JWSR Editorial Policy

The main editorial goal of the Journal of World-Systems Research is to develop and disseminate scholarly research on topics that are relevant to the analysis of world-systems. We especially want to include works that proceed from several different theoretical stances and disciplines. These include, but are not limited to, civilizationists, evolutionary approaches, international political economy, comparative, historical and cultural analysis. We seek the work of political scientists, historians, sociologists, ethnographers, archaeologists, economists and geographers.

We especially encourage works that take theory seriously by confronting problems of conceptualization and making definitions of concepts explicit, by formulating hypotheses, constructing axiomatic theories and causal models. Theoretical research programs that combine theory construction with comparative research are badly needed to take the world-systems approach beyond the stage of a perspective.

We also want to encourage the application of comparative, quantitative and network-analytic methods to world-systems research, though we will certainly also publish pieces that do not use these methods. Any empirical study that is deemed relevant to world-systems analysis may be published even if it uses a very different conceptual framework.

And finally we also want to publish discussions of future trajectories and options for the modern world-system and considerations of what can be done to create a more humane, peaceful and just world society.

The Purposes of JWSR are
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The Double Register of History: Situating the Forgotten Woman and Her Household in Capitalist Commodity Chains

Wilma A. Dunaway

The State of the Field

By analyzing research and theoretical foci in its three major publication venues, we can judge how much attention the world-system perspective has been paying to women. After 25 years, women are only a faint ghost in the world-system perspective. In the first twenty volumes of Review, less than 5 percent (16) of the articles deal with gendered exploitation, women, or households. In the first five volumes of the Journal of World-System Research, less than 4 percent of the articles address women’s issues. By 1999, PEWS had published 21 annual monographs; yet less than 5 percent of the articles in those volumes integrated women or gender inequalities. Another indicator of women’s invisibility is that relevant terms about gender

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1. I analyzed the content of Review, volumes 1 through 20, the Journal of World-System Research, volumes 1 through 5 (Nos. 1-3), and the monographs that have been published as PEWS annuals. For a complete list of the PEWS annuals, see <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/pews.htm>.

2. Only four articles address women’s issues (Moon 1997; Dickinson 1998; Moghadam 1999; Smith 1999). However, two of these articles offer no explanations from the world-system vantage point and make no references to world-system literature. Moon (1997) is positive toward women in development approaches with which the world-system
or household are listed in only two of the indexes of these PEWS annuals. Overall, women, households, and gender inequities were investigated by less than 5 percent of all the studies that appear in the three major venues of world-system publication. In short, women’s problems still lie far out at the distant periphery of the field.

Our track record is even worse than these statistics reveal. Even in research that claims to focus on households, we have made less than a minimalist effort to connect the capitalist restructuring of women’s everyday lives with other transformations that occur in the world-system. In the articles that focus on households, for example, fewer than 50 percent actually include either of the terms women, female, or gender inequity. Even when world-system analysts address issues that are central to women’s lives, they have forgotten the suppression and exploitation of females almost entirely. In a majority of the studies of agricultural households that appear in these three publication venues, the words women or female rarely appear, and there is very limited analysis of gender differences among agricultural laborers or households. This oversight occurs in the face of the historical reality that women have always comprised a large segment of the agricultural labor force, a conceptual error that is common in the mainstream literature against which we purport to argue.4 We have managed to talk about plantations, peasant households, the informal sector, and labor unrest without ever mentioning women or gender disparities.5

Our analysis of commodity chains (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986, 1994; Gereffi perspective disagrees. Though she examines only wage earners, Miller (1999) repeatedly employs the phrase “women’s share of the labor force.” Her careless choice of sexist wording is the equivalent of saying to a nonwaged mother of children: “why don’t you work?” (Waring 1988: 22).

4. In its special issue about agricultural households, Review (vol. 7, no. 2), published only 1 article (von Werlhof 1983) that analyzes gender inequality. The word women rarely appears in the other 4 articles of that issue. The PEWS annual dealing with agriculture and food systems includes only one article (Collins 1995) that analyzes gender inequality, and there are only ten brief mentions of women in its 275 pages.


6. For world-system analyses of the environment, see Journal of World-System Research (vol. 3, no. 3) and Goldfrank, Goodman, and Szasz (1999).

7. For analyses of household reproduction that ignore women, see Stauth (1983); Frobel (1982); Thompson (1991). Ulshofer (1983: 189) claims that “reproduction is wholly dependent on external relations to the capitalist factor markets.”

8. For studies that ignore women’s domestic production, see McCann (1986); Feder (1980); Quataert (1988).

9. For studies of malnutrition that ignore women, see Feder (1980); Micah (1989); McMichael (1995: 15-34).
sexism are routinely ignored by the perspective’s writers. In addition, world-system analysts have tended to disregard the work of radical feminists, even when those writers embrace a world-system conceptualization of capitalism (e.g., Mies 1982; Mies, Bennhold-Thomsen, and von Werlhoft 1988) or employ very similar concepts (e.g., Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983; Beneria and Roldan 1987; Salleh 1994). To use a metaphor from Dorothy Smith, the world-system perspective has not yet reached the level of “add women and stir” that characterized so many disciplines in the 1980s. What is the real danger of this void? The gender blindness of the world-system perspective sends the political message to women all over the world that we do not consider the problems of their lives worth knowing or worth telling. Through this intellectual and political blunder, we have, by default, relinquished women to the enemy. In the same time period that the world-system perspective has been ignoring gender inequality, the pro-capitalist development paradigms have discovered women and are attempting to co-opt them all over the world. By making the intellectual choices we have about gender, we convince female scholars and activists that world-system analysis is irrelevant to their concerns. In effect, then, we have disconnected our research agenda and our praxis from more than half the world’s population and from a majority of the wretched of the earth.

What have been our successes in the analysis of women’s exploitation? Wallerstein has played a pivotal role in laying the groundwork for three constructs that hold promise for the analysis of gender inequality: household, semiproletariat, and commodity chain. However, most world-system analysts either ignore these crucial ideas, or they utilize them in ways that exclude questions about women. I am convinced that these three important concepts offer us the tools we need to rescue women from the periphery of world-system thought. Consequently, this article will suggest the kinds of theoretical issues we need to raise if we are to engender world-system analyses. Second, I will specify the conceptual blunders that cause us to overlook the gendered implications of the structural transformations that we study. Third, I will propose a synthesis of ideas from radical feminism with the world-systems notions of the semiproletarianized household and the commodity chain. Along the way, I will direct attention to major global trends of gender inequality at the end of the twentieth century.

10. For the conceptualization of households and semiproletariat, see Wallerstein and Martin (1979); von Werlhoft (1980); Wallerstein (1983); Wallerstein, Martin and Dickinson (1982); Smith, Wallerstein, and Evers (1984); McGuire, Smith, and Martin (1986); Smith and Wallerstein (1992: 3-26, 253-62). For conceptualization of the commodity chain, see Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, 1994).

11. The centrality of the semiproletariat has been stressed by Wallerstein (1976) for more than two decades. Still, this concept has only rarely been recognized as a central element in the research agendas of world-system analysts.

12. These articles about households also analyze women and/or gender inequality: Turner and Benjamin (1995); McGuire, Smith and Martin (1986); Ward (1985); Vellenga (1985); Wallerstein, Martin, and Dickinson (1982); von Werlhoft (1980); Morrissey (1986).

13. These studies analyze households without ever mentioning women: Thompson (1991); Ulshofer (1983); Staith (1983); Fox-Genovese (1983); Meyers (1983); Wallerstein and Martin (1979); Elwert and Wong (1980); McCann (1986).

14. In his historical retrospective about the world-system perspective, Martin (1994: 163) describes the difficulties encountered in the theoretical formulation of household boundaries, suggesting that this problem was never satisfactorily resolved. For conceptual problems of ethnocentrism and household boundaries, see Vellenga (1985); Thompson (1991); Smith and Wallerstein (1992: 13-14).
and trends of the world-economy, (b) state machinery, and (c) ethnicity/culture/ 
subculture. Why did gender disappear in this unrealistic fashion? Obviously, we 
need to rethink this concept so that we do not make women invisible in this manner. 
If we are to engender the household, we must begin with a re-examination of income pooling. Smith and Wallerstein (1992: 15) have defined a household as “a unit that 
pools income for purposes of reproduction,” and they have linked this notion to the 
semiproletarianization of women. “Stagnations in the world-economy create pressures on small household structures to enlarge boundaries and to self-exploit more…. For a wage worker in a semi-proletarian household is more able to accept a low real wage since this worker may be able to assume that, via self-exploitation, 
other compensating forms of income will be available” (Smith and Wallerstein 1992: 
15-16). To subsidize the low and unstable wages of its members, the household 
pools four types of nonwage income: market sales, rent, transfer payments, and 
subsistence.15

As Wallerstein (1983) has argued, most of the world’s households acquire only 
a minority of their survival needs from wages. It is imperative, therefore, that we 
select terminology that reflects our knowledge of the historical fact that nonwage and 
unpaid labor is the pivotal thesis of the world-systems model of households (Smith, 
Wallerstein, and Evers 1984; Smith and Wallerstein 1992).16 In contradiction to 
that central idea, the term income pooling implies the aggregation of money and of items to which a market price has been assigned. I prefer to think of households as resource pooling units, in order to encompass all sorts of women’s economic and non-
material activities that are not implied by the list of four types of nonwage income.17 
For example, the list of five categories of “income” offered by Smith and Wallerstein (1992) does not alert researchers to take into account inputs like garbage-picking, 
and fuelwood gathering, or water collection. Households are not just producers and consumers. They are also units of reproduction; they are decision-making and resource-allocating units; they are sometimes economic enterprises that produce market commodities; they are arenas that transmit culture and ethnic heritage; and they are units that support and/or organize antisystemic resistance (Ulshofer, 1983: 192; Dunaway 1995, 1997, 2001; Hall 2000: 195-236). Furthermore, households 
pool many resources that are not material. For example, the first resource that a woman brings to her household is her own body which naturally reproduces human life, feeds infants, and is the object of sexual gratification. Nor does the notion of income pooling call attention to the non-material resources brought to households by women, such as care-giving or specialized eco-medical knowledge (Mies, Bennis-Thomsen, and von Werlhof 1988).

The third conceptual weakness is that the world-system approach masks the 
power struggles and inequities within households. Indeed, the tendency of world-

system analysts has been to beg off this issue. After laying considerable ground-
work about the external processes that shape households, Wallerstein and Martin 
(1979: 202) apologetically commented in 1979: “What remain much less known are the actual dimensions of the reorganization of internal household dynamics.” In the early 1990s after several radical studies of household inequities had appeared (e.g., Beneria and Roldan 1987), writers of the second world-system monograph on households (Smith and Wallerstein 1992: 12), were still excusing their failure to address “the internal structure of the households, and how power and goods are distributed internally.” In short, the perspective admits that resource allocation is inequitable (McGuire, Smith, and Martin, 1986: 76-77), but we have not prioritized that household reality in our theory or our research. Because it ignores such inequities, the perspective has transformed women into appendages of households, thereby effectively erasing them from the world-system (Vellenga, 1985: 316). We need to stop depicting households as though they are ungendered monoliths. To do that, we must assess the true extent to which capitalism exploits the nonwaged labor of women. We cannot make such an inquiry unless we decompose household pooling strategies and recognize internal inequities.

With the different contexts of pool and housekeeping allowance groups, women’s capacity to maneuver the duty component of their total workload is very limited…. They can mobilise claims to other women’s labor. In no case, however, have women been able significantly to diminish their own contribution by having husbands (or other male relatives) undertake a share of domestic work…. Men’s [pooling] strategies involve collective and individual components; the women’s, closely linked to the present and future situation of children, tend towards an overall, collective character (Beneria and Roldan 1987: 135-36).

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15. Each of these categories is complex and not as simple as the term may imply; see Smith and Wallerstein (1992: 7-12) for explication. Their categories exclude three additional forms of household provisioning: reciprocal exchange of labor and resources, gifts (Polanyi 1957), and theft (Dunaway 2001: Chapter 6).

16. In his historical retrospective about the world-system perspective, Martin (1994: 163) describes the difficulties encountered in trying to relate non-wage to wage forms of labor within households and commodity chains. “This effort bristled with complications, requiring the specification in different locales and times of the gendered and generational antinomies of household relationships, the configuration of labor and commodity production within the boundaries of the household, and the reproduction of labor through pooling of resources derived from wage and non-wage labor.”

17. Martin (1994: 163) also suggested the language shift to “pooling of resources.”
ENGENDERING THE CONCEPT OF COMMODITY CHAINS

In addition to the semiproletarian household, world-system analysis has advanced the concept of commodity chain. Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986: 159) envisioned a commodity chain to be “a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity,” every box or node in the chain representing “a particular, quite specific production process.” World-system analysts have identified input acquisition, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and consumption as the sequential stages of a commodity chain (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994: 51, 2). Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986: 162) stress that there are four properties for each node of a commodity chain: (a) the relations of production within the node, (b) organization of production, (c) the node’s geographical location within the chain, and (d) flows between the node, other nodes of the chain, and with other commodity chains. A single commodity chain usually exploits several forms of waged and nonwaged labor. At the world-market level, “the uneven exchange of these commodities between nations…constitutes the very essentials of global inequality” (Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994: 83). Thus, commodity chains are the key structural mechanisms of unequal exchange. They are the chains of the capitalist world-system in three senses: they derive from the system; they link together the diverse local economies of the system; and they entrap and exploit its entire population, almost no household excepted.

Personally, I am convinced that the commodity chain concept is one of the most promising tools through which world-systems analysis can integrate women and households. By examining commodity chains, we can do the type of research that Braudel (1981: 28) loved; we can simultaneously overlay the “double register” of history: the global and the local. For Braudel (1981: 559, 29), history was the unveiling of “a succession of landscapes” consisting of two major levels of human existence: (a) the realm of major historical events and (b) “the ground floor and the first story” of history that lay in “images of daily life.” Braudel (1979: 28-29, 16) argued that the task of the historian is to reveal the dialectical interplay between the upper and lower levels. But he complained that the lower level is too often ignored, so that everyday life has been “the great absentee in history” (Braudel 1979: 16).

Everyday life is also the “great absentee” from most commodity chain analyses. In some ways, our mechanistic applications of the model have done the work of mainstream economists better than they do it themselves. When a commodity chain is delineated in terms of “the production process itself” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986), it documents the construction or creation of a market product, overlooking far too many human and ecological aspects. In other words, it becomes an analysis that emphasizes things rather than human beings, exactly opposite to the historical approach urged by Braudel. What do we miss when we turn the analytic lens upon the commodity itself? First, a narrow emphasis upon those waged and nonwaged laborers who are involved directly in manufacture of the commodity can ignore three types of hidden laborer inputs. There can be direct and indirect flows into the production process from subsistence sectors, from the informal economy and from illegal sectors (Dunaway 1995). Second, the focus upon a particular commodity may unintentionally hide from view those laborers and resources in the interconnected local and distant commodity chains that supply the foodstuffs, raw materials and consumer goods to provision the production process (Dunaway 1996).

Third, commodity chain analysts have not recognized the pivotal role of households or of the females in those households. Consider Wallerstein’s (1995: 6-7) description, for example.

Commodity chains have been the integument of capitalist production processes from the outset…. It is not hard to demonstrate that almost every item that is marketed by enterprises is constructed from components (which are in turn constructed from components), utilizing machinery (constructed in turn from components…) and manpower (sustained by food production constructed from components…), the totality of which are produced in geographically dispersed areas.

Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994: 50) have emphasized that commodity chains “reproduce a basic order that permits the endless accumulation of capital.” Then they prioritize the research question they consider to be most crucial: “If one thinks of the entire chain as having a total amount of surplus value that has been appropriated, what is the division of this surplus value among the boxes of the chain?” What is missing? While the inequitable accumulation of capital at the world level is an important element of commodity chain analysis, it is only half of Braudel’s (1981: 28) “double register” of history. At the macrostructural level, a commodity chain is indeed the global mechanism that insures the inequitable division of surplus among the core, semiperiphery, and periphery (Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994). Long before those expropriations can occur, however, the commodity chain structures the maximal exploitation of underpaid and unpaid labor. If we are to engender the commodity chain, we must also investigate how and by whom that surplus is produced at every node of the network. To accomplish this task, we must enter through the doorway of the household. It is

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18. According to Braudel (1972, vol. 1: 353), the correct subjects for historical materialism are “human beings, and not things.”

Consequently, the theoretical model of commodity chains needs to be extended to transform the household structures that permit the survival of low-paid workers. For he tells us in  

Indeed, it is clear that Wallerstein (1983: 32) knows that commodity chain analysis should not focus solely on the material aspects of the commodity itself. I am convinced that we lose the conceptual power of the commodity chain and that the survival of those households rests inequitably on the shoulders of women? Why have we forgotten that commodity chains are embedded in households and that the semiproletarianized household, unless we turn the conceptual lens a different direction. A commodity chain is more than a long string of spatial points at which mechanical processes occur to generate a marketable product. We need to re-embed commodity chains in the everyday lives of the laborer households at every node in the chain. We must think of the commodity chain first and foremost as an interconnected network of nodes at which human laborers and natural resources are (a) directly exploited and/or (b) indirectly exploited (c) to permit surplus extraction by a few.

Because they embed the commodity chain in material and mechanistic inputs, Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, 1994) have de-emphasized the very concept that Wallerstein (1983, 1995) identifies as central to the world-system: the semiproletarian household. Indeed, they ignore the reality that every node of every commodity chain is embedded in the gendered relations of households. A commodity chain investigation should not focus solely on the material aspects of the commodity itself. Indeed, it is clear that Wallerstein (1983: 32) knows that commodity chain analysis should be about the agenda of documenting the exploitation of semiproletarianized households. For he tells us in *Historical Capitalism* that commodity chains create and transform the household structures that permit the survival of low-paid workers. Consequently, the theoretical model of commodity chains needs to be extended to encompass these five key research questions that it did not originally address.

1. How does the commodity chain transform and reshape households through surplus extraction and unequal exchange?
2. To what degree do households and women subsidize the production process through non-wage inputs?

3. To what degree does the commodity chain externalize material, political, social and ecological costs to households and to women?
4. To what degree do households and women at lower nodes of the commodity chain subsidize households, laborers, or consumers at higher nodes?
5. To what degree does the commodity chain structure gender inequality within and among the households that comprise its entire labor force?

A commodity chain is a much more powerful conceptual tool when it is viewed as successive layers of unequal exchanges. Indeed, every exchange within a commodity chain is unequal, for there is a polarized distribution of the means of production (including natural resources) not only between nodes but also within every single node. If we turn our theoretical lens this direction, we can utilize the commodity chain to make visible “the basic inequality of partners that underlies the capitalistic process” and that permeates every aspect of social life (Braudel 1979: 62-63). World-system analyses have not only failed to integrate the labor and ecological contributions of households. They have also ignored the unequal exchanges that occur within households themselves. Used more effectively, the commodity chain approach can demonstrate that every node of the production process—and every household that contributes labor and resources to that node—are microcosms of the structural inequities of the capitalist world-system. “Men are simultaneously agents for capital and for themselves, keeping women intimidated and pliable” (Salleh 1994: 114). Consequently, women and girls contribute more labor power to household survival than males; but they receive an inequitable share of the total pool of resources (Mies, Bennhold-Thomsen, and von Werlhof 1988). Moreover, we would be able to see resistance against capitalist oppression as a process that is not monolithic. Within nonwestern households, women and men frequently conflict over the allocation of ecological resources. When capitalist incorporation creates new wage and trade opportunities for males, those economic activities quite often threaten the ecological resources from which women produce household sustenance and trade commodities (Dunaway 1997; Shiva 1988).

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20. According to Polanyi (1957: 46), “Neither the process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but every single step in that process is geared toward a number of social interests….the economic system will be run on noneconomic motives.”

21. In a rare study that engenders the commodity chain, Vellenga (1985: 315) argues that the world-system notion of household is less useful than the concept of commodity chain to investigate women’s invisible work. She states: “It is the concept of commodity chain that seems more helpful in looking at the way in which women operate as economic actors and at the way in which class differences emerge among women.”
WOMEN’S HIDDEN INPUTS INTO COMMODITY CHAINS

As it incorporates new zones of the globe, capitalism embraces two dialectical labor recruitment mechanisms. Some household members are proletarianized into wage laborers who produce capitalist commodities, but women's labor is concentrated into semiproletarianized activities that are not partially remunerated (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987). Women's inputs into commodity chains occur at three levels. Historically, women have been wage laborers just as long as there has been capitalism (Dunaway 1995); and the late 20th century is characterized by two varied trends.22 In the core, most women are employed outside their homes, and that wage labor has altered household patterns and contributed to the high divorce rates. Nearly half of all wage-earning women work different hours than their spouses or partners, and two-fifths of all U.S. working women head their own households.23 At the periphery, women are increasingly entering the wage labor force (Ward 1990), but these poor women much more often subsidize commodity chains through low-paid, non-wage direct inputs (such as industrial homework) into the production process (Beneria and Roldan 1987). Historically, women have completed piece-rate labor through cottage industries and putting out systems. Their household-based labor generates market commodities or informal sector inputs into the export production process, but their labor has typically remained socially invisible, and they have received below-market prices for those contributions (Mies 1982). In tenant and sharecropping households, women's labor remains hidden behind that of adult males who execute contracts for the entire household with landholders (Mies, Bennhold-Thomsen, and von Werhof 1988; Dunaway 1995). In the late 20th century, these forms of non-wage labor are still common all over the world (Mies 1982; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983; Beneria and Roldan 1987; Ward 1990; Miller 1999). In the core, there is a trend toward home-based workers who utilize computers and subcontracting systems in which women are paid by task completion, thereby cutting the costs incurred by employers for wages and employee benefits (Hayashi 1998). In peripheral regions, women engage in industrial homework and make other inputs into commodity chains. Moreover, world-systems analysts have not done a very good job of documenting women wage laborers, but they have done a poor job of documenting women's direct non-wage inputs into commodity chains. However, world-systems analysts deny the material inputs of women into commodity production, see Bergquist (1984: 108-34); Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994: 165-86); Smith and Borocz (1995: 91-108, 131-44).

World-system analysts have done a fairly decent job of documenting women wage laborers, but they have done a poor job of documenting women’s direct non-wage inputs into commodity chains. Moreover, world-systems analysts deny the material inputs of women into commodity production, see Bergquist (1984: 108-34); Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994: 165-86); Smith and Borocz (1995: 91-108, 131-44).

Consequently, the world-system transforms women into “the last link in a chain of exploitation, permitting by their unpaid labour the reproduction” of the workforce and the unrewarded subsidization of male-dominated labor (Mies, Bennhold-Thomsen, and von Werhof 1988: 29). What, then, are the hidden inputs of women and households into capitalist commodity chains (see Figure 1)? Households subsidize at three levels the commodity chains in which those laborers are situated. First, the biological reality of women’s lives is sexual and reproductive; thus, mothers make their first subsidy to capitalism through the bearing and raising of successive generations of laborers. Despite its dependency upon this natural female contribution, however, capitalism has externalized laborer reproduction outside the realm of the economic. Thus, capitalism devalues women’s childbearing as “a nuisance to the production unit” (Sen 1980: 82).24 Second, the household is the site in which women undertake unpaid labor for those members who are waged laborers. By keeping production costs lower, women’s hidden inputs subsidize the production process throughout the commodity chain, thereby keeping consumer prices lower and profits higher. To generate family survival requirements, women engage in food and ecological resources and the retrieval of recyclable items from the garbage. In the late 20th century, textile commodity chains are increasingly decentralized into putting-out systems in which household-based women finish commodities on a piece-rate basis (Mies 1982).

In addition to their direct wage and non-wage inputs, women and households subsidize the commodity chain through several forms of invisible labor and hardship. Destruction of precapitalist modes of production leads to a new sexual division of labor organized into semiproletarianized households (Smith, Wallerstein, and Evers 1984). In order to keep the waged labor force:

- at a relatively low level of pay (by the existing standards of the world-economy), they had to be located in household structures in which the work on this new “export-oriented activity” formed only a small part of the lifetime revenues.
- In this case, other household activities which brought in revenues in multiple forms could “subsidize” the remuneration for the “export-oriented activity,” thereby keeping the labor costs very low (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987: 777).

22 World-system analysts have done a fairly decent job of documenting women wage laborers, but they have done a poor job of documenting women’s direct non-wage inputs into commodity chains. Moreover, world-systems analysts deny the material inputs of women into commodity production, see Bergquist (1984: 108-34); Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994: 165-86); Smith and Borocz (1995: 91-108, 131-44).


24 “What women do ‘gratis,’ whether birthing labor or sustaining labor, is called ‘reproduction’ as opposed to production. Yet the word reproduce here connotes a secondary or diminutive activity, as distinct from the primary ‘historical act’ of production itself. And since reproduction is not recognized as ‘primary,’ it cannot be seen to generate ‘value’” (Salleh 1994: 115).
What the housewife produces in the family are not simply use-values but the commodity “labour-power” which the husband can then sell as a ‘free’ wage labourer in the labour market....the productivity of the housewife is the precondition for the productivity of the (male) wage labourer. The nuclear family, organized and protected by the state, is the social factory where this commodity “labour-power” is produced. Hence, the housewife and her labour are not outside of surplus value production, but constitute the very foundation upon which this process can get started. The housewife and her labour are, in other words, the basis of the process of capital accumulation (Mies 1986: 31).

Historically, the world-system has fed parasitically on “an army of non-wage-laborers, who are responsible for the (re)production of the necessary preconditions for wage-labor” (von W erlhof 1980: 41). This army of non-wage-laborers consists mostly of women (Emery 1986; Pelizzon 1999). During the late 20th century when the world-economy is experiencing intensified globalization, there are pressures on poor households to enlarge their boundaries and to self-exploit more (Nelson and Smith 1999). Thus, household nonwaged activities are actually increasing (Smith and Wallerstein, 1992; 9-16), and most of that labor is done by females (Hayashi 1998; Pelizzon 1999). Women’s work is dominant in food production and processing, in responsibility for fuel, water, health care, child-rearing, sanitation and the entire range of so-called basic needs (Sen 1980). To accomplish that labor, most of the world’s women draw heavily upon natural resources. In this way, the economic contributions of women remain structurally invisible; and the capitalist shifts to the worker’s household and to the ecosystem a large portion of the actual costs of labor subsistence (Dunaway 1995; Instituto del Tercer Mundo 1994: 47).

There is a third more deeply hidden way in which women subsidize the commodity chains in which their households are situated. The subsistence inputs of women and households at one node may subsidize other nodes of the commodity chain. In effect, the commodity chain structures a network in which consumer and laborer households at higher nodes actually exploit households and women at lower nodes. Let me provide an historical example from my own research and then an example from the late twentieth century. In the U.S. Mountain South, small Appalachian plantations required slaves to generate half or more of their foodstuffs and all their shoes and clothing. That household subsistence production, primarily generated by women, made it possible for Appalachian masters to maximize their profits. Appalachian slave households reproduced, fed and clothed the surplus laborers exported by their owners. Through their forced migrations, those surplus slaves provided direct labor to produce the cotton that was exported to the world-
economy. By externalizing to slave households the costs of their own reproduction and maintenance, mountain masters exported large quantities of food and clothing to provision the slaves who produced Lower South cotton. As a direct result of their hidden inputs into the cotton commodity chain, Appalachian slave households experienced chronic malnutrition, broken families, dangerously high fertility rates, and higher mortality rates. While mountain slave households subsisted on 70 percent of the needed survival nutrients, the Lower South slaves who consumed Appalachian surpluses were better fed and clothed, rarely were required to produce their own survival needs, and the women were pregnant only half as often. As a result, black Appalachian women died at a rate twice as high as that experienced by Lower South slave men, and mountain slave children were three times more likely to die than Lower South slave children (Dunaway, 2001: chapter 9).

At the end of the late twentieth century, the women who manage the millions of households throughout the nodes of any commodity chain are divided internationally into producers and consumers. At the consumption end of a commodity chain, core women diminish their own household hardships because they are subsidized by the peripheral women whose low-paid and unpaid labor keeps prices low.

This relationship is structured in such a way that Third World women are objectively—not subjectively—linked to First World women through the commodities which the latter buy. This is not only a contradictory relationship, but also one in which the two actors on each side of the globe do not know anything of each other. The women in South and South-East Asia hardly know what they produce or for whom they make the things they make. On the other hand, the Western housewife is totally oblivious of the female labour, the working conditions, the wages, etc., under which the things which she buys are produced. She is only interested in getting these things as cheaply as possible… the enslavement and exploitation of one set of women is the foundation of a qualitatively different type of enslavement of another set of women (Mies 1986: 121).

**WOMEN AND THE EXTERNALIZED COSTS OF COMMODITY CHAINS**

In addition to the failure of commodity chain analyses to investigate the hidden non-wage and unpaid inputs of women and households, there is another fundamental conceptual problem. Commodity chains have largely been constructed around the acquisition and organization of material inputs (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994:2), a methodological decision which ignores the tendency of capitalists to externalize costs as much as possible (Wallerstein 1999). To maximize profits, capitalists must exploit as many “costless” social and natural conditions as possible. To put it differently, the capitalist mode of production structures and reshapess households in ways that minimize production costs by allowing extensive use of conditions external to the production process. Thus, capitalists shift to society, to the culture, to the ecosystem, and to human laborers most of the real costs of commodity production (see Figure 1).“Externalized costs are unseen and unpaid bills that are additional components of unequal exchange. They are part and parcel of normal capitalism, and they are to be found at every node/link of every commodity chain” (Wallerstein 1995).

Thus, semiproletarianized households subsidize commodity chains through their absorption of production costs that are externalized by capitalists (see Figure 2). Capitalism not only shifts to women the costs of reproducing the labor force and of subsidizing wage-earners. Capitalism also externalizes to women and girls greater costs and risks than are shifted to males. Because the inequalities are so stark, it is easy to be fooled into thinking that all peripheral men, women, and children experience the same degrees of immiseration. However, the world-system has structured “a modern form of patriarchal relations, in which women experience a social reality very different from their brothers in capital or labor” (Salleh 1994: 108-109). Consequently, peripheral men and women do not experience the same degrees of exclusion and poverty.

The double exploitation of women is based on the possibility of using their labor-power/sexuality as a human resource and their bodies as a natural resource…. The difference in the exploitation of men and women consists in the fact that men normally are only exploited as human resource (labor-power/sexuality) and not as if they were also a natural resource. Another difference, related to the first one, is that men are socially enabled to compensate for their exploitation (partly/ totally?) by appropriating the labor-power/sexuality and bodies of women (von Werlhof 1980: 40-41).

If we are to capture the workings of the household, therefore, we must recognize that there are two classes of people among the exploited: the doubly exploited (women) and those who are both exploited/exploiters (men).

To treat all peripheral households as though there are no gender differences in the experience of inequality is to ignore the worst effects of the world-system itself. Because women experience two levels of resource inequality (outside and within the household)

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25. Similarly, impoverished antebellum Appalachian households subsidized the living conditions of Northeastern industrial laborers; see Dunaway (1996: chapter 10).

26. For a chart of social and cultural costs that are externalized by capitalism, see O’Connor (1994: 102-103).
and because capitalism increases female subordination (outside and within the household), poverty is disproportionately felt by the world’s women (Smith, Collins, Hopkins, and Muhammad, 1988: 28). Global trends of the late 20th century demonstrate their double exploitation. In every part of the world, women control very little of the wealth, even though they work longer hours than men. More than 70 percent of the world’s illiterate adults are women. The world-system is currently structuring a vast international sex industry, and girls are targeted as the human resources to be exploited (Mies 1986: 137-42). In addition to these health and ecological risks, capitalism externalizes to women the negative side-effects of cultural change and disruption. Domestic violence increases dramatically as manufacturing and extractive industries enter new zones, and females are almost always the victims. The world-system has always structured the absence of males from poor households (Mies 1986), so there is an increasing trend toward female-headed households and feminization of poverty all over the world (United Nations 1999).

Global ecological stresses pose different crises for people according to their ethnic group, social class, sex, or age (Merchant 1992; Stephens 1994). Women are disproportionately endangered by the ecological degradation that accompanies capitalist development, and they are the household members who must contribute the labor needed to care for those made ill by environmental risks or resource depletion (Warren 1997: 8-9). Worldwide, resource scarcities impact women much more severely than men (Shiva 1988: 9). Water scarcity, desertification, deforestation, land degradation, and coastal pollution are forms of resource depletion that pose special hardships for women. Malnutrition is the most fundamental act of environmental sexism that is inflicted by the capitalist world-system upon women and girls. Half of all Third World children die before age ten. Females are disproportionately represented among those deaths because poor families allocate more of their scarce food resources and safe water to boys (United Nations 1999). Capitalism also externalizes to females the costs (e.g., the nutritional battering of children) associated with high fertility rates that follow high child mortality in about one-third of all peripheral countries (Ward 1985; Scheper-Hughes 1991).

The modern world-system has institutionalized the cultural devaluation of the work of women and girls. “Sexism was the relegation of women to the realm of non-productive labor, doubly humiliating in that the actual labor required of them was if anything intensified, and in that productive labor became in the capitalist world-economy, for the first time in human history, the basis for the legitimation of privilege.” (Wallerstein 1983: 103). Consequently, institutionalized sexism makes possible reproduction of the work-force at the most profitable levels for capitalists. Gender discrimination provides an in-built training mechanism for the work-force, ensuring that a large part of the socialization in occupational tasks will be done within the framework of households and not at the expense of employers (Waller-
stein 1984: 177). Consequently, integration into capitalist commodity chains brings destructive economic results for women. Historically and currently, women have been targeted for the dirtiest, most back-breaking aspects of the capitalist production process (Dunaway 1995), while higher-skilled, higher-paying artisan jobs have been reserved for males (Hayashi 1998; Pelizzon 1999). In the face of capitalist expansion, Third World women lose artisan jobs and local markets to imports and to commercialized agriculture (Mies, Bennhold-Thomsen, and von Werlhof 1988). Multinational corporations control the commodity chains that are initiating these economic changes, and these global conglomerates are externalizing major ecological costs to peripheral women. Females are entering the labor forces of multinational corporations faster than adult males, and this is a trend expected to continue into the 21st century. To keep production costs low, multinationals are breaking the bodies of Third World girls and young women at an alarming rate. By eliminating safety equipment and sanitary working conditions, corporations externalize to women and children the health costs of industrial injuries and disabilities, work-related diseases, and the higher incidence of birth defects and mother mortality due to exposure to chemicals and industrial waste. Yet most of these women live in countries with grossly inadequate medical systems (Madeley 1999; Barndt 1999).

Over the historical existence of the modern world-system, capitalism has gradually reached deeper and deeper into the everyday lives of households. Because they remain less fully proletarianized than men, women are more intensively and more extensively exploited by capitalist commodity chains. When we take into account all paid, under-paid, and unpaid labor, it is clear that capitalism captures more of women’s work time and extracts from them greater indirect subsidies than from males.

What does capitalism extract from women that it does not take from men? In order to transform households into units that reproduce laborers and consumers, capitalism has commodified human reproduction; and it has reshaped and deformed child rearing and parenting (Mies, Bennhold-Thomsen, and von Werlhof 1988). In every historical era, the modern world-system has restructured households, repeatedly breaking families whose members (most often adult males) were removed by labor migrations (Boss 1993; Gisbert, Painter, and Quiton 1994; Grosfoguel 1997; Dunaway 2001). Capitalist commodity chains compete with households for limited ecological resources; and females contribute much more unpaid labor to those commodity chains than men (Wallerstein 1995: 5-6). Over the life of peripheral women, their recruitment into and expulsion from waged labor is functionally tied to phases of the family life-cycle.

Women, by means of their work trajectories and strategies, supply labor for different processes of capital expansion and proletarianization according to the family life cycle, a conditioning factor that does not pertain to men....the semiproletarianization of women—who in their character of unmarried daughters, wives and mothers, are differentially “expelled or retained” in the household they belong to—facilitate a different and generally higher paid labor opportunity for the husbands....It can be argued, therefore, that a kind of “functionality” of gender subordination exists for capital, not only through cheap reproduction of labor power by means of the housewife’s nonremunerated domestic work, but also through the subproletarianization of the wives (Beneria and Roldan 1987: 102-103).

Because it accumulates greater profits off the backs of women, the world-system does not seek to transform females into wage laborers. The system profits at maximal levels by semiproletarianizing women and by shifting to women and households most of the costs of commodity production (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987; Shiva 1988). While women are semiproletarianized, they are also semi-domesticated—not able, then, to function predominantly within or outside their households. On the one hand, they are identified socially as housewives. On the other hand, they are “fully integrated in a world market oriented production system.” According to Mies (1981: 493), “the social definition of women as housewives serves mainly the purpose of obscuring the true production relations and to consolidate their exploitation, ideologically and politically.”

Women are not simply ‘left behind’ while men monopolize the new and more productive areas of the economy; they are in fact deliberately ‘defined back’ into the role of housewives. Only if women remain outside the formal sector and are socially defined as housewives can the double exploitation of their labor go on. Not only the big exporters, but also the husbands...are benefiting as non-producers from [women’s] ongoing subsistence production. The integration of women...into a world system of capital accumulation has not and will not transform them into free wage-labourers. It is precisely this fact—their not being free wage-labourers, but housewives—which makes capital accumulation possible. (Mies 1981: 500).

Clearly, females reproduce the world-system in ways that men cannot, yet capitalists remunerate them at much lower levels than males. If capitalists compensated women for all their externalized costs and unpaid labor, prices would be driven up so high that most commodities would not be competitive in the world-economy. Thus, the modern world-system has restructured gender into forms that permit maximal extraction of surpluses from households for the benefit of capitalist production. “It was exactly this (re) creation that gave the developments of world-capitalism its specific character and, along with historical dimensions, the fuel that would eventually and constantly (re)create world capitalism” (Smith 1993: 14).

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27. As Beneria and Roldan (1987: 56-74) use the term, “subproletariat” is equivalent to Wallerstein’s semiproletariat.
CONCLUSION: BRINGING WOMEN TO THE CORE OF WORLD-SYSTEM ANALYSIS

Marginalization of gender issues by this perspective parallels the structural position of women in the world-system. At the ultimate periphery live women and girls in semiproletarianized households; and they comprise a majority of the world’s poor. Moreover, there are two bare essentials without which the world-system cannot exist: (a) the reproductive capacity of the ecosystem to supply natural resources and (b) the reproductive capacity of women to supply the human laborers and consumers who make the system profitable. Those two realities alone should be enough to convince us all that we must bring women and households much more fully into the core research agenda of world-system analysis. Failure to prioritize women represents the greatest intellectual and political blunder of the world-system perspective. There can be no effective world-system analysis or praxis so long as women and households are introduced as an afterthought or ignored completely. Gender "is not just another variable to be thrown into analyses, but is an integral component of the world-system evolution. Focusing on gender points to new theoretical insights into the factors that shape group consciousness, into subtle forms of resistance to oppression, into the ways capital exploits extant cultural values, and into ways micro and macro social processes are linked" (Day and Hall 1991: 4).

Concepts like commodity chain and semiproletarianized household lay an important foundation for us to integrate the vantage points of women, but the perspective has not yet done that. With some revision, commodity chain research can be utilized to merge macrostructural trends with the micro-level, where we may discover the everyday lives on which the complex global system feeds. As Wallerstein (1986: 15) has pointed out, world-systems analysis was born as a moral and a political protest against the exploitation and inhumanity of the present world order. I am simply challenging proponents of the perspective to remember that political agenda and, thereby, to write morality tales that are more inclusive of a majority of the wretched of the earth. For every visible node in a commodity chain, there are many invisible links to households that are grounded in the super-exploited labor of women and girls. If, then, we engender commodity chains, we will discover that the tentacles of the world-system are entwined around the bodies of women. Every diagram of a commodity chain should remind us that consumers at the end point are devouring the lives and labor of multitudes who subsist off the invisible and unrewarded inputs of semiproletarianized women. And as we descend down the nodes of the commodity chain diagram, with every link we should call Her name, not the brand name of a product. For every link is embedded in the foundation we call Woman.

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Paul Einzig, a London financial journalist, after a four week visit to New York, observed: “With few exceptions they [financiers] were convinced that the period of prosperity then being experienced was everlasting,…Although just then there was a minor slump in Wall Street…everybody I met was convinced that the boom would be resumed…” (London Financial News 4/9/26, cited in Davis, 1975:132) This would have been an accurate portrayal of the spring of 2000. But this observation was made in spring 1926.

To some analysts of the period, this was an era of optimism and miracles. After all, this was the period that the Gold Standard, the pillar of the world trade and financial system, was restored; Germany became a full member of the League of Nations, the international business index for major industrial and industrializing countries rose nearly 50% from mid-1924 to late 1929; international trade grew even between the West and the Soviet Union. “Everywhere in the Western world pre-war standards of prosperity had been surpassed….The average standard of living, even in Europe, was in 1928 higher than it had ever been.” (Salter, 1961) With the boom of the economy came the boom of the analyses explaining economic miracles. This is especially true with analyses of the “American Miracle.” Among the crucial factors that contributed to the miracle were traits of modernization: “the high premium on management and organizing capacity and the emergence of far-sighted management as a new profession”; “the open-mindedness of the American management” and “dominant national trait of optimistic energy.” (Gay, 1929) This analytical approach was reminiscent of the fashionable analyses of the “Asian Miracles” and the “Asian Tigers” in the 1970’s and 80’s.
World Trade Networks from 1928 to 1938

Tieting Su

1. Liberal World Economic System

It is argued that while an autarkic economic course was taken by fascist powers during the 1930's, the liberal leadership role was assumed by the Great Britain in the late 1920's when it restored the Gold Standard and thus the liberal world economic system characterized by open markets and free trade. With the exception of Russia, the liberal world system, which was greatly damaged by the First World War, was back on its pre-war track. Even Germany, the formal adversary of the system dominated by the Great Britain, was fast integrated into the system. (Davis 1975)

When Great Britain abandoned its leadership role of the liberal system in the early 1930's, the U.S. failed to take over the role according to some analysts (e.g. Kindleberger 1973). According to others, however, the U.S. started to adopt such a liberal course in the mid-1930's (Gilpin 1987:130). The U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934 is regarded as such a symbol (Frieden 1988; Gilpin 1987; Haggard 1988). Hence from this perspective the economic version of the clash between the Allied and the Axis powers during the World War II is basically a conflict between imperial autarky and a liberal order.

Was the world marketplace dominated only by the liberal world-system and its logic and dynamics during the first half of the period, as indicated by analysts of the period? During the second half of the period, i.e. the period of Great Depression, was there really such a dichotomy between the imperial autarky and a liberal order led by the U.S.? Did the U.S. have the material interest and the global reach which might enable its policy makers to push for a liberal world economic order?

2. World Empires

This view regards the establishment of formal autarkic empires as a further development of economic autarky or proto-empires. In other words, the economic autarkic proto-empires are the bases for development of formal empires. Hirschman (1969) analyzed the German case during the period before the Nazis took power and strived to establish a formal empire. McCormick (1989) also pointed out the existence of domestic forces in the U.S. pushing for such an imperial proto-system which may or may not develop into a fully grown system. Some proto-systems may evolve into fully developed systems and others may fade in their embryonic stage and still others may not evolve as fast. They may induce different outcomes of world political and economic and social changes.

What are some possible examples of development of systems and proto-systems? Although this exploratory research is not bound by existing theories, existing theoretical literature indicates that there were at least four systems and proto-systems: the liberal world economic system, world empires, regional systems and cultural-historical market systems.

i. Development of macro systems and proto-systems

In this article, a proto-system is defined as a macro political economic system based on actual international economic transactions in its early development stage.
during the transition period. Did proto-empires flourish during the transition period? While there have been numerous analyses of the Third Reich, the Japanese Empire, and the British and French colonial empires in the second half of this period, the key questions are: (1) were the prototypes of these empires a strong trend in the first half of the period; (2) was the U.S. also developing its proto-empire in this period?

3. Regional Systems

The third view points out the development of regional blocs during the transition period, especially during the later years of the period (Condliff, 1950; Kindleberger, 1973). This view, however, tends to confuse two types of regional blocs. One type includes hierarchical regional blocs which involve major powers and which are often the prototypes of empire blocs such as the Yen and Sterling Blocs, and the other is a true regional bloc which involve more or less equal partners based on comparative advantage. This alliance can also be construed as the arms-length extension of the nationalism of small or medium independent countries with complementary economic structures. Since the rise of economic nationalism was described as one of the most powerful features of the period (Kindleberger 1973) were there true regional blocs emerging in the transition period? Policy blocs aiming at regional coordination and cooperation were constructed such as the Oslo Group of nations which comprised Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The Rome Agreements of 1934 which involved Italy, Austria and Hungary is another example (Kenwood and Loughhead 1992). However these policy blocs only suggest “real” blocs based on actual trade flows. How powerful was the real regional proto-system during the transition period as the world economy was disintegrating?

4. Historical and Cultural Market Systems

Economic activities such as economic transactions are regarded as socially and culturally embedded (Granovetter 1985). There is evidence that economic transactions are based on historical and cultural bonds, which are difficult to sever. For example, even under formal British and French colonial rule, in the 1920’s the trade of Hong Kong carried out by indigenous merchants with merchants in French Indo-China, China, and Thailand was just as important, if not more, as trade with colonial powers and newly industrializing powers such as Japan. This old historical web was established by merchants in the area for over hundreds of years and even formal colonial governance could hardly break it. Furthermore, old colonial ties could evolve into cultural and linguistic ties. For example, in 1938 the volume of Portuguese trade with Brazil was greater than its trade with all the developing countries in Asia and Latin America combined.

How important was this cultural prototype in the transition period as the world political economic system under British hegemony was decaying? Was there a revival of historical market systems such the trade webs in West Africa, the Mediterranean, Central Asia and Southeast Asia and other parts of the world?

During this period under study, was the world marketplace dominated by any one of four systems or proto-systems, as described above, or by combinations of the systems and proto-systems? If there were combinations, what were the exact configurations? All the questions raised above can only be addressed by analysing real trade flows in 1928 and 1938.

II. DATA AND METHODS FOR TRADE NETWORK ANALYSIS

1. Data

International trade data in 1928 and 1938 provide the primary source of information for a systematic exploration of the systems and proto-systems discussed above and other possible proto-systems. I analyze trade flows among 99 countries and regions in 1928 and 100 in 1938 which had such information. The data for both years are derived from the League of Nations’ Network of World Trade (1942). The countries and regions in both years are identical except the case of Manchuria. In 1928 it was classified as part of China and in 1938 it became an independent unit of accounting after the Japanese invasion in 1931.

A focus on country by country trade flows produces two symmetric matrices (a 99 by 99 matrix in 1928 and a 100 by 100 matrix in 1938) with each cell containing the dollar volume of the trade between two countries.

The next step was to percentage these matrices, creating new matrices. These new matrices are asymmetric because for each trade relationship between two countries there are two ratios. For example, the trade in 1928 between the United States and Mexico accounts for 64.6% of Mexico’s foreign trade while it only accounts for 2.5% of U.S. foreign trade. A high percentage on either side may suggest an important relationship. Although the trade between Mexico and the U.S. only accounts for a relatively small share of America’s foreign trade, the high percentages on the part of Mexico not only suggest Mexico’s dependence on the trade but also indicate American market share and the extent of its political-economic leverage.

The next step was to construct a matrix of significant trade relations (or adjacency matrix) for network analyses. What is a significant trade relation? In order to carry out network analyses consistently, it is necessary to establish a cutting point. Since there are 99 countries in 1928 and 100 in 1938, the random trade level would
be around 1%. The analysis is performed at the 10% level, indicating a high trade engagement or a significant trade relation. Thus any percentage equal to or above 10% is recoded as “1” and that below 10% as “0.” This new adjacency matrix of “1”s and “0”s, is the input for network analyses.

2. Methods: Networks and Graph Theory

Network methods as used in social science are an extension of graph theory in discrete mathematics. They are designed to ascertain patterns of relations (edges) among actors (vertices). This study uses two major techniques in detecting patterns of network relations: centrality and subgraphs (or network groups) with the emphasis on the latter.

The degree of centrality is simply the count of significant relations of an actor with others in the network. It is a proximate measure of power. I employ this technique to identify major trade powers. However my focus is not on this aspect of network analysis, but rather on identifying meaningful structures in world trade networks in the transition period.

Previous studies on trade networks (Su and Clawson 1994; Su 1994, 1995a, 1995b) revealed that major trade network structures consist of elementary structures. Those studies mainly rely on two elementary structural concepts: clique and structural equivalent groups. While the concept of the structural equivalent groups is a useful one in other areas of social research, for our analysis it has its limitations as it does not identify the actors (vertices) that constitute the definition of a structural equivalent group. These actors in trade network analyses are important to identify as they usually occupy central positions in the structures of the network. Furthermore, the four basic structures I will discuss below are all “structurally equivalent” by definition. However, they are simply not “equivalent” in their construction of the larger systems.

In the following I will discuss these meaningful elementary structures that may give rise to larger structures.

a. clique or cohesive sets

A clique is a group where every member of the group is tied to every other member of the group by whatever criterion is selected. More technically, a clique is a maximal complete sub-graph (Alba 1973). Theoretically, the number of vertices ranges from three to infinity. In other words, theoretically it is possible that a network is simply a clique, signifying a structure of complete “interdependence” or “globalization.” The trade flows among the UK, South Africa and Egypt in 1938 constitute such a clique. There are two types of cliques in trade network analysis: one which involves major trade powers with small or medium countries and the other involving countries with more or less equal trade relations.

b. centripetal sets

A centripetal group resembles a planet-satellite structure with only an actor in the center connecting to other actors. Although this is one of the graph patterns identified by Trudeau when the number of actors (vertices) is three (1993), theoretically, the number of vertices ranges from three to infinity. It is theoretically possible that a network is simply a centripetal group suggesting a situation of complete centralization. The trade of France with its colonies in Africa and Asia in 1938 and the trade of Hong Kong with its neighbors in 1928 fits this pattern.

c. dyadic sets

In trade network analysis, this represents incidence of isolated bilateral trade. Although it is a pattern identified as one when the number of vertices is four (Trudeau 1993), it can have the number of actors ranging from four to infinity, suggesting a very decentralized structure.

d. null sets

This pattern only consists of non-interactive actors. In trade network analysis, this could mean that the actors involved have very evenly diversified trade relations with others or completely isolated actors. Theoretically, the number of actors involved in this pattern can range from two to infinity, suggesting a complete decentralization or the situation of total chaos.

b. trade blocs

A trade bloc is defined as a large trade group which combines cliques and centripetal groups. What potential trade bloc configurations are possible? There are at least three.

(1) Exclusive major power blocs. These blocs include small-sized cliques and centripetal groups revolving around major powers. These blocs do not overlap with one another. This is usually the empire autarkic economic arrangement referred to by economic historians. (Kindleberger 1973; Hirschman 1969)

(2) Overlapping major power blocs. These major core power blocs overlap with one another. Limited overlapping areas may suggest intensified competition and conflict for market and resources. Large overlapping areas together with significant relations between major powers suggest a fairly open economy for major core powers.

(3) Coexistence of major power, regional and cultural blocs. Regional or cultural blocs may emerge if trade cliques only consist of non-major-power countries or these cliques are sufficiently large so that the major power influence is diminished even though the cliques may overlap with a major power bloc.
What were the trade structures in the transition period? Did they consist of the combination of trade blocs and other structures such as dyadic and null structures? What was the configuration of the structures? If trade blocs dominated the period, what were their nature and their relations?

III. TRADE NETWORK STRUCTURES

Centrality

Trade networks in both 1928 and 1938 are highly concentrated. The U.K., the U.S., Germany and France are the most central players in the networks. They are the only ones that have significant trade relations with more than ten countries. From 1928 to 1938, the trade networks of all the major powers contracted except that of Germany. The U.K.’s significant trade relations decreased from 66 in 1928 to 60 in 1938 and those of France dropped from 21 to 15. The significant relations of the U.S. plunged from an extensive 56 in 1928 to 39 in 1938. It ranked number two in 1928 but yielded that position to Germany in 1938. The only major power that had gained ground in extending its trade relations was Germany. Its number of significant trade relations increased from 48 to 52.

The aggregate centrality measures indicate economic influence of these major capitalist powers. However they are not very informative about the structure of the trade networks and the major power trade spheres and their relations.

Were there major alternative structures other than the major power trade spheres developing in this period? What were the structural relations among major powers and their trade spheres? What structural changes took place in this transition period?

Structures

Although dyadic and null sets are theoretically possible, our empirical exploration of the trade networks in 1928 and 1938 failed to find their existence. Hence any network configuration can only be based on the combination of clique and centripetal sets.

Structural analyses based on clique and centripetal set detection techniques indicate that major powers dominated the networks. In 1928, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France were the most important trading powers in the network. Furthermore all four major trading powers had close trade ties with one another except that between the U.K. and Germany. One hundred and seventeen cliques were found for the trade network in 1928. The largest size of any clique is four. All the cliques except one involved one or more of the four major trading powers. There are relatively small exclusive centripetal sets surrounding major trading powers, the U.K., the U.S., Germany, and France. In addition, a Hong Kong set emerged with three alters.

The combination of cliques and star sets produces four major trading power spheres and a rather small trade sphere around Hong Kong.

As in 1928, the four most central players in 1938 were the U.K., Germany, the U.S. and France. Sixty-two cliques were found for the 1938’s trade network and the largest size of the clique is four. None of the cliques found did not involve one of the three major trading powers: the U.K., Germany, and the U.S. The largest centripetal sets were the ones surrounding major trading powers.

The combination of the clique and centripetal star sets shows the development of four major power trade blocs. Another striking feature of the network is the absence of close trade ties among the major trading powers except that between the U.S. and the U.K.

The empirical structures in 1928 suggest three types of systems and proto-systems, which I call the old, the new and the ancient regimes respectively. While both the old and new regimes can be regarded as a combination of liberal and imperial (or proto-imperial) systems, the major difference between the new and the old regimes lies in the way that their imperial or proto-imperial sectors are organized. While the old regime’s imperial sectors were penetrated by other major trading powers, the new regime powers were able to keep exclusive their proto-imperial sectors. The ancient regime can be construed as the revival of a historical market system. However in 1938 the ancient regime disappeared and imperial order dominated the world.

In the following I will discuss these three regimes respectively in 1928 and the imperial order in 1938.

IV. THREE REGIMES IN 1928

1. The Old Regime: The Cases of the U.K. and France

The U.K. sphere was the most global in 1928. It had significant trade relations with 15 countries and regions in Africa, 10 in Asia, 19 in Europe and 22 in the Americas. The French sphere largely concentrated in Africa and Europe in 1928.

In 1928, both Great Britain and France maintained two economic sectors in their trade spheres: the imperial sector and the market sector. About half of the countries in their spheres were their colonies in 1928. My focus in this paper is on the imperial sector, as it is the difference in this sector that distinguishes the old and new regimes and it is the structural differences here that led to the imperial order of the following two decades.
While the French colonial sector exhibits a simple centripetal hierarchical structure, the U.K. colonial segment clearly shows a combination of a simple centripetal structure and cluster hierarchical structures, which are combinations of cliques and simple centripetal sets.¹

In 1928, cluster hierarchical structures dominated the U.K.’s imperial segment. In this typical cluster not only did the U.K., the core, maintain its centripetal relations with smaller colonies but also its regional core, such as India, tied closely with those colonies. In 1928 the U.K. imperial segment had six such clusters. Other than the U.K.-India cluster, there were the U.K.-South Africa, the U.K.-Egypt, the U.K.-Canada, the U.K.-Malaya, and the U.K.-Australia-New Zealand clusters. With minor variations, all these clusters resemble the U.K.-India hierarchical cluster. This clear cut pattern of cluster hierarchical structure reflects British imperial geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy and planning. This cluster hierarchical pattern is not as obvious in the non-colonial or the market sector of the U.K. trade sphere.

Were these mainly exclusive imperial sectors? Were they free from penetration by other major powers?

First let us examine the U.K. imperial sector. As shown in Table 1, the U.K.’s imperial sector was heavily penetrated by other major trading powers, which means that the U.K. not only faced competition in its market sector but also challenges in its own bailiwicks. The largest penetration came from the U.S.. In about 45% of the countries and regions in the U.K. imperial sector a U.S. commercial presence was found. The percentage of countries that the U.K. was able to maintain exclusive relations with was only about 23%. Germany and France also penetrated the British imperial sector. A scrutiny of the penetration into different U.K. imperial clusters reveals its intensity. Where the U.S. penetrated into every one of the U.K. imperial clusters, Germany focused on the U.K.-South Africa cluster and the U.K. simple centripetal group in 1928 as the penetration ratios are 75% and 100% respectively. In 1928 France was better than the U.K. in maintaining its imperial sector, as it kept exclusive trade relations with about 44% of its colonies, shown in Table 1. However, its imperial sector was also penetrated by other major trading powers: the U.K., the U.S. and Germany.

1 These simple and cluster hierarchical structures are not easily detected as the members in the structures were also entangled in their relations with other major trading powers. However once we remove their relations with other major trading powers, the pattern becomes very clear based on elementary structures. We then consider the relations between these members and other major trading powers, which will be discussed later in the paper.

### Table 1 – Overlap between Imperial Clusters and Major Power Trade Spheres in 1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imperial Cluster</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK Imperial Clusters (n=32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-South Africa (n=5)</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>$75.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Egypt (n=5)</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Canada (n=9)</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-India (n=8)</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Malaya (n=3)</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Australia-New Zealand (n=4)</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-others (n=5)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Imperial Cluster (n=10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Proto-Imperial Cluster (n=7)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Proto-Imperial Cluster (n=4)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentages included in this table are overlap ratios which are calculated as follows:

Overlap ratio = \[ \frac{\text{M}}{\text{n}-1} \times \frac{100}{100} \]

where M = number of members in the overlapping area between a major power’s imperial segment and another major power’s bloc;

n = number of members in the imperial segment.

* These ratios indicate the percentages of members exclusive to an imperial or proto-imperial cluster.

The penetration into the imperial sectors of the old regime powers such as the U.K. and France may not be very surprising as there were forces attempting to liberalize global trade even in the imperial sectors of the old colonial powers. However it is quite a contrast once the old regime’s imperial sectors are compared with the imperial sectors of the new regime powers such as Germany and the U.S.

2. The New Regime: The Cases of Germany and the U.S.

Although Germany did not have formal colonial possessions, it was able to cultivate a cluster centripetal group as part of its trade spheres. This could be construed as a proto-imperial sector. (Hirschman 1969) This cluster centripetal group, which
is part of German trade spheres in 1928, is very much like the typical U.K.-India cluster with Austria playing a similar role as India. All the countries found in this cluster were located in Central and Eastern Europe. While engaging in competition with the U.K. in Africa and Europe in its market sector, Germany was moving towards a “proto empire,” an exclusive trading bloc in Central Europe and the Balkans as early as 1928. This was before the Nazis took power and before the Great Depression. Hitler wrote: “We stop the endless German movement to the south and the west, and turn our gaze towards the land in the east. At long last we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-War period and shift to the soil policy of the future.” (Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 598, cited in Broszat 1989:56) One has to wonder if this was simply his reflection of the reality before his time or his original design for the future.

The U.S. in 1928 also maintained a small imperial or proto-imperial sector which included the Philippines, Panama and Mexico in addition to its large market sector.

Again we can ask the same questions about the imperial sectors of the new regime as we did about the old regime: Were these mainly exclusive imperial sectors? Were they free from penetration by other major powers?

As we discussed before in 1928, Germany and the U.S. heavily penetrated the imperial sectors of the old regime powers, especially that of the U.K. However the remarkable thing is that they were able to maintain their complete exclusive trade relations with countries in their imperial or proto-imperial sectors. As shown in Table 1, both Germany and the U.S. kept their exclusive trade relations with 100% of all the countries in their imperial or proto-imperial sectors. This is in striking contrast to the old regime’s imperial sectors, where the U.K. and France could maintain exclusive trade relations with fewer than half of the countries. It is this difference in the imperial sectors that distinguishes the old and the new. While the old was unwilling or unable to keep exclusive their imperial sectors, the new was able to penetrate the imperial sectors of the old regime while keeping exclusive their own imperial or proto-imperial sectors. The new regime powers not only applied their neomercantilist strategies with regard to their respective national markets, but also their imperial sectors with great success. It is clear that if the trend continued, the old regime powers would not even be able to prevent their imperial sectors from being taken over by the new regime powers, let alone their market sectors. The trend contributed to the secular decline of the U.K., the hegemonic power, and its decision to abandon its liberal regime in favor of a consolidated empire in the early 1930’s.

3. The Ancient Regime: the Case of Hong Kong

In 1928 Hong Kong, the British colony, did not have significant trade relations with any major trading powers including the U.K.. However it was at the center of a centripetal group which involved China, Thailand and French Indochina. This trading position suggests the revival of a long-term historical market system in the region. It revived during the period of the World War I, when the U.K. and other major powers focused their attention on war in Europe and other areas. And in the post-WWI 1920’s this ancient regime maintained its momentum and prospered. However I should point out that compared with the other two regimes, it was rather weak, limited in scope and short-lived. In 1938 the U.K. resumed its predominant trade tie with its colony and the ancient market system of 1928 ceased to exist.

v. The Imperial Order of 1938

Great Britain’s abandonment of the Gold Standard in September, 1931 removed a great barrier for it to consolidate its empire. From then on it could concentrate its resources to reclaim its empire, which was heavily penetrated by other major powers in 1928. This autarkic empire building was followed by other empire builders: France, Germany, and to a great extent, the U.S. The imperial order reigned, which seems to be the only regime in the late 1930’s. There were no other competing systems or proto-systems. The only alternative system, the ancient market regime centered around Hong Kong in 1928 simply ceased to exist in 1938 when Great Britain consolidated its control over its empire. But then two crucial questions could be raised about the imperial order of the period: While it is not surprising that Germany, Japan, Great Britain and France engaged in autarkic empire building, extensively covered in the scholarly literature, was the U.S. also building its own autarkic empire? How successful were the powers in consolidating or building their empires?

During the “transition” period, the world economic system headed towards a system of world empires. This argument is not surprising in the case of Germany, Japan and even the UK, France and other colonial powers. Germany and Japan had formal “domestic” and “colonial” imperial political economic institutions and the UK and others had only formal “colonial” imperial political and economic institutions while maintaining “democratic” domestic ones. What about the U.S.?

It is clear from the trade network analysis that although the U.S. trade bloc in 1938 contracted in size as compared with 1928, it expanded its proto-imperial centripetal sector. In 1928 this sector was rather small consisting of only three countries: the Philippines, Panama, and Mexico. In 1938, however, this proto-imperial star sector expanded to include Panama, the Philippines, Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Turkey. Furthermore despite its retreat from other parts of the world, the U.S. still managed to penetrate the U.K.-Canada cluster, which was largely centered in the western hemisphere. In fact, the penetra-
As soon as war broke out in Europe, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) organized a study group, working with the U.S. State Department, to plan what the world should be like after the war was over. The war was understood as a European war rather than “World War II.” The post-war, in the minds and words of U.S. policy makers in the early 1940’s referred to the situation in which several empires might coexist after Germany won the European war on the continent. (Shoup and Minter 1977; Marshall 1995) The CFR analysis explicitly considered the relative self-sufficiency of the German bloc as compared to the U.S. bloc. The question they posed was: as the Western Hemisphere was endowed with abundant resources, if the U.S. were confined to the Western Hemisphere, would it be able to rival the German Bloc? They decided that Germany was in better shape than the United States because it could get a higher proportion of the materials it needed to dominate the world from within the countries it controlled. In order to match Germany, the U.S. needed to control the Asia-Pacific area as well. Accordingly, the Council on Foreign Relations, in conjunction with the State Department, started planning a “life space” called the “Grand Area,” which initially included the western hemisphere and Asia-Pacific area and later incorporated the United Kingdom as well. (Shoup and Minter, 1977) U.S. policy makers were contemplating the possibility of the coexistence of a German bloc and the American “Grand Area,” a U.S. proto-empire.

Furthermore the argument between the so-called “internationalists” and “nationalists” of the time was not about whether one should engage in free international trade or national isolation and protectionism. From the rhetoric of their debate, it was obvious that it was about the extent and scope of the “proto-empire.” While the America Firsters, the “nationalists,” argued that the U.S. should keep itself within the western hemisphere to achieve “self-sufficiency,” the designers of the “Grand Area” and other so-called “internationalists” argued that the western hemisphere was not large enough for “self-sufficiency.” (Marshall 1995) Both sides were concerned about a “self-sufficient” empire. “Free trade,” the cornerstone of the liberal world system, was an outmoded phrase associated with a bygone era.

One could detect an urgency in the designs of U.S. policy makers in planning a proto-autarkic empire. Why was it so urgent? Our trade network analysis reveals that as far as empire building is concerned, like Great Britain, the U.S. was on the losing side. Compared with 1928, the U.S. trade bloc in 1938 was rather limited. It was largely confined to the western hemisphere. But even here it could not exercise its domination. It is true that the U.S. expanded its centripetal proto-imperial sector in the western hemisphere. However, it could not impose exclusive control over this sector as it was heavily penetrated by Germany. As shown in Table 2, Germany penetrated into 67% of the countries in the U.S. centripetal proto-imperial sector while the U.S. could claim exclusive control in only 22% of the countries in this sector; in 1928 this ratio was 100% for the U.S. In 1928, the U.S. was able to penetrate every imperial cluster of the U.K., while in 1938, it was only able to maintain its presence in three of them. In other words U.S. leverage in the U.K. clusters had greatly declined, and at the same time the U.S. faced a fierce challenge from Germany in its own backyard. Given the German challenge as described above, whether the U.S.

### Table 2 – Overlap between Imperial Clusters and Major Power Trade Spheres in 1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imperial Cluster</th>
<th>Major Power Trade Spheres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Imperial Clusters (n=29)</td>
<td>35.7%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-South Africa (n=4)</td>
<td>0.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Egypt (n=3)</td>
<td>50.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Canada (n=7)</td>
<td>0.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-India (n=8)</td>
<td>71.4%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Malaya (n=3)</td>
<td>50.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Australia-New Zealand (n=4)</td>
<td>50.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-others (n=7)</td>
<td>33.3%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Imperial Cluster (n=10)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Proto-Imperial Cluster (n=7)</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Proto-Imperial Cluster (n=10)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentages included in this table are overlap ratios which are calculated as follows:

\[
\text{Overlap ratio} = \frac{M}{(n-1)(100/100)}
\]

where

- \( M \) = number of members in the overlapping area between a major power’s imperial segment and another major power’s bloc;
- \( n \) = number of members in the imperial segment.

* These ratios indicate the percentages of members exclusive to an imperial or proto-imperial cluster.
was able to consolidate its own proto-imperial sector in its “own” hemisphere had become a serious question with great urgency. Facing a serious challenge from other powers, especially Germany, the U.S. would probably have been content with an intact autarkic proto-empire.

Another loser in this rivalry for empire building was the U.K. Given the released resources the U.K. had used to buttress the world-system as the hegemon, the U.K. could very well have consolidated its exclusive control over the empire. In fact in 1938 the U.K. was able to maintain the cluster hierarchical structures which existed in 1928. While these structures still dominated the U.K.’s colonial segment, its simple centripetal structure expanded. However the success in rebuilding the British empire was very limited. The percentage of the members in the U.K. imperial sector with which the U.K. maintained exclusive ties was only about 36%, as shown in Table 2. Although this was an increase from the ratio of 23% in 1928, it was very low compared with Germany’s and France’s ratios, which were 83% and 89% respectively. As shown in Table 2, rivalry in the U.K. imperial clusters had become concentrated and intensified. In its South African, Egyptian and simple hierarchical clusters, the U.K. was challenged by Germany. In every country in the U.K.-Canada cluster, the U.S. commercial presence was found. The U.S. also extended its reach to the U.K.-Malaya cluster. Even France penetrated into the U.K.-Australia cluster. Although a number of policies and strategies were deployed to keep the empire exclusive, such as the currency arrangement known as the Sterling Bloc, the evidence from actual trade flows showed that the U.K. was simply not successful in keeping its empire intact.

Compared with the U.K. and the U.S., Germany and France were much more successful in their empire building. In 1938 Germany had surpassed the U.S. in the extent of its global trade web. It had the most extensive global reach next only to the U.K. It not only successfully kept its proto-imperial sector exclusive, as the exclusive ratio was 83% shown in Table 2, but also was able to penetrate the U.K.’s imperial clusters in Africa and the U.S.’ proto-imperial sector in the western hemisphere.

In 1928, the French imperial sector was heavily penetrated by other major powers. By 1938, however, it had successfully reclaimed its exclusive control over its

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2 It may be argued that the pattern of the German trade in 1938 is abnormal as it engaged in armament for war. However a comparison of the pattern in 1938 with that in 1935, for which I did a separate analysis, reveals a striking similarity. It is believed that Germany did not engage in serious armament until the beginning of the Four Years Plan in 1936 (Balfour 1992; Kindleberger 1973). Furthermore German stockpiling of raw materials for war did not seem to be the primary aim of German trade in 1938 as its stocks were very low in 1939. (Balfour 1992:61)

World Trade Networks from 1928 to 1938

vi. conclusion

Using trade networks as an empirical indicator, this paper could address a number of issues in the “transition” phase:
1. the structure of the global economic systems;
2. the decline of the U.K., the hegemon, and the material base for its decision to abandon the liberal world-system in favour of its empire; and
3. the material base for the U.S. to opt for a proto-empire in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s.

In 1928, there existed three types of systemic regimes: the old, the new and the ancient. While the weak ancient regime was clearly a revival of a historical market system, the other two were based on a hybrid of two systems: the liberal market system and the imperial system. While the old regime powers such as the U.K. and France were challenged in their own imperial sectors, the new regimes powers such as Germany and the U.S. successfully built their exclusive proto-imperial spheres. In 1938, the imperial autarkic system prevailed. It was the only order of the time with no competing systems. And this transition from a hybrid system to the imperial system alone was also reflected in the mainstream intellectual trend of the time. For Keynes (1973) the degree of profit decline and intensification of competition dictated the transition from world market to “national” market. Coase (1937) uses one variable, “transaction cost,” to justify such a transition from market to “hierarchy,” although he focuses on smaller units which constitute the larger system: the firms.

During booming 1926, the U.K. restored the Gold Standard and in the 1920’s it was still able to bail out Austria and Hungary in the name of the League of Nations. And yet in 1931 it abandoned the Gold Standard and engaged in consolidating an exclusive colonial empire by establishing the Sterling Bloc. While Kindleberger (1973) argues that the U.K. was not able to maintain the liberal world-system, others contend that it could have. The ensuing crisis of the world system was largely a policy crisis instead of a structural one: namely if the right policy had been adopted, the crisis could have been avoided and the system could have undergone a smooth transition.

Our trade network analysis suggests that the UK had to abandon the system to concentrate on rebuilding its empire because it faced fierce rivalry not only in the world market but also in its colonies, which it tried to keep exclusive while competing in the world market. The neomercantilist U.S. and Germany had cut deeply not only into the market segment of the British sphere but also its imperial segment. If the U.K. had not abandoned the world-system to concentrate on its empire, it was
probable that the U.K. would have lost the economic battle in two areas, its market sector as well as its empire. Our trade network analyses suggest that there was an absolute secular decline of Great Britain. It not only declined as the hegemon of the world-system but also declined as an empire builder.

In 1938 the U.S. trade bloc contracted and its leverage largely retreated to the western hemisphere, where it expanded its proto-imperial sector. The U.S. trade web was largely regionally based. It did not have the global reach to push for a new liberal world-system. It even had serious problems in consolidating its own proto-empire, where it was challenged by Germany. Strategic planning by key U.S. policy advisers and makers and the debate between the “internationalists” and “nationalists” all tend to indicate that the U.S. aimed at building a self-sufficient proto-empire. From the point of view of a contemporary in the 1930s and 40s, the surprising thing was probably not that the U.S. was developing its proto-empire. Rather it was surprising that history changed its course when a new liberal world-system led by the U.S. replaced the blueprint of a U.S. empire in coexistence with other empires. The key to this historical mystery needs to be sought in the development of the second phase of the war and its impact on American strategy and economy, a discussion beyond the scope of this paper.

REFERENCES


Radical Rhetoric and the Working Class During Zimbabwean Nationalism’s Dying Days

Patrick Bond

I. INTRODUCTION: AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN DECLINE

Startling arguments have been made by radical scholars that the nation-state is no longer an appropriate site for contestation of formal power, on behalf of social progress, by the ‘multitudes.’ Perhaps most extreme is the stance of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000: 305), in Empire:

As the concept of national sovereignty is losing its effectiveness, so too is the so-called autonomy of the political. Today a notion of politics as an independent sphere of the determination of consensus and a sphere of mediation among conflicting social forces has very little room to exist. Consensus is determined more significantly by economic factors, such as the equilibria of the trade balances and speculation on the value of currencies. Control over these movements is not in the hands of the political forces that are traditionally conceived as holding sovereignty, and consensus is determined not through the traditional political mechanisms but by other means. Government and politics come to be completely integrated into the system of transnational command. Controls are articulated

1. Thanks are given to an anonymous JWSR reviewer, as well as to numerous Zimbabwean and South African commentators—especially Tawanda Mutasah and Peter Alexander—who provided feedback at a Rand Afrikaans University (Johannesburg) Department of Sociology seminar where this paper was first presented in mid-2000.

2. I review (and dispute) a few of the arguments for overarching attention to world-state building in Bond (1999b).
through a series of international bodies and functions. This is equally true for the mechanisms of political mediation, which really function through the categories of bureaucratic mediation and managerial sociology rather than through the traditional political categories of the mediation of conflicts and the reconciliation of class conflict. Politics does not disappear; what disappears is any notion of the autonomy of the political.

The decline of any autonomous political sphere signals the decline, too, of any independent space where revolution could emerge in the national political regime, or where social space could be transformed using the instruments of the state.

This deduction will be controversial, at least in the African semi-periphery and periphery. The approach taken in this essay is an investigation into political prospects within a single case, Zimbabwe, which embodies various discursive currents associated with African nationalism and class politics. Elsewhere (Mhone and Bond, forthcoming; Bond forthcoming-a), I discuss the material conditions required for Zimbabwe’s national economic revival, drawing upon a modified, partial ‘delinking’ scenario advocated by even the United Nations Development Programme.

Contrary to Hardt and Negri, I will conclude that the appropriate normative formula is not the dismissal of state-sovereignty as a short-medium term objective of Third World progressive social forces, but instead, aligned simultaneously with international popular struggles against the forces of Empire (both in Washington and transnational corporate headquarters), the rekindling of nation-state sovereignty but under fundamentally different assumptions about power relations and development objectives than during the nationalist epoch. Such power relations can probably only be changed sufficiently if the multitudes contest those comprador forces who run virtually all their nation-states. To do so, I submit, will require the articulation of a multifaceted post-nationalist political programme, grounded in post-neoliberal economic formulations.

Zimbabwe is obviously not the only situation in which to consider the challenge associated with this strategy, though it is certainly one of the crucial test-cases in coming months and years. If it is possible to generalise, the most exciting social struggles in contemporary Africa tend to be between advocates of progressive politics and basic-needs development within formal and informal organisations—based in workforces, communities, women’s and youth groups, environmental clubs and churches—on the one hand, and on the other, nationalist political parties that still rule most states, often pursuing neoliberal policies yet still capable of deploying radical rhetoric.

Representing the most advanced analytical and activist currents in the former camp, an ‘African People’s Consensus’ backed by dozens of major grassroots advocacy/activist groups from Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone Africa gathered momentum at a major conference in Dakar, Senegal in December 2000.³ Catalysed by traditional critiques of neoliberalism by African political-economists...

³ The ‘Dakar Manifesto: From Resistance to Alternatives’ included the following argument:

We will first attempt to strengthen the relationships between organizations committed to this struggle in Africa and in other developing countries as part of the Jubilee South movement. In fact, we think that the strengthening of such links constitutes one of the preconditions for the success of the campaign for debt cancellation. Solidarity between these organizations represents the base on which the solidarity between South and North organizations must be built. The strategic alliance with the latter constitutes a solid link in the chain of the world human solidarity for breaking the resistance and egoism of Western states and multilateral institutions.

Another development in Africa involves the creation of new development institutions, one of which is a new State ridded of its oppressive, exploitative and repressive colonial heritage. In fact, it is imperative to reconsider all institutions inherited from colonization and create instead new institutions consistent with an endogenous and autonomous approach to development. The State and most present institutions are of ‘elitist’ type and carbon copies of their European counterparts. That is why they participate more in the repression and exploitation of the African people than in the creation of conditions allowing them to develop all their potential and to blossom. In fact, institutions created to enslave Africans would not, under any circumstances, serve to free them. Therefore, new institutions whose nature and functions are different from the ones inherited from colonization, are needed. It is necessary to put in place a new State, which will ensure equity between all and promote an integrated human development.

Organisers included CONGAD (Le Conseil des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales d’Appui au Developpement; http://www1.telecomplus.sn/cig/congad) in Senegal; Jubilee South http://www.jubileesouth.net, the Committee for the Cancellation of Third World Debt (COCAD/CADTM; http://users.skynet.be/cadtm), and the Centre National de Cooperation au Developpement.
like Samir Amin (who gave the main plenary talk in Dakar), this perspective is encouragingly similar to the kinds of international anti-capitalist, people-centred-development discourses offered by the popular movements across the world, that have generated such upsurges of protest in many sites over the past few years, including Africa, on matters such as debt and trade.

Africa’s crises—encompassing socio-economy, geopolitics, ethnicity, public health, ecology, gender relations, youth and many other sites of conflict—have generated widespread despair about the continent’s condition, especially from paternalistic Northern critics. The period of Afro pessimism, which continues, requires the fading from memory of the accomplishments of 1950s-90s struggles for national/racial justice. Only in newly liberated sites (South Africa, Namibia, Eritrea) and in last-gasp resurrections (Zimbabwe, as this essay dwells upon) does ‘nationalism’ retain substantial purchase.

Yet in virtually all the continent’s anti-colonial projects during the last half of the 20th century could be found liberatory rhetorics: of human dignity that a fully-fledged citizenship would provide at Independence, of the simultaneous need to capture the state and nurture participatory democracy, of socialist (or at the least Uhuru) development ideals, of ending racial (and sometimes gender) oppression, and of the harmonious relations between states and civil societies that would make these visions a reality. The late Claude Ake (2000: 46) expressed it as follows:

The language of the nationalist movement was the language of democracy, as is clear from: I Speak of Freedom (Nyerere), Without Bitterness (Orizu), Facing Mount Kenya (Kenyatta), Not Yet Uhuru (Odinga), Freedom and Development (Nyerere), African Socialism (Senghor), and The Wretched of the Earth (Fanon). It denounced the violation of dignity of the colonised, the denial of basic rights, the political disenfranchisement of the colonised, racial discrimination, lack of equal opportunity and equal access, and economic exploitation of the colonised. The people were mobilised according to these grievances and expectations of a more democratic dispensation.

Of course, things went badly wrong in virtually all cases. In some ways, the malgovernance that emerged across Africa emblematised larger political-economic processes and geopolitical alignments associated with the Cold War—whose African battlegrounds were often extremely hot—and the simultaneous slowdown in economic growth (and hence demand for raw materials) in Northern sites of industrial accumulation. These factors culminated in a global political-economic environment that, during the last two decades of the 20th century, was not conducive to African development.

Internal reasons for Africa’s economic problems vary, but included inherited colonial legacies (including the illogicality of many borders) and the transition from colonialism to undemocratic (and often corrupt), highly-militarised neo-colonial regimes. Many had adopted economic strategies which benefited a few urban elites at the expense of peasants (especially women producers), workers and even local

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4 Others in the tradition include Fantu Cheru, Guy Mhone, Thandika Mkandawire, Dani Nabudere and Bade Onimode.

5 Not atypical of the discourse was this comment from the conference (in Lusaka in May 1999) which launched the African People’s Consensus process (with delegates representing debt campaigning groups from Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Cameroon, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe):

We insist that debt is a manifestation of the neoliberal world order, the power of international banks to push loans on Southern borrowers without the democratic inputs of parliaments and civil societies, and the disastrous character of the world economy, which charges ever greater prices for imports from the North while paying ever lower prices for Southern exports. In short, debt is one of the most important instruments of Northern domination over the South and the domination of financiers over people, production and nature everywhere. (for more see http://aidc.org.za)

6 Also emblematic of the radical rhetoric of some civil society networks on trade (e.g., the Africa Trade and Development Network), a ‘Southern African Peoples Solidarity Network’ meeting paralleled the Windhoek (Namibia) summit of the Southern African Development Community (in August 2000), and resolved ‘that the governments of our countries’

• have for long mainly engaged in rhetorical declarations about national development, and development cooperation and regional integration, with few effective achievements;
• are mainly concerned with preserving and promoting their own individual and group status, power and privileges, and their personal and aspirant-class appropriation of our nations’ resources; and, for these reasons, are frequently engaged in divisive competition and even dangerous conflicts amongst themselves at the expense of the interests of the people at national and regional levels;  
• are, at the same time, committed to supporting and defending each other whenever the interests and power of the ruling elites come into conflict with the human rights, and the democratic and development aspirations of their own populations; and are using SADC as a self-serving old boys’ club for such mutual support;
• are increasingly responsive and subordinate to external inducements and pressures from governmental agencies in the richest industrialised countries, and their global corporations, banks and other financial organisations, and the ‘multilateral’ institutions dominated and used by them. http://aidc.org.za

7 Exemplary of banal, victim-blaming argumentation is The Economist, 13 May 2000, whose cover story on ‘The Hopeless Continent’ is subtitled: ‘Africa’s biggest problems stem from its present leaders. But they were created by African society and history.’
manufacturers. The continent's civil wars and adverse climatic conditions (droughts and floods) are increasingly identified with structural political-economic problems, ranging from post-Cold War geopolitical fragility to global warming. But too, domestic economic policies, especially in the main settler-colonial societies, were often inappropriate (Import Substitution Industrialisation was biased towards luxury-goods production, which ironically caused even greater dependence upon external sources of sophisticated machinery, parts and raw materials). Subsequent export-led growth strategies were typically promoted as a central component of ‘macroeconomic reforms' imposed on countries by lenders and Northern governments, notwithstanding the declining, glutted character of world markets associated with the main goods produced in Southern Africa.

In virtually no cases, in Africa or elsewhere, were power relations optimal to develop an economy from the standpoint of meeting the basic needs of all in society, even though this kind of strategy would have provided far greater ‘multipliers' (economic spin-offs) than multinational corporate investments or African post-colonial rulers' own prestige projects (see, e.g., Wisner, 1991). But aside from Cold War military and political interference, there were, moreover, two main external factors associated with Africa's economic crisis: falling international commodity prices since the mid-1970s (the drop for non-oil commodities was more than 80% from 1973 to 1993), and rising real interest rates since 1979 applied to massive, growing external debt (the real dollar-denominated effect was from -4 to 4%). The treadmill ran ever-faster, leaving virtually all of Africa with a reduced capacity to raise foreign exchange simultaneous to a rise in annual debt servicing obligations to levels typically above 25% of forex income.

Even taking this macroeconomic bind as given, a material link to the African crisis must also be identified at lower levels, in the rural settings in which African nationalism has proven most durable. Indeed, Mahmood Mamdani (1996: 111) argues that much of Africa's local-level rural state administration amounted—thanks to nationalist appropriation of colonial mechanisms—to ‘decentralised despotism,' even prior to the 1980s-90s crisis. Virtually all attempts to reform colonial-era Native Authority (and equivalent ethnic-based) systems in Africa failed. Even under the best case, Museveni's Uganda, where local-level power relations inherited from centralised-despotic rule had to be thoroughly broken, there remained a 'bifurcated’ duality of power: between a centrally-located modern state (sometimes directly responsible for urban order in primate capital cities) and a 'tribal authority which dispensed customary law to those living within the territory of the tribe.'

With this observation, Mamdani (1996: 287) sets the stage for the problem of global-national-local processes:

In the absence of democratisation, development became a top-down agenda enforced on the peasantry. Without thorough-going democratisation, there could be no development of a home market. The latter failure opened wide what was a crevice at Independence. With every downturn in the international economy, the crevice turned into an opportunity for an externally defined structural adjustment that combined a narrowly defined programme of privatisation with a broadly defined programme of globalisation.

The implications of this combined failure of the African state—in overlaying neoliberalism upon often-despotic rural social control—can be understood in Zimbabwe. There, not only has the existing urban-rural divide opened extremely wide in recent years. In addition, as we see, a broader (urban-based) challenge to political order has, since the late 1990s, generated more acute responses than in most countries. And here arises the dubious challenge posed by Hardt and Negri (2000: 43), ‘to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded [Empire] and refuse any political strategy that involves returning to that old arrangement, such as trying to resurrect the nation-state to protect against global capital,' because 'we insist on asserting that the construction of Empire is a step forward in order to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded it.'

Thus, in a seeming reversal of the 1960s 'winds of change' remarked upon by British premier Macmillan while liquidating the formal British empire, the surface-level appearance of Zimbabwe's 2000 parliamentary campaign had all the hallmarks of a young, fresh, democratic, and pro-Western wind sweeping out Zimbabwe's old-fashioned, proto-Stalinist 'socialist' rulers. President Robert Mugabe's reaction to a new opposition party's dramatic rise in popularity, after all, occasioned a renewed round of bashing a few thousand white farmers and the International Monetary Fund. As portrayed by the mainstream media to most of the world, Zimbabwean nationalism was in its dying days, as new, popular, democratic and ostensibly market-oriented politicians—led by two modern trade unionists—prepared to sort out the mismanagement, end the corruption and reverse the ruling party's incompetent left-wing economic policies.

But matters are certainly not that clear, and to understand why Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) isn't by any means the ‘Left' or even ‘progressive' social force in Zimbabwe, requires looking first at the post-independence socio-economic record, and then the contestation between leftwing and rightwing tendencies within the trade union movement and opposition party. The logic of the argument should be clear: the rhetoric of nationalism in disguising the exhaustion of a capital accumulation cycle itself becomes delegitimised; yet in this context, as a new working-class ideology struggles to emerge, the residual power of left-sounding discourses within nationalist rhetoric retains great currency. This is the source of Zimbabwe's terrible contemporary confusion. While
resolving the confusion through intensified class struggle remains vitally important, that struggle is more likely in the short term to be prosecuted by the international, regional and domestic capitalist classes, via IMF policy dictates,accommodated by Zanu PF (with the support of some influential ‘left-nationalist’ intellectuals) even if Mugabe implements the ‘necessary’ stabilisation measures apparently kicking and screaming. Radicals in Zimbabwe’s growing social movements have an enormously difficult period immediately ahead.

2. STRESSED NATIONALISM

Under the circumstances, it is easy to see why Zimbabwe’s nationalist project is exhausted, a phenomenon widely understood throughout society at the point its rule reached two decades in duration, in 2000. One sign, early that year, was the electorate’s rejection of a referendum promoted heavily by the Zanu PF government. In desperation, Mugabe resurrected Zanu PF’s most militant, often virulent strain of nationalist demagoguery, attempting as time ran out to simultaneously ‘solve’ the long-standing land distribution problem, terrorise supporters of the opposition, and pass the buck for its own failings to, variously, the country’s small white population, foreign countries (especially Britain and the US), imperialism in general and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular.

Separating the truth from the myth-making in Zanu PF’s repertoire is important. But it goes without saying that for the foreseeable future, Zimbabwe will remain in ‘crisis’—a situation whereby socio-economic equilibrating mechanisms have broken down, and some force external to the prevailing systematic logic must be invoked to restore stability. We return to this definition at the conclusion, for it implies the need for a much more radical process of social change than even the country’s recent upsurge of working-class and nationalist rhetorics suggest. And for many such African—and other Third World—countries facing the depredations of exhausted nationalism, the challenge of countering radical rhetoric with discourses that attract voters, and also conservative economic argumentation to attract the ‘international community’ can be debilitating.

In such a context, the contestation of political rhetoric and reality remains profound. The potential for violence and terror in such a process was already witnessed before the June 2000 parliamentary elections, when more than three dozen murders were amongst 5,000 recorded incidents of state-sanctioned intimidation. At surface level, sites of crisis in early 2001 include a massive fiscal deficit that had worsened dramatically in 2000 as Mugabe’s election-patronage strategy unfolded. The country is periodically hampered by foreign exchange shortages, with the normal six months of import cover reduced to a few days’ worth. Both city and countryside are vexed by periodic fuel scarcity that began in late 1999, with no end in sight. The army is overcommitted in a hopeless war, with more than 10,000 troops deployed far away in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in part to guard the diamond mines of leading Zimbabwean politicians and generals (the *quid pro quo* that the late Laurent Kabila offered Mugabe for the military support required to defend key installations against rebel groups backed by Uganda and Rwanda). Zimbabweans grieve lost family and friends in the midst of the AIDS pandemic, with more than one in five adults now HIV positive. The economy has, since the early 1990s, suffered unprecedented price inflation (higher than 60% in 2000), as business failures and unemployment soared from the outset of the latest downturn in late 1997. Policy confrontations with the IMF and World Bank continue. Income inequality rose during the 1990s to amongst the world’s worst levels, especially with respect to control of good farming land. Rife with corruption, the Zanu PF government appears to be in death-throes stage, with internecine conflict between old- and new-guards often exploding into public (and degenerating into chaos in several of the party’s provincial structures), and likely to worsen prior to the next presidential election (mid-2002) in which Mugabe may or may not choose his successor. The country’s 12 million people are restless and often furious, as demonstrated in occasional urban riots.

However, these *symptoms* are rarely explored in relation to the underlying character of the struggle, confused as it is by ideological fudging. The 2000 election did not clarify much, with Zanu PF taking 48% of 2.5 million votes, against 46% for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a difference of just 70,000. Zanu PF thus gained 62 of 120 contested seats, with an additional 30 appointed directly by Mugabe according to an outmoded, unpopular constitution. A few months earlier, in February, a national referendum on a new constitution—55-45% against government proposals—had revealed an impressive mobilisation of MDC supporters and an apathetic turnout from peasants who normally champion the ruling Zanu PF party. If the referendum was widely interpreted as another ‘yellow card’ (soccer referee warning) for Mugabe, the MDC hopes and plans on using its ‘red card’ (eviction) emblem in the 2002 presidential election, under the leadership of a charismatic ex-trade unionist, Morgan Tsvangirai.

Mugabe, 76, has raised hopes, even within Zanu PF (which correctly sees him as a popular liability) by hinting that he won’t stand again. But at this writing it appears he may well run for a fifth term as leader, as there is no obvious successor in the wings of his fractious, crisis-ridden party. A December 2000 Zanu PF congress rid the leadership of at least one potential successor (a lawyer, Eddison Zvobgo), thanks to Mugabe-authorised purges. Former minister of justice Emmerson Mnanagwwa, who in the 2000 election lost his constituency seat to the MDC, was brought back by Mugabe to become Speaker of Parliament, and is usually mentioned as a logical heir, as is Zanu PF chairperson John Nkomo (from the Ndebele ethnic minority, which probably prevents him becoming national
leader). But an additional name, Simba Makoni, a much younger (51) technocrat-politician recently named as finance minister, has also surfaced as the possible heir. Ironically, the most influential advisor to Mugabe has been Zanu PF’s minister of information Jonathan Moyo, a former liberal political scientist (trained at University of Southern California) who during the 1990s directed the Ford Foundation in Kenya but who turned to hard-line nationalist discourses in 1999 (Moyo has many internal foes in Zanu PF, but remains a significant personality, known for untiring vitriol against opponents). Regardless of which individual is given the status of presidential candidate (and when that might happen), the job of controlling a fracture-ridden party—and from there, the fortunes of the country—will still likely be Mugabe’s for the foreseeable future (as it was Julius Nyerere’s in the Tanzanian ruling party during the 1980s following his formal retirement from government). In short, however, the role of leading personalities during a period of ebbing African nationalism is often decisive, warranting continuing attention.

The most likely scenario, then, is that Mugabe retains his office until the last minute, dispensing patronage and probably terror in equal measure, hoping to assure some kind of amnesty for crimes he could be prosecuted for—whether associated with corruption or his role in the mid-1980s mass murder of 5,000 Ndebele civilians in Matabeleland. MDC leader Tsvangirai publicly offered such an amnesty in early 2000, when it appeared his party would win the parliament convincingly; Mugabe turned instead to a campaign of intimidation and squeezed through the election with a bare majority of contested seats.

Still, the MDC gained powerful experience and momentum in the June 2000 elections. It has the capacity to harass Mugabe through its 57-strong parliamentary delegation (such as through a presidential impeachment process which amounts mainly to a public relations gimmick) and various legal challenges to the ruling party.8 Thus, the widespread impression in Zimbabwe is that even a dynamic Zanu PF leader with full party support will not prevent a transfer of executive power in 2002.

Yet, cynics posit, Tsvangirai will just as likely repeat the wretched experience of Zambia. There, trade unionist Frederick Chiluba won the 1991 election against veteran nationalist Kenneth Kaunda with a multiclass alliance, and quickly applied neoliberal economic policy with even worse results than his predecessor. Unpacking the ideological ‘spaghetti’ (as Tsvangirai terms it) of the MDC’s self-styled ‘social democracy’ is thus a vital ongoing exercise. Given that the MDC is the first political party over the past two decades with a chance of upsetting Zanu PF’s hold on power, the run-up to 2002 presents a crucial time for defining the ideological struggles within the struggle. To do so requires reconsideration of the 1990s socio-economic crisis.

3. THE LOST DECADE OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

In 1980, Zimbabwe’s independence was won after a brutal war against 200,000 white, settler-colonial Rhodesians (with 40,000 black casualties); the core force was a guerrilla army which enjoyed—and sometimes forcibly compelled—mass support from the peasantry. Mugabe and his on-off-on ally Joshua Nkomo (who died in 1999) established an ideology of national unity with ‘socialist’ overtones. But over the years Zanu PF’s status quo development strategy failed to raise living standards, aside from construction of an initial round of rural clinics and schools, and the growth of a 180,000-strong lower middle-class state bureaucracy.

A key reason was the growing influence of the World Bank and IMF. While the 1990s represent a lost decade of development for Zimbabwe, the rot had set in earlier. Even in 1977, political scientist Rukudzo Murapa predicted ruptures within the alliance between a politically ambitious petit-bourgeois leadership, a dependent and desperate proletariat and a brutally exploited and basically uninitiated peasantry. Forecast Murapa (1977: 28),

After national liberation, the petitbourgeois leadership can abandon its alliance with the workers and peasants and emerge as the new ruling class by gaining certain concessions from both foreign and local capital and, in fact, forming a new alliance with these forces which they will need to stay in power. Of course, lip service commitment, a la Kenya, to the masses, will be made.

Zanu PF leaders’ post-independence realignment is reflected not only by the steady rise in corruption, and by the fact that most of the good agricultural land and other wealth redistributed since 1980 has gone to Mugabe cronies, not the masses. Most importantly, Zimbabwe’s new rulers made bad policy choices and succumbed to arm twisting by Washington. Finance minister Bernard Chidzero (who later chaired the IMF/Bank Development Committee) borrowed massively at the outset, figuring that repayments—which required 16% of export earnings in 1983—would, he insisted, ‘decline sharply until we estimate it will be about 4% within the next few years.’ The main lender, the World Bank (1992: 3), concurred:

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8. The merits of such approaches, in contrast to mass-action strategies in the streets, was thrown into question repeatedly, including in a failed MDC effort to contest 39 of the parliamentary contests it lost, as Zanu PF then legislated in parliament that any such challenge was illegal.

The debt service ratios should begin to decline after 1984 even with large amounts of additional external borrowing. In reality, Zimbabwe's debt servicing spiraled up to an untenable 37% of export earnings by 1987.

Loan conditions quickly emerged. By 1985, the IMF pressured Mugabe to cut education spending, and in 1986 food subsidies fell to two-thirds of 1981 levels. Similarly, genuine land reform was stymied not only by the ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ compromise with Ian Smith's Rhodesians during the 1979 constitution-writing exercise at Lancaster House, but by the World Bank’s alternative: showering peasants with unaffordable micro-loans. From a tiny base in 1980, the Bank's main partner agency in Zimbabwe granted 94,000 loans by 1987. But without structural change in agricultural markets, the Bank strategy floundered, as 80% of borrowers defaulted in 1988 notwithstanding good rains (Bond, 1998: Chapter 10).

Radical analyst Ibbo Mandaza (1986: 53) lamented, 'International finance capital has, since the Lancaster House Agreement, been the major factor in the internal and external policies of the state in Zimbabwe.' Agreed Thandike Mkandawire (1984: 43), presently head of the Geneva-based United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 'It seems the government was too anxious to establish its credentials with the financial world.' The macroeconomic situation worsened when Chidzero persuaded Mugabe to ditch Rhodesian-era regulatory controls on prices and foreign trade/financial flows, liberalising the economy through an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Esap) in 1991. Esap was supposedly 'homegrown,' but World Bank staff drafted much of the document, which was substantively identical to those imposed across Africa during the 1980s-90s.

Esap brought immediate, unprecedented increases in interest rates and inflation, which were exacerbated (but not caused) by droughts in 1992 and 1995. As money drained from the country, the stock market plummeted by 65% in late 1991 and manufacturing output declined dramatically (from a peak 32% share of GDP in 1992 to 17% six years later). From 1992 to 1994 alone, Zimbabwe's largest textile firm and more than 60 clothing firms collapsed, and the industry that remained operated at only 65% capacity in 1995 (Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, 1996: 48). The country became little more than a re-export platform for South and East Asian textiles (technically ‘dumped’) and second-hand clothes from European aid agencies. Ironically, against all evidence to the contrary, the World Bank's Project Completion Report (1995: 23) gave the best possible final grade to Esap: 'highly satisfactory.' All the macroeconomic targets failed, but the Bank blamed 'poor phasing' and two droughts.

Urban workers and lumpenproletarians began to resist, most self-destructively in a series of 'IMF Riots' during the 1990s, and also less obviously through a dramatic rise in petty crime and domestic violence. More promisingly, the 1990s saw the emergence of a deep-rooted urban political alienation from nationalist discourse, and the rapid maturing of political consciousness. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) under Tsvangirai's leadership broke out of a paternalist grip in which Zanu PF had held the federation since its 1981 founding (when Albert Mugabe, brother of Robert, served as secretary), and in which union strategies, tactics and politics were controlled during the 1980s. As general secretary in 1989, Tsvangirai even found himself in jail for two weeks, simply for supporting left-wing students' criticism of Zanu PF's rapid right-wing drift towards structural adjustment.

Quickly identifying neoliberalism as one of the most important issues (along with corruption) dividing the Zimbabwe government from the masses, Tsvangirai predicted a difficult period ahead, at the outset of the Esap when bourgeois commentary was universally optimistic:

> What we are looking for in Zimbabwe is a democratic space. Because what is going to be sacrificed in this programme [Esap] is democracy. When people go to the streets, complaining about these things, the state will be forced to use power to quell these riots, and in fact one of the ironies is that we are arming our own people—the police and the army—to turn against our people. At the end of the day we become the marginalised group, because the government has put itself in a position so that it cannot take a stand against the IMF. The only way to defend against international capital marginalising further the indigenous businessman, the worker, the peasant, is to have all these groups together.

Yet the ZCTU was not well-placed to take advantage of the opening, and instead zigzagged between anti-imperialist critique of externally-imposed structural adjustment (1990-94), a desire for corporatist technical solutions (1994-97) and a broad-based front-building strategy aimed at dislodging the authoritarian Zanu PF regime (1997-present) (Raftopoulos and Sachinkonye forthcoming; and Yeros forthcoming). The erratic nature of ZCTU politics can probably best be explained by the movement’s initial political marginalisation, for the Zanu PF government's divide-and-conquer strategy (enhanced by residual nationalist loyalties in several key union affiliates) seriously threatened the ZCTU after an initial anti-Esap union protest on May Day, 1992 was met with repression. As the ZCTU retreated into an aspirant-corporatist mode, even Tsvangirai sought an accommodation with neoliberalism.

10. Author's interview with Morgan Tsvangirai, published as 'What We Need is Mass Action!', *Southern Africa Report*, July 1991.
To this end the ZCTU’s important 1996 Beyond Esap policy advocacy document was penned by a diverse group of technical associates (including one noticeable merchant banker). Blinkered by the desire to remain relevant to reforming Esap in potential tripartite settings (including sectoral fora dealing with housing, social security and other social policies), Beyond Esap in fact codified many of the Mugabe regime’s worst conceptual errors and policy recommendations. As Tsvangirai himself wrote in the foreword, ‘While acknowledging that SAPs are necessary, the study shows that they are insufficient in fostering development’ (a more militant political strategy would have generated the affirmation that Esap was unnecessary and indeed that it fostered underdevelopment in Zimbabwe during the 1990s).

The ZCTU’s (1996: i, 20-21, 58, 61) neoliberal policy concessions in Beyond Esap included (1) avoiding ‘subsidisation of nonproductive uses’; (2) means-testing ‘welfare and relief funds’; (3) ‘trimming the public sector’; (4) ‘repeal[ing] any regulations... that discriminate against non-formal sector activities or small-scale firms’; (5) ‘hav[ing] the peasant captured by the market’; and (6) ‘close government collaboration with private business’ on industrial policy. Beyond Esap also suggested that ‘financial resource mobilisation’ should include ‘government selling off its assets using the proceeds to reduce the stock of debt’ and ‘encourag[ing] people to save by providing incentives that would encourage them to invest in shares quoted on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange.’ Regarding fiscal policy, the ZCTU consultants argued, ‘current [domestic] debt needs to be reduced substantially’ and there is a ‘need to redirect government funds away from recurrent towards capital expenditure.’ The ZCTU also posed a crucial limitation for future strategies, namely that ‘There can be no return to pre-Esap policies, partly because of the stranglehold that foreign creditors have on policy through the substantial debt that has accumulated, paradoxically, because of the failure of the policy.’

The basis for the terribly concessionary language—a reflection of the opposition’s lost decade, in programmatic terms—was a consistent, mainly fruitless attempt to establish a broad ‘social contract’ that would, as Tsvangirai put it in a typical mid-1990s remark,

involve the three parties reaching a consensus where workers agree to restrain wage demands on the one hand and employers agree to control price increases for commodities, invest surpluses to create more jobs and train workers on the other. For Government, you would expect them to cut spending.

Corporatism on the semi-periphery of the world economy is never easy. As Zimbabwe’s economic crisis deepened, autonomous, shopfloor-based actions outran the ability of national union bureaucrats to control or direct the membership. The corporatist strategy mistakenly pursued during the mid-1990s by the ZCTU quickly became irrelevant.

By 1998, in the wake of an unprecedented year-long wave of worker militancy (including previously docile public sector employees and even atomised plantation workers) and two successful national mass strikes against Mugabe’s policies, Tsvangirai had changed direction again, this time apparently back to the left. Instead of joining a National Economic Consultative Forum in January 1999, as expected, he led a ZCTU walkout on the grounds that Mugabe’s government could not be trusted. A few weeks later, Tsvangirai convened a broad-based National Working People’s Convention (a significant name), which cited not only good-governance concerns, but also

the inability of the economy to address the basic needs of the majority of Zimbabweans; the severe decline in incomes, employment, health, food security and well being of people; the unfair burden borne by working women and persistence of gender discrimination in practice; the decline, and in some cases collapse of public services; the lack of progress in resolving land hunger and rural investment needs; the weak growth in industry and marginalisation of the vast majority of the nation’s entrepreneur’s...

In contrast, the Convention resolved that

National policies should prioritise the mobilisation and organisation of resources to meet people’s basic needs for food security, shelter, clean water, health and education; the equitable distribution of resources such as land, skills, capital and technology for production and industrialisation strategies that are based on building and using the capabilities of the people for production.....The country should aim to reduce its dependency on foreign loans and the loss of sovereignty that this brings.....The right to a minimum standard of health inputs (food, water, shelter) and health care must be defined and entrenched in the constitution, guaranteed and funded on an equitable basis by the state through its mobilisation of national resources.....The Convention thus resolved to take these issues to the people across the country, to mobilise them towards the working people’s agenda, and to implement a vigorous and democratic political movement for change.

11. See Bond 1998: Chapter 12, for full details.
Tsvangirai also led a National Constitutional Assembly process that in 1998-99 garnered sufficient popular support to force Mugabe to set up his own constitution-rewriting commission. And in a telling move, he explicitly— if unsuccessfully— informed the IMF that any further funding to the Zanu PF government in August 1999 would be firmly opposed. The massive foreign debt Zimbabwe faces will be a bone of contention for any post-Mugabe government, and questioning the legitimacy of structural adjustment funding to Mugabe was an important first step towards, potentially, repudiating the IMF and Bank's other loans at some future date. Finally, when in mid-1999, ZCTU leaders Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda (the federation's president) announced the formation of the 'labour-backed' MDC, a founding manifesto balanced its overall good governance orientation with quite expansive socio-economic visions.14

Interestingly, at the MDC's launch in September 1999, Sibanda attempted to undermine Zanu PF's claim to nationalist memory by describing the new democratic struggle as another 'chimurenga' war, in the same spirit as a 1890s insurrection against the initial white-settler invasion, and the 1960s-70s guerrilla war against Rhodesian colonialism:

Our struggle in Zimbabwe has always been a struggle for the dignity and sovereignty of the people. We, the workers and peasants have always been in the leadership of that struggle. In our first chimurenga/umvukela, workers fought against massive exploitation in the mines, farms and industry, and peasants against the expropriation of their land. The nationalist and liberation movement that led the second chimurenga/umvukela was born from and built on the struggles of workers and peasants. But after twenty years of Independence, we now have a ruling nationalist elite that has exploited this long history towards its own ends, betraying the people's struggles. Is this the country that we fought for and rejoiced in 1980?15

A few months later, Tsvangirai provided more clarity about the potentially post-nationalist, post-neoliberal MDC project:

In many ways, we are moving from the nationalist paradigm to politics grounded in civic society and social movements. It's like the role and influence that in South Africa, the labour movement and civil society organisations had over the African National Congress in the early 1990s. MDC politics are not nationalist inspired, because they focus more on empowerment and participation of the people. Zanu PF's nationalist thinking has always been top-down, centralised, always trapped in a timewarp. Nationalism was an end in itself instead of a means to an end. One of Zanu PF's constant claims is that everyone in Zimbabwe owes the nationalist movement our freedom. It's therefore also become a nationalism based on patronage and cronism.16

For Tsvangirai, a logical discourse was 'social democracy':

We are social democrats. The MDC can never be pure, ideologically, because of our broad orientation. Besides, social democracy is a half-way house, a spaghetti mix. In our case, the main characteristic is that we are driven by working class interests, with the poor having more space to play a role than they do now. But one of the components is an element of participation by business, which is just not able to develop under present conditions.

In slightly more concrete terms, the implications involve a strong commitment to meeting basic needs:

Development must be genuine, defined by people themselves. We know that export-led growth is not a panacea. And we place a high priority on meeting basic needs. How could we not, with 75% of the population live below poverty? So our development strategy will highlight land, health, education and the like.

When asked of the concern that with such a multi-class project, the MDC will end up like the Zambian Movement for Multiparty Democracy, Tsvangirai replies:

I think Chiluba did not come on board with any ideology at all. But the main lesson there is that if the workers are not careful, they may give up their initiative over the party. That means that even though we need to build coalitions, the structure of MDC has to be, and is, participatory, with far more control from the base than normal parties.

The best indication of the potential for Zimbabwe workers' leftward momentum, in the wake of the conservative discourses of the 1990s, may simply be Mugabe's own confused and confusing reaction: a resurgence of leftwing rhetoric. By late 1999, Mugabe publicly told the IMF to 'Shut up!', amongst other outbursts reported in the international press. This was not unjustifiable, for the IMF's Zimbabwe objectives were straightforward: Mugabe was told in August 1998 to reverse the only three progressive things he had done in a long time, namely the imposition of a) a ban on holding foreign exchange accounts in local banks, b) a luxury import tax in 1997, and c) of price controls on staple foods in mid-1998 in the wake of IMF riots. Corporate foreign currency accounts were reintroduced (with a small amount withheld to pay for vital inputs), and so, according to a blunt Michael Nowak, IMF assistant director for Africa.


15. The Worker, 72, September/October 1999, for more on the ideological give and take, see Yeros, forthcoming.

16. See Southern Africa Report, 15, 3, June 2000, for these and the following quotes.
There are two issues outstanding and these have stopped the IMF from making the [$53 million] standby credit available to the country. These issues are, one, we want the government to reduce the tariffs slapped on luxury goods last September, and secondly, we also want the government to give us a clear timetable as to when and how they will remove the price controls they have imposed on some goods.17

Mugabe gave in sufficiently to win the first tranche of support in August 1999, but when he continued running a budget deficit and refused to unpeg the Zimbabwe dollar from the US dollar,18 the IMF quickly stopped the funds. Holders of forex accounts began hoarding hard currency, and by late in 1999 Zimbabwe ran out of foreign reserves and, in turn, could not even pay for US$10 million in monthly petrol imports.

The issue of Zimbabwe's sovereignty persisted, as shown below, into campaign debates over the government's 'Millennium Economic Recovery Programme' (a slightly more dirigiste structural adjustment programme). Yet even if Mugabe was appropriately furious at IMF bias against the poor, again and again, throughout Zimbabwe's history, the president had shown a remarkable capacity to talk-left, act-right. Mugabe often reserved his most revolutionary-sounding rhetoric for those occasions when there appeared leftist political threats. As a US banker observed in 1982, 'I feel it is a political pattern that Mugabe gives radical, anti-business speeches before government makes pro-business decisions or announcements.'19

The most emotive 'anti-business' issue in Mugabe's contemporary discourse is land inequality, and with it, the violation of property rights. (Such violation is, by all objective considerations, required to resolve the problem, given the failure of willing-seller/willing-buyer policy over two decades duration.) Yet here Mugabe has potentially broken the talk-left, act-right mould. In 1997 Mugabe restored the prominence of the War Veterans' Association, after a long period of neglect. He granted each vet Z$50,000 (then US$5,500) on a once-off basis, plus a Z$2,000 pension per month. The vets, in turn, became Mugabe's shock troops after the February 2000 referendum defeat, invading more than 1,500 white-owned farms, allowing Mugabe to resurrect, yet again, the claim that only Zanu PF can resolve Zimbabwe's land inequality. With that claim, albeit contradicted by two decades of land-reform failure, came something else: a memory of an anti-colonial struggle that only Zanu PF can invoke, and an image of a time when the party was in fact a fish within the sea of the rural masses.

Even if there are numerous complex structural relationships in the country-side, the essential problem is simple: land hunger for millions of peasants and small farmers (relegated to the country's worst soils and driest regions), alongside vast unutilised arable land on 4,000 white-owned commercial farms whose products, especially tobacco, are mainly exported. The land question entails many factors: durable colonial/neocolonial relations and deep-rooted white racism; a bad deal struck by the liberation movements with the outgoing Rhodesian regime at the 1979 Lancaster House power-transfer agreement; subsequently a failed market-oriented land reform (and microcredit) program overly reliant upon World Bank money and advice; widespread ruling-party corruption in the land acquisition process; bureaucratic bungling; worsening international commodity market conditions; rising costs of agricultural inputs; devastating (Kuznetsian) cycles of speculative credit and land prices; and growing inequality associated with the disastrous 1990s structural adjustment program.

The gender and generational dimensions of the land question remain extremely important due to residual aspects of colonial-capitalist labour-power reproduction. Consistent with classic systems of articulations of modes of production, many functions—child-rearing, medical care for sick workers and old-age care, without adequate state support—were traditionally farmed out to rural women instead of being internalised within the capitalist labour markets (through adequate state-provided schooling, worker healthcare plans and pensions, none of which were universally available to black Zimbabweans). Although over time, a net positive remittance of wages flowed from urban workers to rural kin and there were some improvements in rural social welfare provision (especially clinics and schools), nevertheless the rural-urban subsidy provided by African women emerged again during the 1990s via transfers of maize and other staple foods to kin in towns and cities. The simple reason was that urban-rural wage remittances declined dramatically due to structural adjustment.

Likewise, environmental pressures associated with land hunger are terribly important. They include not just traditional concerns over woodlot deforestation, soil erosion, watershed siltation, and land exhaustion, but also household environmental problems such as excessive use of wood and paraffin indoors due to lack of electricity (with attendant public health problems), poor quality sources of water and sanitation, and worsening vulnerability to drought and flood.

A central if sometimes unstated presumption in the most rigorous left-nationalist discourse is that these kinds of very durable problems cannot be resolved by mere judicious state intervention, whether via a 1980s World Bank credit plan (in lieu

18. After a speculative run in early 1999, it was held at Z$38/US$1 until August 2000 when it was revalued at just below Z$50/US$1; by early 2001 the black market value was down to Z$75/US$1.
of adequate land reform), or the state land acquisition process proposed during the 1990s but only haltingly implemented. Post-colonial history in Zimbabwe and similar settings demonstrates that states, ruling parties, bureaucrats, rich farmers and local power-brokers can and do together resist radical change in rural land, property and social relations. Thus the war vets’ invasion of white-owned commercial farms has been promoted by varied Zimbabwean left-nationalists and their allies abroad (including some South African communists, pan-Africanists, land-rights activists and other radicals).

More than 1,000 of 3,000 identified white-owned farms continued to witness settlers in the months after the June 2000 election. But given resource shortages of fertilizers, pesticides, marketing support and credit, the sustainability of resettlement operations were rapidly thrown into question.20 However, even if unevenly implemented, the occupations and official resettlement exercise had the effect of sobering white farmers (five of whom were killed while contesting the war vets during 2000), and softening their resistance to land reform (many dozens gave up their land to emigrate). The more rational of white farmers conceded that they had not turned over sufficient land to the government for resettlement at Independence (as they were protected by a willing-seller, willing-buyer clause in the transition settlement agreement at London’s Lancaster House). Indeed, in many parts of the country, white farmers professed a willingness to help parcel out chunks of land they weren’t using (often estimated in excess of 20 percent of their holdings), and even to persuade selected neighbors who mismanaged their plantations to turn them over for resettlement.

The state, however, already possessed vast quantities of land (once owned by white farmers) which it did not have the capacity to redistribute. Resettlement on the best land was regularly delegitimised by blatant cronyism and corruption. Another dilemma was the prolific use of good farmland for tobacco, Zimbabwe’s main source of foreign currency. When some war vets began tearing up tobacco plants to plant the stable maize crop, they were quickly dissuaded by officials.

20. Lack of support reflected empty state coffers. Indeed, the Zanu PF government had originally pledged to compensate white farmowners for their built improvements (buildings, irrigation and related works), but not underlying land values. However, as land occupations continued and the fiscal deficit rose, that prospect also faded, and the option of Britain coming in to reimburse white farmers for resettled land, as Zanu PF had demanded, was vetoed by the Blair government on grounds, as his aid minister Clair Short unconvincingly explained, that the Labour Party was not the coloniser of Zimbabwe. No compensation was ever discussed for the tens of thousands of (black) farmworkers displaced in the process.

21. Interview, Wilf Mhanda, June 2000; for more on the questionable character of Mugabe’s claim to nationalist war-hero status, see the interview with Mhanda in Helen Suzman Foundation periodical Focus, December 2000.


paramount, as the country’s vice president told a rural rally just prior to the election: ‘Even if we put a baboon in Chivi, if you are Zanu PF you vote for that baboon.’

Meanwhile, race relations deteriorated, as reflected in a not atypical comment of a Zanu PF member of parliament:

Let me assure you whites here, that once you support MDC, Zanu PF is not going to treat you as business people, but as politicians. Then if you are treated as politicians, it is like signing your own death warrants. The political storm will not spare you. Let you be informed that our reserve force, the war veterans, will be set on you.

As the main war veterans leader, Chengerai Hitler Hunzvi, confirmed a few weeks before the parliamentary election, ‘Like in any revolution, the path is always bloody, and that is to be expected, and hence no one should raise eyebrows over the deaths of four white farmers….God told us to grab the farms: from them we shall get something to eat.’ As for Mugabe’s perspective on the farm occupations, ‘This is a clear peaceful demonstration and there is no problem with that.’

But beyond this more vulgar, intimidating version of nationalistic, other conflicting discourses emerged, in relation to international financial pressure. Zanu PF leaders continued talking left (and not necessarily with the intention of acting left) while the MDC talked right. Asked whether Zimbabwe needed a financial lifeline, Tsvangirai replied ambiguously, ‘I still hate the World Bank and IMF, but I hate them like I hate my doctor.’ He explained (in a March 2000 interview) the need for a pragmatic not ideological posture:

They have put us into a serious debt trap. We may have to negotiate with the IMF to get out of that. What is important, down the line, is for Zimbabwe to work itself out of the IMF and World Bank’s grip. In the short term, we have to distinguish between financial support that serves Mugabe, versus that which serves the country.

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28. The one exception was explained as a slip-of-tongue. Tsvangirai threatened ‘mass action’ (ordinarily interpreted as non-violent civil disobedience) against the government as the MDC celebrated its first anniversary in September 2000: ‘What we want to tell Mugabe today is that please go peacefully. If you don’t want to go we will remove you violently.’ (The statement was immediately retracted, and the mass-action threat was withdrawn by late 2000, when the limited odds of success became apparent.)

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Radical Rhetoric and the Working Class

Is it, thus, fair to assert—as does Mugabe’s spokesperson, Jonathan Moyo—that Tsvangirai is a sell-out given the MDC’s retreat from left rhetoric on land and international financial dependency? Has there been, in short, a fatal penetration of the MDC by capitalist values and personalities?

5. Capitalist Entryism

Zanu PF’s hypocrisy in pointing out MDC capitalist entryism is evident, merely by citing names of tycoons who have nurtured Zimbabwe’s ruling party over a quarter-century (Tiny Rowland of Lonrho, Tony O’Reilly of Heinz, mining tycoon Algy Cluff, and others). But quite spectacularly, a leading official of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), Eddie Cross, was appointed economic secretary of the MDC in February 2000; it was the decisive signal that the core MDC leadership aimed to ally with big business.

Cross comes from a faction of capital that has long supported the introduction of structural adjustment, and which applauded Mugabe for turning to free-market policies during the 1990s. Even after a decade of failure, Cross told the Zimbabwe Independent in May 1999, ‘We in industry believe that the only way to make a significant impact is to comply fully with the IMF conditions.’ Although in mid-2000, Cross was told to take a backseat role because his public statements were controversial, he is understood to be the central figure pulling the MDC to the right, mediating between the opposition party and its (white) business and commercial-farming funders. The transcript of a speech Cross gave to a packed house at Harare’s Book Cafe in March 2000 is one of the few in-depth, honest appraisals of ideological orientation to be found from within the MDC’s conservative flank, and is therefore worth substantial attention.

Cross began with a diatribe against the massive state debt accumulated by the Zanu PF regime (there was no mention, until a questioner pointed it out at the end, that the debt was mainly built up as a result of the pro-corporate structural adjustment programme’s logic). Cross turned quickly from the critical shortage of forex to the fact that Mugabe is ‘totally politically isolated,’ with only friends like Laurent Kabila (Democratic Republic of Congo), Sam Nujoma (Namibia), Mahathir Mohamad (Malaysia) and Moammar Qaddafi (Libya)—‘providing you don’t ask them for money.’ He noted the total dependency of Zimbabwe upon one

company, British Petroleum (for petrol imports)—but ‘you [Mugabe] go and kick them in the teeth. A telephone call to the chairman of BP and we are sunk!’

As for Mugabe’s ‘Millennium Economic Recovery Programme’ (an update of the structural adjustment programme), Cross railed,

It is toilet paper. It is worth nothing. Complete junk and if implemented it would simply compound our problems. They talk about exchange controls, they talk about price control, they talk about continuing to maintain controls on the Zimbabwean dollar. They talk control on wages. But nothing in the document to address the fundamental problems, absolutely nothing. I actually met with the IMF team after they had spent four fruitless days in Harare, going through the document, going through the planning with the Government and everybody that the Government could bring to speak to then—including Bernard Chidzero, the ex-Minister of Finance—to plead with them to reconsider their position. They saw me after the process and said that there was nothing in the document that they could take back to Washington. Nothing. They said if they took that back to Washington they would be the laughing stock of the financial community in Washington. And I am afraid that throughout the financial institutions of the world, Zimbabwe is the black sheep.

Similarly, Cross remarked, the controversial trip to Harare by South African president Thabo Mbeki and several key officials in March 2000 generated very little. A threatened cut to Zimbabwe’s electricity supply from SA’s Eskom parastatal due to nonpayment was reportedly deferred pending Eskom’s takeover of Zimbabwean state facilities, but a US$120 million loan hinted at by Zimbabwe and widely reported as a bailout in the SA press was hastily denied by the SA Finance Ministry. As Cross interpreted,

South Africa is terrified of our situation here. When Thabo Mbeki was here he agreed to a programme of assistance with Mugabe and he agreed to a wide variety of other things. Went back to Pretoria and the guys in Pretoria said there is no way on this earth that we are going to allow you to prop up their regime in Zimbabwe. He had to go back to the drawing board, as you know. The financial proposals that were agreed to here in Harare were torn up and the South Africans are giving us very limited assistance.

What, then, did Cross propose to resolve the economic crisis?

First of all, we believe in the free market. We do not support price control. We do not support government interfering in the way in which people manage their lives. We are in favour of reduced levels of taxation. We are in favour of introducing Value Added Tax and we will do so quickly, within six months. We are in favour of a National Revenue Authority, these things are things which the government has been talking about for years. We believe they are sound developments. We would like to cap tax levels, both for individuals and for companies.

On privatisation, Cross was especially brash:

We are going to fast track privatisation. All fifty government parastatals will be privatised within a two-year time frame, but we are going far beyond that. We are going to privatise many of the functions of government. We are going to privatisate the Central Statistical Office. We are going to privatise virtually the entire school delivery system. And you know, we have looked at the numbers and we think we can get government employment down from about 300,000 at the present time to about 75,000 in five years.

This emphatic agenda was, in effect, the medium-term wish-list of the CZI over several previous years. As Cross reaffirmed, ‘There is no doubt in my mind that the only way to grow the economy is on a free-market basis.’

6. Anti-corporate populism?

Yet Cross was not without the sophistication required to work within a party formed by trade unionists. He talked of a mixture of a highly conservative approach to economics and a strong social emphasis on improving the quality of life for the average Zimbabwian. Indeed, Rhodesia hosted a peculiar brand of white politics traceable to British working-class immigrants who during the 20th century brought their successful struggle for a generous social welfare state out to the colonies. Confirmed Cross,

My father was an alcoholic and I was raised by a single mom. My mother could not afford to pay school fees and I would not have received an education if the government of Rhodesia had not simply treated me like a special citizen and given me a free education of a very high standard.

At first blush, positive references to the IMF and ‘international community’ may disguise the fact that historically, this political tradition often contested the interests of foreign capital. Indeed, to hazard a label, Cross became a leading post-independence representative of a relatively patriotic white settler-bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding its British-colonial world-view, the assets of this class are more fully developed and cemented within Zimbabwe than anywhere else, thanks mainly to the 1960s-80s period of rigid exchange controls (a large degree of capital flight occurred in the 1990s, but Zimbabwe remains an extremely comfortable habitat for wealthy whites).

The roots of Rhodesian populism are in intra-white struggle against Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (BSAC), which formally ran the colony
from 1890-1923. Various factions of the white community expressed such strong grievances—small miners over royalty rights; white unions over wages; settler farmers over their need to block black competition; and the church over social and political relations—that ‘self-governing status’ was chosen in a 1923 whites-only vote. In 1933, struggling white farmers, artisans, and civil servants elected a ‘left’-sounding (yet very racist) Reform Party under the leadership of Godfrey Huggins.30

Huggins promised to rescind BSAC’s mineral rights, to impose protectionism, to nationalise key parts of the economy, to provide unemployment relief and white labour rights, and to establish a central bank for the colony. The election was, as Iden Wetherell (1975: 61) observed in his seminal analysis of white politics, fundamentally a populist protest designed to remind the State that its primary consideration lay not with the protection of profit, but with the promotion of institutional safeguards that would insure against a repetition of the recent experience.

After Huggins drifted towards establishment interests, angry white men reappeared on the political scene in 1962, when Ian Smith led the Rhodesian Front to power. Smith’s broad coalition of white Rhodesians included not only those racists fearful of British decolonisation, but others who were adversely affected by the colony’s early-1960s economic crisis. Indeed, the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), according to Giovanni Arrighi (1973: 367), ‘was directed as much against large-scale capitalism as against the Africans. The populist undertones of the UDI campaign were very noticeable.’ Those undertones harked back to the 1933 Reform Party victory, Wetherell (1976: 76) insisted, since Smith’s intention was ‘undeniably to conserve a system of safeguards that the radicals of the 1930s fought so hard to establish….The inheritors of the pre-war populist or “left-wing” legacy [were] now self-defined as “right-wing”.’

It is this uneasy combination which Cross appears to have inherited. It combines ‘conservative’ economic policies that meet the needs of the white-dominated business elites, with the memory of state support for a then-white, now-black working class. For even while punting rapid privatisation, the argument Cross makes contains an anti-monopolistic flair:

An MDC government will sell our shares in the Dairy Board [the partially-privatised national milk and cheese marketing board] immediately, use the proceeds to retire debt and we will work actively to encourage competition. What about all the other cozy monopolies? What about Anglo American Corporation and their stranglehold on the sugar industry in Southern Africa? Let us open our border posts….It is competition that will sort out the fat cats in the private sector.

Critical of fat cats living off ultra-cheap Zimbabwe labour and acquiescing to Zanu PF power, Cross adds two additional pillars—corporatist industrial relations and an expanded social plan—to the foundations of the MDC programme:

On the social side we are going to re-visit the issue of minimum wages. Now I am an industrialist and I am well known in industrial circles for actually following this political strategy. I do not believe in low wages. I do not believe in an industrialist or anybody else being allowed to pay wages which are well below the basic cost of living in cities….So we will, as a Government, and with the private sector through a social contract, and working with the trade unions and employers, work towards a situation where we will pay much higher wages in industry, even if it means losing jobs, so that people working in the cities will be able to afford to live in those cities on a whole family basis. He will be able to send his children to school, he will be able to rent or own accommodation which means he can live there with his entire family. For us that is fundamental.

In addition to attacking that [migrant labour] system with everything at our disposal—in part because of migrancy’s contribution to the spread of AIDS—Cross set out impressive social promises:

Education is the key and seven years of compulsory free education—free education—and free, not in the way we are doing it at the moment [with parent fees]. We mean free, parents will not be required to pay for it. And you ask, ‘Can we afford that?’ Yes, we damn well can, we damn well can! And the international community has the resources to help us build that system and they are willing to do so….We have a programme for housing—we are going to give tenure, freehold tenure, to everybody who holds tribal trust land leases, immediately we come to power. The government has been talking about this for the past ten years, we are not going to talk about this, we are going to do it and we are going to fast-track the administration procedures through massive housing schemes, to provide site-and-service schemes in all our cities for the entire backlog of housing within five years. And you say, ‘Can we afford to do it?’ Yes, we can! Yes we can, and the international community is prepared to help us with a programme like that….We have got to have primary health care throughout the country. We have got to get our hospitals back on their feet….Our social programme is going to be strong and it is going to be dynamic and it is going to be directed at the absolute poor, and there’s no compromising that. We are totally committed to that, and you need to know it—this is not a rhetorical commitment, this is not a party of the ‘haves,’ this is not a party on the gravy train.
Beginning around 1990, Zimbabwe's have-nots were ferociously pummeled not only by Mugabe and his then labour minister John Nkomo—who tried often enough to fracture the trade union movement—but by the IMF and international community. Here arises the central contradiction. Cross, ironically, now implies that his own ticket to the MDC dance is IMF access.

This leads to the obvious question: what is, and will be, the balance of power within the MDC when the obvious choice between free education and free markets must be made? That will be the real crossroad. To his credit, Eddie Cross is transparent about his agenda. But it will be up to the MDC's left-leaning populists, not populists who distortedly echo questionable traditions, to better represent the needs of Zimbabwe's black povo (multitudes).

7. Conclusion

This article has laid bare some of the core contradictions associated with diverse forms of political rhetoric in Zimbabwe, including radical arguments by presumed 'left nationalists' and presumed pragmatic arguments by MDC economic conservatives, and has found them both wanting. The resolution to this confusion can only be found at a deeper, structural level.

At the outset, we argued that in a situation lacking effective socio-economic equilibrating mechanisms, a force whose logic is external to the prevailing systematic logic must be invoked to establish the conditions required for the system's restoration. The logic of capitalism is based on accumulation, growth and expansion of markets. During a typical capitalist crisis, the external counterforce is typically a variant of recession, depression and 'devaluation,' i.e., a process in which there is a write-off of economic 'deadwood'—overcapacity in plant and equipment, excess unemployed labour power, crashes in the value of financial assets (including via inflation) and the like. The corresponding resistance by poor and working people, environmentalists and women, indigenous movements and other oppressed people, slows down or moves the devaluation around. But truly resolving the crisis for a new round of capital accumulation occurs only with sustained restructuring of economic and social relations.

I have argued elsewhere that such devaluation and resistance characterised Zimbabwe's history during several crucial periods: the 1890s, late 1920s-30s, and late 1950s-60s (Bond: 1999a). In contemporary Zimbabwe, the 1970s overaccumulation crisis and the devaluation process—and necessary shift in racial/class relations—began in earnest during the late 1970s, continued through the 1980s notwithstanding a minor stabilisation of the social wage, resumed again in the early 1990s, and accelerated with a vengeance from late 1997 through the present.

But there has been something extremely unusual about Zimbabwe's recent experience. The more the devaluation has hurt prospects for social development, the more that a desperate Robert Mugabe conjured up radical rhetoric to outflank the alienated working class on its left. Zimbabwean nationalism's 1990s exhaustion had the unintended consequence, perhaps, of re-radicalising official discourses. Yet by the time Mugabe realised how disastrous his Washington-designed policies were for the masses, in late 1997, it was too late.

From this ideologically-muddled situation, we simply learn, yet again, that economic conflict generates political and social strife, in the course of any period of crisis management and displacement—and that as a result, class configurations and alliances potentially shift very rapidly. The outcome can never be certain, for no matter how much left-wing rhetoric is invoked, the real practical activity of the state can just as easily bolster the interests of capital, as happened through much of the past decade under the banners of Esap and Zimprest.

But perhaps this lesson has not yet been learned, for what is disturbing about the contemporary Zimbabwe crisis is that notwithstanding further sharp rounds of dramatic devaluations, with worse to come in subsequent months and years, virtually none of the major social forces have moved from populist rhetoric about who is to blame for the malaise. There is no hint, yet, of more fundamental questioning as to whether Zimbabwe can, indeed, 'develop' and grow in the context of a world economy also in the throes of crisis management and displacement.

It is here that the coming period of hot contestation over macroeconomic policy becomes crucial. Zanu PF leaders will be more accommodating to neoliberalism, out of desperation for an IMF/World Bank fix. The MDC's more pro-business faction (centered around Cross) will, with Tsvangirai's permission, will probably continue to outmanoeuvre leftwing influences within the opposition party. But that is not the end of the Left's influence. A variety of 'civil society' groups—think-tanks and non-governmental organisations with sophisticated, progressive leaders, including church agencies, a resurgent movement of residents' associations, and the more progressive currents within the ZCTU itself—have established a broadly anti-neoliberal perspective.

The post-election launch of the Campaign Against Neoliberalism in Zimbabwe—led by young church-based activists well connected in the international social-justice movement—was one hopeful premonition of this current. Another example was the joint budget statement ('Civil Society Position on Minimum
Standards of a Democratic Budget Process’) issued in November 2000, by the Combined Harare Residents Association, Community Working Group on Health, National Association of Non Government Organisations, National Council for Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe, Public Services Association, Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development, Zimbabwe Council of Churches, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, Zimbabwe Teachers Association, Zimbabwe United Residents Association, and Women’s Action Group.32 This is the core group of social forces that will attempt to keep the MDC honest.

What will these and various other local organisations be debating in the period prior to the 2002 election? No doubt, ongoing conflict can be expected on major constitutional, racial and health-related issues (as AIDS continues to worsen). But what might also transpire, to be welcomed by progressive campaigners, is an increased public consciousness over the merits of Washington-approved economic policy.

the leaders of each of the 33 trade unions that make up the labour body,… The ZCTU official newspaper, The Worker, in its October/November edition quoted unnamed sources alleging that the ruling party is clearing subscription arrears of trade unions sympathetic to the party to influence them to vote for a leadership loyal to it. Only paid up unions have voting rights.

Both the current ZCTU executive and general council are made up mainly of MDC executive members who include Isaac Matongo, Nicholas Mudzengerere, Gift Chimanimine, Remus Makuva and MDC members of parliament Thokozani Khupe, Esaph Mdlongwa, Gilbert Shoko, Pauline Gwanyanya, Melfort Gweru and Bethel Makwembe.

At least of the 10 of the 33 affiliate unions that make up the ZCTU have leaders who are believed to be sympathetic to Zanu PF while the rest are reportedly pro-MDC. This week sources close to the ZCTU said Matongo is tipped to become the president of the labour movement ahead of currently acting secretary-general, Isodore Zindoga who is also believed to be eyeing the same post. Zindoga has denied any links with the ruling party, telling The Worker that he is an ‘undiluted trade unionist’ who ‘does not mix trade unionism with politics.’

32. The groups’ statement began,

The current budget process is deeply flawed. This is a major reason for the mounting public dissatisfaction over the way public priorities are reflected in the national budget and over the manner in which expenditures are managed. Persistent economic decline, weak redistribution of economic opportunity, ad hoc expenditure decisions, inadequate funding of social sector obligations and weak parliamentary control over spending have all combined to undermine the critical role of the budget as an instrument of public policy.

While by no means radical, this perspective does at least shy firmly away from promoting fiscal contraction, which is a core goal of the MDC’s business supporters.

Elite opinion-makers seemed to sense this coming conflict as well, and by early 2001, two columnists of the influential Zimbabwe Independent argued the merits of neoliberalism with rhetorical antagonism designed, it seemed, to nip any dissent from orthodoxy in the bud. Wilbert Mukori scornfully recalled ‘Tsangirai’s ZCTU days’ when the trade union movement’s economic policies were at best a confused rehash of Zanu PF’s socialist trash….The MDC would best be advised to adopt whatever revision of the Esap the IMF/World Bank has to offer.’33 And the country’s main business commentator (an accountant, Eric Bloch), defended that failed strategy on (transparently faulty) grounds that

Esap was, to a very great degree, implemented only as a matter of lip-service. Esap Government had no substantive commitment to, or conviction in, Esap and therefore only implemented the programme partially. Patients who take prescribed medication erratically, inadequately and in disregard for the prescription directions, rarely recover….It is government which alienated IMF support, and also that of most international monetary organisations, the support of donor nations, and the support of aid agencies.34

But elite consensus is not capable of submerging more profound socio-economic contradictions. At least ten arenas of strife have emerged—or soon will—between the IMF/World Bank agenda and the Zimbabwean society (in a rough order of importance): the enormous budget deficit; land redistribution; price controls; wage restraint; financial and monetary management; the value (and technique of formal pegging) of the Zimbabwean currency; the ability of the state to maintain foreign currency controls (through restricting corporate forex accounts); luxury goods import taxes; pressure on the state to privatise; and the emerging regional free-trade regime propelled by South Africa.35 These arenas, as well as others, will soon emerge, will require of any political force in Zimbabwe a coherent programme; the IMF and its local ally Cross (with the CZI), have such a programme.

We might conclude with the observation that in Zimbabwe, like so many other sites of struggle on the semi-periphery and periphery of the world economy today,
the challenge is to pull together both social and political movements that forthrightly contest neoliberalism. Any review of merely the year-long period following the Seattle protest of December 1999 reflects this global upsurge. The sabotage of a new Seattle Millennium Round of the World Trade Organisation was caused not only by diverse activists on the street, but also, inside the summit, by African governments (led, interestingly, by Zimbabwe’s then trade and industry minister, Nathan Shamuyarira, who subsequently retired from government while continuing to serve Zanu PF as information officer). Seattle bolstered radical social and labour movements across the world, and was soon echoed in more than a hundred other sites of struggle both North and South.

Is there any connection to the confused politics of radical rhetoric and dying nationalism in Zimbabwe? For many alienated Northern youth who represented the majority of protesters at Seattle, Washington, London, Melbourne, Prague and Nice during 2000, the anti-neoliberal protests were a logical outgrowth of discrete, anti-corporate campaigning (Klein, 2000). But for Southern social and labour movements, the opportunity had arisen for transcending the mere IMF Riot as knee-jerk protest, and increasingly bringing out mass activist responses with programmatic demands. In some instances, particularly in Latin America (Bolivia and Ecuador), the anti-neoliberal activism reached a near-insurgent stage; in other sites (South Africa, Nigeria and India), many millions of workers became involved in

Fiscal consolidation would be achieved by reducing the budget deficit from an estimated 23 percent to 15.5 percent of the gross domestic product in the 2001 national budget presented by Dr Simba Makoni last month. The deficit would be cut to 8 percent in 2002 and 3 percent in 2003. The wage bill will also be limited from 16.7 percent to 12 percent of GDP, which refers to the total value of goods and services produced in Zimbabwe, through the rationalisation of the civil service....Zimbabwe is also in the process of eliminating foreign currency and exchange restrictions, stimulate the export sector, paying of its debts and improve the collection of statistical data....But the IMF remained saddened by slow progress in rationalising the civil service and disposing of Government stake in public enterprises.

In early 2001, another IMF report was partially leaked, emphasising the need for devaluation. According to the independent press (Zimbabwe Independent, 5 January),

The International Monetary Fund has urged the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) to scrap its monetary policy linking rates of interest with the rate of inflation, effectively pegging the bank rate at between 2 to 2.5 percentage points above the rate of inflation. However, the RBZ has been commended by the IMF for its decision, which has not yet been announced in the country, to depart from a fixed exchange rate system....The local dollar, fixed at 38 to the US unit for 19 months until it was devalued to 50 against the greenback in August last year, is currently trading at 55 against the US dollar. However, it is trading at 70 on the parallel market, which has been active since the controls came into effect.

36. See documentation by the World Development Movement: http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/DEBT/unrest.htm; see also Bond forthcoming-b for analysis.

37. See the ‘Suharto Scenario’ as painted in Alexander, 2000.
working-class and poor people’s needs. As it stands, virtually all of these logical social demands are likely to be rejected by Washington’s Zimbabwe managers; in turn, they would gain a certain degree of resonance amongst left-nationalists in Zanu PF and unequivocal hostility within the MDC’s neoliberal flank. (A complicating factor is the likelihood of US sanctions against Mugabe—via a resurrected Zimbabwe Democracy Act in the US Congress—which some militants in the MDC support, to the consternation of the bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie, who will most feel its effects.)

On the one hand, such a programmatic challenge risks yet more confusion ahead. Zanu PF may try even harder to turn populist rhetoric into mass support; however, popular disgust with the Mugabe government amongst urbanites and more sophisticated rural residents (led by teachers) is not likely to wane, not even if Makoni is made heir apparent. On the other hand, by returning to more confrontational programmatic struggles—in parliament, in various other venues of advocacy, in street protests—the progressive forces in and around the MDC will very likely pull the 2002 presidential campaign debate to the left. That, in turn, will clarify to the masses which politician—Tsvangirai or whomever Mugabe anoints—is best placed to address the more profound conflict over Zimbabwe’s economic future. And forceful advocacy of a left-programmatic strategy will more rapidly weaken not only the power of the neoliberal elements within the MDC, but within Zimbabwean society more generally, as well as in relation to the financial-technical hold of Washington over Harare. (Prospects for this course dimmed markedly in late 2000, when the MDC executive rejected the militants’ call for a holiday-season mass-action campaign, on grounds that it was too dangerous given Mugabe’s monopoly on violence.)

What would happen if the MDC took this kind of political turn—away from a post-nationalist neoliberalism, to post-neoliberalism? If the organic Left won sufficient hearts and minds of society and leading politicians, and in doing so overwhelmed the residual elites of Zanu PF and the bourgeois alliance between Harare big business and Washington, what options might then emerge? If power were decisively transferred in 2002, could Zimbabwe indeed embark upon a more inward-oriented, basic-needs strategy, as mandated in the February 1999 Working People’s Convention?

No, argues Eddie Cross forcefully, There Is No Alternative to Esap, Zimprest and their structural adjustment successors. In early 2000, in order to get roughly US$2 million worth of campaign resources from wealthy donors (in Zimbabwe and abroad), Morgan Tsvangirai seemed to agree. But this is by no means his permanent perspective (witness Tsvangirai during the late 1980s-early 1990s). Robert Mugabe, meanwhile, contests the moral and political acceptability of such power relations, but still offers nothing to change power relations or even the technical management of the economy. The reign of Simba Makoni as finance minister will not change matters. Social movements will observe such disarray, once their programme is popularised, and understand better the hopelessness of proceeding along any of the trajectories suggested by the orthodox political and economic leaders.

Does this pessimistic account of Zimbabwean politics partially justify the conclusion of Hardt and Negri, that sovereignty ‘is losing effectiveness,’ and with it, so too fades ‘the autonomy of the political’—and likewise, so evaporates any hope that left-wing social forces can one day take and reorient their nation-states? While Cross and Makoni might answer in the affirmative, Mugabe has himself refused to accept this conclusion. But to the detriment of his constituents, Mugabe’s manipulation of state sovereignty has, for two decades, engendered corruption, mismanagement, authoritarianism and a venal politics that reduces to hysterical nationalism that, as Archbishop Desmond Tutu commented prior to the June 2000 election, leaves the president looking like a ‘caricature of an African leader.’

At the level of political fundamentals, there must be an alternative approach. Optimistically, Boris Kagarlitsky (2000: 39) posits that since 1998, capitalist crisis has forced even the neoliberal mainstream to change its attitude towards the role of the state. Experts of the IMF suddenly declared that certain types of capital controls may be justified in some circumstances. American businessmen agreed: ‘Maybe some sort of protectionism makes sense for Russia.’ The state must use its strength to overcome the crisis of the market. ‘If that means instituting wage and price controls, or renationalizing basic industries to ensure supplies and employment, so be it.’

To be sure, Kagarlitsky also advocates international regulation but correctly concludes that no international regulation will work unless it is based on national and regional bodies. If it is not, the rules and decisions made by international bodies simply will not be implemented. And no democratisation of international relations is possible without democracy at the level of a nation state.

I agree with that sense of priority—i.e., capturing, democratizing and retooling the nation-state, which in turn entails rejection of international neoliberal policy pressure. What is advocated is no return to nationalism (even if it is apparently important for Sibanda to debunk Zanu PF’s deformed, exhausted nationalism with a class-oriented ‘chimurenga’ discourse), but instead, a firm restatement of the need to rebuild national sovereignty (and later, regional coordination). If this is an

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38. South African subimperialism will first have to be overcome, through regionalism-from-below; see Bond, Miller and Ruiters, 2000. To this end, Samir Amin (1999: 77)
appropriate way forward, Zimbabwe’s social movements can also take confidence from previous episodes of tough macroeconomic management throughout the country’s history. Concrete strategies included imposition of watertight exchange controls; careful reflation of the economy through strategic state spending; prescribed assets on financial institutions; increasing nationalisation of strategic sites of the economy; directed investment requirements; creative juggling of import/export requirements; default on outstanding foreign debt; and a more general commitment to ‘get the prices wrong,’ if need be, to assure maximum local backward/forward linkages. The last two times such policies were adopted, during the 1930s and just after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence was declared in 1965, the Zimbabwean (then Rhodesian) economy grew at nearly double-digit rates each year for a decade (Bond, 1998: Chapters Two and Five). On those occasions, growth through partial-delinking occurred in a way that amplified racial, gender and class divisions. Assuming the political balance of forces can be changed in coming years, it should be even more feasible, technically, to impose the same mechanisms but this time, to reorient production to meet basic needs, particularly of rural women, and particularly in areas that should be easy to expand—rural water/sanitation and small-scale irrigation systems, electricity, public works—without debilitating import requirements.

These are probably the minimal policy arrangements in the sphere of national political-economy required for Zimbabwe to prosper as a society. At the international scale, reduced pressure from neoliberal actors and markets will also be vital (as demonstrated repeatedly by visiting IMF missions). Fortunately, this is being achieved increasingly through initiatives ranging from mass protests in Seattle, Washington and Prague, to more surgical activist campaigns (such as that which forced the IMF and World Bank to cease imposing user-fees in health and education). The most interesting tactic aimed at weakening international financial determination and national scale, reduced pressure from neoliberal actors and markets will also be vital (as demonstrated repeatedly by visiting IMF missions). Fortunately, this is being achieved increasingly through initiatives ranging from mass protests in Seattle, Washington and Prague, to more surgical activist campaigns (such as that which forced the IMF and World Bank to cease imposing user-fees in health and education programmes in October 2000).  

In Zimbabwe, there appears only one set of social forces capable of moving in this direction: the radical component of the MDC and its civil society allies. Time will soon tell if they have begun this march, or remain in the cul-de-sac in which most radical rhetoric has left the beleaguered Zimbabwean working class.

suggests ‘regionalisation aiming at the building of a polycentric world,’ in part grounded in ‘grassroots labour-popular social hegemonies.’  

38. South African subimperialism will first have to be overcome, through regionalism-from-below; see Bond, Miller and Ruiters, 2000. To this end, Samir Amin (1999: 77) suggests ‘regionalisation aiming at the building of a polycentric world,’ in part grounded in ‘grassroots labour-popular social hegemonies.’  

39. The most interesting tactic aimed at weakening international financial determination of nation-state development prospects is the World Bank Bonds Boycott: http://www.worldbankboycott.org

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Why review a series of books and articles on the rise and fall of chiefdoms in this set—other than my obvious penchant for reading and writing about such topics? The brief answer is that the kind of cycling (rise and fall) that occurs in chiefdoms has analogues in state-based world-systems. In particular, the probabilistic nature of the transitions from chiefdom to state means that there are lots of “near misses,” or examples of failed transitions. The growing literature on such cycling suggests these transitions are the result of Braudelian conjunctures—all the right pieces falling into place at the right time and place—but nonetheless the result of systematic, or I argue world-systematic processes. Furthermore, initial evidence shows that ideology and individual actors play significant roles in such transitions. Kent Flannery (1999) argues that structure and agency rather than being antithetical, are complementary. Via several examples he shows how in certain phases of chiefdom cycling space, or opportunity, is opened for especially potent actions by leaders, and for ideology to play a much stronger than usual role in social, political, and cultural change. Thus, examination of such events gives some insight into the roles of ideology and individuals in system transformation.

At a mundane academic level, world-systems analysis often has been beaten with the club of ignoring ideology or culture and with omitting actors (ignoring agency). This is one avenue to address those critiques. More importantly for activists, insight into just how and when individuals can shape transitional processes is of vital importance. To be sure, knowing how the first states were formed avowedly will not offer a blueprint for building a more human world-system. However, the inventions of states do mark major changes in world-system logic (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Thus, knowledge about this first major shift in system logic might give
some clues about how to think about when and how other such shifts might occur. Following Yoffee et al. (1999), it is also useful to study trajectories of change that do not lead to states. Without complete sampling of all such processes we cannot really assess how rare or common the pristine invention of the state was. Even if one accepts Sanderson’s (1999) argument that the invention of the state was more or less inevitable, we still need to understand how and why it happened in one specific place, and how and why it did not happen in others.

I begin with an overview of David G. Anderson’s The Savannah River Chiefdoms: Political Change in the Late Prehistoric Southeast (1994). This book is based on many years of field research as a staff member of the National Park Service. In this account Anderson combines archaeological research with various theories of chiefdoms and careful use of ethnohistorical documents. In this he provides a model of how to do such research without reading the present into the past, nor the past into the future, yet still gain insights from each for the other. This is extremely important in dealing with nonstate societies, because even where states and writing do exist, the very presence of a literate person is nearly always an indication that pristine conditions have been disrupted. By “pristine” I mean a setting composed only of chiefdoms, with no states present. This is especially important if one wants to examine how states were first invented.

The opening chapter follows archaeological convention and defines chiefdoms as social organizations marked by stratification and redistributive functions of leaders, who are genealogically sanctioned if not appointed. By cycling Anderson means “the recurrent process of the emergence, expansion, and fragmentation of complex chiefdoms amid a regional backdrop of the simple chiefdoms” (p. 9). The oscillation is from one to two level of organization above the local living community (simple chiefdom) to two levels above the local community, with one paramount chief, several subchiefs, and village leaders. Anderson’s figure 1 on page 9 illustrates this nicely. This instability is so common in chiefdoms that it must be considered characteristic of this broad range of societies. In what is now southeastern United States this occurred from ca. 1000 to 1600 C.E.

Typically the cycle of emergence, collapse, and re-emergence of a complex chiefdom involves movement of the center to a new location—a process reminiscent of movement of core hegemons in the modern world-system. Anderson argues that “understanding the political and social histories of individual chiefdoms requires the adoption of broad geographic and temporal perspectives, and that organizational change in chiefdoms must be examined from regional as well as local levels, using information drawn from both synchronic and diachronic frameworks” (p. 4). This sort of approach, of course, is axiomatic in world-system analysis. What is interest-
When successful such management underscores the value and superiority of the
This type of location of course facilitates the chiefly function of risk-management.
in areas suited to the exploitation of several different environmental zones” (p. 130).
centers throughout the South Appalachian area were along major drainages and at
from villages to the center. He also notes that “locations of Mississippian ceremonial
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in the divergence of cultures. When communication is blocked, new ideas and new
next chiefdom. Among other things, this suggests that these empty zones play a role
unwittingly to be sure, new forms of disease that had devastating effects on local
polities. This is doubly so in the New World where Europeans brought with them,
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seem “endless” in that it those areas where states did emerge, cycling was present for
centuries, and often millennia.
Finally, bounding territory is difficult. Typically markers of some sort will be
built such as megaliths or cairns. Empty, or rather “emptied” zones between com-
plex chiefdoms are common. In addition to minimizing contact, and hence conflict,
these buffer zones often provide an important secondary benefit. They allow the
local ecology to recover from occupation. Game can be replenished, and where slash
and burn farming is common the soil remains abandoned sufficiently long to recover
its fertility. Paul Martin and Christine Szuter (1999) re-examine Lewis and Clark’s
reports to map such zones. They show that areas that were thought to be rich or
poor in game, were precisely the result of such processes which formed zones of
heavy usage (“game sinks”), and buffer or war zones (“game irruptions”).

After this general discussion of cycling Anderson turns to his analysis of Mis-
sissippian ethnohistory. He draws heavily on the various reports of the De Soto
expedition (1549-1553). Anderson is acutely aware that state level intrusion, no
matter how seemingly minor or ephemeral can have dire consequences for local
polities. This is doubly so in the New World where Europeans brought with them,
unwittingly to be sure, new forms of disease that had devastating effects on local
populations. These effects are most profound on complex chiefdoms where popula-
tion densities are sufficient to sustain them and allow spread of pathogens. Still,
Anderson mines these accounts to learn more about how chiefdoms operate. Key
points are the importance of ideology, prestige goods exchange, and warfare in main-
taining complex chiefdoms. Within a chiefdom news travels quickly, but between
them the buffer zones often block communication. Thus, in traveling within a chief-
dom De Soto and company found themselves greeted and expected. But when
crossing an empty zone, they found that they entirely surprised the members of the
next chiefdom. Among other things, this suggests that these empty zones play a role
in the divergence of cultures. When communication is blocked, new ideas and new
 technologies do not diffuse easily.

From ethnohistory Anderson turns to archaeology. This chapter is an excellent
tour of how archaeologists infer political structure from remains, for example, place-
ment of secondary population centers in ways that facilitate movement of tribute
from villages to the center. He also notes that “locations of Mississippian ceremonial
centers throughout the South Appalachian area were along major drainages and at
macroecotones, at or near the junction of major physiographic provinces, and hence
in areas suited to the exploitation of several different environmental zones” (p. 130).
This type of location of course facilitates the chiefly function of risk-management.
When successful such management underscores the value and superiority of the
promote complexity do not promote stability. To anticipate the last part of this
essay, the invention of a state is one solution to endless cycling. Indeed, cycling can
seem “endless” in that it those areas where states did emerge, cycling was present for
centuries, and often millennia.

Most fascinating here is the discussion of Cahokia centered just outside of what
is now east St. Louis. Monk’s mound is only surpassed in size by the temple of the
Sun in Mexico. It is the largest earthen structure in the new world. Cahokia’s loca-
tion at a major river confluence allowed it to control all four networks—bulk goods,
political/military, prestige goods, and information—identified by Chase-Dunn and
4). When Cahokia collapsed, lesser centers arose along its periphery.

Anderson says of these four chapters, “I have attempted to show how ethnog-
raphy, ethnohistory, and archaeology can aid in the archaeological examination of
political and organizational change in chiefdom societies, specifically the emergence
and decline of complex chiefdoms against a regional backdrop of simple chiefdoms.”
Indeed, he has done so superbly.

The next four chapters go through the southeastern evidence in considerable
detail. Among many interesting issues is further discussion of buffer zones, which
Anderson characterizes as having their own dynamics. He presents strong evidence
for their existence. Also insightful is his analysis of the effects of climate change. He
argues, at least for this region, that a decrease in rainfall of two or more standard
 deviations is sufficient to cause the collapse of a complex chiefdom. This is based on
empirical evidence, including types of storage regimes in use. Another interesting
finding is, “Whatever the explanation, the appearance of fortifications locally was
almost invariably soon followed by organizational change or collapse” (p. 311). This
suggests that fortifications indicate failure of chiefly function, and are not a marker
of its success. Another interesting finding from mortuary evidence is gender differen-
tials in nutrition, which strongly suggests that women already had lower status in
these chiefdoms.

In the final chapter Anderson summarizes his argument. One remaining puzzle
is why the collapse on the eve of European intrusion? It appears to be a combination
of cycling and environmental change: a decrease in rainfall coincided with a phase
of political instability. As noted the formation of a state can be one way that cycling
ends. But Anderson notes that early, pristine states are also fragile. There is evidence
that Cahokia was an inchoate state that collapsed quickly (see Peregrine 1995, 1992,

One of the strongest conclusions to emerge from this discussion is the point
raised in the beginning, that a regional — or a world-systemic — approach to social
change is vital to understanding the complexities of social evolution. Further evidence can be found in a recent collection that examines Cahokia in detail.

In Cahokia: Domination and Ideology in the Mississippian World (1997) Timothy R. Pauketat and Thomas E. Emerson focus on the role of ideology in regional control by Cahokia’s elites. Their analysis is a counterargument to what they see as an over-emphasis on material culture — a somewhat unusual position for archaeologists. After an opening overview chapter Pauketat seeks to explain the Cahokian “big bang” — its rapid expansion in the first 50 years after 1000CE. He argues that the Cahokian political-economy was held together by ideology. His argument hinges on the finding that the mounds were built by accretion. “Thus, the act of monument construction as a regular event was probably as important, if not more so, than the actual monument itself” (p. 43). Control of exotic goods was the means of shoring up legitimacy “by controlling the production of meaningful symbols that were circulated within their own domains. [Cahokians] were in effect attempting to control the array of symbols that would inform the ideologies of the masses” (p. 47). In short, the development of new ideologies was what allowed the “big bang” to happen.

Neal Lopinot argues that Cahokia was not built on corn (maize), which was only one of many crops. Rather, the key to Cahokia was the stabilization of mobility, storage, exchange, and diversification. Lucretia Kelly finds evidence of status differences in cuts of deer meat consumed in different house types. However, the need to collect deer meat as tribute was eased by the ready availability of fish. Rinita Dalan shows that the construction of various mounds involved moving lots of earth, and began with relatively large constructions. Following arguments about megalith construction in Europe, she contends that construction was a means not only to symbolize group cohesion and structure, but to learn how to reinforce group efforts of the sort needed to maintain agricultural activities. Important throughout these chapters is abundant evidence that processes occurring at Cahokia were not unique to it, but were region wide.

Pauketat and Lopinot estimate the maximum population of Cahokia proper at around ten thousand at its peak, but with considerable waxing and waning over several centuries. For those unfamiliar with how archaeologists make demographic estimates, this chapter serves as a quick primer. James Collins finds decreasing status differences as household autonomy seems to increase, or possibly additional levels of sub-elites developed. John Kelly notes that the plaza of Monk’s mound was outside the palisades, which suggests that fortifications more likely were for internal rather than external defense, which echoes Anderson’s findings. He also argues that since rebuilding was more frequent than would be expected due to deterioration alone, it was a ritual exercise to accompany the death of important personages.

Thomas Emerson considers the roles of the countryside and ritual in Cahokian life. Emerson eschews debates over whether or not Cahokia was a state, and instead examines its relationship with its hinterland. Basically, evidence from the hinterland supports gradual evolution of simple chiefdom from ca 800 - 1050 C.E. After that there is a rather sudden shift with complex burials, large plazas, and the appearance of a “woodhenge” — set of posts that resemble the more famous Stonehenge in structure. Emerson argues that religion in the form of cosmology and ideology, in this case elite ideology in competition with other ideologies, explains the rapid change after 1050 C.E. His argues that the Corn Maiden variant of an Earth Mother fertility cult “was appropriated by the elite as a tool for the domination of the commoners” (p. 228).

James Knight finds parallels to Cahokia throughout the Mississippian region, such as at Moundville (Alabama). He suggests that the sudden growth may indicate passing some sort of demographic threshold which makes complex chiefdoms nearly inevitable. He speculates that many of the societies that the first Europeans encountered may have been on the verge of forming complex chiefdoms.

David G. Anderson extends his earlier work (1994) in an examination of the role of Cahokia in Southeastern Mississippian societies. He argues “That Mississippian culture failed to spread everywhere across the East appears to be, in part, because it was an ideology tied to an organizational form — the chiefdom — and an economic foundation — intensive maize agriculture. Only when these conditions were present did the ideology have a chance of being accepted or differently appropriated” (note 9, pp. 288-289). Clearly, many areas were ripe for this spread, and there appear to have been no competing or rival ideologies.

Pauketat and Emerson conclude that Cahokia was so large precisely because it was the first Mississippian complex chiefdom. Once others came into existence, those who found the demands of the Cahokian elite excessive could leave — and apparently did so. This led to the collapse of Cahokia. They explicitly argue that Cahokia was not a state held together by trade. However, based on their own evidence, the opposite conclusion is almost equally plausible. If Cahokia was a state, it was an inchoate one — which is what everyone who argues for the state position says. Certainly its rise and later collapse, were closely intertwined with the connections to its hinterlands and offshoots. Still, Pauketat and Emerson convincingly argue that ideology played vital roles in these connections.

It is this uncertainty that makes Cahokia interesting in itself and for evolutionary theorizing. Norman Yoffee’s rule, “if you can argue whether a society is a state or isn’t, then it isn’t” (1993, p. 69) does not apply here. Rather, as he (1993; Yoffee & Cowgill 1991; Yoffee et al. 1999) and Joseph Tainter (1988, 1999) argue, collapses and alternative evolutionary trajectories are also part of evolutionary processes and should be studied in their own rights. And in studying them we can bridge the
latest incarnation of the ideologist/materialist divide. While Pauketat and Emerson’s arguments for the important role of ideology in Cahokia’s rise and fall are persuasive, those arguments do not vitiate the vital roles of trade and political-economy in those processes. Rather, as Anderson (1994) and Flannery (1999) argue, it is the latter processes, materially based, which create space for ideology and agency in the form of astute leadership, to play similarly vital roles.

Finally, throughout these arguments it is clear that intersocietal interconnections are crucial to understanding cycling and state formation. That is, there is a clear need for world-systems analysis in explaining them. This is, or should be, somewhat heartening for activists. While humans do not make their own history any old way they please (to paraphrase Marx), there are times when their actions can have considerable influence on the tides of history. Obviously, learning when those times are likely to occur, and what actions will contribute to which results remains problematic. The study of chiefdoms suggests such times occur cyclically, at rare, yet identifiable conjunctures.

REFERENCES
Caspian Sea Oil – Still The Great Game for Central Eurasia

Andre Gunder Frank


A book with a foreword by Pat Clawson of the National Defense University and editor of ORBIS, and dedicated to Ronald Reagan and Target Ozxal, announces its U.S. far-right wing political pedigree literally up front. However the book is chock full of information, alas most already well known to anyone even remotely familiar with the problematique under review; but it also offers some incisive analysis. The twelve contributed chapters by fourteen authors and coauthors are divided into three parts dedicated to examining and analyzing the general history and mutual background of the Caspian Sea region; to the five littoral states of Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan; and to three ‘external’ interested states, the United States, Turkey, and Georgia. Nonetheless, the review by each author goes well beyond the nominative boundaries assigned to him or her and trespasses over into the topics, territories and their relations assigned to other authors. Quite properly so, in view of the mutually complex real-life interrelations in the Caspian Sea Basin, so that no topic or state could be adequately understood in itself other than in relation to the others. Indeed, we are witnessing the contemporary continuation of the nineteenth century “Great Game” for the control of Central Eurasia. However, the oil connection also reaches well beyond Caspian Sea and must make this book pertinent also to readers of this journal.

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Clawson already explicitly, indeed brutally, lays out the groundwork in his two page foreword: The Caspian Sea region is a world-class oil area with complex economic and geo-strategic conflicts of interest and corresponding competing policies among surrounding states and the West, particularly the United States. The issues are not only the oil per se, including its low price at the time of publication, but also the related conflicts of interest over pipeline routes and the U.S. intent to deny them to Russia and Iran. The rule of law, democracy and human rights come in at the tail end.

Chapter 1 by Bulent Gokay traces the history of Caspian Basin oil, beginning with that of Baku 2,500 years ago. He quotes from reports about the Baku region by travelers, including Marco Polo, who visited the area between 915 A.D. and 1684 A.D. Then he reviews more recent Russian and Soviet interests and activities there. Chapter 2 by Cynthia and Michael Croissant examines the ‘legal status’ of the Caspian Sea, whose interpretations are used by each littoral state in attempts to legitimize its own economic interests and political claims. The claim that the Caspian is an inland ‘lake’ is advanced by Russia and Iran, because under international law it would support the common rights of the littoral states, among whom these two big ones would be more equal than others. The smaller states argue that the Caspian is a ‘sea,’ under which the same international law would divide the area into national ‘sectors’ that would result in more equal access and rights to all. The United States supports this interpretation, because it would limit access by its Russian and Iranian enemies. Chapter 3 by Jenifer DeLay examines the confused tangle of existing and proposed pipelines, which is far too complex to summarize here. Suffice it to say that each state seeks to maximize the length of pipeline that would pass through or go to its territory and to deny the same to its competitors. Again the United States is intent on avoiding pipeline routes through Russia and Iran. Therefore towards the West, they would have to pass through alternative routes in Turkey and competing ones in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. They have intense national and political, including armed, conflicts among each other and rival supporting alliances with Russia. For the time being, these conflicts render pipeline planning and construction more than problematical for everybody concerned, again including the West and particularly the U.S. The government of the latter favours a route through Turkey to its Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, about which the private oil companies have reservations—unless they receive massive public subsidies—because this route would be the most expensive to build. Since the publication of this book, agreement has nonetheless been reached on this option, presumably including such unrevealed public subsidies by the U.S. and Turkey.

So as not to put all pipeline eggs into one basket route, before this agreement and perhaps still, there has been serious consideration also of various routes through the Black Sea. Since Russia wants more oil to pass through its own ports on this
points out, while a later one examines the U.S. strategic embrace of Azerbaijan. Indeed, much of the chapter on Russia is devoted to countries other than Russia and their relations with Russia. The now Central Asian republics, several governed by people whose political careers in Soviet times elevated them to local governors within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of course were also economically tied to and dependent on and indeed beneficiaries of supplies of oil to but subsidies from the Soviet economy. Many of these ties have necessarily remained so, but now without the Russian subsidies. For instance, also the vast development of Kazak cotton production—at enormous local environmental costs, such as the almost halving of the extent of the Aral Sea and of the livelihood of the people around—was destined almost exclusively to supply the Soviet textile industry. On the other hand, the local supply of industrial commodities was also dependent on imports from the Soviet Union. For the newly ‘independent’ republics, many of these economic ties have had to remain. For Russia and the often large Russian population—in Kazakhstan 40 percent of its total population that is concentrated in the North—and substantial interchange is still essential, although of course relatively less so for the large Russia economy and moreso for these much these smaller economies of the Central Asian and circum Caspian Sea economies. So their governments are now trying to diversify their economic relations with others wide and near, and also to forge some kind of common market among the latter, but their common commodity production leaves little possibilities for any division of labor.

For Russia, the problem is essentially two or three fold. First, Russia has the most cost-effective existing and potential pipeline routes, which already gives it a critical role in the region and beyond. Russia also has its own demand for oil—despite being a major producer and the world’s single largest exporter—and a quite pragmatic policy to ensure and promote both, although that also is related to Russia’s larger geo-political interests in the region and in the world. The latter of course also involves the West in general and first the U.S., Turkey and China in particular, which in turn seek to enhance their own and to deny Russia as much economic and political clout as possible.

In response thereto, there are three major schools of thought and policy in Russia: One is the ‘Western’ oriented one that seeks some cohabitation with the West within the structured rivalry, which also has not really ebbed despite the end of the Cold War. The second is the ‘Asiatic,’ ‘Oriental,’ or ‘Eurasian’ one that looks eastward, but also southward to the Caspian and beyond. The tension between the two Russian projections has been a constant of its politics at least since the time of Peter the Great. The third school has a leg in both camps and the various factions and alliances within them; and it promotes a pragmatic resolution between the other two, including policy with regard to Caspian Sea problems. More pragmatic even is Moscow’s domestic oil policy and practice, which seeks to maximize production [that has precipitously declined recently], revenues, and largely unsuccessful attempts to keep the West out of its oily backyard. The author’s conclusion is that Russian “economic interests are thus achieving precedence over political ones” [p.150], which is however disputed by the author of another chapter, as we will see below.

The same conclusion may be drawn from Nader Entessar’s chapter about Iran and its policy toward its immediate neighbours, neighbouring oil producing states, and also Western Europe and the U.S. Iran’s bargaining chip including with the U.S. that is trying to put and keep Iran out of business, is that other than the existing Russian pipelines, Iran offers the most cost-effective oil transport and swap options for Caspian basin oil for the world market. That underlies the closer relations between Iran and Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. But Iran today has fifteen neighbouring states, and even all possible oil pragmatism is unable to accommodate them all at the same time. The chapter on Turkey by Bulent Aras and George Foster offers little that is new or interesting. Turkey welcomed the independence of the new CIS states and sought to replace as much old Russian and prevent as much new Iranian influence as possible. Shared Turkic languages and Islamic religion turned out to be the less effective, and the prospects for Turkish capital investment and American support more useful instruments of Turkish policy. That has of course been to get as much oil and particularly gas from the Caspian Sea Basin to supply its own increasing need and as much pipeline revenue through the Trans-Caucasus region as possible. That also includes of course support for construction of the Baku to Ceyhan pipeline, through which oil is to be funneled from a catchment area that also extends to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the other side of the Caspian Sea over which the oil would be shipped or under which the oil would be piped to Baku. Unfortunately for Ankara, astride the Turkish part of this route sit the Turkish Kurds, whose rebellion Ankara therefore seeks to quash also for that reason among others.

By far the most interesting chapter is that on the United States, by Stephen Blank who has done enough of his homework to bring along multiple strategic [in more senses than one] quotations from the horse’s mouth in Washington and at NATO headquarters. The background of it all is of course the ongoing American competition with Russia, now also with the regions under review, among which “the Transcaspian has become perhaps the most important area of direct Western-Russian contention today” [250]. Therefore, the author argues that the new geo-economic competition cannot be separated out from the old but still ongoing geo-political one.

Therefore also, although “Washington is now becoming the arbiter or leader of virtually every interstate and international issue in the area” [254] and indeed also “the main center of international adjudication and influence for local issues” [255],
in the face of the Russian bear old style gun-boat diplomacy is too dangerous and is now replaced by its “functional equivalent … peace operations” [256]. Washington is pursuing these with intense “actual policy making on a daily basis throughout the executive branch” [253] in Washington and by a myriad of “Partnership for Peace” programs of which the Strategic Research Development Report 5-96 of the [U.S.] Center for Naval Warfare Studies reports on activities of these forces that provide dominant battlespace knowledge necessary to shape regional security environments. Multinational exercises, port visits, staff-to-staff coordination—all designed to increase force inter-operability and access to regional military facilities—along with intelligence and surveillance operations.... [So] forward deployed forces are backed up by those which can surge for rapid reinforcement and can be in place in seven to thirty days [256-257]

—all as a ‘partnership for peace’ in Orwellian double-speak, obviously. Indeed, U.S. local diplomats and the Clinton administration now regard the Transcaspian as a ‘backup’ for Middle East oil supplies and some insist that the U.S. “take the lead in pacifying the entire area” including by the possible overthrow of inconveniently not sufficiently cooperative governments [258]. The policy and praxis of common military exercises also includes distant Kazakhstan. All this and more “reflects a major shift in U.S. policy toward Central Asia … coordinated by the National Security Council,” as the author quotes from the hawkish U.S. Jamestown Foundation Monitor. The Security Council’s former head and then already super anti-Soviet Russian hawk, Zbigniew Brzezinski, now promotes a modernized Mackinder heartland vision of a grand U.S.-led anti-Russian coalition of Europe, Turkey, Iran, and China as well as Central Asia [253].

This is where the NATO connection comes in. Former U.S. Secretaries of State and of Defense Christopher and Perry stated in 1997 that “the danger to security … is not primarily potential aggression to their collective [NATO] territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory….To deal with such threats alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory” [252]. Note that this was two years before “humanitarian” NATO aid to ‘out of area’ Kosovo. Also, U.S. Central Asia experts met at NATO headquarters and discussed extensive U.S. interests in Caspian basin energy deposits. Not to be outdone, Javier Solana, the former Defense Minister in the ‘Socialist’ Party government of Spain, become Secretary-General of NATO also during its war against Yugoslavia, and now promoted to czar of European Union [EU] foreign policy, pronounced himself at a Washington conference on NATO enlargement to say that Europe cannot be fully secure without bringing the Caucasus into its security zone [250]. U.S. Ambassador Nathan Nimitz agrees:

“PAX NATO is the only logical regime to maintain security in the traditional sense… [and] must recognize a need for expansion of its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly in Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert of course with the regional powers…) and in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major role in this security system” [252]. This statement is not only a guide to policy making in Washington and NATO headquarters in Brussels. The policy is in fact already being implemented on the ground in that the U.S. has been assiduously using economic, diplomatic and military carrots to engage more and more ‘regional powers’ to play assigned roles in this ‘concert’ under its own regional direction. These countries include especially Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan on the western wing to distant Tajikistan and Kazakhstan on the eastern one of this American and NATO PfP concert hall. All of these states, whether in the oil business or no, happen to be former Soviet republics on the underbelly of Russia.

All this was written and begun to be implemented already in 1997 and earlier. Well before the NATO war against Yugoslavia that was allegedly fought to defend ‘human rights in Kosovo,’ which along with the new NATO ‘out of area’ southeastward projection toward the oil producing countries can now be better seen in the light of the above considerations. Indeed, “NATO’s regional involvement, especially through PfP [referring to the above mentioned “Partnership for Peace”] is intensifying on a yearly basis. Military exercises also already in 1997 were supposed to show that “U.S. and NATO forces could be deployed anywhere” [266].” The obvious implication of current policy is that NATO, under U.S. leadership, will become an international policeman and hegemon in the Transcaspian and define the limits of Russian participation in the region’s expected oil boom” [267]. Now the precedent of “humanitarian defense of human rights” in Kosovo also embalishes the “Partnership for Peace” in the Caspian Sea Basin, where it alone might otherwise not evoke enough popular political support from the folks back home. So now in Orwellian language again, not only “War is Peace,” but now it also is highly “humanitarian.” Preferably that is also placed under a mantle of ‘legitimation’ by the United Nations, as now is the NATO military occupation of Kosovo after the war ended. But if that is not available to make war itself, as it was not against Yugoslavia, then ‘legitimation’ may at least sought by the agreement of the “International Community,” whose states [mis]represent at most 15 percent of humanity, but whose bombs spoke so eloquently in 1999 over Yugoslavia. Where will they fall next—but farther south-east?

“It is highly unlikely that Russia will accept such a position ‘lying down,’” writes Blank, especially in its own Caucasian and Caspian underbelly. Thus, he outlines four main reasons why he regards this U.S. policy as not only misguided but also counterproductive:
1. Structural conditions. Military forces will be deployed in the guise of the now sanctioned ‘peacekeepers’ or ‘peace enforcers,’ as Kosovo has begun to confirm since he wrote. But that can mean also overextending these forces beyond domestic acceptance. (Contrary to the propaganda, NATO bombs did not bring Milosevic to heel and ground troops would have been necessary, had not Russia eventually withdrawn its support from Milosevic, which is what really obliged him to accept Western terms that by then were far less than those for which it had gone to war.) But what if Russia no more plays along at all? U.S. policy and praxis over Yugoslavia and in formerly Soviet Central Asia and the Caspian Sea area has already shifted the Russian political center of gravity towards sharpened nationalism and a renewed increase in the influence of the military. Yet, already before that, Blank wrote that “Russia will resolutely contest the United States’ expanded presence” [263], which can drive Russia into the arms of China and India as “Kosovo” already did, even if it does not threaten a Third World War, as it well may.

2. This U.S. policy also drives Russia to cooperate with Iran, which is certainly not in the interest of current American policy.

3. “It is impossible to discern any strategic context for the Clinton administration’s Russia policy…[which will] only enhance Russia’s sense of regional threat and propensity to reply in kind, while not preventing it from doing so” [262].

4. For all the power at the disposal of the U.S., Washington “remains singularly unable to use such instruments to obtain a comprehensive and insightful understanding of regional trends and their implications” [262]. Kuwait, Somalia, and Iraq—since then also Kosovo—“suggest that this is a structural failing of U.S. policy” [262].

Thus, the U.S. is enlarging its commitment absentmindedly, Blank writes, in the contemporary continuation of the nineteenth century “Great Game” in Central Eurasia — with still the same major players, excepting the replacement of erstwhile Great Britain by the United States. Equally so in Southwest Asia, that in Eurocentric terminology was in colonial times miscalled the “Near East” [near to whom?] and now in neo-colonial ones the “Middle East” [between where and where?]. Therefore again, the information and analysis in this book on Central Asia and the oil producing Caspian Sea Basin must also be of interest to those concerned with West Asia and North Africa.
Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver  
Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System  
Reviewed By William I. Robinson

John C. Cross  
Informal Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City  
Reviewed By Marina Karides

Thomas D. Hall (Editor)  
A World-Systems Reader: New Perspectives on Urbanism, Cultures, Indigenous Peoples, and Ecology  
Reviewed By Thomas R. Shannon

Alex Inkeles  
One World Emerging? Convergence and Divergence in Industrial Societies  
Reviewed By Robin Thomas Pettitt

William R. Thompson (Editor)  
Great Power Rivalries  
Reviewed By Robert A. Denemark

Barry Wellman (Editor)  
Networks in the Global Village: Life in Contemporary Communities  
Reviewed By Patricia Landolt
The current period of uncertain change and transformation in the world capitalist system has befuddled scholars attempting to identify patterns and predict where things are headed. Far from movement towards consensus, debate continues to rage over globalization and what type of world order will emerge in the wake of the apparent break up of the U.S.-centered hegemonic system.

This important volume is a product of the Hegemonic Transitions Study Group of the Fernand Braudel Center. In it, Arrighi, Silver, and several collaborators attempt to make greater sense of the current period and to shine some predictive light on the future by analysis of systemic change in two earlier periods of transformation in the world system. The theory of hegemonic transition as systemic change laid out by Arrighi in his earlier work, *The Long Twentieth Century*, looms large throughout the volume and provides much theoretical guidance. The earlier transitions from Dutch to British and then from British to U.S. world hegemony are seen to resemble the present period of transformation and uncertainty in several key respects. The authors set out to compare the similarities and differences between those earlier transitions and the present period. This endeavor is undertaken through an exploration of four current, inter-related controversies, each of which is accorded a chapter.

First is the changing balance of power among states. What configuration may replace U.S. hegemony is not yet clear, but the authors suggest that there is renewed Great Power rivalry, systemwide financial expansion centered on the declining U.S. hegemon, and the emergence of new loci of power, in particular, East Asia. But the current period is peculiar insofar as it is characterized by an unstable “bifurcation of military [U.S.] and financial [East Asian] global power” (pp. 95).

Second is the balance of power between Western and non-Western centers. The focus here is on the gradual incorporation by the West of the East into the capitalistic world system in the 18th and 19th centuries, which marked the ambiguous triumph of Western civilization in a now single global system, ambiguous because Western colonialism and suzerainty could not fully disarticulate the China-centered Asian trade and tributary network nor undermine the civilizational basis of this network. East Asia, according to the authors, has emerged as the most dynamic center of world-scale accumulation processes. Should the region become the center of a new world order (the new hegemon) it will face the challenge of transforming the modern world into a “commonwealth of civilizations.”

This is a timely, well-done, and important piece of work. Too often scholars observing rapid social change engage in conjunctural analysis which forgets that the present is history, or step backward only to the immediately preceding period, thereby failing to properly contextualize the present or to gain a more solid predictive perspective. The long historic view, one that identifies enduring cycles, tendencies, structures and the patterns of structural change—one of the hallmarks of world system scholarship—is refreshing and essential if we are to understand the current period of globalization. Nonetheless, the study has several limitations and disappointments. The remainder of this review critiques some underlying thematic issues that run through and inform the volume, especially the study’s nation-state-centrism and its notion of the rise of an East Asian hegemon.

It is not clear to me that the theoretical framework of hegemonic transitions is adequate to capture the current period of change, insofar as the new period may involve major discontinuities associated with novel qualitative change in the political economy of world capitalism. The authors seek to uncover underlying patterns in past instances of systemic change as clues to underlying patterns in the current turbulence. They assume that these past transitions are comparable. I have argued elsewhere that the state structuralism and the nation-state centrism which characterizes much world system analysis and which tenaciously informs this volume as production that characterized each period of hegemony were based on social compacts between dominant and subordinate groups. These compacts became undone through intra-elite conflict and unrest from below as competition among states and capitalist enterprises during hegemonic transitions undermined the conditions necessary for the reproduction of social compacts. Growing social conflict, spurred on by rising polarization during the “financialization” period of hegemonic decline gives way to new compacts as emerging hegemons reorganize world production on novel foundations. The authors see the current process creating new social forces—through increased proletarianization, feminization, and changing spatial and ethnic configuration of the world’s labor force—that the decaying hegemonic order will have greater difficulty accommodating.

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well are incapable of accounting for the changes we are witness to under globalization insofar as the nation-state is no longer the organizing principle of the capitalist system and insofar as new transnational social forces have emerged that are no longer grounded in particular states and the old dynamics of state and geo-political competition. I may well be wrong, but these issues are never even problematized in this volume.

The problem of state-centric and nation-state centric analysis is that it does not allow us to conceive of an emergent global hegemony in terms of transnational classes and groups no longer bound to any state or to specific geographies. As a consequence, the most Arrighi, Silver, and their colleagues can predict is the rise of an East Asia hegemony. This is a popular and by now a well-worn thesis but it is backed by very little concrete evidence and not really supported by global political and economic dynamics in recent years. We know that East Asia dynamism is inseparable from the massive entrance of transnational capital, and more recently (especially in the wake of the late 1990s crisis), has been organized by elites seeking not a regional circuit of accumulation in rivalry with circuits elsewhere but a more complete integration into globalized circuits.

What we see instead of a “recentering of the global economy in the East” (pp. 219) is precisely a decentering of the global economy; its fragmentation and the rise of several zones of intense global accumulation. One such zone in Europe runs from the northwest to the southeast, cutting across borders and reaching out into areas of Eastern Europe. Another in North America is the U.S.-Mexico border zones. Several such axes criss-cross East Asia. These may not be territorially-bounded rivals for hegemony as much as sites of intensive accumulation within a global economy that bring together transnational capitalists and elites in diverse locations around the world, precisely what we would expect from a supranational and decentered transnational configuration. This is more a case of historic discontinuity than continuity in the sequence of hegemonic transitions. Nor is it clear that the civilizational perspective advanced in chapter four is appropriate for the current era. The chapter is really about the Western conquest of Asia in the 18th and 19th century, and seems to borrow the civilizational paradigm in order to give weight to the dubious conclusion that East Asian dynamism reflects “the decline of the West.”

The world system is assumed to still be characterized in the current epoch by competitive nation-states as the appropriate sub-units of analysis, even though this type of analysis is less and less able to capture current dynamics. The claim that Great Power rivalry is again on the increase (pp. 88), for instance, was also a popular argument in the early 1990s but is not supported by any evidence and does not go far in explaining current global political dynamics. Arrighi and Silver assume that “new complex of governmental and business agencies endowed with greater system level organizational capabilities than those of the preceding hegemonic complex”

Spanning the last thirty years, investigations of the informal sector have focused mostly on the economic role of unregulated and undocumented work in national and global economies. Considerations of the political efforts of informal sector workers are scant in the literature including political sociology and the sociology of development. John C. Cross’s book, *Informal Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City,* brings to the forefront the political influence of Mexico City’s street vendors in the implementation of state policies which effect them. Using ethnographic and comparative historical methods, Cross details four case studies of recent interactions between street vendor organizations and the state and compares three distinct periods of Mexico City’s government’s relationship to its street vendors. Cross’ research demonstrates that, although marginalized, informal sector workers do have a place in Mexico’s political landscape.

Cross does a nice job naming the various features of Mexico’s political structure and explaining the relationships that have led to the substantial power of street vendors’ organizations in Mexico City. While most analyses of Mexico’s political system characterize it as an oligarchy in which the needs of most members of society are not politically relevant, Cross demonstrates otherwise. By focusing on the political opportunity structure or the ways interest groups or social movements might infiltrate the state, Cross shows how street vendor organizations gain ‘tolerances,’ the informal permission or official blind eye from state actors to vend in city streets (officially an illegal act).

For instance, two characteristics of Mexico’s political structure that prove to advantage street vendors’ organizations are clientelism and low state integration. Clientelism is described as an exchange of political patronage for sought after privileges between a politician and the leader of an organization. Low state integration consists of high disparity between policies made and the implementation of those policies and opens the possibility of government corruption. In case after case, Cross demonstrates how leaders of street vendors’ organizations negotiate with low level political officials who in most cases agree to tolerate street vending in exchange for their political patronage. Because the Mexican state is not well integrated, city officials have leeway in choosing when and where to implement state policies, especially the murky policies regarding the informal sector. In addition, street vendors are an attractive constituency to politicians because the autonomy and flexibility in vendors’ labor allows for impromptu participation at political protests and events. Cross suggests that vendors have advantages over other marginalized groups, such as formal workers and peasants, in gaining political access because of their visibility, flexibility, and the necessity of their perpetual efforts towards securing a place to sell and earn a living.

Cross embeds his examination of street vendors and the state within theoretical perspectives from social movements and political sociology. He challenges arguments that claim that social movements are instigated by the elite to gain advantage and maintain power. By focusing on the organizational efforts of street vendors and their successes, Cross’s findings generally support the resource mobilization perspective, focusing on how members of a population instigate a movement for expanded their rights or freedoms. More specifically, Cross addresses Oberschall’s free rider thesis that those who make no contribution towards a movement still enjoy the benefits earned by movement activists. Cross argues “the problem” of free riders is solved in the case of the street vendors movement in Mexico City, since to operate without harassment or police arrest vendors must belong to an organization. The strict participation of vendors in organizations, Cross explains in a well organized and detailed chapter, was a precedent set by Uruchurtu, a former Mexico City mayor. As part of his resistance to urbanization, Uruchurtu strictly enforced the prohibition of street vending and required street vendors to form organizations to secure a place at the official market venues he had built for vendors to legally retail their goods. Cross argues that this precedent, set in the fifties and sixties, contributes to the current political strength of street vendor organizations. Vendor organizations are also strengthened, Cross claims, by being organized as competitive groups, rather than as a monolithic association. He claims that the competition between vendor organizations to secure ‘tolerances’ from state officials keeps the leaders of these organizations accountable to their constituents who will switch from one organization to another if the leader does not follow through with opportunities sell goods profitably.

According to Cross, the competition among street vendor organizations, unlike worker unions and peasant movements, is an advantage for operating in Mexico’s political system. Vendor organizations make pacts with various cliques in the government (until recently, Mexican politics has been dominated by one party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI). Within the party, camarillas, groups of individual politicians who help each other advance through the ranks of the bureaucracy, are formed. Thus competition among street vending organizations reflects the competition among government camarillas and allows for groups on either side to collude with each other to get needs met. While Cross realizes that this is a situ-
ation in which marginalized workers must constantly secure or defend the right to make a living, he seems to advocate for competitive factions within a social movement as a strategy for success.

Informal Politics contributes to theorizing in the areas of political sociology and social movements and to a political understanding of the informal sector. Critical of theories that assume state actors make autonomous decisions, Cross demonstrates the impact that marginalized groups can have on state officials’ decisions. However, Cross still awards the state, its political structure and precedents, a great deal of power in determining the rights of street vendors. Little attention is drawn to the influence of changes in the national and global economies on decisions made by state actors. Also, from a world-systems perspective, much more could be made of Mexico’s position in the global economy and how this shapes the employment structure of the nation. Cross makes little comment on the role of foreign capital and the US play in Mexico’s political economy. Additionally, besides telling us that men make up the majority of the vendors and that some of the most powerful leaders of vending organizations are women, Cross dismisses the gendering of the informal sector. Also unanswered are questions regarding the ethnic background of street vendors, which may be a factor in how the state responds to the various vendors’ organizations.

Yet Cross does do an excellent job accounting for numerous other factors that account for the impact of street vendors on the implementation of state policy. He gathers sufficient data to challenge arguments that claim that marginal groups in Third World state have no political power. His insight into Mexico’s political structure fortifies his analysis and offers the reader an understanding of how marginalized Third World workers can gain access to the state without direct confrontation. Informal Politics is clearly written with theoretical arguments tightly linked to empirical evidence. This book is clearly a must read for those interested in the informal sector; it provides an excellent introduction to the politics of informality.

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Until now there has been no good “supplementary reader” for courses that introduce world-systems analysis to undergraduates. This book attempts to fill that void. It is a compilation of “state of the art” articles that are intended to serve one or more of four editorial goals: (1) show how world-systems analysis is done; (2) demonstrate how the world-systems view is used outside of sociology; (3) illustrate how wide the range of world-systems inquiry has become; and (4) provide examples of new work in world-systems analysis. Unlike so many readers, the articles were either specifically written for or adapted to the collection, so that each clearly attempts to serve these editorial goals. The result is a collection that has more coherence than that found in most books of this sort. Among other things, each article provides a door into a rich literature for anyone wanting to pursue a particular topic.

The first section of the book provides a useful, if necessarily selective, overview of world-systems analysis and recent research. The second section provides clear statements of how world-systems analysis pertains to work in archaeology, geography, international relations, and feminist research on development. The third section demonstrates the application of world-systems analysis to specific substantive areas: ethnic groups in Canada; urbanization; systems theory; and postmodernism. The fourth section focuses on the process of incorporation and frontiers, including both narrowly focused case studies on the incorporation of and resistance by indigenous women and a more general discussion on the nature of frontiers in world-systems analysis and the recent “rise” of East Asia in the modern world-system. The book concludes with more speculative articles on the future potential for a global movement for social democracy and the connection of world-system analysis to the ecology movement. The selections vary widely in their level of theoretical abstraction and/or their empirical scope. Some are discussions of general issues in world-systems analysis and others are case studies or narrowly focused on one particular issue.

Substantively and theoretically the selections are generally very high quality. For anyone interested in being brought up to speed on any of the topics covered, these articles are a good place to start. The articles on recent research, archaeology, gender and the world-system, urbanization, the analysis of frontiers, the rise of East
Asia, and global social democracy are likely to interest non-specialists with some
curiosity about recent trends in world-systems analysis. I also found my interest
pique by the application of world-system analysis to systems theory (using the
concept of dissipative structures), postmodernism, and the ecology movement.

What about students? The primary purpose of this book is pedagogical and it
is primarily for that purpose it must be evaluated. With some caveats, I think this
book is well worth considering for courses in world-system theory.

Students are going to require some prior exposure to world-system analysis
before they start reading most of these selections. The introductory chapter by Hall
is helpful, but more as a review than as an introduction. My experience teaching
students of fairly average ability in a regional state university has been that they
find both the level of abstraction and the historical sweep of world-systems analysis
quite challenging. Some basic familiarity with the theoretical framework is likely to
make the selections in the book much more meaningful to student readers.

I also think that this book is not the sort of supplemental reader than you
can “assign and forget.” Students are going to need the feedback and assistance of
some sort of in-class discussion. I have found that even very challenging reading
material can be incorporated into a course if it is made an integral part of what goes
on in class. The issues addressed in this book are important enough and interesting
enough that they merit systematic discussion. Given the time constraints of a
semester course, I might find it necessary to be somewhat selective in what articles
I assigned.

The good news is that this book is both challenging and accessible. One of the
dilemmas of teaching world-system analysis that much of the literature is intimating
for undergraduates to read. Students may find this book difficult, but the
selections are generally clearly written, with arguments that are well-organized and
systemic. With the wide variety of topics, there are likely to be at least a few arti-
cles that different students are going to find interesting. Since my course enrols
about half non-sociology majors, but most are in one of the social sciences, the
cross-disciplinary emphasis in this book is particularly useful.

This book also does what no general text can do. It invites students into the
conversation about world-system analysis by practitioners in the field. It makes clear
that world-system analysis is an evolving and expanding field. It illustrates the wide
range of issues to which world-system analysis can be applied. It identifies unan-
swered questions, and sources of continued debate. It provides examples of how
specific empirical questions have been addressed by using a world-systems analyti-
cal framework, including basic questions on the future of human society. In short,
it helps students see world-systems analysis as an ongoing intellectual enterprise,
rather just another “theory” to be learned.

A World-Systems Reader is a welcome addition to the still very short list of books
specifically designed for courses in world-systems analysis and well worth consider-
ing for course use.

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Inkeles, Alex. 1999. One World Emerging? Convergence and Divergence in Industrial
http://www.perseusbooks.com/perseus-cgi-bin/display/0-8133-6803-0

In the modern world it has become generally accepted that certain basic human
goals can be better achieved by embracing a standard set of institutions such as fac-
tories, schools, universities and centres for science. This means that nations have a
tendency to converge towards a set of institutions and with these, to some extent, a
set of values.

The purpose of One World Emerging? Convergence and Divergence in Industrial Soci-
eties by A. Inkeles is to examine the extent to which this convergence has taken place.
The book is divided into 5 parts. Part 1 introduces the different aspects that are
central to the book, such as convergence itself. Inkeles also gives examples to illus-
trate the scope of convergence as well as its limits. In part 2 he examines a number
of nation states, specifically USSR, USA, India and China, in order to establish
whether or not, and to what extent they have converged to some common standard.
Institutions are the focus of part 3 where he examines changes in educational sys-
tems and the family. In part 4 he puts focus on process. He examines convergence
of occupational prestige in industrialised societies, the effects of increasing com-
 munications between societies and individuals across the globe and finally the non-
convergence of national constitutions in terms of due process guarantees. Finally, in
part 5, Inkeles turns his attention to responses to global processes at the level of the
individual.

As this brief synopsis might indicate, One World Emerging? contains many inter-
esting elements. However, it also has many weaknesses and is therefore somewhat
disappointing. The first weakness arises from the book’s nature as a collection of arti-
cles and papers; as such does it not present the reader with a coherent and fully-
fledged argument. Arguably, the issues surrounding convergence and divergence in
the modern world are important enough to deserve a single, book length, examina-
tion. However, here we are presented with a collection of relatively short and self-
contained pieces each examining a separate aspect of convergence and divergence. This lack of a single coherent argument means that an opportunity to examine an important aspect of the ‘modern’ globalising world had been missed.

Furthermore, since the collection is, in reality, a compilation of articles already published elsewhere (and over a period of 40 years) some of the pieces suffer from being severely out of date. One example is chapter 4 (first printed in 1963) which deals with the question of “Were the Soviet Union and the United States Converging?” (pp. 53–70). The chapter is a critical evaluation of a book first published in 1944, by P.A. Sorokin, which presents the argument that the USA and the USSR did not represent irreconcilable ways of life. At the end of the chapter Inkeles concludes that Sorokin understated the differences between the USA and the USSR. An article comparing developments in the USA and the USSR might have been of some interest if it had taken developments after 1963 into account. However, re-printing what is in essence a 40 year-old extended book review seems somewhat pointless.

Another example of an article that could have done with some updating is chapter 11. In this chapter Inkeles examines responses to industrial life in a range of countries. The article itself is quite interesting, but is presented as only the start of a research project: “…the purpose of this study is to open a discussion, not to settle an issue.” (p. 306). Considering that the article was published in 1960, it seems odd that there is no update provided of how the discussion has developed over the last 40 years.

Finally, there are several claims and conclusions in Part 1 which have been rendered irrelevant by subsequent events. For instance, at one point Inkeles writes that “…as the Soviet system matures…” (p. 28) it can be expected to come into line with the general European pattern. A little later we are told that the feasibility of effectively reuniting the two parts of Germany must be seriously questioned (p. 45). Thirdly we are told that when considering convergence we must “…be prepared to face a very difficult task in specifying whether the common system that will presumably emerge will be more like that of the United States or that of the Soviet Union.” (p. 23) It hardly seems necessary to point out how out of place these comments are in the light of the events of the last 15 years. Certainly the cumulative effect of these weaknesses creates an impression of a book seriously out of touch.

In Inkeles’ defense it could be said that One World Emerging?, as Inkeles himself writes, “…is a record of [his] long-term and continuing engagement with the issue of convergence and divergence in industrial societies.” (p. xvi). Therefore, each piece should be read with an understanding of the time in which it was originally published. This would definitely have been possible had the text been left unchanged. However, some attempts have been made at updating the pieces, one example being the opening sentence of chapter 3: “The Soviet Union no longer exists” (p. 53).

Clearly that sentence has been added after 1963. There are other instances of ‘tampering’, such as references to other chapters in the book. Consequently, the individual pieces have neither been left in their original form to speak to us from a time that knew as much as it did (to borrow from Wallerstein), nor have they been comprehensively updated.

Yet, despite these quite serious limitations, the book is instructive in methodological issues. A large number of the chapters are based on empirical evidence and Inkeles devotes much attention to methodology. This sometimes makes the book a bit of a slow read as the reader has to get past the methodology to get to the results. However, for anybody concerned with methodology One World Emerging? will make an excellent training text.

Furthermore, certain chapters of One World Emerging? are both interesting and useful. This was either because of their theoretical contribution to the field or because the contexts being described were still relatively current. In the case of the most up-to-date analyses, Inkeles also demonstrates a keen eye for unexpected yet eminently plausible conclusions. The two chapters in Part One, for instance, outline basic concepts useful for debates on globalisation such as interdependence, dependence and convergence. Inkeles also outlines evidence of convergence between societies as well as instances and trends of divergence. In so doing, he succinctly introduces the main concepts and assumptions that inform the remaining articles.

Other chapters present up-to-date analyses, such as Chapter 5, which examines China. This chapter is particularly interesting because it deals with a country which for a substantial period of time tried to isolate itself from the outside world, attempting to build up unique institutions designed to meet the unique needs of that country. China is also a country with a civilisation stretching back thousands of years and might therefore be more likely than any other country to be able to resist the pull towards convergence. However, Inkeles comes to the surprising yet reasonable conclusion that China is displaying notable signs of taking on institutional forms found in other industrialised and industrialising countries. So despite China’s attempt to remain unique it is indeed converging and Inkeles analysis of the situation is apposite.

Another example is chapter 10 which deals with the granting of due process rights in national constitutions. Examining the constitutional history of 139 nations Inkeles found that despite modern constitutions being “…very much alike in structure and form…” (p. 237) there is no “…general standard that all newcomers had to adopt.” (p. 260). Using empirical evidence Inkeles skillfully illustrates that we are very far from being a uniform global society. He thus shows that even in a world where a great deal of convergence is evident, local culture and historically determined factors still have a great deal of influence on the lives of national populations. The chapter is therefore a sobering antidote to the more exuberant literature on globalisation.
which often talks in terms of “the global village” (p. 3) or “a world polity” (p. 239).

Despite these glimmers of acuity, the book is rather disappointing. This is because it does not present the reader with a coherent argument, nor is it a record of research to be read as pieces of their time since some, albeit half-hearted, updating has been attempted. Finally, since the updating is less than assiduous, many of the articles come across as being very outdated, which gives the impression of a lax or unfocussed approach to the project. In other words, One World Emerging? could have done either with a lot more or a little less work, depending on whether it is meant to be a single coherent argument or a record of past research to be seen in the light of its time.

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Inter-polity rivalry is very much a part of the world system. The swing between hegemony and rivalry is one of three key cycles delineated in Wallerstein’s modern world-system analysis. Hence the suggestion that rivalries have a logic of their own, the core and well defended proposition of this collection, should appeal to those who wish to understand world system dynamics. A quick review of the text reveals that the traditional state-centric, power politics orientation of many political scientists and diplomatic historians is abandoned in favor of a healthy fusion of geopolitical, commercial and ideational analyses. Rivalry is conceived as a process that goes beyond simplistic dyadic interactions and challenges us to understand webs of complex coordinate behaviors. Finally, this volume is a transdisciplinary effort mixing political scientists and historians in a well-integrated interaction.

Thompson’s introduction establishes a number of questions to be pursued throughout. Rivalry is yet to be satisfactorily defined, and the contributors consider quantitative definitions based on the extent of hostile interactions, and qualitative definitions based on the psychology of hostile interaction and on mutual threat perceptions. Each contributor is also asked to consider the manner in which rivalries are initiated and terminated, how they escalate and deescalate, how they grow into webs of interaction and what their ‘internal’ vs. ‘external’ dynamics are. Coverage varies, though a few issues do find some focus. A definition based on mutual threat perceptions is highly favored. The question of which types of rivalries generate the most violence, how rivalries evolve, and how complex sets of associated rivalries develop, garner significant attention.

The book’s 13 case chapters were born of a small conference on rivalries and are divided into 3 groups. The first concerns rivalries between regional powers and includes France and Spain from 1462 to 1700 (John Rule), Franco-Habsburg interaction between 1715 and 1918 (Paul Schroeder), and Franco-German interaction from the mid-19th century (Paul Hensel). Franco-Spanish interaction is most instructive, including a fairly regular cycle of war and peace, along with an excellent description of the nature of the world system during the shift from hegemony to rivalry. The discussion of the Franco-German rivalry adopts an evolutionary framework and suggests that conflict escalates over the life of a rivalry as issues cumulate. The existence of a specific territorial issue makes this rivalry more volatile.

The second section of the book is particularly strong and concerns rivalries between maritime powers. This includes Genoa and Venice from the 11th to the 14th century (David Kelly), Venice and Portugal from the 14th to the 16th century (George Modelski), the Anglo-Dutch rivalry of the 17th century (Jack Levy) and the Anglo-American rivalry of the 18th and 19th centuries (Bill Thompson). Support is offered for greater violence due to the accumulation of grievances over time by Kelly, who argues that rivalries over territory generate more frequent conflict, while those over position/prestige are rarer but more ferocious. Modelski considers the moderating effects of rivalry between democratic powers, and transitions within the ‘democratic lineage’. Jack Levy begins to question the spatial vs. positional rivalry dichotomy by noting the difficulty of separating issues of prestige, power and profit. Finally, Thompson notes the moderation of the rivalry between the UK and US, and suggests it is the explicit outcome of an evolutionary model where sides learn to interact and accomplish their goals short of force. The alternative, a rational choice model of fixed preferences and alternatives, would have yielded a different outcome.

Less agreement is generated over the question of the ‘internal’ vs. ‘external’ genesis of these rivalries. Genoa and Venice fought for structural reasons argues Kelly, though the winner was determined by differentially resilient internal social systems. Levy stresses domestic issues, but his narrative is so rich that it is difficult to discriminate between what might be primarily internal and primarily external.
The third section considers rivalries between maritime powers and their challengers and includes the Ottomans and Venice from the 15th to the 17th century (Palmira Brummett), Britain and France from 1066 (Jeremy Black), Britain and Russia from the 18th to the mid 20th century (Edward Ingram), Britain and Germany between 1890 and 1914 (Suzanne Frederick), US-Japanese relations from the end of the 19th century into the 20th (David Rapkin), and the US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War (Deborah Larson). These disparate cases produce a mixed bag of hypotheses and conclusions. Once again the dispute-count definition of rivalry fares poorly, though many authors offer novel definitional elements. Ingram argues that rivalries are less disputes over specific issues than conflicts over the shape of the future. Rapkin takes a more functional view, accepting the mutual threat perception framework but adding commercial interaction to the mix. Brummett describes the Ottoman-Venice rivalry as a highly uneven ‘rivalry of convenience’ (or perhaps ‘rivalry when convenient’) with each side’s extensive and varied interactions leading to violence only when specific stakes and clear superiority warrant. Frederick adds the issue of growth and technology, while Larson argues that the territorial dimension of the US-USSR rivalry, often pursued by proxy, helped keep the two sides from direct conflict.

The most difficult issue in this section is the ‘internal vs. external’ genesis of rivalries. For the Ottomans-Venice, UK-Germany and US-Japan, structural explanations dominate. Discussions of UK-France, and UK-Russia discount structural explanations totally, in favor of internal, individual level dynamics. The Cold War is described as a rivalry that did not have to evolve as it did, but for a confounding ideological dimension that altered the perceptions and hence the actions of individuals.

One of this volume’s great strengths is its mixing of historians and political scientists. The ratio is fairly even, and attempts at fruitful interaction as evidenced by mention of each other’s chapters suggest a well-integrated endeavor. That said, the gulf between the disciplines remains wide. There is a tendency for the political scientists to structure their concerns around theoretically relevant issues and the generation of hypotheses. The hypotheses are fascinating, but some seem quite contextually specific. Some of the analyses seem so highly focused that future insights based on other variables or hypotheses might find them of little use. Social science may be captive to its tendency to focus analysis along a theoretical line. Some historians, on the other hand, ignore or even savage theoretical schools, and seek to let the available facts speak uniquely for themselves. They nonetheless betray their own theoretical predispositions, sometimes based on the selective nature of the available evidence, and fail to acknowledge this bias or the directions in which it might inadvertently lead. Though these tendencies are pronounced in a few places, they are the minority here. There is a good deal of healthy cross-fertilization, and those chapters that find the magic middle ground are real treats.

The collection lacks a conclusion. Thompson’s introduction does a good job of setting the stage and providing a map of the volume. As such, however, it cannot engage in too much evaluation. The volume would have benefited from a summary consideration of the key questions raised. A concluding chapter could tell us where we stand, and suggest where we might go from here. There are some conceptual issues to be dealt with (e.g. the concept of “hegemony” is particularly abused). More importantly, who better than the editor or another conference participant to suggest what else we might wish to know, where students of one rivalry might look for additional insights or extend there analyses to help address important general questions, or to guide students to interesting and efficient research questions? The reader is left with the pleasant task of putting the various elements of this excellent work into perspective.

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Dating as far back as Machiavelli (1532), Western social and political thought has been concerned with the ways in which structural changes constrain individuals’ ability to establish collaborative social relationships that facilitate the non-contractual circulation of tangible and intangible resources. In Networks in the Global Village (1999), Wellman and his collaborators revive and reframe the age-old debate about the relationship between large-scale social change and sociability.

Wellman terms this bundle of concerns the community question and argues that such meso-level non-contractual exchange of resources is important to social integration (p.34-35). Networks in the Global Village is a book of vast depth and scope. Two key conceptual threads weave together...
the four elemental building blocks (42) into sixteen possible variations. They identify the three community types that occur most often among Torontonians, which include:

1. Community lost—high intimacy, range, contact, and friendship (low immediate kin).
2. Community saved—high intimacy and immediate kinship, low range and contact; and,
3. Community liberated—high intimacy, range, contact, and friendship (low immediate kin).

Finally, in chapter three, Wellman and Potter challenge the assumption that there is a stable correlation between types of social relationship (e.g., parent-child, friends) and the forms of support that flow through them. Furthermore, following in the tradition of Simmel, they suggest that the overall structure of community networks also affects the depth and kinds of support which they offer.

The propositions laid out so painstakingly by Wellman, Gulia, and Potter recast the search for community into social network analytic terms and create a unifying methodological and conceptual framework for cross-national comparative research into the community question. Indeed, a strength of Networks in the Global Village is that chapter authors can and do draw on this framework to explore the ways in which variations in the four elements of community, the overall structure of social networks, and the social relationships they sustain are linked to the quantity and quality of the resources that circulate in personal communities. Indeed, each contributor makes Wellman’s framework their own. Authors reformulate the competing theories of the specific debate in which their research question is embedded as testable hypotheses about the structure and composition of ego-centred social networks.

The second way in which Networks in the Global Village reframes the community question is by posing it as two interlinked components including: (1) a concern with how large-scale social systems affect the composition, structure, and content of interpersonal ties; and, (2) an interest in how the structure of personal networks affects the large-scale social systems in which they are embedded (p.2-3). Reformulated in this way, the community question emerges as a dynamic and multi-level research agenda.

Each chapter in Networks in the Global Village documents the existence of community networks and explores their implications for the societies in which they are embedded. In particular, the chapters on Hungary and China present a poignant and fascinating discussion of the interaction between personal community and social system. Sik and Wellman argue that in Hungary, all sectors of society and economy managed informal social networks that granted access to crucial and scarce resources. Personal community was used both as an addition to and as a substitute for state-controlled modes of resource distribution. Ironically, growing household poverty and fierce market competition in the postcommunist order has led to a greater reliance on personal networks as a complement to the market.
The chapter on getting a job in China tests Granovetter’s ‘strength of weak ties’ argument. Prior to the market reforms of the 1990s, Bian argues, individuals wishing to bypass the state-controlled job placement process used their guanxi (good network connections) both to gather information about available jobs and to be placed in a job. Since these informal guanxi-based resource exchanges (information and the job) were unauthorized, the risk had to be minimized by mutual trust. In other words, in China the key to getting a job was strong, not weak ties. Following market reforms, the job search is, in theory, an open process, with “each individual scrambling for employment” (p.256). In this new context, guanxi-based assistance is no longer necessary to get information about available positions, but remains important for the actual job placement process.

By way of conclusion and critique, it is worthwhile to signal the missing theoretical link in this cross-country comparative search for community, namely a dialogue with the insights of economic sociology. The contributors to this volume, Wellman in particular, make reference to concepts, such as embeddedness and social capital, that are central to Economic Sociology. Yet, except for engagement with Granovetter’s strength of weak ties argument, what might have been a fruitful theoretical dialogue remains largely unexplored or merely implied. While unfortunate, the failure to engage directly with the theoretical contributions of economic sociology cannot detract from the strengths of the volume—a recasting of the community question in social network analytic terms, a theoretical and methodological framework for the cross-national comparative search for community that is flexible, multi-leveled and interactive, and a fascinating set of empirical studies on the nature of contemporary community life.

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