childhood illnesses or to minimize their consequences by purchasing oral rehydration therapy, high quality food, or professional health care. Additionally, more educated mothers have the knowledge required to most effectively utilize clean water and sanitation. Again, even if all families had access to water and sanitation, more educated mothers would still garner a health advantage for their children through their awareness of safe food preparation and storage, water
handling and storage, safe feces disposal, hand washing, and nutrition. Wealth and education deficits create underlying vulnerabilities to illness (Stratton et al. 2008). They are therefore more important for explaining health disparities than more proximate causes of illness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Competing Perspectives on Child Health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-Level Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Economy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capability Development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fundamental Cause</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, these theoretical perspectives provide multiple ways of conceptualizing the most important predictors of child health in developing countries and at multiple levels of analysis (Table 1). A fundamental cause perspective suggests that household wealth and mother’s education should be the most important predictors of child health. The political economy perspective focuses on GDP, trade, and foreign investment at the country-level, but ignores the distribution of wealth within countries. The capability approach, on the other hand, posits that clean water, sanitation, education, and health care are just as important, if not more so, for improving child health. In the analysis that follows, I combine all of the theoretical perspectives using a multi-level statistical technique.\(^1\) By including measures from each framework, the results illustrate the multifaceted set of social structural factors that manifest as unequal life chances for children. Furthermore, the modeling strategy shows that children are affected not only by their household circumstances, but also by larger societal contexts.

**Data and Methods**

I estimate a series of hierarchical generalized linear logit models (HGLM) with the HLM 6.08 software developed by Raudenbush and colleagues (2004). These models predict the odds that a child has had a recent episode of diarrhea or is stunted, wasted, or underweight based on a set of both individual- and country-level explanatory variables. The advantage of this technique is that

\(^1\) Unfortunately, data limitations prevent comparable measures of health care from being included at both levels.
the net effects of one level can be estimated while controlling for variation in the other level. Ignoring the nesting of observations within clusters violates the assumption of independent standard errors and inflates the risk of a Type 1 error. However, hierarchical analysis provides unbiased and efficient estimates of the coefficients, as well as proper standard error estimates (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The analysis can be explained in two steps. First, at level 1, the log-odds of being stunted, wasted, underweight, or having a recent episode of diarrhea \[ \log \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{1 - p_{ij}} \right) \] for the \( i \)th individual in the \( j \)th country is expressed as a function of country intercepts (\( \beta_{0j} \)) and a set of fixed individual-level characteristics (\( \beta_{Xij} \)), and an error term (\( r_{ij} \)):

\[
\log \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{1 - p_{ij}} \right) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{Xij} + r_{ij}
\]

The individual-level variables are group-mean centered (differenced from their country means) in this equation.\(^2\)

Second, at level 2, the parameters from the first step become the dependent variables and are regressed on a set of country-level predictors. Each country intercept (\( \beta_{0j} \)) is expressed as a function of a general intercept term (\( \gamma_{0j} \)), a set of country-level characteristics (\( \gamma_{Cj} \)), and an error term (\( \varepsilon_{0j} \)):

\[
\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{0j} + \gamma_{Cj} + \varepsilon_{0j}
\]

This random intercept model tests the effects of the country-level variables on child health, while also accounting for within-country variation in maternal and household characteristics. While previous research has found important effects of economic development, trade, and foreign investment on health, those findings are limited to country-level associations. Such ecological-level studies cannot conclude that the findings would still hold after taking into account the compositional characteristics of countries (McTavish et al. 2010). The present study therefore contributes to extant scholarship by modeling both country- and individual-level influences on child health simultaneously. This is an important extension of previous work because it treats children as nested in larger structural contexts that shape their chances of being malnourished or having diarrhea.

Individual-level data (level 1) are drawn data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), a collection of nationally representative, population-based surveys in developing countries.

\(^2\) Group-mean centering produces the most accurate estimates of slope variance (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). It implies that an individual’s relative position within a country influences the outcome (Enders and Tofighi 2007). This is appropriate for cross-country comparisons in which levels of wealth or education, for example, may have different value depending on context.
Country-level data (level 2) are drawn from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank 2010), unless otherwise noted. The sample is based on countries with available data on the dependent variables collected during DHS phases 3 through 5 (1995-2008) for comparability in time and content. Thus, the analysis pools data on 258,761 children under 5 in 47 developing countries.

The analysis includes four binary measures of child health. Diarrhea is self-reported by the respondent (the child’s mother) for all children under 5 in the household. A child is coded 1 for having diarrhea if s/he has been ill with diarrhea at any time during the two weeks preceding the interview. Stunting, wasting, and underweight are calculated using anthropometric measures of height and weight. Stunting is defined as low height-for-age. A child is coded 1 for stunting if s/he is more than two standard deviations below the median of the World Health Organization child growth standards for his/her height, age, and gender (WHO 2006). Wasting is defined as low weight-for-height and underweight as low weight-for-age. They are similarly coded. The collection of outcomes together then represents a range of chronic to acute conditions: stunting (most chronic), underweight, wasting, and diarrhea (most acute).

One key advantage of these variables is that they are more valid and reliable than the more commonly used measures of infant mortality. Infant mortality is often derived from indirect estimation techniques that use all available information and attempt to reconcile differences among multiple sources, like vital registration systems, surveys, and censuses (World Bank 2010). Data vary by source and method for any given time and place, which makes cross-country comparison extremely difficult. On the contrary, one of the most significant contributions of the DHS is the collection of internationally comparable data. Carefully trained survey teams follow standardized guidelines in physically weighing and measuring children in the field. Training includes classroom instruction, as well as practice field experience and quality control tests to ensure proficiency (Sommerfelt and Stewart 1994).

Drawing from political economy, economic development is measured as real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in hundreds of purchasing power parity dollars and is logged to correct for its highly skewed distribution. Trade is assessed by exports of goods and services as a percent of GDP. In order to further test the effects of trade, I also include export concentration as an index that evaluates a country’s degree of product concentration. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index ranges from 0 to 1 and is calculated using the total value of exports, number of products that are exported from each country, and the value of each product. Values close to 1 indicate that exports are highly concentrated on a few products, and values close to 0 indicate that exports are distributed evenly across a variety of products (UNCTAD 2016). Foreign investment is measured as inward foreign direct investment stock as a percent of GDP (UNCTAD 2016).
The capability approach is assessed by 5 indicators at the country level. Improved water source reflects the percentage of the population with access to a household water connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected dug well, protected spring, or rainwater collection. Improved sanitation facilities reflects the percentage of the population with access to a public sewer, septic system, pour/flush latrine, private pit latrine, or ventilated pit latrine. Healthcare is measured as number of physicians per 1,000 people. This variable is logged to correct for its skew. Education is measured as gross secondary school enrollment as a percentage of age appropriate children. I also create a capability development scale that includes water, sanitation, physicians, and school enrollment. This is a standardized scale with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1, generated in STATA using the “alpha” command. This recognizes the concept of capability development as multi-dimensional, as Sen intended. Cronbach’s alpha for the capability development scale is .93, indicating that the variables are measuring the same underlying content. This combination of indicators is a good proxy for estimating the concept of capabilities (Boermaans and Kattenberg 2011).³

Fundamental cause is assessed at the individual level by household wealth and mother’s education. Household wealth is measured as a composite wealth index that represents the cumulative living standard of a household. Following Heaton and colleagues (2005), this index is calculated as the percentage of household items (including radio, television, electricity, refrigerator, bicycle, motorcycle, car, telephone, and finished floor) present in the home. Very few demographic surveys gather data on income or consumption expenditures in developing countries. Thus, researchers must rely on proxies for living standards (Montgomery et al. 2000). Asset-based measures of wealth like the one used here are widely used to indicate SES, and some researchers claim they are superior to income in developing country contexts (Bollen, Glanville, and Stecklov 2001). Mother’s education is measured as a series of categorical variables including primary, secondary, and higher, with no education as the reference group. Maternal education is the most frequently used measure of SES in studies of health in developing countries (Bollen, Glanville, and Stecklov 2001).

I also include water and sanitation, the proximate causes of poor child health, as a comparison to the fundamental causes. These variables are coded according to WHO/UNICEF guidelines (2004). Improved water source is defined as either piped water or well water. A household is coded 1 for piped water if the main source of drinking water is piped into the dwelling, yard, or a public tap/standpipe. A household is coded 1 for well water if the main source of drinking water comes from a protected dug well, covered borehole, protected spring, or rainwater collection. The

³ See Appendix 1 for a correlation matrix of the country-level variables.
reference group includes open/unprotected well, surface water (river, dam, lake, pond, stream), irrigation water, tanker truck water, or bottled water. Improved sanitation facilities are defined as flush toilet or pit latrine. Flush toilets may be piped to a sewer system, septic tank, or pit latrine. A household is coded 1 for pit latrine only if the latrine is ventilated or has a slab covering. The reference group includes open pit latrine, bush/field, bucket, or no facility. Finally, several indicators of household family structure and size are included as controls: mother’s employment and marital status, mother’s age, household head’s age and sex, child’s age and sex, number of household members, and the presence of multiple young children. Descriptive statistics for all variables in the analysis are provided in Appendix 2.

Results
Tables 2-4 display the results for HGLM logit models of child malnutrition and diarrhea. Table 2 shows the effects of household wealth, mother’s education, and household sanitation and water, controlling for other relevant household and maternal characteristics. As such, it highlights the usefulness of fundamental cause for understanding variation in child health. At the country level, Table 2 tests the opposing hypotheses of neoliberalism and dependency/world-systems. Model 1 includes trade, foreign investment, and export concentration. Model 2 adds GDP per capita. Table 3 focuses on the capability development variables, comparing them to economic development. Model 1 first displays the bivariate association between child health and water, sanitation, doctors, and education respectively. Again, Model 2 adds GDP per capita. Finally, Table 4 displays the key fundamental cause variables again, and contrasts the political economy variables with the capability development scale.

Individual-Level
Beginning with the individual-level variables only, Model 1 of Table 2 shows that wealth has a considerable effect on child health. Although the effect is robust across all 4 outcomes, wealth seems to have the strongest negative effect on stunting and underweight, the two most chronic indicators of child health. Well water, on the other hand, does not have a statistically significant effect on any of the health outcomes. Piped water only significantly affects the odds of underweight, when controlling for wealth and other household characteristics. The fact that wealth

4 WHO/UNICEF (2004) does not consider bottled water as an improved source because of the limitations in quantity, not quality.
5 The control variables are not displayed in Table 2 for the sake of parsimony, but are included in each model. See Appendix 3 for the full model.
6 Again, the individual-level coefficients are not displayed in Table 3 for the sake of parsimony, although the full set of individual-level variables is included in every model. The effects of the individual-level variables remain stable throughout.
is a more robust predictor of child health than clean water supports the fundamental cause argument that socioeconomic status is an enduring determinant of health disparities in spite of intervening mechanisms that help eradicate disease.

Table 2. HGLM Logit Models of Child Health on Fundamental Cause and Political Economy (Odds Ratios Displayed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diarrhea</th>
<th>Stunting</th>
<th>Wasting</th>
<th>Underweight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth Index</td>
<td>0.995***</td>
<td>0.995***</td>
<td>0.986***</td>
<td>0.986***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Water Source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piped Water</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>0.978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well Water</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flush Toilet</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.754***</td>
<td>0.754***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pit Latrine</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>0.924+</td>
<td>0.924+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>0.850***</td>
<td>0.850***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>0.649***</td>
<td>0.649***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>0.681***</td>
<td>0.681***</td>
<td>0.499***</td>
<td>0.499***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0.992*</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.987*</td>
<td>0.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Concentration</td>
<td>1.504</td>
<td>1.299</td>
<td>4.670***</td>
<td>2.536**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Investment</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>0.672***</td>
<td>0.680**</td>
<td>0.552***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Constants not shown. Each model also includes additional control variables not shown (see Appendix 3).

Access to improved sanitation facilities appears to be more consequential for malnutrition than access to improved water sources. Living in a home with a flush toilet or a pit latrine significantly decreases the odds of malnutrition. This supports previous findings that sanitation has a larger impact than drinking water quality on various health outcomes, including child growth (World Bank 2003). Still, neither the presence of a flush toilet nor a pit latrine significantly influences the odds of diarrhea. This is contrary to expectation, since poor hygiene is one of the largest causes of diarrhea. However, good hygiene is much more than just access to a toilet or latrine. It involves hand washing with soap and safe weaning practices, food preparation, water handling, water storage, and disposal of children’s feces (World Bank 2003). It is possible that these hygiene practices are more important for diarrhea-prevention in particular. Again, household wealth has a more consistent effect on child health than access to improved sanitation.
Mother’s education significantly reduces the odds of diarrhea and all 3 measures of malnutrition. The effects grow stronger with each level of education, supporting the fundamental cause perspective. The effects of mother’s education are more robust than those of water and sanitation. This corroborates Smith and Haddad’s (2000) finding that women’s education has a larger impact on child malnutrition than access to safe water. Simply constructing water supply and sanitation facilities is not enough to improve health without simultaneously changing hygiene behaviors. Education, particularly targeted at women, is the most effective way to promote and maximize good hygiene behaviors (World Bank 2003). Additionally, more educated women are more likely to break from tradition and adopt newer innovations in technology and nutrition (Caldwell 1979). This again provides some support for fundamental cause. Despite the intervening mechanisms of water and sanitation, wealth and education are still more robust predictors of child health disparities.

Country-Level
Turning to the country-level variables, Table 2 also displays the effects of the political economy variables. The models are sequenced to examine possible mediating effects. In Model 1, foreign investment never reaches significance for any of the health outcomes. As neoliberalism would predict, trade is associated with reduced odds of diarrhea, stunting, and underweight. However, as dependency/world-systems theorists would predict, export concentration has adverse consequences for child health as it increases the odds of all three malnutrition indicators. This suggests that trade in and of itself is not harmful to well-being in developing countries. It is when countries become too dependent on one or a few commodities that trade starts to have detrimental costs.

Model 2 includes GDP per capita, in order to demonstrate the extent to which trade affects child health through its impact on economic development. Adding GDP reduces the trade coefficients to insignificance, suggesting that the benefits of trade are entirely mediated by economic development. Export concentration remains significant, although the odds ratios are slightly attenuated. Foreign investment remains insignificant, and the odds ratios are relatively unchanged. The effect of GDP is negative and robust for the three malnutrition variables, as the economic development perspective would posit. However, GDP does not significantly affect the odds of diarrhea, the most acute of the child health variables.
Table 3. HGLM Logit Models of Child Health on Capability Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diarrhea</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Wasting</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Water Source</td>
<td>0.992*</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>0.979***</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>0.987*</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>0.971***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.149</td>
<td>-1.149</td>
<td>-1.154</td>
<td>-1.260</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>-1.650</td>
<td>-1.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.249)</td>
<td>(-1.440)</td>
<td>(-5.179)</td>
<td>(-1.661)</td>
<td>(-2.450)</td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
<td>(-5.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.683***</td>
<td>0.614***</td>
<td>0.525***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>-1.001</td>
<td>-1.376</td>
<td>-1.506</td>
<td>-1.719</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.007)</td>
<td>(-3.749)</td>
<td>(-3.767)</td>
<td>(-4.064)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Sanitation</td>
<td>0.994*</td>
<td>0.994+</td>
<td>0.987***</td>
<td>0.992+</td>
<td>0.976***</td>
<td>0.984***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>-1.183</td>
<td>-1.182</td>
<td>-1.432</td>
<td>-1.922</td>
<td>-1.430</td>
<td>-1.237</td>
<td>-1.933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.501)</td>
<td>(-1.841)</td>
<td>(-4.218)</td>
<td>(-2.035)</td>
<td>(-3.562)</td>
<td>(-1.883)</td>
<td>(-7.869)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.684***</td>
<td>0.740*</td>
<td>0.638***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-1.458</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.014)</td>
<td>(-4.942)</td>
<td>(-2.553)</td>
<td>(-4.595)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians per 1,000</td>
<td>0.874***</td>
<td>0.835**</td>
<td>0.792***</td>
<td>0.906</td>
<td>0.862*</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>0.700***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.240</td>
<td>-1.336</td>
<td>-1.453</td>
<td>-1.171</td>
<td>-1.269</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>-1.771</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.483)</td>
<td>(-2.976)</td>
<td>(-4.617)</td>
<td>(-1.489)</td>
<td>(-2.304)</td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
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<td>0.691***</td>
<td>0.616**</td>
<td>0.584***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.112</td>
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<td>-1.502</td>
<td>-1.572</td>
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<td>(-3.369)</td>
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<td>0.993**</td>
<td>0.991*</td>
<td>0.985***</td>
<td>0.991*</td>
<td>0.988**</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>0.976***</td>
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<td>Enrollment</td>
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<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>0.713**</td>
<td>0.689**</td>
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<td>(1.034)</td>
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+p<.10   *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Each cell contains odds ratios, standardized factor changes in bold and italics, and t-scores in parentheses. Constants and individual-level variables not shown.

Table 3 presents the country-level effects of capability development on child health. Each cell in Table 3 displays odds ratios, standardized factor changes, and t-scores. Access to clean water at the country level has a significant bivariate relationship with all 4 child health indicators in Model 1. However, this effect is reduced to insignificance when GDP per capita is introduced in Model 2. Similar to the effects at the individual-level, wealth seems to be a more robust predictor of cross-national differences in child health than access to clean water.

Standardized factor changes are calculated by first standardizing each coefficient to make the effect sizes comparable across models. Then, odds ratios below one are represented as the negative inverse (1/OR) to make them substantively comparable to odds ratios above one.
Sanitation also significantly improves child health in bivariate models. The effect size is attenuated, but remains significant when economic development is added to the model. Furthermore, the effects of sanitation are slightly larger in magnitude than those of GDP for the odds of diarrhea and being underweight, which provides some evidence for the capability approach. These country-level effects again mirror the individual level in that sanitation is more consequential to child well-being than clean water.

Number of doctors has relatively sizable effects on all health outcomes in the bivariate models. Introducing economic development into the models greatly attenuates the effect of health care on malnutrition. However, this is not the case for diarrhea. Number of doctors remains a significant predictor of diarrhea, while GDP per capita has no effect, again providing some evidence that supports the capability approach.

Education has the most robust effects compared to the other capability development measures. The bivariate relationship is significant for all health outcomes. This relationship holds even controlling for GDP in 3 out of the 4 models. In fact, the effect of education is slightly larger in magnitude than that of GDP for the odds of being underweight. Moreover, GDP does not have a significant effect on diarrhea. Thus, as the capability approach would predict, the health-enhancement resulting from improvements in secondary school enrollment is larger than that of economic development for some child health outcomes.

Because the capabilities are highly collinear, they are measured with a scale. This broad indicator of development measures the environment in which children live and their access to non-economic resources that impact health. Table 4 shows that the capability scale has beneficial effects for child health, even controlling for GDP per capita, trade, and export concentration. As Sen and Nussbaum would predict, the benefits of capabilities are larger than those of GDP for being underweight and comparable for stunting. Notably, the capability scale significantly reduces the odds of diarrhea, while GDP has no statistically significant effect. Because the health enhancement resulting from increasing capabilities is larger than or comparable to the health enhancement resulting from GDP for 3 of the health outcomes, this suggests that economic development is not always the most effective way to improve well-being. Model 4 also shows that trade reduces the odds of being underweight, but export concentration increases the odds of all 3 malnutrition indicators. Thus, trading with global markets can be beneficial for well-being.
### Table 4. HGLM Logit Models of Child Health on Fundamental Cause, Political Economy, and Capability Development

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diarrhea</th>
<th>Stunting</th>
<th>Wasting</th>
<th>Underweight</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.995***</td>
<td>0.986***</td>
<td>0.995***</td>
<td>0.987***</td>
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<td>Improved Water Source</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Piped Water</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.927**</td>
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<td>Well Water</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.956</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Flush Toilet</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.754***</td>
<td>0.804***</td>
<td>0.782***</td>
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<td>1.014</td>
<td>0.925+</td>
<td>0.898*</td>
<td>0.887**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Primary</td>
<td>1.009</td>
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<td>0.851***</td>
<td>0.774***</td>
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<td>0.750***</td>
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<td>Higher</td>
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<td>0.994</td>
<td>1.001</td>
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<td>(-1.220)</td>
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<td>2.065+</td>
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<td>-1.011</td>
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<td>(1.970)</td>
<td>(1.742)</td>
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<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>0.788+</td>
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<td>0.768+</td>
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<td>0.998</td>
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<td>(-2.713)</td>
<td>(-1.880)</td>
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*p<.10  *p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Constants not shown. Each model also includes additional control variables not shown (see Appendix 3). For individual-level, each cell contains odds ratios only. For country-level, each cell contains odds ratios, standardized factor changes in bold and italics, and t-scores in parentheses.
However, dependence on a few commodities is what makes trade harmful in developing countries. Table 4 presents final models that incorporate measures from all of the theoretical perspectives.8

Discussion
Political economy, capability development, and fundamental cause add both competing and complimentary insights into the study of health disparities. The results suggest that cross-national studies of child health would benefit from a theoretical approach that synthesizes these perspectives and situates individual- and country-level factors within a world-historical context. The highlights and lessons learned from each perspective are discussed in turn.

Political Economy
The conventional wisdom in much social science literature is that improving GDP per capita is the most effective route to alleviating health disparities in developing countries. Neoliberals claim that countries boost health through increasing exports and encouraging foreign investment. Integration into the global market brings economic development, which trickles down to improve social mobility and well-being for all. On the other hand, dependency/world-systems theorists caution that developing countries are harmed by trade and investment because TNCs repatriate most of their profits, displace local businesses, and discourage social welfare policies that are not in their interests. The results of this analysis suggest that economic development has a beneficial effect on child health, as it reduces the odds of all three malnutrition indicators. As neoliberalism would predict, trade also has health enhancing impacts. The effect of trade is attenuated to insignificance when GDP per capita is added to the model, suggesting that trade influences child health through economic development.

However, export concentration significantly increases the odds of malnutrition, as dependency/world-systems theory would predict. Thus, although integration into the global economy through trade can have beneficial effects for developing countries, the concentration on a small number of export commodities is harmful to well-being. The more a country’s exports are concentrated in a small number of products, the more vulnerable that country is to fluctuations and disturbances in the global market, which adversely affects economic growth and health. Export concentration also leaves countries susceptible to the pressures of major trading partners to privatize health care and reduce other welfare supports. These pressures erode the authority of the state to provide the capabilities that are so important to health. This points to the importance of incorporating world-systemic factors into analyses of health outcomes by including relative levels

8 Since foreign investment never reaches significance in Table 2, it is omitted in Table 4 for parsimony and to preserve degrees of freedom.
of country wealth and relational measures like trade concentration. The results suggest that position in the world-system hierarchy partially shapes countries’ and households’ abilities to ensure health.

**Capability Development**

The capability approach cautions that a disproportionate focus on economic development neglects other deprivations that are equally important for well-being. Indeed, the results of the analysis suggest that the benefits of economic development are not automatic or guaranteed. Sanitation and school enrollment both have slightly larger effects on the odds of being underweight than does GDP per capita. Perhaps even more surprising, GDP does not significantly affect diarrhea. Rather, improvements in sanitation, number of physicians, and secondary school enrollment are more consequential for reducing diarrhea. The capability development scale further indicates that broad contexts of access to non-economic resources have particularly beneficial effects on child health. Scholars and policymakers assume that the benefits of economic development “trickle down” to influence health and well-being (Jenkins and Scanlan 2001). But this may not be the case for particularly acute health issues like diarrhea. It is possible that doctors and education are more important for attending to immediate health needs.

One limitation of the analysis is that many of the country-level variables are moderately correlated (see Appendix 1). Thus, a bit of caution may be warranted in making conclusions about which aspects of development are most important. Part of the way in which economic development influences health in some contexts is by increasing access to water, sanitation, doctors, and education. A comparison of the size of the GDP coefficients between Appendix 2 and Table 3 suggests that the effects of GDP per capita are moderated by the inclusion of the capability variables. However, it is important to remember that this is not always the case. GDP per capita does not always bring improvements in capabilities or health (Shen and Williamson 2001; World Bank 2014). This is evidenced by the fact that some countries experience dramatically higher rates of malnutrition than their national income would suggest (Hagey 2012). Moreover, it is also possible that the capability variables contribute to improved child health by increasing economic development. After all, populations with better water, sanitation, health care, and access to education are likely more productive and can contribute more to the economic growth of society. A comparison of Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 suggest that this might also be the case. The capability development variables are moderated by the inclusion of GDP per capita. Although it is beyond the scope of the current methods to do so, future research could try to parse this out. As data DHS data collection efforts are ongoing, longitudinal analyses may be a feasible and fruitful next step.
Fundamental Cause

Household wealth and mother’s education are the only variables that have robust and consistent effects across all four dependent variables at the individual level. They seem to produce greater health benefits for children than access to clean water and, in some cases, access to improved sanitation facilities. Despite the fact that these results are cross-sectional, this lends support to the fundamental cause perspective because it suggests that SES is a more robust predictor of child health than the more proximate intervening mechanisms of water and sanitation. That is, the effects of SES endure because those with more wealth and education will always use those resources to garner a health advantage, especially for illnesses like malnutrition and diarrhea with known treatment. Of course, a true test of the fundamental cause perspective would need longitudinal data to assess whether the relationship is reproduced over time with different intervening mechanisms (Phelan, Link, and Tehranifar 2010). The evidence provided here is suggestive and provides an avenue for future research in developing countries.

Conclusion

Sociologists have long been interested in the social determinants of health, and political economy scholars are particularly interested in how world-systems factors shape well-being. Yet research on globalization and development typically focuses on macro-economic processes like trade agreements and international markets, without recognizing the ways in which such processes affect the human body (de Casanova and Sutton 2013). The results of this study point to the need to integrate several theoretical frameworks that are typically deployed in separate literatures. The analyses provide evidence in support of all of the theories, demonstrating the usefulness of synthesizing them. In tandem, the fundamental cause, economic development, and political economy perspectives complement each other by making up for what each of the others lack. By utilizing multi-level models and several perspectives on health, this study offers a more comprehensive theoretical and empirical approach to the study of cross-national health disparities. In addition, the malnutrition and diarrhea variables analyzed here are more valid and reliable than the traditional estimates of mortality that are typically used in cross-national analyses of health. Stunting and underweight (the most chronic health indicators) seem to be most affected by household and maternal characteristics. Diarrhea (the most acute) is least affected by such variables, and it is the only health indicator that is not affected by GDP per capita. That the results vary across these outcomes has important implications for understanding health disparities, a fact which is obscured by the previous disproportionate focus on mortality alone.

More broadly, the results of this study inform our thinking about how global-level relationships influence states’ and households’ capacities to maintain health. Patterns of inequality are rooted in the relations among countries (Ragin and Bradshaw 1992). In the face of declining
state power, countries in the periphery of the world-economy are less able to assert their own governance priorities than those in the core, which continue to sustain considerable welfare states. Some countries have more autonomy, and therefore more policy space, than others. This greatly affects the distribution of non-monetary resources that are so important for health, such as the provision of health care and education. Although the analysis is limited to low-income countries, it demonstrates how world-system factors shape the possibilities for this cluster of states. Understanding more about how some periphery countries are able to ensure child nutrition despite their relative lack of power in the world-system provides useful insights into how to improve well-being in an era of increasing globalization and marketization.

**About the Author**
Rebekah Burroway is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Stony Brook University. Her interests encompass the areas of poverty and inequality, global health, gender, and development. She uses quantitative cross-national and multi-level research designs to illustrate the ways in which political, institutional, and economic contexts influence the lives of women and children in developing countries.

**Disclosure Statement**
Any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledge section of the article’s text. Otherwise, author has indicated that she has no conflict of interests upon submission of the article to the journal.
References


UNCTAD. 2016. UNCTADstat. Available at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN.


### Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix of Country-Level Variables

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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.38</td>
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### Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics

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<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>36.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Children</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Residence</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Level (N=47)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>33.16</td>
<td>18.17</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>86.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Export concentration</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
<td>24.74</td>
<td>21.71</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>111.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved water source</td>
<td>72.53</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>98.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved sanitation facilities</td>
<td>43.96</td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>97.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians per 1,000</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>-3.84</td>
<td>1.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary school enrollment</td>
<td>46.60</td>
<td>27.98</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>99.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capability development scale</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>1.66</td>
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</table>
### Appendix 3. HGLM Logit Models of Child Health on All Individual-Level Variables and Country-Level GDP (Odds Ratios Displayed)

#### Individual Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Model 1 (Odds Ratios)</th>
<th>Model 2 (Odds Ratios)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wealth Index</strong></td>
<td>0.995**</td>
<td>0.995**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved Water Source</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piped Water</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well Water</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved Sanitation Facilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flush Toilet</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pit Latrine</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>1.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother’s Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>1.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>0.911</td>
<td>0.911</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>0.681**</td>
<td>0.681**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother Employed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.091**</td>
<td>1.091**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother’s Marital Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Married</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly Married</td>
<td>1.149**</td>
<td>1.149**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female Head</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.027</td>
<td>1.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother’s Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.989**</td>
<td>0.989**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Head’s Age</strong></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child’s Age (months)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.109**</td>
<td>1.109**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.109**</td>
<td>1.109**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Size</strong></td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>1.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multiple Children</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.109**</td>
<td>1.109**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Residence</strong></td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td>1.020</td>
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#### Country Level

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<th>Model 2 (Odds Ratios)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita</strong> (logged)</td>
<td>0.890*</td>
<td>0.605***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.640***</td>
<td>0.471***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05    **p<.01    ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)
The Caribbean Cruise Ship Business and the Emergence of a Transnational Capitalist Class

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Abstract

This paper will provide an overview of the fundamental changes that the cruise ship business has undergone with the emergence of capitalist globalization and in the context of the Caribbean region. Rising profits and investments in tourism during the later decades of the 20th century and into the 21st century have been an important part of the globalizing economy. This has been a consequence of both the major technological and organizational developments of global capitalism, but also, and most importantly, of the global system’s changing social and class relations. The shifting social relations and productive activities that undergird the cruise ship business have meant gains for some involved, most especially, transnational capitalists, and exploitative and contradictory dynamics for many others. Annually millions of tourists from high consuming sectors worldwide partake in brief holiday escapes aboard cruise ship vessels. At the same time, the cruise ship business has become an oligopoly, controlled by a handful of large companies, that has driven many competitors out of business or acquired them. Labor in the business has become more flexibilized, with low-wage workers (from a variety of nationalities) whose activities are increasingly standardized, monitored and micro-managed. While moving away from indicative development planning (with an eye to national goals), state policymakers in the Caribbean, for their own social reproduction, increasingly promote the interests of transnational capital such as with the cruise ship business. Importantly, labor and environmental protections have been stymied as the cruise ship companies, adept at public relations and skirting regulations, remain largely unaccountable.

Keywords: Caribbean, Tourism, Cruise Ships, Global Capitalism, Transnational Capitalist Class
The Caribbean Cruise Ship Business and the Emergence of a Transnational Capitalist Class

This article critically examines shifting material and social relations in the cruise ship business, as part of a growing body of scholarly work that has analyzed the structural features of global capitalism. Looking in particular at the cruise business in the Caribbean, my main argument is that the emergence of a transnational capitalist class (TCC) has led to restructuring processes that have been geared toward global accumulation, alongside an insertion of labor power and consumer activities into transnational chains of accumulation. While a number of scholarly works have examined the cruise ship business, none have looked at it in regard to the rise of a TCC. Below, I examine the political economy and historical development of the cruise ship business (and in the context of the Caribbean), looking at the fundamental ways in which it has been transformed during the globalization phase of world capitalism. I look at how processes of restructuring are taking place through circuits of transnational capitalist accumulation, connected most notably to the flexibilized exploitation of labor—with its gendered and racialized components—as well as changing corporate relations with the state.

The cruise ship business is not motivated by the national economic development of any single country. Rather, it is capitalism’s anti-social character at any level—local, national, regional, international, and, most importantly in recent decades, the transnational, that propels this business. Yet, when we add up the ecological impact of mass cruise ship tourism, the costs to humanity become increasingly unbearable. This analysis of the expansion of capitalism in the Caribbean via leisure travel reinforces the point that capital accumulation is substantively a contradictory and unsustainable global process in which those exercising state power play a very important role. State policymakers from a variety of states (most importantly, from the U.S.) have become complicit in the reworking of capital-labor relations to benefit the TCC. It shows us that sovereignty, states, and power are not so tightly tethered to a self-interested territorial logic, but, rather, exhibit what John Agnew (2009) calls “certain migratory propensities.” The number and range of incentives that are provided to cruise companies deepen processes of global market integration to the advantage of the TCC. Dramatically expanded cruise travel also draws growing numbers of the middle strata and working class into its circuits of consumption.

1 The author thanks for their feedback: Dr. Georgina Murray, Polly Pattullo, Salvador Rangel, Dr. William I. Robinson, Dr. Robert Sierakowski, Dr. Jackie Smith, and the students and faculty that attended a presentation of this paper at The University of the West Indies at Mona, Jamaica.
Global tourism—and, most notably, the cruise ship sector—stands out as a leading yet under-explored example of the growing transnationalization (the functional integration across borders) of many material and social relations. Vacationers from among a growing number of affluent places worldwide partake in tourism, experiencing new commoditized and hypermobilized social relations. Importantly, the Caribbean sub-region accounts for 34.4 percent of cruise ship deployments worldwide. Whereas around 3.7 million passengers traveled worldwide on cruise ships in 1990, this reached 23 million in 2015 (Cruise Market Watch 2016). With the Caribbean the most popular sub-region for the cruise business, the most highly visited destinations have included Cozumel on the Mexican coast, the Cayman Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, St. Maarten, and Jamaica (Pattullo 2005: 195; Budget Travel 2012). Tourism, the cruise business, and associated commercial and financial activity have grown as a dynamic core of the Caribbean’s service sector (Daye 2011) and a major spigot through which the region’s population has been inserted into the globalized economy.

One of the largest and fastest growing sectors within global tourism has been the cruise ship business (Pattullo 2005). While a number of studies have examined cruise ships (most notably: Klein 2005, 2009) and other globalizing tourism businesses (Theobald 2004), none yet have looked at these changing industries in relation to the formation of transnational capital and its dialectical relation with labor (Robinson 2003). This article’s purpose is to illuminate the contradictions and nature of the shifting material and social processes that sustain the cruise business, as capital seeks continually to expand. How are the shifting capital-labor relations of the globalizing cruise business occurring through the context of the Caribbean? Next I want to look more broadly at contradictions underlying global tourism, focus on the unequal social relations that undergird the business, and how these connect with the rise of a TCC. After that I will look at the history of the cruise business in the Caribbean, attending to the importance of shifting forms of capitalist accumulation. Lastly, I consider the changing contours of the business in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica, elaborating upon its uneven and transnational structural features.

A growing body of work (going back through the last quarter of the twentieth century) on the sociology of global tourism has looked at tourist motivations, roles, and relationships, as well as institutions and their impact on tourists and tourist-receiving communities (MacCannell 1976; Urry 1990; Gmelch 2009). Such studies force us to consider the nature of consumerism and cultural commoditization in the global era. Scholars have also looked in particular at the role of tourism in

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2This research is based on analysis of business and governmental data, including company tax records of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, secondary accounts of the industry, and semi-structured interviews with experts and workers involved with the cruise ship business. My views were also shaped through a significant amount of time spent in the region, in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica.
regard to sex work, illuminating gendered and racialized aspects of class and productive relations in regions such as the Caribbean (Cabezas 2009; Kempadoo 2004; Pattullo 2005; Yelvington 1995; Wonders and Michalowski 2001).

Chin (2008) has written on the gendered labor patterns on board cruise ships. Not only are there few female ship captains, but unequal gendered dynamics permeate labor relations across the business. Female workers from lower-income backgrounds are usually “performing the ‘frontline’ work of interacting with passengers, and/or the ‘backstage’ work of cleaning cabins” (Chin 2008: 13). While it is common for “white” Eastern-European female labor to greet passengers, negatively racialized female workers from the global South are most often tasked with cleaning cabins.

The racialization of labor in the cruise ship sector, as so many other parts of the global economy, has been built up through social constructs and material relations that reproduce ethnic divisions and racialized exploitation. To provide just two examples, Terry (2013) has written specifically on the discursive makings of Filipinos in the cruise businesses’ global division of labor, while Oyogoa (2016a, 2016b) has pointed out how racialized class relations of the world-system have been reproduced on board today’s cruise ships. Negatively racialized populations, recruited mostly from former colonial countries, have been idealized as the perfect crewmembers to perform menial low-waged services. Some scholars have described the situation developing in the Caribbean region as “plantation tourism,” with labor-intensive hotels and cruises evolving from the old plantation agriculture and other labor intensive exploitive models, where low-wage jobs are reserved for Caribbean, Central American, East Asian, Pacific-Islander, and other former colonial peoples (Boyce 2003; Weaver 2001: 166).

Traditionally, scholars have looked at different nation-state-based elites as dominating the resorts and cruise ship destinations. Dotting the Caribbean’s new array of privatized beaches, these businesses are under the control of a coalition of foreign, expatriate, and local elites (Klein 2005, 2009). In fact, it is clear that the world-system that came about through earlier phases of capitalism has played a key role in shaping many terms and conditions of today’s transnational class relations form (Watson 2015).

World-systems scholars have looked at the cruise ship business and tourism industry in the developing world as based on the flow of resources from “periphery” nations to wealthy “core” nations (Boyce 2003; Weaver 2001). Through this perspective, we would then see the U.S. state as facilitating the profiteering activities of U.S. national capitalists (with a fraction being internationally oriented) (Sprague, 2014a). This is in fact also a perspective underlying nationalist sentiments that many scholars and activists have embraced, including within the Caribbean: that poorer nations and their business communities must then compete with influential foreign national power blocs. Yet as capitalist accumulation has undergone fundamental changes over recent decades, we need to recalibrate how we understand political economy in the global era.
Developmental models and relations tied to the inter-state system continue to erode, as many state leaders and local elites promote transnational capitalist interests and global competitiveness—even if this does include national rhetoric (and some policies that are in apparent contradiction).

Importantly, state apparatuses and power blocs in society cannot be understood outside changing processes of production, labor struggles, and class and ideology formation (Poulantzas 1978: 27). With this in mind, we must understand capitalism and the state in its historical and contemporary relations. Over the closing decades of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, inter-national chains of accumulation and the previous indicative development planning (with an eye to national goals) of state managers has largely fragmented and become subsumed within processes of global competitiveness and transnational accumulation. The social reproduction of corporate and state elites is less and less tied to competing national interests, but, rather, is geared toward profiting through the functionally integrated cross-border networks of capitalist accumulation that have formed. U.S. state policymakers; for example, rather than (as in the past) promoting the interests of U.S. national or inter-national capital, increasingly promote the interests of transnational capital (and particular fractions therein) (Baker 2014; Robinson, 2014).

Incontrovertible changes have occurred in recent decades in production, distribution, consumption, and finance. Through technological and networked development, new models of corporate organization have emerged worldwide. Scholars Peter Dicken (2007), Grazia Ietto-Gillies (2012) and others have shown the centrality and the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the global era (See also: Sprague, 2014b). Through functionally integrated networks of production and finance, TNCs have been able to “cut through, and across, all geographical scales, including the bounded territory of the state” (Dicken 2007: 13).

A number of scholars have shown how the structural changes associated with the emergence of capitalist globalization have influenced new fissures among social groups and classes (Harris 2006, 2016; Hoogvelt 2001; Liodakis 2010; Murray and Scott 2012; Robinson 2004, 2014; Sklair 2001; Sprague 2015, 2016; Sprague-Silgado 2018; Watson 2015). As transnational networks of capitalist production and finance redefine the scale and the shape of the world economy, scholars of the “global capitalism school” have argued that transnational social relations have begun to form across different classes and class fractions.3 A TCC has become

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3 There have been lively debates over the conceptualization of a TCC, transnationally oriented state elites, and the analytical abstraction of emergent transnational state apparatuses (i.e., Amin, 2011, Hanieh, 2011; Meiksin Wood, 2007; Robinson, 2014). Scholars of the “global capitalism school” do not claim that the nation-state is disappearing. Instead, these scholars argue that the relationship of states to the global system is being transformed as a transnational capitalist class articulates interests that are tied less and less to territoriality. While the significance of the North-South divide continues (Castillo-Mussot, et al, 2013; Robinson, 2014), powerful TCC groups have emerged throughout the global South whose interests lie in the global over national and regional economies. Rather than core and peripheral nation-states (Wallerstein, 2004), the core and periphery can be first more fruitfully seen as denoting social groups in
increasingly visible, bound together as a conscious class whose material basis is imbricated in TNCs and the accumulation of global capital (Harris 2006; Robinson 2004; Sklair, 2001). This class has emerged as that segment of the world bourgeoisie that owns the leading worldwide means of production embodied in TNCs and various key financial institutions. However, such a class is not monolithic. Many fractions exist within this class, with different historic trajectories and tethered in different ways to one another and to various institutions, states, regions, and industries (Robinson, 2014; Sprague 2016). The owners and major investors within the cruise ship business make up a microcosm of the TCC.

In addition to the TCC, other social groups and classes are undergoing major changes associated with globalization. Middle strata, such as professionals and small-scale working entrepreneurs, and fractions of the working and popular classes have become integrated into processes of global capitalism (Struna 2009; Robinson 2014). Workers are compelled to sell their labor power to capital (directly and indirectly) as well as reproduce themselves as consumers through mortgage debt, rent, personal debt, savings accounts, making it extremely hard for individuals to escape the clutches of transnational capital. Labor power has become incorporated into transnational value chains. In the Caribbean (and around the world) many are linking into these chains, laboring for companies in tourism and other global industries.

All of this underscores the shift from an international to a global division of labor, with its many regional dynamics. The international division of labor described how different countries had become specialized in the production of particular types of products, so that labor across the interstate system was bunched within nations and geared toward particular productive forces (Liodakis, 1990; Mies, 1999). Through globalization though we can identify “peripheral” pools of labor in the “core” and “core” pools of labor in the “periphery”, meaning that we see in recent decades the emergence of a global division of labor “which implies differential participation in global production according to social standing and not necessarily geographic location” (Robinson 2003: 59).

With the Caribbean as an example, my central argument here is that the restructuring of the cruise ship business is tied up with the emergence of a TCC and the globally exploitative relations that it promotes. At the heart of this are altered labor relations, the restructuring of state-capital relations, and a reorganization of financial and productive processes within the business.
Global Tourism and Cruise Ships

The rise of a global tourist industry and a TCC has been a consequence not only of major technological and organizational transformations associated with global capitalism (Lumsdon and Page 2003; Rodrigue 2013; Theobald 2004), but also, and most importantly, changing social and class relations. Tourism is estimated to account for approximately 9 percent of global GDP, or more than $6 trillion (World Travel & Tourism Council 2012). TNCs involved in transportation, hotels, and various tourism related activities have proliferated worldwide (Dowling 2006). This has been aided by well-organized lobbies of industry representatives and allies, as well as transnationally-oriented elites and technocrats operating through state apparatuses. Alongside the increasing transnational integration among dominant groups, lower- and middle-income populations (including those from the global South) have become inserted into transnational chains of accumulation. As Robinson explains, “The globalization of the tourist industry draws in local contingents around the world in diverse ways” (2003: 198).

Another key factor in the global tourism industry’s phenomenal expansion has been the reconfiguration and growth of social strata worldwide that have disposable income for leisure activities (Liechty 2003; Rohde 2012). While inseparably linked to rising global income inequality and social polarization, a growing portion of the global population takes part in mass tourism, and hundreds of millions of jobs are tied to the industry (Mowforth & Munt 2008). According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization, more than one billion people now take part annually in tourism outside of their home country (UNWTO 2012).

The Caribbean has been a major site for global tourism. In 1996, for example, $7 billion was spent on tourism in the Caribbean annually (Uebersax 1996), and by 2013, this had risen to $28.1 billion. Meanwhile, with a growth rate above 7 percent annually since 1990, the global market for cruising had approximately 18.3 million customers in 2010 (Rodrigue 2013). Various segmented and niche markets have come into being, where wealthy and privileged working class clients of global society are channeled into different lifestyles, featuring a variety of entertainment to fulfill their desires and experiences. Cruise costs for passengers, at one point, ranged from 100 USD per night to more than 1,000 USD per night (Tortello 2006). Tourists are thus incorporated into chains of global accumulations and what Sklair (2002) describes as a globalized consumerist culture.

While all regions have experienced growth in tourism arrivals over recent decades, the share of overall arrivals to “peripheral” countries has grown faster relative to the share of arrivals to “core” countries. As Table 1 shows, while only 83 million people visited developing economies in 1980, this reached 498 million by 2010. By 2030, furthermore, more than one billion tourists will likely visit “emerging economies” (UNWTO 2011: 15). Also, whereas 8 percent of tourists in
the mid-1970s were from core countries visiting periphery countries, by the mid-1980s, this figure had grown to 17 percent, reaching 20 percent by the mid-1990s, and then 25 percent by the new century (Robinson 2003: 131).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>165.8</td>
<td>278.2</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>940</td>
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<tr>
<td>To Developed Countries</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>498</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>To Developing Countries</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>442</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
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<td>*Over surface</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>*By Air</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
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Source: UNWTO

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Expenditures by Tourists (US$ billions)</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>269.5</td>
<td>495.6</td>
<td>960</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNWTO
In turn, the development of the global cruise ship business has occurred in the context of the rise of transnational production and financial systems in the world economy. The business underwent a transformation during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, as the maximization of profits and streamlining of the passenger experience occurred alongside a centralization of the businesses’ capitalist interests. The cruise ship business has become oligopolized by two companies: Royal Caribbean and Carnival Cruise Lines, which together control around 70 percent of the cruise sector. Both companies have become involved in a large number of corporate synergies, interacting with a broad range of businesses (Rodriguez 2013). According to Forbes, Royal Caribbean is valued at 9.4 billion USD (Castillo-Mussot, Sprague, and Lama Garcia 2013). The two companies also own numerous subsidiaries and have purchased or eliminated many of their former competitors. A magnet for investor confidence, a number of transnational capitalists and large global investment firms have increased their stakes in these companies.

Meanwhile, the cruise business has increasingly sought to squeeze labor, limit regulatory oversight, and micro-manage the passenger experience. In regards to the impact on local populations in region’s such as the Caribbean: only a very small strata of the Caribbean population gains long-term benefits from the business, and local tax revenues are small, whereas the industry’s environmental damage has been significant and well documented (Klein 2009).

The major cruise companies and their owners have come to embody “transnational capital”—that part of capital that traverses borders through transnational circuits of accumulation.
By influencing and benefiting from the new transnational orientation of many state policymakers, circumventing regulatory regimes, and penetrating local economies, cruise companies sell “exotic” experiences to high consuming sectors while simultaneously exploiting workers and locals. Through the expansion of the cruise ship and other global businesses, nations in the Caribbean and other regions have become more organically linked into the global economy. Local elites and officials compete to entice global investment, which they rely upon for their own social reproduction.

Shifting social relations are at the core of the restructuring process. For example, while wealthy and middle strata passengers experience pleasurable vacations, they are subsumed within a highly advanced and segmented capitalist society that socially alienates them through the reality they experience and the ability to conceive of or determine the true character of what they temporarily interact with and inhabit (Marx 1992: 163-177). Even while enjoying pleasurable experiences, passengers are disconnected from understanding the social, economic, political, and ecological nature of the phenomena in which they partake. We can consider, for example, recent changes in the business that guarantee passengers are channeled into cruise company-controlled or connected service sector zones. In the past, cruise ship passengers could more easily interact with locals and small-scale merchants, but in recent decades, passengers have increasingly been channeled into company-controlled markets. This reflects an intensified social alienation, where passengers believe they are shopping or taking part in local markets, when in fact they are operating through chains of accumulation controlled by a transnational cruise ship company. As scholars have begun to examine, the commodity relations and consumerist culture of tourism and travel, with its new “hypermobilities”, have helped to shape modern social life, including many imaginations and aspirations (Cwerner, Kesselring, and Urry, Eds., 2009).

The Historical Formation of the Cruise Ship Business
With the European imperialistic conquest of the Caribbean region and the ethnic cleansing of its indigenous inhabitants, African chattel slaves and a smaller number of impoverished European migrants comprised the initial labor imported into the region (Williams 1994; Wolf 2010; Linebaugh and Rediker 2013). Beginning in the 1830s, the use of steamships significantly reduced the time of the journey to the Western Hemisphere, eliminating the reliance upon sailing vessels. By the later part of the century, a trickle of tourists from privileged strata in North America and Europe began to visit Caribbean destinations. Where they visited usually reflected their nationality, as English tourists predominantly visited the British colonies of Nevis, Barbados, and Jamaica, while French tourists went to Martinique, the Dutch to Curaçao, and North Americans mostly to Cuba and the Bahamas, islands in close proximity to South Florida (Gmelch 2003).
By the early twentieth century, modern oceanic liner designs debuted, which immediately introduced a rigid class system on board the vessels. As the luxurious first-class experience above decks improved, the cramped unventilated spaces below deck housed the rest of the ship’s passengers and crew. The 1997 Hollywood film *Titanic* illustrates this dichotomy quite vividly. Yet, as migration slowed, shipping liners sought to provide cheap tickets to people in the United States who wanted to return to visit Europe. “If the westbound traffic had dried up, the thinking went, perhaps the new prosperity in the U.S. might give rise to a new flow in the other direction” (Garin 2006: 17).

Transatlantic merchant shipping capital went through tough times, especially as luxury travel and mass migration came to a halt during the First World War. As they tried to salvage their investments following the war and during the pre-depression economic boom of the 1920s, some companies began to seek new customers among the U.S. middle and upper strata by offering improved accommodations, or “affordable luxury.”

During the winter months of this period, early cruises to the Caribbean became essential to the viability and profitability of many ship companies. These early visitors, for instance, from Europe and North America visited Jamaica aboard steamers of the United Fruit Company or onboard the Hamburg-American West Indian cruises (Tortello 2006). Yet a number of factors continued to impede a full-scale cruise ship business, from the particular geography and climate conditions of the Caribbean, to the passenger ships at the time not being built for tropical climates, with limited deck space, small windows, no air-conditioning, and recreational facilities deep in the hulls of ships (Garin 2006: 19).

Transatlantic passenger shipping slowly declined during the first half of the twentieth century and, by the 1950s, had collapsed. This decline was linked to the advent of large passenger jet aircraft in the decades following the Second World War, when intercontinental travel largely shifted from oceanic liners to planes. The antiquated and uncomfortable liners had been designed to maximize passenger numbers, with stifling cabins that often lacked windows. In addition, the ships suffered from high fuel consumption and had deep hulls that prevented them from entering shallow ports.

Into this scene entered a capitalist entrepreneur, Frank Fraser, who sought to build the first year-round cruise-only business, which would operate out of south Florida. Miami’s proximity to the warm climate and islands of the Caribbean made it an ideal choice. It also signaled the shift in the role of the maritime passenger ship from transatlantic transportation to cruise tourism. During the 1960s, a handful of cruise businesses had formed in Miami, most often operating excursions into the Bahamas utilizing pre-war U.S. coastal passenger ships. In fact, the rise of an international cruise ship tourist business in the region grew in part due to the U.S. state’s facilitation. After the Second World War, new U.S. government policies seeking to open up international markets helped
instigate the flow of U.S. capital and tourists into the Caribbean. Some Caribbean elites profited from new construction projects, marketing, and the management of modern resorts.

Similarly, with the transition away from British colonial rule, many West Indian governments and businesses adjusted their practices, seeking out foreign investment. U.S.-domiciled international cruise ship companies became an important new source of foreign capital. Caribbean states began to reduce tariffs and other barriers to travelers entering Caribbean countries, eliminating taxes on arriving and departing tourists, and providing waivers for visa requirements. The growth of tourism, as Chase (2002) argues, also helped shift a more significant segment of West Indian labor into the service sector. Scholars have also argued that the expansion of the tourism industry impacted the social structure of the Caribbean, such as in the English-speaking islands, where the rising hegemony of the United States and new interactions associated with tourism impacted locals by “reinforcing or rearticulating conceptions of national, historical, racial, and economic difference” (Hogue 2013).

The first major international cruise corporation was Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, which was owned in large part by wealthy Scandinavian shipping families, the Skaugens and Wilhelmsens, and operated by businessmen in Miami who had experience in the business. One of these businessmen, Ted Arison, founded Carnival Cruise Lines in 1972. From a long-established Jewish shipping family, Arison had invested in Nili, one of the Fraser family’s cruise ships in the mid-1960s. While a number of cruise lines began during the 1960s and 1970s, by the latter decades of the twentieth century, the business was turning out growing profits, able to hire from a large pool of poor working people in regions such as the Caribbean and Oceania (Klein 2005). As cruise vacations were promoted throughout the later decades of the twentieth century, the fledgling business gained popularity among middle-strata vacationers and retirees, especially in North America and Europe. It achieved notoriety through media, for instance, with visits by movie stars covered through private radio and television broadcasts.

Transnational Capital in the Globalizing Cruise Ship Business

The last decades of the twentieth century were a period of growth for cruise lines companies as they became ubiquitous in popular culture. Cruise ship companies became entwined with global capital flows by opening up to stock markets and outside capital investments. One ship manufacturer explains that there has been a “shift in the ship financing sector” that “uncovers how fast the traditional financiers to the cruise shipping industry fade away” as a new globalized financial system takes hold (Kuehmayer 2013: 2). With deep pockets and financial buffer in difficult times, the largest TNCs in the business have become deeply linked with the hi-tech global financial system rather than the more nationally rooted financial sectors of the past. Carnival went public in 1987 and Royal Caribbean went public in 1993. This reflected in the 1990s and 2000s
the business boom that occurred alongside major organizational and technological advancements, as well as shifting capital-labor relations. A ship building “frenzy” occurred with larger and larger ships produced (Klein 2005: 14). New regions such as in East Asia also started to become major sites of cruise tourism.

Cruise ship companies have initiated IPOs or have partnered with venture capitalists and other investors in order to raise needed capital, in turn allowing for more financial liquidity and growth. Transnational capitalist Leon Black (Apollo Management) established Prestige Cruise Holding, which now controls Norwegian Cruise Line, Regent Seven Seas, and Oceania. Meanwhile when Carnival went public in 1987 it offered to corporate investors 20 percent of its stocks, which was used for new ships and expansion beyond cruises (as with Carnival Airlines, which took over and merged with Pan Am, and expanded into the hotel business as well). It made sense opened up to many more investors. Royal Caribbean’s annual revenues of 3.4 billion in 2002 grew to nearly 7.7 billion in 2012. Carnival Cruise Lines revenues of 1.25 billion in 1990 swelled to nearly 15.5 billion by 2013. Far from an anomaly, the cruise ship business’s integration into the global financial system continues unabated.

Figure 2. Revenue (millions), Carnival Cruise Lines, 1990-2015

Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

The owners and major stockholders of the cruise ship companies became tied to myriad other companies and industries worldwide. As transnational capitalists, they have taken advantage of the scale and financial resources at their disposal to invest in numerous companies and markets. In 2013, major global investment management firms controlled more than a third of Carnival’s
stocks, including Thornburg, BlackRock, Schroder, Legal & General, M&G, Artemis Investment, and the global asset managers TIAA-CREF, UBS Global Asset, and JPMorgan (Kuehmayer 2013: 16). Capitalists invested in the cruise business are in turn integrated with global markets around the world. As Andrew Gavin Marshall (2013) observes: “A geopolitical force unto itself, and a conglomerate embedded within a transnational network of elite institutions and individuals, JPMorgan Chase goes beyond the financial indicators. Put simply, it is one of the most powerful banks in the world.” Transnational capitalists, operating through companies headquartered in the United States (such as with JPMorgan) and in other countries, are geared toward global competitiveness through their holdings in these investment and asset firms, and are involved, for instance, in cross-border mergers and acquisitions in many parts of the world. Furthermore, TNCs, such as in the cruise business, have increasingly sought out cost-efficient synergies, forming relations with a variety of other companies (Travel Weekly 2003; Trade Winds 2014).

**Figure 3. Revenue (millions), Royal Caribbean, 2002-2015**

Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Cruise ship magnates, few in number, have become some of the wealthiest people on the planet, holding investments in numerous globalized industries through a web of transnational finance. In 1992, decades after founding the Carnival Cruise Lines, Ted Arison appeared on the

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4 For more on this deepening relation, view the “Ownership & Insiders” page on the website for the financial services TNC, [fidelity.com](http://fidelity.com), where one can see details on the major institutional and Mutual Fund stock holders.
Forbes list of America’s hundred wealthiest, worth an estimated $2.8 billion (Garin 2006: 38). After stepping aside and leaving the company to his son Micky in 1990, Ted went on to own Israel’s largest construction company as well as massive real estate, technology, and financial holdings. In 1997, he led a corporate buyout of the government of Israel’s largest state bank while he also turned down an offer to become Israel’s finance minister. At the time of his death, his holdings went to his daughter, instantly making her the wealthiest Israeli citizen. Micky Arison, current chief executive of Carnival (and owner of the Miami Heat basketball team), was said to be the 32nd richest person in the United States in 2004. As of 2013, was said to be worth a total of $5.9 billion, the 211st wealthiest billionaire in the world (Forbes 2013). His investment holdings include companies and stocks that span the globe. Meanwhile his reported tax filings have been only around $7 million, which included a base salary of $880,000, a cash bonus of $2,206,116, stocks granted of $3,618,481, and other compensation totaling $496,513 (Forbes 2009).

As capitalist owners of the cruise ship corporations have organized to secure massive profits, labor has organized and struggled for improved working conditions. Workers on board cruise ships have in some instances gone on strike (Oyogoa 2015a). Ross Klein has written extensively on the conditions that labor, especially women workers, face from sexual exploitation, to restrictions on the ability to organize, to deportation of workers who engage in union activities, to various means of social control and surveillance on board cruise ships. He observes how cruise lines have typically hired workers from multiple countries, with different languages and ethnic backgrounds, as a strategy for undermining their ability to engage in collective action (Klein 2001/2002). “In those few cases where workers have joined together, they have met with harsh resistance from the companies. In 1981, 240 Central American workers went on strike aboard a Carnival Cruise Line ship in Miami to protest the firings of two co-workers. The company ended the strike by calling the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The strikers were declared illegal immigrants, bussed to the airport and flown home, unemployed” (Ibid). In another instance, a cruise company solved a labor dispute by placing South Korean, Jamaican, and Haitian room stewards on buses at the Port of Miami and sent them immediately back to their countries (Ibid). Klein adds that supervisors onboard the ships hold tremendous power over labor, as they are able to dock pay, which is a real threat to many workers on board the vessels who have already paid for their return trips. Klein gives the example of a 27-year-old janitor from Saint Vincent. The worker had his “pay reduced from US$452 a month to US$37 while working for Carnival Cruise Line.” Even after “five years with the company, he feared his supervisors would brand him a troublemaker if he complained. He endured the reduction in pay without question, rather than risk his job” (Klein 2001/2002).
Fundamental Changes to the Cruise Business Under Global Capitalism

Throughout this unprecedented growth and centralization of the business, it has undergone deep changes in a variety of areas. These include the companies becoming highly adept at managing public opinion, the experience of passengers, and the activities of the labor force. Carnival cruise lines, for example, first developed highly focused onboard revenue strategies, where low ticket prices attracted customers who then became consumers at casinos, bars, stores, and spa services. The former head of the Dominican Republic’s Chamber of Commerce, who helped to usher the cruise business into her country, observed: “The industry has changed completely since the 1970s, when I first became involved with it. It functions totally differently now, growing in volume but also overhauled with everything working so fast, calculated on board, and immediate with the Internet. The customer experience is now an all-inclusive package and everything is tightly customized, with every avenue of profit tapped into” (Rosalinda Thomas, personal communication, 2015).

The cruise businesses’ links with other economic sectors and the strength of its influence upon state officials has become fundamental to its business model. As part of this process, its onboard workforce has become flexibilized with its time commoditized and intensely managed. By “flexibilization,” I refer to how the components of a process are altered to meet the needs of a more advanced form of reproduction, which increases or diminishes, and redeploys and reassigns with more ease. At the same time like many other sectors of global tourism, the cruise ship business has repatriated more and more value from passenger spending, while maintaining a web of local and regional alliances and relations that benefit from the business (Clancy 2008). In the context of this phenomenon, I want to highlight five particular restructuring processes that are taking place:

1) A variety of organizational advancements have been utilized to restructure the manner in which labor is exploited. For the cruise business, one of the most important elements of this is the “flags of convenience,” a practice that allows companies to flag their ships from countries that do not (or are unable to) enforce labor protections.

The “flags of convenience” serves as a mechanism allowing for companies to employ cheap labor and avoid many state regulations and pressures from labor unions, as well as gain from lower registration fees, regulations, and taxes, all of which serves to strengthen their position against labor and gives them significant competitive advantages (van Fossen 2016). As Chavdar Chanev (2015) writes, in regards to cruise ships registered in the Bahamas, Panama, and Liberia,

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5 Another increasingly flexibilized workforce linking into the business is in the call-centers. Like many other large TNCs, cruise companies exploit offshore telephone center labor to answer its customers’ reservation calls. Royal Caribbean is currently in the process of moving its British call center to Guatemala (McNeil 2013). Carnival, on the other hand, now has its call center labor work from home, where their activities can be easily monitored through new Internet marketing technology (Heilman 2012).
“there are no codes about the number of hours a seafarer may work or his/her days off, no minimum wages, staff can be punished by the captain in case of complaining about issues (such as safety or food quality…).” As an example of this: Royal Caribbean maintains its official corporate headquarters in Miami, while officially being incorporated in Liberia. Some trade unions, such as the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), have attempted to challenge this practice with campaigns against flags of convenience, such as the 2002 “Sweatships” campaign (ITF 2006; War on Want and ITF 2002). However, as Figure 4 shows, the share of foreign-flagged ships has continued to increase massively in recent decades.

In the 1960s and 1970s cruise ships and their flags represented national lines, such as the Greek Line, the Italian Line, or the Cunard (Anglo-American) Line. This was reflected in the fact that, often, the largest proportion of the workers were actually from those respective domiciles, and some from nearby countries, as explained to me by a former cruise ship employee who worked in cruise liners in the 1970s and 1980s (Mario Paz, personal communication, 2011). However, we now see an erosion of that relation, as the hiring practices of today’s cruise businesses appear to have no significant national orientation, but, rather, pull from a global supply of labor (Chin 2008; Oyogoa 2016a, 2016b; van Fossen 2016). The shifting labor-capital relations on board the cruise ships really became visible in the late-1970s and 1980s, coinciding with the growth of companies such as Carnival. Initially, some companies such as Royal Caribbean and Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) retained some of their national character in terms of officers, but even that practice has diminished in recent years. “Flags of convenience” then have served as an important mechanism through which capitalists in the cruise business can exploit a global division of labor.

2) **Major technological advancements have been utilized for restructuring the business.** Industrial innovations have, for example, allowed for larger and larger ships. For comparison, large cruise ships in the 1970s weighed 20,000 to 30,000 tons; in the 1980s, 50,000 to 70,000 tons; in the 1990s, 100,000 to 140,000 tons; while by the first decade of the twenty-first century, they reached 220,000 tons. This has provided further impetus to the creation of new port facilities able to accommodate the new ships. Expanding capacities (from less than 1,000 passengers in the 1970s to more than 6,000 in the early twenty-first century) have also meant that fewer vessels are required for the same number of tourists. Table 3, for example, shows how 907,611 passengers visited Jamaica in 2000 on board 504 different cruise ship visits, also known as “calls.” In contrast, in 2010, a similar number of passengers visited during just 325 trips.

3) **A shifting industry-state relation is taking place. Cruise ship companies have gained unprecedented rights and powers, especially in regions such as the Caribbean, where state officials compete with one another to attract TNCs active in global tourism.** According to Carnival chairperson Micky Arison, appreciation for the impact of cruise tourism in the region is “far more so than 10 or 20 years ago. But it varies government to government obviously, and country to
country. But I think, generally speaking, yes, it is far more recognized today than it was 10 years ago” (Britell 2013). While this process has occurred unevenly, to attract TNCs active in global tourism, state officials across the Caribbean have lowered taxes and regulations and allowed the industry to operate relatively unhindered. Yet, in turn, cruise ship tourism has come to provide only minimal tax income to states in the region, with on average $15 per passenger spent per port of call (Rodrique 2013). To understand then why this process continues to deepen we need to recognize how business and state elites benefit and connect with one another. Some state policymakers, increasingly oriented toward the global economy, now coordinate closely with organizations that the global tourism industry has set up to help facilitate its activities, such as the Florida-Caribbean Cruise Association.

![Figure 4](source.png)

**Figure 4**

This transition in the tourist industry's relationship with states, and particularly with regard to the cruise business, has accompanied moves away from traditional ports and their old state-run local port authorities, instead embracing privatized port operations with new enclaves in traditional ports or altogether new installations outside the traditional ports.

A related trend has led to an increasing number of company-run or highly influenced port authorities. While often leased, some ports have actually become the property of cruise ship
companies. Carnival owns ports in the Turks and Caicos, Cancún, Honduras, and has plans for a port in Belize. Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited owns the Roatán, a port in Belize City, as well as Falmouth in Jamaica. A parallel phenomenon has occurred in the Mediterranean, where cruise companies own a number of ports.

Even where the companies do not directly own ports, they have considerable influence over port commissions, such as through campaign contributions to local politicians (Dr. Ross Klein, personal communication, 2013). Cruise companies also play countries and ports off one another, demanding better incentives and waterfront overhauls (Klein 2005: 116-117). This in turn has meant that the companies can more easily capture passenger spending at manufactured tourist sites, revenue that in the past would have more directly benefitted the region’s local economy. The structure of new company-owned ports or enclaves in older ports (with fences and gates) also keep passengers inside “the port,” leaving only on company-controlled bus tours or with approved taxi companies. This is very different from twenty or thirty years ago, when cruise ship passengers had far less controlled experiences (Rosalinda Thomas, personal communication, 2015). “Passengers traditionally wandered around towns more than they do now. However, when they do and spend money, the cruise line still gets its cut (commission). As well, many of the stores in ports are owned by offshore entities that have cozy relationships with the cruise lines” (Dr. Ross Klein, personal communication, 2013).

4) **We also see an expanding TNC-subcontractor relation playing out through the cruise business.** Cruise lines to maximize their profits use a growing number of subcontractors, such as local shore excursion providers, crew management services, and taxi companies. While there are different marketing strategies on board the ships, all of the cruise companies have devised ways to separate passengers from their cash. Where a local company (sometimes affiliated with the port agent) might coordinate the shore excursions of visiting cruise passengers, some companies hired by the cruise lines operate in multiple ports (usually within the same country, state, or province), whereas other subcontractors such as concessionaires operate regionally and on board the ships (Dr. Ross Klein, personal communication, 2013). Concessionaires manage operations that are less profitable or require an expertise (shops, casinos, photography, spa services, etc.), and these companies in turn pay sizable fees to the cruise ship companies. Importantly, locally based subcontractors and small businesses that have come to link into the globalizing cruise business and depend on it economically have also advocated on its behalf in the Caribbean, with tour excursion providers and taxi operators, for example, mobilizing to lobby in support of the business (Ibid).
Table 3. Number of Passengers and Calls by Cruise Ships per Year for Dominican Republic (D.R.), Haiti, and Jamaica.

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<tr>
<td>D.R./Calls</td>
<td>283,414</td>
<td>397,993</td>
<td>456,321</td>
<td>289,805</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti/ Calls</td>
<td>246,221</td>
<td>304,516</td>
<td>423,693</td>
<td>282,192</td>
<td>368,021</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica/ Calls</td>
<td>907,611/504</td>
<td>1,132,596/502</td>
<td>1,099,773/482</td>
<td>1,135,843/508</td>
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<th>2006</th>
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<tr>
<td>D.R./Calls</td>
<td>303,489</td>
<td>384,878/380</td>
<td>475,206</td>
<td>496,729/411</td>
<td>352,539/264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti/ Calls</td>
<td>449,921</td>
<td>482,077</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica/ Calls</td>
<td>1,336,994/563</td>
<td>1,179,504/435</td>
<td>1,092,263/398</td>
<td>922,349/334</td>
<td>909,619/325</td>
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Sources: Caribbean Tourism Organization, Banco Central de la República Dominicana, and the Secrætaire d’Etat au Tourisme, Haiti. When data on both the number of passengers and number of calls are available, they are separated by a forward slash.

5) Mass marketing strategies have also become a key part of the business in the globalization era, latching onto the culture-idealogy of consumerism (Sklair, 2002). Increasingly finely tuned public relations strategies further polish corporate brands, such as in the cruise business. Through advertisement campaigns with slogans such as “untouched, unmatched, unforgettable” or “let your dreams set sail”, the business has become adept at public relations and managing perceptions. As Klein observes, “They coin the right words and have the ‘right’ labels for what they do, even if these labels are at variance with what they actually do” (Dr. Ross Klein, personal communication, 2013).

Public perception is very important for the business. For example, widespread media coverage engulfed the Carnival-operated vessel that sank off the Isola del Gilio in Italy in 2012 that cost the lives of 32 people. While the costs from the accident were likely to be relatively low, as the company is insured, negative media coverage catalyzed by such accidents is threatening to the company’s reputation. Public relations campaigns thus have proven vital for shaping consumer views.

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6 While this figure does not include some of the more highly tourist trafficked islands in the region, the data does focus our attention on lower-income and major population centers of the Caribbean basin.
The Caribbean’s Insertion into the Global Cruise Market

Cruise ships have long frequented many Caribbean islands, including some of the lower-income population centers of the region, such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. In the 1960s and 1970s, cruise ships traveled between traditional larger ports of call. In recent decades, there has been a rapid development of cruise infrastructure in both traditional and new private ports. Companies have gained more space to operate and exert heightened control under less scrutiny by local authorities. This has occurred as part of a general shift away from indicative models of national economic development and toward a developmental model that hinges upon global competitiveness and broader market trends. As Carnival’s transnational capitalist chairman Micky Arison elaborates, the Caribbean region’s economic prospects and the profitability of cruise ship companies have become more broadly “related to the general economic situation around the world” (Britell 2013). He adds: “…20 years ago, it was a North American-centric industry, and now it’s a global industry. So the Caribbean has to compete in a global marketplace, and I think that’s a challenge that’s relatively new recently” (Ibid).

Caribbean state policymakers have meanwhile struggled to take a unified regional position towards the business so that they might obtain a larger share of tourism-generated revenue. They attempted but failed to cooperate in agreeing on a common head tax in the 1990s and early 2000s (Klein 2005: 192). Pattullo has explained the way in which the powerful lobbying arm of the cruise companies defeated this effort, illustrating how corporate interests heavily impact the decisions of Caribbean policymakers (Patullo 2005: 197-199).

State elites oriented toward the TCC compete in a global battlefield for investors, helping to keep business costs low. In recent years we can see this playing out regionally, as market shares in the cruise ship business have shifted as more price-competitive areas of the Spanish-speaking Caribbean outpace in growth the traditional English-speaking destinations. In fact, around the world other warm and tropical locations are opening up to the cruise business. As the North American, Mediterranean, and Caribbean markets become saturated, cruise companies are expanding to new markets in Asia (especially in China, Vietnam, and Thailand), Australia and New Zealand, the Middle East (such as in Dubai), and to parts of West Africa.7

One clear phenomenon across these regions, and in the Caribbean in particular, has been the shift away from traditional ports toward privatized ports. This has evolved, as previously discussed, through a kind of vertical integration as cruise companies seek to directly or indirectly control the ports of embarkation. In the Dominican Republic, cruise ships previously went to the old ports of La Romana in the country’s south and, more importantly, Samaná in the north. In

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7 A map, updated in real-time, of the position of most major cruise ships around the world can be viewed at: http://www.cruisemapper.com.
recent years, cruise companies have shifted towards new non-traditional private ports of call or new more privately controlled installations within the old ports. Costa Cruises, for example, visits Casa de Camp, a tropical seaside resort with golf courses in the Dominican province of La Romana. Cruise ship companies that visit the Dominican Republic today include Royal Caribbean (RCL), Norwegian Cruise Line, Seabourn, Holland America (HAL), and Silversea. Not surprisingly, top officials within the Dominican state have close ties with the business and have promoted its development continually over the years (Rosalinda Thomas, personal communication, 2015). Dominican President Daniel Medina, soon after coming into office, pledged to attract ten million tourists a year to the country and promptly met with executives from Royal Caribbean on one of their ships anchored in Bay of Samaná (Royal Caribbean 2013). Marking the first time a Dominican president addressed a cruise ship operator in a press-covered event for Dominican audiences, this meeting showcased the importance of the cruise ship business (Royal Caribbean 2013).

In 2011, in the Dominican Republic, tourism generated 4.3 billion in revenues, while 3.7 million foreign visitors traveled through the country’s airports and 430,000 visited the island on board cruise vessels (Accessdr 2012a, 2012b). Tourists visiting the country had grown to 4.56 million in 2012, becoming the region’s most highly visited country (Luxner 2013). Yet as a local tourism specialist, based in Puerto Plata in the Dominican Republic, explains, Amber Cove, the new private Carnival Cruise built port has caused problems locally: “Taxi cab drivers are complaining because many tourists are no longer coming into Puerto Plata (the nearby town). They can’t afford their monthly car payments even. Carnival operations, running through its newly constructed [privatized] port, keep nearly all the passengers money [within their own corporate channels].” Protesting the lack of inputs for the local economy, some taxi drivers and local small business owners have begun meeting with government and business officials (Tourism industry worker in the Dominican Republic who requested anonymity, personal communication, 2014).

Whereas most visitors to Caribbean countries arrive by plane, new mega-projects look set to heavily expand the number of cruise visitors annually to many countries in the region (Luxner 2013). Yet tourists arriving both by air or cruise ships are increasingly channeled “within the company controlled bubbles,” as explained a Jamaican entrepreneur in the tourist industry that I interviewed (Business entrepreneur from Ocho Rios, Jamaica, who requested anonymity, personal communication, 2014). This makes it necessary for local business people to form close relations with transnational cruise companies and other TNCs.

Global tourism has become a reality even in the poorest nations of the region. Haiti has served as a laboratory for the privatized cruise port. During the final stages of the Duvalier regime in 1986, Royal Caribbean International began cruises to Labadee, a heavily guarded and fenced-off private resort installation in the north of the country. Cruise operations to Haiti have run
smoothly, except for some brief shut downs during “emergency periods” in the country (Sprague, 2012b). Into the 2010s, Royal Caribbean ramped up its operations at the port, running a high volume of cruises (Booth 2010). The company leases five beaches and a forested peninsula from the Haitian state. After engaging in watersports, barbecues, and souvenir shopping within the premises, cruise passengers return at night to sleep on board their cruise vessel (Booth 2010). Approximately 300 locals work low-wage jobs at Labadee and a few hundred more are employed indirectly (Booth, 2010). Despite this idyllic and premium setting, Royal Caribbean pays the Haitian state a miserly $6 per visitor. Since 2009, Labadee has been able to receive Oasis class ships, the world’s largest class of cruise ships with a maximum passenger occupancy of 5,400. Including staff, this raises the capacity of the new vessel to 6,296 (Royal Caribbean 2009).

Jamaica, another major population center in the region, is one of the most highly visited cruise ship destinations in the Caribbean. Ocho Rios, its most active cruise port, hosts more than 800,000 cruise visitors annually, followed by Montego Bay, which sees between 300,000 and 400,000 (Tortello 2006). Port Antonio has a much smaller cruise presence. Traditional ports of Kingston and Port Antonio are for the most part no longer utilized by the cruise ship business. Also, whereas the traditional ports can accommodate most ships, new ports and installations have and continue to be developed to accommodate the newer, much heavier ships. This has occurred alongside a trend of cruise lines taking over control of cruise terminals. Presently, cruise companies owe the Jamaican state tens of millions in unpaid taxes, although Jamaica’s government has not moved to collect (Dr. Ross Klein, personal communication, 2013).

New non-traditional private port installations have been set up in Jamaica, either as new enclaves within the traditional ports or within new company-owned ports. For instance, allowing for its new “mega-ships” to dock in the country, Royal Caribbean has developed Falmouth, a private terminal near Montego Bay. The cruise line has promoted the port as unique because of its close access to local city life, allowing passengers to have a “genuine” Jamaican experience. One press outlet describes, “during a Western Caribbean one-week cruise, Falmouth is the only opportunity for passengers to get a look at a real Caribbean island port city. Royal Caribbean and Jamaica have built a modern port facility, with docks and some local shops. Just two blocks away is a real city where residents seem to live much as they did 10 or 20 years ago” (Molyneaux 2012).

Wealth generated from the cruise ship business goes to a small handful of major capitalist investors, who in turn have allies in state apparatuses and among the local business community. Cruise ship companies, it can be argued, hold enormous sway in the region. State elites have become major promoters of the business, with state-sponsored tourism advertisement campaigns targeting wealthy and middle strata consumers abroad, as well as populations at home, to convince locals of the importance of the business. These government managers in the region under study are clearly under many pressures and are being compelled to integrate their nations into the
globalizing capitalist economy, with effects that extend to the broader society.\(^8\) In other words, looking at the cruise ship business as strictly foreign and therefore alien (through a nation-state centric perspective), incongruously juxtaposes place against space. Instead, we need to understand first and foremost how the changes taking place in the cruise business (and global tourism more broadly) are linked to the rise of a TCC, which gathers around it a host of allied social forces.

Cruise companies headed by transnational capitalists are deepening their strategies of accumulation in how they deal with states, labor, and passengers. Cruise ship business are digging deeper and deeper roots in many parts of the Caribbean to further control the activities of passengers: to limit or control local exposure and keep revenues in their hands which amounts partly to increasing the extraction of surplus value. This shows how capitalist expansion is not directed at national economic development. These processes also intensify the fragmentation, splintering, and undermining of the “national,” with the help of transnationally oriented forces (some locally based), in effect deepening the integration of the national into the global production/accumulation process (and inserting national power blocs into an emerging global power bloc (Robinson, 2014)). The point here is that the state is never neutral, nor does the working class necessarily have an ally in the national state, which has a direct interest in the exploitation of labor—hence the importance of elite’s waging class struggle to keep the popular classes at arm’s length from exercising state power with a view to changing structural conditions.

**Ecological Disaster**

A mounting crisis over recent decades has been the cruise business’s impact on the environment. Cruise ships unleash enormous amounts of waste and trash, and have been a contributing factor to the rapid decline of the Caribbean’s corral reefs (with more than half of its corral reefs eliminated since the 1970’s) (Klein 2009; Vidal 2016).

The few actions by some stronger states to enforce regional and environmental regulations have been stymied in recent decades as the cruise companies—adept at public relations and lobbying and with high-priced law firms—remain largely unaccountable. Klein (2015) documents how between 1997-2014 the cruise ship companies spent over 52 million USD on lobbying the U.S. congress. Caribbean state officials, also targeted by lobbyists, have hesitated to implement or enforce stronger environmental regulations for fear of their destinations losing revenue by becoming less globally competitive. Despite this, cruise companies, as Klein concludes, “would lead us to believe that cruise ships are environmentally neutral. The cruise business projects this image through its lobbyists, public relations campaigns, infiltration of environmental

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\(^8\) Even in the particular case of Cuba, as it adapts and faces new contradictions, and as it integrates to some degree with the global capitalist economy, a major overhaul of the port of Habana is being undertaken so as to bring in transnational cruise ship and tourism.
organizations, and advertising...” (2005: 170). Amidst criticism, legal actions, and fines over its environmental impact, cruise companies have sought to mitigate or downplay their environmental impact and risk therein.

Caribbean government elites disposed toward the mass-tourism development projects of TNCs often point to immediate economic benefits, whereas the environmental damage can take a long time to accumulate and be assessed. Even Cuba, the site of the region’s most unspoiled coral reefs, has recently become a destination for cruise ships. How this will impact the surrounding reefs and how it will be managed remains to be seen, but over past decades and across the region the cruise business has left a trail of destruction. When we consider the environmental and ecological contradictions, it becomes evident that the cruise ship business contributes to intensifying ecological disasters.

While cruise companies have put into place new waste treatment mechanisms, the business is still believed to release into the world’s oceans daily between 40 and 120 tons of concentrated sewage sludge that includes beryllium, lead, mercury, and other harmful emissions. While there are various “memoranda of understandings” between the cruise industry and the United States over these environmental impacts, these rely only on voluntary compliance (Friends of the Earth 2014; Walker 2010). Key for cruise ship companies is managing public opinion so that criticism of these types of activities does not grow (Klein, 2009).

**Conclusion: Cruise Ships, Transnational Capital, Labor, and the State**

The cruise ship business increasingly functions as an oligopoly controlled by groups from the TCC, driving smaller competitors out of business or acquiring them. It controls and influences chains of accumulation into which so many other business groups and subcontractors have sought to insert themselves. Exploiting labor and poor communities, transnational capitalists profit from the holiday escapes of high consuming strata in global society. The changing social relations and productive activities that undergird the business have meant massive profits for transnational capitalists, as well as small gains for some managerial, subcontractor, and professional groups. Local markets interacting with cruise passengers have largely come under direct company control or contract as the cruise companies have become proficient in repatriating the onshore spending of passengers.

On the other hand, laborers and lower-income communities connected with the cruise ship business are highly exploited, with many super-exploited (as negatively racialized workers, many of whom are easily deportable due to their citizenship status). As previously pointed out there are also many gendered dynamics in regards to how labor is exploited in the business. As capital transnationalizes, workers face new flexibilized regimes as they sell their labor power to TNCs and their affiliated businesses (Chin 2008; Mason 2010; Oyogoa 2015a, 2015b; van Fossen 2016).
Labor in the business needs to develop its own transnational infrastructure, mechanisms through which workers from diverse backgrounds can organize and coordinate their struggle.

Governments in the Caribbean region have largely handed over control of port authorities or reformed them so as to operate in tandem with the business. Reflected in the policies they have promoted, local state officials and elites in the Caribbean actively encourage transnational capitalist investment, due in part to their social reproduction now depending upon this type of capital accumulation (Robinson 2012; Sprague 2012a; Sprague-Silgado, 2017). At the same time, officials and managerial strata operating through more powerful state apparatuses, most importantly the United States, with the spectacular resources at its disposal, are vital for facilitating networks of global capitalist accumulation (Robinson, 2014). We can see that state managers increasingly behave in ways that extend the rights and power of transnational capital, while diminishing their own ability to act in particular circumstances and with all manner of implications for what it means to be national. State apparatuses never seem as sovereign as when their officials deploy state power in the global arena to defend and protect the rights of transnational capital, which extends to the right to exploit labor, that involves, for instance, local state managers in the Caribbean leasing land or privatizing ports (Labadie, Falmouth, etc.).

I have attempted to demonstrate that the cruise ship business is organized in keeping with the concentration and centralization of capital under capitalist globalization with the transnational features noted. As earlier national and inter-national circuits of accumulation fragment and undergo an insertion into chains of accumulation that are functionally integrated across borders, many social and material relations are undergoing novel changes. We see this within the cruise ship business, where its globalization not only contributes to ecological crises but also leads to unimaginable wealth for some and to new exploitative and contradictory social relations for many more.

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Hollow Ecology: Ecological Modernization Theory and the Death of Nature¹

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Abstract

The last few decades have seen the rise of ‘ecological modernization theory’ (EMT) as a “green capitalist” tradition extending modernization theory into environmental sociology. This article uses a synthesis of political economy, world-systems theory, and political, economic, and environmental sociology to demonstrate that the EMT presumption of growth and profit as economic priorities (alongside its neglect of core-periphery relations) produces many feedback loops which fatally undermine the viability of EMT’s own political, technological, and social prescriptions, alongside creating problems for the fundamental EMT concept of ‘ecological rationality.’ Furthermore, this article attempts to explain why “green capitalist” approaches to environmental analysis have influence within policy and social science circles despite their inadequacies within environmental sociology. Finally, this article argues that in order to address the ecological challenges of our era, environmental sociology needs to reject “green capitalist” traditions like ‘ecological modernization theory’ which presuppose the desirability and maintenance of profit and growth as economic priorities (and predominantly fail to critique power imbalances between core and non-core nations), and instead return to the development of traditions willing to critique the fundamental traits of the capitalist world-system.

Keywords: ecological modernization theory, capitalism, capitalist world-system, environmental sociology, political sociology, economic sociology, green capitalism, human ecology, treadmill of production, metabolic rift, world-systems theory, ecosocialism

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Our planet is in ecological peril—and consequently all living species on it, including humanity, are equally endangered. To address our ecological crises with sufficient quickness and resolution, we need to shelve permanently those attitudes and prescriptions that would put our plans for ecological recovery on the wrong track. Dominant approaches to these problems within environmental sociology often fall within one of two varieties—either “green capitalist” approaches or those of critical environmental sociology. Despite a wide range of established critiques against both the capitalist world-system (CWS) and modernization theory (particularly in the environmental arena), ecological modernization theory (EMT) has emerged as one particularly influential and well-defined variant of “green capitalist” environmental sociologies, both among reformist environmental sociologists and within policy circles (Brulle 2010; Foster, Clark and York 2010). In this paper, I will both (1) critique EMT for its failure to account for the negative ecological impacts of central world-systems factors, and (2) explore why EMT’s ideas (as a particular variant of “green capitalist” approaches to environmental sociology) continue to have influence in policy and scholarly circles despite the overwhelming evidence against their viability as ecological prescriptions.

The critique in this article will proceed in three primary steps. First, I will situate EMT within the history of environmental sociology more broadly. Second, I will demonstrate that EMT’s failure to criticize central CWS features (its profit-and-growth orientation, and the unequal power between the core and the rest of the world) necessarily undermines both (a) EMT’s central concept of ecological rationality, and (b) its economic and political prescriptions towards ecological change. Third, I will explore the sources of EMT influence in policy circles and social science despite these major flaws. Finally, I conclude that environmental sociology must reject and surpass “green capitalist” approaches like EMT if we are to help humanity respond in time to our common ecological crises, and I propose some steps for environmental sociology towards that end.

**The Critical Origins of Environmental Sociology**

Critical approaches to environment-society research have a wide array of intellectual sources:

- from the anti-authoritarianism and anti-commercialism of Kropotkin and Sauer to the local rationalism of White and Netting, [political ecological research] has consistently interrogated the logic of local production, the value of local knowledge, the environmental costs of regional and global change, and the power-laden impacts of socio-environmental change (Robbins 2011).

Recent research has also now engaged with previously neglected ecological foundations within classical sociological thought itself, such as those of Marx and Weber (Foster 1999; Foster and
Holleman 2012). Critical and explicit sociological study of our ecological relations became engrained as the sub-discipline of environmental sociology as a response to the increasingly widespread recognition of environmental problems in the early 1970s. As such, one of its central questions regards diagnosing the anthropogenic causes of our environmental ills (Jorgenson and Clark 2012; York and Dunlap 2012).

While there is no universally accepted theory of the forces contributing to environmental change, two of the most influential traditions are (1) “green capitalist” approaches such as ecological modernization theory (whose analysis maintains the central features of the capitalist world-system), and (2) critical environmental sociology (holding capitalism necessarily responsible for our ecological ills, and thus pursuing both critical analyses and radical solutions), the latter grounded in approaches such as human ecology, political economy, and world-systems theory (Brulle 2010; Foster, Clark and York 2010; Pellow and Nyseth Brehm 2013). At the core of the development of critical environmental sociology is the human ecology perspective, emerging from the works of Catton and Dunlap (see York and Dunlap 2012), which critiqued human exemptionalism under the banner of an approach now referred to as the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP). Contemporary human ecology studies have recently used cross-national research to highlight population and affluence (measured in per capita GDP) as the central driving forces behind environmental degradation at the national level (York and Dunlap 2012), and have also developed the New Ecological Paradigm Scale, an influential measure of proenvironmental orientation (Dunlap 2008).

Marxian political economy-inspired approaches to environmental sociology have also been deeply influential throughout its history. Allan Schnaiberg’s *The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity* (1980) describes the ‘treadmill of production’ in modern industrial capitalism, where each round of investment prioritizes increasingly resource and energy heavy labor-saving technology, and thus increases both demand for ecosystem elements and resultant pollution (Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). James O’Connor’s work on the ‘second contradiction of capitalism’ highlights that capitalism tends to undermine its own conditions of production as it continually depletes natural resources and shifts to resources that are higher cost, lower quality, further from the site of production, etc. (O’Connor 1998). Later, environmental sociology was further influenced by a directly Marxian political ecology, centered in a critique of capitalism’s varied and severe ecological consequences and focusing on ‘metabolic rifts’ which disrupt the society-nature relationship in a number of qualitative ways (Foster 2012; Foster, Clark and York 2010).
While the earliest world-systems theory had originally been subject to various critiques\(^2\) it has since been increasingly recognized and utilized as a relevant approach for understanding the environmental outcomes of capitalist economic processes (Goldfrank, Goodman and Szasz 1999; Jorgenson 2015; Jorgenson and Givens 2014). World-systems environmental analyses join other critical traditions in environmental sociology with (1) an acknowledgment of the negative ecological effects of the profit-and-growth orientation of capitalist economic activity, alongside (2) their sustained, in-depth attention to the differential power between core and non-core nations within the CWS (alongside its negative environmental consequences). This focus has recently produced significant research on both ecologically unequal exchange and foreign direct investment (FDI) dependence as phenomena that contribute to ecological devastation (Jorgenson and Givens 2014).

These foundational critical traditions within environmental sociology, alongside additional perspectives such as environmental justice literature (Anguelovski 2014) and newer contributions, such as Jason W. Moore’s development of the ‘capitalism as world-ecology’ approach (Moore 2015) or many distinct degrowth (D’Alisa, Demaria and Kallis 2014) and critical political ecology (Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011b; Robbins 2011) perspectives, are significantly complementary (Foster 2012; York and Mancus 2009). Additionally, they have together highlighted many of the quantitative and qualitative ways in which capitalism, as a growth-and-profit oriented mode of production characterized by unequal economic and ecological relations, is responsible for our ecological crises (Pellow and Nyseth Brehm 2013; York and Dunlap 2012). Nonetheless, it is exactly this thesis that is rejected by ecological modernization theorists and other advocates of ”green capitalism”, which presume the profit-and-growth imperatives of capitalism, while EMT in particular fails to adequately account for the negative ecological implications of the differential power between the core and non-core regions. Indeed, it is EMT’s presumption of the CWS that impedes the viability of their prescriptions while rendering their approach to ecological rationality deeply incoherent and implausible-effectively undermining the whole of EMT’s prescriptive analysis.

\(^2\) World-systems theory has faced early critique for (1) reifying the concept of the “world-system” and consequently (2) neglecting concrete attention to the historically-specific development of particular nations (see Zeitlin, Maurice. 1984. *The Civil Wars in Chile: (or the Bourgeois Revolutions that Never Were)*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.). Simultaneously, even early world-systems research has analytically treated the ‘world-system’ as a concept *rather* than as a concrete reified ‘thing,’ encouraging the unit-of-analysis to be determined in the course of research. Moreover, I would argue that the plethora of more recent world-systems theory (particularly regarding the effects of international power relations on the environment) has escaped these critiques through attention to concrete relations between core and non-core regions, *rather* than taking the “world-system” to be a reified concept. (For an influential exposition of, and rebuttal to these critiques, see (So, Alvin Y. 1990. *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency and World-System Theories*. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.).)
“Green Capitalist” Modernization Theory as Environmental Sociology

Ecological modernization theory is a fundamentally representative “green capitalist” approach to environmental sociology (Mol 2002), presuming the central features of the CWS and adopting many core elements of traditional ‘modernization theory’ (Foster 2012; McLaughlin 2012; Seippel 2000). Simultaneously, contemporary EMT has been subject to multiple empirical tests, prompting significant critiques of its methodological and epistemological premises (Brulle 2010; York and Dunlap 2012; York, Rosa and Dietz 2010). First, its reliance on the “case study” method has been found to be unable to isolate general large-scale patterns (such as the impact of EM processes on actual ecological outcomes). Second, EMT has a strong preference for qualitative over quantitative methodology, even though the ecological consequences of modernity are predominantly material and can only be fully and reliably understood with large-scale and quantitative analyses. Third, EMT proponents defend typically defend their approach using individual counterexamples to reject a hypothesis, even though the most developed critiques of EMT have hinged, rather, on considerable evidence of widespread negative environmental consequences of modernization (Dunlap and Marshall 2007; York, Rosa and Dietz 2010). In all these elements, EMT neglects the bigger-picture quantitative research that underlies most critical environmental scholarship in favor of individual-case qualitative research that neglects the overall consequences of capitalist development.

While these critiques highlight major fundamental weaknesses in EM analysis, its central weaknesses stem from its adherence to the “human-exemptionalist paradigm” in its approach to human-ecological relations (Foster 2012), and its modernization theory influenced presupposition of the basic features of the CWS (McLaughlin 2012; Seippel 2000). EMT ignores the number of ways that the (1) profit-and-growth orientation and (2) core-periphery relations of the CWS undermine the ability of “green capitalist” prescriptions (e.g. technological changes, “green” consumption, NGO or market-led strategies, etc) to solve our ecological crises. Existing critiques of EMT have not developed a systematic account of how the presumption of these central features of the CWS undermine EMT’s prescriptions as well as their development of the concept of ecological rationality, a thesis I will proceed to demonstrate using a synthesis of a variety of distinct literatures.

The Development of Ecological Modernization Theory

The central premise of EMT is that environmental interests have been increasingly incorporated into social relations, institutions, and everyday practices (Mol 2010). EM analysis presumes capitalist dynamics and relations of production and does not see challenging them as necessary for overcoming ecological problems (Mol 2002). In this context, environmental changes are said to occur through (1) political modernization, involving transformations in the respective roles of 'the
state' and 'the market' which include an “increasing importance and involvement of economic and market dynamics, institutions and agents in environmental reforms” (Mol 2010), (2) transformations in technology and technological development, and (3) broader social transformations within “greening” consumption practices and in global civil society (Mol 2002; Mol 2010). It would be by means of the successful integration of ecological rationality into these arenas and processes that EMT argues for the ultimate potential compatibility of the capitalist world-system/economic growth and ecological sustainability.

EMT shares with modernization theory a Parsonian conceptual edifice, including (1) its core structural-functionalist elements such as functional differentiation, rationalization, and individualization, alongside (2) its human exemptionalist approach to nature, and (3) its theoretical grounding in an elite-driven, essentialist, and developmental account of progress towards various social ends (Foster 2012; Gilman 2003; McLaughlin 2012; Seippel 2000). The latter forms the core of the EMT notion that the ordinary operations of the contemporary CWS are organically tending now towards the incorporation of ecological rationality. These starting assumptions are further consistent with the pro-capitalist, elite-driven, anti-populist, and ethnocentric approaches of classical liberalism (Wallerstein 2004; Wallerstein 2011) and modernization theory (Gilman 2003). The EM eco-optimistic defense of capitalism persists despite widespread recognition that our ecological crisis is increasingly dire (Klein 2014; Steffen et al. 2015) and the influence of environmental movements have been decreasing in influence (Brulle 2010) as anti-ecological movements and environmental skepticism and denialism increase in influence (McCright and Dunlap 2010). Before we address the consequences of the presumption of the CWS on EMT’s other prescriptions, however, we must first look at the consequences of its a priori rejection of other approaches to human-ecological relations.

The Failings of "Green Capitalism" and EMT

To solve our ecological crises, we must first acknowledge the importance of considering alternative sets of values and beliefs concerning human-ecological relations, as one of the biggest challenges we face in attempting to address our ecological crises is:

the narrow cultural scope and shallow historical depth that circumscribe contemporary environmental discourse, constraining our potential to visualize alternatives to currently dominant human-environment relations (Paulson 2014).

Such circumscription limits ecological prescriptions by allowing non-or-anti-ecological criteria (e.g. growth, profit, maintenance of geopolitical power, etc.) to restrict the consideration or implementation of ecological standards, necessarily sabotaging our efforts. Additionally,
exclusion of various communities and their perspectives from our policy and social science discussions is an issue of environmental justice, as the dominant nature-society ideas and relations are often “detrimental to certain human communities, primarily the poor and people of color” (DiChiro 1998). In short, excluding alternative ecological perspectives from our policy and social science discussions is profoundly unjust, and it threatens the viability of any strategy towards a “greening” of human-ecological relations.

Nonetheless, like liberal and modernization theorists before them, EM theorists have shown explicit disdain for theoretical paradigms and traditions associated with “traditional,” “premodern,” or “antimodern” values and perspectives. For example, Mol and Spaargaren critique Catton and Dunlap as contributing to environmental sociology's “coquetting with ecology” (Spaargaren and Mol 1992), and reject all “human ecology” schools and theorists (from Catton and Dunlap to deep ecology) for their supposed “tendency to try and restore the interrelationship between the social and the natural world in such a way that they seem to underscore the fact that all facts, events, goals, outcomes, patterns etc. as we know them, are socially mediated” (Mol and Spaargaren 2000). This ground for rejection of the human ecology perspective shows a neglect of particular environmental paradigms more than it shows weaknesses in them, and predominantly rests on a denial that ecological ‘forced choices’ exist. Thus, EM theorist’s grounds for rejection of whole families of alternative ecological traditions centers on EMT’s committed “failure to incorporate the biophysical environment as an independent causal force” (McLaughlin 2012), and their consequent view of humanity as “ultimately exempt from natural conditions” (Foster 2012).

EMT shares the rigid anthropocentric separation between humanity and non-human nature characteristic of historical Western scientific and economic analysis (Merchant 1989; Plumwood 2002), and rejects any traditions that hold non-human nature to have anything more than pure instrumental value. Like liberal and MT theorists before them, these commitments ultimately limit EMT to “a highly restrictive theory of social change that promotes a panglossian socio-technical optimism, while marginalizing people and projects who depart from that vision by conceptualizing them as deviant, backward, or irrational” (McLaughlin 2012). This contrasts with many foundational critical perspectives in environmental sociology, from environmental justice activists (DiChiro 1998) to the myriad advocates of degrowth and the expansion of the commons against growing commodification (D’Alisa, Demaria and Kallis 2014) to deep ecologists, spiritual ecologists, and social ecologists looking for a total transformation in political economy (Merchant

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3 I highly doubt that Catton and Dunlap do not believe humanity has a choice whether to either accept the reality of environmental degradation or ignore it, yet still there is more truth to even this extreme claim than EMT would like to admit—as beings who require a metabolism with nature to survive, there are limits to the extent that we can both ignore the environment and survive, let alone survive as healthy individuals. In this regard, arguing dismissively that human ecology perspectives are guilty of “coquetting with ecology” is somewhat akin to critiquing medical doctors for “coquetting with biology.”
This similarly rejects by fiat a number of non-Western and/or indigenous perspectives which posit a more relational approach to human-ecological relations, such as indigenous cultures (LaDuke 2005), Buddhist perspectives (Kaza and Kraft 2000), and pagan faiths (Starhawk 2014).

While denying the independent causal impact of non-human nature is a curious stance for an “ecological” scholarly tradition, EMT attempts to escape critique through (a) redefinition of the object and terms of study, alongside (b) a selective use of case studies (enabling their rejection of empirical anomalies) (McLaughlin 2012). In contrast to Marxian political ecology (for example), EMT studies traditionally focus on “relative (but significant) changes into more environmentally sound directions, in contrast to the “absolute” sustainability sought by neo-Marxist scholars” (Mol 2002). Simultaneously, EMT tends to focus on “conventional” environmental problems such as waste and pollution rather than on the kinds of ecological issues central to Marxian political ecology, such as “climate change, bio-diversity, ozone layer depletion and the like” (Mol 2002:96).

In addition to the limits these biases impose on the actual credibility of EMT within environmental sociology, EMT’s prioritization of the maintenance of the CWS as an unquestioned premise creates deep inconsistencies in a central (if not the central) EMT concept—ecological rationality due to both (1) the dynamics of the profit-and-growth imperatives of the CWS, and (2) the unequal power between core and non-core regions. EMT posits a “growing independence” of ecological rationality (Mol 2002) while arguing that it should not be given priority above “other rationalities” (Spaargaren, Mol and Buttel 2000), and that it can be incorporated only when “environmental criteria, instruments and concepts are reformulated to mesh with the logics of modern markets” (Mol, Sonnenfeld and Spaargaren 2009). EMT thus holds that ecological rationality should be subordinated to economic rationalities despite elsewhere recognizing that “economic mechanisms, institutions and dynamics will always first follow economic logics and rationalities” (Mol 2002). Ecological rationality as defined by EM theorists is thus theoretically incoherent and inherently contradictory, as it is supposed to be simultaneously somehow (1) increasingly independent from economic rationality, yet (2) ultimately subordinate to it, despite the latter’s divergence from and potential hostility towards the former.

Simultaneously, inattention to the full implications of global power imbalances within the CWS generates further problems in the conceptualization and hypothetical integration of ecological rationality. At face value, EMT recognizes that (1) nations, global economic institutions, and transnational corporations with more power in the global economy have disproportionate decision-making power (Mol 2002) and (2) tend to neglect underdeveloped/poorer nations and peoples (Mol 2002:106). Simultaneously, EM further (3) prioritizes analysis of local “conventional” environmental problems such as pollution (Mol 2002) rather than the broader global issues common to rich and poor nations and peoples alike, such as climate change. Without fundamentally challenging the disproportionate power between the core
and the periphery and semi-periphery, how plausible is EM optimism when more powerful nations, firms, etc., tend to ignore the issues of poorer nations and peoples, and EM analysis ignores their common-cause global-scale environmental crises? In ignoring these deeper questions, EMT provides little guidance as to how ecological rationality can reliably be incorporated, further undermining the practical viability of their approach to ecological rationality. Beyond these problems, EMT’s presumption of the CWS also undermines their other prescriptions for economic, political, or social change.

Endogenous “Ecological Rationality:” Ecological Production in the CWS?

Despite EMT’s assumptions to the contrary, many natural and social scientists deny that indefinite economic growth is possible or desirable on a finite planet (D’Alisa, Demaria and Kallis 2014; Foster, Clark and York 2010; Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2008). The centrality of growth and profit imperatives in the CWS nonetheless means that firms ultimately have to prioritize growth and profit, regardless of environmental costs (Löwy 2015; Magdoff and Foster 2011) which are not reflected in market prices (Schor 2011). The divergence between profit and ecological rationality impedes firms’ abilities to incorporate the latter, as it is impossible for firms to maximize divergent or competing priorities, and telling managers to try leads to “confusion and a lack of purpose that will handicap the firm in its competition for survival” (Jensen 2001). Profit maximization thus tends to generate externalities, where the social and ecological costs of production are pushed onto the public rather than internalized (Fieldman 2014; Magdoff and Foster 2011; Schor 2011). Studies have shown that financialization has increased the dominance of ecologically harmful profit maximization criteria in recent decades (Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011a; Schor 2011), such as impeding the capacities of firms to implement EM innovations (Fieldman 2014), surging food prices in 2008 following agro-food transnationals’ increasing internalization of the logic of finance capital (Moore 2010), and increasing threats to biodiversity, forest ecosystem functions, and conservation efforts in North American industrial timberland ownership (Gunnne and Gellert 2011).

Numerous limitations exist to the central EMT and “green capitalist” eco-efficiency argument that ecologically efficient technologies and management strategies may be reliably adopted due to cost savings or related improvements in profitability. Eco-efficiency arguments tend to neglect the “Jevons paradox,” in which cost advantages (gained from the cheapening of resources due to increased efficiency in production) often generate increased resource usage (Foster, Clark and York 2010), such as how overall energy demand has recently risen fastest in sectors with the largest efficiency gains (Schor 2011). EMT eco-efficiency arguments further neglect the “paperless office paradox,” where the presence of a substitute of a resource does not necessarily lead to diminished usage of that resource (York 2006). Finally, attention to world-system factors highlights that
“green” technology adoption in the core may come at the cost of ecological devastation in the periphery, as when “green” automotive technologies utilize materials from the global South whose extraction causes tremendous ecological devastation (Bonds and Downey 2012). In short, technological development within the constraints of the CWS will likely be insufficient to overcome the “treadmill” of increasing resource and energy usage (Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994).

Acknowledgement of core-periphery relations further impacts the anticipated environmental consequences of economic development. Within the CWS, the core both extracts resources (Clark and Foster 2009) and labor (Chase-Dunn 1998) at low-or-no cost (relative to the periphery), and commonly externalizes the environmental impacts of their production onto peripheral regions (Jorgenson and Givens 2014). For example, ecologically unequal exchange literature has used cross-national research to show that the vertical flow of exports from poorer to wealthier nations contributes to environmental destruction in the former, such as increased deforestation, biodiversity loss, and carbon dioxide emissions, while foreign direct investment dependence also contributes to a variety of environmental harms (see Jorgenson 2016; Jorgenson and Givens 2014). Accounting for the consequences of the profit-and-growth orientation of the CWS and the unequal power between core and non-core nations highlights that nothing in the logic of profitability or growth suggests ecologically sound production processes as an endogenous tendency of capitalist firms.

Endogenous “Ecological Rationality:” Ecological Consumption in the CWS?
Various other tendencies within the CWS weaken the “green capitalist” and EMT argument that economic and ecological rationalities may be unified as consumers choose “green” consumption. These arguments typically only consider the consumption of individual consumers (Foster, Clark and York 2010), though two definitions are relevant to our ecological crises: (1) consumption as the use of natural and physical resources, and (2) (in economics) consumption as that part of aggregate economic demand that is attributable to consumer spending. The conflation of the “environmental” and “economic” meanings of consumption is referred to as the enigma of consumption (Foster, Clark and York 2010). Prescriptions limited to individual-level consumption consequently often (1) neglect investment and its impact on environmental throughput, (2) lead to analyses which highlight saving as part of our environmental solutions, ignoring that savings become directed into investment oriented towards economic growth in the CWS, and (3) conflate “total environmental waste in society with waste related to direct household consumption” (Foster, Clark and York 2010). A full critique of consumption practices within the CWS thus necessitates a critique of individual consumption practices and a deeper critique of its orientation towards profit and growth, the very aspects EMT maintains at all costs.
Regarding individual consumer spending, economic growth in the CWS typically requires continual overall growth in consumption (Jones 2011; Schnaiberg 1980). At least three (not mutually exclusive) consumption tendencies contribute to ecologically harmful overconsumption. First, the concept of *acquisitive* consumption relates to acquisition of goods that exceeds one’s needs, amplified by the *dependence effect*, whereby the generation of new products expands consumer possibilities and, with them (and persistent advertising), creates new and expanded perceived needs (Dutt 2008; Galbraith 1958). Second is *repetitive* consumption, the “cycle of buying, discarding, and buying again” due to both disposable products and “planned obsolescence” (Sheth, Sethia and Srinivas 2011), including the *psychological* planned obsolescence resulting from increasing emphasis on the “symbolic value” of goods due to the “fashion cycle” (Schor 2011). Finally, the concept of *aspirational* consumption (Sheth, Sethia and Srinivas 2011) reflects how considerations of class and status modify consumption patterns (Bourdieu 1984; Schor 2007; Veblen 1973), easily translating into ecologically harmful consumption practices. These factors together greatly contribute to individual overconsumption and threaten sustainability (Sheth, Sethia and Srinivas 2011).

The factors that contribute to ecologically harmful overconsumption practices are amplified by those keeping consumers in the CWS under-informed of the ecological quality of the goods they consume. Individual consumers in the CWS tend to be blind to the process of production, and therefore the social (Marx 1990) and ecological (Jones 2011) relations and processes that created the commodity, a phenomena Marx discussed in terms of *commodity fetishism* (Marx 1990). This *commodity fetishism* is amplified by the increasing distance between production and consumption in the CWS, the proliferation of marketing (as it drowns out neutral information and thus increases the cost of acquiring it) (Hudson and Hudson 2003), and copyrights, patents, and trademarks (Schor 2011). These phenomena collectively reduce the likelihood that consumers understand the true ecological cost of individual consumption. As information asymmetries between producers and consumers tend to cause the average value of a commodity to decrease (Akerlof 1970), this can easily extend to the diminishment of the ecological quality of goods over time (Kuhn 1999).

Consumer blindness to the true ecological costs of their consumption cannot adequately be solved within the CWS by the common “green capitalist” advocated eco-labeling proposal due to profit-oriented corporate “greenwashing.” Greenwashing emerges from the reality of ‘ecological rationality’ being at best a secondary concern for firms (if at all) against their aforementioned biases towards profit maximization. This effectively guarantees that “in the absence of a compulsory system, corporations will continue to hold a strong incentive to appear socially responsible while avoiding the costs of actually doing so” (Alves 2009), producing a rampant tendency towards greenwashing at either the firm-level or the product-level (Delmas and Burbano 2011). The TerraChoice Group has categorized product-level greenwashing into the “seven sins”
of greenwashing, including (among others) the ‘Sin of No Proof’, where environmental claims cannot be substantiated, and the ‘Sin of Worshipping False Labels’, where a product gives the impression of a third-party endorsement but no such endorsement exists (TerraChoice Group 2010). For example, of the 5,296 home and family consumer products examined in the 2010 ‘Sins of Greenwashing’ report, over 95% of ‘greener’ products commit at least one of the seven Sins of Greenwashing. “Greenwashing” amplifies consumer eco-blindness while eroding confidence in green firms and products (Delmas and Burbano 2011), and cannot form a primary solution to our ecological woes within the context of the CWS. In short, there are no organic tendencies towards reliable prioritization of ecological rationality in either production or consumption within the CWS.

**Exogenous “Ecological Rationality:” Non-State Mechanisms of Political Change in the CWS**

While the increasingly decentralized, private-oriented forms of governance that underlie EM prescriptions for political modernization are an evident trend in environmental policy, they have serious limitations as environmental solutions. In addition to greater inclusion of firms, EMT’s advocacy of political modernization involves the greater inclusion of non-state actors such as NGOs (Mol 2002), as does the influential “world polity” tradition in its analysis of environmental governance. This section will focus on the negative impacts of the CWS on the viability of these prescriptions through a focus on this “world polity” literature, who argue akin to EMT that “significant environmental restructuring is possible within the global economy” (Schofer and Hironaka 2005) through increasing global environmental concern, and through the impact of science on political and economic policy. Along with EMT, they contend that environmental concerns become embedded in institutions, particularly environmental international non-governmental organizations (EINGOs) which pressure the state to take on environmental responsibility. While cross national research has found some limited support for these propositions (Schofer and Hironaka 2005), there are clear limitations to NGO-led strategies of environmental reform within the constraints of the CWS.

“World polity” literature (among others that prioritize NGO-led strategies for environmental change) is often criticized for ignoring power and inequality (Hall and Taylor 1996), and significant scholarship on global environmental governance contests much of the power and autonomy that are attributed to the EINGOs (on which the world polity literature focuses) (Gareau 2012; Goldman 2006). Specifically, “world polity” literature has been critiqued for ignoring the role of both corporate and political power (Smith 2000) and specifically the disproportionate power of states in the core (Beckfield 2003, 419) in shaping global values. Moreover, while NGOs may contribute towards the adoption of regulatory standards, they often have weak monitoring capabilities (King and Pearce 2010), while dependence on external funding and support often
makes them more likely to take relatively conservative positions deemed acceptable to their funders or home governments (Brulle 2000; Fisher 1997), a process which has often impacted EINGOS (Gareau 2012). In light of all these factors working against the efficacy of NGO-led strategies within the constraints of the CWS, it is unlikely that EINGOS will be able to make significant progress regarding our ecological crises without fundamentally critiquing the global economic system. The endogenous production and consumption tendencies of the CWS cannot be sources of sufficient ecological change, and neither can reliance on NGOs in the absence of a full, critical challenge to the CWS itself. As our ecological crisis is truly dire and the central tendencies of the CWS undermine our ability to meet it fully or in anything resembling an acceptable timeline, the more pressing question becomes why “green capitalist” approaches like EMT have had influence in public policy circles, mainstream environmentalisms, and in contemporary environmental sociology.

**Hollow Ecology in State Policy and Social Science**

Within the confines of the CWS, states face many factors that bias their priorities towards the facilitation of profit and growth, and these biases have only grown in the neoliberal era. Simultaneously, this general political context has produced certain analytical paths of least resistance for mainstream environmental organizations and social scientists. As addressing our environmental crises involves both identifying their causes and the factors impeding the adoption of solutions, the following section will explore why states and social scientists sometimes constrain their analyses and prescriptions within the ecologically destructive tendencies of the CWS. Despite the wide diversity of perspectives on the nature of the contemporary state, approaches as diverse as neo-Weberian (Evans 1995), neo-Marxian (Jessop 2002), and world-systems approaches to the state (Chase-Dunn 1998; Wallerstein 2004) acknowledge contemporary states’ prioritization of economic growth as a primary economic objective. The general structural separation between political and economic institutions and agents under capitalism renders states generally dependent on capital accumulation (and the profitability that it hinges on) for the production of the goods used in state power, maintenance of the tax base that underlies state funding, financing (where taxation is insufficient), and employment. Prioritization of profit and growth in state policy is further amplified by interstate geopolitical and economic competition (Chase-Dunn 1998; Miliband 1969) and the increasing dominance of financialization and global financial and trade institutions (Chang 2012; Jorgenson and Givens 2014; Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011a). Outside the core these latter institutions have often imposed strong austerity measures and structural adjustment policies (Dunlap and Jorgenson 2012) which have been shown to increase environmental harms (Shandra 2007). These features of states, the state-system, and political-
economic relations within the CWS often bias state policy towards facilitating profit and growth above competing priorities.

Many further phenomena may contribute towards state actors’ active support of the profit-and-growth priorities of the CWS. The ideological tenets of “bourgeois cultural hegemony” may be believed by both state actors and the population in general (Block 1977; Gramsci 1971), whose power stems from the ability to re-interpret the relations of production (Ewing 2015) and their ecological nature and consequences (Robbins 2011). The acceptance of this hegemonic consensus may be amplified as the highest positions within state institutions (Miliband 1969) and policy-planning groups (Domhoff 2010) tend to be filled with individuals who share upper-class backgrounds. Simultaneously, the interdependence of states and capital within the CWS also creates in firms a general dependence on states to support the preconditions and apparent legitimacy of profitability and growth (Foster 2014; O’Connor 1998; Parenti 2016; Purcell and Nevins 2005) in addition to many specific ways states impact profitability (Wallerstein 2004).

Firms thus have a strong interest in working to facilitate active state support, and to thwart the imposition of any standards that would impede profitability, such as environmental or labor standards (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Industry groups or firms may attempt to use tactics such as lobbying and advertising (Miliband 1969; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994), campaign finance (De Figueiredo and Edwards 2007), or the persuasion of individual politicians (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994) to prevent regulation and secure political support. If regulation does become enacted, “treadmill actors” can attempt to disempower their governmental implementation via means such as lawsuits, appeals to international trade bodies, or various forms of regulatory capture (where special interests such as firms or industries manipulate the agencies tasked with their regulation) (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). In short, without challenging the political power of capital within the CWS (and the factors predisposing states and state actors in favor of profit and growth), state policy will predominantly tend to undermine “ecological rationality.”

Simultaneously, EM theorists often justify their prescriptions via the argument that EM-style “green capitalist” policies are already being enacted by states and within the international community. Given state prioritization of profit and growth (and the ecological inadequacy of “green capitalist” approaches altogether), why would states adopt any environmental policies at all? Despite the factors biasing states within the CWS towards the facilitation of profit and growth, states are simultaneously now held responsible by their citizens to some degree for the alleviation of environmental degradation (Hay 1994; Parenti 2016). These competing priorities mean states often restrict their responses to the minimum necessary to restore face-value legitimacy (Hay 1994), often limited to a combination of strategies such as token gesturism, symptom amelioration, or the “greening” of political ideology (Hay 1994) rather than fundamentally addressing our
ecological crises. Nowhere is this truer than the embrace in many states of “green capitalist” approaches to environmental crisis.

Following increasing public awareness of environmental ills emerging from the 1960s onward, environmental governance institutions and firms alike recognized the necessity of acknowledging and responding to environmental crises (Bernstein 2012; Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011a; Sklair 2001). Rather than reject the CWS or accept an increasingly anti-capitalist environmental consensus, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) organized the “big business response” (Sklair 2001) to the crisis, and in the 1970s founded a Commission on Environment, and later a World Conference of Environmental Management in 1984, attracting 500 representatives from government, environmental groups, and industry. The ICC was then chosen to advise the Bergen Ministerial Conference, which ultimately produced the Brundtland Report of the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future in 1987.

The concept of “sustainable development,” still the dominant approach of both the UN and the increasingly transnational capitalist class (Salleh 2015), emerged from the Brundtland Report (Bernstein 2002; Eckersley 2004; Sklair 2001) as:

a political discourse which sought to address both the growing North-South conflicts (the relations between poverty and global sustainability) and the growing counter-revolution by firms and states to the idea of regulation, that is to say to attempt to install an environmental governance “compatible” with no limits to growth (the pre-condition of neoliberal capitalism) (Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011a)

Free market “corporate environmentalism” that circumscribes environmental analyses and solutions within market logics became “the main weapon of those working for the global capitalist system to establish ownership of [the concept of] sustainable development” (Sklair 2001), ensuring that environmental politics were carefully contained within pro-growth “green capitalist” prescriptions. This business-oriented “green capitalist” consensus continued to mobilize in order to shift global environmentalism towards growth-and-profit oriented directions (Sklair 2001) via the construction of a “sustainable development historical bloc” that solidified in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio.

In Rio, the ICC’s environmental arm (the Business Council for Sustainable Development) guaranteed that emerging environmental discourse continued to reflect the needs of major firms and industries. It was ultimately successful in keeping criticisms of increasingly transnational corporations “off the official agenda” (Sklair 2001) in discussions of our environmental crises,
instead promoting the view that trade and finance liberalization are consistent or even necessary for environmental protection (Bernstein 2002). This approach continues to dominate the mainstream approach to our ecological crises, as exemplified in the 2012 Rio+20 summit, where both the “the business sector and UN promote[d] a future ‘green economy’ based on finance, technology, market mechanisms, and ‘voluntary commitments’” (Salleh 2015). The result of these corporate efforts is a circumscription of environmental solutions within the boundaries of profit-and-growth priorities, and these approaches bled into environmental sociology in a “modernist sociological” form via EMT (Blühdorn 2012; Eckersley 2004; Sklair 2001).

In effect, while “green capitalist” approaches to the environment have myriad evident weaknesses impeding their ability to address environmental crisis, they perfectly package environmental concern in terms friendly to the environmentally destructive profit-and-growth priorities of firms and states within the CWS. In this context, even apparent “green” prescriptions are often wedded to economic proposals that undermine any potential of ecological gains, as was the case with the Rio+20 summit:

Rather than concede the fundamental irrationality of industrialized provisioning, the transnational ruling class asks the World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and UNEP to insert green growth and sustainable development into structural reform policies on a country by country basis [. . . b]ut at the same time, “innovative instruments” for high tech financing are to be consistent with the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The Future We Want builds on Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Declaration, Monterrey Consensus, Istanbul Programme for Least Developed Countries, and the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity Building. (Salleh 2015)

Just as “green capitalist” approaches to environmental governance were initially developed and promoted by capitalists and their representatives to circumscribe “green” prescriptions within the constraints of the profit-and-growth priorities of capitalists and capitalist states (Bernstein 2012; Sklair 2001), so has their influence continued in current policy discussions towards the same purposes. “Green capitalist” solutions were never intended to solve our ecological crises as much as they were intended to contain increasing public awareness of environmental crises within a direction that preserved or hopefully amplified profit and growth (and without substantially addressing the existing relations between the core and periphery), all at the expense of our ecological future. While this seems to be the primary EMT goal as well, it remains to be explained why this approach has retained influence within environmental sociology to the extent that it has.

Despite the critical core of environmental sociology, it has been argued that “today the main thrust of environmental social science has shifted to ecological modernization” (Foster, Clark and
York 2010). If acknowledging the inherent unsustainability of capitalism is historically influential within environmental sociology, why have “green capitalist” approaches retained any credence therein? One answer involves the embeddedness of social science within power relations, as the object of the social sciences is the social, and thus “both its analysis and what is deemed acceptable/unacceptable tends to be filtered through the dominant institutions and structures of the prevailing hierarchical social order” (Foster, Clark and York 2010). Social science “often enters a relatively dormant state once a new system of power is established” and consequently “in normal-non-revolutionary-periods is unable to develop in a rational direction that would allow knowledge to interact in meaningful ways with social practice, particularly of a democratic kind.” (Foster, Clark and York 2010). In short, taking truly critical, sometimes controversial stances (let alone translating them into practice) becomes rare except in the context of periods of widespread, radical change.

In this context, academic success often requires accordance with the dominant ideologies and logics of power, where getting ahead in the academy, media, government, and other occupations for social scientists often involves “self-censorship, a narrow focus on the relatively inconsequential, and leaving the big stuff—in terms of social change—off the table” (Foster, Clark and York 2010). Consequently, scholars search “for models that might be more amenable to the political and economic zeitgeist” (Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2008). Many facets of social science become increasingly safe to the dominant logics of power in these periods via the progressive erosion of deeply critical research in favor of topics and prescriptions that are less substantial and more hollow. In the case of some sectors of environmental sociology, this means analyses that are safely subordinate to the political-economic relations that have been and are creating our ecological ills.

In this context, the political sea change that came with the rise of neoliberalism has constrained the potential for wider adoption of more radical analyses, including within environmental sociology. For example, after Reagan the U.S. political context became dominated by an anti-environmental agenda, increasing corporate power, rolling back environmentalist gains, and directly attacking challenges to capitalism (Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2008; Sklair 2001) just as critical environmental sociology started to come into its own. Over time, many environmental groups and movements became more conservative and cooperative with business and the state (Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2008). As environmental sociologists sought careers that are amenable to power holders, they turn to increased abstraction, safer and smaller topics, and the restriction of environmental study and prescriptions within the limits set by those very logics of power that are corrupting and destroying our human-ecological relations (Foster, Clark and York 2010; Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2008). In short, “green capitalist” perspectives find prominence in policy and the social sciences precisely because they fail to challenge the factors
causing our ecological ills. At the same time, failing to challenge them prevents environmental sociology from accomplishing its potential in contributing towards effective ecological solutions.

**Conclusion: EMT or a Future for Planet Earth?**

EMT is one of the most systematic “green capitalist” perspectives, as its utilization of a variety of “green capitalist” prescriptions makes it a fair representation of much of “green capitalist” thought. The thorough and wide-ranging nature of EMT’s prescriptions is largely responsible for its ability to persist and evade critique—a critique of any singular part can be countered with reference to other EM prescriptions. Consequently, a similarly wide-ranging critique of EMT goes a long way towards identifying issues in the “green capitalist” approach in general. EMT’s maintenance of the profit-and-growth imperatives and unequal international relations of the CWS produces myriad feedback loops for many “green capitalist” prescriptions, and these feedback loops render “green capitalist” EM prescriptions untenable even in combination. Consequently, attempts to construct successful “green capitalist” solutions for our ecological crises (like those of EMT) are effectively doomed to fail.

Critical approaches to environmental sociology, by contrast, refuse to presume the major ecologically destructive features of the CWS. For example, human ecology rejects human exemptionalist theoretical blinders, while Marxian political ecology highlights the impacts of profit-and-growth oriented production on ecological devastation and world-systems theory critiques the ecological impacts of the differential power between core and non-core nations. All of these critical perspectives (along with other environmental justice, degrowth, and critical political ecology scholars (D’Alisa, Demaria and Kallis 2014; Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011b; Robbins 2011)) are predominantly complimentary, which allows them to form the groundwork for a wide-ranging critical environmental sociology (Foster 2012; York and Dunlap 2012; York and Mancus 2009). One central commonality between these different perspectives is an acknowledgment that the central elements of capitalism amplify ecological destruction by necessity (including its profit-and-growth orientation and its unequal international relations). Consequently, any “green capitalist” perspectives which maintain these features (like EMT) are consequently irrelevant at best or obstruct real solutions at worst.

In presuming the central features of the CWS, EMT silences critical traditions within environmental sociology alongside many communities’ and cultures’ different visions for political, economic, and ecological values, objectives, and institutions, introducing ethnocentric biases into EMT analysis. This also restricts ecological rationality to one which is (1) fundamentally human-exemptionalist and anthropocentric, (2) subordinated to profit-and-growth imperatives, and (3) neglectful of the true impact of international inequality within the CWS on EM prescriptions, rendering the central EMT concept of ecological rationality both practically and
logically incoherent within these boundaries. To maintain EM optimism despite these definitive weaknesses, EMT shifts the terrain of its analyses to comparably shallow ecological issues, ignoring large crises like climate change in favor of smaller-scale problems like pollution (Mol 2002), while maintaining implausible general optimism about the widespread integration of ecological rationality of some limited, ill-defined, and internally contradictory variety.

EMT’s presumption of the CWS also proves fatal to the rest of EM’s central economic and political prescriptions. On the one hand, the CWS has no endogenous tendencies towards sufficient greening in either production or consumption, and reliance on “global civil society” or NGO-led solutions are similarly insufficient to compensate for the endogenous tendencies in the CWS towards ecological devastation. Despite these limits, many factors bias the policies of capitalist states towards the facilitation of profit and quantitative economic growth despite states being increasingly held responsible by citizens to address environmental crises. “Green capitalist” policy prescriptions allow states to give the appearance of dealing with our environmental ills while maintaining those very factors that destroy the environment, their influence stemming not from their efficacy but because they safely contain environmentalist analyses within the limits of the major features of the CWS. In the social sciences, “green capitalist” approaches are adopted for many reasons, many of which having to do with the unavoidable fact that failing to question capitalism is the analytical path of least resistance. Though “green capitalist” approaches within environmental sociology may provide an easy path to grants and promotions, nothing less than the fate of our planet depends on environmental sociology abandoning “green capitalist” hollow ecologies, and meeting its promise as a critical and effective discipline.

As the central tendencies of the CWS are both the cause and continuous amplifier of our ecological crises, “environmental sociology” needs to commit to a new critical environmental synthesis. In this regard, environmental sociology must (1) commit to the principled rejection of necessarily inadequate “green capitalist” ecological prescriptions in favor of adopting critical sociological perspectives, and seek both (2) alternative political-economic systems and organization(s) which reject the central features of the CWS, and (3) an interdisciplinary engagement with fields such as political science and political economy to produce concrete, practically-oriented plans to facilitate a transition from the CWS to a more ecologically sound and anti-imperialist ecosocialism. While aiding the pursuit of (1) is the central project of this article, and (2) and (3) are beyond its scope, the following will be a (necessarily brief) discussion of the latter.

History has room for a number of committed ecosocialist varieties and ecologically sound alternatives to capitalism, and different analysts and activists have identified many potential ecosocialist principles, goals, and strategies. Broad principles, for example, could be organized around a synthesis of the elementary triangle of socialism (social ownership, worker-organized
social production, and the satisfaction of communal needs) and the elementary triangle of ecology: “(1) social use, not ownership, of nature; (2) rational regulation by the associated producers of the metabolism between human beings and nature; and (3) the satisfaction of communal needs—of present and future generations” (Magdoff and Foster 2011). Environmental sociology, jettisoning counterproductive “green capitalist” fictions, can work towards the refinement of broad ecosocialist principles, unified around the rejection of (1) profit-and-growth imperatives and (2) power imbalances within core/periphery relations, while (3) theorizing critical solutions to the myriad anti-ecological consequences of these features, as noted throughout this article. Finally, (4) environmental sociology can encourage active experimentation with and analysis of many of these variants of ecosocialism, as “what we need—along with the movements to bring this about—are new conceptions of what constitutes viable post-capitalist societies—aimed at maintaining a rational metabolism between humans and the environment, while promoting economic and social justice” (Magdoff and Foster 2011).

In this process, environmental sociology should support the voices and values of many non-Western and critical perspectives in both analysis and prescription. International political and academic communities need to engage with the thought of diverse thinkers and traditions outside those of the global North (and beyond even the confines of formal academia). Examples of these alternative perspectives include Buddhist economists’ emphasis on reorganizing the economy to prioritize maximizing well-being with minimal consumption (Sivaraksa 2011), or the struggles of neo-pagan practitioners (Starhawk 2014), indigenous peoples (LaDuke 2005; Löwy 2015) and many throughout the global South to pursue less anthropocentric and ecologically destructive relations with non-human nature (see D’Alisa, Demaria and Kallis 2014 for a wide range of alternatives along these lines). Central to this project is the engagement with various political, economic, and environmental prescriptions from various conferences and forums such as the Belém Declaration of the 2009 World Social Forum (see Löwy 2015), the People’s Agreement of the 2010 World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (see Magdoff and Foster 2011), or the Leap Manifesto (2015).

The project of refining broad ecosocialist goals should prioritize consideration of the causes of and solutions to our major ecological problems, including (1) climate change, (2) biodiversity loss and extinctions, (3) stratospheric ozone depletion, (4) ocean acidification, (5) nitrogen and phosphorus flows into the oceans and biosphere, (6) changes in land use, (7) changes in global freshwater use and the hydrological cycle, (8) atmospheric aerosol loading, and (9) chemical pollution and the introduction of other “novel entities,” “new substances, new forms of existing substances and modified life-forms that have the potential for unwanted geophysical and/or biological effects” (Steffen et al. 2015). These constitute the planetary boundaries which are essential to the maintenance of a safe-for-humanity earth-system environment (Steffen et al. 2015).
While environmental sociology can and should also highlight the lower-threat ecological harms that EMT studies, its primary and more immediate goal should be to prioritize the analysis of broad ecological principles and our most consequential ecological challenges.

This interdisciplinary academic work should all be undertaken alongside working with activist communities to generate concrete plans to pursue identified solutions, from short-term (immediate) goals to mid-range and long-term transition plans. This includes both (1) identification of the steps that should be taken to halt and reverse our negative ecological outcomes, and (most centrally) a (2) political-economic plan-of-action regarding how these steps can be actually implemented, and how humanity can overcome obstacles to their practical implementation. In short, environmental sociology should (1) commit to the rejection of the necessary failures of “green capitalist” ecological prescriptions in favor of prioritizing critical ecological approaches, while seeking to define (2) the broad outlines of an ecosocialist future. This should be accompanied with the (3) identification of concrete short-to-long-term plans to (a) increasingly reduce and eliminate the negative ecological impacts of our political-economic organizations, and (b) implement (3a) and overcome the barriers to their implementation. Environmental sociology can learn from the failures of EMT and “green capitalist” approaches to environmental study, and unify around the critical traditions that have long formed the heart of (and greatest contributions to) the sub-discipline.

In addition to contributing to major existing debates in contemporary environmental sociology, this analysis has implications for both environmental sociology in general, and world-systems environmental research in particular. In developing a comprehensive account of how attention to world-systems factors undermines the viability of a host of “green capitalist” prescriptions, this analysis highlights both the connections between world-systems environmental research and other critical traditions (via a shared critique of profit-and-growth prioritization), and ways in which world-systems environmental research has unique contributions to the critical environmental synthesis, via its long critique of unequal international power and its harmful ecological impacts. Attention to world-systems factors is thus a necessary component in the development of a critical environmental sociology. Given the major ecological consequences of power imbalances between core and non-core nations, environmental solutions require the erosion of those power imbalances, and world-systems research is ideally suited for the development of analytic tools to aid in both the critique of such factors, and in the pursuit of solutions.

Recent research has highlighted the need for further study on both (1) ecologically unequal exchange, in order to examine in-depth how the structure of international exchanges allows core nations to impose environmental harms on less powerful nations (Jorgenson and Givens 2014), and (2) the impacts of foreign direct investment dependence on the services sector (Jorgenson and Givens 2014)—both important contributions to the advancement of ecological scholarship in the
WST tradition. Additionally, while a full set of solutions and prescriptions cannot be the focus of this article, I would add that the preceding analysis highlights some fruitful future directions for world-systems’ environmental research. First, world-systems environmental research is well equipped to highlight the myriad factors regarding production and exchange in the CWS that amplify “commodity fetishism” (thus obscuring consumer awareness of the impacts of consumption), alongside the changes to production necessary to minimize commodity fetishism. Secondarily, such research can usefully develop proposals for overcoming the factors that amplify state prioritization of profitability and growth over ecologically beneficial social and ecological relations. Finally, world-systems environmental research can pave the way for the development of the interdisciplinary framework necessary to pursue practical proposals for the implementation of ecosocialist changes (and for the overcoming of unequal power relations between core and non-core nations). The long emphasis in WST on interdisciplinary work renders world-systems research especially salient towards this important project. Altogether, environmental sociology needs to continue the dialogue between critical traditions while transitioning towards an increased focus on implementation, and world-systems environmental research has an important role in this endeavor.

In their extension of the presuppositions of modernization theory into environmental sociology, promoting inadequate partial ecological solutions after defining more rational solutions off the table, EMT seems to have as its primary goal not solutions to our ecological crises, but rather the defense of the CWS from ecological critique. Their unwillingness to criticize the central elements of the CWS creates substantial problems in the heart of both their primary concept, ecological rationality, as well as their major prescriptions for the potential integration of ecological rationality. The circumscription of one’s critique and vision within dominant discourses and power relations for pragmatic purposes is akin to a firefighter putting out only half of a flaming house because they believe it is too utopian to imagine putting out the whole home. Our ecological peril is at hand whether EMT and other “green capitalist” approaches to ecological analysis would like it or not, and the time for valorizing hollow ecology and entertaining pseudo-ecological fictions is at an end. In order to maintain its strong analytic relevance as a sociological sub-discipline, let alone its potential to aid in the transformation of our human-ecological relations before we drive full-speed off the ecological cliff, environmental sociology needs to rid itself of “green capitalist” approaches like EMT (and their presuppositions), and return to its rightful focus—the study of how humanity can truly live in long-term harmony with non-human nature, and the means by which we get there.
About the Author

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Research Note
Measuring the Impacts of Colonialism: A New Data Set for the Countries of Africa and Asia

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Abstract
We present a new dataset with 15 indicators for the political, economic and social impact of colonialism. This dataset and our four indices for the impact of colonialism create for the first time the opportunity to compare directly the levels of colonial transformation for a sample of 83 African and Asian countries. Some of our exploratory findings on the interrelation of the dimensions show that in British colonies political domination was in general less direct and less violent. Plantation colonies experienced more investment in infrastructure and more violence during decolonization. The correlations between indicators for economic distortion (trade policy, trade and FDI concentration) show that the economic re-direction of some colonies towards a more exclusive exchange with the metropole country was an interdependent process. In general, a more intense political domination came along with a higher level of economic transformation. If an area was transformed economically, however, a social transformation was likely to take place too, but these processes should not be confounded. In areas that were politically united for the first time under colonialism, economic distortion and social transformation were more profound.

Keywords: Colonialism; political, economic and social impacts; Africa; Asia
Introduction and Background

Research from a world-system perspective stresses the importance of long-term historical factors, but it has been confined to indirect measuring of historically earlier factors than those present in the postcolonial era. Influential was the article by Lenski and Nolan (1984), focusing on the long-term effects of social-evolutionary development levels on the postcolonial economy and society. However, both precolonial and colonial factors could only be measured indirectly. A remedy to the first flaw was the Atlas of Precolonial Societies (Mueller, et al. 1999). Based on this new data set, Lenski and Nolan’s findings could be confirmed on a more elaborate level and with a larger sample (Ziltener and Mueller 2007). However, the second flaw persisted, as the impacts of colonialism were not measured with the same level of sophistication. The authors admitted that the problem had remained unsolved and that “it should be addressed by future quantitative-empirical research” (Ziltener and Mueller 2007:400). Since colonialism has shaped core-periphery-relations (cf. Sanderson 2005:186-187), it is rather surprising that, in contrast to the situation of postcolonial dependence, “colonization has not been a central concern to world-system theory” (Boswell 1989:180). As a consequence, we simply do not know which aspects of colonialism have been relevant in terms of long-term effects—the “open veins” (Galeano 1973), i.e. the level of exploitation of resources, or investment, taxes, and trade policies, direct or indirect rule, schooling and proselytization—all of them or only certain ones?

From a world-system perspective, the modes of integration of the postcolonial economies in the periphery into the world economy are crucial. The discussion of how foreign direct investment (FDI) in form of transnational corporations and their affiliates affect economic and social development in their host countries since independence started the 1970s (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978; Chase-Dunn 1975), and this has been a topic ever since (Herkenrath and Bornschier 2004). We go a step back and have a look at the different levels of economic dependence of colonies by differentiating between those with a strong unilateral dependence on the metropole country regarding trade and investment and those without. We contribute to a wider and more thorough consideration of colonial factors and their relevance for postcolonial development.

New indicators to measure length, depth, and different impacts of colonization have to be developed in order to define the different “legacies” of colonialism. As a first step, the temporal boundaries of colonialism were coded for 83 Countries of Africa and Asia (Ziltener and Künzler 2013:292-296). A dimensional analysis within the same research survey (Ziltener and Künzler

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2013:297-305) revealed a complex web of interrelations of political, economic and social factors, a challenge for any attempt to measure the impacts of colonialism. We have analyzed the existing body of literature in our research survey (Ziltener and Künzler 2013). Until recently, empirical-quantitative research has dealt inadequately with the problem of the multidimensional impact of colonialism, typically using simple country-dummies (British vs. French colonies etc.). Some authors argued that colonial powers introduced different kinds of institutions (legal systems, extractive institutions etc.) which ultimately determined the post-colonial development of the former colonies (cf. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002; Grier 1999; Mahoney 2003). In research practice, this usually takes the form of one-dimensional concepts, completely neglecting different levels of colonial transformation. We see this article as a contribution to dealing with the impacts of colonialism in a more complex manner. We analyze the variation in the forms of colonial domination as the first step in our effort to make the different aspects measurable.

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We propose to use four indicators for the political dimensions of colonial domination, seven for the economic and four for the social dimension (see table 1). The first three sections discuss the background and construction of these indicators and present some descriptive statistics, following the structure of table 1. Based on these 15 indicators, we constructed indices for the political, economic and social impact of colonialism which we discuss in part four, followed by discussion of a combined index for the impact of colonialism. This new data set creates for the first time the opportunity to compare directly the levels of colonial transformation of the countries of Africa and Asia. The full set of precolonial and colonial variables is available at worlddevelopment.uzh.ch, and the dataset may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UQZFYA; links provided throughout the text add additional illustrative tables.
Indicators for Political Transformation by Colonialism: Form of Political Domination (DOMFORM)

Beyond the mere length of time of colonialism, the intensity of political domination is a crucial aspect: without a significant reduction of the level of political sovereignty, we would not even speak of colonialism (Ziltener and Künzler 2013:292). From a sociological viewpoint, the historical pattern of foreign control does not depend on the official claim or de jure control. We treat all so-called “mandates” as colonies. On a scale of five increasing levels of political domination, we coded for every country in the sample the maximal impact:

0 = no colonial domination / not applicable
1 = semi-colonialism
2 = indirect rule with little interference in internal affairs
3 = indirect rule with strong interference in internal affairs
4 = direct rule

No colonial domination was coded only from Mongolia, which was in the 19th and 20th century mostly under Chinese supremacy and thus not under ‘modern’ colonialism. All other countries of our sample had an experience of being dominated by one or several colonial powers.

We call the “weakest” form of colonial domination semi-colonialism, characterized by the reduction of political sovereignty through “unequal treaties” or similar arrangements. These treaties usually were forced at gunpoint or were the results of wars. They were non-reciprocal and included elements like

- the opening of ports to trade, the ending of state monopolies and of certain interdictions of commerce (as in the case of opium in China)
- special trade/tariff concessions, most-favored-nation status
- the change of diplomatic traditions and communication rules according to European standards, e.g. exemption of Europeans from court rituals deemed to be humiliating, acceptance of a European language as diplomatic language
- the ending or lowering of travel and residency restrictions,
- extraterritoriality (geographical zones, administration, jurisdiction)
- freedom of religion, i.e. the right to preach Christianity openly and to exert missionary activities, while giving the country’s administration the duty to protect persons and facilities involved
• a de facto partition of the country into mutually exclusive spheres of influence (as in the case of Persia between Britain and Russia, or of China as coordination among several colonial powers).

These instruments were used mainly in dealing with the pre-colonial states and empires in Asia, where “the presence of large, antique, yet still death-defying political structures meant that indigenous authorities could not be taken over without promoting internal disorder, incurring massive expense and risking international conflict” (Cain and Hopkins 1993:397). Examples are the Bowring Treaty (1855 Britain-Siam), the Tianjin Treaty (1858 Britain-China)\(^2\) and the Harris Treaty (1858 US-Japan). The group of (present) countries coded as semi-colonial consists of Afghanistan, Iran (Persia), Japan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Turkey (as the core area of the Ottoman Empire), i.e. 7% of the cases in the sample.

With our concept “five increasing levels of political domination” we overcome most of the problems that approaches working with a “col/non-col” binary are confronted with.\(^3\) We do not consider it appropriate to code “more technologically advanced non-European countries” including Turkey, Iran, China, and Japan “as never colonized by Europeans” (Ertan, Fiszbein, and Putterman 2016:182, also Heldring and Robinson 2012:2). In some cases, diplomatic relations became successively more unequal, as in the cases of the series of treaties of Britain with the small emirates at the Persian Gulf, which makes it difficult to define the exact onset of semi-colonialism/colonialism. The next level of intensifying political domination is defined by claims of exclusive rights over the foreign relations of an area/country, the posting of an advisor or resident at a court, the defense against third countries or by bringing parts of the administration under direct control. This form of colonial domination is usually called “indirect rule,” because traditional rulers stay in power and institutions remain at least formally unchanged.\(^4\) However, “indirect rule” had a strong impact on the political sphere, as a Furnivall (1941:9) argues in the case of Dutch rule in Indonesia who “subverted the native principle of rule, and drained the vitality of social life.” Because the category “indirect rule” covers a large number of colonies, we

\(^2\) We base this on Auslin’s (2004:21) assessment: “The crucial change in Sino-Western relations came with the 1858 Tianjin treaty imposed by Britain after the Arrow War. This new treaty was vastly more punitive and intrusive than the Treaty of Nanjing and materially reduced Chinese sovereignty.”

\(^3\) Cf. Ertan, Fiszbein, and Putterman (2016:170) who consider colonization to have begun “once 20% or more” of the territory of a today's country is deemed by sources to have been “largely under the control of the colonizing power”.

\(^4\) In general, the caveat by Trocki (1999:80) applies: “While the legal status of the prior institutions could be taken as a formal guide to the presence of a system of direct or indirect rule, in practice there was often little to distinguish the systems. During this period, legal niceties were respected only at the convenience of the colonial power, though such technical points once again became of importance when questions arose regarding the structure of the post-colonial state. (...) indirect rule often signified no more than a transitory stage between the inception of a colonial presence and the development of a more comprehensive administrative machine.”
differentiate between *indirect rule with little interference in internal affairs* (level 2) and *indirect rule with strong interference in internal affairs* (level 3). This is somewhat arbitrary, but the experience of coding the impact on traditional institutions and processes clearly confirmed the importance and practicability of this distinction.

In cases where the area of today’s country was politically divided and experienced different forms of domination over a longer period, as in the case of the Malay peninsula with directly ruled “settlements,” federated and unfederated Malay states with British residents, but different degrees of interference in internal affairs, we coded level 3 in view of the experience of the majority of the population. We “balanced” the coding in cases of several groups of the population with significantly different experiences, e.g. level 3 in a case with two major groups with direct rule and level 2 in one with indirect and little interference. One example for this is Cameroon, where in the British part and the northern French part administration was based on local authorities as the Lamibé and Sultans, while in the southern French part the administrative was clearly direct.

We did not code traditional empires (Mughal, Ottoman, Omani etc.) as colonialism (cf. Ziltener and Künzler 2013:292). Here we are confronted with the problem how to code areas/regions that were part of one of these empires and therefore were politically dominated already before “modern” colonialism. The partition of the Ottoman Empire by European powers led to new entities for which new political “centers” had to be created, and which led to economic fragmentation: “The creation of these new political entities entailed the creation of new national economies as well, each with its own boundaries, and each with its own centralized system of laws, taxes, and fiscal management. One result was the growth of separate national markets (...), another the development of barriers to the large movement of goods and labor that had been such a prominent feature in the last years of the Ottoman Empire” (Owen and Pamuk 1999:51).

The problem gets even more complicated because the political reality of these empires often did not match the symbolic discourses and rituals of imperial unity. For instance, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the Egyptian regime of Muhammad Ali (reg. 1805-48) was “virtually autonomous” (Lewis 1995:301). Tunis and Morocco also enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. It was only in these areas that the option of “indirect rule” through traditional institutions and dynasties was available (and therefore level 2 or level 3-codings). In others, colonialism not only created new political entities, but also founded completely new “dynasties.” These cases were coded as *direct rule* (level 4), as was the creation of chieftaincies without historical precursors.

Eighteen countries of 83 were coded level 2 (22%), 27 level 3 (33%) and 31 as level 4 (37%). This means that more than two thirds of the countries in our sample experienced strong colonial political intervention, with or without the dissolution of pre-colonial political institutions. As will be discussed later, the intensity of political domination correlates with level of colonial violence as
well as with some indicators of economic transformation. British colonies were in general ruled less directly (annex 1).  

**Level of Colonial Violence (VIOLTOT)**

Colonization was confronted with a broad variety of resistance, triggering often, but not exclusively, violent reactions by the colonial power. We must distinguish between defensive wars fought against the incoming colonialists and later protracted rebellions. In many instances the initial war was fought with the traditional military system (cf. Ranger 1969:312). This primary resistance was motivated by the goal of preserving autonomy and sovereignty and was often led by traditional elites. However, in this context we are less interested in the character or amount of resistance than the varying impact of colonial violence against these resistance movements, measured with our variable (VIOLCOL).

Without denying possible links between different resistance movements, we divided subsequent forms of resistance into two forms: resistance against colonial domination and exploitation (VIOLRES)—sometimes referred to as “secondary resistance,”—and violence during decolonization (VIOLIND). VIOLRES is an indicator for the resistance against measures of colonial domination such as taxation, expropriation, forced cultivation, forced recruitment or forced labor, which was—even when seen economically ineffective—only slowly and unevenly phased out.  

This form of resistance is often carried out by peasants, workers and/or women or, quite common in sub-Saharan Africa, messianic movements. It is often labeled as “rebellion,” “insurrection,” “revolt,” “uprising” or “mutiny.” It has a time lag to the colonial conquest, although the distinction is not always clear cut: What for some groups is primary resistance can for other groups be resistance against domination, and a variety of motives may converge into one anti-colonial movement. In cases were the centers of resistance were under colonial rule for some time, such as in the case of the famous “mutiny” in British India (1857/58), we coded VIOLRES, otherwise VIOLCOL.

The third form of violence (VIOLIND) occurs during decolonization. Having a varying degree of rural and urban mass participation, decolonization movements tend to be led by younger

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5 There is one article with a comparable aim at coding different levels of political domination in the colonial era (Lange 2004). However, Lange measures the extent to which British colonial rule depended on customary legal institutions for the regulation of social relations, by dividing the number of colonially recognized customary court cases by the total number of court cases in 1955. This is an indicator very different from our coding, and our samples overlap only in 22 cases (British colonies). There is no statistically significant correlation between his indicator and DOMFORM. On the other hand, the correlation between his later estimates of the “level of colonialism” (Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006:1414), defined as “the extent to which a colonizing power installs economic, political, and sociocultural institutions in a colonized territory”, and DOMFORM is highly significant (0.71, N= 23 British colonies).

6 While it was in the French colonies abolished by law in 1945, it lasted even longer in the Portuguese empire (Austin 2015:10).
educated elites. Some movements took up armed struggle for independence, while others relied on other means as strikes and demonstrations. Yet others opted for peaceful resistance. We coded for the three variables different levels of colonial violence: no colonial violence (level 0), moderate colonial violence (level 1) and massive colonial violence (level 2). For VIOLCOL and VIOLRES, moderate colonial violence is characterized by small numbers of causalities among the local population, limited length of resistance and limited economic effects for the local population. In contrast, massive colonial violence caused heavy casualties and persisted for a considerable time. It is often characterized by the purposeful destruction of the sources of livelihood (crops, domestic animals, and/or infrastructure), resulting in years of hunger and misery for a significant part of the population. For violence during decolonization (VIOLIND), the armed suppression of isolated acts of violence and/or of riots, strikes or demonstrations were coded as moderate colonial violence, while armed wars of independence were coded as massive colonial violence. Peaceful resistance is thus not measured, neither is the psychological impact of colonial violence which is emphasized by Ranger (1969), but not measurable in a comparative perspective. As we are interested in the impact of colonial violence, we are neither considering the casualties and expenditures among the colonial troops nor wars among colonial powers, as during World Wars I or II.

The total level of colonial violence (VIOLTOT) was measured by adding the values of the three violence-related variables and can thus vary between 0 and 6. Examples for countries with maximal violence are Algeria, Angola or Vietnam. Fiji, Jordan or Kuwait were not exposed to significant direct, open colonial violence. Most countries are in between. The total level of colonial violence correlates significantly and positively with the form of political domination (table of relations between political domination and violence available here). It also correlates in general positively with the length and intensity of political domination as well as with some indicators of economic transformation (annex 2). However, violence during decolonization seems not to be influenced by directly political factors, but it correlates with the existence of a plantation economy. As is documented in annex 1, the level of violence was in general lower in British colonies than in others and the onset of colonialism was usually more violent in sub-Saharan Africa compared to North Africa and Asia.

**Colonial Instrumentalization of Ethnolinguistic/Religious Cleavages (ETHNFUNC)**

Colonial powers instrumentalized ethnolinguistic and/or religious cleavages mainly in three areas: army/police, administration/education, and in the economy. In all colonies, the upper layers of the administration were staffed by officials from the metropole. The colonial powers however used ethnolinguistic and religious cleavages to different degrees to occupy the lower layers and special functions (“martial races,” administrators etc.). As important as this aspect of colonial domination is, it is difficult to measure its impact. Going beyond a simple differentiation between a
low/moderate impact (level 1) and a significant/strong impact (level 2) would be hazardous. For more than one third of our cases, we found indications that there was a strong impact of colonial policy on occupational specializations along ethnolinguistic and/or religious lines. For another 15 cases, there was a low/moderate impact.

Related to this variable is the coding of colonially induced work immigration (for the army, infrastructure project, plantations etc.) because the colonial policy in this regard followed similar considerations. The difference is that with the variable ETHNFUNC we measure the degree to which colonial policies intentionally as well as unintentionally created and/or reinforced such occupational specializations along ethnolinguistic and/or religious lines while WORKIM mainly catches the quantitative aspect of colonially induced immigration.

As significant bivariate correlations show, the instrumentalization of ethnolinguistic and/or religious cleavages usually took place in more directly ruled colonies, in colonies with a higher dependence on investment from the metropole, with more successful missionary activities and, unsurprisingly, in colonies with a higher level of ethnic heterogeneity and work immigration (annex 2). It was more often applied in sub-Saharan Africa than in Asian and North African countries (annex 1). This might be related with the lower levels of ethnic heterogeneity in the latter countries.

Gradualism in the Transfer of Administration (INDTRANS)
In September 1958, Guinea was the only French territory in West Africa overwhelmingly rejecting the French constitutional project and opting for immediate independence: “France was quick to retaliate, withdrawing civil servants, severing aid, trade, and development agreements, absconding with government files, and sabotaging whatever the departing officials could not take with them” (Schmidt 2007:178). This discontinuity in the administrative institutions was a heavy burden for the newly independent Guinea. A similar institutional discontinuity has in other cases been caused by massacres targeting expatriates. In Mozambique or the Belgian Congo, most European civil servants fled or were chased away immediately before or after independence. In contrast, there are countries with an extreme gradual transfer of administrative authority to local civil servants accompanied by training and meritocratic promotion, resulting in considerable state capacity. In Botswana, efficiency of administration was clearly put before Africanization (Künzler 2004:162-163). Just after independence in Malaysia still 44.5% of civil servants were British, in Pakistan 34.2%, in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 18.9%, in India 7.3%, while in Burma they all left with independence (Braibanti 1966). According to Kerbo (2005a, 2005b), the way the colonial power left the country (such as the extent of planning and preparation for independence) was indeed crucial for the further
development in East and Southeast Asia. While our main concern is the transfer of bureaucracy, we also considered the transfer of the judicial system and the security forces, but not the transfer of legislative.

The transfer of administration is an important aspect for the development of post-colonial institutions that has been somewhat neglected so far. We therefore introduce a variable (INDTRANS) measuring the gradualism in the transfer of administration:

0 = not applicable/planned, coordinated and very gradual transfer of administration (52 cases)
1 = short initiation, no conflicts (16 cases)
2 = very quick, disruptive, disorderly transfer (15 cases).

Of course, a planned and coordinated transfer of administration is not possible in the case of armed conflicts/war of independence. INDTRANS correlates highly with indicators for the level of violence, but also a more direct rule seems to have impeded a gradual transfer of administration (annex 2). Of all economic indicators, only the trade-related ones (TRADEPOL, TRADECON) have a significant relationship with INDTRANS: The closer the colonial economy was related to the metropole, the less likely a gradual transfer (annex 2). British colonies experienced a gradual and orderly transfer of administration more often than others (annex 1).

**Indicators for Economic Transformation by Colonialism**

Political domination did not lead automatically to economic changes. To make profit beyond occasional plundering and traditional ways of taxation, a *mise en valeur* (capitalizing on the colony/valorization) was necessary, which proved to be difficult in many cases. Because of their ubiquity and the variety of forms applied, we were not able to code the main aspects of economic colonialism: the degree of expropriation (especially of land), and of financial exploitation. Only recently attempts have been undertaken to compare colonial taxation systems based on historical records (Frankema and Waijenburg 2014). We consider this a major gap in our coding of the impacts of colonialism. However, we measure these effects indirectly: The colonial population had to pay for higher costs if there were more wars, more violence, more investment

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7 Kerbo (2005b:147): “It is particularly important within East and Southeast Asia to compare how each country was treated by the colonial powers and how these colonial powers left the country. The end of British colonialism, for instance, was at first comparatively tame for both Malaysia and Burma. In Malaysia, the British stayed on for several years to provide advice on running the newly independent nation and to fight communist insurgents. Burma, however, became mired in conflict after the British abruptly left the country. Primarily because of internal conflicts the British helped rekindle as they left the country. Burma immediately degenerated into political violence and remains in suspension with a military dictatorship repressing any needed reforms.”
infrastructure or more trade distortions. We focus on the seven indicators mentioned in table 1 to measure the colonial impact on the economy.

**Trade Policy (TRADEPOL)**

Colonies were seen as a way of ensuring markets. Trade flows have always been closely monitored by colonial governments and trade policies were changed frequently in order influence them. In the Great Depression of the 1930s, all colonial empires tried to introduce protectionist measures. Therefore, it is difficult to code colonial trade policies 1850-1950 beyond a simple “general opening” vs. “more distortive.” We followed the definitions of Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008), but made no distinction between “preferential tariff policy” and “tariff assimilation/customs union”:8

1. Not applicable (5 cases in which no colonial influence in trade policy was discernible)
2. Predominantly ‘open door’ policy (43 cases)
3. Preferential tariff policy, policy of tariff assimilation/customs union with metropole country (35 cases, of which 21 were French colonies, 3 Portuguese and 3 Japanese)

French colonies more often experienced a distortive trade policy than British ones (annex 1). Some other relations with colonial indicators become evident (annex 2): The more direct colonial rule (DOMFORM), the more distortive the colonial trade policy, and the more likely anti-colonial resistance (VIOLRES). Beyond that, trade policy (TRADEPOL) also correlates significantly with foreign presence (FORPRES), nature of authority transfer (INDTRANS) and trade concentration (TRADECON). Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008:2) emphasize for the period 1870-1913: “Being in an empire roughly doubled trade relative to those countries that were not part of an empire.” However, trade policies were not always effective, and these “colonial ties” have other causes than trade policies as well. Therefore, an indicator for the factual impact of colonial domination on trade flows is needed.

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8 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008:18-19): “The policy of tariff assimilation is a policy regime where the tariff rates on goods are the same in the metropole and the colony. Under this arrangement, the metropole and colony form a customs union. A preferential tariff system describes a trade policy where colonies and the mother country have differential tariffs, but non-empire goods are generally taxed at a higher rate. An ‘open door’ trade policy refers to a tariff regime where there is no distinction made between the products of the mother country and non-empire trading partners. In other words, a colony or metropole with an ‘open door’ trade policy does have not a preferential tariff policy or trade agreement (i.e., customs union) with some of its trading partners. The open door trade policy should not be confused with a free trade policy, however. Many countries with ‘open door’ policies levied duties to protect local industries or to raise revenue for the fiscal authority.”
Trade Concentration (TRADECON)

Trade concentration measures the colony’s trade with the metropole as proportion of total trade. The main source for this indicator is the International Historical Statistics Data Set (Mitchell 2007). Additional sources were the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE) Database (https://comtrade.un.org/) and, in very few cases, the literature on colonial/national histories. Due to the poor data quality for many colonies, we decided to classify the cases in five categories:

0 = trade concentration under 25%, no colonial trade effect is discernible, three quarter of goods exchanged with third countries/areas:

1 = trade concentration 25-40%, a moderate trade effect
2 = trade concentration 40-50%, a significant trade effect
3 = trade concentration 50-66.5%, a strong trade effect
4 = trade concentration 66.6-%, a very strong trade effect

Unsurprisingly, for the semi-colonial countries (except Persia) no colonial trade effect is discernible; these countries were usually opened for trade under ‘most favored nation’ clauses. Also, for many colonies with an ‘open door’ policy, trade with the metropole was not particularly strong. Together, 22 cases (27%) of our sample had no colonial trade effect (level 0), measured by a trade concentration of less than 25%. For the same number of cases we find a moderate trade effect (level 1) with a trade concentration of 25-40%. In 12 countries, trade concentration was 40-50%, representing a significant trade effect (level 2). A strong trade effect (level 3) with a trade concentration of 50-66.5% was experienced by 18 cases, and another 9 experienced a very strong trade effect (level 4), where more than two thirds of the trade went to the metropole. Among the 27 countries with a strong or very strong trade effect (one third of our sample), there are five British colonies, 14 French, two Italian as well as the Japanese colonies (Korea, Taiwan).

Again, French colonies experienced significantly more often a distortive trade effect than British ones (annex 1). In general, a high level of trade concentration was to be found in colonies with a high level of colonial investment and a disorderly transfer of administration (annex 2). There is a statistically significant relation between the intensity of political domination and trade concentration (table of relations between political domination and trade concentration available here).

Investment Concentration (FDICON)

Similar to trade concentration, we categorize colonies regarding their dependence on direct investment from the metropole. The data situation, however, is very poor for the colonial period itself. As a proxy, we relied on the data provided by the OECD (1972), again complemented by
sources such as colonial/national histories and estimates. As in the case of trade concentration, we classified the cases in five categories:

0 = investment concentration under 25%, no colonial investment effect discernible, three quarter of investment from third countries/areas
1 = investment concentration 25-40%, a moderate investment effect
2 = investment concentration 40-50%, a significant investment effect
3 = investment concentration 50-66.5%, a strong investment effect
4 = investment concentration 66.6-%, a very strong investment effect

In 12 cases (15%), we found no colonial investment effect (level 0), in 8 cases a moderate investment effect (level 1), and in 9 cases a significant investment effect (level 2). Thus, in two thirds of the cases, more than 50% of investment came from the metropole: 10 had a strong investment effect (level 3) and 44 a very strong investment effect (level 4).

It seems that colonial domination strongly relates to investment flows. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to have a high direct investment concentration than the ones in Asia and North Africa (annex 1). As annex 2 shows, there are significant correlations two indicators of political transformation (DOMFORM, ETHNFUNC), with several other indicators of economic transformation (TRADECON, GOLD, INVEST, PLANTAT) and two indicators of social transformation discussed below (FORPRES, MISSION).

**Investment in Infrastructure (INVEST)**

The development of the infrastructure is both a prerequisite for and consequence of the *mise en valeur* of a colony. Harbors were crucial, as well as the transport links (railways, streets) into the interior, followed by local transport systems such as tramways, telecommunications, and gas, electric, and water works. Because of the different situations and needs for infrastructure, we decided not to refer to specific historical data (railway miles etc.) but to code more general colonial investment in infrastructure as “not significant/modest/huge:”

0 = no significant colonial investment in infrastructure / not applicable
1 = moderate colonial investment in infrastructure (e.g. some streets and bridges, not more than one railway line to the coast, only isolated irrigation measures)
2 = huge colonial investment in infrastructure (e.g. a railway net and streets linking major parts of the colony, sea harbor(s), and/or channels/irrigation measures in a significant part of the colony)
The means of financing these investments (public/private) does not matter here. Investment in infrastructure by non-colonial governments/agencies, e.g. the Ottoman railway system built before WWI, are not considered. Mitchell (2007) has been an important source for the coding of infrastructure, controlled by colony-specific sources and complemented for countries/areas not mentioned.

Apart from the semi-colonial countries and Mongolia, we found no significant colonial investment in infrastructure (level 0) in Bhutan, Nepal, three British colonies at the Persian Gulf, four French controlled areas in Africa as well as in Portuguese Guinea-Bissau and Italian Somalia. We coded a moderate colonial investment in infrastructure (level 1) were e.g. some streets and bridges were built, but not more than one railway line to the coast and only isolated irrigation measures. This is the case for one third of our sample (27 colonies), mainly landlocked African countries, areas in Western Asia that were colonially dominated only for a short period such as Syria and Lebanon as well as some Pacific island colonies. Finally, 39 countries (47%) experienced a huge colonial investment in infrastructure (level 2), measured e.g. by a railway net and streets linking major parts of the colony, sea harbor(s), and/or channels/irrigation measures in a significant part of the colony.

As expected, this indicator for the level of economic transformation correlates with many others, such as plantations, gold, mining, trade policy, trade concentration, investment concentration but also with foreign presence (FORPRES) (see annex 2). Also not surprising is the fact that colonial investment was higher in more directly ruled colonies (DOMFORM) that were held for a longer period of time (COLYEARS). Investment in infrastructure also seems to have triggered more anti-colonial resistance (VIOLRES), probably because it required a higher level of resource mobilization out of the colony. Regarding the level of colonial investment in infrastructure, there are no statistically significant differences between sub-Saharan Africa and Asian and North African countries and French and British colonies (annex 1).

**Plantations (PLANTAT)**

It is common to distinguish between smallholder farms and plantations. According to Osterhammel:

Two diametrically opposed forms of entreprise, the farm household and the plantation were and still are the most efficient bases of the agrarian export economy. The farm household cultivates its own and/or rented land with family members and perhaps a small number of paid workers. The plantation is a large-scale enterprise, often remotely situated. Its construction requires substantial capital investments in land, machines, and plants and is kept in operation by often
incompetent wage laborers under the direction of a foreign management. Plantations are often owned by foreign stock corporations, which also manages the processing and marketing of the products. (Osterhammel 1997:76)

We followed this definitions, but coded not only the typical large-scale, foreign owned rubber, sugar, coffee etc. plantations as such, but also the large cattle, tobacco, corn etc. farms in Africa (including the French vineyards in North Africa). These were usually owned by permanent resident families (of European descent), produced for export and for local/regional markets, and employed many workers, but in smaller proportion to the total expenditure (Osterhammel 1997:77-78). Special cases are concessions allowing private companies the exploitation of wild-growing resources as timber or wild rubber. In both the French and the Belgian Congo, these companies used forced labor to collect rubber, and the impact of this system was similar to the impact of large-scale plantations. However, the central buying of wild-growing resources collected by individual gatherers has a different impact and is thus not considered as a form of plantation.

Historical data sets provide data for most important cash crops including plantation products but do not allow us to quantify the significance of the plantation economy in the countries of our sample. In almost all colonies, setting up some kinds of plantations has been tried, often unsuccessfully. Therefore, we code the presence of some small, isolated plantations as zero. Beyond that, we again apply a very simple distinction between countries with plantation economies of moderate and those with significant size. The latter does not necessarily mean that they dominate the economy, and in many countries a significant plantation economy co-existed with the smallholder agriculture.

0 = no or a some small, isolated plantations / not applicable
1 = plantation economy of moderate size (regarding areas occupied and share of total export)
2 = plantation economy of significant size (regarding areas occupied and share of total export)

We identify the following regions/countries as having a significant legacy of a colonial plantation economy:

- in sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, Cameroon, Zaire;
- in North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt;
- in South Asia: Sri Lanka;
• in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines;
• in Oceania: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu.

These are 24 cases out of 83 (29%); 19 cases (23%) had a plantation economy of moderate size. A plantation economy usually developed in areas that were colonially dominated for a long time, in which significant investment in infrastructure was done and in which mining took place (annex 2). Furthermore, in plantations economies investment concentration was high, there were work immigration and missionary activities and decolonization was usually a difficult and violent process. There are no statistically significant differences between the regions (sub-Saharan Africa vs. Asia/North Africa) and British/French colonies (annex 1).

**Extraction of Natural Resources (GOLD, MINING)**

Gold and diamonds have a high value in proportion to their weight and are thus easily exported (or looted) without special infrastructure. The exploitation of oil, coal or metals as copper, iron, tin, zinc and others need more investment in infrastructure, especially when going beyond small-scale traditional techniques. We coded these natural resources thus in one variable (MINING) and gold, diamonds and silver in another (GOLD). For both variables we used trichotomies.

0= not applicable
1= moderate colonial extraction
2= extensive colonial extraction.

We considered an extraction of large quantities over a lengthy period of time as “extensive colonial extraction,” while an extraction of medium or low quantities over a lengthy period or a large quantities over a short period (for example a short “gold rush”) was considered as “moderate colonial extraction.” The *UN Statistical Yearbooks* and Mitchell (2007) proved to be valuable but not exhaustive data sources. Fifteen countries in our sample scored high on both variables, while for 25 countries there was no evidence of colonial extraction at all. These cases have been carefully checked, like Syria, where petroleum was discovered after independence and no colonial involvement can be found. Botswana is among the countries where the colonial extraction was moderate. Again, an important commodity (diamonds) was discovered only after independence. During the colonial period, there has been only a short gold boom around Tati and some small mining (Künzler 2004:179).

Unsurprisingly, GOLD and MINING are related to a high level of colonial investment into infrastructure (annex 2). Extraction took usually place in colonies where also a plantation economy existed. MINING (but not GOLD) signified usually a higher presence of foreigners from the
The extraction of bullion (but not MINING) correlates with a higher level of violence during colonial domination (VIOLRES) and more missionary activities (MISSION). There are no statistically significant differences between the regions (sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, North Africa) and British/French colonies (annex 1).

**Indicators for Social Transformation by Colonialism**

Regarding the social dimension of the colonial transformation of societies, we defined four processes as significant and operationalizable, the immigration of people from the colonizing country (FORPRE) and other colonies or areas for labor market reasons (WORKIM), the extent of successful missionary activities (MISSION), and the colonial drawing up of borders (BORDERS). Due to lack of comparable and consistent data, we could not define indicators for the colonial investment in health and education systems (e.g. colonial government expenditure data, or medical doctors per population). Life expectancy and literacy cannot be taken as indicators for colonial impact because they are determined by several other factors as well (cf. Ziltener and Mueller 2007). Also for more general effects of colonial domination, such as alienation (Fanon 1963; Césaire 2000) we could not find appropriate indicators measuring different levels of impact.

**Colonial Immigration (FORPRE)**

Colonies can be distinguished regarding the presence of people from the colonizing country. While all colonies had officials, clerks, administrators, doctors, traders, and some military and religious personnel, they differed significantly in regard to settlers. Undoubtedly, a larger presence of colonial population has a stronger social transformation effect than a smaller one. Heldring and Robinson (2012:6) argue that in two sorts of colonies there is “a clear case to be made for colonialism retarding development,” one of them being those with “white settlement.” Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau (2006:1426) even use the size of the European population as statistical proxy for the “level of colonialism.”

As many others, we defined the situation at the end of the colonial period as crucial, except in those cases where a big proportion of settlers had left some years earlier (usually due to wars, such as in Libya, where WWII drove most Italian immigrants home before independence in 1951). Colonial immigration, not citizenship, is decisive. To measure the presence of Europeans (Americans, Japanese) in the years before independence, we consulted the UN Statistical Yearbooks (various years), the Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire (Kuczynski 1977), the Dictionnaire de la colonisation française (Liauzu 2007), Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450 (Benjamin 2007), the Handbuch der Dritten Welt (eight vol., ed. by Nohlen and Nuscheler 1992ff), and Maddison (2007:137) and we added colony-specific sources. Following the construction of other variables, we transformed the data into a pentatomy:
0 = colonial population under 1%
1 = colonial population 1-2%
2 = colonial population 2-5%
3 = colonial population 5-10%
4 = colonial population over 10%.

Only three cases of our sample had a colonial population over 10%, namely Algeria, Libya and South Africa. Also, all four level 3-countries are in Africa: Djibouti, Tunisia, Morocco and Angola. At level 2, we find among 11 cases (13%) also non-African colonies: Fiji, Vanuatu and the Japanese colonies Korea and Taiwan. Six cases had between 1-2% colonial population (Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Egypt and Papua New Guinea), which makes the overwhelming majority of the cases in our sample (58, 70%) level 1-countries, with a very low number of immigrants from the colonizing country in relation to the dominated population.

Colonies with a higher level of investment in infrastructure, plantations and mining activities (INVEST, PLANT, MINING) as well as more protectionist trade policy (TRADEPOL) had more immigration from the metropole than from other countries (annex 2). There are no statistically significant differences between sub-Saharan Africa and Asian/North African countries and French/British colonies (annex 1).

**Colonial Mission (MISSION)**

Because missionaries and missionary organizations had to report regularly on their activities, the data situation for this indicator of social transformation is better than for others. However, there are the recurring problems of the areas reported not corresponding to actual state boundaries. Furthermore, the number of converts reported by different churches is sometimes exaggerated. In certain cases the numbers combined exceed the (estimated) total population of the area. Most data come from the *World Christian Handbook* (Grubb and Bingle 1949, 1952), the *World Christian Encyclopedia* (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 2001), the *Dictionnaire de la colonisation française* (Liauzu 2007), *Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450* (Benjamin 2007), and the *Handbuch der Dritten Welt* (eight vol., ed. by Nohlen and Nuscheler 1992ff) and were checked by colony-specific sources and complemented for countries/areas not mentioned. The data (number of Christians per population) have to be controlled for older religious groups which have no relation with colonial missionary activities, e.g. the Copts in Egypt and Ethiopia, for the number of settlers (e.g., almost all of the 100,000 Catholics in Libya before WWII were immigrants from Italy) and for Christian work immigrants (e.g. in some oil-producing countries).
In general, missionaries of any Christian church were protected by the colonial government. In some areas, a protestant colonizing power followed a Catholic one (e.g., in Sri Lanka and parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago). Therefore, we coded all converts to Christianity as “impact of colonialism.” Again, we defined a year before independence as reference, because in some cases decolonization led to emigration of Christians. Therefore, we coded “percentage of Christians (Catholics, Protestants), years before independence.” Following the construction of other variables, we transformed the data into a pentatomy:

0 = no colonial missionary activities / not applicable
1 = colonial missionary activities with little effect (Christian population under 2%)
2 = colonial missionary activities with significant effect (Christian population 2-7%)
3 = colonial missionary activities with big effect (Christian population 7-50%)
4 = majority converted (Christian population over 50%)

Obviously, Japanese colonies (Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria) have to be coded differently. There were Christians under Japanese rule, in Taiwan mainly proselytized by American Presbyterians, while in Korea a process of “self-proselytization” had taken place in parts of the élite since late 18th century. In the 19th century, before the onset of Japanese colonialism, there were around 20,000 Christian converts in Korea (Kim 2005:100-103; Seth 2006:220-221). Under Japanese rule, coercive measures to assimilate (culturally at least) parts of the population were taken, including the participation at state-Shinto rituals. However, these had little effect on everyday religious practices. Therefore, Korea and Taiwan were coded as level 1-countries.

Thirty-seven countries in our sample (45%) did not experience a significant religious transformation (either with or without missionary activities; level 1 or 0), among them all Islamic North Africa and West/South Asia as well as the semi-colonial countries. There are 12 level 2-countries (15%), among them India, several Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma/Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia), five African countries (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Liberia) as well as Lebanon. Among the 25 level 3-countries (30%) are only two non-African countries, namely Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea. Among the nine countries with the strongest impact of missionary activities (conversion of more than 50% of the population) are the Philippines, three Pacific Islands (Vanuatu, Fiji and the Solomons) and five African countries (Lesotho, Equatorial Guinea, Zambia, Swaziland, South Africa).

Consequently, there is a statistically significant, positive relationship between MISSION and sub-Saharan Africa respectively a negative one for Asia and North Africa (annex 1). As documented in annex 2, the religious impact of colonialism was stronger in areas that were longer under colonial rule (COLYEARS), that were economically more transformed (positive
correlations with FDICON, INVEST, PLANT, GOLD) and that experienced colonial measures related to ethnic heterogeneity (ETHNFUNC, WORKIM, BORDERS).

**Labor Immigration (WORKIM)**

Beyond some special cases (such as Malaya and Southern Africa), there are no systematic data for colonially induced labor immigration. We had to make rather crude estimations based on colony-specific sources:

0 = no indicators for colonially induced labor immigration / not applicable
1 = low level of colonially induced labor immigration
2 = high level of colonially induced labor immigration (high figures, big groups; also cases in which some functional groups completely consisted of foreign laborers).

“Colonially induced” means that work immigration has not only been tolerated but encouraged, independently of permanent settlement in the colony. Work immigration has been encouraged by means such as opening markets, recruitment/deployment from abroad, providing permits/licenses for agencies, etc. Therefore, the migration of individual Lebanese traders to Africa or Chinese traders to Southeast Asia were not “colonially induced,” but the immigration of Chinese and Indian laborers into the tin mining areas of British-Malaya were.

For 42 cases (51%) in our sample we did not find any evidence for colonially induced labor immigration. In 20 colonies, some work immigration took place; 15 of these cases are in Africa, two at the Persian Gulf, three in Southern Asia (Indonesia, India, Vietnam). Areas with a high influx of work immigrants (21 cases) typically had strong mining activities and/or numerous plantations, in some cases, colonial governments deemed the local population as not willing or capable of certain economic activities. Among these are Cambodia, Laos (French-Indochina); the British colonies of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Myanmar; Fiji and Vanuatu in the Pacific; the oil producing Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait; in Africa 11 cases linked to colonial administration or infrastructure construction, or to plantation or mining work (Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Congo Rep, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Senegal, Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe).

As expected, colonially induced labor immigration took place in colonies that were longer under colonial rule (COLYEARS) and that had a significant plantation economy, a high degree of trade concentration and a strong impact of missionary activities (annex 2). It also relates to colonial instrumentalization of ethnolinguistic and/or religious cleavages (ETHNFUNC). There is no statistically significant correlation with the colonizing country (British vs. French) or the region (sub-Saharan Africa vs. Asia/North Africa) (annex 1).
Unification and Partition (BORDERS)
The present situation of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in African and Asian countries is a product of coercive division and/or unification, in which colonialism played a major part. The importance of ethnolinguistic fragmentation for the explanation of post-independence economic growth rates is established by the work of Easterly and Levine (1997) using the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization popularized by Mauro (1995). Englebert, Tarango, and Carter (2002:1099) measure for an African sample the suffocation by borders, or in other words “their propensity for bringing together peoples that historically lived under different, if not inimical, systems.” This measure is strongly related to group grievances and the likelihood of civil war. The forced unification is, according to Oliver (1991), more formative than the division of Africa by colonial borders. It is however already included in measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization usually used in multivariate studies.

The second aspect of artificial borders, the “partition of preexisting political groupings,” is called “dismemberment” by Englebert, Tarango, and Carter (2002:193). They measure it as the “unweighted average proportion of groups astride a border” and it “equals one half the sum of the percentages of national populations that these groups represent on both sides of border.” For a sample of 48 African countries, dismemberment is positively associated with the likelihood and intensity of boundary disputes. Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2006:8) go a long way to measure the fractal dimension of borders based on the assumption that “borders which are coast lines or squiggly lines (perhaps meant to capture geographic features and/or ethnicities) are less likely to be artificial.” Among the “most artificial” states identified by these authors (Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski 2006:13) there are countries like Chad, Mali, Niger or Sudan among others. These countries lie in the Sahara-Sahel belt of Africa and indeed have some ruler-straight borders. This is misleading, however, as these borders cut across areas thinly populated by mostly nomadic groups. A border line could be as squiggly as possible but would still cut across these groups. Furthermore, a border can be squiggly and follow a geographic feature as a river, but nevertheless divide, as the same people live on both sides of the river.

The examples of the Bakongo on the lower Congo River or the Lao along the Mekong show clearly that borders following a river are not automatically “natural” and less problematic than other borders. It is therefore advisable to rely on empirical observations in measuring the partition effect by borders. This is also the approach behind the second measure used by Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2006:12), “the percent of the population of a country that belongs to a partitioned group.” This measure is not correlated to the fractionalization measure, but is significant for the explanation of a number of political and economic variables. As there are no consistent data for

http://www.politics.pomona.edu/penglebert/Borders%20appendix.doc
our sample available, we followed this approach and measured the partition by colonial borders as follows:

0 = not applicable
1 = low/moderate colonial partition effect
2 = significant/strong colonial partition effect

For Africa, the *Atlas of Precolonial Societies* by Mueller et al. (1999) was a useful tool for the coding. If more than 50% of the population belongs to groups partitioned by colonial borders the impact is considered strong; otherwise it is moderate unless there was no dismemberment as in the case of an island like Madagascar. In areas with strong traditions of state- and empire-building, colonial borders could not be drawn as arbitrarily as in those without. Most political units could be only dominated entirely or not at all. Colonial partition is therefore a rather rare experience in these areas, except for the non-sedentary or semi-nomadic ethnic groups (e.g. the so-called “mountain tribes” and “sea nomads”) which successively had to accept a new type of borderline enforcement.

In 19 cases (23%) of our sample, we did not find evidence that colonial borders were especially “artificially” drawn in the interests of colonialists, cutting traditional areas of settlement or of close interaction. These cases are mainly semi-colonial countries and islands, or cases in which the actual borders cannot be traced back to colonialism. Thirty-seven cases (45%) were coded as 1, i.e. a moderate impact of colonialism regarding partition; mainly the states in the Northern part of Africa as well as, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. In the clear majority of cases (46; 55%), colonial borders did have a distortive impact. This concerns the Asian part of the former Ottoman Empire (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan), where—as mentioned above—the creation of new political entities entailed the creation of new national economies and legal systems (Owen and Pamuk 1999:51). In many cases, territories were arbitrarily detached, sometimes “bartered” among colonial powers, integrated into existing colonies and reconfigured (e.g. between British-Malaya and Dutch Indonesia or in French-Indochina with Cambodia and Laos). Most cases of “artificial” borders, however, are found in sub-Saharan Africa (37 cases). French colonies experienced significantly more often distortive borders than British ones, as did countries in sub-Saharan Africa, compared to those in Asia and North Africa (annex 1). In areas with “artificial” borders, occupational specializations along ethnolinguistic and/or religious lines developed more often (ETHNFUNC) and missionary activities were more successful (annex 2).
The Construction of the Indices

In this section, the indicators for the three dimensions were combined into separate indices for political transformation, economic transformation and social transformation. Many indicators have different scales of measurement. Therefore, we standardized all indicators between 0 and 1, giving them equal weighting in the process of constructing the indices. To do so, we used the following formula:

\[ \delta_{x_k} = \frac{x_k - x_{\text{min}}}{x_{\text{max}} - x_{\text{min}}} = \delta \subseteq \{0 \leq \delta \leq 1\} \]

\( x_k \) is the value of one country for any of our indicators. \( x_{\text{min}} \) and \( x_{\text{max}} \) then denote the minimum and maximum for all country observations for the same indicator, respectively. \( \delta \) represents the standardized values for each indicator. In the next step, we use the mean to combine the indicators according to table 1 to get our three indices:

\[ \eta_k = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \delta_{i_k} \]

To make interpretation in quantitative studies easier in terms of one unit change/one percent change, we standardized the indices between 0 and 100 using the first formula again:

\[ \varsigma_k = \left( \frac{\eta_k - \eta_{\text{min}}}{\eta_{\text{max}} - \eta_{\text{min}}} \right) \cdot 100 = \varsigma \subseteq \{0 \leq \varsigma \leq 100\} \]

Table 2 shows the resulting values for these three indices for the colonies in our sample. The three indices correlate significantly:

- the Political Transformation (PT)-Index with the ET-Index 0.50,
- the PT-Index with the Social Transformation (ST)-Index 0.44,
- the Economic Transformation (ET)-Index with the ST-Index 0.51.

This means that, in general, political domination came along with economic and social transformation. However, the correlations are not that strong, which indicates that the three dimensions should be measured separately. Colonies in sub-Saharan Africa were more likely to experience a higher level of transformation, politically, economically and socially (correlations with PT-Index 0.37, ET-Index 0.38, ST-Index 0.58), than the Asian and North African ones.\(^{11}\) The smallest difference to be found is regarding political transformation. That means that, although political domination was not much less intensive in Asia and North Africa, these economies and

\(^{10}\) All correlations mentioned in this section are significant at the 1%-level, 2-tailed (Pearson correlation coefficients).

\(^{11}\) Graphs (available [here](#)) ranking the countries of Africa (red) and Asia/North Africa (blue) according to their levels of political, economic and social transformation show the different effects of colonialism.
societies were more difficult to transform through colonialism. There are no highly significant
differences between British and French colonies regarding the level of colonial transformation.
However, British colonies seem to have been transformed a little less than others, politically and
economically.\textsuperscript{12}

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\textsuperscript{12} Correlation British/PT-Index -0.28; British/ET-Index -0.27; British/CT-Index -0.26 (significant at 5%-level; N= 75, without semi-colonial countries and shared colonies).
### Table 2. Indices of Colonial Transformation (Continued)

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To measure the total impact of colonialism, the three indices were combined to our final result: the index for the colonial transformation. Again, table 2 shows the value for this index for all colonies in our sample. As the ranking of the countries of Africa (red) and Asia and North Africa (blue) according to their total level of colonial transformation in graph 1 shows, they have been transformed to very different degrees.
Discussion and Conclusion

We started by admitting that the problem of colonization as “intervening variable” remains unsolved in recent research, including our own. The huge variety and diversity of colonial experiences that we found mentioned in the research literature and that we can confirm on the basis of our evaluation (Ziltener and Künzler 2013) is a challenge to all attempts at coding the factual impact of colonialism and therefore its “legacies.”

In our operationalization, we defined indicators for the main dimensions of the colonial impact, in the political sphere as well as in economy and society. Confronted with numerous data problems—including the recurring major challenge that the areas reported do not correspond to actual state boundaries—we decided to make sometimes crude estimates rather than exclude important aspects of colonialism. Apart from (more or less exploitative) forms of colonial financial organization, we were able to find or create data for all important aspects of colonialism for which variance has been reported in the previous research. As result, we present, to our knowledge for the first time, a multidimensional measure of the impact of colonialism. This opens up new avenues for comparative research, qualitative as well as quantitative.

Some of our exploratory findings on the interrelation of the dimensions confirm the results of research done by others, e.g. that in British colonies political domination was in general less direct, less violent and the path to independence more orderly. Plantation colonies experienced more investment in infrastructure and more violence during decolonization. The correlations between indicators for economic distortion (trade policy, trade and FDI concentration) show that the economic re-direction of some colonies towards a more exclusive exchange with the metropole was an interdependent process. In general, a more intense political domination came along with a higher level of economic transformation. If an area was transformed economically, however, a social transformation was likely to take place too, but these processes should not be confounded.

Some findings relate to the research from a social-evolutionary perspective. In areas that were politically united for the first time under colonialism, economic distortion and social transformation were more profound. This might explain why colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa has left a heavier burden than in most Asian countries. This, however, has to be tested with multivariate methods elsewhere.

Our main result is that there is not one colonial experience. There is an enormous variance regarding the levels of distortion that countries and regions in Africa and Asia experienced. Violence and political domination did not lead necessarily to economic or social transformation. Many Asian societies displayed a strong resilience against the colonial inroads, which might well have to do with the fact that many of these have been part of the Eurasian world system for centuries before European hegemony. Only in a few countries of our sample, namely parts of sub-
Saharan Africa and the Pacific region, European colonialism meant first-time integration into the world system.

In many regards, European colonialism between 1860 and 1960 left much deeper marks than traditional, usually tributary forms of domination. Where a long-term *mise en valeur* was to be realized, infrastructure investment was huge, and labor migration from near and far significant. Some of the countries in our sample truly are creations of colonialism. There is no question that these “legacies” shape our world.

Overall, our data echoes the heightened interests in the study of colonialism among scholars from various disciplines over the last two decades. More specifically, we consider our data to advance existing research in three areas. First, the data cater to the dominant interest of scholars to investigate the effects of colonialism on economic development and trade relations (cf. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Grier 1999; Head, Mayer, and Ries 2010; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; Sousa and Lochard 2012) but also on democratization (cf. Lange 2004; Olsson 2009), conflict and state building (cf. Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001; Lange and Dawson 2009, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016), and policy outcomes (cf. Schmitt 2015). Second, recent research has also started to investigate the determinants of colonialism such as the timing or the mode of domination (cf. Ertan, Fiszbein, and Putterman 2016; Gerring et. al. 2011). More generally, our data provide the first opportunity to study how geographical conditions and pre-colonial societies affected different impacts of colonialism in a larger sample of countries. Third, we argue that the data enable scholars to create meaningful typologies of colonialism for their research questions, thereby overcoming the simple French vs. British dichotomy that has guided most empirical research about colonialism since Crowder’s article about indirect rule in 1964.

**About the Authors**

Patrick Ziltener, born in St.Gallen/Switzerland, studied in Basel, Berlin (Free University) and Zurich Sociology, History, and Economics; Ph.D. from University of Zurich, 1997; 2003-05 research project *Regional Integration in East Asia*; 2008-09 research project *Statecraft in the non-Western World: A Multifactorial Model to Explain Persisting Differentiation*; since 2015 Assoc. Prof. at the University of Zurich.

Daniel Künzler studied sociology, political science and media science in Zurich (Switzerland) and received a Ph.D. from Zurich University for his study on statehood and development in sub-
Saharan Africa. He worked as a post doc researcher in Benin. Since 2009, he is working at the University of Fribourg, where he is currently lecturer in sociology, social policy and social work. His current publications are mainly on his research on social policy in Eastern Africa.

André Walter, born in Erfurt/Germany, studied in Jena and Zurich Sociology, Political Science, Anthropology and Gender Studies. Research Projects on Welfare State Development in Federalist States, the Introduction of Income

**Disclosure Statement**
Any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledge section of the article’s text. Otherwise, author has indicated that she has no conflict of interests upon submission of the article to the journal.
References


Annexes

Annex 1. Interrelations between colonizer, regions and impact

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+ = positive correlation, - = negative correlation, no indication = no correlation.

British vs. French colonies: N= 75 (without semi-colonial countries and shared colonies).
All indicated correlations significant at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed. Source: Ziltener, Künzler and Walter Dataset (2008).

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13 The variable COLYEARS is introduced in Ziltener and Künzler (2013) and measures the length of colonial domination. We find no significant correlation between the colonizing country (British vs. French) and COLYEARS for the countries of our sample. Also, there is no significant difference between the length of colonialism in sub-Saharan African and Asian/North African countries. But the length of colonial domination is related to some economic and social indicators of colonial transformation (annex 2): A longer colonial period means more colonial violence, more investment in infrastructure and more plantations, more work immigration and more religious conversions.
Annex 2. Interrelations Between Types of Colonial Impacts

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X = Positive correlation between the two variables, significant at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed. Source: Ziltener and Künzler Dataset (2008).
In Global Unions, Local Power, Jamie McCallum (2013) offers an original and intriguing contribution to discussions of labor internationalism. His account focuses on a long-term campaign spearheaded by the Service Employees’ International Union (SEIU) and Union Network International (UNI) to develop a Global Framework Agreement (GFA) with G4S, one of the largest global security firms. McCallum argues that the agreement reached between these two organizations and the firm reflects a new form of labor internationalism rooted in “governance struggles” that departs from other forms of transnational labor organizing. He traces the account back to the 1960s when international labor organizations went through a period of transformation, as well as efforts by SEIU to organize security guards in European transnationals in the U.S. following their successful Justice for Janitors campaign.

The book’s central argument is that where workers lack structural power (Silver 2003) and where inadequate labor law enforcement limits workers’ ability to enact associational power, GFAs can be a crucial resource for unions. Under GFAs that provide workers tangible benefits,
employers sign neutrality agreements allowing workers to unionize without interference or repression. He argues that in cases like the precariously employed security guards he studied, before organizing workers, unions may need to secure rules that permit unionization via comprehensive campaigns that rely on corporate research and shareholder actions. The fascinating campaign he describes began with European unions’ support for their U.S. counterparts; continued with organizing in Europe; was made possible through industry research following strikes in Malawi, Indonesia and South Africa; and was later implemented with unions in South Africa, India, the U.S., and elsewhere.

McCallum’s story begins with the development of GFAs in Europe during the 1970s. Global Union Federations (GUFs) used these agreements as tools to hold multinational corporations accountable as they expanded, particularly in the context of Europe’s regional economic integration. GUFs used various techniques like Corporate Social Responsibility campaigns or actions by works councils to move these agreements forward. However, as McCallum argues, the agreements tend to be dominated by corporations if the GUFs lack the will or capacity to implement them with individual unions through organizing campaigns.

The discussion continues through a review of the well-known case of SEIU’s successful Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles. Rather than focusing on organizers’ and workers’ disruptive tactics as keys to the victory, McCallum emphasizes the union’s choice to target all employers in a given geographic region to prevent an individual firm from undercutting the eventual agreement. In this regard, it became less costly for an individual firm to agree to unionization: that employer knew other firms would not compete with them by offering lower wages or benefits. The “organizing model” developed in this campaign and then utilized to expand the union combined corporate research, visits to workers’ homes, protests, and community support. This model would go on to play an important role in the union’s efforts to build alliances abroad, initially in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.

Much of the remainder of the book focuses on the campaign for the negotiation and implementation of a GFA with the European-based global security firm G4S. Before this campaign began, SEIU had already established a partnership with UNI, a European-based group of global union federations. Specifically, SEIU provided financial support to the organization’s property services arm (UNI-PS), which enjoyed autonomy from the larger organization, allowing it to spearhead aggressive organizing. The G4S campaign emerged from SEIU’s difficulties organizing security guards at Securitas, a Swedish firm operating in Minnesota. Through contacts with the union representing workers in the firm in Sweden, UNI organized a delegation of European managers to witness their U.S. counterparts’ racist treatment of the largely Somali workforce. Securitas replaced the U.S. managers and allowed SEIU organizers access to work sites.
More institutionalized global collaboration emerged from SEIU’s efforts to organize Wackenhut, then the brand name G4S used in the U.S. The union’s initial challenges organizing workers in the firm led them to collaborate with their British counterparts via UNI. The SEIU and UNI began to conduct corporate research on G4S in preparation for efforts to target shareholders and institutional investors. However, strikes in Indonesia, South Africa, and Malawi, as well as incipient organizing in India, served as the spark that would catalyze the eventual agreement. SEIU and UNI authored or commissioned alternative annual reports on the company’s abhorrent labor practices in these countries highlighting human and labor rights violations. They used these reports as part of a complaint to the OECD, which eventually led Norwegian and Danish institutional investors to divest from the company. In response, G4S accepted the GFA with SEIU and UNI and agreed not to interfere with unionization campaigns in its global properties. The diverse strands of mobilization in distinct countries, research, and strategic investor targeting that came together in this campaign are particularly intriguing.

The book’s two case studies focus on implementation of the GFA in South Africa and India. SEIU-UNI dispatched organizers to these two countries to train local union staff in the SEIU organizing model that focused on research and carefully targeted recruitment of workers in specific localities. In both countries the SEIU’s strategies and SEIU-UNI staff members’ confidence in their organizing formula clashed with local cultural and organizing styles, but eventually won local adherents to differing degrees. In South Africa, SATAWU, the union organization representing security workers, shifted from a servicing orientation to a mobilization model that drew on the SEIU’s focus on research and targeted campaigns in specific localities. With SEIU support, SATWU gained access to work sites, permitting expansion of the union’s membership and winning key benefits for the union.

In India, the results were more mixed. Local affiliates of G4S refused to abide by the neutrality agreement that was central to the GFA, and unions’ strong attachment to political parties meant that the Communist-affiliated unions in Kolkata were more reluctant to work with UNI than their Congress-party affiliated counterparts in Bangalore. Consequently, the GFA did not lead G4S to recognize new unions organized as part of this initiative in India. However, UNI and local unions gained the Indian government’s agreement to enforce minimum wage and other laws at G4S and introduced pro-labor legislation that was still pending at the time of the book’s publication.

The book’s conclusion points to an important irony. While SEIU-UNI’s campaign successfully led to the negotiation of the GFA with G4S and its implementation to differing degrees in South Africa, India, and the U.S., the SEIU retreated from its global project because it netted few new U.S. members at G4S, although the agreement made unionization more feasible in other European firms operating there. Additionally, staff changes in SATAWU stalled the South
African project, and unions in Kolkata broke off relations with UNI, even though the organization began a successful campaign in Mumbai. Hence, while SEIU and UNI steered an impressive global campaign, their victories may not be sustainable.

McCallum has produced an impressive and far-ranging study that shows both the prospects and limitations of GFAs as important weapons in the arsenal of transnational labor activism. The GFA undoubtedly promoted unionization in South Africa and wage and benefit gains in India, supporting his argument that governance struggles creating new “rules of engagement” between labor and capital create the possibility for local union organizing among precarious workers.

However, his study raises important questions regarding the factors that make GFAs possible, as well as the relationship between this particular strategy and others adopted by transnational activists. The first question is one of emphasis. With his focus on the methodical work of corporate research and shareholder actions that need to occur prior to union organizing, McCallum perhaps understates the centrality of mobilization, which preceded shareholder actions and may have ultimately forced the company’s hand. Strikers in Malawi, South Africa, and Indonesia did not enjoy union recognition, and yet their massive strikes provided the crucial raw material that allowed SEIU-UNI to produce reports that were crucial to their effective shareholder campaign. In this regard, perhaps SEIU-UNI’s strategic skill was their ability to utilize those mobilizations to force the company’s hand. However, I wonder if the company would ever have signed the GFA had the strikes not occurred. In this regard, perhaps Silver’s (2003) argument that mobilization follows the inflow of capital to particular locations is a central, but understated piece of McCallum’s larger story about SEIU-UNI’s organizing expertise.

One of the book’s strengths is McCallum’s focus on union-to-union relationships. Several authors point to the limited success of labor rights campaigns led by NGOs from the Global North with weak connections to workers’ organizations in the Global South where states are unwilling to enforce labor laws (Seidman 2009; Bartley and Child 2011; Vogel 2010). However, it is interesting to note that SEIU-UNI’s use of the human rights frame in their alternative company reports echoes the “image jamming” strategies pioneered by NGOs as part of their anti-sweatshop campaigns. In this regard, while McCallum’s focus is on transnational alliances between unions, it would be interesting to consider the extent to which campaign organizers learned from or emulated earlier NGO-led campaigns.

Finally, it would be important to place this particular strategy in the context of the broad array of approaches adopted by unions and labor advocates to secure worker rights across national borders. In the conclusion, McCallum reflects on the possibilities for the export of SEIU’s organizing model or other transnational campaigns led by different U.S. unions. However, it would be valuable to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of U.S.-based labor transnationalism alongside efforts by Canadian (Aaronson 2001; Ayres 1998; Dreiling 2001),
Belgian (Cumbers et al. 2008), and German unions (Anner 2007), as well as organizations combining unions in the Global North and South (Lambert and Gillan 2010). While McCallum may be correct that U.S. unions’ experiences with neoliberalism better prepared them to fight employer intransigence than their European counterparts due to the latter’s experiences with co-determination, it would be useful to consider the SEIU-UNI experiment in relation to other experiences of labor transnationalism led by organizations outside the U.S.

Overall, Global Unions, Local Power is a compelling and persuasive account of labor transnationalism offering new ideas about how unions can mobilize in response to global capital. McCallum’s focus on governance struggles, multi-site analysis of how the global campaign developed, and excellent case studies represent an important contribution to our understanding of transnational labor activism. It will be interesting to see if this model or others gain traction in emerging global struggles for labor rights.

References
Global Unions, Local Power provides hope in the face of dark times for labor organizing. Decades of global neoliberalism has forced round after round of concessions from American workers. It has led to declining union membership and diminished work power. It has also challenged solidarity, pitting worker against worker across the globe. In this midst of this decline, a group of security guards found their way onto the global stage as they organized under one corporation across the world. It is a story about how low-waged, low-skill, low-status workers won a struggle with the world’s second largest private employer (just behind Walmart), a security company called Group 4 Securicor (G4S). Victory required an aggressive years-long campaign that included hundreds of thousands of workers across twenty countries. In the end, the Global Union Federation (GUF) forced the company to submit to a global framework agreement (GFA). This agreement allows workers in the company, regardless of where they are located, to organize unions without company interference. It had a cascading effect for workers, as they used the GFA to push for economic gains in places like Poland and Indonesia, and organize new unions in countries like...
Nepal and Congo (7). In sum, the organizing campaign included cross-border cooperation among workers from the Global North and the Global South, transcending the formal/informal divide that separates many of them. Together, they forced an industry-leading multinational to recognize them and their right to organize as workers. It is a true David and Goliath story. They accomplished what is thought to be impossible, or at best improbable, eliciting a desire to learn about the details, which is what McCallum provides.

MacCallum starts by putting global unions in context. The idea that workers will unite internationally against capital is as old as capitalism itself. The book traces the development of international labor cooperation starting with the emergence of International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) in the early twentieth century. During this period, ITSs assisted millions of workers on wage negotiations, struggles over working conditions and unionization efforts. The ITSs were accompanied by the emergence of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919 and early global union efforts such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU).

Despite the history of international worker organizations, there has not been much headway made in organizing on the international level. In this section, I wanted to know why these earlier rounds of labor internationalism failed to truly flourish, which is partly answered by the start of the World Wars. I also wanted to know more about what we can learn from these past rounds of international organizing. McCallum does point out that the biggest achievement of the international labor movement in the past was a political campaign, rather than economic bargaining, which targeted apartheid in South Africa. In recounting the history of labor internationalism, McCallum also makes an important observation about the relationship between state-level labor movements and transnational labor organizing. He argues that the relationship is an inverse one, suggesting that stronger national working class labor movements have a lower propensity to participate in international, transnational or global organizing. This may explain why a weakened, embattled labor movement such as that in the United States was the initiator of the international labor organizing and cooperation presented in the book.

In this book, McCallum’s key contribution to our understanding of global labor movements is his concept of ‘governance struggles,’ which extends our notion of how workers gain power, and more specifically how they extend associational power. He notes that work on transnational labor cooperation focuses on understanding partnerships such as collaboration between unions and NGOs, collaboration with new social movements, and the emergence of the European works councils. In contrast, McCallum shifts our attention to how cross-border collaborations achieve goals, identifying what he calls governance struggles, which include 1) struggles for social clauses in trade agreements, 2) struggles over corporate codes of conduct, and 3) struggles over global framework agreements. These governance struggles work to change the rules of the game rather
than to achieve recognition of rights, which extends associational power in new ways. Associational power is the power that workers gain when they organize together to enforce their rights. As McCallum states, “Whereas Silver (2003:14) conceives of associational power as based on the rights granted to workers through state and legal provisions, here it is theorized as the power to act in the absence of such rights” (29).

If we bring together these two important contributions from McCallum, it presents a contradiction. On the one hand, weak national level labor movements are more likely to turn to international or global organizing, but if they succeed and gain new governance structures like a code of conduct or a global framework agreement, they will lack the very thing they need for enforcement: a strong national level movement.

Also, while this example of international labor organizing brings together workers in the Global North and South into one campaign, they are not equal partners in shaping the campaign. Workers in the Global North and Global South have very different relationships to global governance structures and their struggles in the face of neoliberalism take different forms. In the Global North, workers are pushing to develop global governance structures like corporate codes of conduct and global framework agreements (GFAs) with the goal of extending associational power. As McCallum shows, some victories came through spreading the SEIU model of organizing. However, in the Global South, most workers face neoliberalism with a very different form of political struggle targeting their national level governments.

National governance failures, including rollbacks on labor rights, are related to the existing international governance structures. As McCallum notes, the rise of neoliberalism has evolved based on a global governance system centered on the “significance of the Bretton Woods institutions—the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—as governance bodies, especially since the end of the Cold War” (28). In turn, this set of global governance structures has attacked national-level labor standards and labor movements, eliciting strong reactions from workers around the world.

In Latin America, the rise of neoliberalism and failure of national economies in the 1980s and 1990s sparked resistance in the form of national general strikes, popular uprisings, and attempted coups. These actions ultimately took on a political form with the rise of new social movements, political parties, and candidates. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, a charismatic military officer and coup leader was elected in 1999, and reelected in 2000 and 2006. In Brazil, Ignacio ‘Lula’ da Silva, founder of the Workers Party (PT) and former steel worker and organizer of the Metalworkers Union, was elected as President in 2002 and finished his second term in 2010. In Bolivia, the rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and election of Evo Morales in 2006 emerged as a response to global capitalism and the need to protect coca growers.
In Asia, global neoliberalism emerged under international governance structures based on the Bretton Woods Institutions, reaching a crescendo in the form of the 1999 Asian Crisis. The IMF and the World Bank were at the eye of the hurricane, forcing nations to trade national labor protection laws for assistance in re-securing their financial stability. In Korea, the day after Christmas in 1996 the government held a special night session of parliament with no opposition present, voting through a series of labor casualization laws that would allow for layoffs and multi-tiered contracts. The Korean labor movement responded with the first general nationwide strike since the Korean War, bringing millions onto the streets and forcing the withdrawal of the legislation. However, by March, the government reintroduced the bill and passed it. The death knell occurred in the face of the Asian Crisis, as the IMF required massive layoffs as a key conditionality of the Fund’s record $57 billion aid package. It was argued that worker layoffs were necessary to restore financial credibility and attract foreign investment. This would have been impossible under the old national labor laws, but with the new law in place, layoffs started at a rate of 10,000 workers a day from February to May, which sparked another two-day national strike (Kraar 1998).

In contrast, the response to neoliberalism in the Global North has been a push to globalize national models, like the SEIU organizing model. McCallum shows how it emerged in the United States with the early Janitors for Justice campaign in Los Angeles, California (49) and how it was later replicated in the ‘Clean start for Cleaners’ campaign in Australia, and the ‘Justice for Cleaners’ and ‘Driving Up Standards’ campaigns in the UK.

In this sense, global unions, and their related governance struggles are a distinctive model of global labor struggles that dominates in, and spreads through, the Global North. McCallum’s logic follows Evans (2000) argument that “Finally, the labor movement can counteract the advantages that globalization confers on corporate capital by demanding the global spread of ‘core labor standards,’ most essentially the right to organize” (231). However, the idea that traditional unions are a logical vehicle for organizing workers on the national or international level assumes that most workers are formal or standard workers, meaning they are recognized as workers, hired directly by the employer into an employment relationship cemented in a labor contract.

As the SEIU quickly discovered in India, this is not the most common form of employment, and hence, in places like India, unions are not the most common or successful form of worker organization. McCallum recounts how the SEIU took a trip to India to survey its options for a local partner. They chose to work with the Indian National Trade Union Congress rather than the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), which is a national-level worker organization with an impressive track record of organizing workers in the informal sector. Here McCallum’s detailed case study captures the difficulties of pushing the SEIU model, and shows how, on the local level, unions’ approach varied from one city to the next. In Bangalore, the SEIU was confronted by a
relatively new union that held an open attitude towards learning the SEUI organizing model. In contrast, in Kolkata, they met a union with fifteen years’ experience working with security guards. This local rejected the suggestion that they should drop its labor broker role and learn SEIU’s organizing model.

Surprisingly, McCallum interprets the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) leader’s resistance to the Union Network International (UNI) as evidence that Indian unions are isolated and isolationist (141). Reading the well-documented and detailed case studies of how the SEIU successfully built solidarity with workers across different places reveals more about the SEIU than it does about the local unions it encounters. The SEIU’s approach comes across as anything but global. Its international relationships are not forged through mutual sharing and learning; instead, the SEIU’s leadership based on brash gumption is combined with partners who are willing to follow. It is also based on the assumption that that the SEIU organizing model works, and can or should be imported and adopted in places like India.

While McCallum convincingly diagnoses the need for new approaches to international labor practices because “transformations in the global political economy have shifted the bases of worker power” (145), his prescription for increasing governance struggles which focus on “altering the rules of engagement between labor and capital” seems limited. The boomerang effect that the U.S. unions leveraged with their European counterparts was powerful, but it is less convincing that weak U.S. unions are driving success in South Africa or India. McCallum shows how the SEIU has been a beacon of light among the decimated labor movement in the United States and points out that European unions do not seem prepared to deal with the destructive force that neoliberalism has, and will continue to, wreak on their social welfare model. However, he stops short of extending his purview beyond the Global North when scanning the landscape for viable organizing models to lead a countermovement against global capitalism. The campaign against G4S does provide us with a successful international labor organizing model out of the Global North. However, given that most new workers being drawn into global capitalism are in the Global South, and the form of work is quite different, models originating from there might look quite different as well.

Global Unions, Local Power is a powerful and important reminder that global unionism, and more broadly, international labor organizing has ebbed and flowed throughout history, but has always been an important piece part of worker struggles under capitalism. Accordingly, as global capitalism transforms, so must worker struggles.
References
Rule Making Through Governance Struggles: The Case of G4S

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Can global unions build local power? If so, how? McCallum’s central thesis is that effective global unionism requires reciprocity with local actors. In Global Unions, Local Power, the author strikes a middle ground between the optimism about the prospects for authentic labour internationalism and the pessimism of its demise, by carefully investigating and dissecting the overlapping and complex mechanisms of the ‘governance struggles’ that lie at the heart of transnational unionism.

To illustrate his argument McCallum researches the case of a global campaign targeted at a private security firm called Group for Securitor (G4S)—the world’s largest employer after Walmart—by the Union Network International (UNI), a global union federation, and its relationship with the North American trade union Service Employees International Union (SEIU). The analysis is enriched by two cases studies, in South Africa and India, where private security guards are workers in a precarious industry, and their struggles to improve their conditions have been marked.
The book makes four important contributions. First, McCallum addresses the complexities of transnational unionism as a philosophy and a movement. As a philosophy, it is rooted in historical materialism, disentangling a dialectical method in which the contradictions of history are used to explain the present. This is relevant to the author’s elaboration of ‘transnationalism,’ which he distinguishes from ‘internationalism.’ The former implies the blurring of nation-state demarcations and a tendency to transcend national borders, not merely cooperate across them (164-165). As a movement, it shows how the crafting of a global campaign through ‘governance struggles’ (chapter 3) casts new light on the interrelations between the global and the local across time and space. The overlapping complexities and tensions in forming and executing the Global Framework Agreement (GFA) are cautiously researched and described for the cases of South Africa (chapter 4) and India (chapter 5).

Second, the signing and enactment of the GFA between UNI and G4S in the United States, South Africa and India shows the GFA as a maker of new rules, which in turn, enables the potential to achieve further rights. Thus, McCallum moves beyond the static view of GFAs as ‘policy instruments’ to demonstrate how they shape the rules of engagement and can be used in different ways according to local context. For example, in the South African case, the GFA provided a template to contain management’s anti-unionism and promoted the ability to mobilize and organize (121). In contrast, the GFA in India has not managed to constrain anti-union behaviour, but rather led the local union to redirect its claims towards the state, generating a social dialogue process (143).

Third, reciprocity between the global and local spheres of action is a necessary condition for building global unionism (146). However, the case studies show how intertwining complexities at the heart of ‘governance struggles’—surpassing strict top-down/bottom-up perspectives—lead to a ‘boomerang in reverse effect,’ by which unions in the Global North are reinvigorated by building transnational solidarity with their counterparts in the Global South.

Fourth, GFAs are most effective when they are part of a comprehensive strategy. The implications of theorizing GFAs in this way is that the focus is not only on the multinational corporation, but the nature of regional and global markets in which they operate in order to understands whether GFAs can be a tool for worker power, and whether workers really have the capacity to craft the terms of these rules.

The book comes at a juncture in which ‘labour studies’ as a field of inquiry has managed to permeate a broader spectrum of disciplines in the social sciences beyond sociology. From human geography to international relations, Global Unions, Local Power is an important read for academics, practitioners, unionists and activists interested in transnational governance. The book is nicely written, catching the attention of a wide audience comprised not solely of academics, but also activists and union organizers who want to understand the rationale of corporate research, the
thinking process behind adjusting strategies to local contexts, and how to engage labour power across borders.

The way forward? McCallum has provided new light on debates around labour governance through the role of GFAs. What lies ahead is a careful examination of what constitutes a ‘success’ in terms of particular global campaigns and the conclusion of a GFA. From the case studies presented in *Global Unions, Local Power*, success might seem to be in the eye of the beholder and shaped by local context and certain interests of global and local actors. Building on this line of work, further studies can shed light on other cases towards a comparative analysis of GFAs’ effectiveness. In addition, new issues in transnational unionism such as migrant workers, rising xenophobia, and political education can be studied from a ‘governance struggle’ perspective. McCallum has done an outstanding job of presenting transnational unionism and some of its limitations to a wide audience.
Donald Trump was elected president of the United States based in good part on a growing critique of neoliberalism. While Trump himself will continue much of the neoliberal agenda, he is a vocal critic of trade agreements and corporate mobility that are harmful to U.S. workers. Trump promised to “make America great again” by promising to bring back jobs, punish corporations who try to move jobs overseas, deport immigrants, and essentially close the borders to many classes of people. We’ve seen similar nationalist movements emerge in other parts of the world, particularly Europe. The Brexit vote was in part a rejection of more open borders and also of an undemocratic European Union. Nationalism is one response to continued economic hardship.

Another response to the damages of neoliberalism could be an expansion of internationalism. Jamie McCallum’s book, *Global Unions, Local Power*, shows us what such internationalism could look like: unions working to build alliances across national borders in order to organize massive global corporations. This approach would regulate transnational capital, raising the floor on wages and workers’ rights.
The campaign, led by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), has had mixed results, but overall, McCallum argues, it is the kind of campaign that is necessary in current times. As corporations have more and more freedom to move around countries and across borders, and as states rewrite laws and regulations to favor those corporations at the expense of workers, unions have no choice if they want to survive but to build their own global campaigns.

Internationalism is not a new concept for the labor movement, as McCallum shows. But interestingly, concrete efforts to make internationalist rhetoric real have ebbed and flowed counter to the growth of unions. In the wake of WWI, the left, and unions, turned away from international organizing and focused more heavily on domestic organizing. In many countries that took the form of building a role for unions inside the state (such as via corporatist politics), or via strong collective bargaining agreements directly with employers. It is only in recent decades as those systems and union power broke down that unions have turned back to the hope of transnationalism.

McCallum cites scholars that argue that neoliberal globalization opens up new opportunities for workers to organize across borders (Evans 2010). With the expansion of global supply chains, just-in-time production, and global markets, workers may have more reasons to cooperate and more structural power if they can stop production in key places. But McCallum argues that the Group 4 Securicor (G4S) campaign had some success not because of globalization but rather in spite of it. Instead, he asserts that it was a combination of strong union leadership and vision at the top, effective research, a global corporate campaign that helped change the rules, and local conditions that, in some places, opened up enough space for workers on the ground to organize. In this way, McCallum does not necessarily share the optimism that some scholars have for labor organizing in the period of neoliberal globalization—he does not think campaigns like G4S are a reflection of a Karl Polanyi-type “counter-movement.” At the same time, his work suggests some key lessons for labor unions and those fighting for workers rights in the global economy. I highlight a few points that I think are key.

First, McCallum’s work suggests that labor scholars and activists should not be overly committed to a specific model or approach. His case study is particularly interesting because the G4S campaign uses a Global Framework Agreement (GFA) with some success. U.S. activists in particular have expressed skepticism about the GFA model, as it is more in line with a European, “social dialogue” approach. The GFA is basically a voluntary agreement between a corporation and a global union; as it is generally not enforceable by law, it is therefore a “soft law” tool. Americans are cynical of this approach, having watched employer after employer violate voluntary agreements. Instead, the U.S. model relies more heavily on “hard law” contracts that are enforceable in court. The U.S. model is more confrontational and aggressive, while the European model is, on average, more cooperative.
At the same time, there are many in Europe skeptical of the U.S. model of confrontation and aggressive organizing, and certainly some resistance to U.S. unions coming into Europe and telling Europeans what to do. After all, the U.S. labor movement is in weak shape—and never even had its own political party. Many activists in the international arena have been frustrated by what they see as American arrogance and another form of cultural imperialism. Finally, SEIU has many critics, in Europe and the United States, who believe the union has been too top-down and overconfident, and too willing to compromise shopfloor organizing for other “faster” methods of organizing, such as making deals with employers.

McCallum acknowledges all of these criticisms and concerns, but then goes on to show how the G4S campaign was more complex than a simple analysis would suggest. There is not really one specific SEIU organizing model, and there isn’t even one specific model for using GFAs. In this case, the models came together with some positive outcomes. It is not easy, and varies greatly with local conditions, so there is no “one size fits all” or “best practice model.”

This underscores McCallum’s call for unions to experiment. This does not mean abandoning existing models or older practices, but being open to a combination of strategies and tactics in all dimensions—research, organizing, global, local.

I share McCallum’s call for scholars and activists to keep an open mind in the search for an organizing strategy. We have much to learn from history, and we must be prepared to learn from other countries, other kinds of social movements, and different types of organizing. For example, unions can work with and learn from movements such as Occupy Wall Street, the landless workers movement, worker centers, and worker co-operatives. Some scholars have even suggested that Alcoholics Anonymous has lessons for social movements in terms of building a non-hierarchical self-sustaining model (Room 1993). Employers have been bold and innovative in their quest to expand around the globe, testing new limits and pushing boundaries. Unions must do the same.

The second key point is that unions need to experiment in order to find sources of power. Neoliberal globalization has created new opportunities, but for the most part, has left workers with less power, McCallum argues. Corporations have more power to move their jobs and investments, to fire workers, and to outlast workers’ organizing attempts. Because some service sector jobs, like security guards, are place-bound, employers do not have the same ability to just pick up and move. However, deregulated labor markets mean it is easier for employers to break strikes and bring in replacement workers. It is also easier for employers to use guestworkers or hire unauthorized immigrant workers. Lacking structural power, workers must find ways to exercise associational power.
McCallum cites Frances Fox Piven, who argues that collective actors can increase their power, or make it actionable, by breaking rules. People must disrupt the ways society functions on a daily basis, creating chaos and disorder. In response, policymakers work to restore order.

SEIU worked to gain power for G4S workers through building a global alliance with other unions and working together to conduct research into the company’s weak spots. Around that time, 2006, the United Nations created its Principles for Responsible Investment. This allowed the unions to target certain investors and highlight the ways in which G4S was abusing workers and violating human rights in global South countries. The unions attended shareholder meetings, released reports, and filed charges against the company with the OECD.

At the same time, workers were organizing on the local level in multiple countries, including Indonesia, South Africa, Malawi, India, Poland and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The G4S Alliance sent resources and staff to assist with these efforts and draw more unions and workers into the campaign. The campaign used stories of abuses from some of the local strikes in its reports. The campaign began to have success with some investors, such as Norway’s largest life insurance company, which agreed to divest from G4S. Eventually the pressure built from multiple angles, and the company agreed to sign the Global Framework Agreement (GFA) in 2008. The GFA required the company to stay neutral in unionization efforts.

This leads to the third point, which is that workers must develop power in order to change the rules of governance. In short: they must stretch and sometimes break the rules in order to change the rules. Global Unions, Local Power argues that unions may have more success organizing if they shift from a focus on labor rights, and instead work to change the rules of governance. In my own work on living wages, I have found that passing a law mandating higher wages is of little value if workers don’t have the power to enforce the law. Winning legislative victories, or even a union contract, may have little effect.

More importantly, unions should get to the heart of governance. Neoliberal policy has resulted in a massive change of rules: governments have granted corporations and investors more rights, and reduced the rights of workers and unions. This is about rights, but it is also about the power to enforce rights and influence decisions.

If workers and unions play by the existing rules in a neoliberal economy, they will mostly lose. Employers already have more power under capitalism. Social democracy is one way to mediate that: to give workers some more power to even the playing field. Even a true “free market” would be more fair for workers than neoliberalism, because at least then employers could not grow to monopolies and workers would not be barred from moving to other countries. But under neoliberalism the tilt goes back the other way, to an extreme imbalance. Investors and employers have inordinate power relative to workers. The rules of the game must be changed in order to have a more equitable system.
Unions themselves can be a way for workers to change the rules in many countries, where they have a formal role in setting national policy. In others, unions have fought to set or change federal legislation.

Global Framework Agreements are another tool for changing the rules of governance. Other mechanisms that have been used in transnational labor organizing, like corporate codes of conduct, don’t change rules of governance. Social clauses, like the labor side agreement in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) don’t really either, because they have no mechanism for unions or workers to enforce their rights (unlike other elements of trade agreements, where corporations have legal channels and can win compensation if their rights are violated).

*Global Unions, Local Power* shows how the campaign won the Global Framework Agreement. By launching a comprehensive corporate campaign, the alliance was able to “disorganize,” and thereby neutralize the company enough so that it could run a campaign to build a union. Without changing the rules of governance, G4S, as one of the largest employers in the world, would have had too much power and could have easily continued to fight the union at every turn.

McCallum is right to point out that the need for governance struggles is in part a reflection of the failure of states to regulate. Markets are unequal to start with, and neoliberal markets are even more unequal. Asserting that workers have rights is not enough, particularly in a terrain where they is no way to enforce those claims, especially across borders. Unions cannot rely on states to regulate corporations and must pursue direct mechanisms to hold corporations accountable.

At times I found myself confused by McCallum’s arguments about where workers get power and how to use it. In part this might be because there can be a slippery line between workers and unions, between union staff and union leaders. In the G4S case, much of the alliance building seems to have taken place among SEIU staff and leaders, building connections with other unions’ leaders. It also seems that SEIU research staff played a big role in setting up the corporate campaign and pushing the company to agree to the GFA. On the other hand, worker strikes also seem important. Here, workers used their associational power to cause disruptions for the company. But is this also structural power, as the strikes did impede the company from making profit? In any case, workers and unions needed to find sources of power to even win the GFA. They then needed to exercise that power in order to organize themselves into unions and win contracts. In this sense, the argument sometimes felt a bit cyclical: you need power to change the rules, and you need to change the rules to gain power. Perhaps that is in fact true, and McCallum’s point is that it is an iterative, dialectical process. But it may be that there are different kinds of power accessed at different stages?
A fourth point that McCallum makes is that once they change the rules of governance, workers must then build new institutions. Building transnational labor movements depends on this. It requires more creative experimentation, combining local and international work. Constant mobilizing is not enough: it must be transformed into lasting organization or it will likely fade away. This point makes sense, and history suggests that workers advance significantly when their fight-back results in the formation of unions, political parties, and political structures and policies. It seems unions have had their greatest impacts not just on their members but society overall in countries where they were able to institutionalize their power on the national level, such as through systems of co-determination or formal seats on government bodies.

Unfortunately, many of our models for doing this have failed. Polls show that many young people in particular are skeptical of traditional vehicles like unions and political parties, as they see them prone to bureaucracy and/or corruption. While McCallum makes a strong case that workers benefit from unions, he does not take on the question of whether our unions are functional. Indeed, that question is well beyond the scope of this book. However, part of the challenge for labor activists is to take seriously the critiques of traditional models and find ways to make our organizations and institutions more democratic, accountable and effective.

Finally, McCallum calls for more vision, and, as one of his interviewees suggests, “imagineers.” We are now experiencing a true ideological battle for a new economic and political model, or models. While there are many political theorists, entrepreneurs and elites thinking about 10, 20, even 50-year visions, the union movement rarely makes the time or place for such kind of visioning. At times, this visioning has even been criticized as a luxury or a distraction. Some have argued that we can’t spend time on vision until we increase union density: only then, when more workers are organized, can we talk about alternative models. Yet this leaves us fighting defensive battle after defensive battle, or at best, stuck to old routines that win short-term gains. The G4S campaign was an experiment in thinking longer term, bigger and bolder.

SEIU has since launched the Fight for $15 campaign, which I think is another example of such experimentation, as union insiders acknowledge they had no real strategy for unionizing fast food corporations when launching the campaign. Rather they worked with workers on the local level, first in New York, then around the country—and then in many countries around the world. This campaign has also tested old tactics (strikes, community support, corporate campaign, legal battles), but with a new approach: targeting city officials for legislative gains, revitalizing old tools like the New York state wage board. So far this effort has achieved extraordinary success in terms of minimum wage gains in U.S. cities and states. It has also assisted some SEIU unions in securing stronger collective bargaining outcomes. It has not yet won unionization for fast food workers, and to date, has had no victories in other countries. Yet it has inspired workers to organize their own
versions of the Fight for $15 campaign, in Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, Canada and more (Kann 2014; Torio 2016).

This kind of experimentation is good, but I would argue it is still far from the real “imagineering” we need from the labor movement. We want to fight for short-term gains like increased wages, and we want workers to be able to form unions, but we also want to think about the larger system we want to live in. Union leaders and members need to have a critique of capitalism and the ways in which it fails to meet people’s needs. We need to study alternative economic models and have discussion and debate about their strengths and weaknesses. We need to have open, transparent and democratic dialogue about our own organizations.

We are living in a moment of serious economic, political and environmental crisis, and unions cannot afford to remain in defensive mode. The German political theorist Wolfgang Streeck argues that capitalism and democracy are no longer mutually compatible, and most likely, capitalism will survive with the growth of authoritarianism. If this argument is true, we need democratic forces building a challenge, to help the transition out of capitalism by expanding democracy and democratic control over the economy.

By most measures, the left is quite weak at this time, in most parts of the world. Some of it was killed off by outward attacks (red scare, military, state repression). Other parts were demoralized by the collapse of left countries or the failures of hopeful states like South Africa and Brazil. Some of the left has imploded from internal feuding, scandal or simple ineffectiveness. Left-leaning parties have mostly moved to the right, and unions are declining in membership and power. If McCallum’s point that left power and internationalism have had a somewhat inverse relationship, this should be a positive sign for the potential of transnational labor organizing.

Global Unions, Local Power gives us hope that the labor movement can be a force in building an alternative. Indeed, unions have been the backbone of key liberation movements in many countries. Now is time for those unions to build a global liberation struggle.

References


Review Symposium on Jamie McCallum’s *Global Unions, Local Power: The New Spirit of Transnational Labor Organizing*

**Reflecting on Global Unions, Local Power**

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I began the research for my book in 2009 with a great deal of skepticism as to the possibilities for authentic labor transnationalism. National or even local union victories seemed so hard to come by; how could unions win across national boundaries that were complicated by geography, language, identity, etc? Over the course of writing this book, I was convinced that the G4S campaign, and a few others, represented a decisive answer—not only was it possible, it was already happening. Sometimes it seemed unions couldn’t win locally precisely because they were not campaigning globally. In certain industries, and especially in property services, the global arena provided an avenue for unions to effect change across a wide geographic span, and at different scales.

The intervening years since the book was published have altered my view again. Below I would like to reflect on some of those changes, provide some updates on the book, and offer some thoughts about the future of this field. The book featured the experiences of labor movements in the global South—South Africa and India in particular—but also those in mainland Europe, the UK, and Eastern Europe. Of those places, South Africa offered the most promise as a strong ally.
in a global campaign. With the help of UNI and SEIU, the union there, the South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union (SATAWU), went through a robust rehabilitation of its internal organizing commitments in order to transform itself into a union that can bring in new workers. As a result, throughout the highly collaborative campaign, union membership among security guards spiked from 8,000 to 36,000. Moreover, the ideological orientation of the South African labor movement, and its close affiliations with the Communist party, meant that it was easily predisposed toward international cooperation. Nevertheless, amid the divorce of the unions and the African National Congress, SATAWU splintered and UNI says it no longer has a role in the larger campaign.

In India, where challenges were stronger, UNI and its local affiliates still made gains. Union membership among Indian security guards grew from 1,500 to 17,000 in Bangalore, and from 12,000 to 20,000 in Kolkata, for example. This activity translated in 30% to 100% wage increases over the past nine years in addition to benefits increases and a panoply of worker rights victories. As in South Africa, however, most of the unions that worked alongside UNI have withdrawn from the campaign. UNI still works with the Bangalore-based unions highlighted in the book and a 2016 UNI document lists an active property services campaign in Ahmedabad.

Perhaps one weakness of the book was to underestimate how precarious such global alliances and relationships can be. It is of course possible that unions are making use of the global agreement where it is in force, without working collaboratively with UNI or other unions. In Malawi, and some other places mentioned in the book, unionists seemed on occasion to spontaneously take ownership of the framework agreement and use its neutrality clause to apply local pressure, without the assistance of UNI or others. But these cases were rare and always bubbled to the surface or echoed back to Geneva, where UNI was invariably asked to intervene in some way. Today, UNI has four active campaigns in Latin America and one in India.

Despite completing interviews around the globe, my primary interest was always the fate of the American case. Did sending resources around the world ever boomerang back to help U.S. workers, whose dues were funding at least some part of the campaign via SEIU’s seed money to UNI property services? The impression I received was that many staff leaders within SEIU in the U.S. thought the answer was “no,” yet I felt it was “yes.” This discrepancy came from the trust I placed in my interview partners in Europe and around the globe who felt the G4S agreement would significantly aid SEIU in organizing all security guards, not just those in G4S. At the time I wrote the book, SEIU was able to use the G4S agreement to help organize 10,000 security guards. Years later, this assessment still seems accurate, with 50,000 new security guards potentially joining the union because they work within the orbit of an agreement that covers their company.

UNI also gained important lessons from the G4S campaign that happened after the book came out. Since the signing of the framework agreement with G4S, the property services division
of UNI, which organizes security guards, has grown by 100,000 members. According to Christy Hoffman, director of the property services division of UNI and the primary leader of the G4S campaign, some of the strategies used in the G4S campaign have been deployed with success against other large companies.

But the challenges of cross-border work are even more complicated than usual, given the renewed attack on U.S. unions. The largest single contributor to the UNI Property Services war chest is SEIU, which has recently announced plans to reduce significantly its staff in reaction to the attack on unions already underway by the Trump administration and other Republicans. Will it continue to fund global labor activism when there is a dire threat to workers in the U.S. and its resources are even more strained? My best guess is that it will. Though SEIU has reduced its global department staff, its largest active campaign to raise the minimum wage floor to fifteen dollars per hour has had an important global dimension. With copycat campaigns in Japan, the Philippines and New Zealand, it represents a third wave of global struggles that have rippled out from worker movements in the U.S.—first Justice for Janitors, then Stand for Security, and now Fight for $15. One organizer in my book referred to this process, where a campaign strategy and its corresponding “brand” go viral, as “open source organizing.” It is unlikely that a global campaign will soon receive the kind of resources that the G4S campaign had at its disposal, yet that was true before the U.S. elections as well.

Aside from the empirical insights to be gleaned from wide-ranging interviews and ethnographic content, I hoped that my book would inaugurate a larger conversation about a labor union strategy I called governance struggles, in order to flesh it out. This didn’t happen to a great degree and as a result the concept remains undertheorized.

I argued that a governance struggle can be thought of as one of many strategies to “subordinate the rules-based logic of private companies to democratic oversight by workers and their unions” (3). While the term “governance,” probably more widely used in Political Science, typically implies an authority vested in non-state actors, I redefined the term to apply to worker struggles that sought to enforce new “rules of engagement” with large companies. A great exemplar of this strategy are the codes of conduct won by anti-sweatshop activists that create a new arena of labor standards. Another are the neutrality clauses that unions are sometimes able to win that force an employer to surrender its right to fight the union organizing drive. Ultimately, I concluded that the G4S agreement “helped workers build power not because it won them new rights but because it made new rules” (145). The distinction between rules and rights seems important, though my book inadequately addresses the differences. Over the years through subsequent conversations with scholars, labor activists, and lawyers, this concept has become
clearer to me.¹

Central to Nelson Lichtenstein’s *State of the Union*, is the contention that the rights consciousness of the 1960s and 1970s served to undermine the solidarity of American unions by deflecting worker struggles from the workplace to the courts. Since that time, he argues, ‘If a new set of work rights was to be won, the decisive battle would take place, not in the union hall or across the bargaining table, but in the courts and the legislative chambers’ (Lichtenstein 2013: 192). My experience tells me that unions often lose in that arena. And where workers do win state-sanctioned rights, they are unable to make use of them without a robust organizing program anyway. Moreover, Frances Fox Piven (2008) argues that movements show their power when they break rules, not when they exercise rights. Can rulemaking be as powerful as rulebreaking?

However, it is possible that rights, broadly conceived, are fundamentally better ways to mobilize workers and communities. Rights are principled statements of entitlement and social access that allow people to make viable and legitimate claims on governments, companies, and other entities. As labor lawyer Cesar Rodriguez put it to me during a 2014 exchange, “rights are enabling.” Rules, by contrast, come “from outside” and are very often there to limit rather than expand collective action.

But what if labor makes the rules? Certain forms governance can also be seen as empowering because workers can be said to have a genuine impact within their own workplaces. Take, for example, the German model of codetermination, where unions help establish production schedules and output quotas, and other rules governing the work process and employment relationship—wages, hours, benefits, vacation, pension investments, and so on. Another example is the framework agreement signed between UNI and ISS, another large property-services firm. The agreement includes an ‘organizing fund’ seeded by the company.

The risk of these types of arrangements is that unions become merely junior-level managers of their work lives. But that is a risk that can be avoided, if taken seriously. The G4S agreement, for example, represents what Müller-Jentsch (2004) calls a ‘conflict partnership’. The union inserted itself into the boardroom by force and has demanded the company accept a series of its demands. While this has granted them less voice in the quotidian workplace than a more friendly partnership, the risks associated with bureaucratization are decreased.

How might the field of global labor studies change, or be shaped by current events?

First, the Trump administration will be as potentially destructive for global union collaboration as it will be for domestic union rights. An anecdote might help explain why.

Several years ago, I was lucky to be included in an American Sociological Association

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¹ In particular, I credit the labor lawyer Cesar Rodriguez and my collaborator Marissa Brookes (who is currently writing a book on labor transnationalism) with helping me sharpen my analytical approach to the concept.
delegation to Beijing led by Katie Quan and Chris Tilly to meet Chinese labor activists and speak at a conference. During my presentation, one attendee from the pro-democracy movements in Taiwan objected to what he felt was a large bias for U.S.-style unionism, which he interpreted as corrupt, imperialistic, and undemocratic. I believe that characterization of the U.S. labor movement is incorrect today, however accurate it might have been at one point. There are simply better critiques to level at U.S. unions. So I stand behind my contention in the book that American unions have much to offer their counterparts in other places, especially Europe. However, this incident forced me to realize the significance of the popular impression that U.S. unions face around the globe, or the self-image they may even inadvertently propagate.

Today, for example, the surprisingly cozy relationship between with the AFL-CIO and the Trump administration could have ripple effects around the world. If American labor is unnecessarily timid in the face of a racist, xenophobic, business tycoon—as it is today—it will adversely impact the ability of any U.S. unions, no matter their political compass, to find willing global collaborators.

Perhaps some current activist work will yield new scholarly contributions. My book defends a relatively top-down strategy brought about by union leadership, an unpopular position. In the end, I felt that global unionism at the scope of the G4S campaign required the kind of omniscient bird’s eye vision that could only come from a well-oiled bureaucracy. I was in no way downplaying the significance of the ground campaigns of workers. But I had grown weary of the scholarly tracts that seem to conflate the form of politics with its content. In this case, I had genuine faith in the fairness and political acumen of leaders at multiple levels. In some ways, this conclusion led me toward a position that over-emphasized the impossibility of authentic bottom-up labor transnationalism.

Since then, however, I began working with ReAct, a France-based labor activist group that has managed to coordinate serious campaigns between French unions and disparate places like Cambodia, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Using community organizing tactics borrowed from U.S.-based organizations, it has waged successful campaigns with activists at rubber plantations in Cameroon and for workers in Moroccan call centers, the latter of which also had assistance from UNI. After building global networks of union leaders, it held simultaneous international solidarity actions against the French company ST Micro in France, Italy, and Africa. In 2015, I served as an adviser to several ReAct organizers who worked on campaigns and research via a generous grant from the geography journal, Antipode, which has published excellent scholarly work on global labor issues.

ReAct is a young organization, still very much a work in progress, but it is a gentle reminder that a grassroots movement can wage legitimate cross-border campaigns. Although not a substitute for large labor institutions with resources and experience, groups such as this have
much to contribute to the future of a global labor movement.

References
Correction to: Coakley, Maurice “Ireland, Europe and the Global Crisis.”
*Journal of World-Systems Research* 22 (1): 177-201. 10.5195/jwsr.2016.634

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**Abstract**  
A series of citations in the text were missing page numbers. There were a series of quotations in the original text from journal articles and books that have been changed to reflect the exact page that the author is referencing in the article. The author has also attributed the quotations from public figures and politicians to their respective journalistic sources. Finally, the author has updated the “About the Author” section of the paper. The original article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.634
Erratum

Page 178: The Arrighi citation is now “Arrighi 1986: 26.”
Page 187: The Sarkozy quotation is now attributed to the EU Observer from 28 September 2008.
Page 187: The Trichet quotation is now attributed to Leaman 2014: 45.
Page 187: The Chatterjee quotation is now attributed to Common Dreams 28 May 2012.
Page 188: The Merkel quotation is now attributed to Deutsche Press.
Page 195: The Streeck 2014a citation is changed to “Streeck 2014a: 106.”
Page 196: The citation for Anderson 2011 is changed to Anderson 2012.
Page 197: The quotation from the president of the European Commission is now attributed to the Daily Telegraph 15 July 2015.
Page 198: The About the Author text now reads:

“Maurice Coakley lectures in the Journalism and Media Studies faculty, Griffith College Dublin. He is author of Ireland in the World Order: A History of Uneven Development (Pluto: 2012). His research interests include the historical development of capitalism, patterns of hegemonic power and the structures of contemporary imperialism.”

Full Text Original Article
http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.634

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Abstract

Corrections have been made to the first page, including the two quotations that begin the article, and the first full paragraph. The original article can be found via the doi at  
[http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.637](http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.637)
Erratum

1. The first page of the article now reads as follows:

"If you wish to know what the spirit of conquest, religious hatred, combined with all the abuses of aristocracy without any of its advantages, can produce, come to Ireland." - Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835

   "I remember when the market took off, about 1988/89 . . . We'd no idea it was going to escalate into what it did. Nobody had experienced the type of boom that came. There was a lot of money made in that period. People who cashed in did very well." - An Irish auctioneer, 2005

From the imperially imposed destitution rued by aristocratic iconoclasts Tocqueville and Beaumont to the epic financial meltdown imposed by domestic quasi-aristocratic bankers and allied insiders is quite a rocky journey, but one with steady themes: deference to authority, comprador capitulation to external forces, celebration of the conventional, and exclusion or erasure of anyone the least bit critical of elite schemes…

Full Text Original Article

http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2016.637

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1 Larkin, 1990: 26; Beaumont, 1839.
2 MacIntyre, 2005: 161-162.
3 On the authoritarian strain in political culture see Ferriter, 2005.