RESEARCH NOTE: HOW DID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE AFFECT WOMEN’S SHARE OF THE LABOR FORCE IN THE 1980S?

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ABSTRACT

Changes in women’s share of the labor force are examined by analyzing data from 40 Less Developed Countries and 20 more advanced industrialized countries. Results show that women did not gain any control of the labor force in the 1980s. Although Less Developed Countries (LDCs) moved toward convergence with advanced industrialized countries on measures of fertility and trade dependence, major economic and social differences remained.

INTRODUCTION

Women’s contributions to the global economy have received increased attention in the last twenty years. It is common knowledge that women workers from all over the world produce the clothes on our backs and many of the conveniences in our homes. Yet, as the awareness of women’s contributions to the global economy increased, no one has tested empirically whether women’s share of the labor force changed during the 1980s. We are left with a number of questions: Did women’s share of the labor force change in the world economy? If it did, were those changes different for LDCs than they were for more advanced industrialized countries? Also, what other economic and social changes occurred in the 1980s, and did those changes have an effect on women’s share of the labor force? By analyzing data from 1980 and 1990 on 40 Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and 20 more advanced industrialized countries, for which data were available, I shed some light on how changes in the global economy did (or did not) affect women’s lives.

REVIEW

Previous research on how women’s share of the labor force was affected by the world-economy focused on the effects of economic development and trade dependency (Ward 1984; Pampel and Tanaka 1986; Semyonov and Shenhav 1986; Clarke et al. 1991). Economic development was hypothesized to increase women’s share of the labor force. As a country’s GNP per capita increased, it was hypothesized that the wage rates available to all would increase as would job opportunities. Educational opportunities and health care would improve with development as well. Through such advancements, women would be better suited for employment because of education and training and because, through better health care information and facilities, they would be able to better control their fertility. Earlier researchers therefore tested the effects of a country’s GNP per capita, education of women, and fertility rates on women’s share of the labor force.
As presented in Table 1, the findings were mixed (Ward 1984; Pampel and Tanaka 1986; Semyonov and Shenhav 1986; Clarke et al. 1991).

The findings on the effects of trade dependency were mixed as well (see Table 1). Kathryn Ward (1984) hypothesized that trade dependency had specific and deleterious effects on women's employment. She argued that upon inclusion in the world-system, women experienced a disruption of their traditional sources of economic livelihood, because they were only offered limited access to paid labor. Men, on the other hand, were given access to the new crops, credit and technology. She found support for this hypothesis in her tests for the effects of foreign direct investment and commodity concentration on women's share of the labor force. Both indicators were found to have a negative effect on women's share of the labor force. As presented in Table 1, Clarke et al. (1991) found similar results, but others did not (Pampel and Tanaka 1986; Semyonov and Shenhav 1986).

All previous research on the effects of the world-economy on women's labor force participation were conducted using data from 1965-1980. Time has passed, and many changes in the global economy have occurred; therefore, a reexamination of these hypotheses is warranted.

DATA AND METHODS

Statistical Models. Early cross-national research on female labor force participation used panel data in which the independent variables were lagged five to ten years behind the dependent variables, in order to allow for the effects of development or dependence to affect women's share of the labor force. Lagged dependent variables were not included as regressors (Ward 1984; Pampel and Tanaka 1986; Semyonov and Shenhav 1988). These are called lagged regressor models.

\[ y_{i2} = a + b x_{i1} \] (lagged regressor model)

Later, models that attempted to control for base levels of the dependent variable at \( t/1 \) by including it as a regressor became more accepted in the dependency literature (Wimberley 1990). These are called lagged \( y \)-regressor models.

\[ y_{i2} = a + b y_{i1} + b x_{i1} \] (lagged \( y \)-regressor model)

Of the cross-national research on women's share of the labor force discussed above, only Clark et al. (1991) employed this statistical model. However, these models received some important criticism. Firebaugh and Beck (1994) claimed that the specific panel analyses used by most of the dependency researchers, the lagged \( y \)-regressor model described above, does not control for the effects of unmeasured and unchanging characteristics of countries. They recommended the use of a "first-difference model" for cross-national
studies. This model uses change scores for both the independent and dependent variables. For example, \((y_{2} - y_{11})\) is regressed upon a series of independent variables, each in difference form \((x_{2} - x_{11})\).

Since I wanted to find the effects of economic growth and changes in dependence on exports, I have taken the recommendation of Firebaugh and Beck and included the first-difference model in my analyses.

\[(y_{2} - y_{11}) = a + b(x_{2} - x_{11})\text{ (first-difference model)}\]

However, one drawback of the first-difference model is that it removes the effects of differences in levels of development or dependency. In order to test for the effects of differences in levels and changes on women's share of the labor force, I conducted analyses using all three statistical models. This also allows for a comparison of my results with those from previous research. In this study, \(t1 = 1980\) and \(t2 = 1990\); a ten year lag is allowed for effects to manifest themselves.

In another attempt to test for the effects of levels of development on women's share of the labor force, analyses of variance were conducted. Countries were either coded as more advanced industrialized or less developed, based on their status as OECD countries and their 1980 real GDP/capita. If a country was a member of the OECD or it had a 1980 real GDP/capita of $6,000 or more it was coded as "more advanced industrialized". The means of the two samples on all indicators were compared to see if there were significant differences between the more advanced industrialized countries and less developed countries.

Sample: Analyses included all 60 countries, 40 Less Developed Countries and 20 advanced industrialized countries for which data were available. The sample includes many, but not all, of the same countries included in previous studies (see Appendix Table I).

**Table 1** Previous Cross-National Studies of Female Share of the Labor Force (FSLF).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Countries in Sample</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Statistical Model Used</th>
<th>Variables In Study-Significant Predictors of FSLF</th>
<th>Included Non-signiff. Predictors of FSLF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Model Type</td>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampel and Tamaka (1986)</td>
<td>70 advanced &amp; less developed</td>
<td>1965-1970</td>
<td>Lagged Regressor</td>
<td>imp/exp + inv. dep.</td>
<td>development + imp/exp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>development&quot;U&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>chd/woman -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-sah. Afr, 2° educ and Asian dummy +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semyonov and Shenharv (1988)</td>
<td>53 less developed</td>
<td>1965-1970</td>
<td>Lagged Regressor</td>
<td>Development + inv. dep.</td>
<td>1° educ. + urbani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1970-1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islam dummy -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marx dummy +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key to Abbreviations: + positive relationship; - negative relationship; "U": curvilinear relationship; trade dep.: trade dependence; inv. dep.: investment dependence; imp/exp: import/export balance of trade; LF: change in labor force; inv. dep.: change in investment dependence; imp/exp: change in import/export balance of trade; chd/woman: number of children age 0-9 divided by the number of women 25-44; 3° educ.: percent of females enrolled in colleges/universities; 2° educ.: percent of females enrolled in secondary education; 1° educ.: percent of females enrolled in primary education; divorce: crude divorce rate, gov. revs.: government revenues as a percent of GDP; Cultural/Regional dummy variables: Sub-saharan Africa, Asian, Latin, African, Islamic, Marxist.

MEASURES

Dependent variable. Female Share of the labor force is measured as the total number of adult females (fifteen years old and older) in the labor force divided by the total adult labor force. These are International Labor Organization data (from Social Indicators of Development 1991-92 and The World Tables 1984) which have the limitation that the number of economically active women is often underestimated due to the exclusion of unpaid agricultural and family workers (Dixon-Mueller and Anker 1985; World Bank 1990). However, Female Share of the labor force is the most consistently reported indicator of women’s employment, and it is highly correlated with the percent of age-appropriate women in the labor force2 (Ward 1984).
Economic Growth and Modernization Measures: Logged real GDP per capita was used as an independent variable to test the effects of changes in the relative wealth of nations. Because modernization does not necessarily occur just through economic growth, but also through changes in policies and attitudes, other measures that specifically affect women’s employment were included. Measures of changes in fertility were included, because it is hypothesized that as the number of children women bear increases, women’s employment is impeded. The total Fertility Rate for each country was included in analyses. This is the number of children a woman would bear if she were to live from the beginning to the end of the childbearing years, bearing children at each age according to the age-specific fertility rates of the year to which the total fertility rate applies (World Bank 1988). This is a useful measure because it can be interpreted as the average completed family size for women implicit in the current age-specific raw fertility rates. The variable Secondary Education was measured as percent of females at the appropriate age enrolled at the secondary level of education. This measure was included, because as women’s educational achievements increased, it would be expected that they would be viewed as more employable. Of course, the ability to improve the education and health of women is dependent on a country’s economic growth, but other foreign aid and political changes could be responsible, too. Data on fertility (1980) were found in The World Tables (1984). Other data on fertility (1990) and education were found in The World Development Report (1992-1995). Real GDP/capita data were obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston and Summers 1999).

Trade Dependence: I included the classical dependency measure Commodity Concentration. Commodity Concentration was measured as the percentage of all of a country’s exports done in a single commodity. The main justification for use of this measure is that it is the most commonly used measure of dependence on exports. Therefore, it allows me to compare my results with previous research. Commodity Concentration is a measure of trade diversification. If 75% of a country’s exports are in one commodity, cocoa for example, that country is very vulnerable to fluctuations in the world-economy (Chase-Dunn 1975).

RESULTS

Did women gain any control of the labor force in the 1980s?

Table 2 presents the results of the paired-samples t-test conducted on the means of Female Share of the labor force in three different samples, all sixty countries, 20 advanced industrialized countries, and 40 LDCs. Women did not make any significant gains nor losses of the labor force in any of the three samples of countries.

Table 2. Results of Paired Samples t-Tests of Female Share of Labor Force in 1980 and 1990 for 60 Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Δ (1990-1980)</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means for all countries (N=60)</td>
<td>31.60</td>
<td>31.53</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.713</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What caused changes in women's share of the labor force?

Results of the OLS regression of Female Share of the labor force on measures of development and trade are presented in Table 3. Logged real GDP and Commodity Concentration were the only independent variables displaying significant effects on women's share of the labor force when they were included in the lagged regressors model. Assuming that the lagged regressors model is valid, for each one unit increase in Logged real GDP, women's share of the labor force would be expected to decrease by 7.8% (depending on the sample). For each percent increase in dependence on trade in one commodity, women's share of the labor force would decrease by approximately one-tenth of a percent. However, neither variable showed up as a significant indicator in the lagged y-regressors model nor the first-difference model. None of the other independent variables were significant in any of the models5.

Table 3. Results of OLS Regression of Female Share of the Labor Force on Measures of Development and Trade Dependency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(s.d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lagged-Regressor Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lagged-y Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First-Difference Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-213.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Share of the</td>
<td>-253.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labor force 1990</td>
<td>(78.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female population</td>
<td>-14.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.08 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-8.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP/capita</td>
<td>.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do levels of development matter?

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted in order to test whether changes in women's share of the labor force and measures of development and trade differed depending on a country's status as less-developed or industrialized. Results shown in Table 4 reveal that changes in women's share of the labor force were negative for LDCs and positive for industrialized countries, but the differences in changes were not significant. The lack of significant difference is partly due to the surprisingly small changes in women's share of the labor force over the entire decade. As discussed above, women did not gain (or lose) much control over the labor force in the second-to-last decade of this millennium.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N=40</th>
<th>N=20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change in FSLF 1980-1990</strong></td>
<td>-1.80</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP/capita 1980</strong></td>
<td>2277.95</td>
<td>9829.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1505.42)</td>
<td>(3160.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP/capita 1990</strong></td>
<td>2428.79</td>
<td>12414.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1504.4)</td>
<td>(3245.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in GDP/capita 1980-1990</strong></td>
<td>62.89</td>
<td>2585.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(637.01)</td>
<td>(896.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Females Enrolled in 2nd Education 1980</strong></td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.99)</td>
<td>(16.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Females Enrolled in 2nd Education 1990</strong></td>
<td>39.56</td>
<td>93.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24.94)</td>
<td>(15.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in % Females in 2nd Ed. 1980-90</strong></td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.75)</td>
<td>(6.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fertility Rates 1980</strong></td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fertility Rates 1990</strong></td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in Fertility 1980-1990</strong></td>
<td>-0.623</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: **p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, *p < 0.10**
Other levels and changes of development and trade do reveal significant differences between LDCs and more advanced industrialized countries. Less Developed Countries had a slower rate of economic growth, a 3% increase compared to the 26% increase for the more advanced industrialized countries. LDCs did have larger declines in the number of births per women than more advanced industrialized countries, and both LDCs and more developed countries experienced increases in the percent of females enrolled in secondary education. Changes in enrollment were not significantly different dependent on a country's status.

In terms of trade dependence, LDCs and more advanced industrialized countries became more alike. LDCs became less dependent upon exports of primary commodities, while advanced industrialized countries increased their commodity concentration. Those changes in commodity concentration were significantly different.

**DISCUSSION**

Women did not gain much control over the labor force in the 1980s. In fact, the gains were small, mostly in advanced industrialized countries, and insignificant. Women in advanced industrialized countries gained less than one-fifth of one percent of the labor force. This suggests that the increased awareness of women's economic contributions, especially in Less Developed Countries, reflects more of a cultural shift than an economic one. Scholars and the media heightened our awareness that women were making our tennis shoes and microchips, but women did not gain more control over the work force
during the 1980s. However, other economic and social changes that affect women did occur.

These results suggest that, for this time period, a country's level of development in 1980, as measured by logged real GDP per capita, actually had a negative affect on women's share of the labor force. This contradicts a modernization hypothesis that higher levels of economic development offer environments in which more women are accepted, prepared for and needed in the labor force. However, this finding was not supported in the results from the analyses employing the statistical models more widely accepted in comparative research today.

Negative affects of trade dependence were also found in results using the lagged regressors statistical model. Women's share of the labor force was lower in countries that were more dependent on trade in a primary commodity. This supports the classical dependency hypothesis that women are marginalized in trade dependent economies. However, the results were not robust in other analyses using the different statistical models.

A country's developmental status was important in determining the direction, and amount or rate of changes experienced during the eighties. Levels and changes in economic development and trade indicators affecting the World's women (and men) were found to be significantly different for LDCs and more advanced industrialized countries. First, LDCs did not experience as rapid economic growth as the advanced industrialized countries. This supports previous comparative research on economic development (Firebaugh 1992, Dixon and Boswell 1996). LDCs experienced economic growth, but it was "not as good as" the growth experienced by advanced industrialized countries. Second, although the 1980s were not a great decade in terms of gains in the labor force for women anywhere, LDCs converged with advanced industrialized countries in other ways. Fertility rates in the LDCs declined even more than they did in advanced industrialized countries, but the larger decline seen in LDCs just might have been due to the fact that there was more room for improvement than in more advanced developed countries. The average fertility rate for the 20 advanced countries was already below replacement level in 1980. Female enrollment in secondary education increased and dependence on exports of a primary commodity decreased in LDCs. Female enrollment in secondary education increased in advanced industrialized countries, also, but commodity concentration actually increased for this small sample of countries. In other words, although women did not gain much more control over the labor force in the eighties, their lives improved in other ways. Their chances of getting an education, avoiding continuous pregnancies, and living in a less economically vulnerable economy improved, especially in Less Developed Countries.

It is important to continue to monitor changes in women's labor force participation and other development and dependency indicators. Hopefully, in the nineties, women's participation in and share of the labor force has changed enough for us to develop an
understanding of what causes improvements in women's economic power. Hopefully any gains women made in the labor force in the nineties were more than just symbolic.

NOTES

1. Analyses were conducted using membership in the OECD (Organization for Economic and Cultural Development) only as a dummy independent variable, but there were few differences in the results.

2. Attempts to test hypotheses using a measure of the % of age appropriate women in the labor force (female labor force participation rates) were made, but data was not reliable enough to conduct analyses.

3. Previous research used GNP/capita as the measure of development, but there is now general agreement that real GDP/capita is a more appropriate measure of economic development for comparative research because it is a better indicator of purchasing power parity.

4. These models are comparable to models tested in previous research. To test other hypotheses, a measure of the % of Exports in Manufactured Commodities %Exports/GDP and a measure of Debt Servicing were also included in regression analyses, but none were found to be significant.

Appendix Table 1. Countries Included in Analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less Developed Countries</th>
<th>Industrialized Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Country</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REFERENCES


THE SOUTHERN AEGEAN SYSTEM*

Ina Berg

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Introduction

Although world-systems theory was originally formulated with our modern economic system in mind (Wallerstein 1974), it was not long before archaeologists began to apply it to ancient societies. Archaeologists and world-system theorists alike both argued that Wallerstein had disregarded evidence of interconnected, hierarchical systems in prehistoric times (Schneider 1977; Chase-Dunn & Hall 1991, 1997; Kardulias 1999a). Pailes and Whitecotton (1979) were among the first to modify world-systems theory for use in pre-capitalist settings. Since then many archaeologists have looked at data and regions with a world-systems perspective in mind (e.g. Champion 1989; Bilde et al. 1993; Rowlands & Larsen 1987; Kardulias 1999a). Some have attempted to map Wallerstein’s theory directly onto prehistory (Kohl 1979; Whitecotton & Pailes 1986; Ekholm & Friedman 1982). Others have found the world systems model heuristically useful but lacking the analytical power needed for their prehistoric cases (Blanton et al. 1981; Upham 1982; Plog 1983; Alcock 1993).

Building on the assumption that ancient societies were not qualitatively, but only quantitatively, different from modern capitalist ones (Schneider 1977; Sherratt & Sherratt 1991), this study applies world systems theory to the Southern Aegean during the Middle and Late Bronze Age (ca. 2000-1550 BC).

Crete and the Southern Aegean

Prehistoric settlements in the islands of the Southern Aegean show a dramatic increase of Cretan (Minoan) imports, local imitations and the adoption of Minoan architectural, ritual, and cultural features from the Middle to the early Late Bronze Age period (ca. 2000-1550 BC). This phenomenon has been called 'Minoanisation'. Irrespective of the reality of a political or military domination by Crete over islands in the Southern Aegean -- the so-called 'Minoan Thalassocracy' -- scholars refer to an interconnected political or economic system with Crete at its centre. Models for the observed interaction include exchange networks such as the 'Western String' (Davis 1979; Cherry & Davis 1982), political domination of the sea (Wiener 1990) and religious overlordship (Marinatos 1984) by Crete. It is apparent that exchange took place between these different regions, independent of whether one polity or island was pre-eminent in this interaction or not. The commodities traded in these networks probably included foodstuff, pottery, and
prestige goods that were not available locally (Davis 1979: 147), as well as technologies, iconography and mental constructs (e.g. Marinatos 1984, 1990; Davis 1984; Hood 1990).
Map 1: The Southern Aegean
Kardulias, a prominent world-systems theorist, believes that interaction between the Cyclades and Crete is best described as peer-polity interaction, i.e. as an interaction between roughly equal partners (1999b). During the Middle Bronze Age, "the archaeological record", says Kardulias, "indicates a symmetrical economic relationship among many of the settlements, but there is also evidence that Crete's 'pull' [e.g. emulation or 'Versailles effect', directional exchange along the 'Western String'] created some imbalances" (1999b: 190). As trade became increasingly important to Crete in the early Late Bronze Age, bigger quantities of Minoan features infiltrated the Aegean. There is evidence for Minoanisation not only of pottery, but also of technology and artistic expression in various sites. The Minoan world system "benefited many local communities and engendered, at most, a loose confederation within which Crete was unable to exercise hegemony even though her dynamic economy and elites generated much of the demand for goods that raised production levels and stimulated trade. While certain individuals may have desired to control the system, they could not fully exploit it because of the number of middlemen, and their relative isolation on so many islands." (Kardulias 1999b: 190-191).

Wilkinson on the other hand believes in 'unequal exchange' between Crete and the Aegean islands. He states that civilisations ordinarily have one of two political structures. One is the so-called 'states system' which is described as a network of many independent states. The other system is the 'universal empire' which consists of a one-state system (1991: 116). Based on these categories, Wilkinson sets out to define systems as either one or the other. He thus sees neopalatial Crete as a 'universal empire' or 'world state'. In this he follows a long-standing and powerful school of thought which sees Crete as the ruling and dominant power at the core of Aegean exchange (e.g. Evans 1928; Pendebury 1935; Buck 1962/63; Hood 1984; Hiller 1984; Strom 1984; Melas 1990). Conversely, Wilkinson regards Aegean history before the neopalatial period ("pre-thalassocracy") as a 'states system', thus representing independent and roughly equal partners (1991: 119).

After the collapse of the Cretan palaces, the Cretan core was succeeded by the previously semiperipheral Mainland. The Aegean islands are considered to be semiperiphery rather than periphery. This grants them limited political and economic power (Wilkinson 1991: 118-119). In comparison with the Mesopotamian world-system, Wilkinson sees the Cretan core as quite durable, lasting from ca. 2600 to 1425 BC. "Occasional rather than 'frequent' core shifts seem to characterise the Aegean civilisation" (one per millennium versus eight per millennium in Mesopotamia, and a similar frequency for Egypt) (Wilkinson 1991: 127).

The boundaries of the regional networks within the Southern Aegean system

It is difficult to define the nature and the extent of boundaries in a pre-capitalist world-system. Depending on the viewpoint taken, boundaries can be defined by various factors, such as trade and information flow (Renfrew 1977; Schortman & Urban 1987; Chase-Dunn & Hall 1997: 52 who further subdivide this category into bulk-goods and prestige-goods networks), political/military interaction (Chase-Dunn & Hall 1997: 52), or ideological factors (Schortman & Urban 1987: 69,76). Each one of these aspects can generate changes in an interrelated system. Thus, investigations into military interaction
will probably show different boundaries from those derived from prestige-goods. There is no easy solution to this problem, but Hall’s definition appears to be most practical: "...a 'world-system', or better core/periphery relations... are 'worlds' in the sense that they are far more self-contained than anything that exists outside of them." (Hall 1999: 4). In other words, interconnectedness provides the criterion for determining the external boundaries of a system, though it is not absolutely clear how much contact is enough to make the two units part of the same system.

As we have seen, assigning boundaries is a difficult task. Political, military, economic, or ideological parameters will potentially supply us with very different boundaries and spheres of interaction. Worse still, the researcher cannot always be sure which of the boundaries are visible in the material record. To circumvent this problem it becomes necessary to focus on classes of evidence which are indicative of one of the above mentioned network types (bulk-goods, prestige-goods, information, military/political or ideological networks). Unfortunately, our knowledge of the prehistoric Aegean is not detailed enough to match classes of evidence with network types and thus establish the external boundaries of the system. We can, however, gain some idea about boundaries by analysing the network outlines we get from all available classes of evidence. Although this procedure does not allow us to determine what the boundaries are of bulk-goods exchange or military interaction, etc., we can nevertheless use the evidence to give us a general picture of interaction in the Southern Aegean. As different kinds of evidence are interpreted together, it seems most likely that the boundaries we gain from this procedure will encompass trade, military/political, information and ideological interaction. Chase-Dunn and Hall have convincingly argued that information networks are generally the most expansive networks, whilst bulk-good ones are comparatively small (1997: 54). It seems likely that the boundaries determined by a variety of evidence will tend towards the larger side of the spectrum and might indeed be bigger than any of the individual ones since they might encompass all of them.

The most important evidence available is ceramics. Pottery has been found on every site, it is plentiful, can be provenanced and has a good chronological resolution. Ceramics were rarely traded for their own sake but served as containers or as by-products of trade. Any type of trade, military activity, religious or political event could have contributed to the distribution pattern of pottery. The ceramic evidence is complemented with other classes of evidence such as metals, stone, ivory, etc. This procedure is designed to mirror the total activity in an interaction system.

Core-semiperiphery-periphery

Antiquity presents some difficulties in determining which regions are core, semiperiphery or periphery. This is because the differences and dependencies between regions are not as pronounced as in our modern world-system. It has been suggested that the 'status' of a region can be determined by the extent of its interaction links (Champion 1989; Broodbank 1993). Champion considers plurality of interactions as indicative of a core
state since cores generally have more interaction partners than peripheries (1989: 14-15). Broodbank has successfully utilised a similar concept to explain the dominance of Ayia Irini on Kea, Dhaskalio-Kavos on Keros, and Chalandriani on Syros as trading sites over other Cycladic sites in the Keros-Syros culture (ca. 2700-2300 BC); a domination based on the islands' geography and the total number of close-distance links (Broodbank 1993). Accordingly, there seems to be a link between the plurality of connections and the island's position in the world-system. The more connections and contacts an island has, the more prominent its position in an interaction network.

Since our evidence is too fragmentary, I suggest a slightly modified model to determine the plurality of contacts: the plurality of individual interaction links shall be replaced by the plurality of network contacts. A network is hereby defined as a zone in which an island or a region has frequent and thus possibly direct trade links. To establish if exchange is direct or indirect, the number of provenanced vessels, stone, metal or ivory objects, etc. was counted. Twenty was regarded as the minimum number of exchanged items necessary to demarcate direct contact between two areas in a given period. All direct exchange partners were then marked on the maps. They were then connected with one another. The resulting area is the so-called network (see Maps 2a-c).

For the Middle Bronze Age we have sufficiently detailed evidence for seven separate networks: the Cretan, Melian, Mainland, Kytheran, Aiginetan, Keian, and Theran one. In Late Bronze I the Dodecanesian network has to be added to the already existing ones, and by Late Bronze II the Theran one was destroyed. Having established the network for different islands, the next step was to count the number of overlaps with other networks. This number of contact partners is given below. Interaction links with regions beyond the Southern Aegean are not taken into consideration:

**Table 1: The Southern Aegean network in the Middle Bronze Age** (see Map 2a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle Bronze (ca. 2000-1700 BC)</th>
<th># of contact partners</th>
<th>Late Bronze I (ca. 1700-1610 BC)</th>
<th># of contact partners</th>
<th>Late Bronze II (ca. 1610-1550 BC)</th>
<th># of contact partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crete:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Crete:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Crete:</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland, Melos:</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mainland:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mainland:</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aigina, Kythera:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the Middle Bronze Age Crete has the biggest network in terms of area, volume of trade and contacts with other networks. Although the Mainland and Melos follow in second place, their networks are considerably smaller geographically. The high number of contacts for Melos is surprising and seems mainly due to the export of fine Cycladic White vases and the extensive use of obsidian in this period. Although Melos' contacts are far-reaching, the network is much smaller in terms of area and volume of trade than either the Mainland or Cretan one. Kythera, Aigina, and Kea have relatively few contacts. Thera brings up the rear. However, as the Middle Bronze Age period has not yet been investigated fully on Thera, it is likely that Thera's position within the Southern Aegean system will have to be revised when more information becomes available from the excavations. We can thus summarise that Crete is the core in the Middle Bronze Age as it has the most expansive network of all. The Mainland, Melos, Aigina, Kythera and Kea are best characterised as the semiperiphery. Thera is the tail-light but also belongs to the semiperiphery.
Although all the networks are different in size, carry a higher or lower volume of trade and have a variety of contacts with neighbouring regions, there is no great difference between the number of contacts. The number of interactions slowly decreases by one (i.e. 6,5,4,3,1). Relationships appear to be balanced during this period: there is a wide range of semiperipheral networks in different stages of their development while Crete is the core. The fact that the Mainland network is at the top of all semiperipheral networks is an indicator of its future 'ambitions'.

The Southern Aegean network in the Late Bronze Age I (see Map 2b)

Both the Cretan and the Mainland network have the same number of contacts in this period. However, the range of their respective networks and particularly the volume of trade indicate that Crete is still more powerful and expansive and remains the core. The Mainland is beginning to flex its muscles but has not yet developed into the leading power. The Melian, Keian, Theran, Kytheran, Aiginetan and the Dodecanesian networks
have few contact partners and make up the semiperiphery.

Map 2b: LCI Regional Exchange Networks
The Late Bronze I period is characterised by a dramatic change from the previous period: instead of the wide spread of semiperipheral networks of the Middle Bronze Age, a great divide between the core, Crete and the aspiring Mainland can be observed. The semiperipheral regions have all been reduced to only three contact partners. Crete and the Mainland appear to exert a lot of pressure on all the other networks forcing them towards becoming peripheral whilst carving out an ever more powerful position for themselves at the core. The change is most drastic for Melos, which loses its place as a high semiperipheral network and is now placed into a low semiperipheral position. The Theran network alone seems to profit from this shift, as it increases its contacts by two and becomes a vital harbour bridging the gap between Anatolia (with its connections to the Near East), the Mainland and Crete.

The Southern Aegean network in the Late Bronze Age II (see Map 2c)

The Cretan network remains in its privileged core position with the highest number of contacts as well as the greatest range and a very high volume of trade. The Mainland network follows in second place. Its volume of trade has now increased dramatically, in some cases even outnumbering Minoan imports (e.g. Ayia Irini on Kea and Phylakopi on Melos) (Cummer & Schofield 1984). The Melian, Keian, Kytheran and Aiginetan networks remain semiperipheral with only three contact partners each. The Dodecanesian network is in touch with Crete only. Due to the volcanic eruption at the end of the Late
Bronze I period, interaction with the island of Thera ceased.

Map 2c: LCII Regional Exchange Networks

**Discussion**

As has become clear from the above presentation, the Southern Aegean system consists of a core and a semiperiphery. No periphery could be ascertained within this region. This should not surprise us as peripheries need not be islands or regions but could be small villages on an island which were being exploited by the centre. As only relatively little is known from the internal organisation on islands, this point cannot be assessed accurately. Throughout the Middle Bronze and early Late Bronze Age, Crete is the core and its network covers most of the southern Aegean. The Mainland is beginning to flex its muscles already in Late Bronze I, although real changes are only visible in Late Bronze
III. The Cycladic islands, Kythera and Aigina form the semiperiphery.

Map 3a: Low-ranking Semiperipheries in MC
A most interesting development is indicated by the increased number of semiperipheral spheres with three contacts or less. From the Middle to the Late Bronze Age, the total number of low-ranking semiperipheral networks increases (see Maps 3a-c). The 'peripheralisation' of a region seems to be an indicator of the power of the core state. The more vigorously the core expands, the more it will take over trade and interaction between other societies and thus turn them into low-ranking semiperipheries. If this development continues the semiperipheries will be reduced to peripheries. This process can justifiably be called 'peripheral exploitation' (Shannon 1989: 30), and is comparable to processes observed in modern systems. It should be noted that the process of 'peripheral exploitation' need not be unilateral. As several scholars have emphasised (Shipley 1993: 273; Kohl 1987: 16; Schortman & Urban 1994: 403; Stein 1999: 153-154), peripheries or semiperipheries are sometimes successfully able to manipulate the core(s) to their own advantage. We therefore cannot exclude that some of the islands under discussion strove to be included in the Hellado-Cretan interregional exchange and purposefully turned their back to their former regional partners.

Map 3b: Low-ranking Semiperipheries in LCI
The spread of contacts shows that interaction in the Middle Bronze Age happened between relatively equal units. Although Crete is the core, it is not powerful enough to exploit its neighbours or more distant networks. The semiperipheral networks vary in the number of links and this variety within the semiperiphery indicates that no stresses have been exerted by the core state. By the Late Bronze I period, the situation has changed dramatically. We now see a strong core state closely matched by the Mainland, which is now equal to the Cretan network in terms of contacts. In contrast, most other networks have experienced a reduction in links: all of the semiperipheral networks have now been reduced to three contact partners. This development continues into the Late Bronze II period when all of the semiperipheral networks are limited to three contact partners. The reduction of contact partners for the semiperiphery cannot be totally unrelated to the high counts for Crete and the Mainland. Assuming that these tendencies are related, the attempted expansion of the Mainland and the desire by the Cretan core to remain in its privileged position must have resulted in a reduction of links for most other networks. This has to be regarded as an expression of a developing core-(semi)periphery hierarchy from the Middle Bronze Age to the Late Bronze II period. This apparent peripheral exploitation is worthy of closer investigation. Phylakopi on Melos and Ayia Irini on Kea
are the only settlements which provide sufficiently detailed data.

Map 3c: Low-ranking Semiperipheries in LC
Phylakopi on Melos and Ayia Irini on Kea

Detailed data for Phylakopi shows that the marginalisation of the island coincides with increasing Mycenaean influence, since a jump in Mycenaean imports and an increase in wheelmade production in Late Bronze II can be observed. However, the marginalisation of the islands had already begun sometime between the Middle and early Late Bronze Age, when Mycenaean imports are relatively infrequent at most sites. We therefore have to assume that the explanation for the decrease in contact partners is not due to the Mainland trying to assert itself, but might more reasonably be sought in the ensuing competition between the Mainland and Crete over access to raw materials, exotic goods and prestige items. Phylakopi’s reaction to its marginalisation is characterised by its withdrawal from interregional trade as witnessed by the almost complete lack of Minoan or Mainland imports in the Late Bronze I period.

Ayia Irini, on the other hand, became a vital point of contact between Crete and the Mainland. This is attested by the increasing quantities of both Minoan and Mainland imports. By the Late Bronze II period Ayia Irini also became a redistribution centre for other Cycladic islands as the sudden rise in Cycladic imports shows (Cummer & Schofield 1984). Not surprisingly, Kea retained its status (in terms of contacts) and did not become marginalised further. Its privileged position, however, was secured at a price. Ayia Irini turned itself into a production site which catered for Cretean and Mainland needs and has been most appropriately described as "one big workshop" (Schofield 1990: 209). Regardless of whether this development was initiated by the Keians themselves who actively sought to maximise their profits or whether it was a result of pressure exerted by Crete and/or the Mainland, this process resembles more contemporary forms of exploitation of developing countries. Although Kea was exploited in its position as a point of contact, it nevertheless profited substantially from this ongoing trade, and so can justifiably be called semiperiphery.

Summary

Our investigation into the South Aegean network shows that there was a core-semiperiphery relationship in the Middle Bronze Age but that it never developed into a hierarchical relationship. Regions and towns interacted with each other on a peer polity basis as no player was strong enough to totally subjugate other islands (cf. Kardulias 1999b). This kind of interaction has been called core-periphery differentiation and denotes interaction between societies which is not governed by exploitation but is the result of different levels of social complexity (Chase Dunn & Hall 1997: 36). This picture changes in the early Late Bronze Age when there are clear indications that the Mainland was gearing up to compete with the Cretan core. This battle between the two strongest powers resulted in the marginalisation of most other islands in the Aegean. The divide between the core and semiperipheries became very pronounced. The early Late Bronze Age is thus more accurately characterised as 'unequal exchange' and as a core-semiperiphery hierarchy (cf. Wilkinson 1991). Nevertheless, despite exploitative tendencies as a result of competition between Crete and the Greek Mainland, neither of them was able to actually politically or economically dominate any of the other islands.
(Kardulias 1999b). They exerted a strong 'pull' which went well beyond simple imitations of Minoan features and led to deep-seated changes in the field of production and technology of these societies (e.g. pottery production, metallurgy, weaving) (Davis & Lewis 1985; Davis 1984; Schofield 1980).

Despite exploitative tendencies by Crete and the Greek Mainland, we should remind ourselves that the islands were by no means helpless bystanders but rather active participants in the process. Although the semiperiphery might not have gained as much from the 'arrangement', it nevertheless gained something -- it is a two-way process (Shipley 1993: 273; Kohl 1987: 16; Schortman & Urban 1994: 403). The settlements of Ayia Irini and Phylakopi reacted differently to the encroaching Cretan and Mainland influences: Ayia Irini was eager to turn itself into a workshop (Schofield 1990) to support and supply Cretan and Mainland trade. It became part of the interregional trade, whilst Phylakopi attempted to withdraw from the Hellado-Cretan trade network.

Notes

1 I would like to acknowledge the help of Damien Browne and Dr A. Ladurner who commented on earlier drafts of this paper and Professor C. Clase-Dunn, Professor T.D. Hall and Dr P.N. Kardulias for comments on a thesis chapter on which this article is based.

2 Wiener's 'Versailles effect' refers to the widespread adoption and imitation of 'fashions' coming from the court of Versailles in the 17th and 18th Century. Castles in Germany were built following French architectural models, fashion copied andimitated the French style, and French became accepted as the language of conversation in the upper circles of society (Wiener 1984: 17). The model stipulates that no political or economic gain is implied, but that cultures strive to imitate a society which they perceive to be culturally superior. In other words, societies outside Crete, recognising Crete's cultural superiority, would endeavour to imitate its culture.

3 For a detailed list of find references for all artefacts, see the Appendix in: I. Berg (1999) The Minoanisation of the Southern Aegean: A Comparative Approach to Ceramic Assemblages. To be submitted to the University of Cambridge toward the degree of Ph.D.

4 See note 3.

5 For a full discussion of the networks, see Chapter 6 and the Appendix in: I. Berg (1999) The Minoanisation of the Southern Aegean: A Comparative Approach to Ceramic Assemblages. To be submitted to the University of Cambridge toward the degree of Ph.D.

6 For a detailed discussion of Phylakopi on Melos see Chapter 4 in: I. Berg (1999) The Minoanisation of the Southern Aegean: A Comparative Approach to Ceramic Assemblages. To be submitted to the University of Cambridge toward the degree of Ph.D.
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1 INTRODUCTION

Many political discussions share a common understanding of a rapidly changing world. A global market economy is seen to pose new demands for national markets and is expected to increase the international competition concerning locational factors.

Globalization is the keyword of this debate. It describes an economic process that results from changes in the investment, production and distribution decisions made by individual firms and households. Unfortunately, the term globalization can mean different things to different people. Some observers define globalization as market integration (Frieden/Rogowski 1997); others refer to the internationalization of production processes (Pauly/Reich 1997; Archibugi/Michie 1998). Though the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, they neither share a common definition nor do they examine the same processes. Whereas from the macroeconomic perspective of Jeff Frieden and Ronald Rogowski (1997), evidence for a globalizing or even a globalized world economy is to be found in the convergence of prices for goods, capital and services, the approach of Daniele Archibugi and Jonathan Michie (1998) regards globalization as a consequence of the growing number of transnational companies.

In this paper we concentrate exclusively on the latter perspective and analyze globalization on a sectoral and systemic level. The information that allows us to trace globalization involves sector-specific trade flows, which are available for a period of fourteen years. Network visualizations, a technique that we illustrate more closely in the following section, also help to describe the structural change to the world trade in automobiles on the systemic level.

The incentive for firms to globalize their production has many sources, one and possibly the most important being the reduction in transportation costs. The decline in transaction costs provides incentives to producers to "slice up the value chain" (Krugman 1995), i.e. to locate each single step in the production process at that location where production costs are lowest. What is new here is that countries do not always need to have a comparative advantage in producing cars, but in producing engines.

If such a process of locational differentiation within a single production process exists, we should be able to observe an increase in the trade of semi-finished goods relative to
trade in finished goods. If the process exists and if it is caused by a reduction of transportation costs, we should observe it more or less everywhere and equally distributed through the entire world. We will analyze these two processes in the remainder of this paper.

To do so, we have selected the automobile industry for a number of reasons. First, cars constitute the single industrial product that holds the biggest share in world trade, and cars are the most important commodity in the exports of many industrialized countries (Ruigrok/ van Tulder 1995). Almost ten percent of all German exports (by value) originate in car manufacturing, Germany being the biggest car exporter in the world in 1994. The share of exports is pushed up to a total of more than 14% when the value of the trade in car components is included. Secondly, trade in cars and car parts is important for the current account of countries. While for the UK the sectoral deficit of the car trade is 25 percent of the total national trade deficit, in the US the car trade deficit approximates a staggering 40% of the total current account deficit (according to the figures for 1994). Thirdly, 1.7 Million jobs in the EU are connected to the auto industry; almost one out of ten jobs in the EU is directly or indirectly associated with this industry. Under the conditions of industrial mass production, the international market for automobiles is characterized by its economies of scale, which is to say that the industry involves a relatively large number of transnational corporations that move high financial volumes with any production decision they take, amounting to sums that can easily distort the balance of a nation's trade.

Yet the car industry is not only economically important, it is also an important engine of world change (Womack/ Jones/ Ross 1990).

In addition, for the purpose of our analysis, the industry has certain methodological advantages. Most importantly, car manufacturing is, unlike other sectors, characterized by a comparatively small number of producers and export nations. This is due to the size of fixed capital investments needed to produce cars. Assembly plants require smaller volumes of production and investments than sites producing car engines, whereas sites for engines require smaller fixed investments than does the production of car bodies in a body-stamping site. Thus, there are large incentives for internationalization and the creation of production chains (Ruigrok/ van Tulder 1991; Lee/ Cason 1994; Gereffi/ Korzeniewicz 1994).

There are also disadvantages, however, to choosing to trade in cars and car parts as our object of study. Here the practice of governments in regulating car markets is most important (Berg 1988; Cole/ Yakushiji 1984 ; Nobel 1992; Smith 1994). Regulations can take various forms: governments may choose to impose tariffs and import quotas, to pay export subsidies, to grant tax subsidies or reductions, and to impose local content regulations on foreign firm, to name but the most important and distorting regulations (Krugman/ Obstfeld 1994; Yoffie 1993).
The aim of our study is threefold. First, we wish to shed light on the structure and the
dynamics of the international trade in cars and car parts. Using network visualization as a
tool of analysis, we can show how the focus of international car trade has changed over
time, mainly because new countries have begun to export cars. The second purpose of
this paper is to illustrate that notwithstanding the globalization of business, geography
still matters. We use the examples of Germany and Japan, as the two most important
countries involved in car trade, to visualize the degree of distinctiveness in trading
patterns by country. Finally, we analyze where and to what extent an international
division of labor has been established and also provide some evidence that a geographical
pattern persists in the organization of business.

2 METHOD AND DATA

Information concerning the composition and changes in world trade have been
documented by international agencies for quite some years now. Nevertheless, research
on the internationalization of the car industry has rarely made use of this informational
richness, preferring instead to rely on national studies. Methods of information
visualization provide a powerful means of accessing and communicating the richness of
such information, as observed in other disciplines that need to handle large amounts of
data (Card/ Mackinlay/ Shneiderman 1999).

Such methods enable us to study the structure and growth of transnational trade for
specific markets, which can be pursued in a much more elaborate manner than has been
possible until now. However, before we can use the newly developed tools to grasp the
current state of international trade, it is necessary to introduce the method of analysis in
brief.

Visualization methods are able to use large amounts of statistical information in a
systematic manner, and they are able to reconstruct the overall global structure of the
international trade system from data on trade flows. Algorithms allow the researcher to
use the volume of the trade flows to create images that try to conserve at least the rank
order of the trade volumes. High volumes between any two countries result typically in a
placement of the countries as neighbors, unless a specific high volume link is
counterbalanced by the joint volume of links to other countries. Additional esthetical
constraints enhance readability by enforcing a minimal distance between any two nodes.
The resulting placement of the countries in the images is an equilibrium distribution of
the connectedness by trade volumes and the imposed esthetics. The algorithms that are
used to order the empirical information are known as spring embedders, a family of
algorithms that are based on force directed placement (Eades 1984, Kamada/ Taiwai
1989). Krempel has refined the spring embedder technique to handle valued graphs and
two-mode data (Krempel 1999).

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The volumes of the trade flows between any two countries describe the exports and
imports of each country and their bilateral trading balance. The sectoral balance for each
country is symbolized with spheres. The size of the spheres represents the volumes of imports and exports. A 'mushroom' symbolizes a country with a trade deficit (higher imports than exports), a complete 'sphere' a country with a balanced trade account, and a 'potbelly' a country with a surplus. The image below uses the shares of the country-specific destinations and origins as additional information. This allows us to read the direction of trade from the pie charts that are drawn onto each country's symbol.

**Figure 1:** Symbols Used to Summarize the Sectoral Balance of National Trade

We can now read the origin of the imports (top) and the destination of a country's exports (bottom). The dominant light-blue sector in the bottom of the Japanese pie illustrates the importance of the US market for the Japanese exporters, whereas the Japanese imports from the US (light blue, top) yield only a small share of all Japanese imports. This coding of information allows us to evaluate specific phenomena from a world systems perspective and to identify specific structures that can be analyzed with any additional information available. Data on the change of trade volumes and composition of traded goods can be mapped onto the resulting trade structures, visually summarized and aggregated, and linked to the restructuring of the international system. This provides us with the information necessary to examine structural change and its correlates, which allows us to identify some of the underlying dynamics of change. In the case of the global
car trade, we will apply these methods to analyze the degree of internationalization and to identify if the overall structure consists mainly of regional patterns, or whether a global tendency towards integration is discernible.

Our analysis is based on the statistics published by the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and the GATT, which have been further enhanced for statistical purposes by Statistics Canada. The data are comparable across time. The underlying database describes the trade among 160 countries on a yearly basis between 1980 and 1994. The trade flows between nations are broken down to a very detailed level, which allows us to distinguish between all sorts of sectoral trade, even that of male and female underwear. For our purposes it is more important that we can separate trade in cars from trade in car components.

3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AUTOMOBILES

For 1995, the World Motor Vehicle Data Handbook (1995) reports the production of over 34 million passenger cars worldwide as being supplied by only 38 manufacturers. According to the trade statistics of the IMF, cars in the value of 200 billion US$ have been traded across national borders. Depending on the average value of a single car, this suggests that between 23% ($25,000) and 39% ($15,000) of the total world production is traded on the world market. The share of trade in passenger cars amounts to about 5 per cent of all internationally traded goods. The volume of world trade in cars has almost doubled in value (inflation corrected), while the ratio of trade in unfinished car parts has remained fairly stable, at 34 percent of all traded cars and components. The global car market is highly concentrated: only 25 countries account for 85% of the total volume of cars (by value) traded worldwide in 1994. These countries are mostly the highly industrialized countries of the OECD.

A closer look at the geographical pattern of the automobile trade displays two regional clusters, one of which consists of Japan and North America, while the second contains the European countries, which are grouped around Germany, the largest exporter of the European cluster. Note that the placement of ‘countries’ in the images have been computed from the bilateral trade flows only. Trade occurs between the two clusters; however, as the visualization reveals, the intensity of flows between clusters is not high enough to integrate them into a system with a single center. The configuration found for 1980 remains mostly stable in the 1994 solution.
Figures 2a and 2b are standardized and allow for an easy comparison. From such a comparison it immediately becomes clear that the structures of 1980 and 1994 show structural changes taking place: within the European cluster Germany increased its orientation toward Japan in 1994. This results from an increase of Germany's shipments to Japan and the relatively smaller volume of German exports to the US in 1994. Owing to the strong inter-European trade flows, the entire European cluster is reoriented. Spain has gained importance in 1994 (Langendijk 1995a, 1995b) and Portugal becomes a visible newcomer. Compared to the 1980 trade pattern, in 1994 the European cluster is more condensed.

The North-American-Japanese cluster contains two new members in 1994: Mexico and Korea. While Mexico is dominantly linked to both the USA and Canada, Korea is almost exclusively connected to the US (Kim/ Lee 1994; Lee/ Cason 1994). There are also stronger connections from the periphery of the total system to both clusters in 1994: both the trade with Argentina and Brazil and the trade with China and Hong Kong surpass the (inflation corrected) volume threshold, which was imposed for the flows of the above
images. While we have imposed value thresholds for the trade flows in the visualizations, the actual country positions in the images as well as the percentages in the following tables have been computed on the basis of all reported trade flows.

Despite the structural changes in the global car trade, one can nevertheless see that continuity prevails over change, as can be read from the following table, which describes the share of world trade of the largest car exporting nations:

**Table 1:** Share of World Trade in Passenger Cars by Value (in %) in Selected Countries

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<tbody>
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<td>25.23</td>
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<tr>
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<td>29.95</td>
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<td>27.47</td>
<td>24.80</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.60</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.93</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.92</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.15</td>
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<td>1.67</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Rest</td>
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<td>3.49</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>4.09</td>
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</table>

Table 1 shows that a number of new exporters have joined the car exporting nations. We find Mexico and Korea as the most important new exporters, which is of course a well-documented fact (Shapiro 1993; Lee/ Cason 1994). On closer inspection, Table 1 reveals that, from these 12 countries, seven increased their trade share between 1980 and 1994, whereas five countries declined in importance. The heaviest loss in world market share was suffered by Japan and France, whereas Canada enjoyed the strongest growth in absolute numbers. In relative terms, the newcomers have shown the highest growth rates: South Korea and Mexico have increased their share from almost zero to 2.6% and 2.1% respectively. In absolute terms Mexico has increased its exports from 83 million to more than 5.6 billion and South Korea from 52 million to 4.4 billion dollars. The car industry literature is mainly focused on the description of the success stories in the global car market. The impression that world market competition has changed due to the rising market share of low-wage countries is completely misleading, however. The correlation between the exports of 1994 and 1980 can be used as a rough indicator of market change. Yielding an $R^2$ of 0.933, the analysis shows that the overall structure of the world market by and large has remained unchanged.
A second table allows us to further investigate the structural stability. Table 2 records the share of passenger cars compared to all exports of a given country.

**Table 2:** Car Exports as the Share of Total Exports of Selected Countries (in %)

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<td>11.54</td>
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<td>2.75</td>
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<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
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<td>5.36</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>5.83</td>
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<td>GBR</td>
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<td>3.61</td>
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<td>ITA</td>
<td>3.18</td>
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<td>2.20</td>
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<td>9.86</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.60</td>
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<td>2.82</td>
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<td>5.74</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 reveals the extent to which cars contribute to the total exports in different countries. In Germany, Japan, Canada, Belgium and Spain the export share of cars exceeds 10 percent of the total exports. The importance of car manufacturing has increased for all these countries except Japan. Interestingly, Japan - the country most dependent on car exports in the eighties - has lost her unfavorable position to Spain, who nowadays is the most car-export dependent nation.

### 4 COMPETITION OVER THIRD MARKETS

The notion of a growing economic world system and the decline of transportation costs suggests a picture of emerging global competition (Thurow 1992; Wallerstein 1992). The question of whether competition is truly global, however, cannot be answered by pointing to the existence of multinational corporations in distinct parts of the global economy. One way to test for the existence of a global market is to compare prices: only if the price of an homogenous commodity on different world markets does not differ (much) can one speak of a truly integrated, single world market. The frequently cited McDonald's Index indicates, however, that there is very little international convergence of prices.

We have chosen another way to analyze the impact of geography on competition. Our analysis is based on the assumption that the market share that dominant exporters face on third markets is an illustration of the degree to which global competition exists today. Let us suppose there are only two corporations in the world, but 100 nations: under these circumstances there can be fierce competition along with a geographically determined duopoly, in which each corporation holds a monopoly on, say, 50 national markets.
Hence, for calculating the extent of global competition, third market rivalry may serve as a good indicator.

The next visualizations show the structure of imports and exports in the Japanese and German car trade. The images give the shares of all export destinations for Japan (red) and for Germany (yellow) in relation to the total Japanese and German exports. For all other trade partners, the Japanese shares are given as red and the German shares as yellow pies for the total amount of cars a specific country imports.
Figure 3: Japan's (a) and Germany's (b) Participation in the World Trade of Passenger Cars. Exports and Imports by Destination and their Relative Shares of Third Markets in 1994

For both Germany and Japan, we find a decrease in imports with increasing distances in the visualization. This highlights the fact that even today geographic distance is an important factor in trade volumes and that globalization is still a long way from equalizing geographic distance as a transaction cost. It also means that there is no strong support for a significant decrease in transaction and transportation costs, from which we might expect changes in the world trade structure. Instead, the geographic pattern of third market competition lets us conclude that the internationalization of corporations is strongly influenced by distance and the number of competitors that have already entered a market.

Combining both single images allows us further to identify the degree of market penetration of single markets by Japanese and German car exports and to point to those markets where market shares of the Japanese exports quantitatively approximate German exports. Owing to the logic of visual reconstruction, we find similar shares occurring for
those countries which are placed between Japan and Germany in the images - Thailand, Switzerland and Sweden - and for Denmark and Hong Kong on the periphery of the system. For all countries placed either to the left of Japan or to the right of Germany we find either a clear Japanese or, respectively, a clear German dominance. There are only few markets among the 25 most important car-exporting nations that can be characterized by a significant coexistence of Japanese and German imports. The result is robust and is not altered by increasing the number of countries. This forces us to conclude that third market competition is relatively weak despite the recent increase in global economic integration.

![Image of market competition graph](image-url)

**Figure 4**: Japan's versus Germany's Penetration of Third Markets

5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE WORLD MARKET FOR CAR PARTS AND COMPONENTS

Following the previous general descriptions, we are now in a position to approach the more specific goal of our analysis. As mentioned earlier, we set out to describe the potential impact of the structural changes in the international car trade on the international division of labor. In order to identify the degree to which this occurs, we will now use the volumes for the trade in car components as additional information. A
comparison of the two types of trade allows us to identify which locations are connected by cross-border production of cars.

As a first step we will look solely at the organization of international trade in car components and its growth between 1980 and 1994. For the following image, we have colored the volumes of the bilateral trade in components for 1994 with their growth rates since 1980. Red arrows indicate trade flows in 1994 that have grown strongly compared to 1980 (more than 3 times their amount in 1980). The import and export symbols for the nodes now aggregate the exports and imports that originate or depart from a specific country on the basis of this growth classification. The pies show the shares of all destinations in 1994 that have strongly increased, stayed unchanged or declined for the total exports and imports of a country. A completely red pie (e.g., Japan) describes a country that has increased its trade in components with almost all destinations; a blue pie chart (e.g., Canada) indicates a country for which the volume of trade in components with all destinations has declined.

![Diagram showing trade flows and growth rates](image)

**Figure 5:** Growth Rates for Trade in Parts and Components 1994/1980
Flows exceeding $300,000 in 1994. High growth is shown in red, declining deliveries are shown in blue. The import and export pies aggregate this information and allow classification of the countries by the growth of their component exports and imports.

We see strong growth in the trade of components for Mexico and Japan, as well as for Korea, albeit for a smaller total volume. In the European cluster, we can identify the UK and Spain and to a lesser degree Germany (where the changes in import composition dominate the change in exports) as high growth countries.

The component trade of Japan and Germany, both dominant exporters of their clusters, target mainly smaller countries on the periphery of the total system. The main receivers of Japanese exports are Taiwan, Thailand and Korea. The US industry exports components and parts mainly to Canada, Mexico and Australia. Large shares of German components go to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.

The high US shares of component shipments to Canada seem to be traditional ones. They have not significantly increased if only growth between 1980 and 1994 is considered. Japan's overall exports have increased sharply and are, with the exception of the UK, mainly directed to the periphery of the North-American-Japanese cluster. Exports and imports of components for Germany show increases only for very specific destinations: the UK and Spain.

For the international trade in components we can identify centers in both clusters; in the North-American cluster we find Japan, Mexico and Korea as countries with a strong growth of trade in car components. In the European cluster this is true for Spain, the UK and Germany.

The question of a transnational organization of an international auto production chain can now be answered through a simultaneous classification of the trade flows of cars and the trade in components. We use both types of trade to classify the total flow through the share of components in 1994.

If the trade between any two countries consists mainly of components, this points to either a cross-border organization of production or an assembly of car components in the destination country (in the sense of import substitution of finished cars). In the image below, we mark trade flows consisting mainly of car parts as red; flows where trade is almost solely made up of fully assembled cars are dark green. The pies show the resulting country-specific aggregation of a country's total trade: whether imports or exports consist mainly of parts (red) or exclusively of cars (green).

Dark green flows occur mainly between the two clusters of the world's car trade, reflecting the fact that trade between the North-American/Japanese cluster and the European cluster consists mainly of finished cars.
Red flows are explained by two factors. First, a high degree of component imports is found for those countries that assemble imported components in order to supply cars locally. Such a pattern is typical for smaller countries or less developed countries. They tend to substitute expensive, imported finished products (which include the cost of labor supplied by the exporting country) with the local assembly of components. This is often a first step toward building up local industries and creating jobs inside the importing country over the long term. Real import substitution will thus lead to a relative decrease in the imports of finished cars or even to the absence of any imports of finished products.

Second, red flows in one direction coupled with green flows in the other reflect an international division of labor in which some countries import mostly components and export finished products, or vice-versa. Such pairs of different colored trade relations are located mainly in the North American/Japanese cluster. US exports comprise mainly parts, and the destinations of these exports are Canada and Mexico.

Figure 6: Shares of the Component Deliveries

Shares of the component deliveries of the total exports (parts + finished products) color-coded for trade flows exceeding $600,000 in 1994. High shares of components are coded red, flows consisting mainly fully-assembled cars as blue-green. The pies show the resulting country-specific aggregation of a country's total trade: i.e. whether imports or exports consist mainly out components (red) or solely of fully-assembled cars (blue-green).
While the US trade with Canada is more important (by volume), the pattern of specialization for trade with Mexico is almost unique: Mexico's imports from the US consist almost entirely of car components, while its (return) exports to the US consist almost exclusively of finished cars.

Most importantly, patterns of such clarity are not found in Europe and, if they do exist, they are far less dominant. We find a complementing trade flow between France and Spain with flows of components out of France and a reciprocal import of finished cars from Spain, but this is far less developed than the similar structure between the US and Mexico. For Germany, we find a reversed pattern of component imports: the trade with Austria and, to a lesser extent, the trade with the UK. In both cases, Germany imports components and exports mainly finished cars. In Europe, quite unlike the North American division of labor, we find component suppliers to be internationalized, whereas the production and assembly of finished products remains in the old industrial centers.

This clearly demonstrates that the international division of labor and explicit specialization in either car or component manufacturing is more important for American car manufacturers compared to their European counterparts. If it is true that transnational production chains take advantage of the different cost of production factors in the associated countries, our findings raise crucial questions as to the reason for the apparent differences in production chain specialization. Though our analysis is basically descriptive and we are not intent on testing hypotheses, our belief is that historical path dependencies are more important in Europe because of the practice of government intervention in old industrial locations. Once a certain region has developed a sufficiently large car industry, governments tend to support the persistence of the particular industrial location despite its loss of competitiveness. If an European car producer goes bankrupt, a government will almost certainly subsidize any (foreign) corporation that takes over the production facilities (Berg 1988). For this reason, European car manufacturers own production facilities in a number of European countries. Specialization exists only to the extent that smaller cars are more likely to be built in Spain than in Germany (Wells/Rawlinson 1994).

6 CONCLUSION

Starting from the public concern over the potentially negative consequences of the globalization of international economic activity for the industrialized countries, we have tried to identify the degree to which we can find an internationalization of markets and international production chain in the automobile industry. Our reconstruction of the world economy on the basis of data for the international trade in passenger cars has revealed two local clusters, which have remained fairly stable in their overall structure between 1980 and 1994. In both clusters we have identified new producer countries, which are positioned at the periphery of the local clusters. The volumes that these new countries contribute to the total trade are relatively small. We discern mainly trade in finished
products (cars) between both clusters, whereas trade in car components occurs mainly inside each cluster or with the periphery of the total system.

Significant indicators for an apparent increase in an international division of labor for the period between 1980 and 1994 are found for the North American-Japanese cluster only. A consistent and strongly complementary pattern exists for the US trade relations: both Canada and Mexico receive a very high proportion of US component shipments and export mainly complete cars (back) into the US.

In the European cluster we find such patterns only to a much smaller extent. The American pattern exists only between France and Spain: France exports components and imports finished cars from Spain. For Germany, Austria, and England we find a second type of international organization. Here Austria and the UK export components to Germany, whereas Germany tends to ship complete cars only. The amount of change we have found for the international automobile industry is far less than was expected based on the literature on the globalization of the world economy. We cannot positively identify the existence of a global trend for the automobile industry, by which parts of the domestic production are transferred to countries with low wages. The only country in our study for which the data point in such a direction is the USA. The American car manufacturers use the instrument of low-wage assembly to a much higher degree than their European or Japanese counterparts. Clearly, the comparison of the US and European situations points to deficits in the literature on globalization, especially since the labor costs in Europe are much higher than in North America, which would suggest that European producers are under greater pressure to relocate their industries. Our attempts to explain this shortcoming by reference to political interventions and subsidies remains a mere hypothesis that has yet to be subjected to a rigorous test.

NOTES

1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented on several occasions: a the Working Group Netzwerkanalyse (Netzkränzchen), at the MPIfG, and the World Congress of Sociology July 10th 1997, Cologne. We thank participants at these seminars and conferences for helpful and encouraging comments. Special thanks to Gregory Jackson and anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper and John Booth for copy-editing our English manuscript.


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Detroit.


ABSTRACT

Power polarity in the Far Eastern macrosocial system is assessed at twenty-five year intervals 1050 BC--AD 1850. Consistent with analysis of Indic system data, there is no support for the theory that the normal world-system power configuration is multipolar, hegemonic, or universal-empire. Instead, several different "stability epochs" are discerned.

This study provides some of the first systematic long-term data on the evolution of the political structure of the Far Eastern world system, based on a range of valid and reliable archaeological and historical sources. It is part of an ongoing attempt to expand the space-time horizon of such disciplines as international relations and world systems research, and to heighten the attention to empirical data of the more humanistic discipline of civilizational studies.

1. Reprise: Project, Units of Analysis, Variable Values

This is one in a series of articles and papers exploring various aspects of very large scale social systems from an empirical, comparative-historical perspective. To denote its unit of analysis, it uses the terms "civilization," "world system," or "macrosocial system" more or less interchangeably. "Civilization" is historically prior; "world system" is more familiar to readers of this journal; the author has argued that these terms properly denote the same set of entities (Wilkinson, 1995a). " Macrosocial system," a more recent coinage, is the most neutral across the social sciences, but thus far commands only a small constituency. The use of all three terms is intended as a reminder that there are important literatures whose relevance should not be lost on account of terminological exclusivity.

This paper, like its immediate predecessors, directs itself to assessing the polarity, or systemwide power structure, of one such system, the Far Eastern (East Asian), over some three thousand years. This paper continues an attempt to increase the coding resolution, from 100 year intervals (Wilkinson, 1997) to 50-year intervals (1999a) to the current 25-year intervals.

Previous papers in this series (Wilkinson 1980-82, 1987a, 1993-1994) have addressed the question of the definition and roster of very large-scale very long-lived social systems. The criteria there proposed involve (1) a minimum settlement size-level of 10,000 in at least one city (thus Chaco Canyon in the U.S. Southwest, with a size of "perhaps 3000"—Lekson 1999: 68—falls short) and (2) an "individuating" criterion (a historically-autonomous political-military-diplomatic transactional network, not part of a larger such network).

The list of entities that certainly, very probably or probably met both the size-level and the individuating criteria is itself necessarily a work in progress, as smaller and more obscured systems slowly emerge out of the fog (whether real or in the mind of the observer). The following list is current, and adds one "probable" (Omotic civilization) to the last update (Wilkinson, 1993-1994) of a list begun much earlier (Wilkinson, 1980-1982). Macrosocial systems already generally recognized are simply named; others are briefly noticed. The order in which the systems are listed reflects the approximate order of each one's absorption into the Central world system.

---

1. **Egyptian or Northeast African world system/civilization.**

2. **Mesopotamian or Southwest Asian civilization/world system.**

3. **Central civilization/Central world system.** 3500 years of world system history, c. 1500 BC to the present.

Formed in the near east by the expansion, collision (in Syria and Anatolia) and fusion of Egyptian and Mesopotamian world systems. Continued to expand, and in due course engulfed, approximately in this order, all the other previously autonomous civilizations whether great or small: the Aegean, Irish, Mesoamerican, Andean, Chibchan, West

Central civilization probably included or includes, as regions or epochs, the whole history of the following entities often labeled "civilizations" on the taxonomically inadequate basis of their genuine cultural distinctness: Persian, Classical, Medieval, Byzantine, Russian, Western. Central civilization may reasonably be said to have had five phases: Near Eastern (c. 1500–300 BC); Greco–Roman (c. 300 BC–c. 500 AD); Medieval (a time designation, c. 500–c. 1500 AD, intended to include Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic cultures within Central civilization); Western (c. 1500–c. 1940 AD); and Global (c. 1940 AD to date). Greco–Roman and Western phases were characterized by a greater dominance of one geographic area and one cultural tradition within the Central complex than the Near Eastern, Medieval and Global phases.

4. **Aegean (Minoan–Mycenaean–Hellenic).**
5. **Irish.** Its maximum area was approximately that of contemporary Ireland. Cities began after, probably well after, 5th century AD. Engulfed by Central civilization until the Norman–English invasions of the 12th century.

6. **Indonesian.** Its maximum area included contemporary western Indonesia, Malay, and (perhaps as a shared semiperiphery with Far Eastern) some of coastal Vietnam. Engulfed by Central civilization via Portuguese, British and Dutch invasions after 1511.

7. **Mesoamerican or Mexican.**
8. **Andean or Peruvian.**
9. **Chibchan.** Highlands of Colombia. Possibly, even probably independent and very early in its evolution when engulfed by Central civilization in the person of Spanish conquistadors of the 16th century.

10. **East African (Coastal/Swahili).** Extant, 14th to 15th century AD, possibly cited since 12th century or even earlier. Engulfed by Central civilization (Portuguese, Ottomans) from the 16th century.

11. **West Central African (Kongo/Tio).** Extant, 15th century AD, possibly earlier. Engulfed by Central civilization (Portuguese) early 16th century.

12. **West African (Western Sudanic).** An autonomous civilization from at least the 8th century AD, perhaps 4th or 6th (Ghana); engulfed by Central civilization (Morocco) in the 16th century.

13. **Indic or South Asian.**
14. **Mississippian.** Centers at Cahokia (Illinois), Macon (Georgia), Moundville
(Alabama), Etowah (Georgia), Spiro Mound (Oklahoma), and Aztalan (Wisconsin). Never incorporated into the Central world system; collapsed before AD 1700, after about 1000 years as a world system, perhaps as a result of depopulating plagues, perhaps in turn forerunning European explorers.

15. **Japanese world system.** At its greatest extent coterminous with contemporary Japan. Budded off Far Eastern system mid 1st millennium AD; engulfed by Central civilization during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

16. **African Great Lakes world system.** Probably a world system, late 17th to late 19th century, when engulfed by Central; possibly such earlier.

17. **Omotic world system.** Southwestern area of current Ethiopia. Probably isolated and autonomous 18th, perhaps 15th, to 19th centuries AD; much missing data. Incorporated into the Central world system by Abyssinian conquest (Ethiopian state formation) in last decade of the 19th century.

18. **Far Eastern world system.** This system, the subject of the current paper, began when a polyculture in the Yellow River basin produced one and then many cities over 3000 years ago. This expanding civilization, with its polity of states, hegemonies and empires, probably soon collided and fused with another, begun in the upper Yangtze basin perhaps even earlier. Continuing to grow outward, it early began to interact regularly tradewise with other macrosocial systems (Central and Indic) to form a larger oikumene (tradenet). At its greatest extent the Far Eastern system included contemporary China, Korea, Vietnam, Tibet, Mongolia, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and also early Japan. The Far Eastern network was absorbed through war and diplomacy into Central civilization in the late 19th and/or early 20th centuries, between the First Opium War and the First World War. Before that time, it went through a long sequence of changes in macropolitical structure.

A recent paper in this sequence (1996a) attempted to extract a long–term sequence of macropolitical configurations for Indic civilization from an independent macropolitical data source, the monumental Historical Atlas of South Asia, edited by Joseph E. Schwartzberg, which provides a remarkable amount of information upon the political trajectory of Indic civilization from 560 BC.

It was possible to use Schwartzberg's atlas to produce a series of data for the power configurations of the Indic system, using the following categories:

- Universal State/Empire
- Hegemonic
- Unipolar (non-hegemonic, "unipolarity without hegemony")
Bipolar
Tripart
Multipolar
Nonpolar

The coding concepts of, and distinction between, hegemony and (non-hegemonic) unipolarity are discussed at greater length elsewhere (Wilkinson, 1994a, 1994b, 1999b); the other codings reflect well-known systemic concepts. In brief, these categories cut the continuum of possible degrees of centralization of state power configurations in a macrosocial system, or world system, or civilization, as follows:

- at the most centralized end, where one state encompasses the whole system, is the **universal state** (Toynbee) or empire (Quigley);
- next to it is **hegemony** (or "unipolarity with hegemony"), where a single great power or superpower, with influence to match its capability, oversees a number of subject states which retain internal autonomy;
- next to that is the condition of **unipolarity** (more precisely, unipolarity without hegemony), where a single great power, lacking the influence to match its capability, rests among a collection of non-subject non-tributary states;
- nearer the decentralized end come configurations with two, three, or more great powers: **bipolarity, tripolarity, multipolarity**;
- and most decentralized, with many ministates and no great powers, is **nonpolarity**.

This coding scheme for power concentration is certainly nominal; it may also be ordinal. However, more dimensions than one may be involved, or the ordinal topology may be nonlinear; configurations herein labeled both "hegemonic" and "nonpolar" are sometimes thought by other writers to be "feudal."

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2. Coding Narrative: Far Eastern System

The Far Eastern world system may have existed at the time of, and with a core state from, the semilegendarily Hsia (Xia) dynasty. (The traditional Wade-Giles transliteration system is used herein, except in a few instances in which a more recent pinyin transliteration would reduce, not increase, the confusion and pronunciation errors of an ordinary reader.) A walled city a mile square near present Zhengzhou may have been the Hsia capital Yangcheng, and large walled Lungshan-culture towns may have been Hsia subcenters. But because of fundamental historical and archaeological discrepancies, little can be said of configurations in the Far Eastern world system before the triad of Hsia, Shang and Chou, often treated as a succession of dynasties in a single state, but by Chang (1980:348-355) argued to be three states, respectively to the center, east and west of the Central Plain of the Yellow River, arising and succeeding one another in that order and in power primacy.
Furthermore, we omit the Hsia "era" as essentially not yet datable (Chang, 1986: 306; Murphey, 1996:33, suggests 2000-1600 BC, Chang, 1983: 512, 2200-1750 BC), nor classifiable as to polarity-configuration. The most frequent coding would likely be hegemonic, but there would have been a period of bipolarity in the transition to Shang (cf. Chang 512-513). An area of perhaps 350 X 450 miles, mainly in the middle Yellow River basin, could speculatively be assigned to the entire Far Eastern system during the alleged Hsia period. (See Hermann 2; Wheatley's comment, xiii; Penkala 8)

The Shang era which supposedly followed Hsia is also omitted, as not yet firmly datable nor classifiable at most particular moments. (Chang, 1983:512-514, proposes 1750-1100 BC--cf. Chang, 1980:322-329--and his description, like that of Keightley, 1983, seems to leave a choice between hegemony or unipolarity without hegemony.) The system's boundaries were now more likely 500 X 500 miles, with extensions into parts of the Huai and Yangtze basins. (See Hermann 3-4, and Wheatley's comment, xiii-xiv; Penkala 10; Blunden and Elvin 54-55)

Late Shang does seems to have been clearly hegemonic, with Shang ascendancy over a multicultural system in the lower and middle Yellow River basin which contained the Shang royal domain (the bureaucratic core empire), vassal states, friendly states, independent states, and hostile states. (Hsu and Linduff 20-25, 145; see map, Blunden and Elvin, 34-35, and Keightley, 538) Yin, the final Shang capital near Anyang, "may have covered at its peak as much as 10 square miles" (Murphey, 34), implying fairly widespread and massive extractions by the militaristic slaver aristocracy of Shang. Chao Lin notes a move in finds that late Shang was in the process of moving "from a state confederacy toward an empire" by conquering small states, establishing overlordship, and transforming vassal states into Shang administrative districts. (93-105, 129)

Toward the end of Shang's prominence, Chou (possibly proto-Tibeto-Burmans, "Ch'iang" or "Jung"; Pulleyblank, 460) slowly arose out of a weak, distant and intermittent vassalhood (Keightley, 529-532) to become a strong and growing state, variously imitating, resisting, fighting, or submitting to Shang. (Hsu and Linduff 45-49) This would have entailed a bipolar transition period; this was followed by a period of Chou hegemony.

Chou chronology remains extremely unsettled before 841 BC, with problems that are numerous, complex, and highly specialized, with all dates subject to significant future alterations. The "Western Chou" era may have lasted 250 or more than 300 years: while 771 BC is the generally accepted ending date, conflicting recent chronologies begin it 1122, 1100, 1087, 1050, or 1027 or 1025 BC. (Hsu and Linduff 390; Ebrey 23, 30; Blunden and Elvin 55; Huang 15; Murphey 35; Bodde, 1986:21; Shaughnessy, xix) From 1025, however, coding becomes plausible, because Chou was by then established as a hegemony, and apparently remained hegemonic to 841. We shall use Shaughnessy's dates for the Chou reigns (which are mentioned because much Chou material is organized by reign).
In Chou's ascent to primacy it is recorded as having destroyed 99 "states" and subjugated 652, but these were probably statelets, clusters of villages. (Hsu and Linduff, 113) Chou then set up a system of governance usually styled "feudal," but effectively hegemonic, in the Yellow River basin. The early geography of the Chou-centered world-system did not much alter that of its Shang-centered predecessor; the Huai, Han and Yangtze basins remained outside the system. (Hsu and Linduff 127-128)

1025 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Chou. (King Ch'eng: Shaughnessy, xix; but cf. Hsu and Linduff, 387-390)

King Ch'eng established many new "states" in the Yellow River basin. Chou, as foreign conquerors, planted many new garrison and colonial fortress-cities to control new territorial states containing both Shang remnants and the numerous non Hua-Hsia peoples Shang had conquered but not incorporated. (Eberhard, 1952, 4, 6, 66-68; Hsu and Linduff 127-128, 158-163, 187-189, 224, 269, 379)

Eberhard emphasizes the polycultural character of the Chou state and the system in which it resided: "a little area of China surrounded by large tribal areas. Large parts of what politically belonged to China as a state at that time, still belonged ethnically and culturally to the tribal areas." (1967: 22) Existing "vassal" nations and states in the world-system's polyculture area (which contained proto-Chinese "Hua-Hsia" peoples and many others) remained substantially autonomous, and underwent little internal reorganization. (Hsu and Linduff 123, 127-128, 150-152, 380)

1000 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Chou (King K'ang)

King K'ang planted new military-garrison states to the south. (Hsu and Linduff, 129-133)

975 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Chou (King Chao)

This appears to be the peak of Chou dynamism, with firm control of the Yellow River basin, defense against northern nomads, and notable expeditions southward to the Han and Huai valleys. (Hsu and Linduff 133-137)

950 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Chou (King Mu)

925 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Chou (King Mu)

The reign of King Mu may have involved hegemonic order-maintaining operations. (Hsu and Linduff 137-140)
900 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Chou (King Kung)
875 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Chou (King I)

The system seems to have been stable at this time, for these reigns were "uneventful." (Hsu and Linduff, 140) But there seems to have been a bureaucratization and centralization going on which eventually reached a critical point. (Hsu and Linduff 140-141, 145, 146, 280)

850 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Chou (King Li).

In 841 BC an attempt by King Li to monopolize finances and repress opposition by terror, i.e. to reorganize the system as a genuine centralized bureaucratic empire, was stopped by a coup of the "feudal nobles" (i.e., leaders of subject states), who installed a more pliant Chou king after a 14-year "regency." (Hsu and Linduff, 144-146) Incidentally, it also firmed up the chronology of Chou. (Hsu and Linduff, 387-390)

825 BC. Unipolar. Polar state: Chou (King Hsüan).

Chou never recovered from the coup and the regency. Under Li's successor Hsüan, Chou had lost control of its northern frontier, was hard-pressed by mobile peoples--Jung in the north and Hsien-yun near the western capital. Chou military expeditions southward, earlier and even into the troubled late reigns, had expanded Chou's grasp, permitting substantial tribute-collection in the Han-Huai area. Now in its preoccupation with defending the northern frontier against nomads, Chou also let slip its grip on its southern vassals, whom it could no longer mobilize on its behalf. (Hsu and Linduff 258-262, 268, 279)

800 BC. Unipolar. Polar state: Chou (King Hsüan)
775 BC. Unipolar. Polar state: Chou (King Yu).

Horse-nomad Jung had been fought on the northern frontier by the Chou vassal-garrison states of Jin and Ch'in, by King Chao and King Mu. In 771, a Jung alliance captured the Chou capital and killed the king. The dynasty fled east. (Hsu and Linduff 135, 139-140, 192-194, 259, 265) The "Eastern Chou" revived a doctrine of universal empire and a rhetoric of feudalism; but behind it hid, no revived Chou hegemony, but a multistate system, more often than not multipolar (cf. Walker, 13, 20), continuing for five centuries, until the rise of Ch'in (Qin). There was first a brief period of extreme disintegration, with two rival Chou kings. (Maspero, 171)

750 BC. Nonpolar: "a world of numerous small city-states." (Blunden and Elvin, 61)

By the beginning of the annals of Lu, 722 BC, there were about 170 states in the former Chou conquest area, ten of them rather more important than others, and "of
approximately equal power": Lu, Cheng (Zheng), Wey (Old Wei), Sung (Song), Chi (Ji), Ch'en, Ts'ao, Ts'ai, Ch'i (Qi), Chou (Walker, 20-21). Most of these states were on the central plain of the Yellow River, and were of Chou derivation, e.g. Cheng was a Chou colonial state. Sung was a remnant of Shang. Ch'i lay to the east, "was the direct descendant of Hsia" (Chang, 1980:350) and/or had a Chiang nobility (Chou allies) overlying a Shang population, over subdued "indigenous," or at least "ancient," peoples. (Hsu and Linduff 160, 186, 201-205)

725 BC: Multipolar. Great powers: Lu, Cheng, Wey, Sung, Chi, Ch'en, Ts'ao, Ch'i, Chou.

As the system reordered itself, it also expanded. There probably was a Yangtze civilization/world system simultaneous with and parallel to the Yellow River system, and only coupling to it at about this time. The Yangtze system was probably hegemonic, its hegemon being the state of Ch'u (probably Man "barbarians," Miao-Yaos, Pulleyblank 460) in the upper Yangtze basin, which had had some previous brief collisional interaction with Chou. (Hsu and Linduff 128, 133-134, 138, 221, 225-226)

Ch'u in this period reorganized itself for northward expansion, came into continued interaction with the southern Chou colonial states, and began to conquer them. Ch'u tended over time both to extend its hegemony by subjugating independent states, and to annex its subject states and turn them into internal metropolitan provinces. Consequently, the multistate system occasionally assumed a bipolar configuration in which Ch'u led a southern, Yangtze-basin empire, and was opposed by an alliance led by one or another of the northern, Yellow River states. (Maspero 178-179; Walker 38-39)

The leader of the northern alliance is often spoken of in the literature as a "hegemon," but in fact no northern leader managed to achieve systemwide hegemony. Different states led the northern alliance at different times; as time went by, direct Chou successors were displaced by larger, less "Chinese" peripheral powers in the alliance headship, with its prerogatives: to call meetings; to mediate and arbitrate disputes; to authorize or undertake intervention (Walker, 79, 87-89). The status of the "hegemons" was dependent not only upon their personal qualities, but also upon the intensity of the southern challenge. When Ch'u underwent episodes of weakness or diminished militancy, the northern alliance would weaken or dissolve and a multipolar configuration would emerge.

For the twenty-year period 720-701 BC Walker (14, 55) identifies two great powers: Ch'u and Cheng. Blunden and Elvin (63) see Cheng's leader, Duke Chuang (r.c. 742-700, reign dates after Legge Prol. 102-111; Maspero 744-701; Maspero's dates cited hereafter e.g. as 744-701M), as the first northern "hegemon." However, in this period the states of Ch'i and Sung were also highly active in fighting wars, making alliances, and leading coalition invasions. Furthermore, Cheng was in fact an aggressive expansionist; repeatedly fought one or several of the northern states, including Chou itself (720, 718-
716, 712-711, 706, 704, 701); only once helped them against the Jung (705); and never led them to resist the depredations of Ch'u (705, 703, 702). Chou, and then, after Chou suffered a great defeat (707M), Sung, led the counteralliance which provided northern resistance to Cheng. (Legge, 1-55; Maspero, 172-174) Accordingly, and matching Walker's (14, 55) ranking for 700-681:

700 BC. Multipolar. Great powers: Ch'u, Ch'i, Cheng, Sung.

The northern states continued to fight one another, allowing Ch'u to expand unhindered, until 680M, when Ch'i, which had itself been expanding successfully, presided at the first "hegemonic" northern conferences (which would involve some, but rarely all, of: Sung, Lu, Wey, Cheng, Ch'en, Ts'ai, Ts'ao) to arrange coercion of deviant northern states, Cheng first of all. (Maspero 182-183)

The statesman Kuan-tzu (Kuan Chung; Guan Zhong; Kuan I-wu; d.c. 644), in the employ of Duke Huan of Ch'i (r.c. 683-641, or 685-643M), undertook extensive centralizing, meritocratic, state-monopolistic, mercantilist, legalist, militarizing reforms, eliminating internal hegemonic or "feudal" structures. In consequence Ch'i was able to field "the largest and best organized army of its time." (Maspero, 180-181; Walker, 29-33) Meanwhile, Ch'u was stalled 676-671M by rebellion and civil war, and even became temporarily polite and entered relations with Chou. (Legge, 97-99, 105-106; Maspero 185-187)

675 BC. Bipolar. Polar states: Ch'u, Ch'i.

(This is also Walker's ranking for 680-661: 14, 55.) Ch'u began reasserting its power by invading Cheng 666M. Eventually, in 665, Ch'i and the league, which were often active against Jung, Ti and other "barbarians," came to the aid of Cheng against a Ch'u invasion. After 658, Ch'u was somewhat contained by rescues, and by counterinvasions of states which inclined its way. Ch'u still made progress, though only slowly, against small border states: eliminating Hsien 655M, subjugating Hsu 654M (Walker, 29, 31-34; Legge, 56-173; Ebrey, 39; Maspero 182-188)

During this period, the small northern state of Jin (Chin), having recovered from the paralysis of sixty years of civil war, subjugated all its 7 or 8 small neighbors, establishing itself as a local hegemon on the north side of the Yellow River in a series of campaigns 669-652M. (Romanization in this section generally follows Wade-Giles, except that, to reduce the most obvious chance of confusion, the Pinyin "Jin" is used instead of Wade-Giles' "Chin.") The small Western state of Ch'in (Qin) had unified the Wei valley in a series of local wars 713-655M, but organized its acquisitions not hegemonically but as districts in a centralized state. (Maspero 175-178) Jin was a colonial state planted by Chou on the former Hsia territory, interacting with the northern Jung (Rong) nomads; Ch'in was a far western peripheral state, "non-Chinese" (i.e. non Hua-Hsia), whose later
conquests would by a sublime historic irony produce the "China" of which it was not really much a part. (See Hsu and Linduff, 190, 192-193)

650 BC. Bipolar. Polar states; Ch'u and Ch'i.

Walker (52), apparently to the contrary, appraises the interval 660-641 BC as multipolar, with four great powers, Ch'u, Ch'i, Ch'in and Jin; but the latter pair seem to have risen to systemwide prominence only after 643M, when, after the death of Huan, Ch'i fell into some disorder, and lost its place. Ch'u swallowed a few more small states. Sung, under Duke Hsiang, attempted to assume the northern hegemony 641-637M, but got no following, and actually provoked the league to enlist Ch'u against Sung. (Maspero 188-191; Legge 172-186)

Ch'u accordingly made major advances, forcing the subjugation of Cheng, Ch'en, Sung, Ts'ai at and Lu (633M). The northern semiperipheral state of Jin, under Duke Wen, in response assumed the headship of the Yellow River alliance (Ch'i, Sung, Cheng, Wey, Lu, Ch'in) against Ch'u, militarized his country, organized a large army, attacked Ch'u vassals Ts'ai and Wey (632M), inflicted a major defeat upon Ch'u in 631 (632M), disassembled its league, and compelled Ch'u to make peace in 627 (628M). (Maspero 188-201; Legge, 207-221)

After the death of Duke Wen of Jin at the end of the war (628M), a multipolar period ensued. Ch'in took advantage of the Jin succession to begin asserting itself, and became embroiled in a stalemated war with Jin (627M); Ch'u took advantage of the Ch'in-Jin war to reopen its struggle with Jin over the intervening states of Ts'ai, Ch'en, Cheng and Wey (627M). (Maspero 198-203)

This quarter-century was accordingly unusually variable, moving from bipolarity to multipolarity (643) to unipolarity (after 636) to bipolarity (631) to multipolarity (628).

625 BC. Multipolar. Great powers: Ch'u, Jin, Ch'in, Ch'i, Cheng.

(This matches Walker's great power list for 640-621: 14, 55.) Walker argues for the inclusion of Cheng, often treated as a pawn, on the grounds of its extent, wealth, centralization, patriotism, effective statecraft, defensive resilience, and occasional successful aggression; 49-52) Jin and Ch'u recognized stalemated and stopped fighting (624M). Another succession crisis in Jin (621-614M), in which Ch'in intervened, paralyzed it and caused the league to decline, Ch'i and Ch'u took advantage, Ch'i attempted to reassert its leadership, attacking its small neighbors Lu, Chu, Chü and Ts'ai, and forcing their submission. Ch'u returned to menace, invasion and subjugation (Ts'ai, Cheng, Ch'en, Sung 618-617M) and then collapsed into its own internal succession strife (614-611M), to the profit of Jin's alliance; reasserted itself (608-607M), and collapsed
again (605M), reasserted itself and was successfully resisted by Jin (600M). (Maspero 203-206; Legge, 224-305)

600 BC. Multipolar. Great powers: Ch'u, Jin, Ch'in, Ch'i, Cheng.

(Walker lists Ch'u, Jin, Ch'in, Cheng, and Wu--but not Ch'i--for 620-601, and drops Cheng for 600-581: 14, 55. But this may be a misprint: Wu was not assertive until 583, or even, per Walker 52, 568.)

Ch'u, under King Chuang, rose suddenly to the greatest prominence, conquering Cheng and greatly defeating Jin (597M), subjugating Sung (596-594M), befriending Ch'i; the system was, briefly, unipolar (594-591M). (Legge 307-338; Maspero 206-207) The tables turned rather quickly: Ch'i tried to take advantage of Jin's weakness and a succession crisis in Ch'u to extend its influence over Lu; in 589M 587L a revivified Jin defeated Ch'i and forced it to submit 588M and renewed the league; whereat Ch'u made a treaty with Jin 588M. Ch'u-Jin bipolarity ensued 587-583, with intervening states vacillating between fears and pressures. (Legge 343-363; cf. Maspero 207-208) As Maspero says (209), "The suddenness with which these hegemonies arose and collapsed shows how fragile they were."

In 583 BC (584M), the southeastern peripheral state of Wu, a Ch'u vassal in the Yangtze delta, originally a distant Chou colony planted on a distinct local culture (Hsu and Linduff, 160) which was probably "Yi" Mon-Khmer (Pulleyblank, 459), inspired or provoked by assistance from Jin, revolted from Ch'u, allied with Jin, and began to assert itself against Ch'u. (Legge 362-364; Maspero 209-211) Jin was able to seize Ts'ai and Ch'en (583M), resume the leadership of the northern states (Sung, Wey, Lu, Ch'i) plus Wu. Ch'u sued for peace (582M); Jin and the league defeated Ch'in (578M). Jin was again the most powerful state. (Legge 370-407; Maspero 210-211)

Ch'u returned to action against Cheng, Wey and Sung (576M), but was rebuffed by Jin and the league (575M), which could however achieve nothing decisive. (Maspero 211-212)

Again this quarter-century was conspicuous for quick transitions: multipolarity, unipolarity, bipolarity, unipolarity, bipolarity.

575 BC. Bipolar. Polar states: Ch'u, Jin.

This is consistent with Walker (46), though elsewhere he rates the great powers 580-561 as including Ch'u, Jin, Ch'in and Wu (14, 55).

For a moment Jin resumed unipolar status, enforcing league membership upon Cheng (571M) and Ch'ên and Hsu (570M), supported by Ch'i, conciliated by Ch'u. Then Ch'u resumed its incursions (566M) and Jin, weakened by internal divisions, could do no
better than maintain bipolarity. (Maspero 211-213; Legge 385-409) The camp of Ch'u included the small states of Hsu, Ch'en, and Ts'ai, and that of Jin the small states of royal Chou, Cheng, Wey, Chi, Ts'ao, Chü, Small Chü, Lu and Hsueh. The "middle powers" Ch'in and Yin in the northeast were neutral (Hsu, xii).

Jin's league defeated Ch'in's attempt to ally with Ch'u (561-559M), and Ch'i's defection and attack on Lu (556-553; -555M). (Maspero 213-214; Legge 471-528).

This period accordingly saw rapid change in the power structure: transitions from bipolarity to unipolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity, and bipolarity again.

550 BC. Bipolar. Great powers: Ch'u, Jin.

Ch'i redefected and attacked Jin itself, but was defeated again and brought back to the league 549-547 (550-548M; Maspero 213-214, Legge 471-528).

Walker (14, 55) gives the great powers of 560-541 as Ch'u, Jin, Ch'i, Ch'in, Wu, but this better describes the situation a few years later, when Ch'u and the northern league led by Jin made peace in 546M. At this time there was an explicit acknowledgement that "Tsin, Ts'o, Ts'e and Ts'in are equals," such that neither Ch'i nor Ch'in could be compelled to join the settlement; and Wu was also left out, or let out. (Legge 532-535; Hsu 57-58; Walker 56-58) Blunden and Elvin (64) see this settlement as Jin and Ch'u having arranged a dual hegemony; here we would instead concur with Walker's judgement.

In 538M Ch'u became active again, creating a counter-league and leading it to war against Jin's ally Wu, which got no help from Jin, having in fact embarked on a career of expansion of its own. Among those thus led was the future great state of Yüeh, which comes to notice 535 BC. Yüeh, a non-Chinese (non Hua-Hsia) state (Hsu and Linduff, 161, 190), possibly Mon-Khmer (Pulleyblank, 459) lay in the far southeast, beyond Wu, in the Yangtze delta. (Maspero 214-215)

Ch'u conquered Ch'en and Ts'ai; Jin had become internally conflicted and could not respond, but Wu resisted stubbornly. Eventually Ch'u's relentless expansionism exhausted and alienated its population. A coup threw Ch'u into sudden disorder in 528 (529M), and the victors abandoned Ch'u's recent gains in the north (528M). Jin (528) and Ch'i (525) took the occasion to expand while Ch'u recovered and resisted Wu. (Maspero 213-216). Accordingly:

525 BC. Multipolar. Great powers: Ch'u, Jin, Ch'i, Wu.

This is in accord with Walker's rating for 540-521 (14, 55). There was now a chaotic succession of assertive acts by a variety of powers, sometimes involving one state alone,
sometimes carrying along a few allies or a part of the northern league: as by Wu 518 and
511 and 505, Yüeh (or Yu-yüeh) 504, Ch'in 504, Ch'i 502 and 500. Wu for instance did
great damage to Ch' u 506M, was defeated by Ch'u, Ch'in and Yüeh 505M, and defeated
Ch' u again 504M. Jin occasionally called the states together (510M, 506M), and
unilaterally settled disputes in royal Chou (520M, 519M). (Legge, 532-773; Maspero
216-219)

500 BC. Multipolar. Great powers: Ch' u, Jin, Ch'i, Ch'in, Wu, Yüeh.

Walker ranks only Ch' u, Jin, Ch'in and Wu as great powers 520-501, and only Ch' u,
Wu and Yüeh in 500-481: 14, 55. On a criterion of unimpeded aggressiveness, all five
seem about equally qualified in 500. Judging by the same criterion, all five were highly
active over the next quarter-century: Ch' i was again aggressor in 497, Yüeh in 496, Ch' u
in 495 and 494, Ch' i and Wu in 494, Jin in 493, Ch' i in 492 and 491, Jin and Wu in 490,
Jin in 489, Wu and Ch' i in 488, Ch' u in 487, Wu, Jin and Ch' u in 486, Ch' i and Wu in
485, Yüeh, Ch' u and Jin in 483, Jin in 482 and 481, Yüeh, Jin and Ch' i in 479, Yüeh in
477 and 476. (Legge, 772-863; using the dating in the Concordance pp. v.-xi, rather than
that implied by Legge on p. 861)

In 497-490M, Jin fell into civil warfare among its great territorial lords, and its
league began to dissolve. (Maspero 217, 227-228) Ch' i took advantage of the troubles
to intervene to increase them, and to expand its local hegemony, until it too fell into
succession difficulties after 489M. (Maspero 234-235) Wu had a skyrocket career:
subjugating Yüeh 494M, attacking Ch' i 489-485M, usurping Jin's notional leadership
of the non-functional northern league 482M, and exhausting itself in the process; in 482M it
was defeated, and in 475-473M destroyed and annexed by Yüeh, which however was not
strong enough to keep all its territory but shared with Ch' u. (Maspero 217-221, 242)

The larger states began extinguishing middle powers about this time. Sung absorbed
Ts' ao 487 BC. (Walker, 27) Ch' u erased Ch'en 478 BC (479M). (Ssu-ma 1994, 78, 105;
Maspero 242)

481 traditionally ends the "Spring and Autumn Era." Walker notes that there were
then 13 important states, five of which were non-Chou (22), i.e. in some rather strong
cultural sense "non-Chinese": Jin, Ch'in, Ch' u, Wu, Yüeh--in fact, almost every great
power. The Far Eastern system remained polycultural: "there was a very small area in
which only Chinese lived, and a large area surrounding it [but within the "Chinese" states]
that was occupied by non-Chinese," Liao hunters, Yao hunters, Yüeh sailors, Tai
ricegrowers, Tibetan sheep breeders, Turkish horse-breeders, Mongol cattle-breeders,
Tungus pig-breeders. (Eberhard, 1967, 18-22)
Yüeh was again aggressive in 474 (when it destroyed Wu), Jin in 473 (472M), Yüeh in 470, Jin in 469 and 463 (463M). Here the detailed data of the Tso Chuan ends. (Legge, 772-863) Maspero’s dates are hereafter normally employed.

110 or more states having been extinguished 722-463 BC, 22 remained. (Hsu, 1, 58-59).

In 453 Jin ceased to function as a unit and began to dissolve into three component parts, Han (Han), Chao (Zhao), and (new) Wei. (Maspero 225-228)

Though it may be an illusion caused by the end of the detailed data series, it seems that the other three major powers, Ch’u, Ch’i and Ch’in, remained mostly quiet with respect to each other, Ch’u recovering and reorganizing, Ch’i involved in internal struggle and reorganization, Ch’in slowly expanding westward against stubborn tribal resistance, for the next 100 years. (Maspero 233-242)

450 BC. Tripolar. Great powers: Ch’u, Ch’i, Ch’in.

Ch’u annexed Ts’ai in 447M (Maspero 242).

425 BC. Tripolar. Great powers: Ch’in, Ch’i, Ch’u.

Jin faded away in stages to 375 BC. About 424 BC the three new states had recognized one another’s independence; by 402 (403M) they had been recognized by Chou. (Legge, ProL. 105; Maspero 228-229) They began functioning as major powers, though not quite at the level that Ch’u, Ch’i and Ch’in were later able to manage when internally stable, united and centralized. They were not so in this period, but rather preoccupied by internal power struggles and reorganizations, Ch’in being immersed in chronic civil war. Han was able to begin the conquest of Cheng in 408M, and Wei to reduce and subjugate Wei, without interference. Yüeh occupied itself with local aggressions against its northern neighbors. (Maspero, 226, 244, 251)

400 BC. Multipolar. Great powers: Ch’in, Ch’i, Ch’u, Han, Chao, Wei, Yüeh.

Two states of some significance were now emerging, Yen (Yan) and Ko-Choson. The northeastern peripheral state of Yen had been formed by resting a Chou elite on a Shang population. (Hsu and Linduff, 194-201) Beyond Yen there had by now formed a proto-Korean state in southern Manchuria and northwest Korea, a confederated kingdom of walled town-states, Ko-Choson ("Ancient Choson," "Old Choson"). (Lee, 13-14; Eckert et al, 11; Han 12-15; Henthorn 21)

The extent of the system in the warring states period, when its boundaries were expanded in the northeast (states of Yen and Ko-Choson), north (building of walls of Yen, Chao and Wei), and southwest (rise of Shu-Pa area of Szechwan, and its later
conquest by Ch’in), would now be about 800 X 900 miles. (See Herrmann 6; Penkala 14; Blunden and Elvin 62-63)

Internal troubles and reorganizations continued at the start of the fourth century BC. Hann erased Cheng by stages 398-375 BC. Stability was restored in Ch’in. Yüeh fell into disorder 376-357. (Maspero 237, 244, 251-252)

New combinations were spurred by the efforts of Wei after 386 to refound Jin by subduing Hann and Chao. Interference by Ch‘i was soundly defeated 384-378, and Wei gained stature. (Maspero 247-248)

**375 BC.** Multipolar. Great powers; Ch‘i, Wei, Ch‘u, Ch’in.

Wei added to its stature by a victory over Ch‘u 371, survived a succession civil war and a revolt by Hann and Chao 370, and brought Wey, Lu and Sung into a truncated northern league 356 BC. Ch’in, Ch‘i and Ch‘u all intervened, individually and then in combination 356-351, and forcibly dissolved Wei’s league despite staunch resistance. Hann remained allied to Wei. (Maspero 248-249)

In this period Ch’in, advised by Lord Shang (fl. 361-338 BC, Walker, 100), began to undertake productive, totalitarian and militaristic imperial reforms, in emulation of Ch‘u, and increasingly in opposition to the then pre-eminent northern leader Ch‘i, aggressive and pre-eminent in the north with Wei’s eclipse. (Ssu-ma 1994, 109-110; Walker, 100; Maspero, 237-242)

**350 BC.** Multipolar. Great powers; Ch‘i, Wei, Ch‘u, Ch’in.

Wei sought protection from Ch’in against Ch‘i 350-349. Wei, with Hann, reasserted itself 346, defeating Ch‘u, but was compelled to recognize the hegemony of Ch’in in 342. Hann thereupon broke away; Wei tried to coerce it, and was defeated by Hann, Chao, Ch‘i and Ch’in, and saved only by the intervention of Ch‘u. Wei never recovered; in its extremely exposed central position it now became the prime advocate of peace. Wei received peace and even support from Ch‘i, but became the main target of Ch’in’s relentless eastward drive. (Maspero, 249-251).

Ch‘i, powerful but passive, dominated Chao and Wei. Yüeh revived, began to assault Ch‘i, then turned toward Ch‘u, and was unexpectedly destroyed by it 334 or 333 M. Ch‘u annexed the old territories of Wu and exercised suzerainty over petty states in the original Yüeh lands. (Blunden and Elvin, 71; Maspero, 251-252; but Nienhauser believes Yüeh survived to c. 230 BC, note 117 to Ssu-ma 134)
Chi and Ch’u then fought each other to stalemate and exhaustion c. 333–323, giving Ch’in a free hand against Wei, which it slowly dismembered, 332, 331, 329, 325. (Maspero 251-252)

325 BC. Tripolar. Great Powers: Ch’in, Chi, Ch’u.

Ch’in mediated peace between Chi’i and Ch’u, and took its pay by subjugating Wei 323. (Maspero 252-253) Chi’i and Ch’u combined against Ch’in about 321, and when Wei rebelled (319) they went to its aid, bringing along Chao, Hann, Yen, and even the Huns (or proto-Huns, Hsiung-nu) of Inner Mongolia. Yen and the Huns may have attended as Chao vassals. This first major countercoallition forced Ch’in to retreat (318) but could not defeat it, and broke up over a prestige rivalry between Chi’i and Ch’u. Ch’in inflicted a paralyzing defeat upon Hann (317), and then took the opportunity to destroy the isolated state of Shu (316), thereby conquering the immense and rich territory of Szechwan, a major food source. Ch’in then extended its attacks, usually taking a bit of territory on each occasion: Chao 316; Chao and Hann 315; Wei and Hann 314; Chao 313; Ch’u, Chi (via Hann), and Yen (via Wei) 312; Ch’u 311. Ch’in isolated, defeated and subjugated Wei and Hann, and compelled Ch’u to cede a strategic mountain barrier and Wei the right bank of the Yellow River. Ch’in had also (315) broken through Jung resistance on its west to reach an important Central Asian caravan terminus. Chi had compensated itself poorly enough by occupying Yen 314, but was driven out by a revolt in 312. All the major states but Yen submitted to Ch’in in 310; Yen, hostile to Chi after the occupation, became friendly to Ch’in. (Maspero 241, 252-255, 257-258; Ssu-ma, 1994, 110-113. See Nienhausers’s note 267--Ssu-ma, 1994, 112--which suggests confusion about which members of the "coalition" of 318 or 317 were actual combatants, or even participants at all)

But Ch’in lost its hegemony in a succession crisis 307-305 BC. Wei and Hann revolted to Chi’i. Ch’in made territorial concessions to keep peace with Ch’u 304, gave lands back to Hann and Wei 302, put down a rebellion in Shu 301 and sent a hostage to Chi. Ch’i now dominated Lu and some smaller states, Ch’in was an ally-protector to Wei and Hann and Yen, Ch’u protected Sung and the now-divided Chou realm; only Chao was outside the three spheres of influence. In 302 war broke out between Ch’in and Ch’u. (Maspero, 257-258; Ssu-ma, 114-115)

300 BC. Tripolar. Great powers: Ch’in, Chi, Ch’u.

Ch’in made major gains against Ch’u in a war lasting to 292. Chi, Hann, Wei, Chao and Sung took advantage of this war to attack Ch’in 296—the second major countercoallition against Ch’in. They could not get past its mountain defenses, though Ch’in ceded some land to buy peace for the moment. Ch’in resumed its steady advances against Hann, Ch’u, and especially Wei 294-286. (Maspero 258-261; Ssu-ma, 115-117)
Ch'i now took the initiative, annexed Sung 286 BC, became hegemon to Lu and thirteen other small states, and proceeded to assault the "Three Chin" (Hann, Chao, Wei). The other six major powers formed an alliance which crushed Ch'i 285-284 BC. Yen actually occupied almost the whole of Ch'i 284-279 BC. When Ch'i at last drove Yen out, it returned as only a minor power, usually a passive ally of Ch'in. (Ssu-ma 117; Maspero 261-263)

The system was now bipolar. Ch'u had profited by the coalition to take over the former territory of Sung, and dominate Lu, Hann and Chou. Ch'in then turned on Ch'u in 280, and crushed it 278 BC, annexing its capital Ying and the Yangtze heart of Ch'u. (Maspero, 263-264) The system became unipolar.

275 BC. Unipolar. Polar state: Ch'in.

Ch'u was largely confined to the Huai valley by a peace of 272-263. (Maspero, 263-264; Ssu-ma, 118-119) The polar state, Ch'in, was uniquely aggressive, attacking Wei or Hann or Chao almost every year. (Ssu-ma, 119-121; Maspero 265-267) Blunden and Elvin (72) emphasise its overwhelming preponderance in resources--territory almost equal to the other states combined, population probably larger than any other. Resistance was fierce, and slowly crushed. Ch'in defeated Wei with great slaughter 273 (274M), Chao with even greater 260, but the struggle continued. (Bodde, 1967:86; Maspero 264-266)

At the northeastern edge of the system, Ko-Choson declined under Yen pressure, losing the Liaotung peninsula. (Eckert et al, 12)

250 BC. Unipolar. Polar state: Ch'in.

Ch'in, having eliminated West Chou 256-255 BC, finished off East Chou 249 BC. On both occasions the offending part of Chou, divided since 367, had tried to form a general alliance against Ch'in. (Ssu-ma, 83, 121-122; Maspero 267-268) Ch'u annexed Lu 249 (Maspero 264). A five-state countercoalition against Ch'in, led by Wei, did form, and defeated it 247 BC, but then dissolved. (Ssu-ma, 122) Ch'in resumed its attacks and piecemeal expansion. Another five-state coalition including Hann, Wei, Chao and Ch'u attacked Ch'in 241, but was driven off. (Ssu-ma, 128)

Struggles for power interrupted Ch'in's march 239-235 BC; it then resumed on a much grander scale. Ch'in's unchallenged military predominance over the other states in the system led within twenty years to the final elimination of the other states in a series of annexations. Hann was destroyed 230 BC, Chao 228 BC, Wei 225 BC, each abandoned by the remainder of the states. (Ssu-ma, 132-134; Maspero 267-268)

225 BC. Hegemonic. Hegemon: Ch'in.
Ch'în finished off Ch'u in 223, Yen in 222, and Ch'i in 221. (Maspero 28) Ch'în built a universal state (with 36 commanderies each run by a governing committee) rather than a hegemony (Ssu-ma, 137). This universal state was designed and intended to last to infinity (Ssu-ma, 136), and actually lasted 15 years, to 206 BC. In consequence it falls between our datum points and therefore fails to appear in the coding at all.

It is of interest that the First Emperor of that universal Ch'în state, Ch'în Shih Huang Ti, found it expedient to join together the frontier great walls of the extinguished northern states of Chao, Wei and Yen, to create the first Great Wall of China. (Ssu-ma 146) The implication is that the system had extended itself even further north, and that the steppe peoples, especially the "Huns," were now a part of it.

Rebellions broke out in 209 BC, the year after the death of the First Emperor. (Ssu-ma 158) From 206 to 202 BC there was anarchy through the former Ch'în empire, and then the reconstruction of an empire called Han. Walker proposes (98, 37-39) that the Han state which succeeded Ch'în as the strongest element in the Far Eastern system looked more like the Jin of the late 7th and early 6th centuries BC (a league hegemon leading many locally autonomous states) than Ch'în and Ch'u ("totalitarian" empires which erased states and made their territories into provinces). True enough, as far as the former territories of Ch'în are concerned.

However, by 200 BC, the Far Eastern world-system has grown once again. Partly because of the peripheral effects of the Ch'în empire, the field of inquiry and narrative must now expand far beyond its imperial territory, which can hereafter be treated only as the cultural-political-economic-demographic core of a system whose semiperiphery significant polities were forming under core pressure. Roughly these may be identified as: NE, (proto-) Korean; N, Steppe (Hun/Hsiung-nu, Sienbi/Hsien-pi, Turk/Tu-chüeh, Avar/Jan-juan, Mongol, etc); NW, Kashgaria (Tarim basin); SW, mountain (Tibeto-Burman, Tai); SE, coastal (Yüeh/Viet). The system's extent is now about 1000 X 1300 miles. (See Herrmann 9; Penkala 18) Core state claims of hegemony (and universal empire) must be evaluated in some relation to these polities, at least when they are citified. At the same time, the geographic extent of semiperipheral polities often overstates their relative politico-military and economic-demographic weight in the system.

Granting that Han became hegemonic to the systemic core, what of the extended semiperiphery?

The steppe polities in general, are hard to classify. At times they seem cityless stateless tent nomads nearly irrelevant to the discussion; at times they seem to form a state, with a mobile capital, or at least a headquarters, with an empire rivaling Han (as under Mao-tun 201-178 BC, or Chih-chih 56-36 BC); at times they seem like the nub of a small abortive civilization in the Orkhon basin, isolated from the Yellow River basin by
the Gobi desert. We shall treat them according to their level of organization at any given coding year.

The first steppe polity to be a clear participant in the Far Eastern system was the proto-Hun (Hsiung-nu) tribal confederation, which had begun to contend with the proto-Alans (Yüeh-chi) to its west on the Mongolian plain. The Hun confederation (we shall use the later European label) was driven from Inner Mongolia south of the Gobi to Outer Mongolia north of the desert by a Ch’in army of 100,000 men in 214 BC, but returned to Inner Mongolia in 209 BC when Mao-t’un proclaimed himself shan-yü or emperor (and "son of heaven"), ruling from the capital encampment Lung-cheng (near the future site of Karakorum; Ishjams 153-154, 158, McGovern 115-116; Ssu-ma 167). The fall of Ch’in allowed the Huns under Mao-t’un to incorporate the tribes of eastern Mongolia and western Manchuria. They also made vassals of the thirty-odd walled city-states of Kashgaria—Turfan, Loulan, Karashahr, Kucha, Aksu, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Khema, and others—fighting off the Han armies in 200 BC (Ishjams 154, Ma and Sun 227-228, Barfield 33-35, McGovern 117-122, 133).

Southern Yüeh (now the Kwang provinces of S. China, plus north Vietnam), under its king-emperor Chao To (Tuo), a relic Ch’in conquistador of 218-214, declared its independence in 208, calling itself Nan-yüeh, or Nam-Viet 207. (Ssu-ma, 145-146; Ebrey, 83; Hall, SEA, 211-212)

In present Yunnan there had existed since perhaps 316 BC a independent kingdom of Dian (Tien) (Backus, 4), possibly Tai (Pulleyblank, 460).


The state of Wiman Choson (Chao Hsien), in Northwest Korea and Southeast Manchuria, was founded between 194 and 180 BC by a Chinese refugee, one Wiman, who seized the pre-existing Ko-choson state. Its capital was the city of Lelang, or Lolang, near Pyongyang. Wiman Choson expanded northward, eastward and southward. (Nelson 167-168, 203, 189; Eckert et al, 13)

Nan-yüeh accepted Han suzerainty 196, but revolted and declared itself an empire 183; a Han expedition against Nan-yüeh failed 181 BC. Han conciliated Nan-yüeh. (Majumdar, 14; Hall, SEA, 212; Ebrey 83)

Huns defeated a huge Han invasion army 200 BC. McGovern contends that thereafter, and to 140 BC, the Hun empire became "the largest and most powerful single unit in the Far East." (129) "The empire of continental Asia then belonged to the Hsiung-nu." (Grousset 34) In 198 BC Mao-t’un concluded an unequal treaty with Han to delimit their imperial boundaries at the Great Wall, exacting heavy tribute in silks,
fabrics, handicrafts, rice, gold and money. In 176 BC the Huns defeated the Alans/Yüeh-chih and seized Kashgaria from them.


In 166 BC the Huns fought Han to stalemate. A treaty of essentially equal character, despite the Han tribute contained therein, was negotiated. (Ishjamts 154; Enoki et al., 175; Barfield 35-36, 45-48, 53-54; McGovern, 121-129)


Han itself remained internally as much a hegemonic as an imperial state until 140 BC. Han Wu-ti ruled 140-87 BC, and his reign saw dramatic shifts in power. He replaced vassal states with provinces within the Han domains; he expanded the Han empire in all directions.

Han food and luxury tribute to the Huns was successfully used to render the Huns economically dependent upon Han, and to produce internal tensions between an increasingly refined elite and their conservative society. (Eberhard, 1952, 73-75; cf. Barfield 51-52) Han Wu-ti’s wars with the Huns 133-123 BC drove them to move their capital north of the Gobi.

Southern Yüeh maintained its independence until Chao To’s death in 137 BC, after which Han established control over its rulers. (Ebrey, 83)

**125 BC.** Unipolar. Polar state: Han.

Han was able to follow the Huns across the Gobi, and inflicted major defeats on the Huns in Outer Mongolia 119 BC, but at enormous expense. Though embroiled in leadership struggles, the Huns refused to accept vassal status, and Han lost the ability to defeat them across the desert. The Huns avoided invading Han armies in 111 and 110, and defeated a third in 103. (McGovern, 136-143; Grousset, 35; Barfield, 54-58; cf. Ishjamts, 155). But weakened by rapid Successions and impressed by Han advances on both their flanks, the Huns were inclined to be unusually submissive in 101-100 BC, although there was a sudden breach in the latter year. (McGovern 153-154)

In Korea, Wiman Choson was conquered by Han in 109-108 BC, after an abortive attempt of 128 BC. Han set up four colonial commanderies, Lelang, Imdun, Hyondo, and Chinbon, Lelang being the longest-lived. (Nelson, 167-168; Lee, 16-19; Eckert et al, 13-14)
In Manchuria, a Han mid-Yalu commandery of Ch'anghae was established and abandoned somewhere between 128 and 115 BC, perhaps at Ye (proto-Koguryo?) request for support against Wiman Chosen. (Han 26; Lee 23; Henthorn 20, 22)

Han conquered the Kausu corridor to Kashgaria from the Huns in 121 BC. In campaigns of 108, 103 and 101 BC Han may be said to have acquired hegemony in Kashgaria, which in this case meant that it received hostages, sent military colonists, and received tribute. (Ma and Sun, 227-228; McGovern 140-141, 149-152)

Southern Yüeh rebelled 112 BC, but was conquered, annexed, and further integrated into the empire 111 BC as a tributary protectorate. Thereupon Eastern Yüeh (now SE China) and Dian (the later Nanchao and Yunnan area of the southwest) volunteered to become tributary vassals 110-109 BC (Hall, SEA, 212; McGovern 144-145; Ebrey 8; Buttenger 93). What Han Wu-ti established in Yunnan was the "nominal" control or "sponsorship" whereby local rulers were acknowledged and given titles as agents for the Chinese in their own territories. (Backus, 4, 6) This is one of many possible hegemonic forms; as with others, its content or meaning is highly variable.


The Far Eastern system under Han was greatly extended, to perhaps 1200 X 1800 miles. (See Herrmann 10-11: Penkala 20; Blunden and Elvin 30) Note that the semiperiphery is mostly hegemonic in structure, while the core is a genuine empire. The classification of the system as a whole as Universal-Empire rather than Hegemony reflects a judgment about the relative sizes and weights of these two parts at the time.

In first century BC Korea, the Han commanderies colonized the northwest. Small Korean politics--southeastern Chinhan, southwestern Mahan, south-coast Pyonhan--grew up in the far south, Mahan at least having walled cities and Chinhan city-like stockades. These weak leagues alternately raided and formally submitted to Lelang. All the Chinese Han commanderies but Lelang had evaporated by 75 BC. (Nelson, 167-171; Lee, 19-21; Henthorn, 22-25; Han 33; Eckert et al, 14)

Han campaigns against the Huns in 99, 97 and 90 BC all failed. (McGovern 156-168; Barfield 56, 59) In the southwest, Dian rebelled unsuccessfully in 86 and 83 BC (Ebrey 83).

75 BC. Unipolar. Polar state: Han.

A Han campaign against the Huns 72-71 BC had limited success, mainly achieved by Han diplomacy, which incited the Tolkhars (Wusun) of Dzungaria against their Hun
overlords. (McGovern 156-168) But the Huns suffered a major disaster in a retaliatory
attack on the Tokhars in 71 BC, whereupon their other vassal peoples—Dingling in the
north, Wuhuan in Manchuria—rose up and attacked them. Between 60 and 55 BC there
was factional internal warfare among the Huns. In 55 BC they split into an Eastern
(Inner Mongolian) branch under Huansie and a Western (Outer Mongolian) branch
under Chih-chih. The Eastern Huns requested and received Han vassal status in 51 BC.
The Western Huns sent hostages and tributary presents to Han, though remaining far
beyond any real Han control. (McGovern, 156-171, 187; Barfield 40-41, 59, 61-63)

Han moved slowly to increase control over Kashgar. Having subjugated Loulan
77 BC, Han extended control over Kucha 71 BC, Yarkand 65 BC, Turfan 60 BC. A Han
protector-general ruled Kashgar after 60 BC. (McGovern, 171-181)

Around Kokonor, Chiang tribes formed a confederation. The Han broke this up,
subjugated the Chiang, and colonized around Kokonor 61 BC. (McGovern, 184)

50 BC. Universal Empire. Metropole: Han, Korea: Han Lelang commandery plus
small statelets in south. Huns: Eastern Huns of Inner Mongolia Han vassals. Western
Huns of Outer Mongolia Han pseudo-tributaries. Kashgar: united Han protectorate of

Chih-chih's Western Huns, at first placatory, moved west, abandoning Outer
Mongolia, and created in and around Turkestan a widespread empire. Chih-chih built a
huge walled city (perhaps at the fortress on the Talas near the Jaxartes/Syr Darya) which
served as the Western Han capital. But a Han expedition of 36 BC destroyed city,
empire, and Chih-chih. (Ma and Sun 228; Zhang, 1996a, 304; McGovern 187-196; cf.
Ishjants, 155, 163)

Hunhansie's Eastern Huns occupied the now-vacant Outer Mongolia, but remained,
on the whole, on good terms with Han, despite some episodes in which the Tokhars
(Wusun) of Dzungaria, Han vassals, and the Wuhuan of Manchuria, Han vassals,
provided some cause for dispute. (McGovern, 186-187, 196-204) The Han gave the
Eastern Huns gifts in return for tributary visits, and it is possible that this relationship had
turned from vassalage to extortion, somewhere in this period (Barfield, 63-66); but it
seems to me more like one of very well-paid, but uniquely valuable, mercenary service.

Han retained its protectorate-general over Kashgar, maintaining garrisons, planting
colonies, undercutting vassals, dividing vassal states; the latter strategy also increased
control over, and disorder within, the Tokhars of Dzungaria. It even acquired a purely
nominal hegemony over the Kanggu of the Jaxartes basin. (McGovern, 204-208)

The Chiang of Kokonor rebelled 42 BC and were overwhelmed, subjugated,
expelled or colonized. (McGovern 210)


In the Han metropole, Wang Mang set up the one-emperor Hsin dynasty (AD 9-23). Hsin attempted nationalization of land, manumission of slaves, land division, grain price stabilization, and creation of grain reserves. Hsin also degraded and abused vassals. Wang Mang's reforms ultimately provoked class uprisings which destroyed him and vassal rebellions which dissolved the Han/Hsin empire. In particular, Wang Mang attempted to turn the Huns into a fully subjugated people, which they successfully resisted; indeed, they and the Wuhuan were in rebellion by AD 9. Hun raids (sometimes conducted with Wuhuan and Sienbi cooperation) were supplemented by operations against Hsin rule in Kashgaria. After the Hsin collapse, a Later, or Eastern, Han dynasty nominally reestablished itself AD 25. (McGovern 213-228)

In southeastern Manchuria, Koguryo coalesced as a state by the 1st century AD (though its traditional founding date is 37 BC). It sent envoys AD 9 to Wang Mang, and mobilized forces to enlist against the Huns, but fought Hsin instead, AD 12. (Nelson 204, 207; Henthorn, 26-28; Lee, 23-24; Han 27)

In eastern Manchuria, the Puyo tribal confederation (Henthorn 18-19, 28; Han 22-25; Lee 21-22) had become powerful enough to be ordered to mobilize against the Huns AD 12. Puyo accepted vassal relations with Hsin, and was used to check Koguryo and the Sienbi.

Some rebels in Kashgaria fled to the Huns, who staged repeated raids on Hsin; others held Karashahr against Hsin. As Kashgaria bit by bit, except Yarkand, defected from Hsin, the bits drifted into tributary vassalage to the Huns. (Ma and Sun 229; McGovern 215-222, 226-230, 239-240, 246).

Dian rebelled unsuccessfully AD 14. (Ebrey 83) Nan-yüeh was heavily colonized by Han people AD 1-25, with attempts to organize it along more conventional bureaucratic lines. (Hall, SEA, 212-213; Buttinger 97-99; Majumdar, 69)


The Huns supported a Han pretender in North China AD 30-36. The Later Han dynasty was actually secure only by about AD 40. (McGovern 215-216, 224-228)
A rebellion in Lelang was crushed by the new Han governor AD 30, but the Han direct-rule area contracted. (Lee 19; Henthorn 24)

Puyo resumed vassal service to Later Han, and began using the Chinese title wang in AD 49.

The Huns were expelled from Kashgaria AD 29 by the Han vassal state of Yarkand, which became the local hegemon. Refused office as Han Protector-General AD 41, the ruler of Yarkand then declared and enforced his independence as Kashgarian overlord by AD 46. From that point his oppressive rule provoked a series of risings by city-states who defected to the Huns. The Tokhars (Wusun) of Dzungaria, cut off from Han, became independent. (Ma and Sun 229; McGovern 215-222, 226-230, 239-240, 246).

A fatal drought decimated the Huns. Intrigue and faction split the Huns again, AD 47 or 48, into Northern (Outer Mongolia) and Southern (Inner Mongolia) confederacies, almost constantly at war. The Southern Huns served after 48 as a Han vassal and buffer, defending and supported by the Han garrison towns, and were well rewarded by Han embassies. The Northern Huns maintained independence and sought to control Kashgaria and Dzungaria, the Wuhuan and the Sienbi. But the Han were able to entice the Wuhuan to settle down as vassals, and mobilized the Sienbi as fighting vassals by offering a bounty on Northern Hun heads. (McGovern, 231-238; Barfield, 71-77)

Dian rebelled unsuccessfully again AD 42-45. (Ebrey 83) The southern part of Nanyueh, the Yueh/Viet-populated future Tonkin, rebelled against Han AD 36, achieving independence 40-42. It was reconquered and reorganized as a Han imperial province, military colony, and conversion/assimilation target. (Hall, SEA, 212-213; Buttinger 97-99; Majumdar, 69)


Koguryo was a militant and expansionist state, aiming northwest, southwest, south and southeast, always into Han's territory or hegemonic empire. Koguryo conquered many tribal peoples southward into present Korea (e.g. Ocheo), extracted tribute, and fought frequently with the Han commanderies on the Yellow Sea coast. (Eckert et al 17; Lee 24; Henthorn 28; Nelson 207)

Puyo sent regular embassies to Han. (Lee 22)

After Loulan, Turfan and Kucha had rebelled against Yarkand and accepted Northern Hun protection, Yarkand began to consolidate the rest of its Kashgarian empire by replacing subject kings with puppets, and these with appointed military governors.
Khotan rebelled against this policy AD 60, with such success that Khotan replaced Yarkand as local overlord. At this point a Northern Hun army forced Khotan into vassalship, thereby giving them control over Kashgaria from AD 61. The Tokhars (Wusun) remained independent in Dzungaria. (McGovern, 239-246, 257)

Han and the Northern Huns had thus far not clashed directly, only through intermediaries and buffers. From AD 65 the Huns began raiding Kansu directly. The Han state, by now internally secure, counterattacked successfully in 73-74, inflicting a major defeat on the Northern Huns and regaining the overlordship of Kashgaria. As of AD 75 Han had their northeast and north frontiers securely in the hands of friendly Wuhuan and Sienbi or submissive Southern Huns, and Kashgaria to the northwest well controlled. (McGovern, 255-258, 264-274, 276; Barfield 77-80)

AD 75. Unipolar. Polar state: Han.

When one Han emperor died, and the next reversed his imperialist policy, Han abandoned the attempt to control all Kashgaria AD 76. Kucha and Yarkand were lost to Northern Hun vassalship, though Khotan and Kashgar were held. (McGovern, 255-258, 264-274, 276)

Drought, famine, emigration and surrender afflicted the Northern Huns after AD 82. They made peace with Han AD 84. Han vassals, the Sienbi and Southern Huns, attacked them with great success AD 85 and 87. The Han general Pan Ch'ao reestablished control in Kashgaria AD 88-91, and became Protector General. Having directly attacked and defeated the Northern Huns in 89, Han installed a vassal over them in 91. When the successful Han general Dou Hien was for his pains executed in 92, his Han insaltee revolted, and was destroyed AD 93 by an alliance of Han, Southern Huns, Sienbi, and others. Some Northern Huns moved west, and were confined to Dzungaria as distant, virtually autonomous Han vassals. Some joined the Han vassal Sienbi, who took over Outer Mongolia. The vassal Southern Huns had fallen into civil warfare. Pan Ch'ao undertook demonstrations and enforcement of Han control against various Kashgarian states AD 94 and 97. (McGovern 274-289; Ishjami, 155; Barfield, 77-80)


The Han core lost centrality and cohesion in the 2nd century AD, beginning with a succession crisis AD 105 which was followed by uprisings on the northwest frontier AD 106, in the west AD 107, and in the north and northeast AD 109. (McGovern, 291-294)
Han abandoned Kashgaria AD 107 in the face of revolts beginning 106. The Northern Huns of Dzungaria regained control there 107-119, defeated a Han counterstroke 119-120, and raided the northwest. (McGovern, 291-293)

Han's northern allies, the Southern Huns, Wuhuan and Sienbi, took advantage of floods and famine in the metropole to rebel in 109 but were defeated, the Huns and Wuhuan re-subjected, and the Sienbi driven off, in 110. (McGovern, 294-295) There were revolts among the Southern Huns AD 124, crushed by Han. (McGovern, 3020-202)

In the west, proto-Tibetan Chiang proclaimed a rival emperor and began attacking Han in 107; by 116 their empire had been liquidated through a series of assassinations. (McGovern, 293-294)


The Sienbi returned as raiders after 115. Their leader Kijgien reorganized their rival tribes (AD 121-133) into a cohesive tribal confederacy raiding Han, but resisted by Southern Huns and Wuhuan. After his death his works evaporated. (McGovern, 304; Barfield, 88)

Pan Yung reestablished Han supremacy over Kashgaria in a campaign 123-127, and it was enforced against Khotan 133. In Dzungaria, the Tokhars (Wusun) were let alone and the Northern Huns stalemated in campaigns of 134 and 135. (McGovern, 295-301)

Revolts by Southern Huns and Wuhuan AD 140-143 were put down by Han. (McGovern, 302-303)


The Southern Huns and Wuhuan were on the whole submissive, at least between revolts of 153 and 158. (McGovern, 303)

Shortly after 150, Tanshihuai reunited the Sienbi. He established a Sienbi state with laws, large forces, and vassals--Dingling of Siberia, Puyo (Fuyu) of Manchuria, Tokhars (Wusun) of Dzungaria. He drove the Northern Huns out of Dzungaria and broke up their state for good. Tanshihuai raided Han regularly after 156. By 166 he had established a Sienbi steppe empire of dimensions comparable to that of the Huns, though with less of a settled population. He asserted full equality with Han. (Kyzlasov 318-319, McGovern 304-308, Ishjams 156; Grousset 53-54)
AD 175. Bipolar. Polar states: Han, Sienbi.

Han lost much cohesion and went rapidly downhill toward the century's end. After the Revolt of the Yellow Turbans of 184, Han broke into warlord statelets, though the "dynasty" nominally continued to 220.

In Korea, the Chinese commanderies fell into disorder in the 180's. (Henthom, 28) There was strong fighting between Koguryo and the Han warlords of Liaotung; both were expansionist. (Lee 24; Henthom 28)

Tanshihuai destroyed a Han-Southern Hun army AD 177, after which the Southern Huns slowly disintegrated. But when Tanshihuai died around 180, he left no competent successor, and his Sienbi empire decayed after 180, though it remained a power into the first decades of the next century. (Kyzlasov 318-319; McGovern 303-308, 313-314; Ishjamts 156; Grousset 53-54)


Tonkin, nucleus of the current Vietnam, revoluted against the Han and achieved independence AD 183. To its south, Lin-yi, proto-Champa, predecessor of South Vietnam, did the same AD 192. (Majumdar, 18, 69; Hall, SEA, 28)


After a chaotic period of revolution and warlord secession and imperialism, the Three Kingdoms period AD 220-265 found the Far Eastern core split among Wei in the Yellow River basin (Loyang), Shu Han in the western Yangtze Szechwan basin (Chengdu), Wu in the eastern Yangtze area (Nanking). Wei was largest, most densely populated, best armed and wealthiest.

In Korea, another Chinese commandery, Taifang/Teabang, with a capital city near present Seoul, was established AD 204 by the Lelang commander, the northeast China warlord. Puyo formed ties with Lelang. Koguryo moved its capital south to the Yalu AD 209. From this point it is convenient to treat Koguryo as a Korean rather than Manchurian state, although it was both. (Nelson, 169, 189, 220-222; Henthom, 28-30; Lee 23, 37)

The Sienbi state split, hiving off Toba, Muyung and T'yu-yu-hun (or Togon: Beckwith, 17) kin-tribe parts. (Ishjamts, 156)

The Southern Huns broke up into many tribal units, some pro-Han, some independent AD 216; later they were loyal or submissive to Wei, while it lasted. (McGovern, 313-315)
Wei inherited the Han protectorate of Kashgaria. (Ma and Sun, 229-230; Grousset, 54) Shu Han inherited Han sponsorship of Dian; Chu-ko Liang led a major expedition into Yunnan, but rejected direct control in favor of patronage. (Backus, 6)

**AD 225.** Unipolar. Polar state: Wei.

In Korea, Lelang sought independence as "Yen" in 237, but was crushed and taken over by Wei. (Nelson, 169, 189; Henthorn, 28-29; Lee 23) The Korean state of Paekche in the southwest of the peninsula dates no later than about the middle of this century; it was hostile to Koguryo and friendly to the Chinese dynasties, though it probably defeated a Wei attempt to extend the commanderies AD 246. (Nelson, 220-222; Henthorn 29-30; Lee 37) Wei, provisioned by Puyo, successfully attacked Koguryo AD 244, taking the capital and holding it for a year, in reprisal for a Koguryo raid of 242. (Henthorn 29; Han 23, 42; Lee 23, 45)

The independent state of Tonkin was suppressed AD 226. (Majumdar 69)

Champa (actually then called Lin-yi, after its capital) sent embassies to offer tribute to the Chinese governorate of Tonkin, and received embassies to spread "Chinese civilization" in the 220's; nevertheless Champa aggressively attacked and expanded against Tonkin in 248. (Majumdar, 22; Coedès, 42-44; Hall, SEA 29)

The Indianized state of Funan, centered on the Mekong Delta, predecessor of Chenla and Cambodia, now puts in an ambiguous appearance. Was Funan truly "the dominating power on the peninsula for five centuries" (Coedès, 36, 61)? Or was it a temporary assemblage of small chiefdoms for trade with, and requests for aid from, whichever Chinese state was handy (D. Chandler, 1996: 15)? Did Chinese envoys find there "walled cities" (Hall, SEA, 27) or "walled villages" (Coedès 42)? Whatever it was, it was polite, sending embassies offering presents to Wu in 243. (Coedès 40-41)


Wei annexed Shu Han AD 263. Wei was overthrown by a military coup in 265 that changed the state-name to Jin. This "Western" Jin state lasted about 265-302, sometimes as the polar state in a unipolar system, sometimes as a systemwide hegemon.
The Toba group of Sienbi achieved hegemony over 36 tribes AD 258. (Huang, 87)

A Southern Hun tribal rebellion was put down in 271. (McGovern, 316)

In Kashgaria, several states became powerful from the mid-3rd century: Kashgar, Khotan, Loulan and Shan-shan. (Zhang, 1996b, 284, 288-289; but McGovern, 174, identifies Loulan with Shan-shan)

Funan sent an embassy to Wu 268. It then may have aided Champa in the latter's northward expansionist attacks on Tonkin c. 270-280.

**AD 275.** Unipolar. Polar state: Western Jin.

Western Jin annexed Wu in 280. Western Jin, unlike Wei, partly decentralized itself, appointing territorial lords. (Holcombe, 35-36) From 281 to 302 there were famines, plagues, floods and banditry in north China. Northern peoples had been allowed to immigrate and settle, and ethnic conflicts grew. (Wright, 24)

In south Korea, Ma-han and Chinhan opened trade relations with Western Jin. (Han 33)

The Sienbi invaded Puyo AD 285; Western Jin restored Puyo. (Lee 22; Hentborn 28)

A Southern Hun rebellion was put down in 296. (McGovern, 316)

Funan sent three embassies to Western Jin, 285-287; Champa sent one 284. (Majumdar, 23; Coedès, 42-44; Hall, SEA, 28-29).


A succession struggle in Western Jin from AD 300 produced civil wars and decentralization. The Sixteen Kingdoms 302-420 could be seen as a multipolar period for the system, though perhaps at times unipolar for the core. The core always included the central, Yangtze state of Eastern Jin. There was usually a far southern state (Nam Viet), a western state (Ch'eng), 3 Korean states, and several northern states, Hun, Mongol or Toba.

There were fratricidal civil wars in Western Jin 300-306. These provided the occasion for northern alien tribes to enter and conquer north China. (Holcombe, 27) The Jin empire's overlord for the Southern Huns, one Liu Yuan, revolted as Hun shan-yü AD
304; claimed the heritage of Han and created a Han Kingdom in North China; claimed the entire empire AD 308. The Hun/Han state conquered and destroyed the imperial capital Loyang AD 311; controlled most of North China by 317. The Western Jin fled and reorganized as a Yangtze basin state, the Eastern Jin at (modern) Nanking, 317. A coup overthrew the Han/Hun dynasty, 318. Two Hun-ruled states, a Western Chao at Changan and an Eastern Chao at (modern) Beijing, emerged 319. (McGovern, 316-351)

Eastern Jin continued the process of decentralization, territorialization, and feudalization of its predecessor. It suffered rebellion 322-324. (Holcombe 29-30, 38-42)


Eastern Chao conquered Western by AD 329. United Chao, with capitals at Loyang and Ye (Anyang), overawed the Yangtze state of Eastern Jin, the divided Toba Sienbi of Southern Mongolia, the Liang state of Kansu, the Former Yen state of the Murung tribe of the Sienbi in southern Manchuria, as well as the city-states of Kashgaria. Chao however then failed to complete an attack on Eastern Jin 342, failed in an attempt to further subjugate Former Yen (and lost overlordship of it), was consequently repudiated by the Tobas and Liang, and was repulsed in an attack on Liang. (McGovern, 316-351)

Though plagued by disastrous rebellion 327-328, still Eastern Jin was able to conquer Szechwan 347. (Holcombe 29-30, 38-42)

Former Yen badly defeated Koguryo in 342 and subjugated Puyo in 346. (Han 23, 43; Lee 23; Henthorn 30, 34)

Champa built itself up militarily in a peaceful period to 336. After a coup, an aggressive ruler subjugated interior tribes, and then had a falling-out with Eastern Jin. Champa requested the cession of the territory of Jih-nan 340, did not receive it, seized it anyway during troubles there 347, and defeated Jin forces 348 and 349. (Majumdar, 23, 24; Coedès, 45; Hall, SEA 29)


The Chao dynasty destroyed itself as its Hans massacred and destroyed its Huns, and were overrun by Former Yen 350-351. (McGovern 350-351) Former Yen conquered Loyang 364, but ran athwart of a sinifying Tibetan state of Former Ch'in, set up in 350 at Changan, which conquered all of Former Yen by 370. (Grousset, 58-60; Holcombe, 31; Eberhard, 1952, 77-78; Huang, 88)

Around mid-century Paekche became an Eastern Jin vassal. Paekche destroyed and incorporated Mahan AD 369. Paekche and Koguryo fought for the center of the peninsula, Paekche being victorious AD 371. Koguryo accepted vassal status to Former Yen in 355 and Former Ch'in AD 372. (Fairbank et al, 282; Henthorn, 33-35, 37, 47; Lee 22, 37; Han 35, 43-44) Puyo became a Koguryo protectorate when their mutual overlord, Former Yen, was destroyed AD 370. (Henthorn, 34; Lee, 22)

About 371, a Togon state in the Kokonor area appeared; it became a vassal to Former Ch'in during the latter's brief ascent. (Molé, xiii, 77, 79)

Champa attempted unsuccessfully to expand northwards 351 and 359, lost Jih-nan instead, and sent an embassy in 372. Funan reappears for the first time since 287, sending tribute to Eastern Jin 357 and then falls silent again. (Coedes, 46-48, 56; Hall, SEA 29, 31; Majumdar 25)


Former Ch'in annexed the Liang state in Kansu 376 and subdued Kashgaria 382-383. It thus reunited the north, and turned to attack Eastern Jin. But its assault on south China failed in 383 and the state split into five parts. A (Turkic/Sienbi) Toba state expanded from Tatung to Anyang (Ye) in the 390's, transporting and settling conquered Sienbi, Huns and Koreans, and taking on the dynastic label Northern Wei 398/399. (Grousset, 58-60; Holcombe, 31; Eberhard, 1952, 77-78; Huang, 88)

Eastern Jin weathered wars with the north, puppet emperors, regional and palace strongmen. A rebellion of 399 was too much for it to survive. (Holcombe, 30-33)

Koguryo remained tributary to whatever was the strongest state in north China, accepting patents of investiture, though the relation seems to have become almost nominal quite soon, since in 391 Koguryo began a vigorous expansion in all directions, which suzerains generally discouraged. Silla, in the southeast, formed as a state about this time out of the Chinhan tribe of Saro, and proceeded to seek Koguryo's suzerain protection against Paekche. In southern Japan, a strong unified state, Wa or Yamato, had
by now formed. Paekche sought Japanese protection, and became a vassal in 397. (Fairbank et al., 282; Henthorn, 33-35, 37, 47; Lee 22, 37; Han 35, 43-44)

On the south coast of Korea, Pyonhan had evolved into the Kaya League of six states, with old trade and cultural links to Yamato. Pressed by Silla and Paekche, the Kaya League probably became tributary to Yamato, and secured military aid. The Wa-Kaya alliance attacked Silla in 399. (Henthorn 35-37)

Kashgaria came under Former Ch‘in for a moment, 382-383, just before that dynasty collapsed. (Grousset, 59)

About 388-390 Togon was vassal to one of the Former Ch‘in successor states, Western Ch‘in (Kansu). Togon revolted in the 390's, but was defeated and resubjugated. (Molé, xiii, 77, 79)

Champa sent an embassy in 377, then renewed its attack on Jih-nan 399 and was defeated. (Coedès, 46-48, 56; Hall, SEA 29, 31; Majumdar 25)


The Eastern Jin at Nanking, in what should probably be called the Yangtze State (since it continued as fundamentally the same state through a series of "dynastic" coups), underwent a coup in 403 and a counter-coup 404-405, fell under the control of their saviors, and were in due course replaced by the Liu Sung (Former Sung) AD 420. (Holcombe, 32-33) A separate ethnic identification, "nan-ren" (Southern people), had by now developed among the inhabitants of the Yangtze State, and northerners and southerners had developed contemptuous labels for each other. (Wright, 28-29)

Silla, backed by Koguryo, defeated the Wa-Kaya attack in 400, and made peace with Wa in 402. Wa troops installed a Paekche scion during a succession struggle there in 405. (Henthorn 37-38)

Avars (Ju-juan, Juan-juan, Hun-Mongols-Liptak, 48; Grousset, 84) established a powerful nomad empire or Kaghanate in Mongolia 402-555. In the early 5th century it contended on equal terms with Northern Wei, the Toba state of north China. Northern
Wei drove the Avars back in 402 and 424 and raided across the Gobi 425 to disrupt their hordes. (Kyzlasov 321; Grousset 60-62)

Togon raided Western Ch'in c. 401, was badly defeated, and settled down to wage a long and unsuccessful struggle to regain lost territories. Togon submitted once again 421. Taking advantage of its position on the route to Kashgaria, Togon also submitted to the Yangtze State 423. (Molè, xiii-xv, 5-10, 27, 80-86)

Champa renewed its invasions of the Chinese province of Tonkin in 405, 407, 413, at which time it was badly defeated and counterinvaded, and fell into anarchy to 420. Raids on Tonkin continued, but Champa was again badly defeated 420, and in 421 sent an embassy to the Yangtze State requesting investiture. (Coedès, 56-57; Hall, SEA, 35; Majumdar, 25-26, 28-31)

AD 425. Multipolar. Great powers: Yangtze state (Liu Sung dynasty); Northern Wei, and other Yellow River states; Avar confederacy; Koguryo; Wa; Champa.

The Northern Wei, having taken Loyang 423, proceeded to destroy and absorb the other states of north China by 439. They and the Yangtze State thereafter constituted the "Northern and Southern Dynasties." (Grousset, 61-62) The Northern-Southern period to 589 included a south China dynasty on the Yangtze, a partly sinified Yellow River Toba state (Wei-Yuan), three Korean states, Puyo, and far southern states (Champa, Funan). More shapeless were far southwestern proto-Burman formations (Pong, Talaung, Prone), and the Avar steppe tribal confederacy in the far north. At its most centralized the system was probably occasionally bipolar, more usually multipolar.

Koguryo's "Long-lived King" Changsu-wang (413-491) maintained tributary ties and accepted investitures from both northern and southern Chinese dynasties, as well as northern nomadic peoples, thereby gaining effectively total independence. (Henthorn 47; Lee 38, 46; Han 47) Changsu-wang moved the capital south again in 427, to Pyongyang, and created several new major regional capital cities. Koguryo now pressed hard on Pakche and Silla, which allied against it in 433, Silla having stopped sending tribute and hostages. (Nelson 211, 216; Lee 38-40; Henthorn 47) In Manchuria, Puyo remained dependent on Koguryo. (Han, 23)

Northern Wei raided the Avars again 429, 443, 449 to keep them off balance. (Kyzlasov 321; Grousset 60-62)

Northern Wei annexed the Shan-shan (Loulan) kingdom of Kashgaria in 445. (Zhang, 1996b, 289; Molè, 116) It extracted tribute from Karashahr and Kucha in 448. (Grousset, 62)

During the rise of Northern Wei, Togon submitted to it (431) and seized Hsia and Western Ch'in territory; unable to extract more territory, Togon then shifted its major
submission back to the Yangtze State. A pattern of good but weak relations with the
Yangtze State continued. Togon alternately submitted and rebelled, raided and
counterraided Northern Wei, which drove them out of their lands 444-446; they then took
Khotan, and ranged through Kashgaria. (Molé, xiii-xv, 5-10, 27, 80-86)

Champa continued to pay tribute to the Yangtze State, but even so attacked Tonkin
again 431, evoking an unsuccessful punitive invasion. Champa tried to ally with Funan
to destroy Tonkin 431-432, requested its cession from the Yangtze State in 433, invaded
again. In 446 another Chinese expedition badly defeated Champa, and took and sacked
its capital. (Coedès, 56-57; Hall, SEA, 35; Majumdar, 25-26, 28-31)

Funan refused to help Champa conquer Tonkin 431-432. Funan instead sent
embassies and presents to the Yangtze State 434, 435, 438. (Coedès, 56; Hall, SEA, 32)

AD 450. Multipolar. Major powers: Northern Wei (Yellow River Basin); Yangtze
State (Liu Sung dynasty); Avar empire (Mongolia); Koguryo (Korea, Manchuria).
Manchuria: Puyo vassal to Koguryo. Korea: Silla, Paekche independent. Kashgaria:
Avar or Togon hegemony. Kokonor; Togon hostile to N. Wei. Tonkin; Yangtze State

Northern (Toba) Wei expanded at the expense of the Yangtze State AD 466-469.
Northern Wei counterraided the Avars in the Gobi once more 458. (Grousset 64-65)

The Avars acquired overlordship in Turfan 460. (Grousset 64; cf. Molé, 136, who
sees Turfan as independent after 460.) Loulan passed from Northern Wei to Avars 468.
(Molé, 116, 135)

Togon sent tribute to Northern Wei and the Yangtze State, but was in fact quite
independent of both. Wei invaded Togon in 460 and took loot; in 470, and got brief
submission; in 473, and got regular tribute, after which peaceful relations were
re-established. (Molé, xv, 11-16, 27, 29)

Champa adopted a peace policy and sent rich tribute embassies to the Yangtze State
in 455/456, 458, and 472. (Majumdar, 31-33; Coedès, 57-58; Hall, SEA 32)

AD 475. Multipolar. Major powers: Northern Wei; Yangtze State (Liu Sung
dynasty); Avar empire; Koguryo.

The Southern Chi’i dynasty supplanted Liu Sung in the Yangtze State AD 479.
Northern (Toba) Wei undertook major and controversial centralizing reforms, moved its
capital to Loyang 494, and attempted sinification in language, surnaming, rites, dress, and
marriage. (Wright 30; Grousset 64-65; Ebrey 92)
Koguryo seized the Han valley, and the Paekche capital, AD 474-475 despite Paekche appeals for help to Silla (which provided it) and Northern Wei (which did not). Koguryo now controlled a great empire, and was doubtless as strong as any state in the system. It finally absorbed Puyo AD 494, but thereafter stopped expanding. (Han 23, 47-48; Henthorn 38-40; Lee 40)

Loulan passed from Avars to Dingling 491-493, to Togon at the end of the century. Togon was in control of Khotan and Turfan, and generally in Kashgaria, in 485. (Molè, 116, 135)

A succession crisis after c. 480 led to a coup in Champa by an exiled Funan rebel. Funan sent presents and asked the Yangtze State for help in conquering Champa 484, but did not get it; instead the Yangtze State recognized the usurper, as it did his restorationist successor, who sent embassies 492 and 495. (Majumdar, 31-33; Coedès, 57-58; Hall, SEA 32)


Until the near-unification of the core by Sui (581) the Far Eastern system remained multipolar, with a central, Yangtze state (S. Ch'i, S. Liang, Ch'en), one and later two Yellow River states (e.g., E. and W. Wei; N. Chi and N. Chou), three Korean states, several steppe khanates, and two southern states—Champa and Funan or Chenla.

AD 502 the Yangtze State dynasty changed from Southern Ch'i to Southern Liang. Nobles, landlords, officials, became increasingly corrupt and oppressive. Liang faced popular rebellions in 504, 511, 516. (Wright, 41)

Northern Wei failed in its last major attempt to conquer the Yangtze State in 507.

The Avars built their own first town, Mumo-chen, about 511. (Kyzlasov, 322)

Togon, hegemonic in Kashgaria, continued regular tribute to Northern Wei to 524, when a series of insurrections in the latter state interrupted relations. (Molè, xv-xvi, 16-19, 32, 110, 135)

Champa sent embassies to the Yangtze State 502, 510, 512, 514. So did Funan 503, and 517-539. (Coedès, 59-60; Hall SEA 33; Majumdar, 33, 36)

AD 525. Multipolar. Great powers: Yangtze State; Northern Wei; Avar empire; Koguryo.
Rebellions against the Southern Liang dynasty of the Yangtze State broke out in 529, 530, 533, 541, 542, 544, increasing in frequency, extent and participation. (Wright, 41) Finally the disastrous revolt of the Tartar general Hou Ching 548-552 crippled Liang. (Marney 15-16, 139-162)

AD 534: the Northern Wei state, divided over sinification, split in two, a sinifying Eastern Wei at Ye/Anyang, and a Toba-revivalist Western Wei at Changan. (Grousset 65-66; Wright 31) Mutually hostile chauvinisms continued to animate northern and southern states. (Wright 31-34)

In Korea, Silla reorganized and centralized its state, and began an expansionist career by eliminating the independent Kaya city-states 532-562. (Nelson, 237; Henthorn 35, 40; Lee 41, 43) Paekche also reorganized and developed ties with the Yangtze State (Southern Liang) and with Yamato. (Han, 48)

The Avars became allies and frontier-protectors for the divided Eastern/Western Wei states of north China. (Kyzlasov, 322)

Kashgaria was under Togon overlordship during this period. (Molè, 32, 135; but cf. 34, 136)

Togon established friendly "tributary" relations with Eastern Wei after 539, but were beyond the reach or aid of that state. (Molè, xv-xvi, 16-19, 110)

A Tonkin satrap revolted against the Yangtze State 534 or 541, and became independent until 547. (Coedès, 70; Wright, 183-184; Hall, SEA, 213)

Champa embassies, lapsed after 514, were sent again to the Yangtze State 526, 527, 529/530, 534. The Funan embassies of 517-539 were its last. (Coedès, 59-60; Hall SEA 33; Majumdar, 33, 36) Champa attacked independent Tonkin 541 or 543, and was defeated. (Majumdar, 36; Coedès, 70)


The Eastern Wei at Anyang were succeeded by their Northern Chi' puppeteer-creators AD 550. The Western Wei at Changan took Szechwan from the Yangtze State 553 (Ebrey 93), and were replaced by their own puppeteers, Northern Chou, 556-557.

The Hou Ching rebellion and factional struggles among its Liang opponents tore the Yangtze State apart. Western Wei was called in, took the western Yangtze State territories as its reward 553-554, suppressed most factions, and installed a puppet Liang
government in the rump state 555. (Marney, 162-175) A Yangtze State general staged a
coup and changed dynasties from Southern Liang to Southern Ch'en 557, but the state
lost control over outlying territories to local warlords. It gained a breathing space while
the two northern states struggled with each other. (Ebrey 91, 93; Wright 42-43)

With Koguryo weakened by civil war, Silla and Paekche took the center of the
peninsula from it in 551; Silla then seized all its ally's gains in 553 and destroyed its
avenging army in 554. Silla, which was developing a militaristic-elitist organization and
cult finished conquering the Kayas in 562, and next seized the east coast from Koguryo.
(Han 49-50, 76; Henthorn 43-45; Lee 43-44, 47)

Turk (T'u-chüeh) subjects of the Avars rebelled and destroyed the Avar empire 552-
555; in its place there arose the First Turk Kaghanate (552-630). (Kyzlasov, 323) The
Turks defeated Khitans, incorporated Kyrgyz, crushed the Hepthalite Hun Empire 557-
561. The Turkish Kaghanate collected tribute from, arbitrated between, and protected
the two north Chinese states, Western Wei (coup-superseded by Northern Chou 557) and
Northern Ch'i (coup-successors to Eastern Wei 550). (Sinor and Klyashtorny, 332-333;
Grousset 66, 81-83; Wright, 187-188)

Togon's raids and its relations with Northern Ch'i led to repeated Western
Wei/Northern Chou attacks 552-576, once with Turk Kaghanate help. (Molé, xvi-xvii,
20-22, 39-44)

Champa sent embassies to the Yangtze State 568 and 572. (Majumdar, 37; Coedès,
70-71; Wright, 184)

In the second half of this century the Funanese vassal kingdom of Chenla, proto-
Cambodia, rebelled and began the conquest of Funan. (Coedès, 61, 65-68.) David
Chandler (1996: 26-27) doubts the might, centralization, extent and durability of Chenla,
which he sees, following Claude Jacques, as a collection of small entities only sometimes
led by one leader. This is in a sense old news, since evidently the same could be said of
"China" at most moments after its inception, and a fortiori of the steppe kaghanates and
other semi-peripheral formations. But the duration of unity is worth problematizing in
principle at the "state" level, as well as at the system level, despite the practical problems
that will normally preclude extensive analysis of both problematic levels simultaneously.


The core of the system was rolled up in twelve years' time. Northern Chou and
Southern Ch'en combined to conquer and divide Northern Ch'i (575-577); Northern Chou
robbed all the booty from Southern Ch'en (577). Sui, led by a notable military
commander, overthrew Northern Chou, which had fallen into the hands of a child emperor, by coup and civil war (580-581).

The Turk empire split into Eastern and Western states 582-584. The Eastern Turk Kaganate was divided, partly by lineage rivalry, partly by Sui diplomacy, from the 580's onward. (Grousset 88-89)

When the Turkish Kaganate split, Sui, having made careful logistical and strategic preparations, eliminated its intervening tributary state of Later Liang, used a conscription system inherited from Western Wei to mobilize an overwhelming force, launched a preliminary psychological-warfare campaign, conquered Southern Ch'en (588-589), and put down a southern rebellion (589-590) against Sui cultural impositions. Force and diplomacy won the submission of the southern tribal peoples. (Wright, 43, 54-61, 139-156; Holcombe, 137-138) The system was then unipolar.

Sui now undertook to recover political and military power from fragmented and overstuffed local sarrapies and recenterate control and revenues in the capital, in the hands of a meritocratically examined bureaucracy of new men. (Wright, 95, 98-105) It undertook to formulate and impose universal moral, legal, cultural, historical, religious, and ritual norms designed to create and justify Sui "cultural hegemony," drawing on ancient and recent, northern and southern traditions; its main objective was the cultural reintegration of the south. (Wright, 108-138, 156-161)

Packche allied with Koguryo to resist Silla imperialism; but a Koguryo expedition of the 590's to regain the Han river basin in the peninsula's waist was defeated by Silla. Silla proceeded to submit to Sui. (Han 49-50, 76; Henthorn 43-45; Lee 43-44, 47)

The Turks attacked Sui in 597, as did Koguryo in 598. A Sui retaliation against Koguryo failed. (Henthorn 46-47; Lee 47; Han 76)

After being attacked 552-576 by Northern Chou, Togon submitted and became a regular Northern Chou tributary. But Togon took advantage of the Sui coup against Northern Chou to resume raids. Sui sent punitive expeditions 581 and 583, and encouraged dissidents. Togon resumed tribute and submission after Sui's conquest of the south 589. (Molè, xvi-xvii, 20-22, 39-44)

In Yunnan, which had become quite independent by this century, a Sui mission of c. 583 produced acceptable diplomatic relations; in 589 Sui received "appropriate gifts" and conferred an "appointment" on the local ruler. He later resisted Sui, which in 597 invaded and extracted submission; but Yunnan rebelled again in 598. (Backus, 8-12)

There was another unsuccessful revolt in Tonkin, inspired by the Sui conquest of the Yangtze State, 590. Tonkin again revolted under the Ly, 600. (Hall, SEA, 213)
Toward the end of Southern Ch'en (557-589) Champa repudiated its vassal status, then resumed tribute to Sui 595. (Majumdar, 37; Coedès, 70-71; Wright, 184)


Sui began the century with improvements in education, the building of an eastern capital at Loyang, extensive construction of canals. From about 609, Sui moved from domestic integration and improvement to foreign imperialism. Sui's agenda included subjugating the Kaganate, Togon, Yunnan, Tonkin and Champa; but its chief obsession was Koguryo. (Wright, 172-183)

Suspecting a Turk-Koguryo alliance after 607, Sui repeatedly attacked Koguryo, 612, 613, 614, with disastrous results until the third campaign, when Koguryo offered submission. Sui found the submission inadequate and prepared another attack. But Sui's reputation and finances had been heavily damaged. Taxation, conscription, and failure produced desertion, banditry and rebellion. Revolts began at home 613, and Sui dissolved into twelve contending warlord states. After a chaotic period (618-624), the state of T'ang emerged victorious throughout the ex-Sui realm. (Henthom 46-47; Lee 47; Han 76-77; Wright, 190-195; Fitzgerald 1933)

Sui diplomacy split the Eastern Turks into pro- and anti-Chinese factions, and then insured the success of their favorites. The Western Turk Kagan became a threat to Sui and its Eastern puppet 601-602. Sui sponsored a Uighur (Tölös) uprising against the Western Turk Kagan 603, then split the Western Turks and gained control over both factions by 611. Sui rebuilt and extended the Great Wall against the Eastern Turks. (Wright, 187-189) But the Eastern Turks revolted in 615, after Sui's Korean fiasco. They supported several vassal Chinese pretenders in the post-Sui chaos 617-622. They invaded in some force 622, 623, and attacked the T'ang western capital Changan in 624, but were defeated and withdrew to Mongolia. (Grousset, 89-93; Mu and Wang, 350; Fitzgerald, 1933: 24-25, 60-67, 98, 129-146, 166-167, 199)

Sui secured homage from Turfan 609, from Kucha 618. (Grousset 89) Between 618 and 630 the Western Turk Kaganate acquired control of Turfan and part of Kashgaria. (Grousset 93)

Sui and Tölös/Uighur allies crushed the Togon state 608-609 and drove the Togon out of Kokonor, coming into touch with Tibet, a settled kingdom with towns which had recently undergone a dynastic change; it sent embassies to Sui in the same years. After
Sui fell, Togon revived and returned to Kokonor, alternating raiding with tribute; and Tibet expanded to become a major power. (Beckwith 17-24; Backus 24-25; Richardson 28-32; Mu and Wang, 360, 362; Molé, xvii-xviii, 44-57, 145-151; cf. Fitzgerald, 1933:162-164, 201)

Sui invaded Yunnan and suppressed the rebellion there in 602. There is no evidence of the imposition of Sui taxes or administration in Yunnan (Backus 12-13); presumably hegemony was restored.

Sui reconquered Tonkin 602 (Hall, SEA, 213; Wright 183-184). Tang 622 established a protectorate general of Ngannan/Annam there (but we shall continue to call it Tonkin). Tang dominated in a "firm and efficient" manner that produced peace, prosperity and stability. (Hall, SEA, 213)

Perhaps exasperated by Champa's history of alternating submission with attacks, or incited by reports of its fabulous wealth, Sui invaded its then tributary, defeated it, and looted its capital in 605. Champa begged pardon, then neglected tribute. With the arrival of Tang Champa resumed its embassies: 623, 625. (Coedès, 71-72; Hall, SEA, 35-36; Majumdar, 37-39)

Funan continued sending embassies to Tang. Cambodia (Chen-la) befriended Champa, and sent embassies to late Sui 616-617, then to early Tang 623. (Coedès, 65, 69-70; Hall, SEA, 106-107)

Sui in 610 raided the Liu-ch'iu islands (Ryukyus or Formosa?), with no lasting gains. (Wright, 184-1860)


Koguryo early accepted Tang investiture and tributary status, and Tang attempted to mediate among the three Korean kingdoms. But Koguryo went to war with Silla again in 631, having spent 16 years in building its own Great Wall against Sui and then Tang. Silla meanwhile had begun a systematic imitation of and vassalage to Sui. Under attack from Koguryo (and Paekche, 642) Silla appealed to Tang, which ordered Koguryo to desist. The order having been rejected, Tang attacked Koguryo in 644-645, 647 and 648, but without success. (Henthorn 47-48, 50; Lee 48, 66; Han 78; Fitzgerald 1933: 187-199)

The Eastern Turks attacked Changan again 626 during a Tang internal crisis, demanding tribute, but were faced down. The tables then turned as Tang consolidated. Tang, pursuing the "half-forward" policy of hegemony, again supported a Uighur uprising 627 and a Turk civil war 628, and was able to defeat and subjugate the Turks and usurp the kaghanate 629. Sarinda Turkish invasions in 641 and 646, attempting to
exploit presumed T'ang exhaustion, were thoroughly defeated. The Uighurs rebelled against the Sarinda confederacy with T'ang aid, and achieved independence as T'ang vassals. (Grousset, 89-93; Mu and Wang, 350; Fitzgerald, 1933: 24-25, 60-67, 98, 129-146, 166-167, 199)

One of the Western Turks' subject tribes, the Karluk, rebelled 630. The Karakhanate split, the T'ang supporting one faction. Kashgaria then came under T'ang hegemony. Kashgar and Khotan paid homage 632, Yarkand 635. Kocho in Turfan offered tribute 630, stopped tribute 639, and was invaded and annexed as a province 640. Beshbalyk was taken from the Western Turks. Karashahr submitted 632, rebelled and was subdued 640, again 648. Kucha submitted 630, rebelled 644, and was taken 648. (Mu and Wang 350-351; Grousset 89, 93-101; Fitzgerald 1933: 164-166)

T'ang crushed Togon again 634-635, installing a sinified puppet, again receiving Tibetan embassies. After Tibet defeated Togon, Tanguts and T'ang 637-638, a Chinese princess was obtained as wife for the Tibetan emperor AD 641. If not tribute extracted from T'ang, this was at least a recognition of independent and significant status. (Beckwith 17-24; Backus 24-25; Richardson 28-32; Mu and Wang, 360, 362; Molé, xvii-xxviii, 44-57, 145-151; cf. Fitzgerald, 1933:162-164, 201)

T'ang first established a more direct form of rule in Yunnan, reappointing a local ruler as T'ang prefect, but also sending a T'ang garrison (Backus, 14). T'ang later returned to the more usual form of "loose rein" or "indirect control," appointing a local chief as T'ang representative and satisfying themselves with submission and tribute in return for recognition. In the 640's the T'ang again sought more direct control, moving against walled cities of the Man people, hoping to control a route to India. (Backus, 16-21)

Champa sent frequent embassies to T'ang: 628; 630, 631 (with "rich presents"); 640, 642. (Coedès, 71-72; Hall, SEA, 35-36; Majumdar, 37-39) Declining Funan continued sending embassies to T'ang until extinguished by Cambodia (Chen-la) about 627/635. Cambodia sent an embassy to T'ang 628. (Coedès, 65, 69-70; Hall, SEA, 106-107)


The T'ang state was vigorous to 665, then weakened by internal intrigues. (Grousset, 102-103)
T'ang attacks on Koguryo in 655 and 658-659 also failed. (Henthorn 50; Han 78) T'ang now decided to cooperate with Silla in eliminating Paekche first, then attacking Koguryo from the south. T'ang and Silla attacked Paekche in 660, and destroyed it, though complete victory was delayed by a three-year guerrilla uprising. Koguryo defeated a Silla-T'ang attack in 661, but became involved in a succession struggle after 666. T'ang and Silla eliminated Koguryo 668 (by bypassing the wall). T'ang attempted peaceful annexation of all Korea. Silla resisted militarily, successfully, after 671. (Lee 66-72; Han 80-86; Henthorn 52-54; Nelson 219, 247)

The Western Turk remnant of the First Kaghanate reunited 651-657 and attempted to conquer Kashgaria; instead it was defeated by T'ang and Uighur allies, divided again, and the two parts came under T'ang client khans. But when the T'ang center weakened after 665, the Western Turks revolted and became once again independent. (Mu and Wang, 351; Grousset 102-108; Sinor and Klyashtomy, 334-335)

Tibet 660-663 conquered Kokonor, destroying the Togon state, acquiring control of some Togon around Kokonor, driving others into T'ang. Western Turk remnants submitted to Tibet. (Molè, xviii-xix, 58, 177-178; Beckwith, 29-33) A T'ang expedition to reconstitute Togon was disastrously defeated 670. (Molè, 59, 180-182) Tibet had already begun to struggle with T'ang for the valuable Kansu corridor and Kashgaria. (Mu and Wang, 349) A direct conflict occurred when the Tibetans acquired hegemony over the T'ang Kashgaria protectorates (Kucha, Khotan, Kashgar and Karashahr) 665-677, and forced the T'ang to pay tribute. (Beckwith, 34-36, 40-43; Richardson, 28-32) Backus considers Tibet thereafter a dominant military power, probably stronger than T'ang. (28-29)

A Yunnanese revolt against T'ang control led to a vigorous T'ang reply and reassertion of hegemony, 651-656. Another Yunnan rebellion led to further T'ang extension in the 670's. But Tibet had by now become a major military power in this area too, and Yunnan became a contested area of Tibetan expansion and T'ang containment. (Backus, 21-23, 30-32)

Champa sent embassies to T'ang: 653, 657, 669, 670. (Coedès, 71-72; Majumdar, 39, 45, 47)

Cambodia (Chen-la) sent several more embassies to T'ang after 650. Its king Jayavarman I conquered large dominions to the north. (Coedès, 72; Hall, SEA, 108)


Silla expelled the inadequate T'ang forces 671-676, and controlled the whole south and center of the Korean peninsula. T'ang set up a Koguryo scion in Liaotung, which became a "lesser Koguryo" vassal state. In 696 a former Koguryo general set up the state which became Parhae in the northern reaches of former Koguryo; he held off a T'ang attack, and in 698 T'ang made peace with him as a new vassal. (Lee 69-72; Henthorn 53-54; Han 85-86)
The Eastern Turks revolted from Tang 679-681, withdrew, and created what became the Second Turkish Kaganate of 682-745. Raids against Tang began at once. By 689 the Turks had subjugated the Western Turk Turgesh. By 691 the Turks, now under their great Qapagan Kagan, brought under the Tokuz-Oghuz and Uighurs of Mongolia. After 693 the Turks repeatedly invaded China and exacted tribute from the usurping Empress Wu (who briefly changed the dynastic name to Chou 690-704, a usage which we shall not follow here), threatening to restore Tang. In 696-697 the Turks took payment from Empress Wu for subjugating their own rebellious allies, the Khitan Mongols, who had begun raiding northeast China on their own account. The Turks then resumed their own raids and massacres. (Sinor and Klyashtorny, 334-335; Beckwith 60; Grousset 106-108)

Tibet defeated Tang armies in Kashgaria in 678 and 689 (Beckwith 44, 51) While the Empress Wu reordered affairs in Tang, court intrigues weakened Tibet severely. Tibetan subjects, Tanguts and Chiang, defected to Tang. Tang recovered lost ground in Yunnan 688-694, and reconquered Kashgaria in 692-694 (Beckwith, 34, 52-57; Backus, 32-33; Mu and Wang, 352; Grousset, 107)

Tang lost ground against Yunnanese rebels, perhaps Tibetan-aided, in the early 680's, but recovered well 688-694. (Backus, 21-23, 30-32) In farther Yunnan, the early Nanzhao state sent missions to Tang, receiving gifts and titles. (Backus, 57)

Champa continued to send embassies to Tang: 686, 691, 695, 699. Cambodia (Chen-la) sent embassies to Tang to 683. (Coedès, 71-72; Majumdar, 39, 45, 47; Hall, SEA, 108)

There was a Pyu state in upper Burma at Old Prome (Srōkhetra) from at least 673, perhaps 638 (Hall, Burma, 8) or even six centuries earlier (Hall, SEA, 154); its size and external orientation are unclear.


A tripolar power configuration reasserted itself in many years of the 8th century, though there was constant struggle, with frequent collapses and sudden recoveries. Different powers each assumed the first rank for a while--the Eastern Turks around 712, Tang around 750, Tibet around 763. None could durably occupy and incorporate the core territory of another. Shifting alliances, including also Arabs and the Western-Turk
Turgesh confederacy (usually Tibetan allies) as well as smaller states and groups, were the rule. (Beckwith 6 ff.)

T'ang created numerous "legates," military officers with great autonomy, on its menaced frontiers. (Levy, 1)

T'ang invested the Parhae king 713, but subverted one of his vassals 722. (Han 86-87; Lee 72; Henthorn 54)

The second Turkish Kaganate expanded until 711, subjugating the Kyrgyz Turks of the upper Yenisei (west of the Orkhan in Outer Mongolia) and the Bayirku Turks of the upper Kerulen (Outer Mongolia, east of the Orkhan) The Kaganate controlled the Western Turks and the Turgesh and Karluk Turks of Dzungaria, paralyzing a T'ang-Tibetan alliance. They collected slaves and booty. But their far-ranging western expedition was defeated by Arabs near Samarkand and their siege of Beshbalyk failed 714. At this defeat many subject peoples seceded or revolted to T'ang, Qapagan Kaghan was killed by Bayirku rebels, and the empire was only reestablished by Kultegin after a weakening war 716-718, and the Western Turks were lost to it. After decisively defeating a T'ang attack 720-721, the Kaganate sold T'ang continuing peace for a continuing price, and relations continued friendly. (Beckwith 72-77; Sinor and Klyashtomy 339-341; Litvinsky and Zhang, 24; Grousset, 108-115)

The Turgesh allied with Tibet and assaulted the T'ang protectorate in Kashgaria 717-736.

T'ang was involved in major fighting with Yunnanese 707, 710, 713, 715, with little to show for it. (Backus, 36-40)

A Vietnamese revolt against T'ang occupied the local capital but failed 722 despite aid from Champa and "Land Chenla." (Hall, SEA, 213; Majumdar, 70) After 706 Cambodia divided into "Land Chenla" and anarchic southern "Water Chenla." Land Chenla, possibly extending to Yunnan/Nanchao, was ambivalent: sent an embassy to T'ang 717, helped the Viet revolt against the T'ang governor of Tonkin 722. (Coejdes 85-86, 95; Hall, SEA, 110)

Champa sent embassies to T'ang frequently: 702, 703, 706, 707, 709, 711, 712, 713, then lapsed. (Majumdar, 47; Coedjes, 72, 94)

AD 725. Tripolar: Second Turkish Kaganate, T'ang, Tibet.

Parhae sent a force oversea to attack T'ang-controlled Shantung 732; Silla, commissioned by T'ang launched a disastrous retaliatory attack against Parhae 733. (Han 86-87; Lee 72; Henthorn 54)
Succession and secession problems dissolved the second Turkish empire 741-745. The steppe was soon reorganized by struggles among Turki vassal peoples, Basmil, Uighur, Karlik: the Second Turkish Kaganate was succeeded by the Uighur Kaganate in 744. T'ang approved the Uighur accession, and the Uighurs became T'ang clients. (Beckwith 72-77; Sinor and Klyashtorny 339-341; Litvinov and Zhang, 24; Grousset, 108-115)

T'ang was generally at war with Tibet in this half-century. Turgesh-Tibetan attacks were held off in Kashgaria to 736. The T'ang high point was reached during their western operations of 736-750, when they subdued the now disunited Turgesh and attacked the Tibetans from the west, over the Hindu Kush. At that point T'ang ruled Kashgaria and Dzungaria, and had clients on the Jaxartes, the Oxus, in the Pamirs, Kashmir and present Afghanistan. (Adshead, 43; Beckwith 114-137; Grousset 114-115, 118-119)

T'ang finally made gains in Yunnan from 729 to the 740's. (Backus, 36-40) From at least 730, Nanchao conciliated both T'ang and Tibet. Both regarded it as a subject ally; but in fact it was operating on its own account, though using T'ang help, to conquer western and then eastern Yunnan. (Backus, 41-45, 52-66)

Champa embassies to T'ang were now sporadic: 731, then 749. (Majumdar, 47; Coedes, 72, 94)


The T'ang universal empire (hegemonic in the semiperiphery, weighted by the size of the imperial core) lasted only a few years. A long-distance T'ang enforcement action against Tashkent provoked a Karlik revolt. Karluks, with Arabs under Ziyad ibn Salih, defeated Kao Hsin-chièh at the Talas in 751, marking a limit to T'ang's westward expansion. The Karlux took Dzungaria. T'ang continued to press Tibet hard, to the point that the latter fell into revolt in 755. But this was of no use to T'ang, which itself now collapsed. (Grousset, 119-120; Beckwith 137-142)

Signs of strain had already shown. For whatever reason, from the early 750's T'ang began to feel threatened by Nanchao's growth. Nanchao and T'ang became enemies, and Nanchao became a vassal ally of Tibet alone. (Backus, 70-71; Beckwith, 141). T'ang expeditions of 752, 753 and 754 against Nanchao ended with a rout of T'ang forces by Nanchao and Tibet in 754. (Backus, 75-76)
Corruption had depleted and enfeebled T'ang forces, except for northern frontier troops under foreign generals. The Turco-Sogdian T'ang general An Lushan rebelled against the dynasty in 755. To defeat the rebellion, T'ang had to call in the loyal frontier troops and the Uighurs, thereby forfeiting control over the outlying regions. (Backus, 73, 77; Grouset, 120-121) T'ang was compelled to make a compromise peace in 763. Several rebel generals who had "surrendered" were accepted as governors of their own provinces. T'ang's own military governors also escaped central control. (Levy, 1; Wang, 7-8) The T'ang state broke up into "approximately 40 states ruled by military governors, many of whom were effectively independent" (Blunden and Elvin 26), paying no taxes, appointing their own subordinates, establishing hereditary succession. (Ebrey 127-128) The term "warlords" seems apt. But in time the independent ex-rebel armies institutionalized further, becoming hereditary, professional and self-governing. (Wang, 10) Nevertheless, T'ang continued to conduct the foreign relations of its now much enfeebled state.

Silla fell into intense factional struggle, with six revolts or coups 750-800, especially serious in 768-771. Parhae took advantage of the T'ang collapse to absorb the Liaotung area and the Lesser Koguryo state. About this time Parhae reached an accommodation with T'ang on the same terms as Silla, i.e. as a tributary. (Han 87, 112; Henthorn 55, 79; Lee 72, 92)

During the An Lushan rebellion, the Uighurs twice recaptured the eastern capital of Loyang from rebels (757, 762) and restored it to T'ang, on the second occasion pausing a year to plunder it. Thereafter the Uighurs dealt with T'ang as an equal ally, patronizing and protecting Manichaeeans (the Uighur state church after 763) in the T'ang domains. (Grouset, 120-122)

T'ang officials provoked an escalating quarrel with Nanchao by 751. Nanchao sent tribute and submitted—to Tibet. Nanchao defeated T'ang forces in 751, 753, and, with Tibetan help, 754, 756, 757. Nanchao expanded into southwestern Yunnan and even established domination over the Pyu kingdom in upper Burma (757-763), while operating with internal autonomy and subordination to Tibet. (Backus, 69-71, 75-77, 80; Hall, Burma, 9; Coedès, 95)

Tibet recaptured all T'ang-occupied Tibetan territories 756-757, and took the war into north China. In 763 it went so far as to capture and sack the T'ang western capital of Ch'ang-an. Tibet took the Kansu corridor 758-71. (Beckwith, 144-155; Mu and Wang, 362-363; Backus, 81, 84-85)

Land Chenla sent an embassy to T'ang 753, helped it against Nanchao 754, sent another embassy 771. (Coedès, 93-94; Hall, SEA 110)

The Pyu kingdom of upper Burma was conquered by Nanchao 757-763 and placed under Nanchao hegemony. (Backus, 102; Coedès, 95; Hall, Burma, 9)

Silla suffered another serious revolt AD 774-780.

T'ang, able to operate diplomatically but not militarily, sought widely for allies to control Tibet. Talk had been exchanged with Indian and Arab powers about joint action against Tibet. Coordination could not be arranged, but Tibet did become separately involved against the Arabs after 786. (Beckwith, 152, 157; Backus, 87-89) T'ang persuaded the Uighurs to campaign on its behalf against Tibet in the late 780's. (Backus, 87-89, 92) Tibet became entangled in a protracted war with the Uighurs in Kashgaria after 790. (Beckwith, 154-157; Ma and Wang, 365)

In 779 Tibet and Nanchao invaded Szechwan and were severely defeated. (Backus, 84-85) Tibet had begun to increase its demands for tribute, soldiers and garrisons on Nanchao, and lowered Nanchao's symbolic vassal status. T'ang began to regain ground against Tibet in Yunnan after 789. In 793, Nanchao switched suzerains, submitting to T'ang. (Backus, 85-95) Nanchao expelled Tibet from northwestern Yunnan and stabilized its state control. (Backus, 99-100)

The defeat of Tibet and Nanchao in Szechwan 779 may have motivated the T'ang -Tibet border treaty of 783. Tibet helped T'ang put down the Chu Tzu' rebellion, in return for lands T'ang failed to deliver. War resumed; Tibet took the Ordos (in the bend of the Yellow River) 786-787. Tibet made major gains in Kashgaria 789-791. (Beckwith, 144-155; Mu and Wang, 362-363; Backus, 81, 84-85) But in the 790's, with Uighur and Nanchao help, T'ang began defeating Tibet regularly, and Tibet entered upon a long decline. After 797, there was a succession crisis in Tibet. (Beckwith, 156-157; Backus, 85, 94-99)

A Vietnamese revolt in Tonkin 791 seized the capital, but was suppressed by T'ang a few years later. (Hall, SEA, 214)

Champa fell into disorder, was raided by Javanese fleets, and then restabilized between raids. With greater order after 787, Champa sent another embassy to T'ang 793. (Majumdar, 49-52)

Land ChenJa sent an embassy to T'ang in 799. (Coe'des, 93-94; Hall, SEA 110)


T'ang reasserted some control over its warlords 806-820 by reducing the size of provinces and thus the power of governors. An enlarged palace army led by eunuchs
outweighed any provincial army. But the palace, the emperors and the succession then fell under the control of the emuchs. (Wang, 9-10; Levy, 1)

The Uighur Empire in Mongolia continued its frontier warfare with the Tibetan Empire until a general settlement in which Tibet made peace with the Uighurs, T’ang and Nanchao 821-823; the first three, at least, were behaving as equals. (Beckwith, 163-167)

Silla underwent major insurrection and short-lived secessions after 822, and fell into disorder. (Han 112-113; Lee 92-94; Henthom 79-81)

Under King Son (813-830), Parhae reached its zenith as a large and prosperous state. (Han 87-88; Lee 72-73)

Nanchao and T’ang maintained a stable peace in the first half of the 9th century, with Nanchao submissive; with one major exception. Nanchao did invade and loot Szechwan 829-830. But further predation was discouraged and impeded by a T’ang reorganization of the province, and Nanchao-T’ang relations were restabilized. (Backus, 105-127)

Champa raided Tonkin 803 and 809, conquering two disputed provinces with the aid of the local people, but was driven out by the T’ang Protector of Tonkin 808/809. Champa raided Cambodia around the same time. It then entered a period of piety and religious foundations. (Coedès, 103; Hall, SEA, 214; Majumdar, 52-55)

Cambodia was anarchic c. 800, but made strides towards unification 802-850 via Jayavarman II’s wars, city-foundings and alliances. (Coedès, 97-99, 102-103; D. Chandler, 1996; 34-36; Hall, SEA, 112-114). For D. Chandler, 802 marks the beginning of Cambodia’s “period of greatness.” (1996: 29)

Nanchao extended its dominance over Pyu in upper Burma. (Backus 102) Pyu vassals of Nanchao from upper Burma appeared at the T’ang court, with embassies 802 and 807 (Hall, Burma, 9; Coedès, 104), as did their ”Mi-ch’ien” o Mon vassals from lower Burma in 805. (Coedès, 106)


After a period of some tripolar stability, there was great disorder: two of the polar states collapsed. The Kyrgyz and Karluk Turks overthrew the Uighur Kaganate and took its capital city Karabalgasun 840, reversing a trend toward settlement and urbanization in the Orkhon. Some Uighurs fled to T’ang, others to Tibet. The T’ang could take no better advantage of this collapse than to suppress the now-unprotected Manicheans. (Grousset, 124-125, 196; Beckwith, 165-166, 168) Other Uighurs fled from the Orkhon to Kashgaria, settled there from 843, at Kocho/Turfan, Beshbalyk,
Karashahr and Kucha, and formed a second Uighur empire, and began the Turkization of what was to become Eastern Turkestan. (Grousset, 125-126; Zhang, 1996a, 314)

The Tibetan empire also collapsed after 842. Corruption, faction, religious strife, uprisings within and without the metropole, civil war, paralyzed and divided Tibet, which lost border areas to T'ang and withdrew into introversion. (Beckwith 168-169; Ma and Wang, 365; Richardson, 28-32).

Court intrigues, assassinations, regencies and coups further weakened T'ang after 820, rendering it unable to take full advantage of the 840's collapse of both other major powers (Ebery 129), although after 845 there was some recovery of internal control (Wang 12).

Disorder continued in Silla. Tribute to T'ang failed after 847. (Han 112-113; Lee 92-94; Henthorn 79-81)

Nanchao and T'ang remained mostly at peace. There was however a premonitory Nanchao raid on T'ang's Tonkin protectorate 846. (Hall, SEA, 214)

Cambodia continued a period of internal development under Jayavarman II.

In 832 Nanchao depopulated Prome and destroyed its vassal Pyu kingdom; it destroyed the Mon Mi-ch'en kingdom in 835. It may have established suzerainty over Pyu vassals (18 claimed), including the Mon states. (Hall, Burma, 10-11; Backus, 129; Coedès, 105) With the Pyu removed, their Burman neighbors founded a city and state, Pagan, traditionally dated 849. Pegu, traditionally dated 825, and Dvaravati replaced Mi-ch'en as Mon centers. (Hall, Burma, 10-11, 14; Hall, SEA, 155-156; Wheatley, xx; Coedès, 105-107)


The T'ang were able to reinstate some larger imperial-bureaucratic control in the relatively peaceful period to 860. (Wang, 12) But mismanagement, corruption, flood, plague, and famine began to incite banditry/rebellion: Ch'iu Fu 859-860, P'ang Hsün 868-869, Huang Ch'ao 874-884. (Blunden and Elvin 26; Backus 144-145, 156-157; Grousset 126-127; Levy 1-6, 119, 123-124; Wang)

T'ang recaptured the Kansu corridor in 851; about this time Kashgaria must also have thrown off Tibetan rule. (Beckwith, 170-172)
In the second half of the century, Nanchao's ambitions became grander. Nanchao claimed the empire; diplomacy broke down. Nanchao invaded T'ang Tonkin 858, briefly captured it 860-861. Nanchao held Kwangsi in 861, Tonkin again 862 and then 863-866. Nanchao invaded Szechwan 866-870 and again 874. (Backus 131-158)

**AD 875.** Unipolar. Polar state: T'ang.

The Huang Ch'ao rebellion reached major scope, and, like An Lu-shan's, seized both imperial capitals. Central authority collapsed ("At this time, central power was at its weakest"; Wang, 5). Imperial armies mutinied year after year. Some went over to the rebels and then returned to T'ang. Turkish tribes were called in to the rescue, and ex-mutineers and ex-rebels were given appointments. T'ang attempts to regain control backfired and led to further decentralization 885-893. The de facto independent states--bandit, Shato, mutineer, hereditary--began an elimination process as they fought one another for succession to the shadow empire, though T'ang was not officially terminated until 907. (Blunden and Elvin 26; Backus 144-145, 156-157; Grousset 126-127; Levy 1-6, 119, 123-124; Wang 5, 11, 16, 19-23, 31, 35-43; Eberhard, 1952 55-64)

Disorder continued in Korea, with seven major military groups moving toward proto-statehood after 890. One founded "Later Paekche" in the southwest in 892. (Henrithon 81-82; Lee 98-99)

Nanchao was driven out of Szechwan. Exhausted, Nanchao became submissive to T'ang after 875, and began to decline. T'ang was itself exhausted by its efforts, increasingly preoccupied by the Huang Ch'ao crisis, and unable to do more than stabilize its frontier with Nanchao. (Backus 131-158)

T'ang maladministration provoked revolts in Tonkin in the 850's. There was an interval of reform 858-860, then a struggle with Nanchao there 860-866. T'ang control over Tonkin thereafter stabilized. (Backus, 131-133; Hall, SEA, 214)

Champa sent an embassy to T'ang in 877; thereafter, with T'ang's renewed decline, relations were interrupted. Champa went through a peaceful, religious monument-building period. (Coedes, 123; Hall, SEA, 203; Majumdar, 60)


For Burma there are no reliable data till about 1050, though Pagan existed from 825 or 849 onward. (Hall, Burma, 11, 14)


The elimination process among T'ang warlords continued. One, Chu Wen, an ex-Huang-Ch'ao rebel, had emerged as clearly the best collector of provinces by 903, killed the T'ang emperor in 904, and replaced T'ang 907. (Wang, 43-46)

During the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, 907-960, the core was multipolar, and the system as well (see the map c. 920, Blunden and Elvin 25). There was ordinarily one Yellow River Basin state which underwent a sequence of coups (the Five Dynasties, actually six) and a number of southern states (the Ten Kingdoms, actually no more than seven or eight at any given moment). The various states practiced mercantilism, manipulating trade so as to accumulate (copper) money (Blunden and Elvin 26).

The Yellow River State was seized by the bandit-warlord Later Liang dynasty 907-923, then by the Shato Turk Later T'ang dynasty (923-936). (Grousset, 128-130; Wang, vii et passim)

Later Paekche established ties to south China. Another new state, Later Koguryo, also hostile to Silla, was founded in central Korea 901. It was successively renamed Majin, Taebong and Koryo. Koryo established ties to the north China Yellow River State. After 918 Koryo patronized Silla. (Lee 99-103; Henthoen 82-83; Han 123-124)

Khitan Mongol nomads in the Liao basin of Manchuria proclaimed an empire in 916, later to be named Liao, which title we give it here for convenience. Liao drove the Kyrgyz Turks out of the Orkhon in 924. (Han 88-89, 126; Lee 91; Grousset 127-130)

During the multipolar period in the core, a Vietnamese state arose in Tonkin by stages. It began as an indigenous vassal of the Yellow River State 907-923. (Hall, SEA, 215)

Cambodia bordered Nanchao and Champa. (Coedès, 114) Monumental building continued there, despite a division of the country 921-928. (D. Chandler, 1996 39-41)

AD 925. Multipolar. Great powers: Yellow River State (Later T'ang); Khitan Liao empire; Koryo; Wu; S. Han. Minor powers: in South China, several other states; in Korea, Later Paekche, Silla; in Manchuria, Parhae; in northwest, Uighurs; in Yunnan, transitional regime between Nanchao and Tali; in Tonkin, Vietnamese proto-state; Champa; Cambodia (divided).
The Yellow River State passed to the Later Jin (936-946), and Later Han (947-951) dynasties, with a brief conquest by Liao 946-947. (Grousset, 128-130; Wang, vii et passim) The successive dynasties reduced the power of the governors, increased centralization of finances, reinvigorated the imperial bureaucracy, and created a new elite of palace officials to replace the eunuchs and a new Emperor's Army to oversee the provinces. (Wang, 134-143, 169-178, 194) But they also repeatedly emptied the treasury in donatives to their soldiers. (Eberhard, 1952, 96-97)

Koryo absorbed Silla in 935; in 936 Koryo destroyed Later Paekche and reunited the Korean peninsula. (Lee 99-103; Henthorn 82-83; Han 123-124)

The Khitan Mongol empire of the Liao basin conquered Parhae in 926. Parhae's ex-Koguryo elite fled to Koryo; its Tungusic Malgal population fell under Khitan rule, but would later rebel to found the Jurchen Jin state. The Khitan installed the Later Jin dynasty in the Yellow River State, acquired northeast China lands in payment, made Yen-ching (Beijing) into their southern capital, and founded the Liao state in 946. (Han 88-89, 126; Lee 91; Grousset 127-130) They accidentally conquered the Yellow River State in 946, but soon lost it to revolts and a succession crisis. (Wang, 191-194)

After a series of usurpations 902-937, a Tali kingdom emerged to replace Nanchao in Yunnan, and lasted 3 centuries. Tali confined itself to Yunnan only, was neither aggressive nor large, and was generally left alone by South China even after the Sung unification. (Backus, 160-163)

The Vietnamese state in Tonkin became involved in struggles with the Southern Han state at Canton, and its local supporters, ending in victory 939. An independent Nam Viet/Dai Viet state was proclaimed in 939. (Hall, SEA, 215)

Champa enjoyed a period of peace, piety, temple-building, scholarship and splendor until impoverished by a Cambodian invasion in the 940's. (Majumdar, 61-66)

Cambodia invaded and looted Champa 945-946, but was then defeated. (Hall, SEA, 120; Coedès, 117, 124)


The Later Han dynasty was overthrown in the Yellow River State by Later Chou 951, fled to Taiyuan, and established a Liao-protected Northern Han state there to 979. Despite its many "dynasties," the Yellow River State had now recovered from the 885
post-Huang Ch'ao nadir of disintegration and functioned as a single integrated state (Wang 195, 206-207)

Sung overthrew Later Chou 960. The (Northern) Sung deleted seven states from 963 to 979, notably Southern Han 971 and Southern T'ang 975. (Grousset 130-132)

Karakhanid Muslim Turks became established in southern and western Kashgaria (north and east remaining Uighur), with a seat in Kashgar itself around 950. (Grousset, 144-145)

Dai Viet fell into twelve warring statelets by 965; one conquered the rest by 968. Champa resumed tribute embassies (to the Yellow River State 951, 958, 959, then with greater frequency to Sung: 960, 962, 966, 967, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974.(Coedès 124-125; Hall, SEA, 203-204, 216; Majumdar 66-68, 72-74)


The Sung continued to expand, destroying Northern Han 979 in despite of its Khitan Liao protectors. Thereafter, the core was bipolar (Sung vs. the Khitan steppe empire of Liao). Two Sung attacks (979, 986) failed to conquer Liao Beijing and were disastrously defeated; but Liao counterstrokes were also defeated. (Grousset 130-132) Tanguts, a Tibetan people, founded a new state (Minyak; Western Hsia/Xia; Hsi Hsia) in the Ordos and Ailashan steppes northwest of Sung China. The small but militaristic Tangut state was recognized by Liao 990 and expanded against Sung. (Grousset 132) A tripolar situation ensued.

Koryo established contact with Sung in 985. Koryo expanded northward and Liao eastward until they confronted one another at the Yalu river 989. Koryo was invaded by Liao 993, and compelled to accept tributary vassal status and sever relations with Sung in 994. (Henthorn 96-97; cf. Han 137-139, Lee 125)

Champa sent tribute embassies to Sung in 976, 977, and 979. Dai Viet and Champa began a five-century-long struggle. When the Dai Viet ruler was assassinated 979, Champa intervened on behalf of a refugee warlord claimant, but suffered disaster. Dai Viet restabilized 980, defeated a Sung invasion, and sent an embassy to Champa. Champa insulted and was invaded by Dai Viet, was badly beaten, and fell in two 982, when Dai Viet sacked the Cham capital Indrapura and annexed Champa's northern territories. Champa was refused Sung aid against Dai Viet 985, came back together 989, fought off Dai Viet 990, exchanged presents with Sung 992. At Champa's request, Sung successfully ordered Dai Viet to stop attacking Champa. Champa attacked Dai Viet again in 995, yet also paid it tribute. Champa sent an embassy to Sung 999. (Coedès 124-125; Hall, SEA, 203-204, 216; Majumdar 66-68, 72-74)
In Cambodia, the reign of Jayavarman V, 968-1001, was "an age of learning." (Hall, SEA, 120)

AD 1000. Tripolar. Polar states; Liao, Sung, Minyak, Korea; dual vassal, Kashgar; Karakhanids and Uighurs. Tibet; withdrawn. Yunnan; Tai independent. Dai Viet; independent Sung vassal. Champa; independent Sung vassal. Cambodia; independent.

The polar states were prominent on different power dimensions, an intriguing situation worth closer study than we can here undertake. Sung was ten or twenty times the size of Liao, yet Liao was militarily much the stronger. Sung was disastrously defeated by Liao 1004, but held its capital Kaifeng. Minyak also fought Sung 1001-1003. Sung was forced to submit to both, granting substantial annual tribute. (Ebrey 138, 157, 166-167)

"Tribute" of course has to be interpreted. Extortion, bribery, subsidy, taxes, trade, hire, and charity all involve a flow of wealth, and the flow itself has no unambiguous meaning. Sung however appears to have resisted payment, by force, and unsuccessfully, which suggests it was a subject vassal under a dual hegemony it was too weak to shake off.

Koryo, having resumed trade and tribute to Sung, and then fallen into disorder, was invaded by Liao 1010 and 1018, made peace and resumed tribute to Liao in 1022. (Hentorn 97-98; but cf. Han 139-142, Lee 126)

Liao, Minyak, Uighur, Karakhanids and Tibetans contested Kansu and Kashgar after 1017, with greater success to Uighur and Karakhanids in Kashgar and Minyak in Kansu. (Groutset, 133, 146)

Champa moved its capital from Indrapura to Vijaya (Binh Dinh) 1000. Champa sent embassies to Sung 1004-1005, 1007, 1010, 1011, 1015, 1018, and to Dai Viet 1011. Champa was attacked by Dai Viet 1021. (Coedès, 139-140; Hall, SEA, 204, 216; Majumdar 74-76, 80)

Cambodia underwent a chaotic succession 1001-1003, a partition, and a slow civil war of reunification to about 1010. Thereafter it expanded westward during the long reign of Suryavarman I. The Mon kingdom of Dvaravati/Lopburi/Louvo had sent an embassy to Sung 1001; attacked by Haripunjaya, it appealed to Cambodia, and was annexed. Cambodia even attacked Lower Burma, though there it was defeated by Pagan. City-formation, bureaucracy, coercion, trade, all flourished in the Cambodian empire. (Coedès, 134-137; D. Chandler, 1996: 42-44; Hall, SEA, 121-122, 155-156; Wyatt, 28)

Minyak fought Sung again 1039-1042. Sung tribute to Minyak and Liao was increased 1042-1044. (Ebrey 138, 157, 166-167)

Koryo, now tributary to Liao, broke off tributary relations to Sung in 1030. (Henthorn 97-98)

Champa was again attacked by Dai Viet in 1026. Champa stopped tribute to Dai Viet 1027; sent tribute to Sung 1030; underwent civil war 1038-1039; requested Sung investiture 1042. The Sung connection brought no help. Champa raided Dai Viet 1043, was counterinvaded 1044 and disastrously defeated; Dai Viet sacked the new Cham capital Vijaya. Champa sent embassies to Dai Viet 1047, 1050, and Sung 1050. (Coedès, 139-140; Hall, SEA, 204, 216; Majumdar 74-76, 80)

In Burma, Pagan emerged from mists and myths when the kingship of Anawrahta united the loose federation of immigrant Burmans from Nanchao 1044, occupying the former Pyu capital of Old Prome. Before 1050, Suryavarman I of Cambodia, pushing on from his conquest of Dvaravati, attacked the Mon states of Pegu and Thaton in Lower Burma. Anawrahta came to the aid of the Mons and drove out the Khmers. (Hall, SEA, 121-122, 156-158)


Wang An-shih of Sung attempted extensive centralizing reforms and innovations to fight corruption and increase revenues. The reforms led to controversy and factional struggle rather than rejuvenation. (Ebrey 139, 141)

At some time in or near this period Koryo resumed tribute to Sung as well as Liao. (v. Han 153)

Karakhanids united western Kashgaria and Dzungaria about 1055, then partitioned them again. (Grousset, 147)

Champa restored internal order after a period of chaos 1050, and entered a period of religious endowments and military preparations. Champa sent embassies to Sung 1050, 1053, 1056, 1061, 1062, and to Dai Viet 1050, 1055, 1057/1059, 1060, 1063, 1065, 1068. Champa returned to more normal relations thereafter, disastrously attacking Dai Viet 1068. Dai Viet took the Cham capital again 1069; Champa ceded three provinces
for peace 1070, and fell into civil war to 1084. Even so Champa sent tribute to Dai Viet 1071, 1072, 1074, and to Sung, which was beginning to reassert itself, in 1072. Champa defeated an attack by Dai Viet 1074/1075 and by Cambodia somewhere between 1074 and 1080. (Coedès 140, 152-155; Hall, SEA, 204-205, 216; Majumdar, 77-91)

Cambodia underwent uprisings 1051 (Champa-sponsored) and 1065, and thereafter was split in two, even three. Attacks on Champa and Dai Viet in the 1070's were unsuccessful. (Coedès, 138-139, 152-154; Hall, SEA, 122-123)

In Burma, Anawrahta of Pagan built a noticeable empire. He allied with the Mon state of Pegu in Lower Burma, and conquered the Mon state of Thaton, destroying it by deportations 1057. Thereafter Pagan expanded greatly in all directions. (Hall, Burma, 15-19; Hall, SEA, 159-160, 162-163; cf. Coedès 149-151, 155-156)

**AD 1075.** Multipolar. Great powers: Liao, Minyak, Sung, Dai Viet, Pagan.

Sung stirred at last and led Cambodia and Champa in an unsuccessful attack on Dai Viet 1075/1076. Champa then paid tribute to Sung and Dai Viet 1077, and yearly to Dai Viet 1081-1085; to both Sung and Dai Viet thereafter, except for a stoppage in the Dai Viet tribute in the early 1090's when Champa sought but was refused a Sung alliance against Dai Viet. (Coedès 140, 152-155; Hall, SEA, 204-205, 216; Majumdar, 77-91) From 1095 Champa was tributary both to Sung and to Dai Viet, but the latter was the more real overlord since Sung refused to help Champa against Dai Viet. (Majumdar 91)

Pagan paused its expansion to put down a Mon revolt in Pegu in the 1080's; it engaged in great temple-building and supported Buddhist religious scholarship. (Hall, Burma, 15-19; Hall, SEA, 159-160, 162-163; cf. Coedès 149-151, 155-156)


Tungusic Jurchen from northeastern Korea and eastern Manchuria, settled Liao and Koryo vassals from the tenth century, steadily improved their organization, stopped tribute after 1100, defeated and made peace with Koryo, declared war on Liao 1114, and formed the state of Jin 1115. Jin allied with Sung 1118, made Minyak a vassal 1124, and destroyed Khitan Liao 1125. (Fairbank et al, 297; Lee 128; Han 153-154; Ebrey 150; Grousset 134-138; Chan, 52-59, 62)

Koryo resisted Jin 1107 but then traded land for peace, and accepted vassal status in 1116 (Henthorn 110) or 1126 (Han 155-156; Lee 128; Chan 58).
Another Karakhanid unified western Kashgaria and Dzungaria about 1100. (Grousset, 147-148, 164-166)

Cambodia was forcefully reunited about 1113 by Suryavaman II, and began a career of wide-ranging imperialism. Its vassal state Louvo managed to send an embassy to Sung 1115, possibly displaying or seeking independence, but did not do so again until the next Cambodian collapse. Cambodia itself sent embassies to Sung 1116, 1120. (Coedes 159-162; D. Chandler, 1996: 49-52; Hall, SEA, 125-126, 205)


Sung intrigued against Chin; Jin then captured the Sung capital Kaifeng 1126-1127. Jin conquered the whole Yellow River basin, forcing Sung to move its capital south to the Yangtze basin. Jin's cavalry army attacked Sung 1129-1130, but found the Yangtze rivers, canals and paddies a bad terrain, and Jin was under Mongol attack in the north. Sung made peace with Jin 1138/1141, and from 1142 made annual payments, resuming the vassal status originally imposed by Liao. (Fairbank et al, 297; Lee 128; Han 153-154; Ebrey 150; Grousset 134-138; Chan, 52-59, 62)

Koryo's submission to Jin led to a suspension of cooperation with Southern Sung; but later Koryo sent tribute to both Sung and Jin, though its genuine overlord seems to have been Jin alone. (Fairbank et al, 297; Lee 128; Han 155-156; Henthorn 110; Chan 58)

A Mongol federation under Qabul Khan, at first a Jin vassal, had begun to raid Jin in the eastern Gobi (1135-1139), and defeated a Jin army. Jin bought peace with lands, cattle and grain in 1147. (Grousset 138, 197)

The Khitans of Liao fled westward after being defeated by the Jurchen, and established the state of Western Liao, or Karakhitai, ruling Uighurs and Karakhanids in Kashgaria (1130), Karluks in Dzungaria and Ferghana, and Muslim Turks on the Oxus. (Hermann 38-39; Grousset, 147-148, 164-166)

Sung at last reopened trade with Tali, which remained independent. Neither state was aggressive along their common border. (Backus, 163-164)

Champa sent tribute to Dai Viet 1102; made an abortive attack on Dai Viet 1103 to recover its lost provinces, and again sent tribute; then sent numerous embassies to Sung and Dai Viet 1116-1126. (Coedes, 160, 164-165; Hall, SEA, 205; Majumdar, 91-92, 94-98)

Champa joined Cambodia's unsuccessful attack on Dai Viet 1128, paid tribute to Dai Viet 1131, repeated the fiasco 1132 and the reparation 1136, and broke with Cambodia. Cambodia thereupon invaded, occupied and subjugated northern Champa 1145; but a
national resistance arose in the south and defeated Cambodia, its Champa vassals, and a Dai Viet intervention 1147-1150. (Coedès, 160, 164-165; Hall, SEA, 205; Majumdar, 91-92, 94-98)

Cambodia sent an embassy to Sung 1128. It was "recognized as a great vassal of the [Sung] empire" in 1128. It then began a long quarrel with Dai Viet, attacking it 1128, 1129, 1131 (with Champa), 1138 (without Champa), generally without much success. Cambodia negotiated commercial matters with Sung 1136-1147. After conquering and being driven out of ex-ally Champa 1145-1149 Cambodia resumed attacks on Dai Viet 1150, with disastrous result. During this period the great temple project of Angkor Wat was built. (Coedès 159-162; D. Chandler, 1996: 49-52; Hall, SEA, 125-126, 205)

Burma (Pagan) paid tribute to Sung, with missions starting in 1103 and 1106, and was treated as an equal to Dai Viet. Possibly the contact was an attempt to countervail Tali raids from Yunnan, but Sung was too preoccupied and weak to help; Pagan had to rebuff Tali itself 1111. The long, somewhat disorderly reign of Alaungsithu (1113-1165) was notable mainly for its public works and monuments. (Hall, Burma, 18-22, 25; Hall, SEA, 163-165; Coedès, 157, 166-167)


Despite dissenter resistance, the Jurchen of Jin sinified rapidly after moving their capital to Yen-ching (Beijing) 1153. Another massive and costly Jin attack on Sung failed 1161, and peace was restored on the basis of the status quo ante (Sung tribute unchanged) 1163-1165. Jin then went through a period of placid prosperity. (Ebrey 168-169; Grousset 138-139; Chan 67-75)

Koryo continued as a Jin vassal, during years of intrigues and revolts. (Henthom 114; Lee 140-144; Han 158-163)

Jin combined with Tatars of eastern Outer Mongolia to destroy the Mongol khanate 1161. The Tatars proceeded to raid the Jin frontiers. The Jin changed allies, supporting Mongols against Tatars. (Grousset 192, 198, 200, 202-204)

Kara-Khitai was drawn into struggles among its Muslim Turkic vassals of Khwarizm (Khiva). (Grousset, 166-167)

Champa defeated a Dai Viet-sponsored rebellion 1150-1151, sent tribute to pacify Dai Viet 1152, 1154, 1155, 1160, sent tributary embassies to Sung and received recognition 1155, put down another rebellion 1155-1160. Temples were restored and re-
endowed. Tribute was sent to Dai Viet 1164 and 1165; a border war with Dai Viet 1166 was followed by conciliatory tribute 1167. Champa looted Arab merchants to send tribute to Sung and request a Sung investiture 1167, but received a scolding instead. Champa conciliated Dai Viet with tribute 1170 and went to war with Cambodia. (Coedès 163-166, 170-171; Hall, SEA, 207; Majumdar 98-109)

Cambodia suffered a temporary decline after its rout by Dai Viet. Its vassal Lopburi/Louvo sent an independent embassy to Sung 1155, the first since 1115. Weakened by internal rebellion, Cambodia was invaded by Champa 1167. (Coedès 161-164; D. Chandler, 1996: 53, 58-59; Hall, SEA, 127)

AD 1175. Multipolar. Great powers; Chin; Sung; Tatars; Dai Viet; Champa.

Jin faced floods, overspending, and sinification problems from the 1180's. Sung and Minyak began harassing attacks from the 1180's, with Sung preparing for a major confrontation. (Ebrey 168-169; Grousset 138-139; Chan 67-75)

Koryo continued Jin vassalhood, palace intrigues and internal revolts. (Henthorn 114; Lee 140-144; Han 158-163)

The Kerayit Mongol Khan Togrul, a Jin client and vassal, defeated the Tatars with Jin help, and became the chief power in Mongolia 1199. About 1175 Togrul had acquired a vassal Temujin, who had become Khan of the Mongols proper 1196. (Grousset 192, 198, 200, 202-204)

Champa's attack on Cambodia was hampered by a Sung embargo on horses 1175. Champa plundered the Cambodian capital 1177, and was expelled 1178-1181. Trying again, Champa was itself subjected and divided by Cambodia 1190. Champa freed itself by 1192, held off Cambodian attacks 1193-1194, sent an embassy to Dai Viet 1194, secured Sung investiture 1199. (Coedès 163-166, 170-171; Hall, SEA, 207; Majumdar 98-109)

Cambodia, still weak and a target, was again invaded by Champa 1177 and 1178, and Angkor pillaged. Under Jayavarman VII, a devout Mahayana Buddhist, Cambodia made a quick recovery, restubjugating Lopburi by 1180, expelling the invaders by 1181, putting down revolts, neutralizing Dai Viet 1190, and turning a Champa attack of the same year into a brief conquest and subjugation of Champa. (Coedès, 161-164, 169-171; D. Chandler, 1996: 53, 55, 58-59; Hall, SEA, 127-128; Wyatt, 28) A hasty and widespread public works program was undertaken: roads, temples, rest-houses, reservoirs, and hospitals.” (Chandler, 1996: 60-68)
Pagan embroiled itself in somewhat obscure struggles 1165-1174, and then enjoyed peace, prosperity, orderly development, public works, monumental building, and religious schisms. (Coedès, 166-167, 177-178; Hall, Burma, 22-23; Hall, SEA, 165-168)


Sung raided Jin 1204, heavily attacked Jin 1206 and was defeated; Sung and Jin made peace 1208 based on an indemnity and an increase in the tribute from Sung to Jin. Sung stopped tribute 1211. (Grousset 139-140; Chan 94-95, 115)

Cooling of the steppe produced a subsistence crisis for its pastoral nomads, who responded by uniting and moving south. (Ebrey 169) Intense warfare was waged among the steppe peoples 1200-1207. An independent Mongol-Turkei steppe empire emerged under Temujin, now proclaimed Kagan as Genghis Khan. (Grousset 205-216)

The Mongols began their conquest by attacking Minyak. After a devastation 1205-1207 Minyak became a vassal, but was attacked again 1209, and subjugated itself. The Mongols rebelled against their overlord Jin on the occasion of the succession of an incompetent 1209. Minyak and Sung also attacked Jin. Jin was driven out of Peking in intense warfare 1211-1215. A long struggle for north China followed, while the Mongols turned their main attention westward. Minyak refused to supply troops for the Mongol western campaign. Meanwhile Jin tried to subjugate Sung 1217-1224 in an unsuccessful campaign costly for both. (Grousset, 227-233; Chan 98-100, 115-116)

Koryo began this period as a Jin vassal plagued by internal rebellion. (Han 163-164; Henthorn 116) When the Mongol empire attacked Jin, Khitan declared independence and tried to refound Liao in southern Manchuria; when Mongols captured the Jin capital Yenching in 1215, they drove the Khitans into Koryo 1217, where Koryo combined with the Mongols to conquer them 1219. The Mongols then enforced tribute on Koryo. (Han 147-149; Henthorn 116-119; Lee 165-167; Grousset 259; but cf. Grousset 228 on the Later Liao)

Kara-Khitai was suzerain to Uighurs and Karakhanids of Kashgaria, Karluks of Dzungaria, and Muslim Turks of Khwarizm. The Uighurs changed suzerains to Genghis Khan's Mongols in 1209, the Karluks in 1211. Khwarizm threw off the overlordship of Kara-Khitai 1207-1210. A coup in Kara-Khitai 1211 allowed a temporary reassertion of
its lordship in Kashgaria and Dzungaria, until the Mongols overran the state in 1218. (Grousset 168-170, 233-236, 330)

Tibet sent submission to Genghis in 1207. (Richardson, 33-34)

Champa was subjugated by Cambodia 1203. The Cambodian-installed vassal ruler put down revolts and assisted Cambodia in wars with Dai Viet. Cambodia withdrew from Champa in 1220 and made peace with a local ruler 1222. Champa underwent reconstruction. (Majumdar, 109-113)

With Burmese and Thai help Cambodia attacked Dai Viet 1207. Cambodia and its Champa allies jointly attacked Dai Viet 1216, 1218. By 1218 the Khmer empire was at its largest, bordering Nanchao (i.e. Tali), controlling Dvaravati/Lopburi/Louvo but not the Mon state of Haripunjaya, fighting Dai Viet, in control of Champa. Great expenditures were made on monuments and hospitals. But the attacks on Dai Viet were defeated. In a succession crisis, Cambodia lost control of Champa 1220, and of its Thai vassal state Louvo (about the same time). (Coedès, 171-177, 180-182, 195-196; Briggs, 235, 216, 237; Hall, SEA, 186, 207; Wyatt, 52-53)

AD 1225. Multipolar. Great powers: Mongols; Jin; Sung; Minyak; Dai Viet.

The Mongols destroyed and massacred Minyak 1226-1227; during this campaign Genghis Khan died, after having decided to establish a tributary system rather than exterminate the sedentary population. Jin, which had regained some lost ground, was destroyed 1232-1234. Sung unwisely helped the Mongols finish off Jin, and more unwisely attacked them in 1234, whereupon the Mongols began the conquest of Sung, which resisted with remarkable vitality. Sung was defeated 1236-1238 and driven out of Szechwan after a long struggle. (Grousset 247-248, 251, 257-259, 282)

Koryo resistance to the Mongol tribute 1225 led to a Mongol attack 1231. Koryo submitted, then revolted 1232; was invaded 1232 and 1235, and submitted again; revolted 1247. (Han 147-149; Henthorn 116-119; Lee 165-167; Grousset 259)

Some Jurchens of Jin resettled in their old tribal homeland of Southern Manchuria, where they paid taxes and tribute to the Mongols. (Rossabi, 3-7)

Uighar Kashgaria remained subject to Genghis and his successors. (Grousset) Tibet was invaded and subjugated by the Mongols in 1239. (Richardson, 33-34)

Cambodia lost control of its other Thai vassal state Sukhothai (1238). (Coedès; Briggs; Hall; Wyatt)

Pagan experienced a peaceful, pious, monument-building, literary era. (Hall, Burma, 23-24; Coedès, 183; Hall, SEA, 168)

The Mongol Kagan Mongka resumed the conquest of Sung from 1253, deputing it to his brother Kublai. Mongka's death and succession problems provided Sung a respite 1259. Kublai became Kagan 1260-1264 via a civil war, and resumed the attack on Sung. Kublai moved the capital from Mongolia (Karakorum) to Beijing ("Dadu," Khanbalik) 1260-1267. A long siege of Siangyang and Fancheng 1268-1273 allowed a speedy conquest of most of Sung 1273-1276. Kublai had assumed the Chinese dynastic label Yuan 1271. (Grousset, 258, 284-288; Ebrey 173; Penkala 47)

The Mongolian homeland was the imperial metropole until Kublai moved the capital. Immediate Mongol resistance from 1260 transformed Mongolia into "an unstable and anarchic frontier zone." (Dardess, 21, 31) The Mongol civil wars pitted sinifying Mongols--Kublai and his Yuan state--against other Mongols, steppe-loving defenders of the yasa laws: Arigh Böke 1260-1264, Qaidu 1269-1301. Yuan was repeatedly victorious, but could never manage to stamp out the opposition entirely. (Grousset, 285-286, 291)

Yuan attacked Koryo four times 1253-1257. A coup in Koryo overthrew the recalcitrants. Koryo surrendered, and called in Mongol troops to put down resistance, which was suppressed by 1273. Korea was used as the base and supply source for the disastrous Mongol invasions of Japan 1274. (Han 167-173; Lee 149-151; Henthom 119-122; Grousset 289)

Both Mongol civil wars afflicted Dzungaria and Kashgaria, which came under control of the rebel Ögedei and Jagatai khanates or served as battlefields. (Grousset 331-336) Yuan lost the ability to administer this area, or to manipulate the succession there, after 1260, when Kublai transferred the kaghanate capital away from Karakorum. (Dardess, 21, 27)

Yuan invaded Tali 1252, abolished the Tali state and ruled Yunnan as an imperial province, though the old ruler was retained as a puppet. (Grousset, 283-284; Backus, 164) They colonized it heavily. (Ebrey 195)

Mongols seized Hanoi in 1257, but met resistance and retired, though receiving submission from the Tran king 1258. A Dai Viet complaint to Kublai against Cambodian and Champa attacks got no help 1268. (Grousset, 284, 290; Fairbank et al, 266; Coedès, 192; Hall, SEA, 216-217)
Independent Champa raided Dai Viet, stopped tribute, and demanded return of the provinces lost in 1070. Dai Viet sent a moderately successful punitive expedition 1252. (Coedès 182, 192-193; Hall, SEA 207-208; Majumdar 113-122) Thereafter Champa underwent a coup 1257 and adopted a placatory policy. Champa tribute embassies went to Dai Viet 1266, 1267, 1269, 1270. Temples were endowed.

Narathihapate's megalomania culminated Pagan's monumentalist era, which Yuan rudely interrupted by demanding submission from the ancient tributaries of its predecessor dynasties. Burma refused tribute in 1271 and 1273. (Grousset, 290-291; Hall, Burma, 24-27, 34; Coedès 183, 190, 193-194, 209-210; Hall, SEA, 169-172)


After another distraction caused by the second (Qaidu) civil war in Mongolia, Yuan conquered the remnant of Sung 1277-1279.

Yuan again attacked Japan from Koryo, again disastrously, 1281.

Yuan attempted to impose a centralized provincial administration in Manchuria. Jurchens of Manchuria, exasperated by Yuan demands for supplies and men for the Japan invasions, joined the second Mongol revolt; their section of it was put down in 1287. The Yuan provincial administration was reestablished. (Rossabi, 7-8; Dardess, 23-24)

A Yuan expedition against Champa 1282-83 was refused passage or assistance by Dai Viet, which considered Champa its own subject. Dai Viet being otherwise insufficiently submissive, Yuan invaded Dai Viet 1285, seized the capital, but was resisted and its armies defeated or forced out. Yuan again occupied Hanoi 1287, but withdrew and accepted an offer of vassalage and tribute from Dai Viet 1288. (Grousset, 284, 290; Fairbank et al, 266; Coedès, 192; Hall, SEA, 216-217)

Champa offered submission to Yuan 1278, exchanged embassies 1279-1280, accepted Yuan vassalage 1280 but expelled Yuan viceroy and thus refused annexation 1281. Yuan invaded 1282-1284, could not overcome national guerrilla resistance, refused to withdraw and receive tribute. The Mongol invasion of Dai Viet 1285 was meant to get through to Champa, but Yuan was defeated by Dai Viet and Champa. Champa instead sent a tribute embassy 1285, which was accepted. After a succession in Champa, tribute to Dai Viet was stopped; presents went to Yuan 1292, but Champa refused to allow a passing Yuan fleet to land that same year; and Yuan accepted this rather limited degree of vassalage. (Grousset 290; Coedès 192-193, 217; Hall, SEA, 208; Majumdar, 113-122. Majumdar, 122, denies any tribute to Yuan in the 1290's)
Cambodia defeated the Mongols in 1283 and paid tribute nonetheless in 1285. (Coedès 192) Yuan representations to the Khmer empire 1296-1297 apparently failed to extract homage. (Briggs, 244; Coedès, 213; Hall, SEA, 136)

Yuan favored a new Thai immigrant population, which seized power from old rulers and was submissive to Yuan, in much of southeast Asia. (Hall, SEA, 187) At the end of the century, Cambodia was under attack by its former Thai vassal Sukhothai, which had taken over much other vassal territory of the former Khmer empire from 1270. (Briggs, 240-241, 250, 253; Hall, SEA, 187; Wyatt, 54-56) From 1282 Sukhothai sent embassies to Yuan, 1292, 1294, 1295, 1297, 1299, even while it expanded locally at Cambodia’s expense; its King may have obeyed an order to visit the Yuan court, and was encouraged by Yuan in his expansion. (Briggs, 240, 242; Coedès 206; Hall, SEA, 134, 190) While Sukhothai acquired a wide hegemony over Thai tribes in the south, Chiengmai/Lan-na was its ally from 1287, and Lopburi/Louvo was its independent equal and sent its own embassies to Yuan from c. 1280 to 1299. (Wyatt, 56-58, 63; Coedès, 196, 204-205, 208; Hall, SEA, 134)

The Thai Lao prince Mangrai of Chiengsaen and Chiengrai conquered the Mon kingdom of Haripunjaya c. 1281, founding the city of Chiengmai and the state of Lan-na (usually also called Chiengmai) 1296, apparently with Yuan concurrence. (Wyatt, 44-49; Briggs, 241; Coedès, 195, 208-209; Hall, SEA, 187) Chiengmai’s relations with Yuan at this time are however not clear: perhaps Chiengmai was a Yuan vassal from 1294 (Grousset 291); perhaps it was an object of an unsuccessful Yuan punitive expedition, ordered 1292, repulsed 1296. (Wyatt, 48-49)

Burma (Pagan) attacked a Yuan tributary in 1277. Yuan struck back in 1277-1278; Pagan continued its raids. Yuan invaded 1283-1284, conquering much of the country, provoking Mon rebellion, and carrying Shan (Thai) tribal invaders in their wake. By 1287, the Pagan state was destroyed, and the city burnt 1299. A Yuan province was established in the north 1285-1303; the rest of Burma broke up into statelets like the new Burman refugee state of Toungoo in the southeast, the independent Mon state Pegu in the delta (which obtained Yuan recognition after 1287), and various Shan chiefdoms which dismembered a second Yuan province that had been set up around Pagan. (Grousset, 290-291; Hall, Burma, 24-27, 34; Coedès 183, 190, 193-194, 209-210; Hall, SEA, 169-172)

Yuan from 1280 was probably sufficiently comprehensive, cohesive at the core and powerful in the semiperiphery, to be called a universal empire, despite local revolts.

independent of Yuan. Thailand: Sukhothai and Lopburi Yuan vassals; Chiangmai
rebellings against Yuan. Burma: divided. Yuan province/ various rebels.

After the death of Kublai’s successor Temur Oljaitu in 1307, the dynasty declined
rapidly. A major cultural-factional controversy pitted steppe Mongols against court-
bureaucrat Mongols. In 1307 this struggle manifested itself in conflicting imperial
candidacies (Quishan vs. Ayubbarwada). On this occasion the steppe candidate was
successful. (Dardess, 9, 12-21, 38-42) Despite weakness at the top, the bureaucracy
continued to function.

The victory of the steppe candidate brought no power back to the steppe. Instead
Mongolia was reduced to Yuan provincial status 1307, with bureaucrats and garrisons
and colonists, relief grants and subsidies. The northern steppe homeland was fully
absorbed, administratively assimilated into dependency. (Dardess 8, 24-25)

Koryo and Manchuria remained subject to Yuan in this period. (Han 155-159;
Rossabi, 9)

After the Jagatai-Ögödei Mongol rebellions against Yuan petered out in 1303, the
two rebel lineages fought. Kashgaria and Dzungaria fell to the Jagatai branch 1306, with
Yuan help. There were raids and counterraid between Jagatai and Yuan thereafter until
a peaceful, loose tributary relation was established 1323. (Grousset 336-338; Dardess 12,
25-26)

Exasperated by rebellions and incursions in provinces surrendered by Champa for a
marital alliance of 1306, Dai Viet attacked and subjugated Champa 1312, then defended
its vassal against a Sukhothai raid 1313. Champa revolted 1314-1318 without success.
Yuan objected to Dai Viet’s acquisition of a Yuan vassal, and the next Champa revolt got
Yuan diplomatic support 1324, though it had to defeat Dai Viet on its own 1326.
(Coedis 229, 230; Hall, SEA, 209, 217; Majumdar, 122-128)

Cambodia entered an obscure period. (Coedes, 228-229)

A Yuan punitive expedition of 1301 against Chiangmai was a disaster; but
Chiangmai, raiding to 1311, sent tribute missions to Yuan 1315, then fell into succession
struggles from 1317 onward. (Wyatt, 49-50, 75; Coedes, 226-227)

Sukhothai sent embassies to Yuan to 1323. It was able to raid Champa over
Cambodian territory 1313. After its founder’s death (1298? 1317?), its power and thrust
decayed, its vassals rebelled, and it adopted a more status quo policy, and involved itself
in piety, monuments and scholarship. Lopburi/Louvo then displaced Sukhothai as the
local power. (Coedes 206, 219-222; Hall, SEA, 191-192, Wyatt, 59-60)
Burma remained divided. A Yuan invasion 1301 was defeated by Burman and Shan (Thai) resistance; the Shan chiefs then sent repeated submission and tribute to Yuan, which accepted it, and even abolished its other Burma province in their favor 1303. The Shan chiefs then divided and ruled the Burman area of Upper Burma from Pinya 1312 and Sagaing 1315. A Thai dynasty ruled the Mon state of Pegu in the south. (Hall, Burma, 27-31; Briggs, 241; Coedès, 190, 209, 227-228; Hall, SEA, 172-173)


After a series of abbreviated monarchs (nine successions 1307-1333, often by coup), the long feeble final Yuan reign (to 1370) was disturbed by factional-ideological struggles among the Mongol elite over Confucianism and racism. Signs of loss of control appeared in the 1340's: floods, banditry, piracy, famine. One pirate gained dominion over maritime grain shipments. (Grousset, 320-325; Dardess, 53-102)

Koryo continued a Yuan vassal (Han 155-159), as did Jurchen Manchuria until Yuan repeatedly raised its gerfalcon tribute. The Jurchen revolted 1343, 1346-1347, 1348-1355, by which time Yuan had worse revolts to preoccupy them. (Rossabi, 9)

Another Yuan succession struggle between a steppe and a court-bureaucrat candidate (1328-1329, Qoshila and Tugh Temür) went badly for the now-subjugated steppe, whose candidate was defeated. (Dardess, 9, 12-21, 38-42)

The Jagatai candidate for the Yuan throne was defeated in 1329; thereafter, the Jagatai khanate isolated itself from Yuan. (Dardess, 8, 27-30) In 1347 the local Dughlat Mongol clan called in one Tughlugh Timur as Jagatai kaghan; he converted to Islam. (Grousset 344)

Champa, having thrown off Dai Viet lordship in 1326, sent embassies to Yuan 1327, 1328, 1330, then ceased and became fully independent during a period of state weakness in both Dai Viet and Yuan. Champa remained independent, at peace and prosperous to its next succession crisis 1342; thereafter it underwent civil war. (Coedès 229, 230; Hall, SEA, 209, 217; Majumdar, 122-128)

Cambodia seems from what little evidence exists to have been post-imperial, weak, peaceful, friendly to Yuan (sending an embassy in 1330) and Dai Viet (sending a greeting delegation 1335), and rich. (Coedès, 228-229)

Chiangmai reestablished order 1328, sent tribute to Yuan in 1326, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1347, and spent most of this period in city-building and temple-building. (Wyatt, 49-50, 75; Coedès, 226-227)

The Burman refugee city of Toungoo became a kingdom in 1347.

Many Chinese popular rebellions broke out from 1351. Yuan was able to put down all but two by 1354 using mixed Chinese, Miao, Mongol and Central Asian armies. (Dardess, 104-116) Intrigue and power struggles within Yuan then paralyzed its forces. From 1355 Yuan fell apart into regional warlordism. Semi-independent loyalist strong men took over North China; the two major rebels received appointments as nominal loyalists on the coast; suppressed rebellions sprang up again to form three major de facto independent rebel-revival states. A Mongol warlord destroyed one; a second, which became the Ming state, captured Nanking 1356, disposed of the other three groups one by one, seizing all south China. Civil warfare among its warlords paralyzed the Mongol north after 1360. Ming swept the Mongols out of north China 1368-1369. (Grousset 323-325; Dardess 104-156)

The Mongol empire pulled back into Mongolia; the Ming pursued. Ming expeditions of 1369, 1372, 1374, all failed to end Mongol raiding and bring submission. (Rossabi 12; Grousset 502-503)

Koryo rebelled successfully against Yuan 1356, defended themselves against the neo-Sung Red Banner Chinese rebel army 1359-1362, suppressed a Yuan counterattack 1368, and accepted Ming that same year. (Henthorn 128-135, 152; Han 180-181, 185-191, 220-222; Lee 161-165)

Mongol-Jurchen forces in Manchuria rejected Ming minatory embassies of 1370 and 1371. (Rossabi, 13-19)

One Qamar ad-Din usurped the khanate of Mogholistan (Dzungaria, Kashgaria, and the vicinity) from the Jagatai dynasty 1363. Tamerlane of Samarkand sent or made eight expeditions 1366-1390 to subdue this Qamar ad-Din. (Grousset 422-426)

Tibet reestablished its autonomy of Yuan by 1350, and remained independent and introverted to the 18th century (Richardson, 35, 49).

Champa ended its civil war 1352, fought off a Dai Viet intervention 1353, and attacked Dai Viet 1353 in another unsuccessful attempt to reconquer lost territory. Champa launched successful raids on Dai Viet 1361, 1362, 1365, and defeated Dai Viet punitive expedition 1368. Champa established early and annual tributary ties to Ming from 1368. Ignoring Ming commands to be at peace with Dai Viet, Champa intervened in Dai Viet civil strife and sacked Hanoi 1371, and neutralized Ming with ties 1372 and tribute 1373. (Coedès 230, 237-238; Hall, SEA, 209-210, 217-218; Majumdar, 128-134)
Cambodian chronology becomes problematic. Hall suggests there was an Ayuthia conquest of Angkor 1369-1375 and again 1389, while the rulers of Cambodia, sometimes in revolt against Ayuthia occupation, were exchanging missions with Ming 1371, 1373, 1378-1383, 1386-1390. (Hall, SEA, 139-141) Coedès dates the Ayuthia conquests of Cambodia 1352-1353 and 1393-1394 (236-237); Briggs doubts their existence (254-255).

A former piece of the Cambodian empire, and then of Sukhothai's, became independent, with Cambodian aid, as the Thai state Laos (Lan Chang, Luang Prabang) 1353. To its east Laos bordered Dai Viet and Champa, to its south Cambodia, to its west Chiangmai, Sukhothai and Ayuthia. Laos expanded in all directions, then exhausted itself attacking both Dai Viet and Ayuthia until a coup of 1373, after which it turned toward peace, trade and prosperity. (Coedès, 223-225; Hall, SEA, 137, 192, 284-284; Wyatt, 82-83)

Lopburi founded the new city and state Ayuthia 1350/1351. Sukhothai was at first perhaps a vassal, perhaps a weak ally. Ayuthia became strong as Yuan overlordship weakened, but cultivated Ming when that became established. A first Ayuthia assault on Cambodia was successful 1369-1375, then expelled. Sukhothai had recovered its independent strength; Ayuthia attacked Sukhothai from 1371. (Hall, SEA, 191-194; Wyatt, 66-69)

**AD 1375.** Unipolar. Solar state: Ming.

After a breach and a flirtation with Northern Yuan remnant, Koryo became a Ming tributary in 1384. In the process, a pro-Ming faction abolished Koryo and created the Yi dynasty in what the Ming designated as the state of Choson. (Henthorn 128-135, 152; Han 180-181, 185-191, 220-222; Lee 161-165)

Mongol-Jurchen holdouts in Manchuria, having rebuffed another Ming demand for submission in 1378, raided the Ming holdings, were overawed by a Ming army, and accepted vassal status. (Rossabi, 13-19, argues that there was no Ming "hegemony" because Ming did not collect the taxes, raise the armies, and govern the area, but also shows that the Jurchens offered submission, paid tribute, tolerated an inferior position, and provided auxiliaries, i.e. that there was Ming hegemony but no imperial province.)

Ming inflicted a great defeat on the shrunken Mongol empire 1388. The steppe empire dissolved: Kyrgyz, Alans (Asod) and western Oirat Mongols (Kalmyks, Jungars) went their own way, and all paid homage to Ming. (Rossabi 12; Grousset 502-503)

Having survived Tamerlane's expeditions to 1390, Qamar ad-Din vanished 1392, a Jagataite was restored, and Tamerlane sent another expedition 1399-1400 to plunder Kashgar. (Grousset 422-426) In 1385 Ming ambassadors nonetheless obtained Jagataite or Dughlat homage, whatever its worth. (Grousset 485)
Ming conquered Yunnan 1381 against last-ditch Mongol resistance and resumed the Yuan policy of massive colonization. (Ebrey 195)

Dai Viet next ignored Ming peacemaking advice, attacked Champa 1377, and was badly defeated. Champa pillaged Hanoi again 1377 and 1378, annexing several provinces and sending booty to Ming. Champa attacks of 1380 and 1382 failed, succeeded 1383-1384, but suffered defeat 1390 and re-lost all the reconquered territories. Tribute sent Ming by a new coup government in Champa was rejected 1391 but accepted 1397 and 1399. (Coedes 230, 237-238; Hall, SEA, 209-210, 217-218; Majumdar, 128-134)

Ayuthia completed its subjugation of Sukhothai by 1378. It then intervened in Chiengmai in the late 1380's, while Chiengmai attacked Sukhothai in the same period. (Hall, SEA, 191-194; Wyatt, 66-69)

Thais of Chiengmai and Ayuthia claimed several provinces of the Mon state, whose capital was Martaban. Chiengmai attacks of 1356 were driven off. Ayuthia seized Martaban 1363, forcing the Mon state to move its capital to Pegu 1369. After this setback, the Mons held their own, because Ayuthia was more concerned to subdue Cambodia, Sukhothai and Chiengmai. (Hall, Burma, 34; Hall, SEA, 179-180)

Burma became more clearly quadripartitioned: many Shan statelets established themselves in the north; a Shan dynasty extinguished local competitors, ruled, and assimilated to, the Burmans of Upper Burma from Ava; a Thai dynasty ruled, and assimilated to, the Mons of Lower Burma from Pegu; a Burman dynasty ruled Burman refugees at Toungoo. Ava fixed a border with Pegu 1371, and received Ming recognition and support against northern Shans 1383. Ava took advantage of a succession struggle to attack Pegu 1385, took Prome, but could not complete the conquest. The main axis of conflict in Burma became Ava vs. Pegu, Burmans vs. Mons. (Coedes, 227-228; Hall, Burma, 30-31; Hall, SEA, 174-175)


There were Ming naval expeditions to Sumatra, Ceylon, Persia and Arabia 1403-1433, which brought back prisoners and prestige.

Korea provided steady tribute-trade of horses and oxen to Ming. (Henthorn 154-155)
Ming embassies succeeded in securing peace and economically beneficial tribute of horses, furs, camels and luxury goods from the Jurchens of Manchuria. (Rossabi, 19-36)

The Oirat Mongols expanded their control through western Mongolia. In the east a Kublaid arose again, rallied the Alans, and refused vassalage to Ming. Ming campaigned into Outer Mongolia 1410-1411 and routed the Kublaids. The Oirats finished them off, claimed Mongol hegemony, and threw off the Ming yoke. Ming attacks across the Gobi drove the Oirat off at heavy cost 1414-1415. The eastern Mongol Khorchins then rose up again, first for a Kublaid, then on their own. Ming, now with Oirat help, attacked them in Mongolia 1422-1425, without decisive result. (Grousset 504-507)

The Oirat Mongols became hegemonic in Dzungaria and eastern Kashgaria about the 1420's. Tamerlane's son and successor Shah Rukh (r. 1407-1447) ruled at Herat and Samarkand. He allied with the Dughlats of Kashgaria and defeated the Jagataite Khan of Mogholistan (Dzungaria) 1425. (Grousset 506, 457-460, 492)

Dai Viet underwent a coup 1400; the losers called in Ming, which conquered Dai Viet 1407 with the help of Champa. Ming reorganized it as "Annam," and tried to sinify it. Rebellion began 1418. (Hall, SEA, 218)

Champa defeated a Dai Viet invasion 1401, but was badly defeated by the next 1402 and had to cede its historic and fertile northern half and accept vassalage. Champa appealed to Ming 1403 which called on Dai Viet to leave Champa in peace. Dai Viet seized Champa's tribute to Ming and invaded Champa in great force. Champa again appealed to Ming 1404, which sent ships and an ultimatum. Dai Viet desisted, but was anyway invaded, conquered and annexed by Ming 1407, while Champa regained its just ceded territories and reaffirmed tribute to Ming. Champa invaded Cambodia after 1407, was asked to withdraw by Ming, and commemorated victories against Cambodia 1421. (Coedès, 238-239; Hall, SEA, 141, 210, 218; Majumdar, 134-141)

Cambodia continued tributary missions to Ming until 1419, complaining of Champa invasions to Ming 1408 and 1414, and receiving diplomatic support. (Hall, SEA, 139; Majumdar, 138) It then underwent major change which for Chandler ended its "period of greatness" (1996: 29), although he is unable to accept the label "decline" (78).

Laos suffered internal struggles and many successions after 1416. Laos embroiled itself in the Ming-Dai Viet war 1421; its force sent to aid Dai Viet changed sides and was expelled by Dai Viet. (Hall, SEA, 285)

Chiengmai underwent a succession war 1401, and repelled Ming invasions from Yunnan 1404 and 1405, then was at peace. (Wyatt, 76-77)
Ayuthia intervened and imposed a candidate on rebellious vassal Sukhothai 1410. An attack on Chiangmai 1411 captured Chietgrai. Ayuthia controlled the Sukhothai succession 1419. (Hall, SEA, 194-195; Wyatt, 69-71, 77)

Ava and Pegu fought constantly 1401-1417; Ava also fought Arakan 1404-1430. Ming did not take administrative control of Burma, but obstructed the growth of any powerful state, e.g. Ming reprimands saved a Shan state from Ava 1406. Upper Burma fell into anarchy 1426-1440. (Hall, SEA 175-177, 180; Hall, Burma, 31, 35)


Korea extended itself northward against the Jurchen, essentially reaching the present Tumen-Yalu river boundary 1431-1447. (Henthorn 154-155)

After 1426, Ming began to retrench on empire, becoming isolationist and xenophobic, while the Jurchen demanded more reciprocal gifts for more, increasingly unwelcome, "Jurchen embassies" to Ming, whose rejection provoked armed raids. Jurchens cooperated with the Oirat Mongol attack of 1449. (Rossabi, 36-44)

With Ming help, the Oirats took the Kaganate 1434-1439. They then attempted the further reconstruction of the steppe empire, attacking Ming all along its northern frontier. Oirat inflicted a great defeat on Ming 1449, capturing the Ming emperor Ying-tsung, but could not capture fortified cities. (Grousset 504-507)

The Timurid Shah Rukh of Samarkand seized Kashgar, which the Dughlat Mongols of Kashgaria took back about 1433-1434. (Grousset 506, 457-460, 492)

The Vietnamese country regained its independence in (and may be called Vietnam after) 1428--whereupon it sent submission to Ming. (Hall, SEA, 218) Its "Later Le" dynasty received Ming recognition and the royal title.

Champa made peace with independent Vietnam 1428, but attacked it during a succession crisis 1434, was defeated and made peace. There was a succession in 1441 and a Ming investiture, and renewed attacks on Vietnam 1444 and 1445. Ming requested armistice of both, but Vietnam took its capital and king 1446, ignoring a Ming order to release him. A successor requested and received Ming and Dai Viet investiture 1447, but was overthrown 1449. (Coedès, 238-239; Hall, SEA, 141, 210, 218; Majumdar, 134-141)
In Cambodia, a succession crisis, partition, civil war and Ayuthia intervention led to Angkor being abandoned in the 1440’s in favor of Phnom Penh. (Hall, SEA, 142-143; D. Chandler, 1996: 77-80; cf. Coedès, 237-238)

At peace to 1441, Chiengmai fell into a succession war to 1450. (Wyatt, 76-77)

An Ayuthia attack on Cambodia 1431-1432 succeeded as a raid, but failed as an attempt to establish a vassal state. In 1438 Sukhothai was abolished, annexed and provincialized by Ayuthia; the resulting state may now be called Siam, with Ayuthia its capital city. Siamese campaigns against divided Chiengmai 1442 and 1448 failed. (Hall, SEA, 194-195; Wyatt, 69-71, 77)

Ming suppressed a Shan attempt to revive Nancho 1438-1465, becoming embroiled with Ava in the process 1441-1446, producing a formal act of submission by Ava 1445. Once the Burman attacks ceased, Pegu entered a long period of peace and prosperity. (Hall, SEA 175-177, 180; Hall, Burma, 31, 35)


Unable to conquer Ming, and threatened by factionalism, the Oirat Khan Esen made peace with Ming, became its vassal, claimed the Kaganate (1453), and was assassinated (1455). Oirat was able to invade Mogholistan, but eastern Mongolia fell to the Kublaids, who fought one another and the Oirats. Dayan was proclaimed khan 1470; his people defeated the Oirats and restored Kublaid primacy among the Mongols. (Grousset 507-510)

Korea continued regular tributary-vassal embassies to Ming, whose effect was to provide the Korean ruler with a trade monopoly in return for his submission. (Han 219, 223, 227; Lee 189. As to the degree of Korean vassalhood, cf. Fairbank et al. 300--"unswervingly loyal" with Han 222--"only nominal.")

There was sporadic warfare between Ming and the Jurchens of Manchuria. (Rossabi 47-48)

The Jagataite Khan of Mogholistan raided the Timurid Abu Sa'id of Samarkand after 1451, who then supported a Jagataite claimant so as to divide the Kashgaria-Dzungaria region, which however was reunited under the Jagataite Yusu 1472. (Grousset 460-461, 493-495)
There were major Miao and Yao risings in south and southwest China against Ming control and colonization 1464-1466. (Ebrey 197)

Champa was at odds with Vietnam, but received Ming investiture 1453 and 1457. Champa refused homage to Vietnam; war began, and Champa complained to Ming, which declined to help. Champa sent tribute to Vietnam 1467, but Ming-level tribute was demanded, and refused 1469. Champa attacked Vietnam 1469; Vietnam complained to Ming, invaded, and took Champa's capital again, this time permanently, 1471, along with 4/5 of the country. Ming, anxious for good relations with Vietnam, offered no assistance. A rump of Champa continued a reduced existence until the 19th century, slowly retreating before Vietnamese annexations, maintaining Ming investitures and embassies to 1543. (Coedès, 238-239; Hall, SEA, 210; Majumdar, 141-146)

Cambodia was well into five hundred years of alternating wars with, and submission to, Siam. The Ming seem not to have intervened nor been invited, perhaps because this was regarded as an internal affair. An overthrow of Thai-oriented vassals around Angkor c. 1450 was followed by civil strife. (Hall, SEA, 146-147; D. Chandler, 1996: 80-81)

Chiengmai attempted to acquire rebellious Sukhothai from Siam 1451, but was distracted by an attack from Laos. Chiengmai fought Siam off and on from 1456 to 1464. Siam apparently failed to capture Malacca 1455 and was discouraged from further attacks by Ming, held off Chiengmai with some loss of land 1460-1462, suppressed another rebellion in Sukhothai 1462. (Hall, SEA, 196-199; Wyatt, 77-81, 86-88)

There was a period of calm among the Shan states after the Ming punitive expedition, maintained by occasional Ming warnings.


Ming adopted a more pacific policy toward the Jurchens of Manchuria around 1478, allowing numerous tribute missions and tolerating substantial smuggling. (Rossabi 47-48)

The Kublaid khan Dayan's Mongols resumed raids on the northern Ming frontiers in 1497. (Grousset 507-510)

Kashgaria revolted from the Jagataite Khanate of Mogholistan, split under competing Dughlat emirs about 1479, and was largely subjugated by the Jagataite Ahmed 1499. (Grousset 460-461, 493-495)
Vietnam invaded Laos 1478, took its capital Lan Chang, but was driven out again. Laos now sought and achieved prosperity through peace and trade with Vietnam and the Thai states. (Hall, SEA, 285; Wyatt, 84)

Chiangmai complained to Ming of Vietnamese incursions stemming from Vietnam's attack on Laos 1478-1479, was urged to become a Ming tributary, and apparently agreed. Siam fought Chiangmai again without decisive result 1486 and 1494. Siam prospered through trade, and engaged in notable public and religious works. (Hall, SEA, 196-199; Wyatt, 77-81, 86-88)

Ming control in Burma weakened after 1481, and the Shan state of Mohnyn began to raid Ava, which could not curb it. Pegu meanwhile enjoyed peace, stability, prosperity, and trade, and devoted its energies to religion. (Hall, Burma, 32, 35-37; Hall, SEA, 177-178, 180-181)


Korea continued a Ming vassal during a period on internal factional struggles and elite purges. (Han 264-267; Henthorn 177; Lee 205-206)

Manchurian Jurchens continued peaceful tribute-trade relations with Ming. (Rossabi 49-50)

The Kublaid khan Dayan's Mongols raided Ming to 1505. (Grousset 510-511; Ebrey 210)

The Jagataite Khan of Mogholistan was attacked by, but expelled, the Dughlat Emir of Kashgar 1514, reunited the Dzungaria-Kashgaria districts within the Jagatai dynasty, and began raiding northwest China 1517. Later Dzungaria was lost to the Kyrgyz-Kazakhs of the Great Horde. (Grousset 497-500)

Vietnam underwent rapid turnover at the top and feudal decentralization below 1497-1527. (Hall, SEA, 218-219)

Cambodia is spoken of as warlike and independent in a European source of c. 1512-1515. There was some alternation between raiding and Siamese hegemony which is hard to sort out in this period. (Cf. Hall, SEA, 146-147, and D. Chandler, 1996: 81-82)
Siam fought Chiangmai over Sukhothai 1507-1508, 1510, 1513, 1515, and kept it. Peace followed. Chiangmai invested in religious foundations, Siam in public works. (Hall, SEA, 199, 286-287; Wyatt, 80-82, 89-92)

Shan Mohnyin continued to attack Ava, which ceded territory 1507. A Ming intervention 1520 was without effect. Mohnyin captured Ava, pillaged it, and set up a Shan state there. Meanwhile Toungoo expanded greatly at the expense of Ava, receiving many Burman chiefs when Ava fell to Mohnyin. (Hall,Burma, 38-41; Hall, SEA, 178, 181, 287-289)


The Jurchens of Manchuria continued a placid tributary trade with Ming, even though Ming once again limited, controlled and monopolized their traffic after 1536. (Rossabi 49-50) Their largely passive acceptance of Ming exploitative behavior suggests that the previously irrepressible Jurchens had reverted to subordinate, genuinely tributary status.

The Kublaid Mongol khan Dayan ruled the Mongols until his death 1543. His grandson and successor Altan Khan had resumed raids on Ming almost every year from 1529. In 1542 he defeated a Ming army, capturing or killing 200,000 Ming people in a single month. In 1550 he raided to Peking. (Grousset 510-511; Ebrey 210)

The Le dynasty of Vietnam was overthrown by the Mac 1527, but nominally restored in southern Annam by the Nguyen and Trinh. The Mac held Tonkin, and Ming ordered both sides to remain in place as Ming vassals. (Hall, SEA, 218-219)

Laos continued to seek peace, and to prosper by trade with Thailand and Vietnam. Public works and religious foundations increased. The capital was moved from Lan Chang (Luang Prabang) to the better-placed trade site of Vien Chang (Vientiane). Laos intervened in a Chiangmai succession struggle 1545-1547. (Hall, SEA, 285-286; Wyatt, 84-86)

A succession dispute in Chiangmai invited Siamese, Shan and Lao intervention from 1545, which left Siam defeated and Chiangmai independent but chaotic. A succession struggle in Siam invited Burmese and Cambodian intervention 1548-1549, which was repelled. (Hall, SEA, 199, 286-287; Wyatt, 80-82, 89-92)

Toungoo conquered Pegu 1535-1542, repulsed an attack by Shan-ruled Ava and six other Shan states 1544, and created a Mon-Burman Burmese state 1546. Proposing to conquer the world, Burma thereupon attempted, unsuccessfully, to subjugate Arakan and
Siam 1547-1548, and fell back into disorder and secession. (Hall, Burma, 38-41; Hall, SEA, 178, 181, 287-289)


Korea remained a Ming vassal, subject to intense elite factional strife.

In Manchuria, Jurchen had begun to protest Ming trade controls by predatory raiding, which led to successful Ming repression 1574, (Rossabi 51-53).

Altan Khan ruled to 1583, raiding Ming, but also demanding the opening of frontier markets. (Grousset 510-511)

Jagataite Kashgaria brought in devout Muslim khojas, and religious factionalism arose, dividing the Aqtaghlik of Kashgar from the Qarataghlik of Yarkand. (Grousset 500-501)

Bayinnaung united Burma by blitzkrieg: Toungoo, Prome, Pegu, 1550-1551, Ava 1555, Shan states to 1562. Burma subjugated Chiengmai 1556, and again 1558-1559 and 1564-1565 after defeating Laotian and resistance forces. Burma repressed a Mon rebellion in Lower Burma 1564. Burma attacked Siam from 1563, twice conquering Ayuthia (1564, 1568-1569), placing a vassal on the Siamese throne 1569. In 1569 a Venetian traveler estimated Burma's wealth and strength as higher than that of the Ottoman Empire. But Burma bogged down in expeditions to Laos 1569-1570, 1571, 1574-1575. (Hall, Burma, 41-48; Hall, SEA, 289-300, 380, 398-399; Wyatt, 92-104, 118)

Cambodia attacked Burma-occupied Siam in 1570 and 1575. (D. Chandler, 1996: 84-85; Hall, SEA, 147-149, 295, 297, 299; Wyatt, 100)

Laos defended Chiengmai against Burma in the 1550's and 1560's with more determination than success, and resisted repeated Burmese invasions in the 1570's. (Hall, SEA, 294-295, 467; Wyatt, 120)

Chiengmai remained chaotic until subjugated by Burma against resistance in the 1550's and 1560's. (Wyatt, 92-93, 118)


Japan invaded Korea 1592-1593 and 1597-1598, was resisted by Korean and Ming armies and Korean guerrillas, but was most stymied by the ironclad cannonships of the Korean navy. (Lee 208-2; Han 267-273; Henthorn 177-185.)

Ming punitive expeditions against Jurchen raids continued 1579-1580, 1582, 1584, and 1588. But north of northeastern Korea, Jurchen vassals of Ming under Nurhachi had formed an expansionist state by 1583, and began assailing Korea. Nurhachi attacked Ming in Manchuria 1593, but otherwise performed as a loyal Ming vassal and tributary. (Rossabi, 51-53; Henthorn, 186)

Tibetan lamas of the Yellow Hat sect undertook missions to the Mongols, with great success, converting Altan Khan 1576. Tibet and Mongolia were united, the Tibetan Dalai Lama as spiritual leader, the Mongol Altan Khan as temporal leader, by an assembly at Kokonor 1577. The eastern Mongols, ruled by Altan Khan to 1583, became by degrees less aggressive and centralized. (Grousset 513-515)

Vietnam was partitioned further by a split between Le/Trinh in the center and Nguyen in the south. The Trinh captured Hanoi and drove the Mac to Caobang on the border 1592, where they held out with Ming support. (Hall, SEA, 219)

Cambodian incursions into Siam continued: 1578, 1582 twice, 1587. But Siam, having at last recovered, drove a Cambodian attack force all the way back to the capital Lovek 1587, taking Lovek and devastating the country 1593-1594. (D. Chandler, 1996: 84-85; Hall, SEA, 147-149, 295, 297, 299; Wyatt, 100)

Having held back the Burmese, Laos fell into anarchy in the 1580's, achieved renewed unity and independence, but not stability, 1591-1592. (Hall, SEA, 294-295, 467; Wyatt, 120)

Chiangmai rebelled unsuccessfully against Burma 1595, then fell under Siamese suzerainty 1599 when Burma collapsed. (Wyatt, 92-93, 118)

Siam prepared for war with Burma from 1550. Siam invaded Cambodia to force submission 1555-1556. Siam was conquered and subjugated by Burma in the 1560's, invaded five times by Cambodia 1570-1582, but recovered, rebelled 1583, defeated repeated Burmese invasions to 1593, offered Ming the Siamese navy against Japan 1592, turned the tables and invaded Burma from 1593. (Wyatt, 92-104)
Another Burmese expedition to Laos bogged down 1579. Burma's people were impoverished by the state's constant conscriptions, Burma fell into annual rebellion from 1581. Siam rebelled, defeated five Burmese invasions 1584-1593, invaded Burma 1593, took the suzerainty of Chiangmai 1599. Burma broke apart into warring states-- Toungoo, Ava, Prome, the Shan states--with pieces to Siam and Arakan, by 1599. (Hall, Burma, 41-48; Hall, SEA, 289-300, 380, 398-399; Wyatt, 92-104, 118)


The Manchurian Jurchen chief Nurhachi named himself emperor and his state "Later Chin" in 1616. The state-name was changed to Ch'ing 1636, but we shall style it Manchu, after the national name chosen 1652. Manchu defeated Korean-Ming armies in Manchuria 1619, and began extending its influence over Mongol tribes from 1624. (Henthorn, 186; Han 275)

Korea vacillated between Ming and neutrality 1619-1623, then rejoined Ming and resisted Nurhachi 1623-1627. (Henthorn 186-189; Han 276-278; Lee 215-217)

The Nguyen overlords of southern Vietnam ceased to visit the Le court in the north in 1600. War broke out between North (Le/Trinh) and South (Nguyen) Vietnam 1620. It proved a durable near-stalemate despite seesawing victories and defeats. (Hall, SEA, 219-220) South Vietnam began to colonize the Khmer-populated but unadministered region of the Mekong Delta by the 1620's. (D. Chandler, 1996: 82, 94-95)

Cambodia became a vassal of Siam 1603. During Siam's struggle with Burma over Chiangmai 1615-1618 Cambodia declared independence 1618 and drove out the Siamese garrison in Lovek; Cambodia maintained itself against Siamese attack 1622-1624. Cambodia sought South Vietnamese protection against Thailand, and got it at the price of allowing Nguyen colonization of the Mekong Delta. (D. Chandler, 1983: 84; Hall, SEA, 283, 382, 459-460)

Laos underwent a rebellion and coup 1622, then fast turnover of monarchs. (Hall, SEA 467-468; Wyatt 121-122)

Chiangmai returned from Siamese to Burmese control 1614-1615. (Wyatt, 119)

Siam fought Burma for the independent Shan states to 1605; then a succession turned it toward peace, foreign trade, centralization, revenue-building. A revolt of Japanese exile-traders and an invasion by Laos were defeated 1610-1612. Reunited
Burma recaptured some of its territories 1614 and Chiengmai 1615, with a truce in 1618. Siam lost control of Cambodia by 1622. It then occupied itself with trade, assassination, revolt, and again trade. (Hall, SEA, 380-384; Wyatt, 105-111)

Another reunification of Burma occurred, starting from Ava: Shan states, Prome 1608, Toungoo 1610, the chief port Syriam (headquarters of a Mon state with a Portuguese adventurer-king) 1613. Burma then resumed war with Siam 1614, making some territorial gains, and took Chiengmai 1615. After a truce with Siam 1618, Burmese policy shifted toward peace with war-preparation. (Hall, Burma, 63-68; Hall, SEA, 398-403)


Famine in 1627-1628 produced uncontrollable banditry in Ming. Two main large rebel groups coalesced by 1636. Floods, epidemics, and bankruptcy undercut Ming; the two rebels established new "dynasties." (Ebrey 214-215)

The Manchu state, at Shenyang/Mukden after 1625, subdued eastern Mongolia in the 1630's. Manchu expanded to the Great Wall by 1644, recruiting Mongols and defecting Ming armies. Manchu replaced the Ming at Peking in 1644, and defeated the bandit "dynasties." Manchu still had to fight four Ming princes in the south and southwest, defeating one in 1645 and another in 1646. (Grousset 516-518; Ebrey 227)

Korean rebels joined Nurhachi, and Korea, invaded, was forced to switch suzerains and promise tribute to Manchu from 1627. A decade of resistance culminated in a major Manchu invasion, and genuine subjection after 1637. (Hentom 186-189; Han 276-278; Lee 215-217)

The disintegrated and quarrelling eastern Mongols went over to Manchu tribe by tribe—Khorchin, Chahar, Ordos, Tümed—from 1624 to 1635. Khalkha Mongols of central Mongolia drove the Oirat westward. (Grousset 516-517, 525)

Kashgaria, nominally the Jagataite khanate of Mogholistan, remained controlled and divided by its Muslim clergy or khojas. Oirat Mongols settled in Dzungaria. (Grousset, 501, 525).

An Oirat tribe, the Khoşhot Mongols, took Kokonor and intervened in a Tibetan quarrel on behalf of the Dalai Lama and the Yellow Hat sect, establishing the Dalai Lama as his vassal ruler of central Tibet. (Grousset 523-524)
Cambodia suffered coups in 1630 and 1642. (D. Chandler, 1983: 84; Hall, SEA, 283, 382, 459-460)

Unstable to 1637, Laos then enjoyed a long reign that restored internal peace and military strength, and created good relations and border treaties with all neighbors. (Hall, SEA 467-468; Wyatt 121-122)

Chiangmai revolted unsuccessfully against Burma 1631. (Wyatt, 119)

Burma pursued peace but prepared war to 1628. After a succession and the suppression of a Mon revolt, Burma turned to peaceable conservative isolation and xenophobia. The last Ming emperor arrived in Yunnan in 1644 and began conscripting Burmese men and goods, but was defeated by Burma by 1650. (Hall, Burma, 63-68; Hall, SEA, 398-403)


Manchu overcame Ming resistance in the south by 1659, only to face a rebellion by three Chinese viceroy’s, again in the south and southwest in 1674. Manchu enjoyed a period of unusual leadership stability: three emperors ruled 1669-1799. (Ebrey 224)

The Koxinga dynasty of Ming rebels seized Formosa from the Dutch 1661.

The North-South Vietnam war continued sporadically, with triumphs and routs, until a peace of exhaustion set in 1672.

A South Vietnamese intervention force carried out a Cambodian coup 1658. As a price Cambodia became a tributary. Cambodia’s sea trade was taken away by Vietnamese and overseas Ming-refugee Chinese in Saigon. In 1673 South Vietnam took advantage of a succession crisis to install another vassal, but was driven out. (D. Chandler, 1996: 88-89; Hall, SEA, 460-463)

Chiangmai vacillated between Burma and Siam after 1658, but returned to Burmese control 1664. (Hall, SEA, 385; Wyatt, 119-120)

Siam fought Burma 1661-1662 to no great net effect. Siam captured Chiangmai 1662, using Manchu backing to keep Burma quiet; but a local revolt restored Burmese lordship 1664. European power politics now began to
enter Siamese history. Dutch demands for trade monopolies were enforced by a blockade 1664. (Hall, SEA 385-397, 477; Wyatt, 111-118, 125)

Manchu mopped up Yunnan 1658, driving Ming remnants to Burma where they fought Burmese to 1662. Weakened Burma had further trouble with a Mon revolt 1661, an associated war with Siam 1661-1662, a Manchu invasion that mopped up Ming and forced obedient surrender by Burma of a Ming prince 1662, and a struggle with Siam over Chiangmai 1662-1664. Stagnation, peace, isolation, and feudal fragmentation then set in. (Hall, Burma, 68-69, 73; Hall, SEA, 403-404, 407)


Manchu put down the Three Viceroy's Rebellion in 1681.

Chahar and Tümed eastern Mongols of Inner Mongolia rose against Manchu and were put down 1675. Galdan became Oirat Khan in Dzungaria c. 1676. He attempted to acquire control over the four Khalkha khansates of central Mongolia, succeeding 1688-1690. Manchu artillery drove Galdan out 1690, and the Khalkha khans became Manchu tributary vassals 1691. Galdan's Oirats tried again to conquer the Khalkas, and even the eastern Khorchins, but were thoroughly defeated by Manchu artillery and muskets and driven westward 1696. (Grousset 528-531)

C. 1677-1678 the last Jagataite Khan of Kashgaria drove out the Aqtaghlik faction of khojas, who appealed to the Dalai Lama, who referred them to the Oirats of Dzungaria. The Oirats drove out the Jagataites and the Qarataglik faction. Kashgaria, reunited under a Muslim Aqtaghlik theocracy, became a protectorate of the Oirat Mongol empire. (Grousset 501, 527-528)

Kokonor continued in control of Tibet. (Grousset 524)

Manchu naval expeditions conquered independent Formosa 1683. (Ebrey 227)

The Nguyen of South Vietnam turned to expand against the Chams, annexing, subjugating, and working to assimilate their few remaining independent districts. They sought, but were refused, Chinese recognition and direct vassal status. The Le/Trinh of the north eliminated the Mac, who had lost their Ming patrons, in 1677, and engaged in peaceful, stable development. (Hall, SEA, 219, 438-439, 442-444)

Another Cambodian civil war in the 1680's was settled when Cambodia accepted South Vietnamese suzerainty, and allowed some separated territories to come first under Nguyen patronage, then suzerainty, then administration and colonization. Another Cambodian separatist with Vietnamese forces was stopped 1699. (D. Chandler, 1996: 88-89; Hall, SEA, 460-463; but cf. 444-445, with a different story)
Laos remained stable to 1694, except for a predatory war with the small tributary state of Tran Ninh (capital Xieng Khouang), which produced a long feud. Otherwise culture, arts and crafts flourished. Succession coups however disturbed the country 1694 and 1700, and a Vietnamese-Tran Ninh force, perhaps with Siamese help, installed a candidate vassal 1700. (Hall, SEA, 469, 478; Wyatt, 122)

An English blockade of Siam in reprisal for piracy was destroyed 1687; a French plan to take control of the country 1688 was squashed. An anti-European reaction restricted further trader presence thereafter. There were insurrections 1690, 1691, 1692 and 1698-1700. (Hall, SEA 385-397, 477; Wyatt, 111-118, 125)

Manchu was let in by Ming warlords; though it acquired the rest of "China proper" by 1659, it was only a core hegemon until the warlords ("viceroys") were suppressed in 1681. Manchu may be considered a (briefly) universal state after the acquisition of Formosa 1683 and the crushing of the Oirat Jungars 1696, with Eastern Mongolia thereby acquired, and the Khalkha states hegemonically reorganized, Kokonor and the two Vietnams submissive, and the rest of Southeast Asia variously enfeebled.


Manchu and Oirat fought each other back and forth to stalemate on the Kashgaria frontier 1715-1731. (Grousset 536-537)

Tibet fell under the control of a leader who favored the Oirats as against Manchu. Manchu incited Kokonor to intervene in Tibet and forcibly enthroned a chosen substitute Dalai Lama with Manchu official sanction 1705-1710. Tibetans appealed to the Oirat Mongols, now of Kashgaria. The Oirat seized Tibet 1717, ending the Kokonor protectorate. Oirat defeated a Manchu intervention 1718, but were driven off by Manchu forces in 1720. (Grousset, 524, 532-536; Richardson, 49, 51, 99; Ebrey 227)

Cambodia entered two centuries of chronic civil warfare, disintegration, factional vassalhood to and invasion by Vietnam and Siam. (D. Chandler, 1996: 95) Six successive independent regimes were replaced by a Vietnamese-installed one 1710, which held off Siamese-candidate attacks 1710, 1714, 1722, the last however only by tribute to Siam. More Cambodian territory was lost to South Vietnamese colonization in 1714. (Hall, SEA, 445, 463-465)
A Formosan revolt was suppressed 1721.

The continued succession struggle split Laos 1707 into two states, North Laos (Luang Prabang) and South Laos (Vientiane), hostile and aggressive toward each other and in search of foreign patrons. (Hall, SEA, 470-471, 474-475)

After the insurrection of 1698-1700, Siam was generally peaceful and stable except for succession struggles. In the 1710's Siam became involved in a proxy war with Vietnam over the domination of Cambodia, sometimes winning, sometimes losing, but never preventing Vietnamese direct colonization and annexations. Trade increased noticeably in the 1720's. (Hall, SEA, 478-479; Wyatt, 126-129)


The Manchu-Oirat war for Kashgaria continued stalemated to 1731; a similar war was fought on the Khalkha Mongol front 1731-1735, after which a truce was made on the basis of the status quo ante, and held 1735-1745. Dzungaria fell into disarray. (Grousset 536-537)

Another Manchu expedition drove the Oirats out of Tibet again 1728-1729. (Grousset, 524, 532-536; Richardson, 49, 51, 99; Ebrey 227) Violent campaigns were waged on the Tibetan border 1747-1749.

Le/Trinh North Vietnam was peaceful, stable, reforming administration and the economy, and engaged in ethnocentric policies to reduce Chinese influence. Nguyen South Vietnam was preoccupied with expanding against Cambodia. (Hall, SEA, 442-445)

Another Cambodian succession dispute led to another Siamese installation 1738, then a South Vietnamese installation and annexation 1747, then a Cambodian national rising and Siamese intervention that expelled the South Vietnamese. Cambodian attacks on South Vietnamese settlers in former Cambodian territories led only to further territorial losses 1731, 1739-1749. (Hall, SEA, 445, 463-465; but cf. 478; Wyatt, 130)

After dynastic troubles to 1727, North Laos established internal peace, sent two embassies to Manchu 1729 and 1734, and drove off North Vietnamese demanding tribute 1750. South Laos established suzerainty over Tran Ninh. (Hall, SEA, 470-471, 474-475)

Chiengmai, much reduced by detachment of former provinces, successfully revolted against Burma 1727. (Wyatt, 123-124)
In Siam, a peaceable period ensued upon a succession struggle of 1733, and friendly relations were even established with Burma after 1740. (Hall, SEA, 478-479; Wyatt, 126-129)

Burma continued to decay peacefully. Burma failed to control deep plundering raids by its ex-tributary Manipur. The Mons seceded, massacred Burmans, set up a state at Pegu 1740, captured Prome and attempted to conquer Upper Burma. (Hall, Burma, 73-74; Hall, SEA, 407-410, 475)


Civil war and revolt among Oirats in Dzungaria 1750-1753 led the defeated prince Amursana to invite Manchu intervention 1754. Easy Manchu victory was followed by an attempt to impose Manchu administration (1755). The Oirats rebelled; Manchu reconquered and annexed Dzungaria (1757), killed off most Oirats, and recolonized the territory. (Grousset 537-539) The Kashgarian Qarataghliks rebelled against the divided and weakened Oirats 1753. Amursana and Manchu installed two Aqtaqlikh khojas in their place 1755. The two khojas rebelled against both Oirats and Manchu 1757; Manchu conquered Kashgaria 1758-1760, and annexed it as Sinkiang. (Grousset 541-542)

Manchu oppression and Tibetan rebellion in Lhasa 1750 led to a Manchu invasion 1751 which gained control over the Dalai Lama's succession and policies in 1751. (Richardson 99)

South Vietnam seized both the opportunity offered by Siam's preoccupation by Burmese invasions to 1767, and more Cambodian territory. Wars between Siam and South Vietnam followed 1769-1773. South Vietnam then had to face a three-way war with the Tayson rebels and North Vietnamese invasion from 1773. (Hall, SEA, 445-446, 450-454)

Cambodia underwent a series of internal coups and counter coups in the 1750's and 1760's, losing more and more provinces to South Vietnam. Coch in Chinese drove out a king (Ang Non) and installed a candidate (Ang Tong) against Siamese resistance 1769. Siam reinstalled Ang Non. South Vietnam reinstalled Ang Tong 1772, but Ang Non overcame him 1773. (D. Chandler, 1996: 96-97, 118; Hall, SEA, 445, 450, 456, 465, 483, 488)

North Laos (Luang Prabang) submitted to Burma 1753, but rebelled after 1760. South Laos (Vientiane) allied with Burma and helped it conquer North Laos 1764-1765.
When Siam defeated Burma from 1767, North Laos rebelled again, attacked South Laos 1771, but was defeated by Burma. North Laos allied with Siam 1774. (Hall, SEA, 470-472, 475-476; cf, Wyatt, 134, 157)

Chiangmai underwent a succession struggle 1759-1761, conquest by Burma 1763, revolt and reconquest, and another revolt to Siamese rule 1774-1776. (Wyatt, 133-134, 142)

Siam's peaceful episode was interrupted by a succession struggle 1758, and a Burmese invasion and siege of Ayuthia 1759-1760, and by its invasion, siege, conquest and destruction 1765-1767. Siam fell apart into five warlord states plus a Burmese-occupied area. A Manchu invasion of Burma took the pressure off, and rescued, Siam, allowing a Siamese national insurrection and forcible reuniification 1767-1769, and an intervention in Cambodia 1769. Burma attacked again without success 1772-1773. (Hall, SEA, 479-488; Wyatt, 132-158)

In Burma, the Mon state conquered Ava 1752. A Burman, Alaungpaya, turned the tables with great suddenness, recaptured Ava 1754, Prome 1755, Syriam 1756, Pegu 1757, Manipur 1759. Manchu recognition was given him. Burma invaded Siam 1759-1760. Four rebellions were put down by Alaungpaya's successor 1760-1763. Hsinbyushin of Burma conquered Chiangmai and North Laos 1764, and destroyed Ayuthia 1767. Irritated by Shan border disturbances and tributary complaints caused by the Burmese invasions, Manchu invaded 1766 and was defeated by Burma, which invaded the Manchu empire. Manchu counter-invaded and was disastrously defeated 1768 and 1769, and sued for and got peace and greatly improved trade and political relations. Meanwhile a Siamese national rising had expelled the Burmese 1767-1768. Burma returned to the war with Siam in 1770, but only managed to lose North Laos and Chiengmai, and provoked another Mon revolt 1773. (Hall, Burma, 74-79, 83-86, 89-96; Hall, SEA 410, 426-437, 476, 488, 625-627)

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There was a long and difficult campaign on the Tibetan border 1755-1779. The growth of the Manchu empire within the Far Eastern system paused about 1774, here and in Burma, when corruption and weakening of the Manchu center provoked internal revolts that turned the dynasty's policy toward the status quo.


Manchu had to deal with Muslim revolts in Kansu 1781 and 1784; a revolt in Formosa 1786-1787; Miao revolts in the south and southwest 1795-1797; and the more dangerous White Lotus Society rebellion in three provinces 1796-1804.

Another Manchu expedition restored "order" or at least hegemony in Tibet 1792, and imposed it in Nepal as well. (Richardson 99)
The Tayson state peaked in 1788, destroying the Trinh, conquering North Vietnam, and securing Manchu recognition. The Nguyen then slowly ground up the Tayson with French aid, holding half the country by 1800. (Hall, SEA, 445-446, 450-454)

South Vietnam installed another Cambodian favorite (Ang Eng) 1779. Tayson Vietnamese revolutionaries invaded Cambodia. Thereafter Siam took over and reinstalled Ang Eng, while detaching several Cambodian districts 1795. (D. Chandler, 1996: 96-97, 118; Hall, SEA, 445, 450, 456, 465, 483, 488)

Siam conquered and occupied South Laos 1778, making North Laos a vassal. Siam allowed South Laos vassal status 1782. South Laos took advantage of a North Laos succession struggle after 1787 to invade, massacring and deporting many 1791/1792. Siam replaced its South Laos vassal 1792/1794 and at China's behest restored North Laos. (Hall, SEA, 470-472, 475-476; cf. Wyatt, 134, 157)

Devastated by war, Chiangmai began to make a good recovery in the 1790's. (Wyatt, 133-134, 142)

Siam took Chiangmai 1775. Burmese attacks on Siam 1775 and 1776 failed. Siam conquered South Laos and subjugated North Laos 1778. Siam underwent rebellion and coup 1781-1782, and was effectively reorganized. Burmese attacks 1785-1787, and Siamese invasion of Burma 1791-1793, achieved nothing much, and fighting died down to raiding. Siam became suzerain to Cambodia after 1795. Trade and learning flourished. (Hall, SEA, 479-488; Wyatt, 132-158)

A passive and pious ruler of Burma achieved peace 1776-1782. His successor Bodawpaya put down another Mon revolt 1783, conquered Arakan 1784 provoking endless revolt, disastrously attacked Siam 1785-1786, failed to conquer Chiangmai 1787 and 1797, indulged religious megalomania, but sought and secured friendly relations with Manchu toward the end of the century. (Hall, Burma, 74-79, 83-86, 89-96; Hall, SEA 410, 426-437, 476, 488, 625-627)

A Manchu invasion of Nepal 1792 established suzerainty over the Gurkha dynasty.

The deferential behavior of Burma, Siam and North Vietnam toward Manchu, and its direct control elsewhere, suggest--


Manchu recognition of the Tayson did not abate the Vietnamese civil war. Yet in 1802 Nguyen Anh became Emperor as Gia Long, sought Manchus investiture, agreed to pay tribute, and did so. (Hall, SEA, 453-454)

Siam appointed a king of Cambodia 1802. Cambodia entered a tributary relationship to Siam and Vietnam both. Cambodia sought to survive and preserve independence, but drifted from Thai control to Vietnamese instead. Siam attempted to divide Cambodia and install a second vassal 1812; Vietnam drove him out and garrisoned Phnom Penh 1813. An unsuccessful attack on Siam 1816 was followed by an unsuccessful anti-Vietnamese millenarian rebellion 1820-1821. (D. Chandler, 1996: 106, 114-135; Hall, SEA, 456-457, 491-492)

Siam had a minor war with Burma 1810, split authority over Cambodia with Vietnam to 1812, lost it but took Cambodian territory thereafter. (Hall, SEA, 488-493; Wyatt, 160-180)

Arakanese rebels against Burma repeatedly escaped to British India; Burma pursued them. Burma began quarrelling with Britain from 1811 and fighting it from 1824. (Hall, Burma, 101-105; Hall, SEA, 635-641) Burma thereby was taken out of the Far Eastern world system and brought into the Central system.

**AD 1825.** Unipolar. Polar state: Manchu.

Khoja attempts to regain Kashgaria from Kokand failed 1825-1831.

From 1841 interaction between France and Vietnam grew apace. Vietnamese persecution of French Catholic missionaries and converts, and French warship diplomacy (Hall, SEA, 686-688), were rapidly detaching Vietnam from the Far Eastern system and attaching it to the Central system.

Siam tried to establish a vassal regime in Cambodia 1831-1834, but was driven out by insurgents and Vietnam. Vietnam attempted a peaceful annexation after 1834, suppressing annual rebellions from 1836, fighting against a major Thai-assisted insurrection 1840-1847 which produced a dual-vassal but basically Thai-sponsored regime. (D. Chandler, 1996: 106, 114-135; Hall, SEA, 456-457, 491-492)

South Laos sought to escape Siamese suzerainty by tribute to Vietnam and a direct attack on Siam 1826. The revolt received no help and was disastrously defeated 1827, and the country depopulated. North Laos remained firmly under Siamese overlordship despite tribute missions to Vietnam 1831 and 1833. Xieng Khouang, which helped Siam
put down a Vietnamese-sponsored South Laos recovery expedition, was conquered and annexed by Vietnam. (Hall, SEA, 472-476)

Siam absorbed South Laos 1828. Siam failed to subjugate Cambodia 1831-1834, but achieved a superior position there 1845. (Hall, SEA, 488-493; Wyatt, 160-180)

Somewhere between the First Opium War (1841-1842) and the First World War (1914-1918) the Far Eastern world system was absorbed by the Central system, and this sequence must end. Probably 1858-1860, from the Treaties of Tientsin to the Peking Conventions (foreign diplomats in Peking), is critical. This allows one more coding. Important segments of Southeast Asia having been detached from the Far Eastern system, and despite Manchu control having been weakened in the Far Eastern core by the Taiping Rebellion begun 1850, the reduced world system appears hegemonic.


3. Summary. The Far Eastern world system was coded on the power configuration variable at 25-year intervals from 1025 BC to AD 1850, its approximate date of engulfment by the Central system (Wilkinson, 1987). Earlier, problems of chronology and data availability become substantial.

The following sequence (time series) was obtained:

-1025 Hegemonic
-1000 Hegemonic
-975 Hegemonic
-950 Hegemonic
-925 Hegemonic
-900 Hegemonic
-875 Hegemonic
-850 Hegemonic
-825 Unipolar
-800 Unipolar
-775 Unipolar
-750 Nonpolar
-725 Multipolar
-700 Multipolar
-675 Bipolar
-650 Bipolar
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1100  Multipolar  
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1250  Bipolar  
1275  Unipolar  
1300  Empire  
1325  Empire  
1350  Empire  
1375  Unipolar  
1400  Unipolar  
1425  Hegemonic  
1450  Bipolar  
1475  Unipolar  
1500  Unipolar  
1525  Unipolar  
1550  Unipolar  
1575  Bipolar  
1600  Unipolar  
1625  Bipolar  
1650  Unipolar  
1675  Unipolar  
1700  Empire  
1725  Unipolar  
1750  Unipolar  
1775  Unipolar  
1800  Empire  
1825  Unipolar  
1850  Hegemonic

This sequence of polarity data points toward the need to make comparisons between systems (e.g. the Indic system--Wilkinson, 1996a), as well as to test our theories about systems in general. The idea that multipolarity is the normal structure, for instance, is evidently challenged by this data set; but a more complex appreciation of the role of multipolarity (or hegemony, or universal empire) may also be indicated. Theories of world systems have been better developed in their theoretical parts than in their empirical
sections; this paper deliberately leans in the other direction, with hope for more
productive interaction between data and theory in future.

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ABSTRACT

This is a study that uses data from a national survey of multicultural and multilingual Christian congregations in South Africa to examine the institutional factors that support the dominance of English in formerly segregated churches without a formal language policy. Data were collected by qualitative methods on the levels and types of linguistic integration (as well as racial and cultural incorporation) in each of 60 congregations from nine Christian denominations across South Africa. The patterns found are best explained in terms of the articulation of formal and popular ideologies that contribute to institutional isomorphism across state and civil institutions.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most notable effects of the apartheid state was to segregate all major institutions legally, resulting in an enforced and almost total residential and social segregation between 1948 and 1990. Contact between race groups was extremely limited, usually to formal work environments; while linguistic diversity was dampened under a bilingual language policy which favoured English and Afrikaans.

Currently South Africa's new, post-1994 regime endorses non-racialism and implicitly as twin national ideologies underpinning its frequent exhortations to nation-building. Non-racialism encourages racial integration within the same institution across all sectors of society, from educational to economic, most notably in the affirmative action quotas of the recently passed Labour Equity Bill. Multiculturalism emerges in the recognition of eleven official languages in the new 1996 Constitution, in contrast to the two official European-derived languages of the past (English and Afrikaans). The preamble of the 1996 Constitution also implicitly recognises the rights of all South Africans to practice their languages and cultures. Concretely, people are drawn together into settings and relations which previously were ideologically and geographically difficult to structure, where they can renegotiate or discard ascribed and enforced identities, such as race or language.
There is some evidence that the state's formal multilingual policy conflicts with an existing informal monolingual language ideology. This would explain why the evidence in the public sector is so ambivalent, a subject I referred to elsewhere (Venter 1996). Official encouragement of multilingual diversity is often denied in practice, with English achieving hegemony in Parliament and Senate by 1996, in provincial–national government communication, as well as in many local government meetings (Langtag 1996:47). A Siswati–speaking Constitutional Assembly official reportedly said that "we in the ANC do not believe in ethnic languages" (Leadership 14:2, p.13).

An audit by the Language Plan Task Group (Langtag) in 1996 of the annual reports by government departments found that only two departments published multilingual reports (Communication Services, Justice); seven bilingual (English and Afrikaans); and twelve used English only. In addition many other Government publications were published in English only, including general notices (e.g. relating to the restitution of Land Rights Act in 1995) and White Papers (like the Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994) (Langtag 1996:159–161). In the tertiary education sector Afrikaans–speaking universities have in the past come under pressure to switch to English from non–Afrikaans–speaking students and from the Minister of Education, Professor Sibusiso Bhengu.

The option for a former colonial language places language practice in South Africa within a pattern well established across Africa by elites, who tend to favor European languages above indigenous ones (Prah 1993). While most African states are exoglossic, dominated by European languages (English, French, Portuguese) as the national language – yet European languages are usually spoken by a small elite comprising "fewer than 20 per cent" of the population (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:102,103). Endoglossic states include Tanzania (Swahili), Somalia (Somali), Ethiopia (Amharic), Sudan (Arabic), and Guinea (with eight languages such as Fula, Manding). Other states which have indigenous official languages, but which do not actively promote their use, include Botswana (Tswana), Burundi (Rundi), Lesotho (Sotho), Malawi (Chewa), Rwanda (Kinyarwanda), and Swaziland (siSwati) (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:102).

South African Christian churches were just as affected by apartheid as other social institutions, with few exceptions. Despite an initial ideal of racially–mixed services expressed by most denominations from the 17th to 19th centuries in the first colonised region of South Africa (the present Western Cape), racially–integrated congregations are rare in South Africa today. Although vocally opposed to legislated discrimination, the English-speaking churches generally exhibited a pragmatic compliance with racial segregation. By 1964, Anglicans, Methodists, Catholics, and Presbyterians admitted that "people of different races do not normally worship together in the same church" (Cawood 1964:58,61,52,76,92). Segregated congregations became the rule well into the 1980s, with the only exceptions often being cathedrals in large cities. Significant sections of the
mainline churches were labelled as English-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking - despite other language groups forming majorities in these denominations.

The central concern of this article is with language usage in racially and linguistically diverse congregations; with what the choice of language/s reveals about the relations between language groups; and with how this configuration can be explained through new institutionalism. I am interested in how religious institutions are affected by extra-institutional factors which function at national and global levels. For this reason I examine language choice in a voluntary organisation without a formal language policy, as providing an ideal setting in which to demonstrate the effect of meso- and macro-factors.

As part of religious institutions in a secular state, multicultural and multilingual Christian congregations fall outside direct control of the state as far as language preference is concerned. Theoretically the language used in services (e.g. English, Zulu) is much more open to negotiation than those used in the public sector organisations. At the same time churches are not unconnected to other dynamics and institutions, and their members do not leave either ideological persuasions or social identities at the door, thus importing external dynamics into the decision-making of congregations. Others have examined integrating congregations (Massie 1993), as well as race and language at the denominational level (Kritzinger 1995, Zaanman 1994). Yet mine is the first attempt to specifically examine language usage in South African congregations, as far as I am aware.

Of special import in this article is how language preference links to the perceptions and interrelations between groups of people. First, language preference (i.e. which language one chooses to speak) is not necessarily a neutral option, but often co-occurs with contestations of power. Second, language preference is a function of a language ideology, which determines the attitudes of different language groups towards one another, as well as structuring relations between groups in a status hierarchy. Third, language usage as part of a social identity is largely dependent on the institutional setting within which it takes place. The type of setting, in conjunction with the ideology, determines specific types of representation, with certain linguistic identities deemed appropriate and others not.

In what follows below I will first clarify some terms and briefly outline the methods used to obtain the data which forms the basis for this discussion. Then I supply a summary of the distribution of language and race groups within the three denominations relevant to this study, in the context of a brief social history of the emergence, development, and current state of segregation and integration within these. This overview leads to a description of the data, followed by a analytical discussion. Finally, I close with some concluding comments.

**TERMINOLOGY**
Language refers to the vernacular of a particular (ethnic) speech-community, i.e. English, Afrikaans, Zulu. Race was retained because it remains an operational social construct in the South African context, despite ideological and technical problems involved. While race has no scientific merit, it continues to affect social relations. Racial composition adds a different dynamic to the functioning of a congregation or denomination, and so is worthy of isolation (see De Gruchy 1986:246). I am convinced that a focus on race is essential to expose overt and covert racist patterns of behaviour.

For purposes of argument I distinguish between integrating and integration as follows:

a. Integrating is used in a general sense to refer to congregations which display some (unspecified) level of linguistic and racial diversity, and which are presumably still undergoing this process. Congregation refers to the average number of those people (i.e. the "congregants"), no longer of school-going age, who attended all services on all Sundays during March 1997 for the purpose of participating in Christian worship.

b. Integration refers to the incorporation of differences at two levels in answer to the questions: "Are any differences present", and "How were these differences included?". I operationalize integration at the general level of congregational membership (number of race and language groups present), and at the specific level of congregational leadership (representativeness of race and language groups).

The implication is that an integrated congregation will be a type of mixed congregation that has a (relatively) stable racial/ethnic mix, in which the diversity of members is represented at all levels of decision-making, and allowed to affect the content and structure of the service. In this sense integration proceeds from "a recognition of a racially and culturally pluralistic society ... in which cultures, languages, and races interrelate so as to bring strength, depth, and diversity to the whole. Integration should not mean, or require, the giving up of one's accent, songs, or life-style, but it can be the framework in which diversity is shared and appreciated by all" (Davis & White 1980:100).

**THEORETICAL ORIENTATION**

My study falls, broadly speaking, within the political sociology of language, which addresses language and power as central issues. I refer to the forms through which language and power are mediated (e.g. political ideology, culture, language ideology) as well as the outcomes (e.g. hegemony). Politics "concerns the exercise of power in social situations, its structuring, as well as its legitimation within social groups" (Goke-Pariola 1993:7). The "politics of language necessarily involves relations between languages" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:6).
The focus of a political sociology of language articulates with discourses on language choice, language planning, language policy, and language use. In a narrow sense the emphasis is on "rule-making and rule enforcing activities" of sociolinguistic groups within certain domains, and in a broader sense on "the patterned co-variation of political and social behaviour on the one hand, and language behaviour and use on the other" (Goke-Pariola 1993:7). The narrower focus relates to "who speaks what language/dialect to whom, and when, and what are the consequences of breaking the sociolinguistic rules". The broader emphasis is on how, who or what produces the conventions that determine the "expressive resources" available to particular groups or languages (Goke-Pariola 1993:7).

New institutionalism is not a unified approach, but takes rational choice, historical, and sociological forms, which are employed somewhat differently by economists, political scientists, and sociologists (Cook & Levi 1990; Koelble 1995; Hall & Taylor 1996; Lowndes 1996; Hirsch 1997; cf. Sjostrand 1993:6; Granovetter & Swedberg 1992). My focus is on relevant components of new sociological institutionalism, in which institutions (including "conventions and customs") are viewed as dependent on macro-factors such as culture and society; i.e. institutions are dependent variables which determine individual actions (Koelble 1995:232,234). Actors choose actions based on their institutionally-guided perceptions of appropriateness within a particular context (Koelble 1995:234). Individuals are embedded in so many relationships that utility-maximising and rational explanations becomes almost impossible. Organizations choose particular cultural or symbolic systems "which are then reflected in the structures, functions, and goals of the organisation as well as the rationality of individuals within the organisation and institution" (Koelble 1995:235).

As a major concept within new institutionalism, institutional isomorphism captures what I intend to argue below: that institutions tend to respond to conditions in a particular socio-political environment by usually becoming more alike (DiMaggio & Powell 1991:66). I am most interested in coercive mechanisms (laws, ideologies) such as those set by the state which lead to the institutionalization of similar rules in organisational structures (compare DiMaggio & Powell 1991:68). Yet the influence of the other mechanisms cannot be dismissed: mimetic isomorphism is partly caused by the presence of individuals in churches who are also political beings; while the apparent lack of attention by seminaries to preparing clergy to instigate or manage racial and linguistic integration represents normative isomorphism. My emphasis on structure brings my work more in line with "new" historical institutionalists (who focus on structure) than with rational choice theorists (who emphasise individual action).

In my perception, the world system and the nation-state align with language practices at state and sub-state levels. Here I agree with sociological institutionalists who stress the importance of larger frames of reference. Nation-building and language outcomes can both be seen as examples of global and regional institutional isomorphism. From this perspective the similarities in language outcomes across former African colonies provide
an example of institutional isomorphism operating at the national and global levels. At the national level institutional isomorphism is driven by the attempts of states to integrate nation-states to foster loyalty through policies and ideologies aimed at creating a common national identity.

Any consideration of local social change should be considered against the global system to see whether it was prompted by developments at that level. My analysis below will proceed against the backdrop of an eclectic world system perspective (without the hyphen). As such I will retain and synthesise - somewhat loosely - world-economy and world-polity norms into a implicit analytical framework. Some synthesis is possible due to a level of agreement between world-economy and world-polity theories. In world-economy theory an ideological system operates (Wallerstein 1990:38), which seems similar to the notion of global norms in world-polity (Meyer 1987; Boli 1980, 1987, 1993; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez 1997). World-economy and world-polity theorists also seem to agree on the relevance of location in overall system. Both perspectives accord some significance to cultural hegemony, the role of the nation-state in nation-building, and the absence of a central actor in the world system.

Obviously I am not suggesting that structural similarities between world-polity and world-economy theories should paper over their differences. For example, world-polity theorists like Meyer and Boli argue strongly that global norms operate independently of the world-economy, and determine the legitimacy and structures of nation-states within a global polity. By contrast, Wallerstein considers a global ideas system to legitimate the world division of labour. For the latter world culture plays a secondary rather than a primary role "in the reproduction of contemporary world order", and vice versa, as Chase-Dunn (1989:88-104) observed.

So why insist on a synthesis? Principally because of the difficulty of separating world culture, which drives isomorphism, from the world-economy or from the world-polity. And like world-polity advocates, world-economy theorists do acknowledge that obvious isomorphisms have been produced to some extent within the world-system. For Chase-Dunn the mechanisms are "cultural imperialism and the ideological hegemony of European religion, politics, economics, and science" (Chase-Dunn 1989:98). As a result consensual symbolic systems are emerging globally in the form of "certain underlying cultural themes", which are "at the least shared by national elites everywhere" (Chase-Dunn 1989:98,100).

So my world system theory consists of a conceptual tool kit, taken from three perspectives on the world system. Globalization theory provides the notions of glocalization, and the inherent dialectical tension of heterogeneity and homogeneity. World-economy supplies the centrality of geographic stratification (i.e. core-periphery relations). World-polity contributes a central analytical concept in this study, namely institutionalism, particularly the concepts of institutional ecology and isomorphism. From this perspective, South Africa's nation-building project represents local attempts to
address the twin paradoxical global pressures of increasing pressure for equality of opportunity for all (i.e. social equity), and insistence on recognition of cultural differences (see Rex 1986:120).

METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE

The empirical data for this study was collected as part of research conducted between 1995 and 1997. I was particularly interested in finding congregations with high levels of racial and high levels of linguistic diversity. The unit of analysis was congregations, a meso-level phenomenon, but various aspects of demography and diversity that affect congregations at the macro- and micro-levels were included. Although the research approach was qualitative, I attempted to gather a representative sample across the three denominations selected.

I lean towards a nomothetic perspective, wanting to explain similarities within different congregations by reference to the global structure. Yet this does not mean that idiographic elements are not present; particularly as I consider the 60 cases as a single case study in order to place them within a world system perspective.

The three major "English-speaking" Christian denominations which were finally included claim never to have followed segregationist policies, namely the Anglicans (Church of the Province of South Africa), Methodists (Methodist Church of Southern Africa), and Roman Catholics. The rationale for the inclusion of denominations in the survey were size (affiliation) and non-segregationist ideology, while individual congregations were selected primarily for being racially diverse. As Table 1 shows, these three denominations have a combined affiliation of 7,25 million people – about 26% of the total South African population, and 28% of all South African Christians (unless otherwise indicated, figures reflect the Human Science Research Council's 1993 Omnibus Survey). In addition a major Pentecostal-Charismatic grouping was also included as representing different theological and structural traditions, namely the International Federation (formerly "Fellowship") of Christian Churches.

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<td>12 bishops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 300 priests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>2 750 000</td>
<td>875 parishes</td>
<td>32 bishops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 280 priests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>2 500 000</td>
<td>6 450</td>
<td>941 ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFCC#</td>
<td>400 000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>900 ministers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: # IFCC = International Federation of Christian Churches.
In the Methodist, Anglican, and Catholic denominations, blacks and black languages proportionally outweigh other language and racial categories, comprising 12% of all Catholics, and 11% of all Methodists (Zaaiman 1994). "Coloureds" make up the largest single grouping in the Anglican church, namely 26%, as Table 4 shows. Together the Anglicans, Catholics, and Methodists have a combined membership of 7.25 million – about 26% of the total South African population and 28% of all South African Christians (unless otherwise indicated, figures reflect the Human Science Research Council's 1993 Omnibus survey).

An initial small-scale pilot study was conducted between 1995 and 1996, involving 36 congregations. Addresses of suitable congregations were obtained by means of a snowball method. Three data-gathering methods were used, comprising: a postal survey of 24 congregations; workshops initially involving 36 congregations held in Pretoria (1996), Durban (1996), Cape Town (1995 and 1996) - followed by three in Cape Town (1996) which examined the historical process of racial incorporation in three Anglican congregations; and lastly telephone interviews with 23 clergy and a Methodist bishop. Not all congregations involved in the pilot study were included in the second phase.

In the final study 56 regional church officials (e.g., bishops or administrative secretaries) identified - on request - some 222 congregations in their areas which they believed contained "significant mixes of people from different race or language groups". This total is quite small, as the combined total of such congregations in the Anglican and Methodist churches make up less than 3% out of an estimated 7 650 congregations. The final survey comprised a postal survey in 1997 of the 222 congregations and 12 telephone interviews.

In the survey clergy were asked to complete a questionnaire with the assistance of at least 5 lay leaders, while in the telephone interviews a semi-structured schedule was used.

The survey yielded 60 valid cases out of 75 received, resulting in a final response rate of 34% when measured against the universe of 222. Seven denominations were represented, i.e. the Church of the Province (CPSA), the Roman Catholic Church (RC), Methodist Church (MCSA), the (Pentecostal-oriented) International Federation of Christian Churches (IFCC) and one Independent, one Presbyterian, one Free Methodist Church. Of the 60 cases, 35% (21) were Anglican congregations, 33% (20) Catholic, 15% (9) Methodist, while 10% (6) belonged to the IFCC. The 60 congregations represent 7 out of 27 Catholic diocese and archdiocese; 8 out of 12 Anglican diocese; and 3 out of 11 Methodist districts. The 60 congregations represent an estimated total of 18 586 people, of whom the Charismatic-Pentecostal IFCC and Catholics make up the two single largest groups at 50.16% and 30.35% respectively.

The low response rate was due in part to incorrect information supplied by denominational officials, who did not always know what was happening in the churches under their supervision. While those churches which did not respond may differ from
those that did, my impression - based on typologies developed in previous studies - is that the sample was fairly representative of types of integrating congregations. From experiences with workshops involving integrating congregations I assume that those who did not respond were not that well-integrated, felt that integration did not present a particular problem, or did not trust my provenance as attached to an Afrikaans - and so ostensibly politically conservative - university.

Are these congregations truly reflective of trends in South African society as a whole? In language terms yes, if evidence from research on university students, state organisations, education institutions, and transaction interactions in commercial settings are anything to go by. And not only representative of South Africa, but of language practices which ensconce a foreign language across Africa as a whole. So while the data-set is small, its robustness is improved by association with other studies who have shown similar trends in other domains and at other levels of analyses.

I now turn to a discussion of how race and language functioned in the history of the three major denominations in this study, based on recent research (Venter 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998). The data from the survey is presented below in a quantitative form, yet in essence was qualitative, and based on impressions of leadership. The 60 cases do provide enough evidence to comment on general patterns for integrating congregations, especially where supported by studies of related phenomena in society, e.g. language preference. I acknowledge, though, that further investigation at the micro-level is necessary to confirm my conclusions.

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LANGUAGE AND RACE IN THE MAJOR CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS

My primary focus is on the three major English-speaking Christian denominations who claim never to have followed segregationist policies, namely the Anglicans, Methodists, and Roman Catholics (see Table 2). In addition a major Pentecostal–Charismatic grouping was also included as representing different theological and structural traditions, namely the International Federation (formerly "Fellowship") of Christian Churches. The rationale for the inclusion of three of the four major denominations were based on size (affiliation) and non-segregationist ideology, while individual congregations were selected primarily for being racially diverse.

| Table 2: Affiliation as percentage of the total South African population, 1960–1993 |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Anglican                        | 8.78%     | 7.87%     | 6.48%     | 5.98%     |
| Methodist                       | 10.68%    | 10.58%    | 8.49%     | 9.52%     |
| Catholic                        | 6.73%     | 8.71%     | 9.47%     | 10.18%    |
As far as language is concerned, more than 23 languages are spoken in South Africa. These can be subdivided into seven groupings (percentage of the total distribution of the eleven official languages in brackets), namely *Nguni* languages: Zulu (22%), Xhosa (17%), Ndebele (16%), Swati (2.6%); *Sotho* languages: North Sotho (9.7%), South Sotho (6.7%), Tswana (8.6%); *Tsonga* (4.4%); *Venda* (2.2%); *European* languages and derivatives: Afrikaans (15%), English (9%), and small percentages of Dutch, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, French; *Asian* languages: Tamil, Hindi, Telegu, Gujerati, Urdu, Chinese; *Other* e.g. sacred languages such as Arabic, Sanskrit, and Hebrew (compare Desai 1994:26; Popene e a. 1997:29).

No single language group has been captured by a particular Christian brand but, as Table 3 shows, various languages are distributed across the three major Christian denominations involved in the study. A similar distribution occurs across other denominations. The exception is Afrikaans–speakers, who tend to belong to either the Uniting or Dutch Reformed Churches.

Table 3: Language as percentage of denominational affiliation, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eng</th>
<th>Afr</th>
<th>Xhosa</th>
<th>Zulu</th>
<th>Sotho</th>
<th>Sha/Tso</th>
<th>Swa/Nde</th>
<th>O/E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>229%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HSRC Omnibus Survey 1993. Used by permission of the Sociology Departments of Hugenote Kollege and the University of Pretoria.

Note: Eng=English, Afr=Afrikaans, Sha/Tso=Shangaan/Tsonga; Swa/Nde=Swati/Ndebele; O/E=Other European; O=Other

Historically missionaries had a strong influence on language development, as they learnt – and standardised – indigenous languages. Yet from early on a division of labour emerged among missionaries who could speak indigenous languages, and other clergy who could not. For example, in the 1800s few Catholic priests could speak indigenous languages, and so served mainly the white urban areas, where Mass was conducted in Latin and the sermon or instruction in English (Brain 1991:71). In this way language and race became interrelated, so that language differences corresponded to racial segregation. Even in the Catholic Church, which "recognised no colour bar from the earliest times, all Catholics sharing the same building and joining in the same worship", "difficulties of language and distance" led to segregated parishes in the Transvaal of the 1890s (Brain 1991:71). By contrast, the Catholic parishes of the Cape of the 1880s "included both
European and coloured" (Brown 1960:204). But once the tribes across the Orange were thought of in 1840, the pattern of Catholic mission changed to segregated missions, as European civilisation was considered unlikely to dominate there (Brown 1960:204; see Oosthuizen 1968:15).

As a percentage of denominational affiliation (Table 4), blacks form clear majorities in the Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist Churches. Blacks make up almost 70% in both Catholic and Methodist Churches, but less than half of the Anglican church. White Anglicans have decreased from 12.49% in 1960 to 7.72% in 1993 according to HSRC data*. Coloureds form a significant minority in the Anglican church, a factor which reportedly affects church politics in regions such as the Northern and Western Cape where they form a majority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>46.62%</td>
<td>26.32%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>25.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>69.27%</td>
<td>15.63%</td>
<td>5.73%</td>
<td>9.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>69.54%</td>
<td>14.37%</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
<td>15.52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HSRC Omnibus Survey 1993. Used by permission of the Sociology Departments of Huguenot College and the University of Pretoria.

So despite the ideal of racially–mixed services expressed by most denominations in the 17th to 19th centuries in the first colonised region of South Africa (the present Western Cape), racially–integrated congregations are rare in South Africa today. This is in great part due to the political policy of residential and social segregation enforced by the apartheid regime between 1948 and 1990, a policy with antecedents in the colonial period. Some congregations put the ideal into practice until about 1872.

Where incorporation of people of colour into the English–speaking churches occurred, it happened on the basis of their social position as subservient labourers to whites. So the master–servant relationship functioned to integrate these congregations, and continued to structure relations in the form of separated seating arrangements for different classes (read: races). Leadership remained the exclusive preserve of white male landowners. Superficial integration was often contradicted – or at best skewed – by the occasional turning away of people of colour, and by the overriding equation of white civilisation and culture with Christianity (compare Villa–Vicencio 1988:43,47,54; Maimela 1988:323; Goedhals 1989:108).

Over the last two decades of the 19th century, separate communion services and segregated services became the norm – with some exceptions. Eventually segregated congregations became the rule well into the 1980s. In most white congregations a "three
o'clock service" developed for black domestic workers. These euphemistically-termed "afternoon services" are held primarily for domestic workers in vernacular languages under the authority of a black clergy-person based in a nearby black "township" congregation.

While the English-speaking denominations technically remained racially-mixed in terms of having white and black clergy, the rate of racial integration into national church structures was very slow, as revealed by a comparison of church founding dates with the appointment of e.g. blacks to denominational positions. The Catholic church was founded in 1834, and the Anglican church in 1848. In the Anglican church only white bishops were appointed until 1953, and all had been born in England. The first black bishop (Alpheus Zulu) was appointed in 1960, and the first black archbishop (Desmond Tutu) in 1986 (Goedhals 1989:120,124; Cawood 1964:16,56; Hinchliff 1968:240). By 1980 only one diocesan and four suffragan (assistant) bishops were black. By 1988 nine out of 18 diocesan bishops and five suffragan bishops were black (Goedhals 1989:121; Pato 1989:172).

The Methodist church was established in South Africa in 1814, but the first black Methodist president (Seth Mokitimi) was only elected in 1963 (Gish 1985:74). In the whole history of the MCSA only seven black presidents had been appointed by 1988 (Gish 1985:4,69). The current Presiding Bishop (Mvume Dandala) is also black. Apart from most congregations, subregional (circuit) structures were also segregated. As a result, the Methodist Church of Southern Africa initiated a policy advocating integration of regional structures in 1976, and recently extended this policy downwards to integrate situations where two separate racially-segregated congregations were using the same church buildings at different times. A similar integrative dynamic is in operation in the Church of the Province of South Africa (Anglican).

In the light of the above, the most remarkable aspect about racially-mixed local congregations in South Africa is not that they do not exist, but that some exist at all. Surprisingly, some continued to exist through the dark years of apartheid, e.g. Catholic Cathedrals in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Kimberley (Cawood 1964:10; Brain 1991:157), as well as ordinary congregations in e.g. Kalk Bay. Of particular interest are the deliberately integrated congregations which emerged in conscious defiance of the political system during the dark years of apartheid. These did not appear formally until 1962 in the form of North End Presbyterian Church, East London; and in 1968 in the Buitenkat St Methodists Church, Cape Town.

In the post-1990 era racially-mixed congregations have demonstrably been multiplying faster than before due to demographic changes in urban areas. Previously racially homogeneous urban Christian congregations now have to manage an increasingly diverse racial, linguistic, and cultural membership. As a result people are increasingly drawn into such multilingual settings alongside others previously classified as "other". An arbitrary breakdown shows clearly that the rate at which congregations are integrating is speeding
up. Thirteen racially-integrated congregations emerged during 1974–1989, compared to
the 24 that did between 1989–1997. In the 63 years from 1830 to 1899, 7 congregations
were racially integrated, compared to the 7 that became mixed over the next 48 years
(1900–1948). During the next 24 years (1949–73) the integration-rate slowed down, with
only 4 achieving this status. But the inverse happened over the subsequent 23 year period
(1974–97), with 37 congregations becoming integrated.

Next I profile the 60 cases as a basis for my discussion in the penultimate section.
Without exception, these are all examples of either congregations which have always
been integrated, or formerly white congregations which have recently become integrated.
What the situation is in black multilingual congregations still remains to be investigated.
What little I know about them suggests that due to the multilingual facility of black South
Africans, congregations in multilingual settings will, at least, have thoroughly bilingual
services. The exceptions would probably occur in highly homogenous settings.

DESCRIPTION OF CASES

Of the 60 cases, 35% (21) were Anglican congregations, 33% (20) Roman Catholic, 15%
(9) Methodist, while 10% (6) belonged to the International Fellowship of Christian
Churches (IFCC).

Language was seen as the most prominent marker of diversity, was perceived as the most
problematic, and was cited in a multiple option response by leaders of 39.3% (33 of 60)
of churches as the form of diversity which at present most influence their congregation's
structures. Most respondents perceived their congregations to be in neighbourhoods that
were substantially linguistically diverse. In general, 75.9% of respondents (44 of 60
cases) reported that two or more language groups occurred in the neighbourhoods around
their congregation's buildings – including 27 (46.6%) which were in neighbourhoods
where three or more languages are spoken. In other words, only 24.1% (14) described
their neighbourhoods as linguistically homogenous.

Responding congregations were asked to indicate the approximate percentage of first
language speakers in their respective congregations. Ten of South Africa's eleven official
languages were distributed over the 59 valid responses, while the number of first
languages of congregants in a particular congregation ranged from two to 11 languages,
excluding foreign languages. The presence of up to four first languages in a congregation
was fairly common. Forty-five congregations (76.3%) contained 1–4 first languages; 12
(20.3%) between 5 to 8; and two (3.4%) had 9 to 12 first languages. A similar number of
congregations had five (5 or 8.5%) languages than had six first language-speakers (4 or
6.8%).
Despite the English-speaking label of the denominations to which these churches belong, in a quarter (16 cases) English first-language speakers made up 33% or less of the total membership, as Table 5 illustrates. In 11 congregations (19.7% of 59) surveyed, the number of people who spoke English as first language made up less than 20% of the total. Three churches (3.6%) reported that no English was spoken by members of their congregations. At the other end of the scale English first-language speakers formed a majority (50% or more of all members) in 40 out of 60 congregations, which includes a two-thirds majority (more than 66%) in 29 cases (or 47.5%). In all, English first-language speakers were distributed across 55 congregations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of English first language speakers</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-33%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34-66%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67-100%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own data, 1997.

Afrikaans was spoken by more than 50% of the congregation in 8 out of 59 churches (i.e. 14.8%). Altogether 18 (35.9%) reported that 25% and more of their congregation was Afrikaans-speaking. In 12 (20%) no Afrikaans-speaking were reportedly present. In 54% of all churches surveyed Afrikaans formed the first language of 8% or less of the total membership. Afrikaans first-language speakers were spread over 46 congregations. European first-language speakers (other than English) were distributed over 19 cases, and Asian first-language speakers over eight. In terms of African languages, Zulu was spread over 23 congregations, Xhosa over 18, Sotho over 15, Tsonga over 6, Swazi over 5, Venda over 2, Shangaan over 4, Pedi over 4, Tswana over 3. Other African first-language speakers were distributed over 17 congregations (29%).

Congregational integration was measured along two dimensions, namely race and language.

The extent of racial integration was measured in terms of a racial-integration index, which indicated how representative the leadership, home groups, and outreach programmes of congregations were. I assumed that the level of integration was interrelated to the level of diversity, as would racial integration relate to language integration. Table 6 reviews the extent to which racial integration has occurred. The index represents a ranking according to the total score that could be obtained when scores from three categories were added: mixed, some mix, or representative of the racial diversity of congregants. Through this multidimensional method 54.9% (28 of 51 cases) could be said to be substantially integrated, with 39.2% (20 cases) somewhat integrated, and 5.9% (or 3 cases) poorly integrated.
### Table 6: Racial integration index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Overall%</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>Home groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poorly integrated</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat integrated</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well integrated</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 51 * 57 @ 52 # 53 S

Source: Own data, 1997.

Notes:
* 5 invalid response, 4 no responses;
@ 1 invalid response, 2 no responses;
# 2 invalid responses, 6 no responses;
S 2 invalid responses, 5 no responses

The linguistic-diversity index, as Table 7 indicates, comprised 5 categories: number of languages spoken in sermons, hymns, liturgy, praying, and readings. The level of linguistic integration is represented in terms of whether or not their services reflect the number of languages in the congregation, i.e. whether they are essentially mono-, bi-, or multilingual.

Six congregations placed in the "well-integrated" category, compared to 22 in the "somewhat" and 25 in the "poorly" integrated categories. No single identifiable variable emerged that could explain similarities among the six congregations that were linguistically well-integrated, nor the differences between these and the 25 with poor linguistic integration. There seems to be some inverse correlation between number of first languages spoken and level of linguistic integration. A high number of first languages (ten or more) appears to be associated with somewhat integrated churches. Where relatively fewer languages are present (2 to 6), higher rates of language integration is reported. Higher levels of linguistic diversity in neighbourhoods appears not to be associated with higher levels of linguistic diversity in congregations. Neighbourhoods with high levels of linguistic diversity seem mostly associated with congregations with medium levels of diversity.

### Table 7: Language integration index: number of languages in congregation and number used in services (N=53)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of integration (index)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Number of languages in congregation #</th>
<th>Number of languages used in service</th>
<th>Total as % of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poorly integrated</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Three or more (multilingual)</td>
<td>One (monolingual)</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat integrated</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Two (bilingual)</td>
<td>One (monolingual)</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well integrated</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Three or more (multilingual)</td>
<td>Two (bilingual)</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Two (bilingual)</td>
<td>Two (bilingual)</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 25 congregations, 52 responses
What is somewhat disguised by Table 7 is that monolingual services - usually English - are the norm in multilingual congregations regardless of the size of other language groups. One language is used in the services of 64.2% congregations (34 of 54 cases). This is the more remarkable as in 46 congregations (76.7% of 60 cases) three or more first languages occur. In 32% of responding congregations two languages are used (17), and in only 3.8% (2) are three or more used. Given the presence of more than one first-language group in all congregations polled, bilingual services would have been the expected option, at the least. When the number of languages used in the service is broken down into a more detailed picture, 74.1% of responding congregations (40 cases) are seen to have had monolingual preaching only. By comparison about a quarter had bilingual sermons (13 cases or 24.1%) and only one (1.9%) multilingual sermons.

A comparison of the indices clearly show the relatively well-integrated racial nature of the congregations compared to the poorer linguistic integration. Other major trends can be summarised as follows:

a. most congregations exhibit some form of linguistic diversity, but with low levels of multilingualism;

b. most congregations prefer monolingual sermons;

c. linguistic diversity tends to be expressed in the form of bilingualism;

d. English predominates as language of choice in multilingual settings;

e. integrating congregations are associated with neighbourhoods with high levels of diversity

In the next section I attempt to provide a interpretative framework for these tendencies which gives attention to structure and agency, while examining the interplay of micro-, meso-, and macro-factors.

**DISCUSSION**

The discussion in this section remains at the level of informed speculation, and applies only to general trends among integrating congregations. The same factors are also present in congregations whose make-up is far more representative of their congregants, but then occur with a positive emphasis. While I would argue that the evidence points to a
surprising lack of linguistic and cultural accommodation in integrating congregations, there are exceptions.

Factors which function to limit linguistic diversity

There are several critical elements which constrain linguistic diversity in South Africa; some which can be mentioned briefly, others which require more detailed analysis. The former include the enforced use of Afrikaans under Afrikaner nationalism and the negative reaction to that by the majority of South Africans, which effectively delegitimized that language. Also, native English-speakers provide another example of inhibiting factors, as they have the biggest impact on language preference in multilingual settings. In the case of integrating congregations, this means white congregants, or immigrants who may technically be multilingual but not in any South African language. And, reluctance on the part of congregational leadership (clergy, lay leaders) inhibits the operation of multilingual or multicultural identities.

In addition there are two major factors which require more detailed analysis.

The first comprises the constraints posed by institutional setting on the ability of linguistic or ethnic identities to advance their own interests in congregations. Here organisational culture is of particular interest, while the vector formed by class, language and religion with the integrative dynamic of the congregations also acts as brake.

Apparently institutional culture continues to favour the unofficial national language English, and in a few cases the old official language, Afrikaans in the setting of "English-speaking" Christian denominations. The same ambiguity which marks official policies (good intentions contradicted in practice) occurs here. Linguistic diversity is now reflected in most liturgical publications (Prayer Book of the CPSA) and hymnals, but evidence shows that this is not necessarily translated into congregational life. It is hard not to conclude that South African mainline congregations are "still dominated by European Christian forms" (Ramphele 1989:179). As social institutions, denominations are carriers of the social, cultural, economic, and political forces in society (see Villa-Vicencio 1988:42). And so congregations also contain the values of European culture embedded in the language, structures and processes of their denominations (Ramphele 1989:179; see Cochrane 1987:26; Saayman 1994:12; Bill 1994:168).

The evidence also suggests that the intersection of language and religion in an integrative setting favours middle class aspirations and formation. A lot of ink has been spilled recently about the emergence of a black middle class, for whom English fits class aspirations. Most mixed congregations seem to follow the ideal set by black political elite, namely the primacy of English, and so offer a natural home to this group who are easily integrated into existing leadership structures without affecting the internal
functioning of congregations. Black languages and customs are seldom allowed any space to function, with the exception of hymns translated into Bantu languages. In this way current integration in practice reinforces class divisions, structures of exclusion, and internal colonisation with respect to indigenous languages and cultures. Lower income blacks are integrated in terms of their existing class position.

As can be seen from the next major constraint discussed below, these practices stretch back to colonial times, and apparently have been systemically reproduced to the present day. Under the impact of the Christian missions indigenous societies divided between those who used tradition to oppose domination, those who accepted the cultural dominance of settlers, and those who opposed political exclusion and economic exploitation in Christian terms. The so-called English-speaking churches incorporated indigenous peoples into a European-derived belief system, in which the economic and political structures of the settlers were replicated.

In these integrating congregations blacks, as then, who are allowed into leadership are fully acculturated and occupy the same class positions as their white peers. On the other hand blacks are utilising religious institutions to gain access to economic resources through assimilating their offspring. Meanwhile the marginalised segments of the population, in trying to emulate the status language of the elite, are arguably losing their ability to express themselves in indigenous languages, without emerging above inadequate standards of English. Prah has argued persuasively that this inability to conceptualise in the mother tongue adds to the inability of Africa to produce scientists of note.

The second major constraint on language preference in integrating congregations is posed by a language ideology which operates in South African society, but also across Africa, and is linked to features of the world system. In fact, I would argue that a language ideology, in the sense of attitudes towards languages, has been in operation in this country for a very long time. It structures languages (and so intergroup relations) in a status hierarchy in relation to one another, and deems that English is the only language fit for interstate, substate, and intergroup communication.

Such a language ideology is implicitly traced in other studies which examine the language attitudes of South Africans. The study of individual language preferences have often focused on universities, e.g. Vivian De Klerk's 1996 study of Rhodes students and Kwesi Prah's 1993 study of six Southern African universities; including the historically black Universities of the Transkei and of the Western Cape. Studies of the general public have been conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (e.g. Schuring 1979), the South African Broadcasting Corporation (see Gough 1996:55), and the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (unpublished 1997).

The origin of the ideology lies in the Anglicisation policies of the colonial and Union periods, but can also be located in global politico-economic factors which favour the
domination of particularly English and North American cultural forms. The increasing
dominance of English in South Africa can also be explained by the indebtedness of major
institutions here to the United Kingdom – and the USA, as is the case with other
Commonwealth nations. As a result, structures and organisational cultures discriminate
against other language and cultural groups, ensuring that European-derived languages
dominate (cf. Castles 1992). I do not argue that world ideology directly affects local
congregations, but rather that global norms affect the state-building project in terms of
the direction taken by language practice and ideology, and that this is reflected in the
dynamics of congregations, as it is in the education system. In this way language
ideology locally is tied to the global language ideology.

In addition, a small but significant proportion of past and recent leaders of the liberation
movement were educated in English or in British educational institutions. The roots of a
pro-English bias in the black resistance movement originated in the vector formed by
state, education, and religious institutions in the pre-apartheid era. Before 1948 English
mission schools produced English-speaking black intellectuals, including the founders of
the African National Congress (in its early guise as the African National Congress). Examples include Sol T Plaatje, Walter Rubusana, Pixley ka Isaka Seme, John
L Dube, Sam Makgothi, and Saul Msane (Maake 1994:114). The founders of the Pan-
Africanist Congress were also schooled by the missions, "such as Robert Mangaliso
Sobukwe, Anton Mziwakhe Lembede, Zaphania Mothopeng". These men were described
by H F Verwoerd as "Black Englishmen" (Maake 1994:114).

When the dominance of English is superimposed onto the hierarchical geographical
ordering of the world-economy it becomes clear that the language of two former core
states - the former hegemon, Britain, and the recently dominant USA - is now the
"supercentral" language (De Swaan 1989, 1994). English has achieved pre-eminent status
as global language (Crystal 1997), as a result of the expansion of cultural hegemony
through economic means, and of Western education systems as part of the globalization
of development. As the world-economy is dialectically linked to cultural change, cultural
hegemony accompanied the expansion of the world capitalist system. The preference for
English is supported through the example of the state and various elites, but also through
the common understanding that English is the language of status and commerce.

This is not to deny that reciprocal influences from the periphery do affect the core, nor
that alternative language options do not figure in world culture, setting up contradictory
trends. On the one hand the world-capitalist system often requires trade to be conducted
in the supercentral language of the dominant core state, and aid agreements to be
concluded in favour of the same language, namely English. But on the other hand the
norms circulating within the world-polity require that nation-states acknowledge and
protect constitutionally the diversity of its peoples. Thus two ideologies have been
established within the world system which in linguistic terms simultaneously promote
monolingualism and multilingualism, homogeneity and heterogeneity, as well as
hybridity.
In the politics of difference, a pertinent question is which language(s) will dominate public and private institutions. Across many institutions languages are in competition, and perhaps only the economically powerful will survive in the public domain in South Africa. English has achieved a renewed status as the unofficial official language, despite all the good policy intentions. English is increasingly advanced by some politicians as the dominant language for use in most major institutions (e.g. education, business, government).

Factors which function to enhance linguistic diversity

The rare cases where multilingual interaction occurred is often associated with sympathetic leadership, such as a sympathetic clergy person. The constraints of institutional culture are only overcome where the critical mass of mother–language congregants are so large that another language cannot be avoided. Cases were black congregants insist on cultural or linguistic inclusion are very rare.

CONCLUDING THEOREICAL REMARKS:

Analyzing linguistic and racial integration through attention to interactions between and within meso- and macro-levels

In South Africa the status and role of languages in meso–level interactions are now embedded in a language ideology, supported by the informal language policies embedded in the organizational culture of religious institutions which are labelled "English–speaking". Such a language ideology functions to dictate where and when a particular language is appropriate, and to enforce monolingualism. Congregations where the majority of members are not English–speaking, yet this is the language preferred, illustrate the point. There seems to be some consensus that the public realm is unsuitable for any language other than English, while the room for indigenous languages seems to be contracting. Obviously none of the above examples are purely about language, nor as straightforward as I represent them.

Elements of structure and agency interact to dampen linguistic and cultural diversity in many integrating congregations. At the macro–structural level language ideology, class formation, institutional and congregational setting, and changing demographics all play a role; as do the congregants as actors and the clergy as gatekeepers at the micro–agency level. Meso–level factors include the size of the congregation, the ratio of language groups in relation to one another, geographic location (rural–urban), and the policies of the denomination. For example, majority indigenous languages (macro–factor) only emerge in large congregations (meso–factor); in small congregations (meso–factor) congregants opt (micro–agency) for English (macro–factor).

As rational agents congregants, denominational leaders, clergy, lay leadership all consciously or subconsciously bring the contestations between groups into congregations
with them, while choosing to represent themselves in a particular way. Yet such microlevel actions are also constrained by other actors in the meso-level setting, such as the cultural ideology at work in society at the macro-level and in the organization at meso-level. In other words, while the purpose of the setting is to reinforce a particular social identity, that of Christian believer, church members also bring multiple identities into that setting, some which are repressed and others which are selected. Language symbolises which identity is deemed more relevant to that setting, and demonstrates the perceived status between different language groups.

In most integrating congregations an awareness of the need for multiculturalism is evident in the recent inclusion of samples of linguistic diversity in hymns and readings. While these acknowledgements of diversity are symbolically necessary, regrettably their limited scale of usage means that they will have little effect on existing class or status relations between congregant. Should such practices continue, the national policy of multilingualism will not be advanced, but instead the marginal status of black languages will be confirmed and confined to “minority” rankings. This multilingualism merely enhances the status of English, stigmatises other languages, and leads to a form of linguicism – a form of discrimination against minority groups based on language preference.

At the same time competing loyalties to language and ethnic group are undercut by contending religious and national identities. While elsewhere language and religion have contributed powerfully to ethnic identity formation, this has not happened in South Africa, as more missionaries were at work here during the colonial era than elsewhere on the continent. Ethnic groups were broken up among the denominations, so that religion and ethnicity were different sources of identity with little overlap between them. Membership in mainstream and Pentecostal Christianity tends to neutralise the attraction of local ethnic identities by offering global alternative identities, of being Catholic, etc. Anecdotal and personal experience suggests that believers tend to place loyalty to the Christian identities above other identities.

The same applies to racial identity: in accordance with the dominant non-racial ideology, racial identities are downplayed by denominational and congregational leaders (in line with similar sentiments in the social sciences here and abroad). Yet race demonstrably continues to affect the structures of religious organisations and the interactions within them. This is illustrated by the existence of a separate black caucus in some denominations (Anglicans, Methodists); the apparent need by church officials to (re-)claim a history of racial integration (e.g. Catholics); election of denominational church leaders from certain racial backgrounds (Methodists); the exclusion of white clergy from certain regions (e.g. the Uniting Reformed Church, Anglicans); and a general reluctance from those formerly known as blacks and whites, as well as blacks and coloureds, to unite in regional or local congregational structures.
Some congregations have little racial integration of leadership structures, but generally speaking racial integration is more noticeably present than is cultural or linguistic integration. In line with the anti-apartheid position of the churches, many actively espouse non-racialism in the sense of playing down the salience of race as category. In some denominations (Anglican) clergy are no longer required to report membership in terms of race. However, this does not mean that awareness of race has diminished, or that racial integration has taken place. In some cases relations between black and white, or black and coloured are still strained. In the opinion of a clergy person the Black Consultative Forum in the Anglican church was unhappy with the disproportionately large number of white bishops. Another clergy person felt that the bishop in his diocese reportedly wanted to be "the first one who had no white clergy".

But the increasing domination of class values does not move churches away from race as an issue, for it is European upper and middle class interests which now dominate local congregational structures. These configurations of power enforce white standards of living (e.g. dress codes, even within black congregations), and deny other races access to leadership (see Ramphele 1989:187). Class structures in South Africa coincide with race in an 'internal hegemony', a tempered domination of power and privilege in which race no longer appears as the primary criterion. This structure was revealed in past attempts to de-racialise (church) systems without loss of [white] power, an exercise based on the recognition that dismantling privilege based on race must result in the collapse of (most?) social infrastructures (Villa-Vicencio 1988:83,84).

Analyzing integration in terms of institutional change

Institutional isomorphism can explain the tendency in integrating congregations to use English, by referring to the embeddedness of religious organisation in ever widening concentric contexts of national and global institutions, particularly polity and economy. The expansion of the world system in polity and economic terms is historically associated with the spread of colonialism, a process which led to the diffusion of state forms and instruments of state control and legitimation, namely education and, more ambivalently, Christianity as a world religion. Both mission education and imperialism established a cultural hegemony in British colonies which ascribed to English a higher status than to indigenous languages. Local elites were drawn into these institutions and in this way a language ideology was institutionalized and reproduced.

The difficulties that congregations have in integrating linguistic and cultural diversity demonstrate how problematic it is to replace one set of values and associated norms and roles with another in a context of coercive isomorphism formed by state and denominational policies. The result is the incomplete institutionalisation of non-racialism and multiculturalism. Following Moberg (1962:19-20), patterns of integration in congregations express institutionalised behaviour trends within a state-recognised institutionalized voluntary associational organisation. In this approach I analyse congregations as organisations in which several institutions (religion, gender, leadership)
intersect. A congregation and the denomination to which it belongs represent different aspects of the same religious institution. Institutional change within both are brought about by extra-institutional mechanisms (values and norms in the institutional environment, e.g. nonracialism, nation-building) or intra-institutional mechanisms (e.g. through antagonistic actors who oppose one another in the same institution (compare Koelble 1995:235).

Within such an environment other institutions conform to various degrees, i.e. become isomorphic. In congregations that resist full linguistic and cultural integration, organisational inertia takes the form of loose coupling - that is, racial integration of leadership structures is the price paid in order not to deal with language or other aspects of culture. Notions of multiculturalism are not regarded as essential to organisational survival. Hypothetically, conformity to external policies depends on the extent to which intra-institutional support exists for the values which they represent. Congregations which initiated integration before the formation of the post-apartheid state were arguably more influenced at an extra-institutional level by the relations of its leaders to global organisations like the WCC. Yet, given the policies of the present state, it would become increasingly difficult for institutions dependent on state recognition to resist some measure of implicit conformity to these norms of behaviour. Hence institutional isomorphism is likely to develop more rapidly under the present state.

Integration in congregations can be viewed in terms of a dialectic cycle through which institutional change occurs in a local organisation. Only if values are institutionalised will they be successful; they will only be institutionalised if they are broadly accepted. Institutionalisation implies acceptance of ideas (values and norms), and their implementation in roles and behaviour. On this basis I would argue that congregations which are racially integrated only (along with those that are not integrated at all in contexts which would allow this) present instances of the partial institutionalisation of multiculturalism in contrast to the more complete implementation of nonracialism and nation-building. Racial equality has been institutionalised to the extent that it has penetrated the consciousness of individual congregants (other races should be equally included) and has been accommodated in the creation of formal roles (black lay leaders). Yet the norms that determine the status and roles that languages may play (English should dominate) remain unaffected. As a result indigenous languages are not included, and those congregants or clergy who would support their incorporation are rendered ineffective by the attitudes of both English-speakers and the other language groups, which accept the status quo.

Extra-institutional values - such as multiculturalism - are incorporated and unevenly distributed across the structures of the denomination. Among synodical representatives positive multicultural values are most clearly institutionalised as evidenced by policy and in the use of e.g. different languages in the Anglican prayer-book, but without affecting the norms governing the congregation. At the congregational level there may even be an obvious acknowledgement of the different value-set contained in denominational and
state policy, but this has not as yet ousted the dominant cultural ideology. While there is little disagreement about the usefulness of allowing other races to be integrated, the roles and status associated with language and culture remain unaffected.

Extra-institutional values articulate with the cultural norms of the world system, namely equality and progress (Beyer 1994:23), and feed into the continuous need in the capitalist system for economic expansion. Equality, in the form of a globalized norm of liberal democracy, enables the removal of ethnic and racial barriers which could hinder the creation of new markets, a process undergirded by the diffusion of English as a global language through tertiary education and financial aids programmes. The globalization of liberal values supported the establishment of various charters of human rights, including the Freedom Charter, the present South African constitution, and the ideologies of nonracialism and multiculturalism. These values are expressed in state policies and legislation. Paradoxically, the world system also incorporates norms which establish a single global division of labour between core and peripheral states.

Global factors can explain the preference for English indirectly, as supported through the example of the state and various elites, and through the common understanding that English is the language of status and commerce. Anecdotal evidence points to an understanding in certain black circles that the state's multilingual policy is merely an ideological mechanism for the devaluation of Afrikaans and other minority languages (like Venda). This view, for instance, was aired by black clergy at a recent workshop for a denomination not included in this study.

Generally speaking, both whites and blacks in integrating congregations dominated by English accept the status quo. For speakers of minority African languages, English represents a neutral alternative to the linguisticism expressed by major language speakers such as Zulu or Xhosa. For whites, the use of English maintains the dominance of European cultural values while appearing to conform to nonracialism; while for blacks it confers entry into a higher status and symbolizes the upward aspirations modelled by the new elite.

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The three main contradictions of our era, according to Kees van der Pijl's *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, are the disappearance of contender states in the global system, the breakdown of community, and the threat of fundamental ecological disaster. These challenges spring from the foundations of the capitalist system, and find their most potent dialectical challenge in the development of the "new middle" or "cadre" class.

Van der Pijl traces the rise of the capitalist system to England in 1688. It was in the context of the Glorious Revolution that a new kind of state was created. Local power was not destroyed but co-opted. Citizens came to view themselves as possessed of inherent rights. A strong civil society evolved, with a legal system both independent and strong enough to enforce private contracts. States were weak within their boundaries, but strong externally. Within this context we find the development of important groups with strong transnational liberal interests. The discussion of these various groups, beginning with the Freemasons in the 17th century and extending to relationships between contemporary cabals such as the Bilderberg conference and the Piniy Circle, constitutes one of the great strengths of this book.

Strong groups forwarding transnational bourgeois interests included the Rhodes-Milner group, which strongly favored imperialism as a response to Britain's 19th century internal difficulties. Success in this regard led to the expansion of British power, and the spread of British attitudes regarding the social order. England's unique attributes gave birth to the "Lockean Heartland" of the international system. In opposition to this favored area we find the development of states behind bureaucratic classes. These states were often authoritarian in nature as their bourgeois classes, unable to compete with those of the Lockean bloc, could not institute more liberal systems at home. The result, a "Hobbesian" bloc of contender states, provided global competition for the Lockean Heartland, War, primarily for control of the rest of the world, was "... the ultimate test of whether a contender state has successfully advanced" (p. 86).
Two lessons emerge from the vicissitudes of recent Lockean/Hobbesian interaction. The failure of worker states suggests that progressive hopes ought be pinned not on direct wars of movement, but on what Gramsci called wars of position which in this case ought focus on popular sovereignty, democracy and social protection. More critical still is the Lockean victory, represented by the self-destruction of the USSR, which left contender states in total disarray and swept an important alternative model of social organization from the field.

This conceptualization of international relations, defined by Europe in the 17th century and relegating the rest of the planet to the status of the "prize" over which such powers fought, seems a bit out of date. The author notes that capitalist relations of production proper are not in evidence until industrialization took hold as much as a century later. Why then begin with England in 1688? Societies with a strong commercial heritage and enforceable contracts emerge much earlier and farther afield (Abu-Lughod, 1989). Ascendant bourgeois classes in strong states gain power in different European locations by the 14th century (Arrighi, 1994). A variety of market-based innovations can be traced back even before this (Modelski and Thompson, 1996), while the role the global system played in Europe's initial rise ought not be so cavalierly ignored (Gunder Frank, 1998). Van der Pijl is correct, however, in his concern for lack of significant counter hegemonic models to the prevailing neo-liberal synthesis. Though perhaps a function of the current business cycle upswing, few if any alternative movements capable of taming neo-liberal discipline are in evidence.

Neo-liberalism itself, however, forms the foundation of important contradictions. Van der Pijl spends the first two chapters setting the stage for an understanding of labor processes, class formation and fractionalization, and socialization. As commodification deepens the reach of capital, the human community breaks apart. After the Second World War the solution to this problem seemed to rest with the thoroughgoing corporatism of the Atlantic Community. But economic stagnation, external challenges from the periphery and the Soviet Bloc, and internal challenges from the green, anti-war and youth movements undercut this system. The rise of the Trilateral Commission and other neo-liberal organs gave birth to a new and less forgiving capitalist system that threatens the fabric of our communities.

I sympathize with the need to use, if not create, specialized language to reflect new or complex concepts. But the language adopted in the explication of labor processes and the class system in the first few chapters of this volume makes the argument quite difficult to follow and undercuts the series editors' hopes of providing books not just for specialists but for "...students, policy makers, trade unionists and other activists" (p. ix).

The final challenge generated by neo-liberalism is ecological degradation. Unfettered neo-liberal capitalism is suggested to be heading us toward real physical limits. This important argument, central as it should be, nonetheless goes completely undeveloped and ends up nothing more than an assertion.
Van der Pijl offers some glimmer of hope in the face of these critical challenges by way of new class relationships. As society gets more complex, as production processes come to depend more on knowledge inputs, and as the potential costs to instability increase, we see the rise of the "cadres," a "new middle class" of technocrats, managers, negotiators and educators. Especially in times of crisis, the technical prowess of the cadres makes them indispensable for negotiating and enforcing agreements on representatives of more established classes. Their central role in the process of socialization, their fidelity to systems analysis, social engineering and planning, give them the tools necessary to create and enforce rational outcomes. Yet the cadres themselves, often of lower middle class background, divided by the nature of their positions as representatives of both management and labor, and lacking in strong class consciousness, offer the best hope of transcending class relations within the context of class society itself. Rational responses to the ravages of neo-liberalism must include transcending its preferences on various central issues, and social planning rests at the heart of any such victory.

Cadres may hold the hope of transcending neo-liberal discipline, but the processes that would move us toward such outcomes are hardly clear. The anti-democratic and anti-progressive nature of technocratic solutions imposed by cadres in other eras is also described in this volume. The question of what leads to one outcome as opposed to another is never considered.

This is the first volume in a new series on the Global Political Economy published in association with the journal Review of International Political Economy. It is dedicated to applying Marx's historical materialism at the global level. Class analysis is an important and powerful tool that is wielded with real facility in this volume. Whether it can shed sufficient light on the challenges we now face, however, remains an open question.

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