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For the last several years I have begun several papers on global hegemony and leadership by contrasting the Long Cycle perspective of Modelski and Thompson with the World Economy perspective of Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn, and others. At first, this was an easy contrast. While there was always much overlap, the Long Cycle school emphasized world order produced by a world leader with over half the world's naval power. The world economy school emphasized economic dominance over finance, trade, and production, or in some variants, over leading economic sectors. This difference in emphasis allowed me to set up contrasting propositions from the theories that could be tested empirically.

Unfortunately, with this book, the difference in perspectives narrows substantially and I will have to revise my papers substantially. While their earlier work alluded to economic processes, with this book the emphasis shifts rather dramatically from sea power to leading economic sectors. It is a shift that I wholeheartedly applaud. Their discussion of economic and political coordination, as opposed to focusing on one or the other, raises the level of debate to a more sophisticated level. In addition, I find that determining leadership in terms of dominance over leading sectors, which includes the concept to long waves, to be more convincing historically than arguments about simultaneous dominance in finance, trade and production. I also find it more convincing logically as a causal theory, as they now incorporate innovation, than their own past work, which had a functionalist tinge. While they are not alone in advocating leading sector theory, they have amassed an impressive data set to support their claims. The book is a worthy contribution of those grounds alone.

Given this convergence of emphasis, and I should add that World Economy theorists have become more political, are there still important differences between the two schools of thought? Or in other words, can I still salvage my papers? The answer, thank god, is yes.

The most important differences are the following: 1. Is global war necessary for leadership and can a global war occur without
producing a leader? 2. Are there 3 hegemons or 5 leaders after 1500? 3. Were there world leaders prior to 1500? and 4. Does the modern world-system originate around year 1500 or year 1000?

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1. Global war is still a necessary part of leadership for long cycle theory, but only a likely probability for world economy theory. Global wars, those wars fought between great powers in which world leadership is contested, are only included in their study if the war produced a world leader. This makes for a tautological relationship between leadership and war, a problem world economy theory avoids by making a clearer separation between economic hegemony and world leadership. Levy, for instance, lists 5 global wars that Modelski and Thompson ignore. They even leave out the Thirty Years War, which was one of the world's most devastating and most politically important wars prior to 1914. Perhaps their next book will explain why this and other global wars are not included and how their theory would account for them.

2. World economy theory finds 3 hegemons since 1500, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. Long cycle finds 5 world leaders, the same three plus an 18th century British leadership and a 16th century Portuguese one. The difference, of course, is in how one defines hegemony, leadership and leading economic sectors. On page 83, Modelski and Thompson say that "Global system leaders are not hegemons. They do not dominate all economic and political activity." But this is a straw man version of hegemony. Let us take a leading sector version, where hegemony is dominating (i.e., over 1/2) leading economic sectors. Then hegemony and leadership should be about the same, except that Modelski and Thompson still use sea power to date hegemons, rather than their own data on leading sectors.

3. They also have 2-5 possible leaders before 1500. I must admit in being a bit confused in reading their book as to these early world leaders. Table 8.5 lists Northern Sung, Southern Sung, Genoa, and Venice. Table 9.4 lists the same except it adds the Mongol world empire and drops Genoa. World economy theory, at least until recently, drew a distinction between world empires and world-systems that would exclude most of their early cases, although I must admit, not all of them.

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4. World economy theory also drew a distinction between the capitalist world system, where one has accumulation of profits from commodity exchange of necessities, versus coercive accumulation or precious exchange in other systems. The capitalist world system emerges in the period of 1450 to 1650, with a decisive turning point around 1500 with the European discovery and conquest of the Americas. Modelski and Thompson note that the key element to this distinction is a world market that connects political units into a system, over which a state can lead, but is incapable of subsuming other units into an empire. With a world market, one has a transition belt for innovations, and thus the emergence of economic long waves. They claim that a world market began in China around the year 1000. Some of this difference is over amounts or degrees -- to what extent were market relations central prior to 1500, did they include necessities, was the market fully a world one?. Other theorists, such A. G. Frank, drop the question of necessities as a bogus distinction, and can thus find a world system that stretches back another 5000 years. This leads to a necessary, and so far unresolved, debate over what constitutes a system.

We cannot resolve this issue here, but let me throw a wrinkle in the pre-1500 versions. Starting around 1550, with the long rise of Dutch hegemony, sea trade begins to climb at an exponential rate. This not only changes the basis of wealth in the European core from political power to economic efficiency, but the core states go on to subjugate the rest of the world through colonial conquest. No previous period of world history is comparable. There is a profound qualitative transformation around 1500 in the amount of trade and in its political and social importance, a transformation made more obvious, ironically, by knowing that a world market had existed for 500 years prior or that some sort of system or network existed for 5000 years prior, yet without a similar qualitative change occurring. Capitalism is a fine name for the change as far as I am concerned, but call it what you want, the transformation still must be explained.

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Ideological Hegemony and Global Governance

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In After Liberalism, Wallerstein argues that liberalism is in decline, both as a system and as a hegemonic discourse (Wallerstein, 1995). He holds that those dissatisfied with the liberal consensus have, since 1989, turned to free-market rhetoric as an alternative, but he dismisses this movement as not "serious" (242). He holds that since the collapse of Communism, no hope for liberation remains that can tame the world's working class, and that liberalism cannot consequently survive.

I would argue that free-market ideology is more potent than Wallerstein allows, and that laissez-faire libertarian utopianism could conceivably prove as seductive to a disillusioned working class as socialist utopianism was during the early 20th century. Libertarian sympathies and ideology are easily exploited by non-believers as a means of extending the status quo. "Minarchist" rhetoric upholding small government is commonly appropriated by politicians who have no intention of implementing a full libertarian program. The writings of Hayek and Nozick lend an aura of intellectual respectability to expedient "down-sizing" measures. The more strident, emotional writings of Ayn Rand and the other libertarian popularizers speak to a falling middle-class, telling them that the poor deserve their fate, that taxation for welfare and other unpopular government programs constitutes theft, and that selfishness is a virtue. Such distractions could conceivably succeed in the short run, which in world-historical time could last generations.

In this paper, I speak to "libertarianism" as it is understood in the United States: as a fiscally conservative and socially liberal political philosophy that upholds individual liberties and individual property rights above all other ideals. As such, libertarianism functions as the philosophical justification for Chicago school economic policy --for, in addition to the economic argument in favor of efficiency, libertarian philosophy adds a moral dimension that idealizes individualistic, instrumentally rational maximizing. Keynesianism can consequently be dismissed not only on technical grounds, but can also be indicted as morally corrupt.
In this paper, I analyze libertarian discourse from the perspective of regulation theory, as a hegemonic ideology that underlies the emergence of a new mode of regulation. Within this general theoretical approach, I will also employ frames from regime theory as developed by international relations scholars, as well as the "epistemic community" approach from the same discipline. I want to suggest that free-market ideology could engender the emergence of rationalized global governance in order to maintain a free trade, property rights, and other regulatory concerns of the emerging mode of accumulation, and that such a world state could conceivably extend liberalism's life by carrying liberalism to its extreme.

The regulation school posits two primary spheres of analysis in the study of political economy--the "regime of accumulation", and the "mode of regulation". The regime of accumulation is defined by a relatively stable and reproducible relationship between production and consumption (Hirst & Zeitlin, 1992: 85). The mode of regulation is a complex of norms, institutions, organizational forms, social networks, and patterns of conduct that promote the reproducibility of the regime of accumulation (Jessop, 1992: 48).

Regulation theorists believe that the current regime of accumulation is in the process of transforming from a generally "Fordist" system into what Harvey has called "flexible accumulation" [1] (Harvey, 1990). Fordism is characterized by a circular relationship between mass production and mass consumption, with the main elements of the system generally confined within the borders of a nation-state (Jessop, 1992: 49). While theoretical conceptions of a post-Fordist regime differ, most analysts agree that new means of organizing production and consumption are beginning to appear that differ significantly from the Fordist paradigm. One of the most striking differences of the emergent regime is an increase in production, marketing, and accumulation on a global scale that ignores national boundaries whenever convenient. Although globalized economic action has long been a characteristic of the capitalist world-system, its intensification increases the need for regulation at the world level of governance.

While the mode of regulation associated with Fordist accumulation found its power base in a coalition between a nationalist state and nationally oriented capitalists, the fundamentally different character of flexible accumulation will require the corresponding rise of a new mode of regulation in order to sustain a period of economic and technological growth (Hirst, 1992: 85). Since flexible accumulation is globally realized, we might look for the new mode of regulation to appear on a global scale as well. Let's consider the role of global trade institutions and regional free trade alliances within the paradigm provided by regulation theory, and consider the role these institutions play within the mode of regulation.
Do these international institutions constitute the beginning of a new, global mode of regulation? Questions of power pervade this discussion. Under the Fordist system, the individual state is ceded most of the power to regulate the economy and the social structures that functionally support the economy. Yet the intensification of a globalized economy suggests an increasing need for a globalized mode of regulation. While states participate in international negotiations by definition, they clearly can no longer wield such substantial control over their national economies as was possible in the past. The context of multilateral decision-making and an increasingly globalized financial system imposes growing limitations on the ability of a state to unilaterally control its own economy.

Further, just as political interest groups affect the outcome of national political processes, so do globally organized non-governmental interest groups affect international decision-making. In some instances, representatives of industrial trade organizations--or even representatives of specific firms--take part in international negotiations. International relations theorists have noted the appearance of global "epistemic communities" surrounding specific issue spaces (Haas, 1992). I will examine the role of epistemic communities in the last GATT preceding the formation of the WTO, considered in their role as a challenge to nationally sovereign regulation.

**Epistemic Communities**

Haas notes that the ways that government decision-makers define state interests and formulate policies to deal with complex technical issues can be influenced significantly according to how the issue is presented to them by specialists in that domain (Haas, 1992). The "epistemic community" approach describes the roles played by networks of experts in international decision-making: how they agree upon and articulate causal linkages within complex issue spaces; how they frame issues and define salient discourse; how they define and limit potential solutions or outcomes; and how they define state interests within the issue space.

The consideration of epistemic communities is relevant to the consideration of a global mode of regulation in that these communities are defined by issue space and by technical expertise rather than by national political dynamics. As technical knowledge disseminates and links specialists across political boundaries, we see the formation of knowledge-based power networks on a global scale [2]. I am speculating that this development presages the evolution of a technocracy that identifies with specific, focused issues and specialized knowledge rather than with more general national interests. It seems to me that a globally-identifying conglomeration of technocratic networks would be requisite to the functioning of an institutionalized global mode of regulation.
Gatt Negotiations: Trade In Services

One significant development in the Uruguay Round involved the attempt to construct a new regime for international trade in services [3]. When the question of trade in services first arose, most governments did not understand the significance of the issue, and consequently had no idea of how a multilateral agreement could affect their policy decisions (Drake & Nicolaidis, 1992).

On first gloss, liberalization in services could appear contrary to national interests—particularly as defined by domestic service providers. Further, services have traditionally been under heavy regulatory control by states for centuries. Hence existing social ontology mitigated against the implementation of a liberalized global regime in trade in services.

However, services function not only as outputs in their own right, but as vital inputs to a wide range of corporate activity. Consequently, liberalization of services could potentially reduce corporate costs and thus boost profitability. Further, many business services are global in nature, and impact upon market structures across borders. For example, the global provision of telecommunications, management consulting, and financial services is crucial to multinational production and consumption. Hence a natural constituency exists among domestic MNCs in favor of liberalization, and an epistemic community consequently began to emerge around the issue.

One interesting feature of this particular epistemic community is that it did not exist long prior to the debate. In fact, it appears that once the core group had been able to place the issue on the agenda of various governments, state demand for more expertise and information stimulated the growth of the community. The community's membership is organized in two categories. The first includes personnel from governments, international agencies, and private firms—in other words, people with a compelling interest in the outcome of the debate. The second group is comprised of people with a more purely intellectual interest in the issues: academics, lawyers, industry specialist, and journalists. Still, this second group could also potentially benefit materially from government decisions. Yet in their putative role as "objective" experts, they lend an aura of legitimacy to the former group. Since it is clear that liberalization has distributional consequences, the appearance of "scientific objectivity" was crucial in order to legitimate and justify the regime.
The community's influence dynamics are temporally variable, and fall into two categories: influence within the community itself, and influence by the community upon policy makers. Internally, the terms of discourse were set by predominantly Anglo-American analysts who first posed the issues (Drake & Nicolaidis, 1992: 40). By defining service transactions as "trade", they were able to evoke all of the normative assumptions surrounding the notion of "free trade". Those opposed to liberalization consequently were placed in the position of defending "protectionism".

Drake has four main points to make that describe the community's external influence:

1. First, in issues involving complexity and uncertainty, governments turn to expert communities for guidance and ideas. The newness of the notion of a trade in services regime created a fluidity around the issue space, providing an opportunity structure in which the new community could wield significant power. The situation also created a demand on the part of the governments for such input.

2. Second, to be influential, an epistemic community must have access to top policy-makers. The community must establish both formal and informal channels, and further must create a body of thought that can "filter to them indirectly" (Drake & Nicolaidis, 1992: 41).

3. Third, another function of an epistemic community is to frame issues and delimit the range of defensible policy options. In the case of the service community, it was necessary to create an analysis that could bridge the gap between governments' prior interest and policy structures and the new, politically untested issue of services.

4. Fourth, an epistemic community's influence tends to decline once the issue has reached the negotiating stage. By this point, ideas and interests are clearly delineated in the minds of policy-makers, and they no longer are as dependent upon the intellectual community. Consequently, second-tier members virtually dropped out of the picture in the services case. By the time of negotiations, power and bargaining dynamics increasingly determine policy selection and modification.

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Cohesion Vs. Domination Within Epistemic Communities

It should be clear by now that regime theory and the epistemic community approach place an emphasis upon communities of actors. Incorporating these approaches into a regulationist analysis involves a different, conflicting set of assumptions than those upon
which a regime/community approach is founded. The regulation school evolves from structural Marxism, retaining a good deal of structuralism. It also retains the fundamental Marxist world-view in which politics and economics are seen as intertwined and always contestable and contested.

However, the regime/epistemic community approaches emphasize community by definition, and consequently encourage us to view the "community" as benevolent, voluntary, cooperative, and fundamentally legitimate (Keeley, 1990: 90). Hence incorporating this approach with regulation theory requires us to reemphasize the conflictual and contestable nature of these policy debates, and to question exactly whose community is involved, and whose community benefits from its actions. Further, we need to integrate the cognitive construction of community/regime with the structural preoccupations of regulation theory.

One approach to this integration is through Foucault's notion of hegemonic discourse. For Foucault, a "discourse" is a statement connected to a social practice. These statements define a phenomenon, provide means and grounds for analyzing it, and suggest lines of action in terms of both ends and means. A hegemonic discourse constructs a "regime of truth", which evaluates statements according to their "truthfulness", and decides whether or not they are meaningful or nonsensical. The hegemonic discourse dominates, covers up, and discredits what Foucault terms "subjugated knowledges" (Keeley, 1990: 91). So a regime of truth goes further than agenda setting--it defines and endorses acceptable language, symbols, modes of reasoning, and conclusions.

The concepts of hegemonic discourse and subjugated knowledge point up the structural contestability of regimes. It becomes apparent that the community is not inherently voluntary and cooperative. Rather, it suggests that certain members of the community may wield more discursive power than other members, and that there is a structurally determined domination in play.

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We can also borrow Foucault's notion of "disciplines", which are means of implementing an analysis and giving it a social reality. They attempt to cause certain normative behaviors. Means are constructed to define and correct deviant behaviors. We might interpret a regime as a set of discourses and disciplines that give a specific order to a public issue space, and that authoritatively define the situation. It serves to politicize its realm by identifying public interest, by defining appropriate actions for participants, and by ordering and defining their relations (Keeley, 1990: 92).

A Foucauldian analysis, then, might consider transnational epistemic policy communities as a social means of constructing discourse and disciplines that promote the interests of the community. The Foucauldian perspective implies that an epistemic community's
power extends beyond the Weberian definition of power—the ability to compel others towards one's own ends—into the discursive realm. Epistemic communities wield power by setting agendas, defining problems, and legitimizing desired solutions to those problems. Rather than compelling others, epistemic communities more likely serve to limit the power of opponents by discrediting their definition of the situation, and by discrediting their solutions. The Foucauldian perspective refines and extends the Gramscian conception of ideological hegemony, and can help us understand the role of ideology in international policy decisions.

Combining regulation theory with the IR notion of epistemic communities and a Foucauldian/Gramscian conception of ideological hegemony seems to me a good starting point for understanding the emergence of a world state. I have shown how free-market ideals dominate one epistemic community to influence regulation at the world level. I believe that this is generally true of most transnational epistemic communities that cannot be defined as antisystemic.

**Conclusion**

I have speculated that this example presages the evolution of a technocracy that identifies with specific, focused issues and specialized knowledge rather than with more general national interests. A globally-identifying conglomeration of such technocratic networks would be requisite to the functioning of an institutionalized global mode of regulation. It seems not unlikely, given recent developments in GATT, WTO, NAFTA, and other international negotiations, that libertarian-style privileging of free markets and individual property rights will increasingly dominate the emerging globalized, technocratic network of epistemic communities.

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There are other global epistemic communities that do not fit this description, most notably the Green movement and related environmental activism. But anti-systemic, anti-liberal epistemic communities are more notable by their absence from the world stage. By anti-systemic, I mean any form of opposition to the free-market juggernaut—labor, nationalist, socialist/communist, or Green. Such movements, when they do manage some degree of trans-national organization, tend to focus on restricted issue spaces rather than more comprehensive programs of dissent.

World-wide labor movements have not been significant. Resistance to globalized liberalization has so far manifested more effectively from nationalist political actors than from opponents of free-markets, but these efforts never transcend local boundaries. Global health, population control, and poverty relief initiatives would seem to have more potential for anti-systemic organization, yet more often these communities are coopted
and dominated by systemic interests that continue to promote free market capitalism and Enlightenment individualism--liberalism--as an anodyne to Third World challenges.

Consequently, I think that Wallerstein underestimates the potential power of this emerging phenomenon to maintain an ideological hegemony. I think that the free-market utopia offered by US-style libertarianism is beginning to constitute a hegemonic discourse among the most powerful global epistemic communities. Further, laissez-faire rhetoric inspired by libertarian philosophy seems to be increasingly influential in the political discourse of Western democracies (and many non-Western polities as well). I think that liberalism carried to its extreme-libertarianism-can potentially extend the capitalist world system for a long time, and that Wallerstein's account of its death is premature.

Notes

1. While Harvey himself is not a "regulationist", this terminology seems sufficiently broad so as to include most theoretical conceptions of post-Fordist political economy.

2. Mann describes four types of power networks that overlap one another: ideological, economic, military, and political (Mann, 1986). Epistemic communities would appear to be closest to an ideological form of power network that can interact with all three of the other types of power networks. However, the "ideology" is conceived in a Foucauldian sense as a construction and definition of technocratic discourse.

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1. "Regime" in this sense refers to a complex of formal and informal multi-lateral agreements between states regarding international issue spaces. It might include implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, or decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge (Keeley, 1990: 83). This usage derives from international relations theory, and is distinctly different from the way "regime" is used by the French regulation school. We should also note the difference in the way "regulation" is used in this context. "Regulation" in international relations theory refers to specific policies agreed to by states in order to define, control, or "regulate" international relations. "Regulation" as used by the French regulation school has a much broader meaning, and includes all manner of social/political/economic structures functional to the reproduction of the regime of accumulation (Jessop, 1992:48). In this article, "regime" and "regulation" will
generally be used in the international relations sense of meaning, unless specifically otherwise noted.

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From Peripheral Domination to Internal Colonialism: Socio-Political Change of the Lakota on Standing Rock*

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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses changing "national" identities of the Lakota and Dakota on Standing Rock, "Sioux" Indian Reservation, through an overview of the traditional Lakota, the United States, conceptual differences of Lakota Oyate with U.S. sovereign power, and political representations. Envelopment / incorporation of the Lakota are discussed as struggles over sovereignty and treaty rights leading to formation of the "Sioux Nation" and six separated Lakota-Sioux reservations. External national identities range from "Hostiles" alien labels to "Indians" ultimately as citizens. American citizenship is reviewed as both inclusion and dissolution, with the re-organization, political re-construction, and assimilation strategies of the United States. 20th century Resistance and cultural domination are considered in the American Indian Movement as political resurgence.

I find four major sources and forms of "nationalist" identities on Standing Rock, arising from two "temporal" periods using world systems analysis: the 19th century semi-peripheral domination over the Lakota by the U.S. government, and the 20th century imposition of internal colonialism, especially with the B.I.A. and modern tribal councils. These forms -- progressive and resistance, assimilated and traditional, -- are further tempered in contemporary political and social discourse, especially by Indian activism and cultural survival.
Tribal Councils and the Sioux Indian Reservations form American "Indian" Identity on Standing Rock with the Lakota and Dakota periodically found as "Tribe" and as "Nation", with a socio-political legitimacy and BIA-constructed identity at least as prevalent as traditional cultural forms. Both coerced social change and adaptation to modern geo-political environments are found to be influencing forces on development of the many national indigenous identities on Standing Rock. One central conclusion of this paper is that these socio-political realities and indigenous identities cannot be understood separate from their historical origins, for which a revised world systems analysis makes an excellent platform for exploration and explanation.

1. Preface

This paper will follow the changing patterns of "nationalist" identity of the Lakota Oyate, as they end the twentieth century sharing the Standing Rock ("Sioux") Reservation, or Nation, with Dakota people from shared histories of conquest, domination, colonialism, and resistance. The primary methodological basis for the discussion will be world systems analysis extending toward theories of internal colonialism for the "external" effects (Dunaway, 1996) (Hall, 1986), and ethnographic histories, interviews and situational analysis for the "internal" forms of identity, (Young Bear, 1996) (Green, 1995).

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Two important comments about the use of indigenous "identity" need to be delivered: First and foremost is that the dominating force, in this case the United States, manipulates and controls identity labels as part of its tactical repertoire (Bolsi, 1992), thus leading to "external" identities; Second is that the subordinated or oppressed group, in this case the Lakota peoples, often experience fractured and contrived identity forms in terms of its resistance (Paman, 1994) (Castile, 1992) (Deloria, 1990), leading toward differentiated "internal" identities.

Reviewers for the original form of this paper were concerned with the effects of recent activism on identity constructions, which I would suggest is really a secondary or even tertiary topic for world systems analysis. Another, more problematic issue permeates that set of issues -- conclusions arising from those works on activism, seems to imply that most Natives, including traditionalists on the reservations, were inactive and waiting for the intervention of an outside force in order to make claims to sovereignty and the identity constructions associated with those claims. Although many analysts observe the influence of these activists on particular events and social movements (Johnson, 1996) (Nagel, 1995) (Cornell, 1988), their overly strong claim as to the "shaping of identity" as found in terms like "retraditional" and "supra-tribal" are generally true primarily and in some cases only for "urban Indians" or those Natives working outside of strong reservation or Indian "Nation" situations, which are the legacy of the expanding U.S. systems, (Hall, 1989). The ambiguities of these situations do not belong in work that analyzes devotion of Hunkpapa Lakota to the Standing Rock "Sioux" with Yanktonai Dakota (Defender, 1990). Moreover, many Native people and institutions on Standing Rock are critical of such identities, while others readily embrace them.1

These differences are a problem in our field of Sociology, since most of us want to imply that modern, observable forces are shaping re-nearly identified resistance that have actually been going on all along. Another reviewer found at least three papers in the original work on identity, with a focus on social degeneration from resistance on the tribal or national levels, to that of reservation-based identities. For analytical purposes, there are almost two separate populations -- reservation-based peoples with demonstrable claims to "Tribal" and "Indian Nation" sovereignty, and subsumed Natives usually associated with urbanized areas without any federal recognition, whose identity constructs are more of those arising from "minority group" resistance, resembling those of African-Americans and Latino-Chicanos. Both of these organizational groups behave in very different ways for very different purposes.

Unfortunately, some Native researchers and the majority of non-Native scholars focus on, and base their analysis on, more easily observed events and people associated with activist groups. This paper will give weight to the "traditionalists" and "Indian Nation" leaders who for generations have "preserved their ways of life" against all odds (White Hat, 1990).

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2. Overview

Analyzing changing "national" identities that are related directly to U.S. semi-peripheral domination over the Lakota, and other Native Nations such as the Dakota, links world-system analysis (Chase-Dunn, 1980) with internal colonialism theory (Blaut, 1989) (Snipp, 1986) (Blau, 1972). The external forces and imposition of political and civic nationality, creating or at least manipulating "identity" for most Lakota in terms of their relations with the United States, has thereby often conflicted with internal forms of Lakota identity (Powers, 1986), specifically those who see themselves as "traditional" in any of the time periods (Walker, 1982).

Relationships between the U.S. dominant forces and the subordinated "Indian Nations" therefore are rooted in "cycles of conquest" and domination that are resolutely socio-political, cultural and economic (Hall, 1989). The incorporation process is thus multifaceted (Hall, 1986). Ethnic identity markers are thereby related to dispossession of Indian people from their lands, (Meyer, 1994) becoming instrumental for both dominant and subordinated groups in resistance.

Although I observe these externally formed identities as instrumental in domination, I do not find them directly linked to genocide, as James (1988) and Churchill (1992) strongly argue. Rather, manipulation of "national" or social identities by the American bureaucratic systems were and are associated with cultural domination (Smelser, 1992) as a tool of coercive assimilation policies part of a larger incorporation or exclusion (Kardulas, 1990) unafraid of systematically eliminating Native peoples (Legters, 1992) by any means at the disposal of their expanding society.
Introduction

Native American Indian identity remains one of the most amorphous, changeable cultural constructs in social practice today. Cultural, political and social institutions unique to Native peoples influence every aspect of identity for indigenous people who reside on or near, or maintain close contact with their home communities and lands. Additionally, historical shifts in U.S. governmental policy treatment complicate so-called tribal affiliation and acknowledgment, amplifying the national origin issues (Green, 1995).

The Lakota (Teton-Sioux) remain an excellent example of the multi-modal, intertwined issues of indigenous identity, partly because of the temporal periods of maximized contact and conflict overlap extremely well with the U.S. government's various Indian policies. Development of separate Sioux (Lakota) Indian reservations demonstrates the further fractionation of identity by the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Standing Rock (Sioux) Indian Reservation, or "Nation," illustrates all of these issues, along with the removal and placement of allied yet culturally different peoples into one, partially amalgamated socio-political structure.

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Contemporary forms of Native identity on Standing Rock are partially a result of these forces and the resulting social change, accompanied by a renewed and energized Indian activism. This paper "Socio-Political Change of Lakota to the Standing Rock Sioux" explores and analyzes these issues in terms of historical shifts and changing forms of identity among the Lakota and Dakota people on Standing Rock.

Traditional Lakota follow the oral tradition in naming their origin place as the Black Hills and surrounding points (Goodman, 1992). Methodological tensions between oral tradition and western historical sources, demonstrate the complexity of sorting out misconceptions from both fields of identity interest. Arval Looking Horse, a well-versed Lakota traditionalist, relates both perspectives, describing himself as "the nineteenth generation to serve as (sacred) Pipe keeper," given to the Lakota near the Iron Lightning community on Cheyenne River Reservation, (DeMallie, 1987:67-8) placing the Lakota west of the Missouri four hundred years ago. In the same account, Looking Horse (pg.71) says "our people used to be probably in the Minnesota area, or eastern South Dakota," reflecting a standard migration history from the textbooks found in schools, with a clear influence on modern Lakota who attended those schools. 3

For contemporary purposes, respecting traditional histories as much as scholarly notions, we find the Lakota in seven major groups: the Oglala, Sicangu (Brule), Miniconjou, Oohenumpa (Two boils Kettle), Itazipco (Sans Arc or No Bow), Sihasapa (Blackfeet), and Hunkpapa, existing westward of a northern plains fringe near Minnesota woodlands. While Lakota regularly moved through the eastern Dakotas preceding the 17th century, and the western regions as well, with advent of the horse and pressure from their Dakota allies, some Lakota groups re-entered more forcefully unto the central Dakota plains.
including the Black Hills by the early 1700's. Thus, their historical lands of origin were politically strengthened by allied Lakota groups.

However, reification of Euro-American social structures, as "tribes" versus nation-states, (Dunaway, 1996) (Wolf, 1982) over-simplifies the processes at work. The nomenclature above are culled from Walker's early writings (1917), with primary emphasis on the Lakota. Therefore, he consistently refers to the overall Teton and Santee (Sioux) people as the Lakota. However, most textbook references and nearly all of the major contacts with a "white" people government, as well as major Indian nations reporting direct conflict to European powers, are of the Dakota. Thus most linguistic and cultural works refer to the "Siouxian" "tribes" as the "Dakota" peoples.

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In many of the traditional circles, however, Dakota refers to a most common-used dialect, including the Yanktonai or the Northern Dakota, just as Lakota refers to the so-called L-dialect, used exclusively by the Tetonian people, commonly referred to as the Lakota. Complicating matters more is the knowledge that other allied peoples used the Nakota language, or N-dialect. Since these languages are associated with the so-called "middle-Sioux" referring to the region between the easterly Santee-Dakota and westerly Teton-Lakota, the Yanktonai and Yankton often find themselves given status as Nakota people. Additionally, with circumscribed attempts putting "politically correct" labels in place, each is often referred to as "nations" with the Lakota, "Nakota" and Dakota nations not conforming to accurate geographic history. In this analysis, traditionalists refer to the above groups as Lakota Oyate, versus assimilated "Sioux" with U.S. labels, and "nations" are used only comparatively with modern socio-political interpretations.

Overview of the Lakota and the United States

Over a two hundred year period the "Lakota Oyate" experienced cultural domination through sublimation and elimination of Lakota societal integrity and cultural practices by the U.S. during conquest of the central plains (Joseph, 1992). I find processes of selective extermination, inferiorization and coercive assimilation of the Lakota, identified in three phases of "conquering" modes for socio-political domination, "profiteering" modes for sustained economic exploitation, and "cultural" modes for social systemic domination. Each and every mode of domination targeted, manipulated or deeply influenced forms of indigenous Lakota identity.

Many of these coerced changes in identity were on the ideational level (Berkhofer, 1979:123). Dakota and Lakota leaders and scholars responded by invoking "ancestral rights" emanating from a close relationship of the people with the land (Standing Bear, Lakota, 1933). However, United States land interests were from the start based on declarations of sovereignty, (Deloria and Lytle, 1984).
Therefore, I distinguish between external identity forms, primarily coming from the U.S., (Green, 1995) and internal forms of identity and knowledge-building traditions (Whitt, 1995), resulting from changes in traditional Lakota social practices. Furthermore, I maintain focus on temporal periods based on the dominance of U.S. institutions (Grinde, 1995), including much conquering during the early nineteenth century, conquering and profiteering during the 1800's, and continued profiteering with cultural domination over the turn of the century into the 1900's.

The nature of these conflicts is "masked" by the comparative systems employed (Wilkins, 1995).

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The problems of migration theory, especially with twisted examples of the Lakota-Sioux, are evidenced in many documents by an over-reliance on mainstream and military historians such as Prucha (1990, 1975, 1984), Vestal (1963), and especially Utley (1984, 1983). References to U.S. views of a western "permanent Indian frontier" with "little economic value" are found false, indicated as early as 1804 by Lewis and Clark's instructions from President Jefferson as to value, (Ronda, 1984). Declarations of sovereignty for purposes of controlling riverine trade networks, and later mineral resources, were the central political motivation from 1804 until 1868. Even so, the models are perpetuated by contemporary curricula including those disseminated on Standing Rock reservation, partly as a result of hegemonic interpretation of Lakota identity.

Common problems such as "white travelers were frightened by the turmoil and commotion caused by intertribal raids" (North Dakota DPI 1995 curriculum) underscore differences rather than alliances based on identity, suppressing information about the general invasion under way, precipitated by all three divisions of the U.S. government. In this way, noted "intertribal raiding" serves as analytical justification after the 1851 treaty (White, 1978), producing an understandable intervention by the United States. However, the "treaties" were broken by the U.S. government, military and civilian forces under the pretext of various identity labels including that of "hostile" usually applied to non-assimilated, resisting Lakota (Wilkins, 1995:95). Therefore, discussion of traditional Lakota cultural identity must precede the conflict analysis of social change.

Traditional Lakota Culture and Identity Forms

In traditional Lakota culture, responsibility towards relatives, sacredness and sovereignty, extend outward in networks of extended relationships, ultimately reaching the notion of "nation."

Walker (1914) captures these notions; "The Lakota taka-kiciyapi (consider-one-another-kindred), because they are all either one (of-one-blood), or oweya (considered-of-blood), with ancestors oyate uma (other people)... Lakota divide into seven otonwepi (i.e.}
Teton), and seven ospayepi (i.e. Oglala)... Oglala divide into seven ti-ospayepi (tipi divisions); each tiyospaye is composed of one or more wico-tipi (camps), and each camp is composed of two or more ti-ognakapi (husbanded tipis)... Thus the strength of the relationship of one Lakota to another is in the following order: 1. ti-ognaka; 2. wico-tipi; 3. ti-ospayye; 4. ospaye; 5. otonwe." (1914:97-98)

Therefore Lakota range from household, to family-neighbors (village), extended relatives, (associated villages and hamlets similar to a movable town with outlying districts), to large groups with many allied "camps" such as a "tribe" or "band," to relatedness alliance on the "nation" level, with otonwe (by blood) and oyate (common society). Every level commands greater attention to being a "good relative" and person, so that political relations with oyate unma or "other people" follows these ordering principles. U.S. representatives consistently failed to acknowledge this, until it became to their political advantage to forcibly separate these divisions of identity.9

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Preceding arrival of Euro-American governments, the Lakota viewed themselves as Oyate, or "the people" with Ikce as Native (Walker, 1914) or common together, that can be applied to any substantial grouping, including the largest groups of all "Sioux" Dakota, Lakota and Nakota (Powers, 1986). Seven major "tribal" affiliations are associated with the "Sioux" (Walker, 1982), Dakota "Oyate" of Mdewakantonwan. Wahpekute, Wahpetonwan, Sisitonwan, "Dakota speakers" of the Thunkionwan (Yankton), Thunkionwanama (Yanktonai), and the "Lakota speakers" Titonwan usually referenced as the "Teton" (see Walker, 1982, pg. 14-20) or the Lakota.10

These socio-political and kinship alliance systems are represented in the "Oceti Sakowin" or "seven council fires" comprised of all seven major groups. There are also ancient divisions, including with the Assiniboine and other indigenous "tribes" or nations from the grand alliances, such as the Cheyenne and Omaha. While scholars (Walker, 1982) (Meyer, 1967) debate existence and strength of these networks, without clear resolution (DeMallie, in Walker, 1982), we can say that alliances existed, linguistically and socio-politically, with the Lakota on western boundaries. As American pressures pushed in from the east and south, and the Ojibwa and northern peoples were pressured by the French and British from the northeast, many loose alliances strengthened, hardening by the time the United States military entered the area. Confederacies began to shape themselves more into "national" identities, especially in relation to other Indian societies.

Also, the European-centered world-system, extending through the American economy, attempted to incorporate and peripheralize the Native population's land and people, transforming relations between people and their environments through commodification and proletarianization, (Kardulias, 1990). However, uneven development and indigenous resistance, (Dunaway, 1996), accounts for the historical transformation from an external arena to periphery of the world system -- an internal "Indian Nation" periphery within the rising semiperiphery of the United States. Full inclusion of the incorporated peoples did
not occur in the northern plains. Instead, appropriation of land and reproductive resources was initiated through homesteading and the equivalent of land grants to railroads and other private interests with capital development, along with repopulation strategies for immigrant European labor. Thus demographic pressures, alongside the political, conspired to marginalize the indigenous people, the Lakota, as a minority within their own lands. Internal colonialism on treaty land became central to notions of nationality and identity.

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Cultural semantic-mapping of the external definitions of Lakota identities as a chronology explaining Lakota-U.S. interactions and the critical events and identity shifts (internal or external) are explained in the following chart. Four major temporal periods are identified for this chart: "Oceti Sakowin" loosely allied confederacies; separated "Sioux Nations" with internal divisions; separate "Sioux Indian" reservations for the Lakota; and autonomous Lakota reservation systems, calling themselves "Nation" or "Tribe". I find four major sources of "national" identities on Standing Rock, arising from two "temporal" periods using world systems analysis: the 19th century quasi peripheral domination over the Lakota by the U.S. government, and the 20th century imposition of internal colonialism, especially with the B.I.A. and modern tribal councils. These forms - - progressive and resistance, assimilated and traditional, - - are further tempered in contemporary political and social discourse, especially by Indian activism and cultural survival.

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**External Constructions of "LAKOTA OYATE" and "SIOUX NATION" Identities**

"OCETI SAKOWIN" (alliance of "seven council fires" - Lakota were a council) **OYATE**

1700 - LAKOTA as OYATE, YANKTON(AI) as OYATE, DAKOTA as OYATE, NATION
the Lakota, Yankton, Yanktonai, and divisions of the Dakota, can all act as Oyate
1764 - LAKOTA, DAKOTA, NAKOTA - TETON and SANTEE "SIOUX" 11 - "OYATE"
- bioregional political control regions separate Lakota in Dakotas and nearby areas
1804 - The "SIOUX" - LAKOTA Councils and broad DAKOTA Alliances and Councils while Yankton Dakota negotiated with Lewis and Clark, Lakota controlled the region

Separate "NATIONS" (Santee Dakota, Teton Lakota as separate treaty nations) 12
1851 - Treaties with "SIOUX INDIANS" - Dakota and Lakota "Nations" (multi-tribal)
- Traverse-de-Sioux - Dakota treaty, Fort Laramie - multi-national (Lakota)
- compact
1868 - Treaty with "SIOUX NATION OF INDIANS" - the Lakota Oyate (Teton-Sioux)
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, established U.S. and Lakota geo-political boundaries
1871 - U.S. Treaty-Making Ended: SIOUX TRIBES (Lakota) situated by agency-reservation
National Origin identity internalized sovereignty, limits to external nation constructs

Separate LAKOTA-SIOUX Reservations (U.S. unilateral breakup of Lakota Oyate)
1890 - SIOUX AGENCIES (Lakota divided by "band" into six separated reserves) 13
BIA agencies separated in 1889 with making of Dakota states and huge land-takings
1924 - U.S. CITIZENSHIP with federal enrollment on "INDIAN RESERVATIONS"
Standing Rock "Sioux" with Yanktonai Dakota, Blackfeet and Hunkpapa Lakota
1934 - "STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE" (six reservations as separate "tribes") 14
Indian Reorganization Act influences separate councils and (BIA) tribal identities

Autonomy by RESERVATION re-established as "Nation" and/or "Tribe"

1970's - STANDING ROCK divided - TRIBAL COUNCIL vs Traditionals/Activists
Lakota and Dakota origins and divisions, with Assimilated and Traditional claims
1990 - STANDING ROCK TRIBE as "NATION" (Standing Rock Sioux Reservation)
1995 - STANDING ROCK NATION listed with council, OYATE re-introduced

The four major temporal periods are related to the major Lakota identities, in these ways:

"Oceti Sakowin" alliances All Lakota culture is "traditional" with signs of early resistance, mostly as differing ideas on political treatment of the "wasichu"

"Sioux Nations" treaties: Progressives as "friendlies" make treaties, the rest are "hostiles" and/or "uncivilized" as traditional Lakota culture is repressed

"Sioux Indian" reservations Progressives collaborate with assimilation policies and "councils," while traditionalists maintain their culture and resist assimilation

Lakota "Nation" or "Tribe" Assimilated progressive Lakota often work in modern institutions, while "Traditionalists" know and live their Lakota culture everyday, with Activists and many Bi-Cultural modern Lakota also present.

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Thus four overlapping, loosely boundaryed, external identities are present in four time periods. The typologies are "progressive" (friendly), "resistance" (resist change), "assimilated" (adapted) and "traditional" -- as each is defined by and responds to external
forces of attempted domination, incorporation, elimination and repression by the United States and its inter-American expansion.

**World Systems Analysis and Lakota Identity**

These various identities, of internal and external relations, of Standing Rock Sioux people, have their historical roots traced to domination of the periphery and control over "incorporated" and "subordinated" Natives excluded from full participation in a growing world economic system. Each and every set of Lakota identities and historical periods have past and current controversies associated with them. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the various perspectives grounded in a situational analysis of the Lakota undergoing modified incorporation, and at times elimination, through its relations with the United States and American society.

Hall's (1989) discussion of the problematic concept of "tribe" with respect to Native societies in the Southwest demonstrates the key analytic contribution -- besides dominant labels, academic work itself has introduced distortion into understanding these systemic relationships. These biases are precisely what Wolf (1982) warns social science about in his methods chapters. Similarities with long-term "incorporation" of the Navajo, Apache, and Comanche social group formation identity construction are a consequence of both initial conditions of their incorporation, under Spanish, Native Nation, and Mexican pressures before the United States, and subsequent processes of domination and conquest. However, the initial conditions and subsequent processes of incorporation are substantially different for Lakota peoples, primarily because direct conflict, long after economic penetration, occurs in the nineteenth century and only with the United States.

The context of how Lakota "national" identity and their related modes of resistance shift in response to changes in degree of incorporation into the American State and the world-system, over two centuries with growing American hegemony, is best explained by world-system theory. More relevant to understanding the "Standing Rock Sioux" as an amalgamated and subordinate population under these institutionalized systems of domination, is a devolution of Lakota identity from confederated alliances, to "national" resistance, to the internally colonized reservations, and finally to reconstructed "nation" claims with types from all the previous phases of domination. Thus external identity constructions are used in different phases as incorporation and elimination, just as internal forms of Lakota identity are used to resist, modify and maintain traditional culture.

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Local events and processes for Native nations, in this case particular to the Lakota people, and global/world-system events and phases of expansion are linked, and often fueled by changes outside the "west" of the Northern plains, such as American desire to open land for production, gain access to gold and natural resources, and establish freer transport access across the Plains without interference from Native resistance with claims
to national sovereignty (Ortiz, 1984). Transportation routes, necessary for Eastern capitalists to enhance their ability to accumulate capital in the far west and in the process continue the climb of the American state into the core, (Chase-Dunn, 1980) (Hall, 1989), were critical to the treaty-making phase of Lakota domination, (Lazarus, 1991), and were a primary link between global and local processes (Dunaway, 1996).

The important point is that all these different identities are, for specific times and places, quite "legitimate." Analytically, to define only one as the central or most important identity, remains ineffectual and incomplete in comparison with changing, manipulated and responsive identities. The theory of incorporation needs to be expanded so that the theoretical discussions encompass non-incorporated peoples who maintain cultural or national identities in subordinated societal roles that reflect positions closer to internal colonialism that slips into cultural genocide, when resistance is mounted that might threaten sovereign power over the engines of production.

Hall (1986) marshalls evidence to make a macro-account about World-System theory, inclusive of early Native Nations in his later work on the southwest (1989) that never effectively treats the processes of ethnic group formation/formation in their relation to the incorporation processes of subsumed Native Nations. This paper extends Hall's work (1989) on incorporation within terms of ethnic identity as evidence of the processes, both with macro and micro-level effects. Whereas work done on world-system analysis of the fur trade in the northeastern areas, (Kardulas, 1994) as well as developments in southeastern American colonies (Dunaway, 1996), stress early attempts at incorporation of the periphery into the expanding semi-periphery, this analysis begins with United States continental expansion as it effects the northern plains Lakota, ending with a study of the Standing Rock ethnic identities that result from a rich mix of cultural, national, and societal conflicts.

Therefore, the socio-political mechanisms, as connected to the economic motivations, commanding and controlling these processes of conquest, domination, and internal colonialism, remain central to a depiction of the unfolding processes identified above. We now turn to these discussions.

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3. Conquest and Domination of the Lakota

The conquest of the Lakota as the Great "Sioux Nation" by the United States followed general patterns similar to other Native Nations during the colonial and continental expansion over North America by "western" European powers seeking more land, resources and markets. Because of the nearly unique conflict between the two principal parties, the U.S. and the Lakota, this section of the paper has been written in four parts with a chronological chart of policies. First, the "Lakota Oyate and the U.S. Sovereign Power" relationships are discussed. Then I elaborate on the "Envelopment and Incorporation of the Lakota" and the ensuing "Struggles Over Sovereignty and Treaty Rights." The chart "19th Century U.S. Policies with Direct Influence on Lakota Identity" is presented before discussion of the final section, "The "Sioux Nation" and six Sioux Reservations" taking the analysis into the early 20th century.

Lakota Oyate and the U.S. Sovereign Power

Scholars studying Native societies find at least four approaches to understanding inter-American "conquest": 1.) socially-based theories on assimilation and "cultural conquest" (Axteil, 1983) (Josephy, 1993); 2.) references to "nations" as political structures (P.Deloria, 1993) (AILTP, 1988); 3.) active, coordinated Native societies in a defense of their national origins, along with development of their own futures as indigenous people
(Ortiz, 1984) (Jaimes, 1992); and 4.) the incorporation of dominated social systems into expanding core state economies (Hall, 1989) (Snipp, 1986). While not exhaustive, each of these approaches require an understanding of the principles and ideologies of the dominating systems.

From 1493 on, European powers extended their control and regional dominance through the processes of declaring sovereignty, implementing conquest, developing forms of colonialism, and establishing cultural domination through internalizing maintenance of total social control. These "natural laws" were called the "Rights to Conquest" using the "Doctrine of Discovery" (Wright, 1992) (AILTP, 1988) (Deloria and Lytle, 1984) (Dickason, 1988). The right to a claim of sovereignty, based on judicial constructions of "Indian" identity and "American" citizenship, (Wilkins, 1995), were manipulated to take over and define "Indian land rights" (Coulter and Tullberg, 1984).

Thus, issues of identity become closely intertwined with cultural domination and conquest, (Grinde, 1995), specifically for the relations between the Lakota and the U.S. (Lazarus, 1991). Assimilation theories are thus opposed to nationalism theories are opposed to resistance theory. All three relate historical issues of identity, such as Lakota Oyate, to what Tilly (1978) has expressed as issues of "multiple sovereignty," in situations of collective action and revolution. Although not tempered by "complex unfoldings of multiple conflicts" that take into consideration the conditions of how the "situation emerged in the first place" (Skoepol, 1979), the presence of multiple claims, real or potential, on legitimate sovereignty (Wilkins, 1995:82) greatly informs the processes and outcomes of U.S. struggles with Native Nations, premier among these the Lakota. Issues of spirituality and religious significance quickly became contested, and were the fulcrum points for armed struggle in 1876 and 1890, as well as the primary means of identity adaptation.

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Spiritual and socio-political significance to the pipe used in ceremonial or ritual behavior, as in treaty-making with more complex "tribes" of people grouped together as a nation-state, reflects these relations in terms of identity. The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 made between the United States of America and the "Sioux Nation of Indians" (the Lakota), is just such an example. The U.S. ritual leaders, government and military, revered and followed a written word, and saved their pens after signing the paper, taking pictures of themselves sitting in chairs at the treaty site. The Lakota leaders, as representatives of huge camp-circles, revered and followed a spoken word, the holy wind, remembering the smoking of pipes as a sacred bond not to break "visible breath". Although both these means of making a compact between peoples used representation differently, both were also a cultural expression of intent based on identity. It is interesting to note that many modern Lakota refer to themselves as "pipe-carriers" today, reflecting an extension of traditional identity that is historically loaded with aspects of resistance to cultural and political domination.
Geographic and socio-political change of Lakota identity maintain two underlying themes. The first is that the United States used both brute force and legal chicanery to overcome Lakota resistance. Rather than "cultural inferiority" (Weatherford, 1991:252) finds "Indian civilizations" "succeeded in the face of disease and brute strength" under "world's greatest arsenal of weapons" and the relentless pressures of Euro-American conquest. Citizenship was not awarded so much as dictated or denied based on the dominant group's interest and level of control (Wilkins, 1995).

The other theme is that the United States employed sophisticated cultural domination and elimination to maintain and further its hegemonic control and land tenure alienation strategies, including use of ideological history and manipulation of identities. One particularly evident course of action indicative of these relations develops the "legal fiction" of "unceded territory" found in the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, led to "Sioux Indian Wars" in 1876 (Lazarus, 1994), Wounded Knee massacre in 1890, and resulted in U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 1980's. Thus, identity issues cannot be separated from governmental treatment of the Lakota as Indians, and further is integrally connected to the status of various Lakota groups as in "reservations," "tribes" that become "minority groups" (Deloria, 1981) or as "domestic, dependent nations."

Socio-Political constructions of the "Lakota Oyate" and "Sioux Nation" identities, however different and at odds in terms of cultural definition, can be typologized in conflict terms that hinge upon the relations between these two sets of nations and peoples. These are grouped within four distinct inter-national governmental relations: the traditional Lakota society period, "Oceti Sakowin"; treaty relations of conflict and conquest as "Separate Nations"; domination and division through "Separate Lakota-Sioux Reservations"; and re-expressed "Autonomy by a Reservation or as Nation or as a 'Tribe'" previously described. Reflexive and well-integrated individual identities establish their relationship, sometimes independent of the level of assimilation, based on these socio-political constructions.

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As products of a political identification imposed by U.S. government agencies and agents, or conversely as an oppositional orientation toward resistance against those political identities, individuals over time influence changes in "tribal" identity and construction of historical identity, that is no less powerful than their most contemporary cultural and political constructs. These adaptations and social change mechanisms are understood by the people undergoing the process, discussed below by a traditional-minded Lakota man, an artist in his 30's, who easily moves into and out of modern American institutional life.

You know they call us "Dog-eaters", an ironic name. It includes ceremonies, food in times of starvation, and respect for a species. The wolf is like our people years ago, before the whites came. ...But the dog has changed and adapted over thousands of years, it has survived. We modern Lakota are a lot like the dog -- we have survived, changed,
and adapted. But even so, an elder once told me that when the wolf is gone from the land, that could be the end of the Lakota. (Tatanka Iyotxíspípochi, Fairbanks, 1995).

The "wolf" above is instructive of traditional Lakota life as an Oyate, as allied nations, even though it is well-understood that life has disappeared. So the "dog" has become metaphor for traditional Lakota living and interacting in a modern world dominated by contemporary American institutions and an impersonal technology. However, the wolf is lurking in Lakota life, maintaining oral tradition histories and cultural knowledge that represents the foundation upon which Lakota American Indians base their forms of identity. Neither bureaucratic nor cultural constructs are even remotely monolithic in an analysis covering the last two centuries.

**Envelopment and Incorporation of the Lakota**

The economic forces enveloping and attempting to incorporate the Lakota also become key features in establishing externalized sources of Indian identity throughout the 19th century. Typification as "hostile" or "friendly" Indians introduced divisive elements into Lakota society. (Olson, 1965) (Deloria and Lytle, 1984). Moreover, in terms of pacification of those Lakota resisting the land-takings and social domination, identification with the dominant social groups could change itself, and be adapted by both the external and internal sources of identity.

An outstanding example of this change of locus of identity is the great leader Red Cloud. Universally acclaimed as the war-leader of the Oglala and allied Lakota during the two or three years of war with the United States military leading to the victorious 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, including directing younger leaders such as Crazy Horse in tactical warfare, during the build-up and battles of the U.S. summer campaign of 1876, Red Cloud stayed near the Pine Ridge Agency. Although attempting to represent his people in legal maneuvering all the way to Washington D.C., the 1888 land-takings, 1889 Dakota statehood struggles, and the slaughter at Wounded Knee were all instigated without serious resistance from the once great leader living in an agency house. Political and economic incorporation similar to Red Cloud's experience essentially negated ability to resist cultural domination as an integral part of Lakota leadership on the *tiyospaye*, *otonwepi*, and *oyate* levels of identity.

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Along with the problems of individual leadership and social practices influenced by identity changes in terms of being a Lakota man or woman, the notions of identity orientation with Lakota society was similarly affected, causing less effective claims and practices of sovereign relations. Although arguably a natural outgrowth of the American expansion unto and over the northern plains area, the history of treaties, wars, and diplomatic agreements between the United States with the Lakota makes a fine predictor for how external identity constructions were regularly employed as a means to an end --
whether that is elimination, incorporation, or subordination. The undying key to those relations is the notion of "sovereignty."

**Struggles Over Sovereignty and Treaty Rights**

Contact history between American representatives and the "Sioux" is complex with ethnic and temporal variations. (Powers, 1975:3-10). The word Sioux is a foreign label19 (Robinson, 1904) (Walker, 1914) (Boas and Deloria, 1932). The Santee Dakota had "contact" much earlier than the Lakota, documented by Radisson in 1660, subsequent encounters by La Suer in 1700, Carver in 1766, and first official contact, Lt. Pike in 1805, to establish "American sovereignty" (Powers, 1975), followed by expeditions to build forts by Major Long in 1817. That history of confrontations culminated in the "Sioux Uprising" of 1862 21 (Anderson, 1984). The Yankton and Yanktonai suffered the results of buffering the Lakota in 1862 (Meyer, 1980 (1967)).

The Lakota occupied the plains from the Missouri to the Yellowstone and Platte. Teton Lakota were signatories to the multi-national Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, about the same time Santee Dakota were forced to sign the 1851 Traverse des Sioux Treaty. Two Sioux "Nations" had treaties with the U.S. in 1851 (Meyers,1980; Lazarus, 1991). We observe how "Sioux Indian" identity is constructed by the U.S. institutions. These "constructions of ethnicity, citizenship and nationality" were *mediated* by the dominant group's political constructs and cultural determining, partly or completely to reduce claims to sovereign Lakota identity, and thereby treaty rights.22

19th CENTURY U.S. POLICIES WITH DIRECT INFLUENCE ON LAKOTA IDENTITY

1803 and 1804 - "The Louisiana Purchase" (and the Lewis and Clark Expedition)

produced the first issue of conflict relations over sovereignty claims made by the U.S., defining Lakota *Tionwan* as "Sioux" under American political governance

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1830 - **Indian Removal Act** (Cherokee precedence for all other Indian Nations)

established separation of Indian identity from origin lands as a matter of law and practice, attempted unsuccessfully against the Lakota (Teton) Sioux on multiple occasions

1868 - **Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868** (The Sioux Nation of Indians)

established the Great Sioux Reservation and future dealings with the Lakota Sioux as a Nation, becoming the reference point for all discussion about the Black Hills takings
1871 - Act of March 3, 1871 (ending treaty-making with Indian Nations)

first of many attempts to incorporate Lakota Indians into American nationality without rights of citizenship, essentially dissolving inter-national relations

1876 - Declaration of "Hostiles" transfer responsibility to the Secretary of War

legal definition of resisting Lakota as "hostiles" allowing military and civilian repression, dividing Lakota groups, families and individuals, into "for" and "against" typologies

1877 - Black Hills Act of 1887 (takings of land)

deprieved Lakota of essential spiritual identity links to sacred lands, forcing a reservation identity devoid of direct traditional underpinnings and associated religious practices

1881 - Individual Agencies "banning" (the Sundance) and selected spiritual practices

"legal" imposition of Christian religious identity that further broke down community life through banning yearly celebrations of Lakota spiritual identity and leadership

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1883 - Indian Offenses (1882) and Courts listed/enacted by Indian Affairs Commission

qualified codes of conduct and judicial practices that hampered or criminalized Lakota traditional identity in the Family, Religion, Economic, and Justice realms of society

1885 - Major Crimes Act (jurisdictional sovereignty continued the above encroachment)

1887 - Dawes Severalty Act (General Allotment Act of 1887)

forced land tenure "ownership" on individual or household levels, breaking the traditional and community *tiyospaye* relationships and their relevant social identities

1889 - The Great Sioux Agreement of 1889 (Crook Commission enacted above land takings)

1890 - Transfer (again) of responsibility to the Secretary of War - The Ghost Dance
violent military repression of attempted revitalization of traditional identities through adapted religious practices, forcing any existing spiritual traditions to go underground

The "Sioux Nation" and six Sioux Reservations

Considerations for establishing the territorial domains of Lakota Oyate, thereby identity, include using fixed analytical frames, 24 sensitive to Standing Bear's ideas about "humanization" as the "true essence of civilization" vested for the Lakota in "the spirit of the land." 25 Into the 20th century Ohiyesa (Eastman) finds that the Indian (Dakota) is "reconstructed" in "modern society" built out of "artificial blocks" rather than "natural life" and real landscapes. 26 The cultural overlay for these social blocks is government adapted for specific indoctrination of Indians as the Lakota. Over time, these social issues become differently represented by the separate Sioux reservations. Thus the humanness described above, reaching outward from tiyospaye relations to the oya, became circumscribed by the political constructions of reservations around Indian agencies.

Specifically for the Standing Rock Lakota-Sioux case, a central issue is the "frontier. 27" Rather than typification of an expanding, colonizing American empire, 28 language employed by the United States government on the Lakota as "Sioux Indians", 29 deepened cultural stratification and reified discriminatory labels. 30 Lakota leaders experienced these real-life divisive stand-offs. 31 Ten major social spheres of Lakota life that underwent drastic social change, reflect the powerful forces altering indigenous identity. The three political spheres of governance, military defense, and judicial enforcement, were eliminated or adapted to U.S. Indian agency control. Since most Lakota leadership relied on special councils and warrior societies, this crucial area of identity was denied to the most potent social leaders.

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The Lakota as an "Oyate" had political systems repressed and eliminated, because "fluid" and continuous systems of governance (Biolsi, 1992) and authority, 32 complicated systems for the maintenance of cultural domination. U.S. Indian policy imposed political systems that inculcated non-indigenous interactions which further eroded Lakota social structures. 33 This achieved U.S. objectives in land takings and resource utilization, all based on isolated reservation identities constructed by the dominating government. 34 Historical research had to identify these processes of domination, "anchoring" theoretical observations in the changing relationships to the land35 (Laduke, 1983), and the "absorption" of American Indians (Lakota) "into the white world"36 (Means, 1983). Thus the external identity and policy constructs of progressives and assimilation were considered detrimental to maintenance of traditional Lakota life, leading to internal identity forms of traditionalists in resistance to "the white man" and his ways.

At least three economic spheres achieved these secondary objectives within the main goal. Land Tenure relations, private ownership of Property, and Trade systems were
subordinated to U.S. Indian Agent control, resulting in the drastic reduction or elimination of traditional identity relationships based on social responsibilities of the wico-tipi and ti-ogunkapi to the tiyospaye, furthered to the otionwepi within notions of an Oyate. Even important give-aways were banned.

Finally, as noted earlier, the socio-cultural spheres of Religion, Education, Language and Family were subordinated, deformed, and/or eliminated to reduce traditional identity formation. White Hat and Around Him (1983) demonstrate this by dedicating their book to "the people who preserved our ceremonies and ceremonial songs during the years when governmental and missionary institutions tried to take them away from us... dedicated to the people who have and are bringing the ceremonies and ceremonial songs back into their rightful place in our society -- the Medicine Men and Women, the Singers, and the Ike Wicasa. (White Hat, 1983).

4. CIA/BIA as Internal Colonialism with Resistance by "Traditionals"

From Hostiles and Aliens to Indians and Citizens

An example of how the divisive notions of "legitimate" versus "resistance" identities played a critical part in the breakup of the Lakota Oyate to six reservation based groupings, exemplifies the conflict between the "Indian Police" and the "Sun Dance Leaders" as a source of "traditional" identities associated with maintenance of religious traditions leading to resistance toward the United States. The Hunkpapa leader Sitting Bull had called for a great gathering Sun Dance in the Rosebud and Big Horn River
region over the summer of 1876. When U.S. military forces under Custer attacked them on the Little Big Horn, the Hunkpapa warrior leader Chief Gall was one of three great battle masters that defeated the cavalry. Sitting Bull and Gall lived in Canadian asylum for five years, both coming to rest with their people on Standing Rock. Reservation realities called for the Indian Agent to appoint some leaders to the Indian Police and Courts that criminalized the very practices that made the Lakota so strong a decade earlier. Gall became a judge and supporter of the Indian Police, while Sitting Bull maintained his traditional spirituality and resisted assimilation. During the Ghost Dance fracas, U.S. government and Indian Agency forces targeted and killed Sitting Bull's identity as a well-known "trouble-making source" while his once close friend and war leader Gall conducted an Indian Court on Standing Rock.

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While multiple historical inaccuracies on the "Breakup of the Great Sioux Reservation", denigrate Indian Agents for destructive altercations with the military, a general tone in history places much activity against the Ghost Dance with Agent McLaughlin, when the overwhelming majority of conflict and most military movement happened on Pine Ridge, the Rosebud and Cheyenne River reservations, where senior U.S. officials ordered "the arrests of the leaders." Emphasis on Standing Rock was further misplaced because of the northern Yanktonai Dakota residing on the North Dakota side of the reservation. Besides a successful divide-and-conquer strategy through separated Lakota reservations, assimilated American Indian identities were complicating notions of what a traditional Hunkpapa Lakota represented, at least on Standing Rock "Sioux" Indian reservation, home of the famous resistance leader Sitting Bull.

The concept of the "frontier" being against the "Sioux Indians" as a monolithic whole, gradually was reduced to reservation boundaries as state "frontiers" of sorts, and ended in the identification of individual Lakota as "Hostiles" and dangerous, "Aliens" and thereby suspicious, or and as generic "friendly" Indians with "potential" for becoming good "Citizens" after proving themselves through living and acting like "the white man" thereby giving up their Indian identity. Incorporation revolved around individual rewards relating to traditional or assimilated identity.

"...(For instance), there are families that curried favor with the military, and to this day, those people get all the benefits, the jobs, ...(in the old days), they would be told 'You're better than those Hostiles, those heathens'..." "(It's particularly bad) when Indians, who claim to be your people, then they tell you that... ...and that if you live out at Cannonball, Bullhead or Little Eagle, you are (unimportant, lower)."

"These Indians are the products of a colonial administration, and so they do the work of the wasiciu themselves." (Defender-Wilson, 1996)

American Citizenship: Inclusion or Dissolution?
American "citizenship" became the contested notions of identity and national allegiance expressed in relationship to the Standing Rock reservation, a greater Lakota or Dakota "tribe", and the United States. Until well after World War One, U.S. citizenship had been utilized as inducement to leave traditional lifestyles and "tribal" membership for assimilation into American economic and social life. This was commonly expressed by both military and civilian authority, (Cadwalader and Deloria, 1983). That strategy never achieved the envisioned "tribal" exodus, nor any secondary objectives of tribal dissolution. It did cause, among the Lakota especially, divisions between those Natives who were more or less assimilated, and further distinctions between so-called "full-bloods" and "mixed-bloods" that continue as identity markers today.

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Through 1924 the United States used blood quantum formulas to determine the tribal membership as against a standard "citizenship" in lieu of the "foreign" status of a Lakota Indian. After the 1924 Citizenship Act all American Indians became citizens. Although beyond the stated purview of this paper, one important point to ponder is whether this was a simple expression of civil rights finally accorded correctly, or was it tactically oriented to speed the assimilation of all "un-reconstituted" Indians? From a mainstream or dominant society perspective, this question appears to be one of governmental motivation and intention (Deloria, 1987 vs Jaimes, 1992). From an indigenous identity perspective, this question colored with the history of one hundred years of cultural domination, appears to be whether inclusion into American society is pitted against dissolution of Lakota "national" or "tribal" society. Distinctions of these identities continue into modern social institutions, including courts of law, schools, and family life.

The primary vehicle for achieving these objectives was the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Socio-political identity of the Lakota had been manipulated earlier so that "...after the passage of the allotment acts traditional tribal governments did not have legal or bureaucratic status. The allotment policy was intended to make Indians into independent small farmers who would become integrated into the American economic and social system". (Champagne, 1992:35) In terms of recognition of a national identity, the B.I.A. began a different, more benign approach in 1934.

**Re-organization: Construction or Assimilation?**

With the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, Lakota resistance found new forums from which to organize, as well as new bureaucracies which inhibited traditional identity forms. The educated Standing Bear asked whether "the shattered specimen" of the Indian was brought about by "the benevolent conqueror" of the United States, even as sculptors were carving four faces of the most famous U.S. presidents, into a "great shrine of democracy and freedom" on monumental cliffs in the stolen Black Hills, in an area known to Lakota as "the six grandfathers." The Lakota dubbed the Mt. Rushmore result "the four thieves" as each had taken vast tracts of Indian land. Thus the symbol of Lakota
spirituality was defaced to produce a symbol of American domination. Less symbolic was the attempt to "reorganize" American Indians into Euro-Americans.

Philp (1986) reports that analyst Rupert Costa argued that the Indian Reorganization Act "was the last great effort to assimilate the American Indian. It was also a program to colonize the Indian tribes... The IRA had within its working and in its instruments, such as the tribal constitutions, the destruction of the treaties and of Indian self-government." Deloria and Lytle (1983) find that the I.R.A. was the seed or "inception" points for modern tribal governments. Regardless, after the IRA reorganizations, Champagne (1992:36) finds that "the dominant sentiment in Congress continued to favor assimilationist Indian policies and eventual abolishment of the reservation system," and the "post-World War II period saw resumption of active assimilationist policies within the Indian congressional subcommittees."

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However, another set of seeds had started to grow, for which the B.I.A.'s I.R.A. councils provided powerful fertilizer at Pine Ridge, fueling "Bitter factionalism between full bloods and mixed bloods" that "divided the reservation long before the New Deal." (Parman, 1994:100) "Mixed bloods generally were apt to be more educated, bilingual, and acculturated, and to enjoy success in agriculture or employment. Full bloods tended to be less schooled, more traditional, and still in possession of their allotments."

In terms of identity conflicts, Parman observes: "... a separatist full-blood group known as the "Old Dealers" developed a rival political organization at Pine Ridge and Rosebud... (yet) never sought to control the new councils on the two reservations... (but) instead, regarded them as alien and illegitimate institutions forced upon the Sioux by the BIA and dominated by mixed bloods." (Parman, 1994:101) Biosi (1992:xxi) identifies the old Dealers "refusal to recognize the IRA tribal councils as governing bodies" and their insistence "Treaty Council was the legal and traditional Lakota body for making tribal decisions" as being consistent "both with Lakota tradition and with (1868) treaty law."

Defender-Wilson (1996), usually identified as a Dakota traditional from Standing Rock, clarifies this distinction as deeper than the BIA bureaucratic systems:

"...our identity, coming from the earth, (and) from the land, and other people... Just because the federal government didn't put them on a reservation, or give them a number, doesn't mean they aren't Native."

In terms of that consistency of traditional identity being manipulated by government entities, including the depiction of "hostiles" and "savages", she continues:

"I never saw such fine-looking people... We are not a grotesque people, no one should not have made fun of us, because our spirit comes from the land... We left the spider-man
(Inktomi) behind us in our history -- we are a civilized people. We emerged and learned our ways, and became human beings.” (Defender, 1996)

The Dakota and Lakota "civilized people" were precisely the target of the United States. The critical issue became new and continuing traditional identity formation in social institutions. In discussing "Law and Order Apparatus" of enforced domination of the Lakota, Biolsi (1992:7) observes that "technology deployed by the OIA for controlling Indian behavior used the agency courts and police forces," including having jurisdiction over Indian offenses such as "Sun Dance, new plural marriages, practices of medicine men, destruction of property, payment for cohabiting with a woman..." noting punishment for those "who divorced by Indian custom" even though neither agencies nor courts could or would grant divorces. Full-blood (Sioux) Indians were classified as "incompetent wards" with government trusteeship, enabling "competent" individual allottees to remove land from trust through "fee patenting," with the BIA established and run IIM (Individual Indian Money) accounts requiring Lakota people to apply for and defend the use of their money, and "rations" which "allowed direct and immediate control of Indian behavior" by food dependency. Pressures on those Lakota who did not conform or assimilate therefore included direct manipulation of behavior and identity.

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20th century Resistance and Cultural Domination

The vehicle of cultural oppression designed to strangle traditional identity became a tribal instrument for resistance, such as the formal councils following through on "the need... to make decisions concerning the use of resources or the filing of claims against the government..." (Deloria and Lytle 1983:98). The Interior Department, now formally aligned with the Sioux tribal governments, supported the survivors position that the military wantonly massacred them, by providing testimony in the 1938 Wounded Knee Reparations Hearings against the War Dept.. That occurred even though the government feared continuing resistance through filing grievances against treaty violations, land-takings and BIA injustices, and the Lakota traditional feared that a "puppet government" would disallow those claims. Again, identity was linked to legitimacy.

Even formal organizations such as the NCAI, working within the American systems of national justice and congressional action, provided the national leadership and networking necessary to resist further encroachment, and develop legitimate forums from which to stand for important cross-national Indian interests, and the protests necessary to fight ongoing cultural domination (Prucha, 1984:350). Thus multiple nuclei of resistance arose out of differing forms of identity - traditional, modern, tribal, political and even historic "national" social constructs.

Struggles between Native Nations like the Lakota and American capitalism is evidenced in contemporary corporate influence and takeovers on Indian reservations within the United States. The envelopment and attempted incorporation of the Lakota continued
corporate power and natural resource exploitation depended on sovereignty struggles against corporate power structures enshrined in U.S. social institutions. Each level of social change allowed resistance. Current "Sioux" reservations and jurisdictional issues are demonstrated with examples of a Lakota "Nation" in conflict with corporate powers over the following resources: farming and ranching, mining, gaming, urbanization, fishing, land-tenure disposal, water and mineral rights. Issues of taxation are found intertwined with the U.S. nation-state and a panoply of corporate interests, as exemplified in the Lakota-Sioux in the Dakotas. The maintenance of traditional identities allowed a cultural foundation for the modern, activist-oriented Lakota and related Indian groups to launch successful resistance against external (U.S.) and internal (IRA Councils) domination. The following chart reflects the growth of these resistance movements and their identities against changing U.S. policies of assimilation, suppression, and negotiation in the 20th century.

Fig. 3:

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**U.S. INDIAN POLICY and LAKOTA RESISTANCE with Direct Influence on Identity**

**U. S. American Indian Policy**

1890's Indian Boarding and Day Schools  
Primary goal of "killing the Indian" within education for many Lakota children

1910 Sioux Land cedings, by county  
Intentional breakup of *tjopypaye* relations of communities with the land

1924 Citizenship Act (Burke Act 1906)  
conferring citizenship on all Lakota assimilation strategy against natonhood

1934 Indian Reorganization Act  
formulated American electoral systems on Lakota reservation cultures

1953 Termination Policy, P.L. 280  
Urban Relocation Program attempts alienation of Lakota from reservation life

1958 Pick Sloan Missouri Plan 37  
breakup of the riverine communities and subsistence family economic patterns

1968 Indian Civil Rights Act  
individual opportunity laws opened

1972 Indian Education Act 38

1974 U.S. v. Con. Wounded Knee Cases 39  
morer Indian input with U.S. justice

1975 Indian Self-Determination (Ed) Act 40

1978 Indian Child Welfare Act 41  
American Indian Religious Freedom, accorded Lakota same "freedoms" as U.S.

1980 U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians 42

**Lakota Osage - Resistance**

1911 Society of American Indians formed  
Lakota organize cultural and treaty protection for Native peoples and nations

1922 Sioux tribes initiate Black Hills claim  
resisting land encroachment and Lakota spirituality with sacred lands

1938 Wounded Knee Reparations Hearings  
survivors from Ghost Dance killings testify Congress on human rights violations

1946 Resistance to "emancipation" bills  
Lakota refuge tribal alienation with claims to traditional identities and treaties

1959 Opposition to Missouri Dam sites  
Standing Rock Natives oppose land-takings and destruction of river habitat

1965 SunDances appear in public  
underground spiritual ceremonies actively practiced in cultural restoration

1969 (64) Alcatraz occupied (1868 treaty)  
combined Natives fight for rights

1972 Trail of Broken Treaties, (BIA)

1973 Taking of Wounded Knee, Pine Ridge  
symbolic and real acts of resistance

1974 "Sioux Treaty Hearing" Intl Council

1976 AIM struggle, FBI Killings  
Lakota and "urban Indian" identity asserts historic rights of Native Nations

1978 American Indian Religious Freedom 43
Thus we see that the 20th century began with a completely new set of relationships between the dominating forces of the U.S. American society, and the subordinated peoples, Lakota traditionalists, progressives, nationalist activists and all the other identity constructions. Policies clearly meant to perform cultural domination or incorporation thru coercive assimilation, were met with resistance and adaptation strategies by all of the identity groups of the Lakota. Three major examples, listed in the above chart, are the U.S. Indian policies of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act formalizing tribal councils, the 1954 Termination Policy / Relocation Program moving rural Natives into urban areas, and the 1972 and 1975 Indian Education Acts providing Native control mechanism in determining schools on reservations. Each set of initiatives resulted in counteract responses strengthening rather than weakening traditional Lakota relationships. Although often corrupt and destabilizing, the tribal councils allowed direct Lakota involvement with governance of their reservation "Tribe" or Nation (Deloria and Lytle, 1984) (Biolsi, 1992), strengthening family tiyospaye networks, linkages with traditionalists and cultural survival. Even though cultural solidarity was reduced when many Lakota were relocated, new urban networks and "pan-Indian" resistance groups were formed with strong ties to reservation cultures (Fixico, 1986) (Cornell, 1988) (Fenelon, forthcoming). And even though complexities and poor school conditions were rife with Indian Education programs, curriculum and instructional changes were introduced that brought up a new generation of Native children without the oppressive identity definitions inculcated by the dominant society's education (Locust, 1992) (Fenelon, 1991).

Social conditions related to dependency and underdevelopment were outgrowths of the policies that targeted Lakota traditional identities and their claims to sovereignty (Ortiz, 1984). Resistance hardened with these cultural identity groups, relying on oral histories to informally track reservation hardships and U.S. Indian policy to the conflicts over attempted incorporation, conquest and domination of the Lakota.

One traditional elder, having lived his entire life near Cannonball on Standing Rock, succinctly described the historical relationships with present-day realities:

"B.I.A. always had it in for Standing Rock. Because of Sitting Bull. They pass us by... They think...the fight over the Black Hills. We knocked their flag down... Seven years we talked, many delays. Lots of promises. Electricity, water, fuel. New land, irrigation... Nothing... That is why we call it the 'Taken Land.'" (Henry Swift Horse, 1987.46)

The "Taken Land" Swift Horse is referring to covers much of the Missouri riverine valleys and its tributaries on Standing Rock and Cheyenne River reservations in North and South Dakota, (Lawson, 1982). Vine Deloria, in a preface to Lawson's book
"Damned Indians" states the dams are the single most destructive act of policy in the twentieth century, mostly on traditional families who were forced to move into substandard housing without much hope of gainful employment.

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Although discussion of the 1960s and 70s activism and the resurgence of Indian identity, found in works by Johnson on the Alcatraz occupation, in 1995 issues of American Indian Culture and Research Journal, Fortunate Eagle and Nagel on "Red Power," all argue that this activist period was an important factor in the "renaissance" in Indian identity for two decades, a close discussion of the Standing Rock case finds that much more powerful forms of traditional identity had been preserved under constant suppression for nearly two hundred years.
5. Contemporary Forms of "National" Identity on Standing Rock

The "Nationalist" Lakota identities, first formed from loose alliances and confederacies, braided in the crucible of armed conflict with the United States, continued to exist and exert influence over traditionalists during the Reservation, Reorganization, Termination and Self-Determination policy periods. The marriage of dual citizenship, cultural survival, resistance, activism and AIM, resurrected the strongest and separatist ideas of Lakota nationalist identities.

While not always comfortable with the most extreme activist groups, the Standing Rock tribal councils never countered traditionalists to the levels experienced at Pine Ridge, reducing direct conflict between opposing ideologies of dealing with state and federal governments.

Because of the diversity of cultural origins and socio-political perspectives on Standing Rock, this section heading of the paper is developed in seven areas. First, the "American Indian Movement and Political Resurgence" of the 1960's and onward, are put into historical context.

"Tribal Councils and the Sioux Indian Reservations" discuss the policy implications of the B.I.A. and governmental efforts to control and direct reservation life. Next, the "American "Indian" Identity forms on Standing Rock" are discussed and listed. Since "The Lakota and The Dakota -- "Tribe" and "Nation!" are part of the make-up of the reservation growing from an Indian Agency, these observations are linked to "Socio-Political Legitimacy and Constructed Identity" arguments. "Traditional Culture and Coerced Social Change" are presented in terms of resistance ideologies, developed in an "Elder's Statement to the SunDancers at Prairie Island" in the 1990's. Finally, "The Many Faces of Native Identity on Standing Rock" are presented.

American Indian Movement and Political Resurgence

Reservation, Reorganization, Termination and Relocation policies developed an explosive mixture of historical wrongs, systematic inequalities, stunted political participation and linkages with urban unrest and ethnic resistance groups across the nation.

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Some young Natives experienced injustices, thinking of themselves as American "citizens," and yet also claimed rights to representation as "Indians." By the 1960's, these forces, with an eye toward the Civil Rights movement in the South, were arrayed across a spectrum strong enough to challenge the dominant society's institutions. In 1961, with Lakota-Dakota numbers, the American Indian Chicago Conference convened a collaboration of academics, policy-makers and Indian delegates from over ninety tribes, resulting in a formal Declaration of Indian Purpose.
Internecine resistance struggles on the Sioux reservations, with an increased presence and activity in congressional legislation and so-called pan-Indian movements for resisting domination, ignited powerful issues of "Lakota Oyate" sovereignty and spirituality tied to claims for the Black Hills and the 1868 treaty with the "Sioux Nation of Indians". Within a few years, ceremonies existing underground for over seventy years began to surface, including the socially cohesive and spiritually powerful SunDance of the Lakota.

About 1965 limited SunDances appeared in "public" places within Sioux Indian country, along with the resurrected ceremonies came renewed awareness of traditional life and spirituality. SunDances were essential acts of resistance - to law because it was still illegal, to federal policy because the SunDance was suppressed in the previous century, and to BIA agents it was the quintessential symbol of community solidarity of traditional Lakota culture (McGaa, 1990).

Evidence that the SunDances had been conducted on very small scales among the Lakota traditional groups ("bands" and tribes), includes pictorial proof on Standing Rock (1919, 1924, 1930's), Rosebud (1930's, 1940's), and Pine Ridge (1920's, 1930's); such as Hunkpapa pictures taken at Little Eagle, South Dakota side of Standing Rock, with the SunDance pole, dancers with eagle whistles, and signs of sacred spiritual ceremonies only found in a SunDance. Therefore resistance through maintenance of cultural identity resurfaced with political overtones.

By 1968, the Civil Rights Act included some specific features for Indians, with limitations addressed by Indian leaders, such as constitutional prohibition against "establishment of religion" obstructing the practicing theocracies of some Indian Nations, potentially complicating Lakota religious practices including the SunDance (Wunder, 1994). The Indian Civil Rights Act "had a mixed reception" precisely because it intended "to bring Indian tribal governments within the constitutional framework of the United States." (Prucha, 1984:363) Indian leaders foresaw danger to sovereignty with unrestricted inclusion, but welcomed repeal of P.L.280 state jurisdiction 48

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In 1969, Indians of All Tribes (IAT), headed by Oaks, a Mohawk, and Trudell, a Dakota, re-occupied Alcatraz island by claiming 1868 treaty and 1882 statutes, noted in an earlier Sioux attempt in 1964. The pan-Indian activists combined symbolic and physical acts of resistance, electrifying the nation, the media, and Native Americans. In response to momentum from renewed activity in Civil Rights, the American Indian Movement was formed in an urban atmosphere in the Twin Cities, historical heartland of Wo-Dakota Oyate, and ancient homelands of their Lakota allies, with the other "Sioux Nation of Indians" dispersed outside Minnesota.

In 1972 the Trail of Broken Treaties was initiated on a national level of struggle, pitting the BIA against combined groups including AIM and IAT. The 1868 treaty claim figured heavily in the decision to mobilize Indian activists throughout the nation. History struck
home in 1973, for Lakota on Pine Ridge with the re-taking and "occupation" of Wounded Knee, as resistance against the imposed tribal government, at the 1890 genocidal killings site of Lakota traditionalists. Young Bear remembers that after the Trail of Broken Treaties, "the government sent its people" telling "they are going to take your agency" and suddenly "in Pine Ridge we had armed vigilante squads -- goon squads -- fortified up on top of the BIA buildings," (1994:148-49), who "started harassing people." Young Bear was involved in demonstrations at Rapid City, leading to arrest and injunction because he was a "national AIM leader", that he attributes to his Porcupine Singers' drum support of AIM, so "maybe singing stirring songs is dangerous to people in power".49

Meetings had women exhorting the traditional leaders to "stand up and change things".50 Wounded Knee had symbiotic qualities of a resistance to domination and a powerful spirituality and harkening to the sovereignty of Lakota Oyate, reflected in Young Bear's recollection of the decision and preparation as Akitchita, Tokala "warrior spirit":

"Fools Crow got up and prayed. Then he said "The people need you, are you willing to give up your lives?" Everybody said hau -- that means yes. Fools Crow then said, "What we'll do is take over Wounded Knee store and church and challenge the government to reenact the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890. Come in and kill us!" A lot of those old men got up and said "Yes, let's do it. It should be done that way....they'll really react and put you in prison or kill you." Fools Crow said "Waktapo, ogna wiconi ehpeya kiyapi kite lo." (Beware, you might have to give up your life.) They all agreed and they prayed again. Somebody had a sacred pipe, so they all smoked." (Young Bear, 1994:149-155)

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Lakota traditionalists and AIM leaders took and defended Wounded Knee for two months, under constant fire from U.S. government forces. The U.S. called the negotiations a "surrender" and courts arrested the participants. However, throughout the occupation of Wounded Knee II (1973) traditionalists showed support. "The people who believed in treaties or lived the traditional way of life supported Wounded Knee II..." (Young Bear, 1994:154)

Even our own district members were on both sides of the conflict because some of them were getting paid as BIA police officers, deputies or goons. It's an old colonial technique to use our own people as police against us. These goons were mostly mixed-bloods who got fifteen or twenty dollars an hour, and they went around beating up people and shooting at them... (even) more than the military. (Young Bear, 1994)

Tribal Councils and the Sioux Indian Reservations

Conflict over full-blood traditionalists "old-dealers" maintaining claim to 1868 Black Hills, opposing the more mixed-blood progressives "new-dealers" pushing for assimilative governance, was a central feature of government intervention in the conflicts on Pine Ridge, and replicated divisions on Standing Rock. Although the tribal councils were
without question oppressing some of their own people, for and by whom they had been ostensibly elected and therefore represented, they were recognized by the United States government as "legitimate" and "true". Certainly, many of them considered their own positions in that light.52

These issues come to a head -- historic repression, the resurrection of banned ceremonies, using the pipe as a treaty seal in personal faith, the ancient Akichita oath to defend "the people" (Oyate), local and regional resistance to cultural domination, and expression of traditional Lakota spirituality -- in events directly preceding the re-taking of Wounded Knee (Young Bear, 1994). Afterwards, the conflict continued with the involvement of AIM, increasing repression by tribal GOON squads, and deepening coordination by the United States, notably the FBI.53

Socio-political resistance forces organized an International Treaty Council in June, 1974, held with support from the Standing Rock council, with many Indian Nations. Language from the "Declaration of Continuing Independence By the First International Indian Treaty Council at Standing Rock Indian Country," states the general thinking of these Native resistance forces:

We the sovereign Native Peoples charge the United States with gross violations of our International Treaties. Two of the thousands of violations that can be cited are the "wrongfully taking" of the Black Hills from the Great Sioux Nation in 1877, this sacred land belonging to the Great Sioux Nation under the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868.

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We condemn the United States of American for its gross violation of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty in militarily surrounding, killing, and starving the citizens of the Independent Oglala Nation into exile... (and) for its genocidal practices against the sovereign Native Nations; most recently illustrated by Wounded Knee 1973 and the continued refusal to sign the United Nations 1948 Treaty on Genocide.54

The battle had been joined - Indian movement "activists" aligned with traditional and other Lakota on the reservations against organs and institutions of the United States government, including tribal governments such as at Pine Ridge. In an interesting assumption of the dominant society's language within its unilateral legislation, the International Treaty Council listed the pertinent acts and judicial decisions:

We reject all executive orders, legislative acts and judicial decisions of the United States related to Native Nations since 1871, when the United States unilaterally suspended treaty-making relations with the Native Nations. This includes, but is not limited to, the Major Crimes Act, the General Allotment Act, the Citizenship Act of 1924, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Indian Claims Commission Act, Public Law 280 and the Termination Act.
In 1974, the federal government brought *U.S. v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases* 55 forward in Lincoln, Nebraska, known to its Lakota participants as the "Sioux Treaty Hearing" because the defendants from Wounded Knee II claimed non-jurisdiction due to the 1868 Treaty, responding with claims to Lakota cultural and socio-political sovereignty, and thereby identity, including:

1. "...this Treaty (1868) was made with a Nation, the U.S. and the Sioux Nation... but from the oral history... the Sioux people never gave up anything as far as their land, their sovereignty, or as a people, or even our culture..." (Young Bear)

2. "My (Treaty) understanding is... the people will govern themselves under the leadership of our Chiefs. Our law and order will be maintained by Sioux people. ...but the U.S.56 forced some Acts... opening our land and invasion of the white people. (Chasing Hawk)

3. "Oral history of the Treaty as I learned from my elders pertains to a beautiful word in our language, *Wohlakota*, which means peace between two nations, sovereign nations, *Milahanskan* which means the U.S. and sovereign Sioux Nation of our Lakota." (Gabe)

4. "The 1868 Treaty described a boundary which the United States was not to enter under any circumstances. The Lakota people would continue their traditional way of life and be a self-governing people like any other country." (Spotted Horse)

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5. "The Treaty was signed by the Lakota Nation to stop the war. And the land within the Sioux Nation belongs to the Sioux and no white man will come into our land. The Sioux Nation will govern itself. The nation will live under the Pipe. (Kills Enemy)

6. "Before the Sioux signed they used the Pipe...the peace was to be forever. The U.S. made their promise... told about their Bible...Two nations made agreement." (He Crow)

The re-taking of Wounded Knee had serious side-effects for the struggle over ideological rights toward claims for "sovereignty" and cultural integrity alien to dominant American society -- it focussed the engines of governmental repression on Pine Ridge and the Sioux reservations, pitting tribal councils and the BIA against their own people and "wards" in trust. The result was deep entrenchment of the American Indian Movement (Matthiessen, 1991). Two FBI agents were killed when they stormed into a Pine Ridge AIM compound. A new realm of conflict ensued, where enlightened policy makers were thwarted by FBI "counter-insurgency" tactics.

Lakota identity on the "Sioux" reservations was complicated by political fragmentation, strong differentiation between "full-bloods" and more assimilated "mixed-bloods", involvement with tribal government, and generational differences with new activism. Families were sometimes set against each other, with Crow Dog and Spotted Tail on the
Rosebud (Erdoes and Crow Dog, 1995) or Sitting Bull and Gall on Standing Rock, or could be divided among themselves as with some McLaughlins descended from the first Indian Agent. Similarly, veterans from World War II often maintained different loyalties than Vietnam veterans, reflecting the larger society.

**American "Indian" Identity forms on Standing Rock**

The U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs enrolls American Indians as the "Standing Rock Sioux" depending on a blood quantum based on "rolls" made after the Treaty of 1868. These rolls include Hunkpapa Lakota, Sicasapa Lakota, and Yanktonai Dakota people. Additionally, many individuals claim these and other Native American identities related to Standing Rock, either as a reservation or an historical cultural group with nation-like underpinnings. The socio-political history of Standing Rock reveals, however, that it is entirely constructed by the United States BIA as an Indian Agency, chronologically followed by reservation status, a tribal council, and finally a very limited autonomy resulting in claims to "nation" status.

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Therefore, the Standing Rock "Sioux" designation comes from either Lakota or Dakota cultural backgrounds along with claims to the respective "oyate" or nation status. Additionally, individuals from either group may or may not be enrolled, have strong connections with the tribal government, know their own language or be involved in traditional social and spiritual practices. "Full-bloods" may be on the tribal council or work in agency offices and be called "BIA Indians" just as "mixed-bloods" may embrace the renewed "religious" practices and know traditional life. These terms have become identity markers that do not necessarily reflect their true origins.

A wide diversity of identities was unleashed during interviews, such as a *pipe-carrier* following Lakota "traditional ways"; a *traditional* woman "relocated to (the city)" and cross-identified with urban and reservation people; a *full-blood* who was "strong because of (her) activism" noted by non-Indians; and an *urban Indian* with a need "to maintain connection" to her home community.

These statements reflect the perspectives that contemporary American Indians have:

1. "I'm a Sioux woman, Yanktonai, and it (the group) should be called the Sioux club. I've lived here for almost forty years, so this is my home, but I am from Standing Rock, and so is my daughter... We speak Dakota, and of course English... Some of these people don't even know where they are from, and so they're from nowhere..." (Earth-Powers, 1995)

2. "I am from (a particular Lakota) Sioux reservation - I don't like that word Sioux, but for means of identification I suppose it's OK...that's what I consider home, although I'm living out here, I guess I feel expatriated..." (Yonder, 1994)
Sioux is not a traditional word, for as the speaker says it was "imposed by the oppressors (BIA) as a tribal identification" label, even as the older speaker prefers the word as "nearly traditional", knowing its origins. The use of "home" demonstrates cultural linkage, as does "expatriated".

3. "I felt it was an insult to the wisdom of my ancestors that the knowledge passed on to me should be valued so lowly... When I began teaching, I was amazed how many (Indian people) didn't have any (knowledge of their) background as a people." (Defender, 1993)

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*Journal of World-Systems Research* 4. "When I first came to (the city) I thought 'Good I can relax here' because I had come from South Dakota where you can cut discrimination with a knife it's so thick. But that's not true. Here you find discrimination trying to get our needs met with city and state systems, because the Indian community doesn't have group strength." (Blue Weather, 1992)

5. "When you get cornered, boxed in, with nowhere to go, and your people are attacked... you resist... They take your land, your traditional ways, and then they want to start education their way, and all that is a continuation of their system. It's hard to be an Indian. They embargo your people, your ways, your nationhood. I had to expose this system that is used to destroy us, what is why I talked to the U.N., because we are a nation... They say "we acquired the land, we conquered this land, but we, the Sioux nation were never conquered. We will take our sovereignty..." (Grass-man, 1993)

Thus identity is a very transportable cultural baggage, whether as "Sioux" or "Lakota," indicating both resistance and acceptance as a Native American Indian. One traditional elder visiting the city talked about the importance of traditions, ending with:

6. "...when you know, you learn your language, your traditional ways... your whole outlook on life will change, your whole value system will change - you will be proud when someone calls you a traditional - you will become proud of your identity, and you will see the beauty of life,... and walk the good road." (Big-Horse, 1993)

The importance of an "Indian" identity as foundational to all else, as well as complex changes in Lakota identity itself, underscores lack of a single identity marker for Standing Rock "tribal members." In fact, tribal membership itself is contested.

7. "(The) colonial powers, coming in and re-naming us, ... naming us... (the)...military never gave the people, my grandmother, then chance to go back to their emergent, sacred places... (to re-new their identity)... People have been separated from their emergent places, and are not educated in their language." (Defender-Wilson, 1996)

Thus "traditional" are not always aligned closely with either "activists" or "tribal" governance. The re-naming process, along with amalgamated groups on Standing Rock, have resulted in great ambiguity of identity that can emanate or relate to a number of identity markers, including "Lakota Traditional Native American," "Dakota Tribal
Member Sioux Indigenous," "Hunkpapa Assimilated Indian Activist," or "Yanktonai Agency or BIA Tribe Separatist."

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On or near Standing Rock -- known as an Indian reservation, a "tribe" and now "Nation" -- any person of indigenous descent may or may not use any combination of the above identities. Both Dakota and Lakota people may work for the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the tribal council; they may have mixed "blood" with other "Sioux", other Indian tribes or nations, or non-Indians; they may see the Lakota Nation as politically desirable or want better relations under the states; they may have been or still are AIM separatists, or they may see their U.S. military veteran status supremely important; they may want to be identified as "Indian", "Sioux", "Lakota or Dakota", "Indigenous", "Native American", "Hunkpapa or Yanktonai" or just as an "American".

The Lakota and The Dakota -- "Tribe" and "Nation"

The Black Hills claim was reinserted in the judiciary system shortly after Wounded Knee, leading to a favorable 1980 Court of Claims decision in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians with a substantial Black Hills settlement.61 notably without land restitution, achieved with this testimony from Frank Fools Crow:62

We understand that over 80 percent of the Black Hills is still under the control of the United States. This must be immediately returned to the Lakota people and negotiations must begin for the remainder... Oglala Lakota have always been caretakers of the Black Hills and it is appropriate that I have been allowed to talk here today defending the sale of these hills for my people and other Lakota people. (Fools Crow and Kills Enemy, 1976)

Important symbolic victories of these struggles led to the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Act. SunDances among rural pockets of Lakota, as well as other Plains Indians people, were restored for community participation. Lakota spiritual leaders supported traditional values, bringing renewed respect to the sacred pipes and purification ceremonies. Ever so gradually, concepts of "oyate" moved from the spiritual to the socio-political realms.

However, whereas the Lakota, Dakota and the separate otonwé:¡, Hunkpapa or Sihasapa, have historical claims to oyate traditional identity, Standing Rock has no such cultural legitimacy.

Recently traditional teachers of the Dakota people from the Standing Rock (Indian) Reservation, reviewed a pre-publication titled "History and Culture of the Standing Rock Oyate" coordinated by the state office of Indian Education under the North Dakota Department of Public Instruction.
However, the term oyate is not appropriate to use with the Standing Rock (Indian Reservation) which is a U.S. government constructed socio-political entity combined of Dakota and Lakota people as an instrument of internal colonialism (Hall, 1989) (Snipp, 1986) (Hechter, 1975).

Both the anthropological literature (Green, 1995) and sociological (see Champagne, 1995) studies are quite clear on these points concerning political versus traditional forms of identity. Oyate, loosely translated to mean "the people" or generally glossed into a non-western "nation" constructed of a large grouping of related or closely allied people usually living in close proximity, requires traditional representations. Without such historical underpinnings, the term legitimates contemporary power and political structures that all originate from United States Indian Policy, and not from traditional forms of identity such as the term indicates. Moreover, the identified traditional groupings, each with a tentative claim to usage of the term "oyate" (see Walker, 1917), the Sicasapa and Hunkpapa (Lakota), along with the Yanktonai (Dakota), were literally forced into reservation boundaries that grew out of U.S. government Indian agencies whittled down by U.S. military forces acting out treaty infractions of the United States government in many forms. Therefore, using techniques from comparative / historical methods, both the "nation" and "tribe" terms are problematic, and oyate terminology is mis-applied.

As Vine Deloria Jr. demonstrates in "Red Earth, White Lies" (1995), the primary danger with applying such terms and their Euro-American paradigms, is that they perpetuate themselves. The state document commits such errors on multiple occasions, so instead of discussing opposing theories of both Dakota and Lakota origins, especially that of social science against traditionalists, the work reports that the Hunkpawana "moved onto the prairie" and "displaced these tribes" with "some bands adopted" (of) "horticultural techniques" that infer hunting and gathering.

Many social analysts and almost all traditionalists now refute the "migration" hypothesis, instead lending credence to economic incorporation of semi-periphery peoples in advance of an expanding world system driven by capitalist states (sociologists), and push-pull movement factors, with so-called horticultural and food preservation practices already well-established (Wolf, 1983), or its less accepted corollary of traditional notions (possibly creation myths) of an origin place, with geographic and environmental features describing formation of an oyate and its homelands, (Goodman, 1992) (Young Bear, 1995). In fact, recent gatherings and traditional conferences have recorded challenges to these Euro-American induced identity formations (Jaimes, 1992), such as the Lakota Summit Declaration in August of 1993 (also see Indian Country Today, Lakota Times for multiple entries since 1993).
Both contested identities of "tribe" versus "nation" have ethnographic identity problems. Tribal councils, originally set up and run by the BIA, now claim "national" political constructs, such as with the Standing Rock Nation. Ethno-methodology questions the source of legitimation and the "ethnic re-organization" (Snipp and Nagel, 1992) of a constructed form of identity.

**Socio-Political Legitimacy and Constructed Identity**

"Tiwa heyon ka-pi... There's Lesser Bear's Lodge, what you call Fort Ransom since 1868, pyramid hill.... an emergent place of the Northern Dakota... Greater Bear's Lodge, known as Devil's Lake... The Cheyenne, each people has their own place of emergence... Hawk's Nest... We say 'maka-pi wakan,' only the earth lasts forever... (Our) identity is the spirit... (But instead) you have somebody re-identify us... Indian time, it doesn't mean being late, it means there is no clear-cut past, present, future. Our traditions, (identity)... Even now, we use (other terms)... Hunkpapa, really comes from Humpatina, referring to Hunk-pa-paha, what we know as Devil's Tower..."(Defender-Wilson, 1996)

Cultural legitimation for traditional identity, such as is claimed for oyate or nation terms, would describe the above origins for Yanktonai Dakota and Hunkpapa Lakota on Standing Rock. Weber's sources of authority, similar to socio-cultural legitimation, include the "bureaucratic," such as the BIA, the "charismatic," such as Sitting Bull enjoyed with Lakota, and the "traditional" meaning an extension of traditions. Thus "nation" and "tribe" result from bureaucratic authority, considering the history of Standing Rock as an agency and an Indian reservation. Tribe however, can derive from traditional(s) worldviews, when it corresponds to one of the groups listed above. Tribal councils, without traditional authority, are therefore assimilated forms of governance, although Deloria and Lytle (1983) distinguish between those that replicate or replace traditional social structures from those that act as agency "puppet governments" for the United States. Deloria even finds that tribal councils can be the first real "nation" governance.

These tribal issues are reflected in studies of the "Flathead" Indians by O'Neill (1996), wherein enrollment by a mixed-blood tribal member whose siblings cannot or are not enrolled, becomes a primary means of identification in some circles, and yet is left out altogether in others. The same subjects appear to relate to being "really Indian" as traditional in language, life-ways, and spirituality, which they find impossible in "contemporary" reservation life. The cultural "test" for being traditional is based on historical notions and modern stereotypes of Indian identity.

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Similarly on Standing Rock, for those of both Dakota and Lakota background, identity forms are expressed interchangeably in all of the political, cultural, and social interaction spheres, partly depending on the interlocutors and their perceived level of "Indian-ness" on the reservation. The amalgamated constructed identities relating to being a "Standing
Rock Sioux" are founded within opposing socio-political identities based on whether legitimation comes from governmental entities, either U.S. or tribal, or cultural notions, either traditional or contemporary.

When "sovereignty" extends to government contrived Sioux Indian reservations, but is withheld from the "Sioux Nation of Indians" represented by the Teton-Lakota people, identity and its political constructs become internalized modes of divisive domination. Defender describes "tribes" that are calling themselves "nations" when they exist in tribal councils "controlled" by the government, with enrollment issues that lead people to say "I am Standing Rock Sioux," when that is "a super-imposed identity from the outside..."

Considering Clifford's observations (1988, pg.339) about the "long, relational struggle to maintain and recreate identities..." of the Mashpee Wampanoag over three and a half centuries, the Lakota who initiated the Bear Butte Councils and attempted formation of the Lakota Nation, may simply be placing more steps in a process to preserve and protect external awareness of the Lakota as a sovereign and independent people.

"They (the government) 'enrolls' us, to control us, which I compare to South Africa... many will say, 'Where's your ID card?' (their BIA enrollment card)... and I will not have one -- I will not have a number, or be registered by the government... 63

As Defender-Wilson (1996) states above, many contemporary "traditions" are fully aware that enrollment leads to effective bureaucratic control over cultural identity and sources of authority. Similarly, she observes that blood quantum as a test for tribal enrollment, including by councils, becomes passed on by indigenous people themselves in struggles for recognition.

Another thing everyone asks is 'How much Indian are you?'... I will not have my identity determined by such questions... I've always dislike the word 'tribe'... Now they say that the tribe is sovereign. I think that is (also) used as a form of control..."

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Traditional Culture and coerced Social Change

"Our elders speak of the first times that our people came in contact with the forces of the United States Government which they are presently known by. Our people were for the family. They did not destroy their language, their culture, or their people. They only told the intruders one thing -- try and live the ways, go back and leave us alone. That was not a very hard request, but they would not leave us alone. Yet today we are still repeating the same message." (Lewis Bad Wound, testimony at "Sioux Treaty Hearing" in 1974) 64

Forms of traditional identity have changed under coercion of U.S. Indian policy. Lawson, (1982:198), finds that "by altering their traditional environment, natural resources, social patterns, and means of livelihood, Pick-Sloan (dams on the Missouri) has made sure that
the Sioux tribes of the Missouri River have considerably less of their past to hang on to..." Standing Rock traditional people see that environmental destruction as directly connected to government domination

"My grandfather always said, when a cow gives birth to a calf, who is gonna take care of it? The mother has to take care. But we have lost that, they have taken our mothers... So how do we keep our society?... I do not recognize the IRA (1934) government, it is an act of Congress -- it is a violation of our treaty, our way of life. That has to be recognized!... Sovereignty, according to U.S. law, is accorded by the Congress... But that is not how I understand it. We have always had sovereignty. It is not a 'given sovereignty'."
(Grassman, 1993)

The long-awaited assimilation, introduced and directed by institutional arms of the U.S., never occurred in terms of cultural identity. Ever since the armed struggles and AIM presence, resistance to modernizing forces off the reservation actually increased, as did involvement with traditional cultural practices that were associated with it.

(After 1973)... I saw lots of signs of a growing positive identity among our young people. I saw lots of young boys and young men growing their hair long again and identifying themselves as Indian. Even women started wearing their hair long again and were now fasting and SunDancing. They had many of those AIM leaders and those who took a stand with them to look up to as models. It was a time of real positive identity. (Young Bear, 1994:157)

One elder, speaking at the end of SunDance ceremonies in 1994, first spoke of his home, and its relationship to the *oceti sakowin* (seven councilfires) and his relatives. Then he identified the Lakota origin place and the people as "oyate," before identifying his cultural authority and the nature of Lakota ceremonial and spiritual life. He demonstrated an indigenous giving of "witness" through oral history and tradition as truth, by presenting a pipe in a sacred manner, to the Dakota and Lakota people assembled in June of 1994, in recognition of the 1993 M'deWakantowan SunDance held after 150 years of repression.

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(Given by Chief Dave, Lakota spiritual leader... paraphrased into English)65

"Mitakuye Pi, My name is (Lakota traditional), my father's and my mother's people were (local tiyospaye), My grandfathers were and always have been of the Mnicnonjou people, of Lakota speakers and the seven council fires of the "oceti sakowin" including my good relatives here, the M'dw wakantowan Dakota people."

This "Elder's Statement to the SunDancers at Prairie Island'66 perfectly represents all identity constructions and applications of what is known as a Lakota "traditional" -- historical references carrying as much weight as his own name and home. The much -
malignaded and often stereotypical ties to the land, and United States attempts to break
those ties, makes up his group identity.

"We Lakota, and our relatives here the Dakota, originated from sacred places on earth,
according to our sacred traditional knowledge. The Pte Oyate, we as the buffalo people,
came out from the earth near the place where the holy winds blow out, very close to the
Paha Sapa, the Black Hills, always known to us as the sacred "He Sapa". We know these
things as the Wasicu know their origin place, and so it is..."

Even more powerful for applications of world systems analysis, is the careful oral
recounting of the conquest, injustices, and suppression of the Lakota Oyate and the
Dakota as an allied nation, translated in a brief account in the endnote 67. This elderly
Lakota spiritual leader, a real "chief," represents the linkage between identity, resistance,
and domination.

The Many Faces of Native Identity on Standing Rock - "Elders"

1. "There are seven campfires, and I am from the Teton, the Hunkpapa, living on the
South Dakota side of Standing Rock... I know my language, my ways, and I get visions...
We are losing ground, our land, our reservation... I wonder about so many laws on
immigrants -- yet we are the forgotten people..." "If you back up a horse, or even a cow,
up against a corner, it will fight back -- it will kick you. That is how it is with indigenous
people, the Hunkpapa... (we) went in 1973 with our 97 Indian nations..." (Renfrew Big
Horse, Lakota, October, 1993) 68

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Diffusion of spiritual practices is tightly wound up in critical identity issues, which
virtually every traditional Lakota leader begins with by identifying their relatives.
Assimilation is the enemy in this stratagem of survival, and appropriation of surface level
Lakota religious practices, stereotypically and romantically reproduced, is a grave threat.
Lakota leaders confront these historical treaties, religion, and indigenous Lakota law.

2. "They are breaking those treaties, by denying us our religion, our own laws, our
relationships to the land... My grandfather went to their government, and signed their
treaties, to protect our rights... We were free, a free people before those treaties..."
(Grass-man interview) "...We fought to protect (our freedom)... The constitution to us, is
a cutoff point for Native Americans... The seventh generation is here today, as we,
grandfathers, look upon those, who are educated..." (Walking interview, 1993)

Grass-man, Big Horse and Walking, do not deny benefits of formal education, as they
note when discussing the issues with my degrees. But they see benefit only in terms of bi-
culturation, not assimilation. Moreover, they view the American constitution and bill of
rights as a point of oppression, not freedom as Lakota define it. They poignantly refer to
the "seventh generation", stated by Red Cloud and other Native leaders - as the future of
Lakota children inheriting these traditions. The trails of resistance extend from
monetarily poor but spiritually rich reservations, into American cities with dislocated
Indians, the federal government, and the United Nations.

3. "We are more and more identifying and living out our lives within the colonial society.
Like those who lived (like the agents), and stressing democracy and distribution equally,
"when those 638 contracts (for land) were issued, only certain families received them,
and you know this is true, (that) they were (all) relatives of the council members."
Gradually, we begin to think just about our-selves, and not the people." (Defender, March
7, 1995)

Social change working to dismantle dominating systems is on many levels, - individual,
community, national. One activist notes that "community organizing is a way issues are
brought to the table of city, state and federal government," but betrays her bias that Indian
people have "an almost passive approach to problems, that has its basis in culture." She
sees modern society as different from "traditional ways" and that Indian people who grow
up without "reference to ...the world-views of the reservation ...adapt the dominant
culture's values as their own."

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The identities and resolutions demonstrate these conflicting orientations of love and hate,
resistance and assimilation, incorporation and separation, found in differing responses to
questions about attempts to change the Indian community:69 These responses also reflect
the differing perspectives from those who continue to live on the reservation, and those
whose fortunes have taken them to off-reservation, usually urban areas.

4. "I am sorry I ever served in (the military of) this country, the way they are treating
Indian people..." (Grass-man, 1993)

5. "This Indian wants to keep the 'fighting Sioux' name of the football team I played on
for the University of North Dakota, as a veteran, and thinks somebody that wants to
change that should have to convince the alumni first!" (V. Feton, 1994)

Sovereignty and ethnic identify, in terms of serving one's country and people, are
expressed by these World War II veterans. The first speaker, a full-blood living on a
reservation, tempers his previously proud service in terms of his more recent experience
of discrimination. The second speaker, a mixed-blood living in an urban area, identifies
with his military record, college graduation, and business success. Traditionalists
demonstrate sophisticated awareness of these lived divisions of structural oppression.

6. "Some of the treaties are still being broken, abrogated... As traditional people, we
honor all persons, even those who have furred tongues. That has to stop... We must band
together... (must work together)." (Renfrew Big Horse, Lakota, October, 1993)
7. "the system is not right, is corrupt. The B.I.A., the states, our own I.R.A. councils... The state people are so racist toward Indian people, we are the Mississippi of the North... ...We did not grow up with drugs, with gangs, we had our own good value system..., I am against these casinos. They destroy our ways of life." (traditional Dakota elder)

Casinos and economic development are providing intensive social change (Fenelon, 1997) throughout the communities on Standing Rock. It is a process that is welcomed for its income, and considered suspiciously by most of the traditional elders who have observed loss of many traditions and cultural practices over their lifetime. This paper has relied on those traditional, and elders, as the primary informants on the changing indigenous identities on Standing Rock.

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While it is beyond the purview of this research to consider the myriad short-term effects likely to result from the impact of money, jobs and of greater off-reservation non-Indian traffic, based on the one-hundred fifty years of domination wherein traditional Lakota life has survived, the loss of "Indian" identity seems unlikely. Instead, each succeeding generation will contribute more changes to the complex identities of modern life with traditional culture on Standing Rock. Incorporating the voices of those currently involved with "tribal" leadership, whether political, cultural, economic or spiritual, will further inform the social change processes taking place over the turn of the century. 70
6. Conclusions

The short and long-term effects of Incorporation, Colonialism, Resistance, and Cultural Survival on Indigenous Identities on Standing Rock have been discussed throughout this analytical paper. Essentially, I find and make a distinction between "nationalist" and "cultural" Lakota identities, and further observe these between the reservation-based and "urban" environments of the 20th century. I then focus on differing forms and causes of the "national origin" Lakota identities, within theoretical models provided by world systems analysis and internal colonialism.

I have found that conflicts are occurring in all realms of reservation society and in all social sectors, especially those that have been developed, operated, and influenced by the government. Thus federal and reservation-specific Indian Policy has had direct and strong effects on formation and practice of culture for the Lakota and Dakota people on Standing Rock, as measured through identity constructions related to nationalist discourse. Native national origins include: Lakota, Dakota, Hunkpapa, Yanktonai, and related "Sioux" Indians. Socio-political terms include: Traditional, Tribal Member,
Assimilated, BIA Agents, and related functions of Tribal Councils. Contested cultural labels include: Native, Sioux, Indian, Tribe and most of the above. Political orientations include: American, Indigenous, Activist, Separatist, and sometimes blood quantum, such as "full-blood" or "mixed-blood."

These differences might be made complementary in a movement to redress the grievances of indigenous peoples, such as with the Lakota on Standing Rock, only when there is greater agreement as to the definition and meanings of these labels and identities. Additionally, collective actions with a focus on either Standing Rock reservation as like-a-nation or tribe, or on a Lakota and Dakota Oyate approach, are the only likely avenues of political redress with positive results. Whether these are possible movement activities, mostly depends on how socio-political identities are worked out in the coming years. To that analysis we now turn.

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Conclusions on Identity and Social Change

Multiple types and sources of indigenous identity exist among the native American Indian people associated with Standing Rock reservation "nation". All of these are influenced by the historical relationships between the Lakota and the United States policies of cultural domination. Most indigenous identity forms are "constructed" from various socio-political sources, first intentionally by the U.S. Indian policy, and then through the resistance of the Lakota people.

In fact, Standing Rock as a "Sioux Indian Reservation" and more recently as a "Nation" are both direct evidence of these constructions of socio-political identity. Additionally, many "traditionals" and the recent AIM "activists" make cultural and political claims to "Lakota Oyate" from which they derive strength to resist ongoing socio-political and cultural domination. Thus, embattled identities actually perpetuate indigenous resistance to assimilation.

The four major temporal periods are related to current constructions of Lakota identities, in: "Očeti Sākowin" alliances of "traditional" resistance; "Sioux Nations" treaties leading to Progressives as "friendly" resistance as "hostile" as traditional Lakota culture is repressed; "Sioux Indian" reservations with assimilation policies "councils," while the traditionalists resist; and Lakota "Nation" or "Tribe" assimilated progressives work in modern institutions, while "Traditionals" live Lakota culture, with Activists and Bi-Cultural modern Lakota.

I find four overlapping, external identities in existing typologies: "progressive" (friendly), "resistance" (resist change), "assimilated" (adapted) and "traditional" defined by responses to external forces of domination, incorporation, elimination and repression by U.S. expansion.
Indigenous identities on Standing Rock have undergone enforced and responsive social change processes resulting in complex, interwoven forms of Indian identity. Differing levels of "assimilation" and "political participation" or conversely "traditional life" and "spirituality" only partially explain the long chain of conflicting claims, events, policies and resistance processes. Movement from being "Lakota" as membership in a "tiyospaye" and ultimately an "oyate" extending through the "Sioux Nation of Indians" and "tribal" membership as a "Sioux Indian" returning full circle to claims of "Lakota" and "Dakota" membership of "Standing Rock Nation" with the penultimate claims to being an "oyate" -- all demonstrate these complex processes better, when combined with the effects of internal colonialism, cultural genocide, and the systemic repression of the 20th century.

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Each of the four major politically influenced movements -- from *Oyate* in *Oceti Sakowin*; to Sioux Nation (Lakota); to separated Sioux Reservations (Standing Rock); to the autonomous Standing Rock as Nation; -- caused divisive and integrative changes in individual identity forms. Along with levels of assimilation, maintenance of traditional lifeways, and resistance spirituality, the cultural and socio-political identity of the Lakota on Standing Rock has become a fragmented, multi-dimensional mosaic that harkens to the past as much to the future.

Thus I can state, based on the above findings and observations, that identity constructions related to historical policies and conflicts, will not recede in importance. Instead, they will change reflexively depending on three major issues: contemporary U.S. political and economic treatment, collective interests and actions of the Native people on Standing Rock, and the broader American society's ideologies of Native Nations and American Indians. Each of these are identity issues -- political policies, collective action, dominant-subordinate relations -- that represent racial-ethnic, inequality, and social movement perspectives indicative of the growing diversity in the American society in which indigenous people must live and interact.

Traditional and modern Lakota and Dakota "Sioux Indians" from Standing Rock continue to use one phrase which represents this cultural mosaic, -- "o-Mitakuye Oyasin"-- which means "we are all related" -- demonstrating the respect for all of one's relations that make up identity.

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1. I am particularly sensitive to this having just returned from presenting "The Cultural Domination of the Lakota Oyate" at the National Indian Education Association in Rapid City to a largely Lakota/Dakota audience (October, 1996).


3. This discussion is incredibly complex and methodologically controversial in anthropology, versus an oral tradition perspective. Lakota traditions have an "origin place" in the Black Hills, suggesting ancient knowledge if not direct experience in western South Dakota (Goodman, 1992). Moreover, the buffalo play a heavy part in all Lakota culture, with "Pte Oyate" as a central thematic creation story (Defender, 1989). Cultural evidence suggests familiarity with western Dakotas.

4. I can place some Lakota groups in the western Dakotas, including the Black Hills, in the sixteenth century, and earlier. As noted, "documented" histories can be shown to be false, including Ulley's supposition that the "Lakota culture was hardly a generation old at the time of Sitting Bull's birth" (1993:4), attributed to western migration and development of the horse. Another note are the early explorers such as Verendrye (Thornton, 1986) and trader-"explorers", maintaining economic relations and fur trade long before hypothesized dates of academia. Lewis and Clark are given explicit instructions as to the "immense power" of the Lakota Sioux along the Missouri by no less than the President of the United States. Finally, while northern Dakota were pushed from the north by the Chippewa (Ojibwa) and Cree, there does not have to be a causative migration by the Lakota.

5. In fact, the most informed traditional elders hold that Lakota and Dakota refer to people groups, and thus are Oyate, while the dialects are Santee Dakota *I-Santee*, Yankton(ai) Dakota *Wichyena*, and the Lakota *Titonwan*. While these may roughly conform to the L and D dialects, distinctions between the cultural relationships as "people groups" are very important.

7. "...natives were to understand that they possessed a choice of peace or war as a result of the history of God's creation of the world and patronage of the Catholic Church."
(Berkhofer, 1979:123)

8. (Luther Standing Bear, Lakota-Sioux) The quote is taken from Standing Bear (1933), Land of the Spotted Eagle, as reported by Bruce Johansen (1982:xi) in Founding Fathers.

9. Historical (Robinson, 1904) and anthropological (DeMallie, 1971) sources.


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11. The Ocit Sakowin constituted the Lakota Oyate as one of seven greater council fires, shared with the Wo-Dakota Oyate, and the Nakota. United States economic and political interests caused some differential treatment by 1804.

12. Two separate nations existed for the U.S. government negotiators by 1851, ironically both the Dakota and Lakota treaties were signed with the "Sioux Nation of Indians". After the destruction and diaspora of the Dakota from the 1862 conflicts in Minnesota, the U.S. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 with the "Sioux Nation of Indians" meant only the Lakota.

13. Dakota before, constituted geo-political..... Lakota as forested fringe, before horse 1804 "SIoux" - (Lakota / Dakota Alliances) 1851 "SIOUX NATION OF INDIANS" 1868 "SIoux NATION OF INDIANS" - Fort Laramie Treaty 1890 SIOUX AGENCIES - (reservations) 1934 "STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE" - (reservations as tribes) 1990 STANDING ROCK "NATION" - (Standing Rock Sioux Reservation)

14. By 1889, with U.S. instigated conflicts in 1876 and land-takings throughout the 1880's, the Indian agencies became separate reservations, replacing the Great Sioux Reservation. These were treated politically separate in the 1934 IRA re-organization that denoted each reservation as a tribe (Standing Rock Sioux had Sihasapa and Hunkpapa Lakota, and Yanktonai Dakota).

15. Tilly (1975) discusses these machinations of war in Western society in terms that transfer exceptionally well for explaining the conquest of the North American continent.

16. "The Indian civilizations crumbled in the face of the Old World not because of any intellectual or cultural inferiority. They simply succumbed (to) face brute strength. (Weatherford, 1991:252)
17. The rights of Native Americans as well as their land and resources continue to be eroded. If scholars are to be of service in this area of research, they urgently need to confront the realities of more recent Indian affairs and to place these important events in historical perspective. (Lawson, 1982:199).


19. Most scholars agree, as do most Lakota researchers, that the term originates from a French-Cree mangling of the word "Nadewasue" which apparently was used by the Ojibwa-Chippewa, traditional enemies of the Dakota, and meant "snake-like" or cutthroat "enemies".

20. Powers (1975) effectively groups the three categories as: Political, Dialectical, Geographic.

21. "The history of the Santee Sioux is the history of the American Indian, mutually profitable early contacts with Europeans were followed by a massive onslaught on the native culture... Then came forced land cessions, removal to a reservation, smoldering resentment that erupted in a bloody but abortive protest, vindictive punishment, and a long, dismal period of attempted acculturation, ending in poverty and demoralization." (Roy W. Meyers, 1980:371 (1967), The Santee Sioux, United States Indian Policy on Trial.)

22. These are contested both as socio-cultural and or political groupings, with some researchers and ethnohistorians stating that the construction is from the various Sioux peoples themselves, and without proof must remain myth, although they do say that since the Sioux do not differentiate across time, it doesn't matter anyway. Besides an obvious problem that calling it "myth" simply because they cannot document it, I say it doesn’t matter.

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23. (16 Stat. 566, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976) No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March third, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.

24. Temporal and spatial contexts varying in any analysis, especially those involving incoming societies (Wolf, 1982) with implications of "World Systems" domination (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1980) call for clear delineation of analytical frames, in this case study extending from Oceti Sakowin to Lakota Oyate to the six Sioux Reservations.

25. The man who sat on the ground in his tipi meditating on life and its meaning, accepting the kinship of all creatures and acknowledging unity with the universe of things
was infusing into his being the true essence of civilization... In the Indian the spirit of the land is still vested, it will be until other men are able to divine and meet its rhythm. (Luther Standing Bear, *Lakota*)

26. "Thus the Indian is reconstructed, as the natural rocks are ground to powder and made into artificial blocks which may be built into the walls of modern society." (Ohiyesa, Charles Eastman, *Dakota*)

27. In developing a meaningful discussion of the conquering American social systems and the dominated Lakota-Sioux society over time and space, we have to engage the mythical and real dimensions of something referred to as the "frontier" of American development, inevitably that of Euro-Americans in a large state structure building an empire over smaller Indian nations.

28. The "myth" of the Frontier, built on the above set of conquests, was as much one made of these ideological confrontations as any cross-culturally conceived conflicts, sustained by developing fear and hatred among the soon-to-be dominant group of Anglo-American "colonists" in New England, and similarly in the dominant Euro-American "pioneers" in developing the western portions of North America.

29. The language employed by the Puritan pilgrims in this domination over Native Nations, is perfectly synonomous with its natural corollary and ideological outgrowth - local militia driven by singular interpretations of Manifest Destiny ideologies that prey upon, pray to and thank God for their actions as pre-ordained, including the killing and destruction of Native peoples en masse (Puritan language see Jennings, 1975; Olson and Wilson, 1984; and Takaki, 1994).

30. Culturicide requires elaborate ideologies that not only place one cultural or social group in a superordinate position and other(s) (mostly "racial" minorities) in various subordinate positions, but that also drive the continuing creation of cults, para-military groups, and similar over-intensified aberrations that view any other set of ideologies, even those originally creating their own, as suspect and potentially a threat.

31. Hidatsa-Mandan-Arikara leaders have told me about an armed standoff where two of these para-military hate groups (Aryan Nation and Posse Comitatus) had threatened an Indian boy and then come into the face-off with Indian men in the northeast sector of the Three Affiliated Tribes Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota. When the state police and federal marshals arrived, they did not know which group to square off with, and for once were caught in the middle.

32. In reviewing Lakota sociopolitical organization from the nineteenth century, Biolsi (1992:35) finds it "is best seen as seasonally and opportunistically variable along a continuum running from small units with little formal political structure to large units with more formal organization. Neither corporate groups nor fixed boundaries were characteristic of Lakota political organization, and units of all sizes were fluid."
33. Perhaps the only Indian policy goal that Pick-Sloan helped advance was that of acculturation. For over a century the federal government has implemented policies designed to integrate Indians into the mainstream of Anglo-American culture. (Lawson, 1982:198).

34. The simple truth is that no matter what form a federal public works project takes, the odds are heavily stacked against Indians from the beginning. (Lawson, 1982:199).

35. Without addressing the history marked indelibly in the land, a history neither to be refuted nor "interpreted" thru ideological sophistry, no theory can be anchored. Since an unanchored theory must inevitably result in misunderstanding, it is the history of the land... (Laduke, Winona. 1983.)

36. ...I'm more concerned with American Indian people, students and others, who've begun to be absorbed into the white world through universities and other institutions. ...It's very possible to grow into a red face with a white mind... This is part of the process of cultural genocide being waged by Europeans against American Indian peoples today. My concern is with those American Indians who choose to resist this genocide, but who may be confused as to how to proceed. (pg.1) Means, Russell. 1983.


38. 1972 Indian Education Act (Title IV of the Education Amendments of 1972, PL 92-318)


40. 1975 Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (PL 93-638)

41. 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act (PL 95-608)


43. 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Act (PL 95-195)

44. Repatriation Struggles were initiated in tandem with other related issues for Native Nations, just as Traditional societies were being revitalized in many Sioux - Lakota communities. At about the same time, the Oahe takings claim was revisited by Standing Rock Sioux. In 1987 the Black Hills claim was debated on the Sioux reservations, with many sides including the councils backing the Bradley bill, and others including some
elder traditionalists (the Grey Eagles) supporting the newly rediscovered part-Indian capitalist Stevens initiative.


46. This testimony, taken from Henry Swift Horse at his home outside Cannonball on the North Dakota side of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian reservation in November, 1987, along with the testimony from Reginald Bird Horse and Vernon Iron Cloud, both from the Grand River area, South Dakota side of the Standing Rock reservation, was reported in a short booklet "The Taken Land" submitted to the Senate Select committee on Indian Affairs (1987).

47. The particular photographs I am referring to were taken on Standing Rock by D.F. Barry and another set by Frank Fiske in the first two decades of the 20th century. Another pictures are less incontrovertible, such as one marked "Taking wagons to the SunDance outside of Cannonball".

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48. Understanding the nature of the cultural repression, domination and Culturicideal elimination against Lakota traditionalists by the 20th century U.S. policies and practices, informs the struggle for resistance to these pressures, and understanding of freedom and "cultural rights" in a world of highly codified "civil rights" that had banned religious and socio-cultural "rights" guaranteed in the constitution of the dominant society.

49. In many ways, this kind of ideological warfare being conducted by the FBI as policy, for instance in arresting Severt Young Bear for traditional drum singing, what the government considered "aiding and abetting" the resistance by AIM and Indian Nations activists, makes better evidence and even proof of system-wide conspiratorial repression of Lakota traditionalists, than the ably and well-documented socio-political war conducted by the "agents of repression" as described by Churchill and Vander Wall (1990).

50. Severt Young Bear remembers: "...one day I went to Calico again. They were getting after everybody. It was mostly women and they were really mad. They told all the elderly men, medicine men, chiefs, and treaty people, "If you're not men enough to change things, take those pants off; we'll wear them if you can't stand up for us." (1994:149)

51. Severt Young Bear describes the conditions and predictions from that meeting and reality: "I was the youngest to be a spokesman or negotiator. There were six elderly men, three of them medicine men and three chiefs, who were appointed, all of them treaty people. I was the seventh... It was the first time in U.S. history, I believe, that the 82nd Airborne was assigned somewhere in civilian clothes. They must be part of the Seventh
Cavalry... The people who believed in treaties or lived the traditional way of life supported Wounded Knee II...

52. Without historic analysis of Culturicide in policy and practice, analysts have a difficult if not impossible time in explaining the internecine violence which the United States used as its primary excuse to respond in military force to the "occupation" (or "siege") of Wounded Knee in 1973.

53. The federal marshals, unmarked military personnel in uniform, South Dakota militia, Pine Ridge GOON squads, the FBI, and a host of other state, federal, and governmental para-military forces besieged the Lakota/ AIM occupant of the hamlet of Wounded Knee, for nearly three months, including air cover fire and mechanized heavy guns, amazingly leading to only one death. Not only is this position in clear alignment with its previous one hundred years of policy since the 1868 treaty, but the earlier division into separate agencies and sole recognition of individual councils, rather than the "Sioux Nation" or the "Lakota Oyate" as a collective group, is demonstrated in the conflict and its resolution.

54. Although the condemnation of the United States may be well into existing paradigms of military conquest and early genocidal policies, some of the language stresses credulity in assuming an undocumented (even by oral tradition) "Independent Oglala Nation"; and similarly identifies "genocidal practices against the sovereign Native Nations" as recently including the illustration of "Wounded Knee 1973" without either policy or practice targeting and resulting in multiple or mass death. A better typification would be to identify the policy in the U.S. "refusal to sign the United Nations 1948 Treaty on Genocide".


56. Alex Chasing Hawk (Ortiz, 1977:134) states that: "I understand that during and after the signing of the 1868 Treaty the Sioux people have honored their promises that were made in the Treaty but that the United States government many times violated their own promises and have even made war against the Sioux Nation."

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57. "Pipe-carrier" refers to having the responsibilities, and the rights, to perform the sacred pipe ceremony and to live one's life for "the people" in an honorable and truthful way. These responses are indicative of why group membership is helpful to the individual, and necessary for analysis.

58. "Full-blood" refers to a complicated and legally important ethnic differentiation for American Indians - blood quantum, tribal (BIA) enrollment, and cultural identification. "Activism" is further reference to socio-political struggle that supporting American Indian issues entails.
59. This represents the typical ambiguity for "home-grown" urban Indians - as "pan-Indianism". For some urban Indians the connection to an originating home community is tenuous or non-existent, strengthening self-identification to the urban Indian ethnicity (Baldwin, 1992).

60. We can observe in these initial cross-section responses the tensions of identifying with a home mono-cultural community (reservation, Indian nation, etc.), and experiencing daily identification as an "Indian" in general among other "Indians" in an urban setting.

61. In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), the United States Supreme Court found the mammoth land-takings of the 1877 legislation, including the Black Hills, to be unconstitutional and therefore vacated under the Fifth Amendment.

62. Frank Fools Crow and Matthew Kills Enemy, of the Lakota Treaty Council, provided this testimony to the House Interior Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, September 10, 1976, as reported in (Fools Crow and Kills Enemy) O'Brien, 1989.

63. (The program they set up at the state hospital in Jamestown, made): "Qualifications for "Healers": ...like a profession, a Healer has to know a vocabulary (they qualify in four areas).

64. This testimony was collected and translated from the Lakota present by Severt Young Bear as reported, edited and written by; Ortiz, Roxanne Dunbar. 1977. The Great Sioux Nation, Sitting in Judgement on America. Moon Books, at Bookcrafters in Michigan. (pgs.183-184)

65. (...paraphrased into English to communicate the essence, not the exact words, of an eloquent speech given by this elder spiritual leader on his way to Washington D.C...)

66. Given to the Dakota and Lakota people assembled after the Wi-Wan-yang Wacipi ceremonies conducted for the second year, re instituted for the M'deWakantowan Santee Sioux (Dakota) now residing on the Prairie Island Sioux reservation in Minnesota, in late June of 1994, partly in recognition of the 1993 SunDance held after one-hundred fifty years of repression.

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67. Mitakuye, My name is (Lakota traditional), my father's and my mother's people were (local tiyospaye). My grandfathers were always have been of the M'niconjou people, of Lakota speakers and the seven council fires of the "oceti sakowin" including my good relatives here, the M'dw wakantowan Dakota people. ...We Lakota, and our relatives here the Dakota, originated from sacred places on earth, according to our sacred traditional knowledge. The Pte Oyate, we as the buffalo people, came out from the earth near the place where the holy winds blow out, very close to the Paha Sapa, the Black
Hills, always known to us as the sacred "He Sapa". We know these things as the Wasicu know their origin place, and so it is. ....Another sacred place has been given to us to administer, the place now called Pipestone. Many hundreds of years before this time, the White Buffalo Calf Woman came to us and instructed the people, the oyate, on the sacredness of the pipe, and its importance in walking the good path in life. That is why we have gathered here today. ....My elder grandfathers, and their grandfathers before them, have listened and watched over our lifetimes, and told our observations to select young people, the future Lakota historians. We know these things, and have in this way seen them with our own eyes. I witnessed the coming of the wasicu unto our great plains, and how they killed the great numbers of buffalo, the birds with wings and the other four-leggeds. I witnessed their negotiations, and their leaders, each telling us he alone spoke for their people. ....My own grandfathers' relatives told us how the wasicu government hung your Dakota warriors nearby at Mankato, and sent our Dakota relatives, your people, into exile. I watched as their generals put pen to paper on the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, surrendering their attack on the Black Hills or any of our lands west of the Missouri, and promising us peace, until their generals came, and my grandfathers wiped them out when they attacked us at the Greasy Grass, and again and again over that long winter. ....I am witness to how they have broken that treaty, and their words over the sacred pipe, for the years that followed, until they brought armies back to our lands and killed our visionary spiritual leader, Sitting Bull. I witnessed soldiers hunting down our people, and marching them to the Wounded Knee creek, where they killed us, revenge for having defended our people. I felt the pain of the people not having our SunDances, having ceremony in secret, and keeping the sacred tradition of the pipe alive.

Mitakuye, tonight we prepare to go to Washington, to President of the United States. We present a sacred pipe and ask him to think about these things, and do justice for our people, and return the sacred Black Hills to the Lakota, who will care for them and respect them as we have been taught to care for life on this earth...Mitakuye Oyasin.

68. "The Lakota Sovereignty Organizing Committee held meetings at Bear Butte on July 14, 1991, at which was present approximately 200 plus respected elders, women, children, spiritual leaders, keeper of the pipe, (and on...)" resulting in declaration of: LAKOTA - a Sovereign Nation re-established at Bear Butte in July of 1991. THE COUNTRY OF LAKOTA AND A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT...

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69. Four interviewees responded in terms of urban Indian populations: PD - "...urban Indians looking for something... because they are different than the traditional... FY - "Grass roots organizing, people who have returned, have taken a spiritual path. JB - "Groups are living in deep denial here by not looking at their own issues..." YM -"(But) Indian people resist change, and taking a risk...Tribal affiliations, even weak...affect leadership.
70. Mythos of American development covered up the Aztec, (Russell, 1994), Incan and Mayan (Wright, 1992) civilizations, and the unifying nations of the Iroquois (Snow, 1995), much less the looser confederacies of the Sioux. Theories of social hierarchy and evolution, building on earlier continental conquest justification, described Native cultural systems as if stratified on the levels of European civilization. Smelser examines social theorists with three framework examples: Freud (1953) with "totemic systems and symbols in primitive religions" as dread of incest; Durkheim (1951) with "symbolic reflections on the social structures of the primitive societies", and Malinowski (1971) as "collective myths of social significance...to codify cultural beliefs and social behavior." Smelser (1992:19). We find that assumptions about social organization and control in societies, develops and drives theoretical observations and language about domination processes.

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No Global War? A Role for Democratic Global Federalism

by

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INTRODUCTION

Between 1943 and 1946 E.B. White wrote a series of editorials in The New Yorker magazine supporting democratic federal world government. In his editorial of June 1, 1946, he wrote:

World government is an appalling prospect. . . . Certainly the world is not ready for government on a planetary scale. In our opinion, it will never be ready. The test is whether the people will chance it anyway -- like children who hear the familiar cry, 'Coming whether ready or not!' At a Federalist convention the other day, Dean Katz of the University of Chicago said, 'Constitutions have never awaited the achievement of trust and a matured sense of community; they have been born of conflicts between groups which have found a basis for union in spite of deep suspicions and distrusts.' The only condition more appalling, less practical, than world government is the lack of it in this atomic age. (185-86)

In fact, the issue is not whether we shall be governed globally, but rather by whom and on what basis. The international realm is not one of anarchy as the realists would have us believe, but rather one of order: of rules, procedures and accepted norms of behavior associated in part with what are termed "international regimes" (Krasner 1983), each dedicated in principle to a separate functional domain. Global governance is not something that is to be created, but rather something to be altered in the public interest. The governance of the globe is currently configured by a shifting set of ill-coordinated actors: among them the one remaining super-power and, to a lesser extent, other strong states, as well as powerful individuals and a number of large transnational corporations
and financial institutions. Whereas Le Monde Diplomatique (1995) speaks of les nouveaux maîtres du monde, Robert Cox has summed up our current system of global governance with the phrase nébuleuse: "There is, in effect, no explicit political or authority structure for the global economy. There is, nevertheless, something there that remains to be deciphered, something that could be described by the French word nébuleuse or by the notion of 'governance without government.'" (1992/1996: 311) [1]

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Our current system of global governance is one of rule by the few. While an increasing number of the world’s countries are procedural or even substantive democracies, global governance is far from democratic. Moreover, those international institutions where diverse voices are heard are precisely those with not only the least power to act on matters of substance, but with the most precarious financing. Imagine what the circumstances of national federal governments would be today if they had to rely for funds on a combination of voluntary assessments and proceeds from the sale of greeting cards. Without both cooperation and funding by the US, actions approved in the UN General Assembly are essentially dead letters. The mid-1970s General Assembly resolutions creating a New International Economic Order (Resolutions 3201 and 3202, 6th Special Session, May 1, 1974), and that proclaiming the Economic Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3281, 29th Session, December 12, 1974) were doomed by the de facto veto of the US before they were even approved. In the International Monetary Fund the US has had a de jure veto on matters requiring a special majority (of first 80% and later 85%) of the weighted votes since the Fund was created at Bretton Woods in 1944 based largely on the American drafted proposal. Delays by the US in approving subsequent increases in country quotas (the source of the Fund’s own resources) have been a key element in the conversion over the years of the IMF from a credit union to a powerful global financial watchdog. (Kenen 1989)

Like it or not, we have a global culture, one which the governing few have had a major hand in shaping. If we consider a culture to be characterized as a network of conversations, then it follows that cultures change with alterations in the content of the conversations. (Maturana 1995: 132) Conversations, and hence cultures, have changed throughout the world both by chance and by systematic orchestration by powerful private interests. (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Marchak 1991; Saul 1995)

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As the evolving global culture is one that presently celebrates individual rights without responsibilities, we have witnessed over the past two decades substantial increases in
inequality of wealth and income. Comparative international data on income disparities are at best fragmentary and of recent vintage, but one estimate of the ratio of the income of the richest 20% to that of the poorest 20% of the world's population, based on a ranking by national average income, suggests a gap which widened from 30/1 in 1960 to 59/1 in 1989. (United Nations Development Programme 1992: 34-36 & 96-103) An account in a joint IMF-World Bank journal even counsels us to forget income convergence between countries and even regionally within developing countries, unless there are "serious changes in economic policies" in those countries. (Pritchett 1996: 43) The Human Development Report 1996 identifies a number of types of prominent growth patterns, among them jobless growth, voiceless growth, rootless growth, futureless growth and ruthless growth. Associated with "ruthless growth" was an absolute decline of the per capita income of one billion people over the period 1980-93 (UNDP 1996: 2) A recent evaluation for the United States showed that between 1976 and 1989 the share of the nation's net wealth held by the richest 1% of the country's households had increased from 21% to 36%, reversing a prior decade-long decline. (Wolff 1995: 67) Past gains in income, job security and access to social services, often achieved by way of concerted political action, have been weakened, if not actually swept aside.

NATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS TO GLOBALISM

Robert Gilpin has characterized our current predicament as being the dilemma of the limits of national welfare capitalism in a non-welfare international capitalist world. (1987: 60-64) We live in an integrated world economy with few effective control mechanisms to provide offsets to the varied national impacts of global economic activities. Indeed, governments, acting in response to external constraints, pursue strategies that reinforce some of the adverse national consequences. André Drainville has elaborated on this in his description of global accumulation being validated politically by state-bound democracies and on their ability to strike social compromises. Drawing on Desmond King, Drainville describes how citizens are called upon to embrace economic rationality and "lead the assault on ... the social rights of citizenship". (1995: 60)

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People cannot be counted on, however, to faithfully function indefinitely in the interests of global accumulation. As the divergence-widening effects of the current scheme of global governance with its supporting national manifestations become more and more obvious, reactions begin to set in. One common reaction is to point to "others" as being the threat to one's job (Richmond 1994). But immigration controls are not a solution to the employment problem, which is but one of a range of human interactions which can only be dealt with successfully by collective action on a global scale. The insistence that national solutions be sought to problems generated by global accumulation is essentially a recipe to "divide and conquer." Combining a closing of borders to immigration with an insistence that poor countries resolve their own problems serves to exacerbate two of the
elements (population pressure and inequality) which Christopher Chase-Dunn and Bruce Podobnik have identified as causal factors heightening the probability of future "core wars". (1995: 13)

The Latin Americans have invented a word to describe a procedural democracy where participation is not merely limited, but actively suppressed; a democradura -- hard democracy. (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 4) In its original usage the phrase referred to a pact between civil authorities and the military to establish limited democracy. The term seems more broadly applicable; are we not already seeing the signs of an emerging democradura in a number of northern countries, including Canada, as the will to maintain social programs erodes? (Greider 1992; Saul 1995) The limits on state action arising from the (real or anticipated) hypersensitivity of financial markets has led to what Susan Strange has called the end of opposition from established parties; differences between policies of government and opposition parties disappear, as "society, economy and authority are no longer bound by the frontiers of the territorial state." (Strange 1995: 291,301) One hastens to add that where opposition does remain, it is treated as a fringe (either dangerous or irrelevant) that unrealistically refuses to accept the new and (ostensibly) immutable circumstances of state limits.

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RESPONDING GLOBALLY

Paradoxically, if we are to save the world from breakdown occasioned by capitalism, we must once again save the capitalists from their global excesses, just as the earlier creation of national welfare states saved the capitalists from their excesses at the national level. The same logic that propelled the creation of the welfare state and the extension of democracy at the national level, now must be extended to the global level, not with the express purpose of making the world safe for capitalism, although that may be the effect, but rather to make the world safe: safe for the common person, safe for civil rights, safe for our children and grandchildren, safe for the flora and fauna.

A welfare state, whether national or global, requires a structure of government to shape the programs, to finance them, and to respond to changed circumstances. The difficulty which confronts us in our current situation is that our ability to act at the global level is severely restricted by an institutional framework with limited responsiveness, owing to the recalcitrance of major powers. We are limited as well by our misperception that trying to solve problems at the national level is wholly appropriate for most issues.

Our tacit or overt acceptance of functional globalism, of the sort proposed by Daniel Mitnany (1943), that pretends that most issues of global significance are purely technical and best left to experts represents another major limit. In fact, few problems are purely technical. Wherever there is a human dimension to a decision, discretion and preferences
enter into play; we leave the realm of the exact and enter the realm of the political. To capitulate to the claims that only the experts can decide, for example, as in the current conventional wisdom regarding independence of central banks (Eijffinger and De Haan 1996; Gormley and De Haan 1996) and the IMF, is to concede to a select group sovereign rights, which few of the world's remaining monarchs even exercise. Political problems require political solutions within a context where a range of opinions can be heard. Those which are global problems require global political solutions.

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The idea of global government is hardly new. To give but a sample, we can trace the idea back to Immanuel Kant (1796), John Hobson (1915), Leonard Woolf (1916), and Harold Laski (1921). In 1925 Laski was already arguing that world government was one of the implications of modern conditions and that federalism would be the most appropriate form. (Long 1993: 365) Democratic global federalism is also an idea that has been around for awhile. At the time that official representatives in San Francisco in October 1945 were but a few days away from signing the United Nations charter, The New York Times carried a front page account of a conference in Dublin, New Hampshire whose distinguished delegates signed a declaration calling instead for global democratic federalism. (New York Times, October 17, 1945, p. 1) World Federalists have long been active in Canada and published a periodical (World Federalism) espousing the idea between at least 1955 and 1974.

W. Warren Wagar dismissed federalism and world federalism one-quarter century ago: the former as "so much cold mutton in the second half of the twentieth [century]"; the latter as a project that feeds "on a wide assortment of deadly illusions", yet whose followers were regarded as so hamless (at the time) that "governments let them continue unmolested and unnoticed." (Wagar 1971: 32-36) Is there reason to believe that federalist structures offer any promise today in dealing with our problems? Federalism within nations has been given an impetus by the neo-liberal emphasis on the downsizing of the state and its associated reallocation of functions from the center to the regions. Supranational federalism within the European Union (EU) has found strong support in regions, like Catalonia, whose relations with their national capitals have been marked historically by tensions. In a fanciful scenario Wagar suggests that a world state -- the Commonwealth -- might emerge through the voluntary association of a growing number of states with "World Party" governments. He admits that he currently sees no inkling of a World Party on the political horizon. (Wagar 1996: 10-15) Is it any more far-fetched to imagine that the once 6 member European Common Market, now 15 member European Union, which already has over a dozen willing adherents at its doorstep [2], might eventually through a continuous process of expansion and structural modification include all of the world's people and come to be "known simply" as the Union, with the Union Parliament representing the people of the various members, as does the EU Parliament today, and not their national governments?
What is new today is the urgency and the possibility for bringing the project into being. Consider the logistics of bringing together the American Founding Fathers in Philadelphia in 1776 or the Fathers of Canadian Confederation in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island in 1867. Even bringing delegates to San Francisco in 1945 was a major undertaking. To physically convene today a representaitve cross section of the human population would be child's play compared to these earlier assemblies.

Logistics is obviously not the issue; the issue is always one of will, which would appear to be growing daily with our expanding sense of the global interdependence of a host of urgent issues. We have already witnessed several instances of the gathering of appreciable numbers of citizen delegates at unofficial meetings that have paralleled major world summits, including some 30,000 women, representing 2,000 NGOs at the Women's Forum which paralleled the September 1995 Beijing United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. The elaboration of numerous alternative treaties at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro United Nations Conference on Environment and Development -- the Earth Summit -- by the International Forum of NGOs and Social Movements (Foro Internacional 1993) is but one additional indication that the time may have arrived for the people of the world to take bolder action to wrest control of global processes from les nouveaux maîtres du monde. NGO representation, both official and unofficial, at world summits has the potential to transform politics; to create a global politics where the people have voice to complement international fora where only states have voice.

Preoccupations with the possibility of devastating war and the escalating costs of deterrence, with the attendant neglect of social needs, also focus attention on global institution building to maintain and extend world peace. World Systems theorists who have studied Kondratieff long economic cycles (K-Waves) have been struck by the persistently recurring interaction between war and economic growth processes. (Goldstein 1988) Chase-Dunn and Podobnik see the current K-Wave leading to a 50-50 likelihood of a core war in the 2020s decade and urge us to continue laboring to avoid that eventuality (1995: 22) George Modelski and William R. Thompson wonder whether the current nineteenth K-Wave might avoid an associated global war given, inter alia, "denationalized industrial production, increased political management capacities on the part of international organizations, and the continuing diffusion of democratic institutions." (1996: 225) Their message is a clear one: there is continuing effort to be made if war is to be avoided. However, as Wagar reminds us, peace, like happiness, is a by-product; it is the creation of a "new world civilization" that is the work at hand. (1971: 36)
Returning to the factors identified by Chase-Dunn and Podobnik as either exacerbating or mitigating the likelihood of a major war; inequality, international economic integration, international political integration and disarmament (1995: 13) are all areas where substituting the voice of global citizens for the voice of national interests might well move us forward. As Immanuel Wallerstein puts it: "Perhaps we should tiptoe into an uncertain future, trying merely to remember in which direction we are going." (1991: 229). To build a global federal structure may be our best guarantee to assure that we can preserve that which is of value that is close to us and to permit the directional shifts perceived to be necessary when we appear to be veering off course.

If we achieve global democratic federalism, the eventual form will reflect the outcome of lengthy political processes, with variations from one level of the hierarchy to another and from one jurisdiction to another at the same level. There is no reason to believe that existing differences in federal structures between countries will disappear, nor any way to predict what form will emerge at the global level. We might see a greatly strengthened United Nations, but this is unlikely to help us much with our dilemmas born of neoliberalism, unless there is a major sea change in the visions of national governments. A People's Assembly that would provide the UN with a bicameral legislative structure might well be a possible scenario. Citizen involvement and a global assembly of representatives of the world's people could be an important counter weight to a system where states have the sole voice. (Heinrich 1992; Held 1995: 278-83; Wagor 1996) For as Claude Julien reminds us: "States don't have friends; they have interests." (1996: 16) For Canadians, envisioning forms for global federal structures should come as naturally as getting out of bed in the morning.

Let us not be timid about global government. I subscribe in principle to the notion of subsidiarity, but what has been called marble cake federalism is more likely to be the working result. Responsibilities may rest at a particular level, but higher levels do not keep silent when problems arise. Similarly, pressures may also go from a lower level to a higher level as new tensions emerge. The point of democratic institutions is precisely not to freeze important elements of the structure of governance indefinitely because of the de facto or de jure veto of a key player.

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THE CENTRALITY OF CITIZENS

The phrase democratic deficit is used with frequency in the context of European integration to focus attention on the relative exclusion of the people from the shaping of a united European. (Fischer 1995: 203-222; Norton 1996: 177-93) Those who speak of a democratic deficit seek to provide Europeans with both responsibilities and an effective
voice in the conduct of the affairs of the Union. However important the right to a
European passport and free movement within the Union may be, a Europe of the people
depends on the individual exercise of collective responsibilities with one's counterparts in
other European countries. This is one of the messages that has appeared in a series of
monthly articles on European citizenship ("Une Europe des Citoyens") between March
and June 1996 in Le Monde Diplomatique. Articles in the May issue by Pierre Behar
(1996) and Paul Thibaud (1996) support a federal Europe in which citizens play an
important role and both refer to that as having been the vision of General de Gaulle.

Drainville has raised important questions about "construction of citizenship in the world
economy", suggesting that in fact citizens are presently banished from the space of the
world economy. (1995: 71) As Drainville observes, "there is something radically
important about conceptualizing the world economy as a social space in the making."
(1995: 70) The very act of describing serves to alter; the act of naming can create. To see
our current situation as one of exclusionary global governance is to raise the possibility of
action. Drainville speaks of reconstructing, reimagining and remapping world politics.
(1995: 70) That is precisely the task: to create a real "world politics" which would give
substance to a phrase that has long been a misnomer. What we label today as world
politics is in fact the realm of anti-politics (Ferguson 1990; Mulgan 1994), of the experts
and of the diplomats whose instructions carefully delineate their limits. The NGOs
represents an ongoing important stepping stone in the broadening of world politics and in
the construction of world citizenship. Their achievements should renew our hope that
what appear to be oppressive and unchanging structures are in reality processes in motion
and strengthen our resolve to continue our collective efforts.

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Those who reject supranational government as escapism would appear to be affirming
that citizen participation is a well-established reality in most of the world's democracies
and that citizens acting through their governments are equal to the task at hand. In fact,
democratic deficits are ubiquitous and have been growing with the advance of neo-
liberalism. To the best of my knowledge democratic deficits are not measured, not
reported, and not the object of serious criticism in the way that government budget
deficits are. Indeed were national democratic deficits to be reduced markedly, the hysteria
concerning fiscal deficits and the size of the state might well be dispelled as an outcome
of the resulting public debates. It is not only regional citizens and world citizens that are
to be created, but true national and local citizens must also be either created or recreated.
Mitrany suggested that "the performance of a number of common functions is the way to
create a normal community." (Mitrany in Long 1993: 371) For too long now we have
been witnessing the disappearance of common functions. Our challenge today is to create
a world in which the number of common functions performed by individuals is markedly
expanded in order to swell the ranks of the politically active at all levels.
The task confronting the peoples of the world is the major one of changing perceptions of the nature of our current reality and then changing behavior to join in and create a public debate at all levels and to engage in political action: that is the new world civilization and it is already in formation. Nor is the "Academy" being left in the dust: a keyword search of the on-line public access catalogue of any major university library will identify an outpouring of new publications dealing with either global governance or democracy, far too numerous to list here. Civil society must either be created or strengthened everywhere. The democratic deficit is partly of our own making in so far as we have ceased to behave collectively. Our myopia, cynicism, withdrawal, avoidance of collective responsibility, and deference to authority and technical experts have been carefully nurtured by an educational system in the service of nationalism. We often hear attributed to H.G. Wells a phrase relating to the race between education and catastrophe. In fact, where Wells' sentiment appears in context, we find that he addresses the evils of nationalism and of education distorted by those who choose to use nationalism for personal advantage. (Wells 1932: 650) Most of us are products of an educational system that has done its best through passive learning to neutralize knowledge and of a society with an anti-political bent. That many of us are, nonetheless, active and political is a tribute to the resilience of the human spirit of justice and gives yet additional cause for hope. Moreover, even in the classroom, professing is increasingly giving way to facilitating. The spreading emphasis on participation leaves few of us unchanged.

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The construction of meaningful world citizenship is not likely to be a direct by-product of "globalization from above." Indeed, meaningful citizenship at whatever level is unlikely to result from the activities of the ne buceae, which tend not to focus on participatory democracy, but rather on "good governance", which is something said to be expressed by a ratio of government expenditure to gross product. The construction of meaningful world citizenship is taking place daily. "Globalization from below" with its daily cross-border, cross-cultural interactions, is the incessant process by which our mental images are being altered. Conscious perceptions may not matter in the early stages of formation of our sense of planet-wide interdependence. The process is in motion and the participants may only be dimly aware of the transition of which they are currently part. We have yet to recognize the opportunities that are arising daily. There are limits to the role of civil society at all levels, especially at the transnational or global level, but the frontier of action is an ever-changing one. In an era of positive-feedback, particularly nourished by electronic communications, those limits can change swiftly; witness the events following Perestroika and, less than five years later, the fall of the Berlin Wall.

To get from here to there will require major efforts to spread the word: we live on one small planet and we are one people with a common culture. We may speak different languages, we may have distinct local customs, we may look different, but we are one. Those of us committed to saving local autonomy, must support efforts to strengthen the
global umbrella. Elise Boulding (1988) has written of crafting a global civil society. The time has come to craft as well the global democratic federal structures of governance to go with that. If individuals become citizens instead of onlookers, then the prospect of the public and the political spaces becoming far more active venues could well mean the death of expert-driven exclusionary anti-politics where decisions currently masquerade as technical necessities.

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**CONCLUSION**

I think it appropriate to note that I wholeheartedly support the idea of global taxation and redistribution, essential elements for reducing inequality. (Frankman 1996) Nonetheless, I reject the global tax proposal which seems to have achieved the most popularity of late, the Tobin Tax of up to 0.5% of the value of each foreign exchange transaction, insofar as it deals with effects and not causes. Tobin’s original intent was not to raise revenue, but to "throw sand in the wheels of international finance". By 1995 foreign exchange transactions were estimated to exceed US$1.2 trillion per day. This hypermobility of capital represents a veritable sword of Damocles perceived to threaten any government contemplating measures that diverge from the current market conception of proper public sector behavior. (Haq, Kaul and Grunberg 1996).

I favor instead the creation of a single world currency with appropriate supporting institutions, which, incidentally, is James Tobin’s preferred scenario: according to Tobin the best solution would be "a common currency, common monetary and fiscal policy, and economic integration." (Tobin 1978: 154). The "freedom" to devalue that a separate currency accords to a nation offers no guarantee that generalized benefits will be realized. (Bourguignon, de Melo & Morrisson, 1991) Insofar as exchange rates play a key role in the frantic quest for national competitiveness, international economic integration that brings their elimination, if accompanied where necessary by appropriate offsets, further reduces the likelihood of war.

One ingredient is not made explicit in Tobin’s list: global democratic institutions that presumably would shape a fiscal policy to meet the needs of disadvantaged individuals and regions wherever they may be, just as national institutions presently serve that function with varying degrees of success. My own work on the global economy has brought me to cross the line from the technical to the political. Institutions intended to achieve global social justice must be embedded in a global political system where the peoples of the world can give expression to their will in a democratic context. The political awareness that is necessary to rescue the state, currently under both strain and merciless attack, is the very same awareness that is necessary to construct political democracy at all levels of the hierarchy. What is needed is not a blind allegiance to the...
Father Land or the Mother Country, right or wrong, but an appreciation of the shifting limits of sovereignty and of the ever-shifting locus for action in distinct problem areas.

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Political awakening associated with a local issue may be the start of a long march toward support for global government, given the clear line of causation from supposed inevitabilities at the local level to power relationships extending to the global scale. To the extent that the fallout of neo-liberal economic policy reawakens collective action, the next round may well feature a broadened focus, extending from the local to the global, in recognition of our interdependence and the common problems we confront around the world, whose resolution lies beyond local jurisdiction. That common perception is the current reality of the many NGO members who network regularly with counterparts in many countries of the world.

In the very first paper that I presented on global taxation in 1970, I closed with the following quote from Bertrand Russell: "It is not by pacifist sentiment, but by world-wide economic organization, that civilized mankind is to be saved from collective suicide." (Russell 1934: 510; Frankman 1971) Today, it is clear to me that Russell specified a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one for avoiding collective suicide. For E.B. White, the sufficient condition was unambiguous: "Peace is the product of responsible government." (White: 41) That ideal must be our continuing objective as educators and citizens if the promise of no global war is to be realized for the 19th and subsequent K-waves.

**END-NOTES**

1. And: "Far from being a sinister occult power, the nébuleuse may turn out to be a Wizard of Oz. Perhaps no one, or no coherent structure, is really in control." For Cox, Le Monde Diplomatique's phrase "conjures up a coherent strategy of dominance, virtually a conspiracy." (Cox 1996: E-Mail)

2. Eurobarometer sampled opinion within the EU countries as to the willingness in 1995 of respondents to see each of 24 European countries join the Union in the future. Spanish respondents were the most generally favorable to expansion in that they were amenable to admitting most of the countries; their lowest score was 44% in favor of admitting Latvia. (1996: B62-63)

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George Modelski and William R. Thompson. LEADING SECTORS AND
WORLD POWERS; THE COEVOLUTION OF GLOBAL POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS.
ISBN 1-57003-054-5, $44.95 (cloth).

Reviewed by Terry Boswell, Emory University

For the last several years I have begun several papers on global
hegemony and leadership by contrasting the Long Cycle perspective
of Modelski and Thompson with the World Economy perspective of
Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn, and others. At first, this was an easy
contrast. While there was always much overlap, the Long Cycle
school emphasized world order produced by a world leader with over
half the world's naval power. The world economy school emphasized
economic dominance over finance, trade, and production, or in some
variants, over leading economic sectors. This difference in
emphasis allowed me to set up contrasting propositions from the
theories that could be tested empirically.

Unfortunately, with this book, the difference in perspectives
narrows substantially and I will have to revise my papers
substantially. While their earlier work alluded to economic
processes, with this book the emphasis shifts rather dramatically
from sea power to leading economic sectors. It is a shift that I
wholeheartedly applaud. Their discussion of economic and political
coordination, as opposed to focusing on one or the other, raises
the level of debate to a more sophisticated level. In addition, I
find that determining leadership in terms of dominance over leading
sectors, which includes the concept to long waves, to be more
convincing historically than arguments about simultaneous dominance
in finance, trade and production. I also find it more convincing
logically as a causal theory, as they now incorporate innovation,
than their own past work, which had a functionalist tinge. While
they are not alone in advocating leading sector theory, they have
amassed an impressive data set to support their claims. The book is
a worthy contribution of those grounds alone.

Given this convergence of emphasis, and I should add that
World Economy theorists have become more political, are there still
important differences between the two schools of thought? Or in
other words, can I still salvage my papers? The answer, thank god,
is yes.

The most important differences are the following: 1. Is global
war necessary for leadership and can a global war occur without
producing a leader? 2. Are there 3 hegemons or 5 leaders after
1500? 3. Were there world leaders prior to 1500? and 4. Does the
modern world-system originate around year 1500 or year 1000?

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1. Global war is still a necessary part of leadership for long
cycle theory, but only a likely probability for world economy
theory. Global wars, those wars fought between great powers in
which world leadership is contested, are only included in their
study if the war produced a world leader. This makes for a
tautological relationship between leadership and war, a problem
world economy theory avoids by making a clearer separation between
economic hegemony and world leadership. Levy, for instance, lists
5 global wars that Modelski and Thompson ignore. They even leave
out the Thirty Years War, which was one of the world's most
devastating and most politically important wars prior to 1914.
Perhaps their next book will explain why this and other global wars
are not included and how their theory would account for them.

2. World economy theory finds 3 hegemons since 1500, the
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. Long cycle
finds 5 world leaders, the same three plus an 18th century British
leadership and a 16th century Portuguese one. The difference, of
course, is in how one defines hegemony, leadership and leading
economic sectors. On page 83, Modelski and Thompson say that
"Global system leaders are not hegemons. They do not dominate all
economic and political activity." But this is a straw man version
of hegemony. Let us take a leading sector version, where hegemony
is dominating (i.e., over 1/2) leading economic sectors. Then
hegemony and leadership should be about the same, except that
Modelski and Thompson still use sea power to date hegemons, rather
than their own data on leading sectors.

3. They also have 2-5 possible leaders before 1500. I must
admit in being a bit confused in reading their book as to these
early world leaders. Table 8.5 lists Northern Sung, Southern Sung,
Genoa, and Venice. Table 9.4 lists the same except it adds the
Mongol world empire and drops Genoa. World economy theory, at
least until recently, drew a distinction between world empires and
world-systems that would exclude most of their early cases,
although I must admit, not all of them.

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4. World economy theory also drew a distinction between the capitalist world system, where one has accumulation of profits from commodity exchange of necessities, versus coercive accumulation or preciosity exchange in other systems. The capitalist world system emerges in the period of 1450 to 1650, with a decisive turning point around 1500 with the European discovery and conquest of the Americas. Modelski and Thompson note that the key element to this distinction is a world market that connects political units into a system, over which a state can lead, but is incapable of subsuming other units into an empire. With a world market, one has a transition belt for innovations, and thus the emergence of economic long waves. They claim that a world market began in China around the year 1000. Some of this difference is over amounts or degrees -- to what extent were market relations central prior to 1500, did they include necessities, was the market fully a world one?. Other theorists, such as A. G. Frank, drop the question of necessities as a bogus distinction, and can thus find a world system that stretches back another 5000 years. This leads to a necessary, and so far unresolved, debate over what constitutes a system.

We cannot resolve this issue here, but let me throw a wrinkle in the pre-1500 versions. Starting around 1550, with the long rise of Dutch hegemony, sea trade begins to climb at an exponential rate. This not only changes the basis on wealth in the European core from political power to economic efficiency, but the core states go on to subjugate the rest of the world through colonial conquest. No previous period of world history is comparable. There is a profound qualitative transformation around 1500 in the amount of trade and in its political and social importance, a transformation made more obvious, ironically, by knowing that a world market had existed for 500 years prior or that some sort of system or network existed for 5000 years prior, yet without a similar qualitative change occurring. Capitalism is a fine name for the change as far as I am concerned, but call it what you want, the transformation still must be explained.

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LEADING SECTORS AND WORLD POWERS is the latest entry in a growing literature on the social science of long term change. It well illustrates the increasing quality and sophistication of that effort. George Modelski and William R. Thompson address the interaction of economic growth, political leadership and systemic war. This is not a new question, and some 40 alternative treatments are reviewed in a highly efficient manner.

Modelski and Thompson find order where others have not in part by avoiding some a priori biases. While they look at nation-states, they are not trapped by national level boundaries. Some of the relevant variables come in nation-state packages, but just as many are either sub- or supranational. Nation-states are not reified, nor for that matter is the global system.

The authors also refuse to take the boundaries of "capitalism" as their necessary limits. A central focus of their model is innovation, which they wisely recognize in both its commercial and its technological forms. Since innovations can affect all market systems, not just those of 'capitalist' or 'industrial' periods, Modelski and Thompson are not constrained by any of the dates variously associated with those eras. They instead follow McNeill's (1982) suggestion that the modern market system emerged in China around the 10th century, and extend their analysis to that point.

Finally, Modelski and Thompson ignore the warnings of scholars from Kondratieff and Schumpeter forward who complain that the data necessary to establish longer term cycles or trends is simply not available. They are successful in gathering an impressive array of data for the post-1500 period, and in putting together an informative narrative account of K-waves and system leadership for the 500 years preceding that point as well. The result is a global level treatment of broad processes over the very long term. Modelski and Thompson prove that with some effort, the historical record can be made to yield far more specific information than most might imagine.

Political and economic cycles rest at the heart of their model. Fifty to sixty year long Kondratieff (K-) waves are said to be initiated by the bunching of innovations. Growth slows
when diffusion or competition reduces returns. One hundred to one hundred twenty year long leadership cycles are also identified. These include phases of agenda setting, coalition building, macro decision, and global leadership.

These two sets of cycles are said to coevolve. Innovations generate economic growth and wealth. Increasing wealth provides the incentive to seek to structure the global system, along with the resources needed to engage in agenda setting and coalition building. With growth comes competition among great powers over which will make the rules. This competition, or the fear of falling behind, provides the impetus to war.

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War retards economic growth, in no small part by inhibiting trade. It also determines which state will next lead the system. As a result the downturn is relatively short. With key competitors out of the picture, markets reopening, and the conversion of war-time innovations to new purposes, we find the start of a new K-wave. This second wave is likely to be founded in part upon the fundamental innovations of the first.

Global leadership declines as the second K-wave abates. The global order breaks down. We enter new eras of agenda setting and coalition building. Though it is possible for the lead economy to reproduce itself, this is unusual. Older technology and older solutions become standard fare in the lead economy. Sunk costs retard the use of newer innovations. New problems, new markets and new resources are likely to form the foundation for the next innovation driven K-wave.

Modelski and Thompson identify four attributes that facilitate the rise of a new lead state. It must be one of the existing major economies, as some participation in previous K-wave upswings provide necessary levels of wealth. It must have a strong military with the ability to extend its power. This is defined in terms of naval strength, which continues to be a vital asset even in the age of air power. It is likely to have a relatively open society, which Modelski and Thompson argue will aid in the creation and adoption of innovations, in the setting of global agendas, and in coalition building. A general sense of responsiveness to global problems is identified as the fourth important attribute.

The finished model includes two K-waves which animate one long cycle of political leadership. The first wave provides the resources necessary for successful agenda setting and coalition building, and peaks before a major war. The war decides the
question of system leadership, and slows the economy. The new leader emerges with a preponderance (50% plus) of global naval capacity. A second K-wave follows the war. As it slows, political leadership is contested, disorder increases, and new innovations emerge to provide one of the major economies with the resources necessary to prevail.

Empirical analyses of each of these predictions are undertaken. More formal data are used for the post 1500 period, about which information is more available and comparable. The hypothesized temporal ordering among innovation based economic upswings, war, and naval supremacy, is well supported. Equally supportive are the narrative chapters on Sung China and the northern Italian city-states of the Renaissance. Both the K-wave and leadership cycles are well illustrated.

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Renaissance Italy is linked to Asian markets and technology, and serves to translate the K-wave and political cycle phenomena from China to Europe. It is good to have a picture of how the K-wave and long political leadership cycle came to Europe, which shortly after grew to prominence. Nonetheless it seems that "global" leadership never really rested in northern Italy in anything like the manner that it belonged to the Chinese or even the Dutch. There may be more to be found in Asia, at least about K-waves, and that would make Modelski and Thompson's transition to a Eurocentered analysis in the early 1400s a bit premature.

By the end of the two empirical sections little doubt remains as to the existence of both K-waves and long leadership cycles prior to the onset of capitalism. Relevant data are available and supportive, and Modelski and Thompson use them in a clear and efficient manner.

The review of the relevant literature, the building of the model, and the sections on verification are all well and precisely written. Definitions are clear, chosen measures are well conceived, and the book is written with precision. If anything it is perhaps a bit too sparing. For example, more information on how innovation was defined and the manner in which data on innovation were gathered would have been helpful. It is clear that Modelski and Thompson do not fall into the trap of simply identifying the times and places where we might expect innovations to emerge and searching for them only then and there. But they fail to tell us enough about their search. Innovation emerges as a central dynamic, and the work would have been stronger if we were told us more about it.
Chapter 8 of the book, nestled between the end of the data based chapters and the beginning of the more narrative accounts, has two parts. Its methodological half is designed to deal with criticisms of structural analysis and introduce the concept of social evolution. Its other half seeks to place this study of roughly 1000 years into an even broader picture of human history.

Macro level analyses are more and more subject to the criticism that they are illegitimate because they lack a microfoundational base. Most of these criticisms, based on the arguments of methodological individualists, are devoid of merit. But more subtle criticisms exist that warrant consideration. How, for example, does one decide among competing structural level theories when they are indeterminate, that is when they fail to make unique predictions? In such a case, a resort to individual level or microfoundational analysis would provide an additional layer of analysis by which to judge. There is also the unfortunate tendency for older structural and cyclical analyses to adopt a deterministic air. Microfoundational groundings can help guard against this as well. Modelski and Thompson do an excellent job of avoiding both of these problems, in part by leaving the door open to micro-level considerations. They trace the impetus to innovate to the individual level, and are quick to acknowledge the ability of individuals to recognize and perhaps even ameliorate tendencies toward systemic war that their model predicts for the years around 2030. While methodological individualists might still call them bad names, no sophisticated student of social science methodology will miss the quality of their arguments in this regard.

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A sense of social evolution provides this work’s guiding methodology. The authors show that social evolution need not be teleological or directional. Instead, and contrary to rational choice methods, social evolution stresses changeable preferences and constraints, trial and error, a focus on institutions, transitions, and the long term. This is well illustrated by K-wave dynamics:

... each K-wave builds on the conditions created by earlier innovations, and in its turn, gives rise to problems that future innovations will have to resolve... K-waves are both path-dependent and future oriented and they are best understood if viewed in clusters (p. 130).

The result is a superior method of understanding social processes that is historically sensitive, avoids the fallacy of
determinism, and allows for a holistic apprehension of its subject. My main concern is that the few pages devoted to the discussion of social evolution are once again too few. It is an important methodology about which more ought be said. Models's recent work on evolutionary paradigms in the social sciences, (Models and Poznanski (1996) and Models (1996) would be well considered prior to reading this longer volume.

Chapter 8 also introduces a longer term historical-evolutionary perspective. Four K-waves may be grouped into a "period" with innovations that share a common thematic underpinning and with their own structure of base building, networking, breakthrough and payoff. Four "periods" make up an even longer "global economy process." These global economy processes are also paired, the first laying the foundation for the full development of the second. The whole evolutionary schema is suggested to extend in roughly 1000 year increments from the 3,500 BCE onset of the Bronze Age through the latest, which began about 1850.

This broader perspective is boldly conceived. It faces two problems. The first is familiar. Too few pages are devoted to it. The second is more problematic. The division of human history into neatly packaged 50/60, 100/120, 200/240, and approximately 1000 year increments seems all too handy. What explains this temporal uniformity across so long a sweep of human history? Is it something inherent in the dynamics of innovation, which then provide a more or less stable 50 to 60 year K-wave foundation for the longer periods and eras? Could it be something else? Nowhere in this work, to its great credit, is there much hint of teleology or determinism. What then drives such apparently uniform cycles with their provocatively round numbers? It is a paradox the authors must eventually address.

The final chapter concerns the future, where information technology not surprisingly emerges as the next lead sector, and the U.S. and Japan struggle for lead state status. It is alternately possible, according to the authors, that globalization may make national leadership obsolete.

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Of far greater concern is the coming macro-decision phase. The dual K-waves of the U.S. political leadership cycle have passed, and a new wave began in 1973. We ought be experiencing upheaval and dislocations of various sorts, then new periods of agenda setting and coalition building. The macro-decision phase, traditionally associated with global war, ought be upon us about
2030. Such a war would be tremendously destructive. The authors are quick to remind us that within their framework nothing is inevitable. Models and Thompson consider the arguments against such a war: weapons systems are increasingly lethal, leadership denationalization may obviate war as an instrument of transition, larger international organizations may prove better tension managers, or the diffusion of democracy might enlarge the "zone of peace." Anything remains possible.

This is an excellent work. It is provocative, well conceived, carefully executed, and precisely written. It raises fascinating questions and provides interesting tools with which to address them. Both its substance and its methods will be of interest to social scientists from a variety of fields. This work has a lot to say to all of us.

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Reviewed by Gerardo Otero, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, CANADA

Barbara Stallings and collaborators have produced an extremely useful synthesis of developments in the world economy over the past 15 to 20 years, with thoughtful analysis and generous statistics to support it. Five economic processes are seen to constitute the main context for international development in GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE. The first two -- the end of the cold war and new relations among advanced capitalist powers -- constitute the structure for the new global system; while increased globalization of trade and production, shifting patterns of international finance, and new ideological currents that revolve around market-orientation constitute the main links that unite core countries and their peripheral areas. Defining development as economic growth plus equity, the authors argue that the developing country hierarchy that emerged in the 1980s, with the conversion of a handful of East Asian countries into newly industrialized powerhouses, was closely associated to this international context. As well, because developing countries were associated predominantly with one or another of the dominant powers of advanced capitalism, the United States, Japan, or Europe, such regional links also had major consequences for development. Indeed, a premise of this book is that the Japanese model of development is more conducive to bring forth rapid growth with equity than that promoted by the United States and the international financial institutions.

With the collapse of state socialism, cleavages in the world economy turned toward differences in the styles of capitalism and the growing differences among the United States and its Japanese and European rivals. The latter two seemed clearly more dynamic in productivity and growth. In the case of Japan, its savings and investment propensities, time horizons, the collaborative relationships between public and private sectors as well as between labor and capital, and views about security and equality, made it evident that capitalism is not the same across the globe.

This book's detailed analysis of the effects on developing countries of belonging to one or another region of the world is quite revealing. While Africa has been largely
detached from the world economy and runs the risk of 
marginalization. Asian countries have been successfully 
integrated to the Japanese economy in ways that have allowed 
those countries to experience substantial economic growth and 
equity. Latin America is somewhere in between, with higher 
levels of integration than Africa's.

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Transnational corporations have become the main agents 
in the globalization process through production and trade, while 
new capital flows are dominated by various economic actors. These 
include the international financial institutions, (IFIs, namely, 
the International Monetary Fund, or IMF; and the World Bank), 
owners of direct foreign investment and portfolio capital, and 
governments controlling IFIs and official development aid from 
advanced industrial nations. Where direct foreign investment 
(DFI) predominates as the form of capital flow, there may be an 
overlap with the first link of an integrated production and 
trade. One problem for developing countries is that capital 
flows have tended to concentrate among advanced industrial 
countries, with the proportion increasing from 58% in the early 
1980s to 86% at the end of the decade.

But some foreign capital was still flowing toward third 
world countries. Put schematically, such capital flows changed 
during the 1980s from private loans to public loans and direct 
foreign investment. Latin America saw an increased flow 
dominated by portfolio capital, Asia by direct foreign 
investment, and Africa by grants and concessional loans. The 
type of foreign investment flowing into developing countries had 
a major impact on their prospects for development. Even though 
DFI was seen as the worse type of international capital in the 
early 1970s, at the climax of the import substitution 
industrialization policies in Latin America, there was a major 
reassessment after the debt crisis. This was due to the fact 
that DFI has a much longer term outlook than portfolio capital. 
By contrast, portfolio capital investments are made with short 
term views, may cause appreciation of the currency, and can 
leave the country as soon as they entered.

Regional responses to the international context for 
development have shaped the impact of global variables. For 
Latin America, the combined decline of Soviet and European 
support with increased U.S. direct foreign investment has lead 
to increased U.S. hegemony. By the 1980s this has meant an 
increased influence of neoliberalism in shaping economic policy,
which has also resulted in slow growth and greater inequality. In each third world region there has come to prevail a different meaning of market orientation. While in Asia such orientation has been shaped by Japanese capitalism, which includes a substantial state intervention and protectionism of key sectors, Latin America and Africa have followed the Anglo-U.S. lead of capitalism, which has involved massive privatizations and an almost indiscriminate market opening to foreign competition.

Increased economic importance of Japan and the European Union combined with a decline of U.S. military importance have led to two competing views on how the new global economic system will work. One emphasizes multilateral convergence and trilateral management, while the other stresses regionalization into three competing blocs. This book argues that a combination of traits is materializing, simultaneously involving conflict and cooperation, divergence and convergence.

Barbara Stallings's concluding chapter provides a most interesting elaboration of the mechanisms of influence of the new global economic system in terms of relationships among third world countries and their respective core countries, as well as among the triad of core blocs. By building a "tetrahedron" of such relationships, she offers an analysis based on figures of trade, direct foreign investment, and official development assistance. Trade links are strongest in the countries led by Japan and the United States but weak for Europe. Trade by multinational corporations data is fragmentary, but evidence suggests that an increasing amount of international trade is carried out within firms. This in turn suggests that intrafirm trade raises barriers to entry, which increases the value for developing countries to establish links with multinationals as a way to obtain access to markets.

As mentioned previously, there is an enormous disparity in the distribution of direct foreign investment in the tetrahedron. Japan comes out as the country that sends the largest proportion of its direct investment to the other two core economic regions; 47% to the United States and 23% to Europe. The United States sends 36% to Europe but only 2% to Japan, while Europe sends only 13% of its direct foreign investment to the United States and about 1% to Japan. This means that Japanese investment is almost all financed domestically through its high savings rate, while European countries invest in countries within their own region.
United States, by contrast, has come to rely increasingly on outsiders, which introduces a source of international instability and friction.

Japan also comes out as the most generous of the three core regions in terms of official development assistance, sending 62% to its integrated countries in Asia, while Europe sends 47% to Africa, and the United States only 12% to Latin America. To the extent that these flows are regulated by IFIs such as the IMF and the World Bank rather than governments, they have a dramatic impact in terms of imposing neoliberal ideology. More generally, this book holds the hypothesis that "the policy packages (models) selected by third world countries will resemble those advocated by the countries that buy their goods, supply their finance, and provide their ideological guidance" (365).

Prospects for developing countries will similarly vary according to how they each respond to global trends. In Asia, the NICs are now major players and, as a group, they already exceed Japan's investment in other Asian countries, although they still lag behind investments in other countries and technological capacity. In all likelihood, though, they will play a major role in integrating China and Indochina into the Asian regional economy. The situation for Latin American countries is much more heterogeneous in terms of their potential for hemispheric integration, and it also depends on whether the U.S. Congress will agree to preferential trade relations with more of its southern neighbors beyond Mexico. Finally, there is a strong concern that Africa will be further displaced by the European Union in favor of Central and Eastern Europe. In the long run, a strengthened South Africa might provide an important growth pole capable of integrating some of the Sub-Saharan countries, but this may be well into the future. In addition, argues Stallings, "parts of South Asia, the Middle East, and even Latin America could also end up in this group" of marginalized states (386).

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This book represent a great advancement in the description and explanation of global economic processes, but its focus tends too be almost exclusively economic. The editor of this collection was explicit in her introduction about important aspects that were excluded from analysis: democratization, ethnic and religious conflicts, and environmental problems. Obviously one cannot expect that all
relevant aspects of development will be treated in a single volume. But my critique centers not so much on the absences but in the selected approach to dealing with the problems addressed. Throughout the book it is assumed that states are the only valid actors in making policy choices. It is only in the last page of the book that the editor acknowledges that some bottom-up approaches may emerge in searching for alternative development paths. Even on this point, though, the implication remains that states from developing countries will be the ones looking, for instance, for alternative development partners. The book does not take into account that the social consequences of neoliberalism are bringing forth new social forces emerging from civil society, rather than the state. Invigorated social movements may thus become effective forces which states will have to reckon with in formulating policy. Neoliberalism is becoming increasingly contested and the social and political problems it is causing may determine that its days (or years?) are counted.

This critique, however, shrinks when compared to the accomplishments of GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE. This book will become standard reference for any serious student of development in the age of globalization. It is a must-read for specialists, and it could be fruitfully used in upper division and graduate courses of development economics and economic sociology. I give it my strongest recommendation.

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Reviewed by Stephen K. Sanderson, Department of Sociology, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana, Pennsylvania, USA.

In this extraordinary book, the Australian economic historian Graeme Donald Snooks seeks to do not only the impossible, but the unthinkable: construct a single theoretical model that is capable not only of explaining all of human history and prehistory, but all of the most important transformations that have occurred on earth over the past four billion years! And he nearly pulls it off. Snooks formulates a model that he variously calls MATERIALIST MAN or DYNAMIC MATERIALISM. This model assumes that both genetic and social change are driven by a similar mechanism, which is the desire to gain control over resources so as to maximize the probability of survival and material prosperity. Applied specifically to humans, Snooks's model holds that humans have an innate desire to increase their wealth and power. Indeed, he claims that they have an insatiable desire to accumulate material possessions. The history and prehistory of human societies is therefore a complex tale in which humans have adopted one or another of four basic strategies in order to achieve their objectives: family multiplication, technological advance, conquest, and commerce. Societies may use more than one of these, but one is usually dominant, especially in the most successful societies. Strategies are chosen for their effectiveness, within the total context of social, cultural, and historical circumstances, in promoting economic well-being and growth. However, any given strategy will eventually exhaust its potentialities, and a new one must then be taken up.

The strategy of FAMILY MULTIPLICATION was the dominant strategy of achieving economic well-being throughout all of human prehistory. It involved producing offspring who would eventually migrate and fill up surrounding territories. According to Snooks, this gave humans greater control over natural resources through the extended family. The big problem with this strategy was that, although it permitted a certain level of material well-being, it was unable to generate any real economic
growth or raise living standards. As a result, other strategies came into the picture.

One of these was the TECHNOLOGY strategy, which involves the invention and deployment of new or better tools and techniques. It was often used throughout human history, but usually only as a subsidiary strategy. As a primary strategy, it has been most notably employed in Europe between about AD 1000 and 1500, and then again in Europe beginning with the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century. Why has it been so little employed? Snooks’s answer is that it was generally too expensive in comparison to other strategies. Snooks is highly critical of the conventional assumption made by historians that the agrarian civilizations of the ancient world gave little emphasis to technological advance because they were essentially uninterested in economic growth. They were keenly interested in such growth, he says, but had more cost-effective ways of achieving it.

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The most important of these other growth-inducing strategies was CONQUEST. This involved the military invasion of other societies and their incorporation into the political structure of the conquering state. The economic benefits of this strategy were many, including additional agricultural land; additional labour in the form of slaves and soldiers; additional fixed capital in the form of captured military equipment, irrigation systems, buildings, transport facilities, etc.; treasure; and additional tax revenue? (p. 276). This strategy was preferred to all others because it was the most cost-efficient and produced the greatest return on investment. In order to achieve this return, ancient civilizations had to give emphasis to one form of technological advance, that involving military technology. The advance of military technology in the ancient world occurred, Snooks says, because war was not a game but a business, and in fact a very big business.

In his explication of the conquest strategy, Snooks discusses at length the Assyrians, the Macedonians, and the Romans as leading examples. But China, he argues, did not really follow this strategy, and in fact could not follow it, because of a lack of suitable surrounding societies that were worth conquering. China instead relied mainly on
the family multiplication and technological strategies at various points in its history.

Conquest produced great material gain for its conquerors, but on a global scale it was a zero-sum game. The remaining strategy, though, that of COMMERCE, was capable of allowing societies to break out of this zero-sum straightjacket. The commerce strategy is, for Snooks, essentially one of trade. It could only be effectively employed by societies that had a favorable geographical location, such as on a major body of water, or along the path of a land trading route. Societies in highly geographically and economically differentiated regions might also benefit from trade. Snooks's leading examples are ancient Mesopotamia, Minoan society, the Phoenicians, classical Athens, the Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa at the time of the Renaissance, and Europe between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.

I found THE DYNAMIC SOCIETY to be an extremely provocative read and compelling in many ways. In my view one of the most compelling features of the book is its resolute materialism. Snooks not only defends his MATERIALIST MAN against what he regards as the conventional view of social scientists and historians, MORAL/POLITICAL MAN, but he grounds his economic materialism in a deeper Darwinian materialism. Humans, for Snooks, are Darwinian organisms, which is to say that they have been built for a struggle for survival and a maximization of material advantage. It seems to me that this grounding assumption is not only fundamentally correct, but absolutely necessary to a proper understanding of the nature of human society, its historical evolution, and its future possibilities.

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Snooks's model of MATERIALIST MAN leads him to many crucial insights. One of the most important is his argument that people usually do not struggle for power for its own sake, but rather seek it because it will promote the realization of material advantage. Power, he says, is largely about economics. Perhaps the best example of this is war. Snooks has exactly the right response to Weberian theorists like Michael Mann who assert that the military objectives of agrarian civilizations were essentially independent of economic objectives. War in the agrarian world, Snooks tells us, was all about economics, because
conquest was the most cost-efficient strategy of material
gain.

But although I have found Snooks’s broad outline of the flow of human history quite compelling, I have some serious reservations regarding a number of details. I would question, for example, his notion of family multiplication as a general economic strategy followed in Paleolithic societies. What Snooks seems to mean by this is population increase in order to provide an adequate labor force. Such a strategy certainly makes sense in situations where labor is scarce, but the real problem for Paleolithic and early Neolithic societies is too many people, not too few. A great deal of anthropological and archaeological evidence suggests that societies at these evolutionary levels are far more preoccupied with controlling numbers than with expanding them. And how, exactly, would family multiplication work in such societies? Among hunter-gatherers and horticulturalists, for example, when a camp or village begins to press too severely against resources a new camp or village will be hived off and go its own separate way, thus having little interaction with the original settlement. Later in the book (p. 227) Snooks does acknowledge the existence of family planning as an alternative to family multiplication, but this appears suddenly out of nowhere and is never systematically theorized.

Moreover, Snooks is not very clear about just why humans abandoned the family multiplication strategy in favor of one of the others. Part of his answer seems to be the inability of technologically primitive societies to raise living standards beyond a minimal level. But this is extremely questionable. Evidence marshalled by anthropologists and archaeologists in recent years suggests that living standards were actually higher, as measured by nutrition and health, among Paleolithic hunter-gatherers than among Neolithic horticulturalists and later agriculturalists. And why? Because of growing population pressure, which itself was very likely the cause of the shift to cultivation in the first place. In fact, Snooks seems to have a general misunderstanding of the relationship between technological development and the standard of living. He insists, for example, that the successful employment of the conquest strategy in ancient civilizations raised the standard of living for everyone. But this is very difficult to accept. Most peasant farmers
in agrarian civilizations were worse off, sometimes much worse off, than both early Neolithic cultivators and Paleolithic hunter-gatherers. The standard of living has generally DECLINED throughout human history and prehistory, at least for the average individual, and it was only with the rise of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution that living standards began to rise dramatically for the mass of the population.

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I also have some questions regarding Snook’s specific employment of his four economic strategies. To take just one of the more prominent examples, consider Snook’s claim that Europe between AD 1000 and 1500 relied heavily on the technology strategy. To support his claim he is able to cite numerous examples of technological development during this time, but isn’t it just as logical, if not more logical, to regard European societies at this time as employing the commerce strategy. William McNeill has argued that the world as a whole experienced a tremendous jump in the level of commerce after AD 1000, and certainly Europe, in particular the Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa, was a huge part of this commercial thrust. In fact, why separate the technology and commerce strategies in this case. Could it not be persuasively argued that Europe was using technological advance to promote a commerce strategy, just as the ancient civilizations promoted the development of military technology to support their conquest strategies? And what about the period since the Industrial Revolution? Once again Snooks refers to this period as one characterized by the use of the technology strategy, but could we not argue that it was really the commerce strategy -- perhaps better labeled the CAPITALIST strategy, since it was world production as well as world trade that was involved -- that was dominant and being served by technological advance?

Snooks is an economic historian, and THE DYNAMIC SOCIETY reads like it was written by one. There is certainly nothing wrong with that, but Snooks gets himself into trouble by seldom if ever looking at world history as a sociologist would. As already indicated, I agree with the rational choice grounding assumptions of this book, but one cannot simply stop there. This book seems to contain ONLY individuals, there being little if any recognition of
the importance of social classes and economic inequalities as strongly implicated in world historical development. A glaring example of this absence involves Snook’s analysis of Roman conquest. As he puts it, 

?Conquest was a business pursued to achieve the materialistic ends of ALL ROMAN CITIZENS? (p. 293; emphasis added). ALL ROMAN CITIZENS?! Does Snooks really believe that the needs and concerns of all Roman citizens, rather than those of Roman elites, were being considered by the Roman polity in its mapping out of its objectives? Indeed he does, for he says at the beginning of the book that ‘the dynamics of human society arises from the decision making not just of small elites but of all members of society both male and female throughout the world? (p. xiv). Although elites may capture a disproportionate share of the economic surplus, he says, they merely express the general desires of humanity. If we shift our focus from the ancient world to modern times, we run into a similar problem. The modern world, many would say, is quintessentially a capitalist world, but capitalists are strangely absent from Snook’s view of this world. There are just individuals pursuing their economic objectives, all of which are the same. Having said this, it will come as no surprise to readers of this review that Snooks makes no mention of world-system theory or any of its formulators, a glaring omission it seems to me.

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Since I am running out of space, let me make just two more critical points. I find highly persuasive Snook’s claim that societies select economic strategies on the basis of what will produce, under particular historical and social circumstances, the best material results for the lowest costs. I think he is right that the conquest strategy was the principal strategy of the ancient world because it was economically superior to the commerce and technology strategies. However, Snooks provides precious little, if any, empirical evidence to support this view, or for his view of the superiority of the other strategies under different circumstances. Snooks argues his case well, but hardheaded empiricists will be put off by the lack of any convincing hard data to back up his argument.

Finally, it should be noted that Snooks comes off
as a radical antienvironmentalist. He is openly hostile to
the view of scientists like Meadows, Meadows, and Randers in
their book BEYOND THE LIMITS that we need to be slowing
economic growth and reducing environmental depletion or
face possible catastrophe in the next century. For Snooks,
this is the worst possible prescription, for it would reduce
the intense competitive pressures that have been responsible
for economic growth throughout world history. And he is
certain that humans will be able to respond to the current
challenge with the technological means to make continued
economic growth possible. He could be right, of course,
but much more caution seems to be called for. Never before
has human society been confronted with the kind of
ecological impact that the current economic system is
generating, and never before has the time period within
which massive technological change is required been so
short. The current situation is, therefore, unlike all its
predecessors, and that should not be taken lightly.

My grand conclusions on Snooks are therefore mixed,
but I have to admit that I found this book tremendously
exciting. Who should read it? Quite simply, all scholars
who are concerned with BIG HISTORY, whatever their
theoretical orientation or political stripe. It should
have a wide audience, and will be both vigorously defended
by some and bitterly attacked by others. I am well aware
that its Darwinian and rational choice foundations will be
strongly resisted by world-system theorists, but I have
long believed that these are exactly the right assumptions
for world-system theorists to adopt. Indeed, for me
world-system theory only makes sense in light of such
assumptions. And this should be especially the case for
those, such as Frank, Chase-Dunn, and Hall, who wish to
posit world-system-like activities thousands of years
earlier than AD 1500. Let’s face it, this is what
humans are like whether we like it or not.

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The International People's Tribunal to Judge the G-7 was convened in Tokyo in 1993 to coincide with the G-7 meetings also held in Tokyo. The G-7 group consists of the Finance Ministers and Heads of State of Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Its focus is the world economy, although other urgent items are discussed. The Tribunal was initiated in 1992 at a Washington meeting of 100 NGO activists. It is affiliated with the Rome-based Permanent People's Tribunal. The Tribunal to Judge the G-7 gathered evidence and, utilizing international law such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, judged the G-7's "complicity" in the present global capitalist economic system, and in particular the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), enforced through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

This little book contains testimony of individuals from Japan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sudan, Jamaica, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Brazil affiliated with universities, independent research institutes and other NGOs. It contains an eloquent statement from a farmer from Japan. It concludes with a document of indictment, which summarizes the case against the G-7 in straightforward language. Testimonies cover

The testimonies are uneven. Some are excellent and well documented. Others critique the capitalist development process generally and at least one (Budiman) presents a list of major debtor countries suggesting that Indonesia ranks second only to India in total international indebtedness. The table does not list either Brazil or Mexico, both of which have larger debts than Indonesia.

SAPs are agreed to by the debtor country as a condition for receiving a SAL (Structural Adjustment Loan) from the IMF. Generally, other lending is keyed on approval of the SAL.
and acceptable progress toward fulfilling the SAP. The SAPs generally contain specifics for accomplishing the following: reduction of the size of the government and the fiscal deficit, privatization of particular government enterprises, liberalization of foreign investment, and "getting prices right" including currency devaluation, substantial tariff and domestic subsidy reduction.

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While presenters agree that the import-substitution statist approaches previously pursued by many Third World governments had ultimately failed the masses. However, they argue, the SAPs were designed above all else to ensure that transnational corporations (TNCs) could operate freely throughout the Third World. While ostensibly designed to encourage more efficient production and delivery of services in debtor countries, citizens in those countries was not served by the SAPs? neither in the short nor the longer term. Presenters at the Tribunal suggest the following reasons: 1) The SAPs result in debtor countries "eating their seed corn." Investments in human capital (including both educational and health services) and infrastructure have been curtailed sharply in many countries in order to shrink government. Jennifer Jones, a Jamaican NGO leader, shows that the percentage of the Jamaican national budget represented by the Ministries of Construction (Roads and Housing), Public Utilities and Transport, Agriculture, and Youth and Community Development, and Local Government declined by from half to 70% from the 1970s to the 1990s. Per capita expenditures for education and for health declined by about 1/5. Only the percentages for the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Finance grew. The latter, which manages and pays the national external debt, represented over half the total budget by the early 1990s.

2) Isagani Serrano, Vice President of the Philippines Rural Reconstruction Movement, points out that "getting the prices right" is a good deal more complicated, because of externalities, than is suggested by the free marketers. He points out, "Structural adjustment was just as environmentally blind as the previous State-dominated structures that it was trying to undo" (p. 109), and
argues that cutting back spending "undermined the
government's capacity for environmental management"
(p. 114). He also admits that South Korea cut down 1/3 of
its forests while pursuing a successful state-led Export
Oriented Industrialization. One might conclude that the
culprit with respect to environmental degradation may be
economic growth, but the SAPs offer no solution. More
broadly, if the SAPs ultimately serve the interests of the
TNCs at the expense of the people in debtor countries, then
one would not expect the internalization of
externalities—whether they be deteriorating
infrastructure, human capital erosion, or environmental
degradation—in "getting the prices right."

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3) Maria Clara Couto Soares of IBASE, the Brazilian
Institute for Social and Economic Analysis, in the best
essay in the book, analyzes the process of debt repayment
and assesses the impact of the SAPs in that country. She
points out that the foreign debt by 1985 was US$105
billion, up 64% over 1980, in spite of the fact that Brazil
paid US$91 billion in foreign debt service in that period.
In order to make payments on the external debt, the
government (lacking a fiscal surplus), issued bonds to
purchase hard currency from exporters. This increased the
Brazilian government's domestic debt and triggered
inflation. Efforts to dampen that inflation brought
recession. Annual GDP growth was 1.7% in the
1980s—less than the population growth rate. Poverty
grew more than 50% over the decade. And by 1989, Brazil's
debt had actually grown to $115 billion. Two sectors in
Brazil did quite well—exporters and the financial sector,
who were able to make considerable sums through
speculation. By the 1990s, Brazil had the greatest income
inequality of any country in the world. Soares concludes by
saying that structural adjustment and its neo-liberal
policies have not provided a base for new development, but
rather have eroded the previously developed productive and
institutional structure and technological capabilities.

4) The Tribunal's "Indictment" does a good job of
discussing the relationships which have weakened the ability
of indebted Third World countries to provide for their
people: The G-7 desires to remain dominant through the
"constant expansion of global capital" (p. 126).
However, the global expansion of capital reduces the power
of the G-7 nations, as they have become "front men for
global capital" (p. 127). The World Bank is also a
servant to the TNCs rather than "serving the common
good," as was the GATT (now the World Trade
Organization--WTO). Indictments include violation of
Articles 23, 26, and 25, which forbid denial of the right
to work, the right to education and the right to a standard
of living adequate for health and well being; usurpation of
the sovereignty guaranteed member states in the UN Charter
through the imposition of SAPs via secret negotiations and
rulings by the IMF and World Bank; etc. These violations
are presented in more detail in an introductory essay by
Richard Falk, international legal scholar.

While the indictments are well argued, the call to action
may be satisfying to those who made it, but not very
realistic politically. Organized citizen groups are
exhorted to demand compensation from the responsible
institutions to those who were harmed by SAPs, and to
obtain recognition by G-7 leaders of their of personal
responsibility for the suffering that structural adjustment
has caused. Based on a secret analysis by the IMF of 66 SAPs
which apparently shows almost a total failure to achieve
their fiscal, monetary, income growth, and debt reduction
objectives, the Tribunal suggests that the IMF be required
to compensate "SAPped" countries through debt
reduction for the harm done by SAPs to people and that the
World Bank compensate persons harmed by its failed
projects.

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While these are interesting ideas, I would have been more
satisfied if there had also been analysis of possible
contradictions in the system and of the circumstances under
which the G-7, the World Bank, or others might be persuaded
to counter the power of the TNCs. Perhaps, with organized
citizen pressure, issues like global warming could become a
cause for which the G-7 countries, in their own self
interest, would discard free market concepts and provide
grants to Third World countries and to their farmers,
indigenous peoples, and others to encourage for reducing
pollution reduction and rain forest conservation. At what
point, given the increased capacity and pressure for the World Bank to evaluate projects it supports, will the World Bank conclude that the principles behind the SAPs’ and eventually the globalizing development model which underlies the SAPs--must be radically altered? There are efforts within the Bank to change the corporate culture from an engineering mentality to one which gives greater importance to social results. How successful those efforts will be is unclear, and may depend also on citizen pressure for internalizing the externalities generated by the TNCs. Only once in this book are the NGO coalitions mentioned which have grown up around the major UN Conferences of the past decade on women, the environment, food security, etc. How might they contribute to such citizen pressure?

This book is aimed at activists, and is written in straightforward prose. It is also appropriate as a textbook in advanced undergraduate courses as well as graduate courses on international development and related topics. At the graduate level it should be supplemented by other readings on Globalization. I expect to assign the four chapters I cited above in the introductory part of my graduate rural development course. Although the "Indictment" chapter has shortcomings, it should generate a healthy discussion on the relationship among actors in the Globalization process and regarding appropriate tactics for diminishing or reorienting the global power of TNCs.

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Reviewed by Claudia Buchmann, Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA.

The stated goal of DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT is to provide an interdisciplinary overview to issues of Third World development. Lewellen likens the task to a guided tour through the Metropolitan Museum of Art; it is intended to provide a background to a vast and varied subject and a "mental map" for more-focused return visits.

The book begins by addressing various terms used to refer to the poorer nations of the world. After explaining the origin of the term "Third World," its pejorative nature, and the inadequacy of other alternatives (i.e., less developed countries, the periphery, developing nations, the South), Lewellen concludes that all are inadequate yet none are avoidable.

After this insightful discussion, I was surprised that he classifies the poorest countries as "the Fourth World," since this classification perpetuates the terminology he deems problematic. The rest of the first chapter discusses features common to most Third World nations -- poverty, economic dependency, soft states, population growth -- and provides a clear sense of what is to follow.

Chapter two contains a "brief history" of major Third World regions (Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa) which, while perhaps necessary, comes off like a tedious history lesson. Major theories of development, namely modernization and dependency perspectives are the focus of chapter three. Here the author is careful to distinguish among the variants of each (such as the ECLA model, dependency theory, and world system theory). This brief but lucid presentation is well-summarized with a detailed chart of major paradigms and concludes with a call for a greater synthesis of these perspectives. Chapters four and five rise to this call by focusing first on domestic economies and internal factors and then the international economy and external factors in facilitating or impeding development. Chapter five is more cohesive than chapter four and includes one of the best
short summaries of the debt crisis and foreign aid to date. These first five chapters provide the new student of development with a succinct and well-organized introduction to Third World development but also serve as comprehensive review for the informed reader. At times, the text gets bogged down in the tension between generalization and detail. The author tends to list numerous countries with little or no elaboration in lieu of detailed examples of main points. For example, in a discussion of unequal exchange and raw material exports, eleven countries are presented in less than one page. Similarly, four short paragraphs on land reform cover the experiences of eight countries. In other cases, statistics are presented for the Third World as a whole without acknowledgement of the diversity that is masked by such summary statistics. Neither strategy works very well. A more reader-friendly approach would have been to present one or two country-specific examples in greater detail and leave the categorization of numerous countries to charts or figures.

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The remaining chapters focus on specific topics -- politics, population, environmental problems and human rights -- in a Third World context. Each of these chapters could easily stand alone and they vary in terms of coverage. Chapter seven on population is interesting and inclusive while chapter six on politics is fragmented and misses some major issues. Here, the discussion of strong and weak states is severely limited and there is no mention of the rich civil society that pervades the political sphere in much of the Third World. Although the topic has been the focus of much recent theorizing across many disciplines, it is curiously absent from this volume. In chapters six through ten, as in earlier ones, greater use of charts and figures to present statistics would have aided the reader. As a comprehensive overview to Third World development, the book is largely successful. It encompasses a wide range of theoretical approaches and topics in a concise and well-organized text. Lewellen clarifies terms for the novice but avoids oversimplification in the presentation of most issues. For this reason, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT should appeal to a diverse audience. It is appropriate for use in general
undergraduate classes on development as well as more advanced graduate-level courses.

The book has two weaknesses. First, it only partially achieves the stated goal of being "truly interdisciplinary" (p. x). On one hand, Lewellen, a cultural anthropologist includes a cultural perspective that is missing from many development textbooks. This was a welcome addition. Yet, the contributions of many well-known sociologists of development (i.e., John Walton, Alejandro Portes, Stephen Bunker, Charles Ragin) are neglected in the text and are completely absent from the suggested readings and bibliography. While an interdisciplinary overview of the broad, multi-faceted topic of Third World development is an enormous undertaking, it might have been accomplished with more disciplinary balance.

Finally, as a guide for more focused study on a specific region or issue the book falls short. The text contains few citations for follow-up reading. Often the author refers to "some theorists" or "a group of scholars" without providing references. Some sections cite one or two works repeatedly instead of providing a variety of references on the topic. The suggested readings provided at the end of each chapter, although useful, do not make up for the lack of cited material. They include too many general overviews or reports (such as the World Bank's World Development Report) and too few academic books and articles. Nonetheless, the book's strengths -- its comprehensive scope and well-organized format -- outweigh these shortcomings. As a result, it should find a place in many courses on Third World development.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE is the
second edition of a text first published in 1989. The
author's objective, as stated in the Preface to the first
dition, is to "provide students with an accessible
introduction to world system theory that is firmly embedded
in history." Although aimed at undergraduates, the book
will also be of interest to graduate students and others who
are looking for a guide into the large amount of theoretical
and empirical work in the field.

The book covers the following topics: origins of world
system theory; defining characteristics of the world
system; history of the world system; structure of the
present world system; processes of change; contemporary
developments in world system analysis; criticisms of world
system theory; and the author's own evaluation of the
perspective. Changes from the first edition include
addition of a chapter on "New Directions in World
System Analysis," and various revisions to reflect
changes in the periphery and semi-periphery, dismantling of
the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. Shannon also
states in the Preface to the second edition that he has
attempted to "correct some unintentionally harsh
statements in my final evaluation of the perspective that
seem to have misled readers about where my general
theoretical sympathies lie."

A strength of this book as a textbook is that it attempts
to address comprehensively the entire range of concerns of
world system analysis. Most of the other available
undergraduate texts are more narrowly focused on the
economic development of the periphery (e.g. John Isbister,
PROMISES NOT KEPT; Philip McMichael, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL
CHANGE; Alvin Y. So, SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT) or on
specific world issues (e.g. York W. Bradshaw and Michael
Wallace, GLOBAL INEQUALITIES).
In contrast, Shannon deals systematically with the core and semi-periphery, as well as the periphery, and with a range of concerns, including methodological questions, the issue of pre-modern world systems, hegemonic struggles, the decline of core nations, etc.

The new chapter on "New Directions in World System Analysis" is a definite enhancement. It deals with the analysis of race, gender and culture in the world system; methodological issues; and the debates over the existence and nature of earlier world systems. This chapter demonstrates the continued growth and vitality of the world system perspective. I hope that Shannon will expand the chapter in future editions to include efforts underway to apply the perspective in other areas such as analysis of the environment, urbanization and social movements.

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Shannon's chapters on the defining characteristics and history of the world system are especially useful. I know of no other source with so much of the relevant information so clearly stated for an undergraduate audience. I used the first edition several times in courses for advanced undergraduates. Students were invariably grateful to Shannon for helping them understand the history of the world as a coherent system rather than as a confusing array of disconnected or random events and personalities.

Shannon has worked to make the book accessible to student readers. He states in the Preface to the first edition, "I have...avoided assuming very much prior background on the part of the reader. I have learned that one cannot assume even the most basic historical or geographic knowledge when addressing an undergraduate audience." Despite these efforts, the text is probably best suited to well-prepared, higher level students -- advanced undergraduates and graduate students. In my experience, those who have not taken some combination of college-level courses in economics, history and sociology find this book somewhat overwhelming, rather than challenging. For example, the chapters on history, although lucid, are still too abstract for readers with little knowledge of world history. Other chapters require
a prior introduction to economic terminology. For example, the following concepts are introduced without explanation in chapter 1, "The Origins of World System Theory" -- commercialization, capital investment, infrastructure, subcomponents, industrialization, etc. In fairness to Shannon, the book's failure to be more accessible to less advanced undergraduates is partly an outcome of the book's topic, i.e. it is a book about the world system PERSPECTIVE, not a book about the WORLD SYSTEM. Since the world system perspective is a revision of prior thinking in most of the social sciences, it cannot be fully appreciated without knowledge of the thinking it has rejected or synthesized in a new way. If someone were to attempt to write an accessible undergraduate text on the WORLD SYSTEM, they would be freer to write for a wider audience. Interestingly, such books are beginning to appear at the K-12 level! (See, for example, Ifikhar Ahmad et al., WORLD CULTURES: A GLOBAL MOSAIC. This is a social studies text for middle school students which contains insights from the world system perspective (Prentice Hall, 1993). Ahmad is a researcher at the Fernand Braudel Center and has a Ph.D. in Sociology from Binghamton University.)

In sum, Shannon's book is a fine text for advanced undergraduate courses emphasizing the world system perspective, and an excellent reference for graduate students and others interested in the perspective. I trust that it will be a popular text, and hope Shannon will continue to update the book and keep it in print for future use.

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