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**JWSR Editorial Policy**

The main editorial goal of the *Journal of World-Systems Research* is to develop and disseminate scholarly research on topics that are relevant to the analysis of world-systems. We especially want to include works that proceed from several different theoretical stances and disciplines. These include, but are not limited to, civilizationists, evolutionary approaches, international political economy, comparative, historical and cultural analysis. We seek the work of political scientists, historians, sociologists, ethnographers, archaeologists, economists and geographers.

We especially encourage works that take theory seriously by confronting problems of conceptualization and making definitions of concepts explicit, by formulating hypotheses, constructing axiomatic theories and causal models. Theoretical research programs that combine theory construction with comparative research are badly needed to take the world-systems approach beyond the stage of a perspective.

We also want to encourage the application of comparative, quantitative and network-analytic methods to world-systems research, though we will certainly also publish pieces that do not use these methods. Any empirical study that is deemed relevant to world-systems analysis may be published even if it uses a very different conceptual framework.

And finally we also want to publish discussions of future trajectories and options for the modern world-system and considerations of what can be done to create a more humane, peaceful and just world society.

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to produce a high quality publication of world-systems research articles; to publish quantitative and comparative research on world-systems; to publish works of theory construction and codification of causal propositions; to publish data sets in connection with articles; to publish reviews of books relevant to world-systems studies; and to encourage authors to use the hypermedia advantages of electronic publication to present their research results.

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Two ideas have dominated discussion in recent studies of the social and political impacts of globalization by those who think that globalization has had real effects and is not simply a synonym for the neo-liberal policies instituted by many national governments beginning in the 1980s. The first is the idea that everywhere in the world is becoming alike economically and culturally as a consequence of globalization. This is a scaling up from the national to a global scale of the old idea of “modernization.” From this perspective, common global norms about conduct, consumption standards, and cultural practices are spreading everywhere (John Meyer at Stanford University [e.g. Meyer 1996] and his students are perhaps representative of this thrust). This global modernization is often seen as brought about by causes implicit in a second idea, although proponents of the second idea may well not endorse the first or vice versa. This is that current globalization is about the shrinking of the world because of revolutionary changes in communication and transportation technologies. In the long-term this process of “time-space compression” will produce greater economic similarities across places but immediately this need not be the case. Rather, differences between places may in fact intensify as involvement in a world of flows makes the characteristics of this or that place make the place more competitive globally. In the end, however, different places will establish niches for themselves within the global economy, even if there is dislocation in the short-term. This seems to be the logical implication of the argument of David Harvey (1989), and others.

1 A thorough survey of recent ideas about globalization is provided in Chase-Dunn (1999).
discussed later, about declining transportation costs, notwithstanding Harvey’s observations about short-term uneven development.

In this paper I want to challenge the adequacy of both of these two ideas for understanding globalization, the new uneven development that it is producing, and the political reactions to this. In their place I argue for the importance of the geopolitical role of the United States and the vision of world economic order, or transnational liberalism, that post-World War II US governments have actively sponsored, both unilaterally and multilaterally (through global institutions they created, such as the IMF and World Trade Organization) in the emergence of the new global economy and its geographical structure. In this perspective, technological changes and the values associated with them have been enabling and encouraging, rather than determining in and of themselves, and common outcomes with respect to global norms, etc., are far from likely in a world still exhibiting large geographical differences in levels of economic development. In other words, the new global economy did not simply spring out of technological changes powered by business imperatives and justified by a logic of neoliberal economics that have subsequently produced an increasingly homogenized world.

I start with the evidence for a deepening pattern of global uneven development in recent years. This suggests that envisaging a world increasingly alike everywhere rests on a large element of imagination or wishful thinking without empirical substance. Even if people everywhere may be subject to many of the same cultural stimuli, this is no guarantee that they will react to them the same way or be able to express their preferences for them without the resources needed to command them. It also suggests the need for a certain skepticism about hyperbolic claims such as the “death of distance” or the “end of geography” as time presumably wipes out space as a meaningful dimension of human experience, whether in the short or the long-term. A second section offers a critical survey of the emerging literature that sees time-space compression as leading the transformation of the world economy from a set of national-state economies into a global economy. One strand is distinguished that focuses on the singularity of the present, suggesting that contemporary “time-space compression” augurs a postmodern world in which the fixed territorial spaces of modernity no longer match a new world of kaleidoscopic and jumbled spaces either because of “flexible accumulation” or because speed conquers established geopolitical representations and the material conditions they rely upon. A second strand, however, sees greater continuity between present and past in the configuration of global space. In this perspective, new local spaces inter-linked with existing territorial ones produce a mosaic pattern to global development with local as much as global forces leading the process.

The New Global Economy

Sympathetic to the second strand, I endeavor in a third section to offer an alternative account of the origins and geographical structure of the current global economy to that of time-space compression, even if some sort of time-space compression is implicated. This views powerful states, above all the United States, as sponsoring a new global “market access” regime that is producing a new geopolitics of power in which control over flows of goods, capital, and innovations increasingly substitutes for the fixed or static control over the resources of bounded territories. Thus, the businesses of different states (and regions and localities within them) vie for access to the world’s resources not through classic empire-building or territorial expansion but through command over world markets using the new technologies of time-space compression. In response to this, I propose in the fourth section, that a “politics of globalization” is now in formation involving businesses, social groups and governments around the world (1) left out of the benefits of the new global economy (as they see them), (2) mobilizing against its depredations, and (3) struggling to establish regulatory measures that allow for a “geographical re-matching” between economic organization, on the one hand, and political oversight, on the other. This seems to augur, for some parts of the world at least, the emergence of new political spaces beyond those of the territorial state.

GLOBAL UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

Much of the sociological hype about globalization sees it as synonymous with homogenization, as if the whole world is becoming alike culturally and economically. The literature on time-space compression might also suggest such a prospect, if only on the distant horizon. In fact, there is considerable evidence that globalization is polarizing the world as a whole between geographical haves and have-nots: between regions and localities tied into the globalizing world economy and those outside it (Internet and all) and between those who have received a “leg up” into this economy, on the one hand, and those who may have to remain outside it, on the other. I want to say something illustrative about each of these points with respect to trends between and within groups of countries. Of course, the globalizing world economy is not an economy of national territories that trade with one another, but one another, notwithstanding the tendency of the World Bank and other organizations to portray it this way. Rather, it is a complex mosaic of inter-linked global city-regions, prosperous rural areas, resource sites, and “dead lands” increasingly cut off from time-space compression. All of these are widely scattered across the globe, even if there is a basic global north-south structure to the world economy as a whole. Some of the prosperous areas, for example, can be found within even the poorest countries, so it is important to bear the mosaic
nature of the emerging world economy in mind throughout the following discussion (Agnew and Corbridge 1995:167–8) (see Figure 1).

Global Income Divergence Between Rich and Poor Countries

Among the richest countries in the world today per capita incomes have converged over the past one hundred and thirty years, with the poorer among them growing faster and catching up with the richer (Pritchett 1997). This increased homogeneity among the rich countries is what makes the idea of cultural globalization such a persuasive one. People in France and Japan are now more and more “like” Americans because they can afford to follow many of the same consumption patterns and have many of the same social attitudes. Of course, there is something tautological here, in that countries that were relatively rich and became poorer (such as Argentina) and ones that were poor but became poorer (such as India) are not included in such a rendering of growth trajectories. Only those countries that are today rich as defined by the World Bank and the OECD are included. But, for these countries there is more and more clustering around the group average: from a standard deviation of 0.33 in the years 1870–1960 to 1.1 for 1960–1980, and 0.51 for 1980–1994 (Pritchett 1997:5) (Table 1). In other words, there is as much convergence among rich countries in the thirty-four years from 1960 to 1994 as in the ninety years from 1870 to 1960. What is important for present purposes, however, is that the globalization era of 1980 to 1994 shows sustained convergence after a short period of increased divergence between 1960 and 1980. Convergence temporarily stopped as the old Breton Woods/Cold War system frayed and the globalizing world economy came into being.

What also seems clear, however, is that as today’s rich countries have been converging with one another the rest of the world has been largely left in the dust. Assuming a lower bound of $250 for the poorest country in 1870, Pritchett (1997:11) shows that as the US per capita income went from $2063 in 1870 to $985 in 1960 and $18054 in 1990, that of the average poor country went from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year range</th>
<th>Rich Countries</th>
<th>Poor Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870–1960</td>
<td>1.5 (0.33)</td>
<td>1.2 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–79</td>
<td>3.2 (1.1)</td>
<td>2.5 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–94</td>
<td>1.5 (0.51)</td>
<td>0.34 (3.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Average Yearly Growth Rates in GDP Per Capita


In this figure, (A) represents the world during the pre-1970 Cold War with national economies bonded together in blocs whereas (B) represents the new global economy with its more geographically fragmented, mosaic-like structure.

Source: Agnew and Corbridge (1975:206)
Icons represented by such products as blue jeans and Coke bottles are recognizable the world over, and Stealth technology undermines the ability of territorial economies, and culturally, is seen as creating a world in which ‘all that is solid melts into air,’ to borrow a phrase ... can be shipped over great distances at relatively low cost because of containerization and other innovations, cultural acceptance as representing the fundamental essence of Western civilization. Now a new end of history has appeared. This time, however, it is one in which the globe earlier. History seemed to have culminated with the advent of the European nation-state and the nation-state seemed to be the highest form of governance, therefore, so has divergence among the poorer ones. The standard deviations reported in Table 1 show increasingly variance among poorer countries in their income growth rates over time, with a significant spike after 1980. Poorer countries are becoming less and less alike with respect to economic growth rates and this has happened at an increasing rate since 1980. Between 1970 and 1995 the poorest countries had no increase whatsoever in average real incomes and the better-off ones had only a 0.7 per cent average annual increase compared to 1.9 per cent for the world’s rich countries. (World Bank 2001). Of the 108 countries for which reasonably reliable data are available in the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston 1991), 11 grew faster than 4.2 per cent (the rate at which a country would have to grow to go from the lower bound in 1870 (p$250) to match the US level in 1960: p$9895) in the 1960–1990 period. Almost all of these are East and Southeast Asian economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia (Acharya and Stubbs 1999). Most countries fared much more poorly than these 11: 40 (over a third) had annual GDP growth rates between 0 and 1 per cent; 28 (more than quarter) had rates of 0 to 0.5 (e.g. Peru with 0.1 per cent); and 16 countries had negative growth over the period 1960–1990: for example, Mozambique at –2.2 per annum, and Guyana at –0.7 per cent per annum. The range of annual rates of GDP growth across the poor countries during 1960–1990 is from –2.7 per cent to +6.9 per cent (Pritchett 1997:14).

What seems to have been happening during the globalization era since the 1970s is that three groups of poorer countries have sharpened their differences: a fortunate few largely in East and Southeast Asia have successfully made themselves export platforms for goods sold largely in the advanced capitalist world but have also built domestic markets for themselves; some larger countries (such as Brazil) and oil-rich countries (such as Iran and Saudi Arabia) that have, respectively, either large domestic markets (and had reasonably strong import-substitution sectors) or crucial commodities that underwrite at least a modicum of growth: and “the others,” countries that have few commodities in world trade and little in the way of labor-market, consumer-market or resource advantages to offer the rich countries and their investors (presciently David Gordon (1988:57) offered a similar set of categories).

**TIME-SPACE COMPRESSION**

Early in the 20th century Hegel seemed to have got it right a hundred years earlier. History seemed to have culminated with the advent of the European nation-state and the nation-state seemed to be the highest form of governance, accepted as representing the fundamental essence of Western civilization. Now a new end of history has appeared. This time, however, it is one in which the globe substitutes for the state. The ease with which space is now overcome, militarily, economically, and culturally, is seen as creating a world in which all that is solid melts into air, to borrow a phrase from Karl Marx. Capital now moves around the world at the press of a button, goods can be shipped over great distances at relatively low cost because of containerization and other innovations, cultural icons represented by such products as blue jeans and Coke bottles are recognizable the world over, and Stealth technology undermines the ability of territorial
military power to police its air space. A new postmodern world is emerging in which old rules of spatial organization based on linear distance-decay of transportation costs and territorial containing of external effects by states have broken down (e.g., Langhorne 2001).

Under the new ‘flexible accumulation,’ associated by scholars such as David Harvey with globalization, the unique attributes of particular places in fact can take on greater value for what they can offer to increasingly mobile capital, from specific types of labor market to fiscal incentives. The need for rapid access to information has privileged those ‘world cities’ that have good connectivity to other places. The local availability of entrepreneurship, venture capital, technical know-how, and design capabilities differentiate ‘attractive’ from ‘unattractive’ sites for investment. At the same time, tastes are increasingly volatile, subject to manipulation through advertising and the decline of status-markers other than those of consumption. Niche markets associated with different social groups increasingly cross national boundaries, giving rise to cross-national markets that can be served by factories located in any one of them or, for labor-intensive goods, produced wherever labor costs are lower.

To David Harvey (1989), for example, one of the main advocates of this point of view, the “condition of postmodernity” does not therefore signify the decreasing importance of space, at least for now. Rather, it represents the latest round in capitalism’s long-term annihilation of space by time in which capitalists must now pay ‘much closer attention to relative locational advantages, precisely because diminishing spatial barriers give [them] the power to exploit minute spatial differentiations to good effect. Small differences in what space contains in the way of labour supplies, resources, infrastructures, and the like become of increased significance’ (Harvey 1989:294). Politically, this gives local populations and elites the incentive to organize to represent themselves as best as possible in the struggle for mobile assets. They can be expected to turn ‘homewards’ and away from relying on national states to represent their interests. Political fragmentation, therefore, is a likely outcome of the increased place differentiation of the current era.

Yet, logically the long-term expected world is one in which where you are will no longer matter, materially or culturally. Surely, is this not what time-space compression must lead to? Implicit in the perspective is an imminent decline in the significance of place as first technological conditions and then social relations produce an increasingly homogenized global space, within which local difference will be purely the result of human volition (Dodgehson 1999). Only in the here-and-now is there increased differentiation as new technologies conjoined to the unchanging imperative of capital accumulation work unevenly across the face of the postmodern world.

The historical record, however, seems to offer little comfort to this teleology. Wealth and power always seem to pool up in some places and not in others. Distance is still overcome only partially and to a limited extent. For example, little support can be found in world automobile trade for a significant decrease in transaction and transportation costs (Krempel and Plümper 1999:492). The main difference today seems to be that the global pattern of economic development is a much more localized one, linking production sites across national boundaries as well as within them, than that associated with the era of national-industrial capitalism and its welfare states.

A rather different approach to time-space compression emphasizes more the role of speed in postmodernity than the enhanced importance of local places or lived space on the long-term technological road to One World, however bumpy it might prove. Indeed, in this understanding, ‘the power of pace is outstripping the power of place’ (Luke and Ó Tuathail 1998:72). Accepting the rhetoric of the gurus of the Internet world and the ‘Third Wave,’ this perspective sees the world as on a technological trajectory in which global space is being re-mastered by a totally new geopolitical imagination in which accelerating flows of information and identities undermine modernist territorial formations. Drawing on such writers as Paul Virilio (1986), ‘Places are conceptualized in terms of their ability to accelerate or hinder the exchanges of global formations’ (Luke and Ó Tuathail 1998:76). Space is reimagined not as fixed masses of territory, but rather as velociromes, with high traffic speedways, big band-width connectivities, or dynamic web configurations in a worldwide network of massively parallel formations’ (Luke and Ó Tuathail 1998:76). The main danger here, as McKenzie Wark (1994: 93) notes, is that of mistaking a trend towards massively accelerated information flow with a deterritorialized world in which where you are no longer matters. It still matters immensely. Some places are well-connected, others are not; media and advertising companies work out of some locations and cultures and not out of others. The simulations of the media are still distinguishable (for some people) from the perils and dilemmas of everyday life. Pace is itself problematic when the images and information conveyed lead to information overload and fatigue more than accurate and real-time decision-making. The much hyped televiusal world must still engage with an actual world in which most people still have very limited daily itineraries that root them to very particular places. To think that geopolitics is being replaced by chronopolitics is to project the desire for a boundaryless world characteristic of an older utopianism onto an actual world in which the old geopolitical imagination is still very much alive and well. History has not yet ended in instant electronic simulation. History is not the same as the History Channel.
A second strand of thinking about time-space compression is less melodramatic about recent change in the nature of economic space than either the flexible accumulation or power-of-speed perspectives. This sees recent shifts from more to less territorialized modes of social and political organization as growing out of previous features of global political-economic organization. In particular, it emphasizes that the spatial organization or spatiality of development is increasingly ‘constructed through interactions between flow economies and territorial economies’ (Storper 1997:31). It is not a question of either/or but of how one relates to the other.

In this strand, a number of different territorial-organizational dynamics are distinguished so as to better monitor the trend towards globalization and its challenge to established modes of regulation and governance. In this understanding, local sources of advantage maintain a role that cannot produce complete locational substitutability for businesses moving investments from place to place. Michael Storper (1997:35), for example, distinguishes four dynamics that work differentially across economic sectors and world regions:

In some cases, the opening up of interterritorial relations places previously existing locationaly specific assets into a new position of global dominance. In a second set of cases, those assets are devalued via substitution by other products that now penetrate local markets; this is not a straightforward economic process, however; it is culturally intermediated. In a third set of cases, territorial integration permits the fabled attainment of massive economies of scale and organization, devalues locationally specific assets and leads to derterritorialization and widespread market penetration. In a fourth set of cases, territorial integration is met by differentiation and destandardization of at least some crucial elements of the commodity chain, necessitating the reinvention of territory-specific relational assets.

Globalization of trade, foreign direct investment, and production, therefore, are not just about an emerging geography of flows but how flows fit into and adapt to existing territorial or place-based patterns of economic development.

The point is that ‘globalization does not entrain some single, unidirectional, sociospatial logic’ (Cox 1997:16). Rather, place-specific conditions still mediate many production and trade relationships. For example, most multinational businesses still betray strong national biases in investment activity and the intersection of various external economies and ‘relational assets’ (to use Storper’s term) give different places different competitive advantages in expanding their economic base. Various modes of local regulation and governance evolve to handle the development process.

It is often not quite clear, however, what is that new about all of this. The world’s economic geography has long been a product of a mix of localizing and globalizing pressures, as world-systems theorists have long maintained (see, e.g., Arrighi and Silver 1999). A genuine skepticism about the empirical basis to globalization as a pervasive process is also conjoined with a fairly economistic rendering of what is happening (e.g. Cox 1997).

**THE GEOPOLITICS OF GLOBALIZATION**

This is where greater attention to geopolitics is needed, not in denying the scale-complexity of the spatial impact of globalization (as in Storper’s approach) so much as offering a different account of its origins, novelty, and geographical impact. From this point of view, contemporary globalization has its origins in the ideological geopolitics of the Cold War with US government attempts at both reviving Western Europe and challenging Soviet-style economic planning by stimulating a ‘free-world economy’ committed to lowering barriers to world trade and international capital flows (Agnew and Corbridge 1995).

Globalization, therefore, did not just happen and it is not synonymous with the neo-liberal policies instituted by many national governments in the 1980s. It required considerable political stimulation without which technological and economic stimuli to increased international economic interdependence could not have taken place. From the standard American viewpoint, all states ideally would be internationalized; open to the free flow of investment and trade. This not only contrasted with the closed, autarkic character of the Soviet economy, it also had as a major stimulus the idea that the depression of the 1930s had been exacerbated by the closing down of international trade.

In the five decades after 1945 American dominion was at the center of a remarkable explosion in what I have called ‘interactional’ capitalism (Agnew 1993). Based initially on the expansion of mass consumption within the most industrialized countries, it later involved the systematic reorganization of the world economy around massive increases in the volume of trade in manufactured goods and foreign direct investment. This was definitely not a recapitulation of the previous world economy that Lenin had labeled ‘imperialist.’ Abandoning territorial imperialism, ‘Western capitalism…resolved the old problem of overproduction, thus removing what Lenin believed was the major incentive for imperialism and war’ (Calleo 1987:147). The driving force now was not export of capital to colonies but the growth of mass consumption in North America, Western Europe, and Japan. If before the Second World War the prosperity of the industrialized countries had depended on favorable terms of trade with the underdeveloped world, now demand was stimulated mainly at home. The products of such industries as real estate, household and electrical goods, automobiles, food processing, and mass entertainment were all consumed within, and progressively between, the producing countries. The welfare state helped to sus-
taint demand through the redistribution of incomes and increased purchasing power for basic goods.

Globally, interactional capitalism was underwritten by a massive security apparatus and set of bilateral and multilateral economic packages (most famously, the Marshall Plan aid directed to Europe between 1948 and 1954) deployed by United States governments around the world as part of the containment of communist regimes. This was peculiar, however, in that it did not rely on territorial control as had European and Japanese imperialism but depended upon negotiating the right to station US forces on the territories of independent countries. The infrastructure investments, trading privileges, and diplomatic advantages that accrued to countries making deals with US governments were part-and-parcel of the US Cold War system. This strange “leasehold empire,” as Christopher Sandars (2000) has named it, has been difficult for scholars to recognize as such, given the tendency to see empires as both territorial and exploitative. The fact that the US enterprise was neither, at least from the perspective of immediate economic advantage to the US, has meant that the US role in creating an open world economy has been widely ignored, not least in recent discussions of globalization.

Beginning in the late 1960s this international system started to change in profound ways that augured the onset of globalization. First came increased levels of international trade, particularly between the major industrialized regions of the world, following the revolutionary effects of the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the mid-1960s. This was followed in 1971 by the US abrogation of the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, liberating currencies from a fixed exchange rate to the US dollar so as to improve the deteriorating trade position of the US economy. This set currencies free to float against one another and created the globalized financial system now in place around the world. Third came the globalization of production associated with dramatic increases in the level of foreign direct investment. Initially led by large American firms, by the 1970s and 1980s European, Japanese, and other firms had also discovered the benefits of production in local markets (above all, those of their main competitors in the industrial core countries) to take advantage of macroeconomic conditions (exchange rates, interest rates, etc.), avoid tariff and other barriers to direct trade, and gain knowledge of local tastes and preferences. Foreign direct investment has soared sevenfold since the 1970s, to about $400 billion per year.

With the collapse of the alternative Soviet system since 1989, largely because of its failure to deliver the promise of increased material affluence, the ‘American’ model has emerged into prominence at a world scale. An approach set in train in the 1940s to counter the perceived threat to the American model at home by exporting it overseas has given rise to a globalized world economy that is quite beyond what its architects could have foreseen at the outset of the Cold War. Yet, that is where its roots lie, not in recent technological changes or purely in the recent machinations of American or global big business. Globalization has geopolitical more than simply technological or economic origins.

The globalization entailed by the evolution of the American economy’s impact on the rest of the world has also had dramatic effects on global political geography, affecting the political autonomy of even the most powerful states (Agnew 1999). One is the internationalization of a range of hitherto domestic policies to conform to global norms of performance. Thus, not only trade policy but also industrial, product liability, environmental, and social welfare policies are subject to definition and oversight in terms of their impacts on market access between countries. A second is the increased global trade in services, once produced and consumed largely within state boundaries. In part this reflects the fact that many manufactured goods now contain a large share of service inputs—from R&D to marketing and advertising. But it is also because the revolution in telecommunications since the 1980s means that many services, from banking to design and packaging, can now be provided to global markets. Finally, the spreading geographical reach of multinational firms and the growth of international corporate alliances have had profound influences on the nature of trade and investment, undermining the identity between national territories and economic processes. Symptomatic of the integration of trade and investment are concerns such as rules on unitary taxation, rules governing local content to assess where value was added in production, and rules governing unfair competition and monopoly trading practices (Cowhey and Aronson 1993).

None of these policy areas is any longer within the singular control of individual sovereign states. They all must live in an increasingly common institutional environment; including the United States. Unfortunately, as demonstrations at the November 1999, World Trade Organization (formerly GATT) meeting in Seattle made clear, the global institutional environment is not one currently very open to democratic demands. Indeed, the globalizing world is marked by a crisis of governance as existing national-state scale institutions cannot offer the spatial reach needed to regulate increasingly worldwide and world-regional transactions but existing global-scale institutions are still creatures of the most powerful states and dominant business-interest groups from them.

The globalizing world economy emerging since the collapse of the Bretton Woods years of the early Cold War (i.e. after 1970) is also marked by a substantially different geography of economic growth from that characteristic of either the territorialized capitalism of the colonial era or the national development strategies of the Cold War 1950s and 1960s. Contemporary global uneven devel-
opment has three fairly distinctive features. First, as noted earlier, is the major
divergence in per capita incomes between relatively rich and relatively poor coun-
tries since the 1960s, with the former increasing their share of the global total.
The positive fruits of globalization are overwhelmingly concentrated in North
America, Europe, and Japan, whatever the income and employment worries of the
First-World protesters in Seattle. For example, of the $400 billion per year
in foreign direct investment today, 80 per cent goes to only ten countries, with
100 countries averaging only $100 million apiece per year. Second, is improved
economic performance by some formerly poor countries, predominantly in East
and Southeast Asia, reflecting in part the origins of their improved growth as a
result of geopolitical privilege during the Cold War years when they received
massive amounts of US investment in infrastructure and industry. Third, and
finally, is the emergence of regions on the edge of or actually falling out of the
world economy because they are not attractive to outside investors and, having
borrowed heavily in international financial markets to finance national develop-
ment projects (and elite lifestyles), have become subject to internationally man-
dated programs of economic restructuring that reflect a dominant neo-liberal
ideology more than appropriateness to local circumstances. Large parts of Africa
are exemplary.

The second and third features are of particular interest for the geopolitical
hypothesis. Focusing initially on the first, of course there are all kinds of explana-
tion for the so-called NIC (Newly Industrializing Countries) phenomenon usu-
ally associated with the first category, from their relatively high education levels,
to good infrastructure, strong governments, ethnic homogeneity, Confucian cul-
tural traditions, and high savings rates. Early in the twentieth century they had
many of these characteristics but were as poor relative to the advanced capitalist
countries as African countries are to them today.

Bruce Cumings (1984) was perhaps the first to suggest what was of most
importance in priming the “pump” of economic growth in East Asia and setting
this region apart from elsewhere in the poor world of the 1960s and 1970s. Of
course, once primed the pump has had to work with local resources and capaci-
ties. To Cumings, the priming came from the combination of the US geopoliti-
cal devotion to the region during the Cold War and from previous investment
in infrastructure (railways, ports, etc.) under the Japanese Empire. US govern-
ments certainly poured capital into such free world outposts as Taiwan and South
Korea in the form of military aid and infrastructure investment, building on
what was already there. The immediate purpose was the containment of
Communist China but to this was added the goal of anchoring the Asia-Pacific
region, above all Japan, into the US-based world economy. Initial investment in
the region from outside was premised on the “stability” that US linkages brought
to the region. The later incorporation of other countries of the region into the
globalizing world economy, ironically including China itself, owes much to
the earlier geopolitical sponsorship undertaken by US governments. Obviously,
other factors such as labor skills, political organization, national social policies,
and connections into growing global markets have been of subsequent impor-
tance in lifting these few out of the ranks of the poorest countries in the world.
As is well known, the vulnerability of many of these economies to global finan-
cial pressures has limited their growth since the monetary shocks visited on the
region in the late 1990s. Indeed, eight out of the 27 poorer countries that receive
more than 90% of all the private capital flows to the poorer countries are in
East/Southeast Asia and suffered deep financial crises between 1997 and 1999
(Business Week 2000:98).

Without the Cold War to attract even minimal attention from US govern-
ments and other powerful global actors, many other countries now face the possi-
bility of actually dropping out of the world economy altogether, retreating into
more localized economic zones with only limited connections to the globalizing
world. Many countries in Africa and not a few elsewhere no longer have
well-established niches within the world division of labor, having lost the posi-
tions they occupied as important primary producers within the territorial capi-
talism of the early twentieth century. For example, the African share of world
coffee exports dropped from 29 per cent to 15 per cent between 1974 and 1994
(Economist 1994:76). The following four factors seem of primary importance in
relation to Africa’s lost role in the world economy, suggesting that no single one
offers a complete explanation: the loss of comparative advantage and declining
terms of trade for many primary commodities, particularly since 1970; vulner-
ability to world markets with the collapse of colonial ties; political cronyism and
corruption; and the over-valuation of currencies for political ends (see Grant and
Agnew 1996; Somerville 1999). The US geopolitical imagination during the Cold
War had only a limited place for Africa and other regions at some remove from
the primary conflict of the day. But at least the countries of these regions had
potential leverage in the omnipresent threat posed by the former Soviet Union
and its political-economic ideology. This has now passed and with it has gone the
incentive to stimulate investment in large areas that are consequently the most
extensive “dead lands” of the current world: without either economic or geopoliti-
cal advantage within the globalizing world economy.

THE POLITICS OF REGULATING GLOBALIZATION

Karl Marx always held that at a certain level of maturation of the forces
of production there would be a corresponding set of “relations of production.”
Emerging social classes, those with a dominant economic role in the new mode of production, would recognize themselves as agents of history and institutionalize their new importance. The existing political and legal regimes—superstructures with respect to the economic structure—would not be suitable for consolidating and fixing the new power relations. The contradiction between new forces of production and the old relations of production still embodied in political regimes, however, could not last long. No social power—according to this doctrine—can resist for very long in the absence of a real economic base.

This vision of social and political transformation based on an economic base-political superstructure opposition now fails to satisfy most of those who study and engage in politics. Unfortunately, the intellectual discrediting of this aspect of Marxism has led to an enduring and deliberate neglect of the analysis of great transformations, an undervaluing of the impact of economic changes on power relations. There is little wonder, therefore, if, of course subversively and often over-schematically, neo-Marxist analyses have been the first to signal the fact that something important is happening.

In Marx’s day and for a long time after capitalists drew political strength from the states that had grown up alongside them. In turn democratic movements directed their political energies at redressing the imbalance of power implicit in early liberal states. Extending citizenship rights, such as the right to vote, to an increasing number of social categories and to all eligibles in a given category (first skilled artisans, then adult white males and, later, to other groups such as racial minorities and women) and organizing political parties to push states to pursue policies advantageous to the newly enfranchised were the essential components of democratic struggles. As competitive capitalism shifted towards monopoly forms in the late nineteenth century the state became the joint arena for political combat between organized factions of both capital and labour. The territorial form of the state provided the geographical frame of reference for both economic organization and political citizenship rights.

Karl Polanyi (1944) viewed the competitive market as a utopian ideal that drove and legitimized capitalism as it was backed up by states in competition with one another. As a national society acted to preserve itself from the depredations of the unplanned market, however, he saw the growth of a second phase in which under the guise of political regulation and the welfare state society set about “taming and civilizing the market” (Cox 1992). This double movement identified by Polanyi can be seen at work again today, but at a different geographical scale (Inayatullah and Blaney 1999). Now a dynamic of globalization is prying open national economies and in many countries the welfare state is under threat from privatization and “back-to-work” programs. Slowly, and by no means as an automatic reaction as in Marx’s formulation, new definitions and understandings of political organization, citizenship and political rights are emerging to regulate, challenge and channel the tide of globalization but in the context of globalization itself rather than in terms of retreat into the state as a political weapon against it.

The pressures for political forms more appropriate for the times come first of all, and not surprisingly given past experience, from the businesses and other agencies most active in economic globalization. Many supranational organizations receive much of their impetus and crucial support from international banks and multinational companies seeking a degree of certainty for their operations in a world without central authority (Roberts 1998). At the same time many of their operations are concentrated at certain points in global networks, particularly city-regions, that also require political institutions to serve and legitimize their economic interests. Powerful economic actors (Hollingsworth 1998; Scott 1998), therefore, increasingly demand multiple spatial levels of coordination. In counterpoint, however, new social forces are emerging among environmentalists, women, indigenous peoples, peace activists, churches, labour unions, and other groups, to protest and organize against the less beneficial aspects of globalization. Consciousness of the global and local scales at which they must organize and the increasing irrelevance of purely national forms of citizenship and political rights mark these contemporary movements as parallel phenomena to the economic globalization that receives the lion’s share of attention from most scholars. In other words, spaces of political regulation are starting to emerge that match the global-local geographical form increasingly taken by economic accumulation as growing consciousness of globalization stimulates political action at scales other than the national. This is the political phase of a new Great Transformation obscured by the singular attention devoted to economic globalization.

In the short-term there is, however, a considerable mismatch between the effects of economic globalization and political regulation and responsiveness, which remain largely trapped at the level of individual states (Hirsch 1995). Two major barriers stand in the way of making political organization fully in conformity with recent economic changes: the persisting importance of national identities to political mobilization and the increased alliance between states and the agents of economic globalization. Struggles for extending political rights during the nineteenth century were closely bound up with struggles for national independence and national sovereignty. So it is very difficult to dissociate the idea of belonging to a national “kinship” community from the idea of citizenship. An important difficulty facing the creation of supranational citizenship or extending citizenship rights easily to new residents from elsewhere is the fusion between the ideas of citizenship and nationality (e.g. Zincone 1992; Agnew 1995;
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upon which it is based, therefore, is a hegemonic one complete with a hegemonic leader: the United States. But it is also a transnational liberal order based on the relatively untrammeled access of business everywhere to opportunities wherever they can find them. This is not to say that all of the governments of countries operating under this transnational liberal hegemony are or have been liberal or democratic ones. They need only allow relatively free access to capital and oppose entirely state-based economic development to qualify for entry and potential US government patronage. They must also feed into the post-colonial calculus of a world economy that is no longer driven as it once was by the export of capital to poor but resource-rich regions. As Bruce Cumings (1999:287) has noted, one of liberalism’s strengths is the “accretion of norms” as practice is compared to ideals and practices are thereby adjusted. ... regions, with selected poorer regions largely servicing their manufacturing needs and others literally dropping back off the world-economic map.

Along with transnational liberalism, however, have come coercion and a vast global militarization that brought a US military presence, vast investments in infrastructure, and the inculcation of liberal norms. The regions that experienced this combination of treatment became integrated politically, economically, and, to a degree, culturally by this—the countries of Western Europe beginning with the Marshall Plan, Japan, and the countries of East Asia, such as Taiwan and South Korea beginning during the Cold War—but others have been left out. The entire fabric of global economic institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization, etc., if not without their own internal conflicts, exists to realize the ideals and practices sponsored by successive US governments since the late 1940s. This has undoubtedly led to some degree of cultural homogenization in those parts of the world in which economic globalization has developed strong roots. But much of the world has been left out of both. As a result:

A deepening spatial segregation between rich and poor both within countries and in the world as a whole defines our era, and enhances central power just as it peripheralizes those left behind, creating new polarizations of wealth and poverty that have only increased in the past two decades (Cumings 1999:294).

CONCLUSION

We don’t have a word to adequately describe the contemporary global economy. In one sense it is an “empire,” because it is a global structure of power. But it is not organized territorially as were the old European empires, the Soviet Union, or the United States as it “made itself” in the nineteenth century. So it is probably best not to see it as just the same old imperialism (as in British, French, Russian, or Japanese) plus new technologies, as do many post-colonialists (see, e.g., Jameson and Miyoshi 1998). Nor does it make much sense to see American imperialism (associated with American military occupation and policies) as a totally separate realm from globalization (associated with business and telecommunications). The former has always had much to do with making the world safe for the latter, notwithstanding its own military-industrial imperatives. The order
REFERENCES


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The City-Country Rule: An Extension of The Rank-Size Rule

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INTRODUCTION

This study introduces a “city-country rule” to complement the well-known rank-size rule for cities, from which it is derived. The city-country rule enables us to make a rough estimate of the population of the largest cities when the population of the entire country is known. It quickly tells us whether the actual city populations are large or small, compared to the world average for similarly ranked cities in countries of comparable size.

The existing rank-size rule describes the empirical relationship between a city’s or town’s population and its ranking relative to other cities within an interacting geographical area. This regularity was first noted by Auerbach (1913) and later popularized by Stewart (1947) and Zipf (1949). Hence it is often called Zipf’s law. If \( R \) is the rank in size of a given city and \( P_R \) is its population, the simplest form of the rank-size rule is

\[
R P_R = \text{constant} = P_l. \quad (1)
\]

where \( P_l \) is the population of the largest city. When graphed on doubly logarithmic paper, \( P_R \) versus \( R \), this equation corresponds to a straight line with slope \(-1\). For many countries (or other interacting regions) a different slope \((-n)\) yields a better data fit, and the corresponding generalized expression is

\[
R^n P_R = \text{constant} = P_l. \quad (2)
\]

As an empirical observation, the rule extends far beyond city sizes. It has been claimed to apply to the frequency of English words, the frequency of citations of journals within a scholarly discipline. The important result is that we can thus predict the populations of all cities in a country, once its total population is given, and quickly tell whether the actual city populations are large or small, compared to the world average for similarly ranked cities in countries of comparable size. For countries of more than 100 million, a more elaborate formula holds. The largest city in the country needs a correction (primacy factor), which vanishes as the country population increases. Actual primacy may be relative (compared to other cities) or absolute (compared to country population).
The City-Country Rule

An extensive literature has attempted to explain the existence of such a rank-size relationship. Berry (1966) in particular has drawn upon the earlier work of Simon (1955) to suggest that the rank-size regularity is based on purely mathematical grounds through stochastic growth models. But other works (Vining 1974; Okabe 1977) have challenged the mathematical assumptions that produce such a “steady state” model. Further approaches (Dacey 1966; Beckmann and McPherson 1970; Mulligan 1976; Buzin 1979) have focused on the assumptions that produce a continuous rank-size relationship rather than a stepped or hierarchical relationship that would be consistent with central place theory as developed by Christaller (1966).1

Empirical testing has also continued on the level of individual countries and regions past and present (Berry and Kasarda 1977; Skinner 1977; Alden 1979; Asami 1986; Vining 1986) as well as for the world as a whole (Chase-Dunn 1985; Ettlinger and Archer 1987). Agreements and disagreements with the rank-size rule have been observed, as well as difficulties in testing it, since “legal” (administrative) and actual sizes of population centers differ (Asami 1986) and national units may not always be the most suitable units in which the test should be carried out.

Further operational difficulties have been noted in defining (1) the limits of a city system and (2) the precise meaning of “primacy” (Walters 1985). The latter term expresses the observation that the rule at times works with all other cities except the largest one, which tends to be larger than expected. This “primacy factor” will be discussed in more below.

Now we come to the new idea investigated in this study. The rank-size rule has been a rule about sizes of components (such as cities). But whenever these components add up to a definable total, it also has implications regarding this total. Cities and other smaller settlements do add up to the total population of the country (or other territorial unit).2 Our purpose here is to make this implicit relationship explicit and to use it in predicting population sizes of cities in a given state system. By so doing, we will expand the scope of the rank-size rule considerably. This rule is all too often dismissed as being an interesting empirical regularity without much applicability as a predictive tool. The new “city-country rule” does predict the sizes of all cities in an average system, on the basis of total population. Deviations from the predictions indicate that the actual system is different from this average. Primacy, too, can be defined and measured in a more precise way when the total population of the country is taken as the base line.

THE MODEL FOR THE CITY-COUNTRY RULE

Assume that the rank-size rule (Eq. 2) applies to all settlements, down to the last isolated one-person dwelling.3 By summing up all these populations, one should get the population of the entire country. The details are worked out in Appendix A. If \( n = 1 \) (Eq. 1), the following equation expresses the population \( P \) of the entire country (or other suitable territorial unit) in terms of the population \( P_R \) of its \( R \)-th largest city or settlement:

\[
P = R P_R 1n(R P_R). \quad (3)
\]

For the largest city in the country (\( R = 1 \)), this becomes

\[
P = P_1 1n P_1, \quad (4)
\]

and for the next-largest city (\( R = 2 \)), it is

\[
P = 2 P_2 1n(2 P_2). \quad (5)
\]

The general equation (corresponding to Eq. 2, with any slope indicator \( n \)) is more complex:


1. There are only three relatively simple patterns to choose from, when one wants to have a steady decrease in size: linear, power rule (Eq. 2) and exponential. Any actual distribution of components ranked by size is bound to approach one of these three, more or less perfectly. We observe, for instance, that the seat distribution of parties in representative assemblies tends to follow an exponential pattern rather than a power rule (Taagepera 2001). The broad theory to explain these differences remains to be constructed.

2. The same is the case for revenues of firms in an industry and many other phenomena. It is not the case, however, for others, such as magnitude of earthquakes.

3. Here another assumption enters: that a conceivable smallest possible size can be defined. This is the case for human settlements (one person), for words in a defined set (one single occurrence), and for the journals in a set of citations (one single occurrence). This is not the case for revenues of firms, where the cutoff between zero and some minimal revenue is arbitrary, depending on the currency used. Thus the city-country rule is based on two assumptions: that the total of the components can be defined, and that the components themselves consist of discrete particles of one type (persons, in the case of cities).
\[ P = R P R (P^{\frac{1}{n}} - R^{n-1}) / (1-n). \] (6)

In the case of the largest city (\( R=1 \)), this yields
\[ P = P_1 (P_1^{\frac{1}{n}} - 1) / (1-n), \] (7)

and for the next-largest city (\( R=2 \)), it becomes
\[ P = 2P_2 (P_2^{\frac{1}{n}} - 2^{n-1}) / (1-n). \] (8)

We will test the city-country rule with worldwide data for the largest and second-largest cities (Equations 4, 5, 7 and 8), as well as for the third-, fourth- and fifth-ranking cities (using the analogous equations derived from Eqs. 3 and 6). The population of the largest city often deviates from the rank-size rule, which sets in with the next-largest city. Therefore, the relation between the populations of a country and its second-largest city (and the third-, fourth- and fifth-largest) is expected to give a better fit than is the case with the largest city. We will start the test with these next-largest cities. Only if this first test turns out fairly successful would there be any point in testing for the largest cities, so as to evaluate the extent of the primacy factor.

**TESTING THE CITY-COUNTRY RULE**

In order to test the implications of the rank-size rule for the total population of countries, we collected data for 203 formally independent or effectively autonomous countries as given in The World in Figures (1988). The data refer to the period around 1985 and include the populations of countries and up to five largest cities, with increasing gaps for the lower ranking cities, especially for countries of less than half a million people. For the fifth-largest cities the number of cases decreases to 124.

Before proceeding to the direct test, we should determine the median value of power index \( n \) (assuming that countries do follow the rank-size rule). This is done in the following way. Figure 1 shows the population ratio \( P_4/P_2 \) of the fourth- and second-largest cities graphed against the population of the entire country.\(^4\) According to Eq. 2, the median ratio should be \( \frac{1}{2} n \). While the points are extremely scattered, the median values of \( P_4/P_2 \) (indicated as x-es in Figure 1) are strikingly close to \( \frac{1}{2} \), at any country population below 300 million. This suggests that, on the average, the same value of \( n \) applies to countries of almost any size, and this value is \( n=1.0 \), in line with the simplest form of the rank-size rule (Eq. 1). For the world as a whole (as also shown in Figure 1) a lower value of \( n=0.85 \) would apply, and the same tends to be the case for continents.

In this light, what could be considered a successful test of the city-country model? If we graphed the population \( P_2 \) of the second-largest city versus the country population \( P \), all points should fall reasonably close to the curve corresponding to \( n=1.0 \) (as given by Eq. 5). In order to be consistent with the findings of Figure 1, we would wish for most data points to fall in the narrow zone delineated by the curves for \( n=0.9 \) and \( n=1.1 \) (as determined by using Eq. 8). Moreover, this should be especially the case for country populations below 300 million. For the larger countries, a deviation toward lower values of \( n \) is expected in the light of Figure 1.

Figure 2 shows \( P_2 \) (the size of the second-ranking city) graphed against \( P \) (the population of the country), both on logarithmic scales. The theoretical curves for \( n=0.9, 1.0 \) and \( 1.1 \) (based on Eq. 5 and 8) are shown.\(^5\) The actual data

\(^{4}\) Why pick the fourth- and second-largest cities? We want to avoid the largest cities, where the primacy factor enters. Beyond the fourth-largest cities, gaps in our data set develop. Within this range we want to have sufficient contrast; hence \( P4/P2 \) is chosen. Countries at exactly 10 million—Belgium, Cameroon, Cuba, Greece, Ivory Coast and Madagascar—are labeled in Figure 1, because we will use them in a later section.

\(^{5}\) These curves are not straight lines on the log-log graph, but the deviation from straight lines is almost invisible throughout the range shown. For reference, the line \( P_2=P/2 \) is also shown. This is the maximum conceivable size the second-ranking city could have; it would be reached when a country consists of just two cities with equal populations.
points are visibly most crowded in the zone between the $n=0.9$ and $n=1.1$ curves, and $n=1.0$ is close to the best fit curve for these data. Countries with very large populations (India and China) are on the low side, as expected. Thus our simple model does agree, indeed, with the pattern observed.

A similar test was carried out for the third-, fourth- and fifth-largest cities. The patterns of the corresponding graphs (not shown here) are quite similar to that in Figure 2 in that most country points fall between $n=0.9$ and $n=1.1$. As shown at the bottom of Table 1, more than 50% of the data points for the second-largest cities are located within the zone between $n=0.9$ and $n=1.1$. For the next-largest cities, this proportion gradually increases to 64%.

The main body of Table 1 lists the median values of power constants ($n$) at various ranks (from $R=1$ to $R=5$). This is done separately in various country population brackets. The median $n$ for all cities in all countries is 0.99. The first-ranking cities will be discussed later. For all lower-ranking cities the values of $n$ are within plus or minus 0.07 of $n=1.00$, as long as the total populations of countries remain below 100 million. For countries larger than 100 million, the values of $n$ are consistently below 1.0, with a mean of 0.94, and for the world as a whole the values of $n$ drop to around 0.85. The median $n$ for all second-ranking cities is 0.98, and for the next-ranking cities it slowly but consistently decreases to 0.96 for the fifth-ranking cities.

Thus, the average relationship between the populations of a country and of its second- to fifth-largest cities is well predicted by our model, despite its very simple starting point. Except for very large countries, the value of the parameter $n$ that yields the best overall fit (.99) is extremely close to 1.00.

We may well wonder whether the simple relationship with $n=1$ is some theoretical norm for city systems which are genuinely separate interacting systems rather than parts of a larger system or composites of several systems. In this light, the lower $n$ for very large countries could mean that they consist of several separate geographical systems. If so, then $n$ should be especially low if the entire world were tentatively considered a single system. This is, indeed, the case (see Table 1): for the world, $n$ is around 0.85. Going in the reverse direction, the tiniest countries still do not have $n$ appreciably larger than 1.0, suggesting that, on the average, they are separate systems rather than parts of larger regional systems.
It is now time to apply the model to the first-ranking cities. Because of the primacy factor, we expect a shift away from the n=1.0 curve. As a test of these expectations, we will again use the format of Figure 1. Figure 3 shows the population ratio \( P_2/P_1 \) of the largest and the second-largest cities graphed against the population of the entire country. (The island countries, marked with a special symbol, are discussed in Note 6.) If there were no primacy effect, we should have the same median \( n \) as in Figure 1 \((n=1.0)\), and hence a median \( P_2/P_1=0.5 \). This is visibly not the case. The median values of \( P_2/P_1 \) at various \( P \) (indicated as x-es in Figure 3) are clearly below the 0.5 level, except for country populations above 100 million.

What this means is that for country populations of less than 100 million there is a primacy effect. It tends to be most marked when country population remains below 10 million. For country populations of more than 100 million the primacy effect vanishes or even reverses itself, in a pattern similar to that observed in Figure 1.

The primacy question has often arisen, also in relation to theories of underdevelopment and dependency (see Ettlinger and Archer 1985). Our test suggests that primacy is largely the consequence of being a small country. Within the present context of transnational economic interdependence (whatever its causes) and communication linkages, the largest city in a small country must be in close contact with other large cities in a wider region of the world. These strong connections to centers of other countries present economic opportunities that provide their own impetus for further development of the largest city in a small country, leading to a hierarchy of central places that follows the pattern suggested by Christaller (1966) and Lösch (1954). All other things being equal, the development of central places must be analyzed in terms of the location vis-a-vis other central places, and so too the ability of a threshold population to support the variety of activities found in the highest-ranked centers. Political borders play an important role in small states, because they artificially limit the area to be serviced. Within that area the capital city may turn out to have a greater variety of services than the major city of an equally large area within a larger country.6

6. – and archipelagoes may have a weakened primacy effect.
We are now ready to test the city-country model for the largest city in the
country, using the format of previous Figure 2. We expect the likelihood of
primacy to decline as total population increases and a greater number of other
relatively large and hence multifunctional cities is introduced. Figures 1 and 3
confirm this expectation: the ratios $P_2/P_1$ and also $P_4/P_2$ increase as total popu-
lation becomes very large. Figure 4 shows $P_1$ graphed against $P$. The maximum
conceivable population the largest city could have is $P_1 = P$, when the country con-
sists of a single city. The theoretical curves in Figure 4 are based on Eq. 4 and 7.
Countries of about 100 million are the only ones for which we would expect the data points to fall mainly in the zone delineated by the curves $n=0.9$ and $n=1.1$.
For larger countries many points are expected to fall below that zone, as in Figure
2. For smaller countries, many points are expected to be above that zone, because of
the primacy effect. The pattern of actual data points is fully as expected.

The previous Table 1 shows the median values of $n$ for the largest cities,
indicated as $n(P_1)$, for various ranges of country population. These values are
close to 1.00 only for country populations over 10 million, reflecting an absence
of primacy effect. As countries become smaller, $n(P_1)$ rises markedly above 1.0,
indicating an increasingly strong primacy effect. For the world as a whole, $n(P_1)$
falls clearly below 1.0, and its value is, in fact, lower than those of $n(P_2)$ to $n(P_5)$.
Close to 50 percent of the largest cities still are located in the zone between
$n=0.9$ and $n=1.1$, but this figure is somewhat misleading, since the deviant
points are preponderantly above this zone rather than spread equally on both
sides.

PREDICTION AND EVALUATION OF CITY POPULATIONS

This is the payoff section. The city-country rule allows us to predict the
world average populations of cities for a given country population. It then enables
us to say whether cities in a given country are relatively large or small, compared to
this world average. This is something the rank-size rule cannot do.

In terms of prediction, the best that rank-size rule can offer is to take the size
of one city (maybe that of the second-largest, to avoid the primacy effect) and
predict the rest. This is a weak peg on which to hang the whole scale, because
the given city could be relatively small or large compared to all others. To guard
against that, one would have to graph $P_R$ against $R$ and then look for a city that
fits the average pattern—but that changes prediction into a retroactive search for
a systematic relationship. In contrast, the population of the entire country is a
much more stable comparison point, since it includes the populations of all set-
tlements. Once the country population is given, the city populations are bound
to fall in place to some extent.

According to Table 1, the simplest form of the rank-size rule (that with
$n=1.0$) applies on the average over a wide range of country populations (10,000
to at least 100 million). If we know the country population $P$, we could use $P=P_1$
$1nP_1$ (Eq. 4) to determine a theoretical value of $P_1$, and then use $RP_R=P_1$ (Eq.
1) to calculate all other city populations. Two technical problems arise: 1) in the
equational form above, $P$ could be directly calculated from $P_1$ but not vice versa;
and 2) the value of $P_1$ obtained does not include the primacy effect. These issues
are addressed in Appendix B.
Figure 5 shows the resulting average expectation and actual data for six median-range countries with the same population: 10 million (plus or minus 0.20 million, according to The World in Figures, 1988). Both axes again use logarithmic scales. The dashed curves indicate a deviation from expectation by a factor of two. The median pattern of the six countries is somewhat steeper than predicted. The median $P_1$ (1.4 million) is very slightly on the high side. The median $P_2$ (0.4 million) is exactly as predicted. The median $P_3$ to $P_4$ are low by a factor of two.7

How do the individual countries fare? Belgium fits the expected average pattern very closely, and so does Cuba, except for an unusually large capital city. In Greece the two largest cities are unexpectedly large, while the lower-ranking cities are small.

If one used simply the rank-size rule, Ivory Coast would seem to satisfy it (apart from a strong primacy factor), since the points for second- to fifth-largest cities fall on a straight line (with a very steep slope corresponding to $n=1.9$). From the perspective of the city-country rule, however, all cities beyond the first are much too low. In Madagascar, the rank-size rule would lead to the impression that heavy primacy depresses the population of all other cities. The city-country rule adds the extra insight that even the largest city itself is rather small for a country of that population. In Cameroon, too, what appears a two-city primacy (akin to Greece) turns into two-city normalcy, plus unusually small third- to fifth-ranking cities. Thus we have to specify two types of primacy: relative primacy (compared to other cities) and absolute primacy (compared to the country as a whole).

CONCLUSION

The model presented pegs the entire rank-size pattern of cities to the total population of the given country. It thus leads to new ways to make worldwide comparisons, expanding the scope of the rank-size rule appreciably. The test with second-ranking cities in Figure 2 (and also with the third- to fifth-ranking cities) is successful in confirming the empirical validity of the simplest formulation of the rank-size rule ($n=1.0$), since the actual data points essentially scatter evenly around the $n=1.0$ curve at all population sizes.

8. Scholars used to dealing with empirical data fits may be concerned that the R-squares in Figures 2 and 4 are only around 0.8, while they are typically higher than 0.9 for rank-size fits. If so, what have we gained? The rank-size fits usually apply to a single country, while here we are dealing with all countries in the world. The surprise actually is that worldwide scatter is only slightly less than for individual countries.

9. The strong deviance from expectation in the case of the African countries in Figure 5 leads to a broader question. In the case of low urbanization all cities in a country of a given population are almost bound to be smaller. If so, can the model be expected to hold in earlier historical periods when urbanization worldwide was appreciably lower? Of course, organized countries in earlier times also tended to have smaller total populations (Taagepera 1997), but the question remains.

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7. This subset of countries considered covers the typical range of the ratio $P_4/P_2$ in Figure 1, but the median ratio of the subset (0.35) is below the general value of 0.5. The median ratio $P_2/P_1$ (0.21) is also on the low side compared to the average of countries of about that size in Figure 3, which is 0.33.
APPENDIX A: The Relation Between the Populations of a Country and its Cities

The Model for \( n=1 \)

Consider first the simple rank-size rule corresponding to \( n=1 \):

\[
R\, P_R = \text{constant} = P_1
\]

where \( P_1 \) is the population of the largest city. Hence \( P_R = P_1/R \). Assume that this rule applies literally to every settlement, down to the last isolated hut with a population of one person, with rank \( L \): \( P_L = 1 \). This is a natural cut-off point. Replacing \( P_R \) by 1 in the equation above yields \( L = P_1 \). This is a somewhat surprising result: If the simplest form of the rank-size rule applied to all settlements in the country, the number of these settlements would equal the population of the largest city. The total population (\( P \)) of the country is then the sum of all \( P_R \), from \( R=1 \) to \( R=L \). This summation can be approximated by the integral of \( P_R = P_1/R \), from \( R=1 \) to \( R=L \):

\[
P = P_1 \ln(L) = P_1 \left( \ln P_1 \right),
\]

which is our Eq. 4. Since \( P_1 = R P_R \), the population of the country can be connected to the population of a city of any rank, leading to Eq. 3:

\[
P = R \, P_R \left( P_1^{R^{-1/n}} - R^{-1} \right) / (1-n),
\]

For \( R=2 \) (as used in Figure 2), Eq. 8 results in \( P = 2 \, P_2 \left( P_2^{1/n} - 2^{-1/n} \right) / (1-n) \).

For \( n=1 \), the value of \( P \) in the equations above is not defined. However, as \( n \) tends toward 1, the values of \( P \) tend toward values given by the earlier equations for \( n=1 \).

APPENDIX B: Estimation of \( P_1 \) from \( P = P_1 + n P_1 \) plus primacy effect

One could determine \( P_1 \) from \( P \) graphically, using the \( n=1 \) curve in Figure 4. However, since that curve is almost a straight line (on log-log graph), \( P = P_1 + n P_1 \) can be approximated by the equation of this line, which corresponds to:

\[
P_1(\text{theoretical}) = 0.256 P^{0.925}.
\]

The values of \( P_1 \) obtained from this approximation differ from those obtained from \( P = P_1 + n P_1 \) only by at most 3 percent, for \( P \) ranging from 50,000 to 500 million. Even at \( P=10,000 \) or at 10 billion the discrepancy increases to only 7 percent. In conjunction with Eq. 1 this becomes

\[
P_R = 0.256 P^{0.925}/R.
\]

This is the best average estimate of \( P_R \) on the basis of \( P \), for \( R \) larger than 1. For the largest city, a primacy correction must be added, as follows.

Comparison of actual values of \( P_1 \) to those predicted by \( n=1 \) in Figure 4 leads to the following very approximate expression for the average primacy factor:

\[
p = \frac{\text{actual } P_1}{\text{theoretical } P_1} = 0.5(10^{-\log P}),
\]

where decimal logarithms must be used. Combining this equation with \( P_1(\text{theoretical}) = 0.256 P^{0.925} \) leads to an estimate of actual \( P_1 \) using decimal logarithms:

\[
P_1 = \text{P_1(\text{theoretical})} = 0.128 P^{0.925}(10^{-\log P}).
\]

For \( P \) larger than 10^v, primacy factor is less than one, reflecting the “negative primacy effect” observed for very large countries. In such cases the population of the second-largest city may also have to be adjusted downwards so as to keep \( P_2 \) smaller than \( P_1 \).
REFERENCES


The City-Country Rule


Divergent Paths of Development: The Modern World-System and Democratization in South Africa and Zambia

Stefan Andreasson

I. INTRODUCTION

The 1990s constitute a watershed decade for change in postcolonial Africa as one-party states have crumbled and old authoritarian leaders have stepped down or been removed. The first few years of the 1990s saw about half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa either install, or prepare for, multiparty rule (Widner 1994:1; van de Walle 1999a:21). Of course, not all change has been positive and it is not clear whether the current democratic wave can be sustained as the latter part of the decade has brought both severe setbacks and continued success (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:3; Diamond 1999:269–270; Baker 2000:9). Considering the precarious nature of African democratization, it is necessary to further investigate its future prospects.

The purpose of this article is to examine whether a Modern World-Systems (MWS) perspective can provide an improved understanding of the processes of democratization in Africa (and other developing regions of the world). Can a MWS approach help explain processes of democratization within states, and can this perspective complement, improve, or replace dominant (modernization) theories of democratization? This question will be answered by first developing a MWS explanation of democratization in the non-core, secondly by tracing the incorporation into the MWS of South Africa and Zambia and each country’s subsequent economic development and location in the international division of labor, thirdly by examining the transitions to democracy in each country, and fourthly by assessing the divergent processes of democratic consolidation in each country as they relate to location in the MWS.

This article examines whether a Modern World-Systems (MWS) perspective can provide an improved understanding of the processes of democratization in Africa (and other developing regions of the world) by conducting a comparative case study of South Africa and Zambia in the 1990s, examining the transitions to democracy and divergent processes of democratic consolidation in each country. Semi-peripheral South Africa has, due to its more advantageous position in the world-system, been better equipped than peripheral Zambia to safeguard democracy against erosion and reversal. The central irony of the MWS is that the weakest states in the MWS can be pushed around by core powers and are more easily forced to democratize while at the same time they are least likely to possess the resources necessary for democratic consolidation. Semi-peripheral states can maintain their independence vis-à-vis the core to a higher degree, but if the decision is made to undertake a democratic transition they are more likely to possess the resources necessary for successful consolidation. The MWS perspective allows for an improved understanding of the causal pathway of how position in the MWS translates into the ability to consolidate democracy than does approaches that emphasize domestic factors.
The era of globalization makes it difficult to separate the internal and external processes that shape democratization. Thomas Koelble (1998) argues that democratization is an integral component of the Western-led phenomenon of globalization of economics, politics, and culture. To sufficiently comprehend the changes taking place both globally and within countries entails situating them in the context of the integrated and interdependent capitalist world-economy that constitutes a fundamental component of the MWS (Wallerstein 1974a; Chase-Dunn 1981). The wave of liberalization and democratization that has swept across sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s ought therefore be properly understood within the context of the MWS.

The empirical components of democratization—a liberalization of politics and the exercise of multiparty elections (often accompanied by economic restructuring)—are not merely internal affairs with a genesis in societal pressures and developments within the nation-states themselves. Instead, these events are shaped and take place as a result of dynamics within the MWS that are generated through economic and political interactions between core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral zones of the system (Wallerstein 1974a; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977). Democratization, thus contextualized, is often undertaken as the result of pressures from core countries of the West, including core organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and is consequently subject to the approval and consent of these countries with their own economic, political and ideological interest in these events taking place (Sandbrook 1993; Grosh 1994; World Bank 1994; Young 1994). While these events could be examined by the use of dyadic interactions, the MWS perspective adds a levels of analysis dimension to our understanding of democratization and consolidation somewhat similar to Peter Gourevitch’s (1978) “second image reversed” argument.

Peripheral countries often have little recourse but to conform to the wishes of core interests when it comes to undertaking economic liberalization and democratization (Sandbrook 1993; Widner 1994; Mkandawire 1999; Bond 2000). Few resources are available to non-core countries that will let them stake out their own course independent of the core. As history has shown, it becomes costly to insist on national sovereignty and self-reliance in matters of policy and, like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, reject the neo-liberal policies championed by core countries (in the form of political liberalization and acceptance of IMF-led structural adjustment). The few countries still rejecting the core vision of a liberalized and democratic world, such as Myanmar, North Korea, and to a lesser degree Cuba, pay heavily for their “independence.”

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

A. Modernization and Democratization

The conceptualization of democracy used in this article is Robert Dahl’s (1971:2–3) polyarchy, which takes into consideration three necessary dimensions of democracy: (political) opposition, (public) participation, and (law-based) civil liberty.2 Democratic consolidation, which presumes that an initial transition to democracy (however incomplete or unstable it may be) has taken place, is measured by the degree to which a society that has embarked upon a transition to democracy is able to maintain democratic rule and practices after the initial transition. This article uses Andreas Schedler’s (1998:91) definition of democratic consolidation as

making democracies secure...extending their life expectancy beyond the short term...of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression...building dams against eventual “reverse waves,”

thus restricting the concept of consolidation to its two negative notions: avoiding democratic breakdown and erosion.3

Consolidation of democracy is of utmost importance in any new (and fragile) democracy. In Africa, a continent with a poor democratic record and where economic crisis and societal strife often exacerbate threats to democratic survival, it becomes especially important to understand the processes of democratic consolidation and keeping a vigilant watch for the signs of democratic erosion that Schedler (1998) warns of.

Much of the literature on development, democratic transitions and subsequent consolidation emphasizes endogenous factors within the state (Lipset 1959; Lerner 1968; Huntington 1984; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Vanhanen 1997). Barrington Moore’s (1966) seminal work on comparative regime transitions

1. The Tanzanian economy was in dire straits and dependent on foreign aid from the mid-1970s onward. Economic conditions deteriorated further in the 1980s and finally, in 1986 Tanzania had to accept the IMF conditions that Nyerere had resisted since 1979 (Tordoff 1997:234).

2. Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy moves beyond Josef Schumpeter (1947) and Samuel Huntington’s (1989 and 1991) minimalist notions of electoral democracy that are mainly concerned with the existence of competitive elections.

3. Echoing Adam Przeworski et. al. (1996), Robert Mattes and Hermann Thiel (1998 and 95–96) argue that “consolidation has to do with the probability of sustaining democracy,” and that any analysis of consolidation ought to take into account key structural correlates of democratic endurance such as national wealth, economic growth, economic equality, parliamentary government, and favorable international and regional contexts.
stresses internal state characteristics and dynamics as the determinants of such transitions. Various incarnations of modernization theory have been prevalent in “mainstream” research accounts of the prospects for democracy in the developing world.

Seymour Lipset (1959) linked higher levels of prosperity with increased chances for democratic government. Less desperately poor people and more resources available for redistribution tends to defuse the dangerous zero-sum nature of politics that is often a major impediment to democratization and consolidation. From this perspective, development is long term, linear, and irreversible. It leads to a convergence on the Western democratic and liberal political model (Deutsch 1964; Inkeles 1964; Rostow 1964). “[E]conomic development, cultural change, and political change are linked in coherent and even, to some extent, predictable patterns (Inglehart 1997:10), and modernization theory finds support in many studies (Huntington 1991; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Muller 1985; Muller 1995a and 1995b). Adding some nuance to this understanding of the relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy, Gissinger and Gleditsch (1999:332) note evidence suggesting that income is a significant factor driving democratization at all levels (see Londregan and Poole 1996:1) instead of democracy simply being a fortunate “side effect” of economic growth.

Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997) clearly identify endogenous forces as being primary in their conceptualization and subsequent quantitative exploration of democratic transitions. Their “polico-structural” approach emphasizes domestic political factors while at the same time giving secondary attention to structural and contingent factors (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:20). For Bratton and van de Walle (1997) a democratic transition is the result of key actors’ (e.g., economic, political, and societal) abilities to arrive at negotiated agreements where each party gets at least some of what it wants. Influencing their emphasis on internal factors is their understanding that a rational choice perspective is best suited to explain political developments, an approach that is prevalent in the conventional democratization literature (e.g., Widner 1994). Bratton and van de Walle (1997:33) state that

international factors...cannot on their own account for regime change, let alone for the installation and consolidation of democracy. Instead...political transitions [are] most directly affected by domestic factors.

Fortunately MWS theory makes possible the situating of these domestic factors within the global context from which they derive, thus establishing an explicit causal path between the international and domestic factors affecting democratization.4

4. The Dependency approach (to development) of André Gunder Frank (1967) emphasizes the dependency of peripheral states on core states. Guillermo O’Donnell (1979) criticizes modernization theory and highlights the influence of a peripheral state’s dependency on core state’s economies to endogenous state actions and class-based politics. Daniel Chirot (1977) argues that core countries affect peripheral economies (and their prospects of establishing democracy) in a negative way. Various other studies have emphasized the importance of exogenous factors in shaping the process of development, democratic transition and consolidation within states (Decalo 1992; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Koelble 1998; McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998a and 1998b). Theda Skocpol (1977) argues for the importance of an intersocietal perspective bridging the gap between endogenous and exogenous theories of regime transitions by integrating Moore’s (1966) domestic class analysis with the central ideas of Dependency and Modern World-Systems theories.

5. “A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension, and tear it apart as each group seeks externally to remodel it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. One can define its structures as being at different times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning” (Wallerstein 1975:1347).

6. Inequalities in the world-system between core and periphery tend to be of a permanent character and are increasing. Walter Rodney (1972:22) notes that the asymmetrical relationship based on exploitation of the periphery by the core has resulted in development in the core and underdevelopment in the periphery (cf. Frank 1966). While absolute levels of wealth may increase system-wide, the relative difference tends to be reproduced through a process of unequal exchange whereby surplus value produced in the periphery is accumulated in the core (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977:160). The increasing gap between rich and poor nations that, according to MWS theory, is a result of polarization within the system is subject to some debate recently.
economic and political forces, world-capitalism and the interstate system, within the MWS. There is only one logic of capital accumulation in which the economic and political components make up opposite (and complementary) sides of the same coin. Economic and political developments are considered to be inseparable (Chase-Dunn 1981). Illustrating the relationship between economy and politics, Immanuel Wallerstein (1974:16) notes that

[1] In a capitalist world-economy, political energy is used to secure monopoly rights (or as near to it as can be achieved). The state becomes less the central economic enterprise than the means of assuring certain terms of trade in other economic transactions.

Kiren Chaudhry (1993:247) notes that markets are conscious constructs, not the “natural” or “neutral” phenomena that some neoliberal market adherents would suggest. Neoliberal theories of economic development often tend to ignore international (economic) developments that seriously impact the ability of developing countries to control and sustain their economies (Chaudhry 1993:247–248). This interplay between politics and economics is imperative to understand how core developments in the MWS can impact not only the economies, but also political processes, of non-core states.

The MWS approach yields a different understanding of the link between development and democracy than does modernization theory. Instead of assuming a linear process of development and democratization, MWS theory is better suited for explaining how countries embarking on a process of democratization often end up in the quasi-democratic limbo that Richard Joseph (1997) and Crawford Young (1999) call a “halfway house.” This is a frequent result for semi-peripheral countries such as South Africa (cf. Joseph 1999 on “virtual democracy”). Both modernization and dependency approaches to development understand an intermediary (or semi-peripheral) position in the world economy as temporary. For modernization theorists this intermediary position is a transitional phase in a country’s path from backwardness to modernity. For dependency theorists the intermediary position is a residual one. Countries will eventually be pulled into the core or (more often) the periphery due to the polarizing tendencies of development and underdevelopment in the world economy (Arrighi and Drangel 1986:10).

While a 1999 report by the United Nations Development Programme shows that the ratio of the income between the quintile of the world’s population living in the richest countries and the quintile in the poorest countries has increased from 30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 in 1990 and 72:1 in 1997, a recent study by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Melchior et al. 2000; 2–3) argues that when global income inequalities are adjusted for purchasing power they have for the most part decreased since the 1960s.

Christopher Chase-Dunn (1975) finds support for a dependency perspective rather than neoclassical and modernization theories in explaining uneven development in the world economy. Chase-Dunn’s argument contrasts with that of modernization theory, which tends to assume that increasing foreign (capital) penetration in non-core countries will lead to increased resources, i.e., capital and technology, available for societal development (Chase-Dunn 1975:725). Keeping in mind Lipset’s (1959) link between economic development and democracy, development along modernization theory assumptions should also increase the likelihood of democratic governance in non-core countries penetrated by foreign capital. Clearly the long history of coexistence of profitable foreign corporations and non-democratic governance in Africa and elsewhere in the non-core contradicts this basic modernization assumption. The notion that “foreign capital must be seen as a form of control as well as a flow of resources” (Chase-Dunn 1975:735) is still highly relevant and often marginalized by current neoliberal thinking on the role of international financial institutions (IFIs) and international capital in processes of economic development (and democratization) in non-core countries.  

Ironically, most African countries adopting neoliberal prescriptions for enhancing economic growth today might experience significant reductions in living standards in the short term. Thus support for democracy risks being undermined before there is any economic growth to sustain democracy as expected by modernization theory (Baker 2000:14). Clearly a MWS approach is well suited for explaining this kind of perpetuation of underdevelopment in the non-core.

1. The Role of the Core in Promoting Democratization

It is generally assumed that the recent “wave” of democratization in the Global South during the 1990s has benefited from Western core countries push-
ing for democracy worldwide. From a MWS perspective one could, however, question whether it really is in the interest of core countries that semi-peripheral and peripheral countries democratize. Could exploitation of the non-core not be better facilitated by dealing with authoritarian rulers rather than democratically elected ones with some responsibilities towards their citizenry?

The argument that it is in the interest of the core to push for democracy in the non-core can be supported with reference to the literature on democratization. Along with the push for democracy come demands for “good governance” (Hyden and Bratton 1992; World Bank 2000, Ch. 2). It is not necessarily clear that the “good governance” stemming from neoliberal political and economic reforms is as beneficial to people in non-core countries as it is for core investors. In fact, it might be argued that the “virtual democracy” that is often the result of democratizing efforts in the non-core mainly serves the interests of core countries and capital interests [e.g., the interests of multinational corporations (MNC’s) via the policy demands of IFI’s such as the IMF and World Bank]. The “virtual democracy” has a formal basis in citizen rule but key decision-making is insulated from popular involvement and oversight. Where popular participation is widened, policy choices and outcomes are narrowed. Political incumbents use violence and electoral fraud to manipulate the political transitions in order to re-legitimize their power. External actors only encourage multiparty elections when such elections will not threaten vested domestic and foreign interests (Joseph 1997:367–368 and 1999b:60–63).

It is in the post-Cold War era that core support for democracy becomes especially convenient for core economic interests. “Now that global capitalism has no economic rivals, the institutional certainties of democratic governments are usually preferred to the arbitrariness of autocratic rule.” Furthermore, while the core institutions and practices of contemporary democracy rest on the premise of a free play of ideas and interests, certain substantive policy outcomes are ruled out, and others are assured. Participation may be broad, but policy choices are narrow (Joseph 1997:367).

Thus it is “safer” for core powers and economic interests to demand democracy in the non-core today. The likelihood of democratizing countries implementing policies that radically deviate from the current version of the “Washington consensus” is greatly reduced due to the economic and political leverage of core governments and institutions. Countries in Africa that have moved in a democratic direction during the 1990s are often at the mercy of IFIs and Western governments as these African nations require continued aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) to sustain development efforts essential to maintaining some societal stability and thus the possibility of democratic consolidation (Mair 1996).

Empirical evidence supports the claim that the core is pushing democratization in the non-core. While being careful when discussing political prescriptions, emphasizing that “African countries have to determine the political structures that suits them best,” the World Bank sees democratization (discussed in terms of “governance”) of African states as crucial for economic development.

Democracy can have many faces, but some general principles must be shared by all: constitutional government, respect for human rights, adherence to the rule of law, and freedom of expression and association” (World Bank 2000, 66).

Kick et. al. (2000:137) note that “[t]he democratization agenda is fully supported by a range of [core dominated] supranational agencies with considerable persuasion and coercive potential (e.g., U.N., NATO, World Bank),” and van de Walle (1999b:97) emphasizes that (core) “international market forces” and “their privileged agents in Africa, the IMF and the World Bank” largely control the policy choices available to democratizing nations. Joseph (1997:368–369) attributes democratization in Africa during the 1990s to three factors: prolonged fiscal crisis, the increasing control of (African) economic policy-making by IFIs and Western bilateral agencies, and “the shift of western powers (especially the United States) after the end of the cold war from tolerance of and alliance with authoritarian regimes to liberalization of their systems” (cf. Young 1999:32). While several authors point to a significant variation in outcomes of the general democratization agenda (Peters 1995; Goma and Font 1996; Huber 1996), they also note some common trends in the periphery (Clapham 1996; Schwartzman 1998).

Most notable among these is that core economic and political-military programs to “democratize” the non-core gradually have reduced the number of authoritarian regimes the world over (Kick et. al. 2000:137).

8. The “Washington consensus” represents the collection of developmental policies promoted by Western nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank). It has been reformulated during the latter half of the 1990s to take into consideration a broad array of actors, including the state, while strongly retaining an emphasis on the role of private actors and markets (Broad and Cavanagh 1999). The central prescription for development emanating from the World Bank (2000) is a call for continued emphasis on trade, diversification, and increasing competitiveness.
Both the U.S. and the European Union (EU), the key political and economic actors in the core, have unequivocally been proclaiming their support for democracy worldwide in the post-Cold War era. The United States Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) designates 35 African countries as eligible for trade benefits—specifically a “most liberal access to the U.S. market”—as of January 2001. The AGOA requires countries to liberalize both their political and economic systems to gain eligibility. Countries, like South Africa and Zambia, determined to have established, or...making continual progress toward establishing the following: market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty; increasing availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices are eligible for AGOA benefits (AGOA 2001).

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) explicitly states as one of its goals to: “promote principles of democratic governance and provide technical assistance to newly formed democracies. USAID works to encourage democracy in developing nations throughout the world partly on the intrinsic values which rests in the ideals of liberty, personal and civic freedom, and government of, for, and by the people…”

USAID also emphasizes that “[p]olitical and economic reforms must go hand in hand if either is to succeed” (USAID 2001). Across the Atlantic, the European Commission’s European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) “illustrates the commitment of the European Union to assisting in the global effort to build and reinforce pluralist and democratic society, governed by the rule of law, and respecting human rights” (European Commission 2000:5, 8–10).

Kick et. al. (2000) understand the push by core actors for democracy in the non-core not merely as an altruistic means to promote development, but also as a self-serving means to legitimizing existing inequalities in non-core countries that the core does business with. For example, conducting business that might generate good corporate profits but results in little if any sustainable development in a country still marred by extreme income inequalities and widespread poverty (e.g., South Africa) is less objectionable when its government has made a transition to democracy. Once a democratic transition has taken place, economic policy decisions can be referred to as the “will of the people” via their representatives in government no matter what the actual results of these policies are for the general populace.

2. Labor, Class, and State

Core areas are characterized by strong states and an economy that is based on capital-intensive, high-wage, high-technology production that tends to involve relatively low levels of labor exploitation and coercion. The periphery is characterized by weak states and labor-intensive, low-wage, low-technology production that tends to involve relatively high levels of labor exploitation and coercion, such as slavery in the 18th century. The semi-periphery contains both core-like and periphery-like economic activities and political structures (Wallerstein 1984, 61; Shannon 1996:33). Importantly, the nature of a state’s economy will, to a high degree, determine the resources available in the pursuit of democratization (Diamond 1999:78).

The bourgeoisie is generally strong in core countries and weak in the periphery where economic stagnation (and collapse) and colonization have prevented its growth and entrenchment. Barrington Moore (1966:418) asserts that “a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy.” The strong class of capitalists that can be a driving force of economic and democratic development has not developed in most African countries and other peripheral regions of the world (Sandbrook 1993 and 1993; Bates 1994:19–21).

State strength tends to vary with position in the MWS, with strong states in the core and weak to nonexistent ones (colonies) in the periphery (Wallerstein 1974:349). State strength is related to state capacity and should not be confused...
with state size, its degree of centralization, or its ability to repress and control society when results are not optimal from the perspective of its ruler’s interest in economic development (cf. the concept of governance in Hyden and Bratton 1992).

III. METHODOLOGY

A. Case Selection

The basic unit of analysis in MWS theory is the world-system itself (Wallerstein 1974a). Thus the two cases selected for this study are states existing within this world-system, South Africa and Zambia. The time frame of the study is the last decade of democratic transition and consolidation in the two countries, roughly 1990 to the present. This controlled comparison case study is informed by John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference,” where an investigator examines paired observations in two or more cases and determines whether different outcomes are congruent or incongruent with a theory’s predictions (Lijphart 1971 and 1975; van Evera 1997:23).

The selection of South Africa and Zambia contrasts certain historical, political, and socioeconomic characteristics. The two countries vary in one important aspect concerning the MWS perspective; South Africa is located in the semi-periphery of the MWS and Zambia is near the bottom of the periphery. In terms of outcomes of the democratization processes (consolidation), it appears that South Africa has been able to strengthen its democracy while Zambia has experienced serious problems in terms of maintaining its fledgling democracy.

1. Locating Countries in the MWS

In order to make the argument about divergent trajectories in South Africa and Zambia, the position of each country in the global division of labor must be clearly established. This can be done by reference to the literature on the position of countries in the MWS and by examining relevant differences in national economic characteristics. Based on the existing literature and data on the South African and Zambian economies (see the empirical section) it is possible to make a distinction between positions of the two countries in the MWS.

While there are some disagreements on exactly how to measure the semi-periphery and which countries belong in it, a clear precedent exists for designating South Africa as semi-peripheral and Zambia as peripheral. David Snyder and Edward Kick’s (1979:1110) designation of South Africa as a core country together with the United States, Japan, West Germany and others is perhaps the least useful for this project. Snyder and Kick’s (1979) “block model” measures trade, interventions, diplomats and treaties in 1965. This model exaggerates the role of South Africa by focusing on its economic and geo-strategic role at perhaps the height of Pretoria’s influence regionally and is in any case of little use for understanding South Africa’s role in the global division of labor in the 1990s. Other measures are more instructive for the purposes of this article.

C. P. Terlouw’s (1993) measure of “mean coreness” based on economic, military and political factors gives South Africa one of the lowest “degrees of coreness” among countries he include as being semi-peripheral. Others are more explicit about South Africa’s role in the semi-periphery. Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel (1986, 69) make a clear distinction between South Africa as an “organic member” of the semi-periphery and Zambia as an “organic member” of the periphery throughout the 1938-1970 period measured. Arrighi and Drangel (1986) utilize Gross National Product (GNP) per capita measures when locating countries in the global division of labor, as does this article when highlighting economic differences between South Africa and Zambia (see especially tables 1, 6, and 7).

Patrick McGowan and Fred Ahwireng-Obeng (1998b) make a strong case for South Africa being a regional hegemon due to its role as the only semi-peripheral economy in an otherwise peripheral region (including Zambia). They argue that patterns of commodity trade are the best indicator of a country’s role in the global division of labor (1998b:173–177). Similarly, William Martin and Wallerstein (1990, 103) label South Africa a “stable member of the semi-periphery” based on its economic relationships with the periphery and core. Following these authors, economic data on trade characteristics, specifically data on export and import patterns in tables 2 and 4, are used in this article to locate South Africa in the semi-periphery and Zambia in the periphery.

B. Key Variables

The independent variable is the state’s location in the MWS that is determined by measuring its economic characteristics, specifically the nature of its exports and imports. Particularly important to the causal connection between location in the MWS and democratic consolidation in individual countries is the degree of economic vulnerability, and thus susceptibility to external pressures for change,
that characterizes the state in core, semi-peripheral and peripheral regions of the MWS.\textsuperscript{10}

The intervening variables are the state’s nature of class relations, civil society, and state strength that are derived from its location in the MWS. These variables are of a “political” nature and thus distinct from the “economic” nature of the independent variable (location in the MWS). The nature of class relations and civil society will be described through examination of the events leading to democratic transition in each country and the role played by domestic and external actors. State strength will be measured by examining the availability of political and economic resources in each country to resist core pressures, and thus acquire some “ownership” of the democratization process, and to contain domestic upheavals.

The dependent variable is degree of democratic consolidation that is ultimately affected by the state’s location in the MWS. Political and societal developments following the initial transitions to democracy will provide the basis for judging the degree to which each country’s government has been able to avoid relapse into non-democratic practices and instead consolidated its democratic achievements by holding successive free and fair multiparty elections and upholding political rights and civil liberties.

C. Causal Argument and Hypotheses

A set of predictions can be made based on the identification of variables. These predictions constitute the two hypotheses to be tested in this article and are derived from the divergent trajectories of democratic consolidation expected to be found in states located in different zones of the MWS. Empirical inquiry will serve to confirm or refute these theory-driven hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: it is predicted that a semi-peripheral state will be able to exercise a significant degree of independence by resisting core pressures and because semi-peripheral status enables it to diffuse some of the political and economic costs associated with democratization onto its peripheral neighbors. Compared to peripheral states, the semi-peripheral state will have more resources and a stronger civil society and state available to facilitate democratic consolidation once a transition to democracy takes place.

Hypothesis 2: it is predicted that a peripheral state will not be able to exercise independence and resist core pressures. Location in the periphery precludes the state from diffusing political and economic costs associated with democratization to other states; instead it has to deal with all the pressures of democratization and consolidation by itself, which it is particularly ill-equipped to do. A peripheral state will more easily be pressured into democratic transition but will be less likely, due to insufficient resources, to consolidate its democracy once it is installed.

Figure 1 provides a conceptualization of the two hypotheses to be tested in this article.

IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

A. Incorporation into the Modern World-System

1. South Africa

European settler origins in what is today the Republic of South Africa began with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape as governor for the Dutch East India Company in 1652 (Chase 1967:5–6). The actual incorporation of South Africa into the periphery of the MWS began around 1800 in terms of production processes with the Cape producing wool and Natal producing sugar for Great Britain (Chase 1967; Wallerstein 1986:139).

Industrialization commenced at an increasingly rapid pace with the discovery of diamonds in the Free State in 1871 and gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 (Stadler 1987:36–38). It is not clear that South Africa had become a semi-peripheral country at the time of the Union of South Africa in 1910. However, the global depression of the 1930s, along with the subsequent manufacturing for the war effort, provided the impetus for increased import-substitution industrialization in South Africa and thus generated an indigenous industrialist and capitalist class (classically capital in South Africa had three factions: mining, industry, and farming) which ensured that South Africa emerged out of WW II as a thoroughly semi-peripheral nation (Stadler 1987:58–59; Martin and Wallerstein 1990:102–103).

\textsuperscript{10} Historical background variables held constant across cases-e.g., British colonial heritage, location in Africa, majority Bantu populations, ethno-linguistic fragmentation, high degrees of income inequality, and so on—cannot explain the outcomes of the dependent variable. Instead, it is variation on the independent variable (location in the MWS) that is predicted to explain variation on the dependent variable (democratic consolidation).
South Africa became a major force in southern Africa after the Second World War. [...] The political structures which evolved in South Africa were complex and atypical of other colonial settlements in the region. Unlike territories in other parts of Africa, where direct colonial rule persisted until after the Second World War, South Africa enjoyed effective political independence from metropolitan powers from the beginning of the twentieth century. South Africa's economy is largely controlled by domestic forces (Stadler 1987:10).

2. Zambia

Incorporation of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia since independence in 1964) began with the mining activities of the British South African Company throughout its southern African territories in the early years of the 20th century. Northern Rhodesia attained British protectorate status in 1911, and at first the territory served as a mere labor reserve for Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. During the 1920s copper mining was intensified in Northern Rhodesia’s “copper belt” and the territory became an important mining economy (Chiwele 1996, 211). Colonial policies apparently discouraged the development of agriculture and manufacturing which resulted in the very high dependence on revenues from copper exports at Zambian independence (Klepper 1979; Seidman 1979).

Typical of a peripheral economy the wealth generated by copper mining did not stay in the country. The Northern Rhodesian economy had recovered from the Great Depression by 1935 and the mines boasted a profit well above 4 million British Pounds by 1937. Of these profits Northern Rhodesia kept only about 13–14 percent by way of taxation while the rest of the wealth went to Britain, the British South African Company and overseas shareholders. At the same time Northern Rhodesia’s African population (approximately 97 percent of the total population) had not one secondary school as the territory, according to colonial authorities, was too poor to afford one (Davidson 1994, 50).

B. Economic performance since World War II

1. South Africa

After nearly two decades of sustained growth, the apartheid economy began to falter in the mid-1970s. The relative calm in South African society during the height of apartheid was replaced by wildcat strikes in the 1970s, the Soweto uprising of 1976, and other major riots in urban South Africa in 1980, 1984, and 1985 (Stadler 1987:1). The rise of a black urban wage class in South Africa in the 1970s was on one hand a result of the country’s need to remain competitive in a tighter world-economy. At the same time, this urban wage class became the source of militant trade unionism and the wave of strikes that emerged in the 1970s and was in part the catalyst for the widespread urban political conflict of the 1980s (Martin and Wallerstein 1990:105). Robert Price (1991) notes that apartheid developed into a serious liability for South African economic performance. By the time of the National Party (NP) victory in 1948, South African industry had become thoroughly reliant on cheap black labor, including forms of skilled labor required by the complexities of an industrial economy; and there would be no turning the tide (as was the intent of the apartheid “visionaries”) regarding this basic fact.

Dependence on black labor made black townships a more or less permanent feature in and around South Africa’s white cities. Attempts by the apartheid regime to discourage such permanence of blacks in “white South Africa” merely served to exacerbate the hardships of township life, which in the end would create a fertile ground for unrest and huge expenses for the apartheid regime when it finally accepted the reality of blacks in South Africa and decided to upgrade township conditions. Black industrial labor meant black proletarianization and collective organization, which ultimately would lead to demands for political inclusion (Price 1991). From this point on South African government policies were at constant odds with the country’s role in the international division of labor.

The two decades following the 1973 oil crisis were, despite a few minor upswings, overwhelmingly negative in terms of South African economic performance. An average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 6 percent in the 1960s declined to an average of 1.8 percent in the 1980s and eventually became negative (−1.1 percent) in the early 1990s. The South African economy of the 1980s and early 1990s was characterized by a plunge in gross fixed investment, high rates of capital flight, low rates of private savings leading to plant underutilization and declining competitiveness, low levels of private savings, very high unemployment, and chronic balance of payments difficulties (Gelb 1991:6 and 1994:3–4).

[T]he crisis reflected the break-down of the post-war accumulation strategy based on primary product exports and inward industrialization (including import substitution), based on a violently regimented labour supply... It also imposed structural limits on the growth of domestic demand, inhibited productivity and led to a severe shortage of skilled labour (Marais 1998: 100–101).

2. Zambia

Despite some significant fluctuations in economic performance, Zambia remained peripheral during both its colonial and independence eras. Much like other African nations, Zambia inherited economic and political disadvantages, being “nearly devoid of indigenous owner-producers [a capitalist class] at inde-


slowest progress in human development among countries starting with medium human development and Zambia making the slowest progress in human development among countries starting with low human development.11

C. Current Location in the Modern World-System

A state’s location within the international division of labor can be determined by assessing the standard characteristics of a state’s economic activities as reflected in the nature of its exports and imports (Wallerstein 1974a and 1974b; McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998a and 1998b). The economies of South Africa and Zambia differ on many key measures. As manifested by their historical development and contemporary economic characteristics, South Africa has remained semi-peripheral and Zambia peripheral in the post-WW II era (Arrighi and Drangel 1986).

Table 2 illustrates the differences in diversification of the South African and Zambian economies. While 49 percent of South African exports stem from primary products and natural resource-intensive manufactures (a testament to the periphery-like activities that exist in semi-peripheral states) the corresponding number for Zambia is 89 percent. South Africa’s growth in technology and human resources-intensive manufactures (17 percent combined) is far higher than its negative growth in primary products and natural resource-intensive manufactures (–12 percent combined) in the period 1994–1998. Conversely, Zambia’s

The inherent danger of Zambia’s dependency on copper exports became evident as the commodity price crisis emerged during the 1980s.

Zambia’s main economic strength became a costly liability in an increasingly interdependent global economy leading to a series of four standby agreements with the IMF between 1971 and 1981, loans from the World Bank between 1973 and 1976, and a belated effort at reforming the national economy beginning in 1985 (Bratton 1994:104–107). As Zambia became beset by foreign debt and decreasing revenues, IMF loans became increasingly conditional. Zambia would have to liberalize and adjust in order to receive more help (Esomba 1995:96). In 1999 Zambia spent 13.9 percent of GDP on debt servicing up from 6.2 percent in 1990. By contrast South Africa spent nothing on debt servicing in 1990 and 3.7 percent of GDP in 1999 (UNDP 2000:196–197). These developments are illustrative of how weak peripheral countries, dependent on core (economic) actors such as the IMF, are less resistant to external pressures for liberalization and democratization and thus less “in charge” of their own policies.

Table 1 illustrates persistent economic problems in both South Africa and Zambia. Both countries have experienced an overall decline in per capita GDP in the last twenty-five years. This is consistent with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1999) labeling South Africa as one of the countries making

11 It should be noted that the overall decline, or slow progress, of overall Human Development Index (HDI) values and rankings of sub-Saharan African states is in large part related to the current AIDS epidemic that is reducing life expectancy considerably across the continent.
growth in technology and human capital-intensive manufactures (19 percent combined) is less than its growth in primary products and natural resource-intensive manufactures (32 percent combined) over the same time period. South Africa’s economy displays growth in “core-like” sectors while Zambia’s economy displays growth in “periphery-like” sectors.

Table 3 illustrates Zambia’s dependence on a primary export commodity—copper—that is characteristic of many peripheral economies (they are usually “monocrop” and “monomineral”). Zambia clearly displays the economic characteristics of a peripheral state. As a country no more industrialized than most Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries (with the exception of South Africa), “[c]opper and cobalt form the mainstay of Zambia’s export goods” (South African Department of Finance 1998).12

While South Africa also is dependent on mineral exports, its dependency on such exports is less serious and its economy is clearly more diversified (as befits a semi-peripheral country) than the Zambian economy. According to the South African Department of Finance (1998),

South Africa has a modern, well-diversified economy in which agriculture, mining, secondary industry (manufacturing, electricity, gas, water and construction), commerce and a broad structure of service establishments contribute to the wealth of the nation.

It is especially over the past decade that the South African economy has diversified. Growth in communications, transport, financial services, tourism and manufacturing sectors has eclipsed the former importance of the mining, quarrying, and agricultural sectors. The biggest growth has taken place in the finance and insurance sector that has grown from 14.8 percent of GDP in 1991 to 20.2 percent in 2000, making it the largest sector of the South African economy. Notably, the agriculture, mining, and quarrying sectors, traditional mainstays of the South African economy, now account for less than 10 percent of the country’s GDP for the first time in history (The Sunday Independent 2001). Although South Africa is still dependent on exports of primary and intermediate commodities to core countries, the country’s exports to the rest of Africa consist mainly of manufactured goods (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998a and 1998b) in accordance with its semi-peripheral role in the world-economy.

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12 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe are members of the SADC.
There are discernible differences in import patterns between South Africa and Zambia as well. Table 4 lists the five major product groups imported to South Africa and Zambia according to value in 1995. According to the South African Department of Finance (1998), imports to South Africa consist mainly of capital goods, raw materials, semi-manufactured goods, and consumer commodities, largely from Germany, the USA, the UK, and Japan. Zambia’s imports consist mainly of crude oil, chemicals, machinery, iron, steel, textiles, and vehicles, largely from South Africa, the UK, Zimbabwe, and Japan.

Table 5 shows the total numbers and percentages of the workforce that are employed in agriculture, industries, and services in South African and Zambia. Zambia’s workforce is concentrated in the agricultural sector (65.7 percent) as might be expected in a peripheral country, and South Africa’s workforce is concentrated in industries (40.9 percent) and services (54.5 percent), which is to be expected in a more developed, semi-peripheral economy.

Aid and financial flows are another set of useful indicators of South Africa and Zambia’s different positions in the MWS. Table 6 shows that net private capital flows are comparable in the two countries and that Zambia’s FDI as a percentage of GNP was slightly higher than that of South Africa in 1997 (due to the impact of privatization efforts in Zambia at the time). However, Zambia’s much higher external debt (at 136 percent of GNP, seven times higher than South Africa’s) and serious dependence on official development assistance (16.7 percent of GNP, compared to 0.4 percent in South Africa) constitute clear evidence of Zambia’s vulnerable position in the MWS (World Bank 1999:271). Such vulnerability makes Zambia more sensitive to external pressures than South Africa as the discussion on democratization will show. The information provided in tables 2–6 is consistent with the designation of South Africa as a semi-peripheral state and Zambia as a peripheral one.

Lastly, the Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Programme (2001) provides an indication of the human resources available for a particular country (in its quest for development, democratization, etc.). Ranking on the HDI is predicted to be affected by a country’s position in the MWS. MWS theory predicts that semi-peripheral states will
have a higher degree of human development than peripheral ones. As Table 7 shows, South Africa ranks better than Zambia on all components of the HDI.\(^{13}\) As the sections below will illustrate, position in the MWS has been of crucial importance for determining domestic economies, societies and politics. Without taking position in the MWS into consideration, and its effect on domestic economies, societies and politics, it becomes impossible to understand the constraints under which domestic actors operate.

### D. Transitions to Democracy

#### 1. South Africa

Early industrialization and the development of Africa’s only “modern” capitalist and middle classes, initially driven by core interests, have profoundly impacted South Africa’s class structure and civil society (Stadler 1987). Arguably the active role of black unions, legalized in 1979 along with other social organizations (Bendix 1996:233), played a great part in fostering a strong civil society and democratic practices among the majority of South Africans officially excluded from such associations and practices in general since the arrival of European settlers in 1652 and in particular since the introduction of apartheid in 1948. The United Democratic Front (UDF), created in 1983 as a multiracial umbrella organization bringing together labor unions, churches, student and civic organizations in the fight against apartheid, also contributed to the development of civil society among South Africans in the authoritarian apartheid state (Deegan 1999:67). The development of “modern” class relations is due to South Africa’s status as a semi-peripheral state containing modern economic sectors conducive to the development of class-based organization, including the development of a significant middle class, that often proves elusive in peripheral countries.

Commentators on the South African transition to democracy such as Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley (1993) and Patti Waldmeir (1997) highlight the importance of agency manifested in the willingness of key actors within both the African National Congress (ANC) and the NP to negotiate a transition to democracy. However, structural aspects of the “inevitability” of the transition are also evident in their accounts. They emphasize the political stalemate and untenable economic situation developed by the end of the 1980s, the rapprochement between the NP and ANC (beginning with secret talks in the 1980s and escalating with the ascendance of F. W. de Klerk to the South African presidency), and the elite pact between the NP and ANC leaderships making the final transition to democracy (the 1994 national elections) possible. In this sense, while individual actors were able to shape the outcome of the transition to a significant degree, forces “larger” than individuals moved the process itself forward. A transition of some sort was bound to take place by the early 1990s.

Hein Marais (1998) provides a somewhat pessimistic assessment of the transition to democracy. He argues that a (race-based) capitalist logic of accumulation created “two nations”—one privileged and one destitute—since the

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13. “[T]he HDI reflects achievements in the most basic human capabilities-leading a long life, being knowledgeable and enjoying a decent standard of living. Three variables have been chosen to represent these dimensions-life expectancy, educational attainment and income” (UNDP 1999).
discovery of minerals in the nineteenth century. When faced with an “organic crisis” the same capitalist system facilitated a pacted transition which managed to co-opt ANC elites and thus keep capital interests privileged at the expense of real socioeconomic transformation by creating a new centrist pro-capital bloc. This reading of the transition sees the appeasement of capital as perhaps unavoidable and South Africa destined to continue on the “two nations” track (cf. Bond 2000). At the same time, South Africa’s transition to democracy has not been at the mercy of IFI’s as the transition in Zambia clearly has been.

Despite some doubts about fairness and openness (mainly in KwaZulu-Natal), the 1994 South African elections were by and large considered a success and an official manifestation of the establishment of true democracy in South Africa (Reynolds 1994; Johnson and Schlemmer 1996; Butler 1998). The ANC ran on a nonracial platform and captured 62.6 percent of the votes and 255 of 400 seats in the National Assembly (Reynolds 1994).

2. Zambia

Zambia lacks the same history of an indigenous capitalist class and competent bureaucracy as developed in South Africa. “[T]he Zambian bureaucracy has a far shorter history of professionalization [and] Zambia was essentially a labor-reserve colony” until the 1960s when advanced training for Zambians began (Denemark 1991:534). Despite the relatively strong performance of the Zambian economy during the decade following independence, neglecting to invest in proper training of the Zambian bureaucracy has resulted in a poorly administered, and therefore weak, state. However, the emphasis on copper mining in the primary sector created a class-conscious proletariat and a sense of civil society reinforced by trade union practices (Hamalengwa 1992). Arguably the influence of civil society through the unions, considering that Kenneth Kaunda’s successor Frederick Chiluba was Zambia’s foremost union leader, played an important part in the events leading up to the 1991 democratic elections (Ihonvbere 1996:Ch. 3).

The weakness of Zambia’s economy, coupled with the weak state typical of peripheral regions and exacerbated by internal pressures for change (Denemark 1991), led to its acceptance of IMF structural adjustment programs (SAP’s) and eventually the end of President Kaunda’s one-party state (Bratton 1994, 107–108). This development is important, because countries most likely to be forced into accepting SAP’s wholesale are the countries most likely to see their democratic legitimacy subsequently undermined (Mkandawire 1999, 125–130). During a crisis of political realignment Chiluba’s Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) emerged as a viable opposition to Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP). The government’s final loss of legitimacy was illustrated by the urban food riots of 1990 that eventually turned political (Bratton 1994:102).

Zambia became a formal democracy after Kaunda signed a constitutional amendment introducing the Third Republic in 1990 and subsequently stepped down as president after his electoral defeat by Chiluba and the MMD in October 1991. In this election, the MMD captured over 75 percent of the vote and 125 out of 150 seats in the National Assembly (Burnell 1996:407). The 1991 election was widely regarded as free and fair by international observers (Bjornlund et. al. 1992; Bratton 1992; Commonwealth Observer Group 1992).

The peaceful nature of the democratic transition was applauded both domestically and internationally. Zambia was upheld as a model of transition and benefited from a large inflow of foreign aid. The inflow of aid was not only a result of the successful electoral transition, but also because Zambia’s new regime had committed to economic liberalization and structural adjustment (Baylies and Szeftel 1997:113). At the time of the initial transition to democracy, however, the World Bank (1994:58) rated Zambia’s overall macroeconomic policy stance as “very poor” (in comparison to other sub-Saharan African countries) and noted that Zambia’s changes in macroeconomic policies from 1981–1986 and 1987–1991 had “deteriorated.” Ultimately, post-transition Zambia has been bogged down in economic stagnation and dependency and hopes for democratic consolidation seem dim.

The events leading up to the democratic transition in Zambia in 1991 are an excellent example of how systemic forces both shape and interact with the internal weaknesses characteristic of peripheral states to influence domestic events and, in this case, translate into poor prospects for democratic consolidation. Thus Zambia’s democratic experience cannot be fully comprehended without situating it within the context of the MWS as a whole.
E. Consolidation of Democracy: Success and Failure

A measure which can be used as an indicator of how a country’s consolidation process is progressing is the Freedom House (2000) survey of political rights and civil liberties, which designates countries as being “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated “free;” between 3.0 and 5.5 “partly free;” and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” For a fuller explanation of the methodology consult the most recent edition of the survey, available online: <http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm>.

The characters representing scores for each year are, from left to right, political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Each of the first two is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. “F,” “PF,” and “NF” respectively stand for “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated “free;” between 3.0 and 5.5 “partly free;” and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” For a fuller explanation of the methodology consult the most recent edition of the survey, available online: <http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm>.

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Source: Freedom House (2001)

The characters representing scores for each year are, from left to right, political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Each of the first two is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. “F,” “PF,” and “NF” respectively stand for “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated “free;” between 3.0 and 5.5 “partly free;” and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” For a fuller explanation of the methodology consult the most recent edition of the survey, available online: <http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm>.

Comparing South Africa and Zambia’s past transactions with the IMF gives us a clear indicator of Zambia’s greater economic vulnerability and dependence on IFIs, as well as the greater leverage by IFIs over Zambia’s democratization process. In 1983 South Africa entered its only stand-by arrangement with the IMF, drawing 159 out of 364 SDR million approved. In addition, South Africa drew 614.43 SDR million from the IMF General Resources Account (GRA) in 1993 and repaid this amount in 1997–98. South Africa currently has no outstanding purchases or loans, nor any projected obligations, to the IMF (International Monetary Fund 2001a). By contrast, Zambia has borrowed regularly from the IMF since 1984. Zambia drew 147.5 and 103.8 SDR million from the GRA in 1984 and 1986 respectively, an additional 1458.113 SDR million from the GRA and the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1995, and a total of 64.94 SDR million from the SAF between 1997 and 2001. Zambia is scheduled to repay approximately 172 SDR million per year (principal and interest).

16. Patrick Bond (2000) does emphasize that South Africa’s transition to democracy also has been hampered by constraints imposed by the core actors of the world economy and that the domestic discourse on appropriate policy has been conflictual. However, the conflict over policy in South Africa has not been characterized by nearly the same degree of vacillation and volatility as compared with that in Zambia.

17. Special Drawing Rights (SDR) is an artificial currency unit created by the IMF in 1966. It is used as an international reserve asset and is defined as a basket of national currencies-Euro, Japanese Yen, Pound sterling, and U.S. dollar (see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm).

18. The GRA contains the IMF’s financial resources that are based on member nations’ subscriptions (see http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/activity/2001/070601.htm).
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204 to the IMF through 2005. The country’s outstanding purchases and loans, 181.74 million in SAF arrangements and 716.62 SDR million in Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) arrangements, constitute 37.2 percent and 146.5 percent of its quota respectively (International Monetary Fund 2001b).

This comparison of each country’s involvement with the IMF provides an appreciation of Zambia’s difficulties in terms of acting independently vis-à-vis core interests and why the country’s peripheral role in the world-economy has resulted in a more volatile transition to democracy than has been the case in South Africa. The dependence on core-led IFI’s is more acutely felt in Zambia and thus disagreements over what economic policies are appropriate, and how IFI demands infringe on national sovereignty, are more likely to result in conflict that impedes democratization. Whereas there at times have been sharp disagreements between the ANC and its alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), on major economic policy decisions such as the move from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), the ANC has had an easier time acquiring “ownership” of its economic policies and its developmental projects than has Zambia’s MMD (Hanson and Hentz 1999).

Ironically, the IMF’s insistence on neoliberal policy adjustments for developing countries today follows a long period of IMF support for “statist” policies. According to George Ayittey (1998:270), IMF emphasis on conditionality and macro management reinforced notions of state control and management in Africa.

For 30 years, Zambia’s statist policies of import-substitution, subsidized food prices and state enterprises were backed by western economic advisers including the World Bank. True, the IMF always disliked them, but then, as one IMF official said privately: “Why did we lend $1.2 billion to a government whose policies we disapproved of?” (The Economist 1995:34).

1. South Africa

Despite setbacks and international doubts, South African consolidation has made steady, if slow, progress (Southall 2000). The second national elections in June 1999, as well as local government elections in 1995 and 2000, have further established South Africa as a democracy able to survive internal and external pressures. The 1999 national elections saw the ANC win yet another decisive victory capturing 66.3 percent of the votes and 266 of 400 seats in the National Assembly (Friedman 1999).

Although the 1999 elections saw some realignment in the South African political arena, voting patterns still resemble societal ethnic cleavages (that also correlate with socioeconomic cleavages) where whites still support “white parties” and blacks still support “black parties.” The most significant results of the 1999 elections were the decline in support for the New National Party (NNP) by two-thirds (from about 21 to 7 percent) and the rapid rise of the Democratic Party (DP) from less than 2 to almost 10 percent, thus making it the new official opposition. The fact that the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) remained in control of KwaZulu-Natal despite an offer by the ANC to name IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi Deputy President in return for an ANC premiership in the province, and that the Western Cape remained in NNP hands (through a coalition with the DP) despite an ANC plurality (about 42 percent) in the province are also significant as they provide indications of significant opposition to the dominant ANC as well as the latter’s ability to accept rejection and electoral defeat.

The 2000 local government elections have arguably transformed the South African political landscape into a “two-party” system with the ANC receiving 59.4 percent of votes nationwide, the Democratic Alliance (DA)—which includes the NNP, the DP, and the Federal Alliance (FA)—22.1 percent, the IFP 9.1 percent (concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal) and various other parties between 2.6 and 0.3 percent each (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2000). The rejection in successive elections of extreme parties on the right and left, e.g., the Freedom Front (FF) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), points to a preference for centrist politics and a degree of continuity among the South African electorate. This is a good omen for the future of democratic consolidation, and in terms of successful multiparty elections being one sign of consolidation South Africa’s positive experience has been quite different from the reversal of consolidation occurring in Zambia between its 1991 and 1996 elections.

On the other hand, successful elections are not a sufficient cause for democratic consolidation, and in South Africa consolidation has been hampered by differences between liberal and emancipatory understandings of democracy. Liberal democracy is often associated with minimalist requirements of democracy (Di Palma 1990; Huntington 1991). Emancipatory democracy entails a notion of transformation (Gould 1988; Pateman 1970) along with socioeconomic justice and fairness, deliberation of issues at the grassroots level, and participation in decision-making (Koettle 1998:34). Persistent signs that the South African citizenry does not agree on the meaning of democracy, or how it ought best to be practiced, signals potential trouble ahead for consolidation (Koettle 1998, 100; Mattes and Thiel 1998). The stark differences in understandings of what democracy means stem in part from the existence in semi-peripheral South
A 1996 IDASA survey found that 41 percent of respondents in the Western Cape, 37 percent in KwaZulu-Natal, and 29 percent nationally associated democracy with substantial improvements in their lives, thus conceiving of democracy as emancipatory. Forty-five percent of respondents nationally, 33 percent in the Western Cape and 39 percent in KwaZulu-Natal regarded democracy as consisting essentially of a specified set of procedures, thus conceiving of democracy in procedural (Western liberal) terms. Other respondents were ambivalent about the meaning of democracy in substantial (emancipatory) or procedural (liberal) terms (IDASA Public Opinion Service 1996a:4–6 and 1996b:6–9).

South Africa’s government generally respects the human rights of its citizens even though killings due to excessive use of force by security forces and deaths in police custody remains a problem in some areas. Levels of political violence have been reduced since 1998 but remain a problem in KwaZulu-Natal (U.S. State Department 2000a). Amnesty International (2000a) is more critical and reports that torture and unnecessary violence is still common among the South African police, that asylum-seekers and suspected illegal immigrants face official ill-treatment and racially motivated attacks, and that political violence still takes place in parts of the country.

On the economic front, South Africa has emerged out of the era of apartheid-isolation as a thoroughly re-integrated player in the global economy (Koelble 1998), which has led to tensions between the ANC and its government allies, the SAPC and COSATU. These tensions are illustrative of the effect of MWS forces on domestic relationships between state, capital and civil society in a semi-peripheral country pressured by sharply divergent concerns of “core” and “periphery” segments of society. The emerging rift within the Tripartite Alliance is due to the ANC’s acceptance of neoliberal economic growth policies as the only method capable of providing the resources needed to correct the inequalities created by centuries of race-based oppression while its allies pushes for highly redistributive policies (Ward 1998:50). Given the highly skewed income distribution in South Africa and the resulting low rate of domestic savings and investment, the country needed FDI. Hence pursuit of an “investor-friendly environment” and the adoption of the GEAR program in 1996.

South Africa has been better able to enhance the extractive capabilities of the state than have weaker (peripheral) countries. Instead of seeing its tax base shrink after liberation as has been common in other African countries, the South African government under President Nelson Mandela “has broadened the base by building an efficient collection agency outside the regular civil service” (Africa Confidential 1999c). The South African Revenue Service (SARS) collected a record R200 billion for the 1999/2000 fiscal year. Revenue collection efficiency has been steadily improved over the last few years due to improvements in collection procedures and the combating of corruption and fraud (The Star 2001). Activists in civic organizations suggest that having a substantial tax base outside workers employed by government, which is uncommon in most African countries, is positive for democracy. “It helps democracy. If the government’s taxing your income at source, there’s more incentive to hold it to account for the way it’s spending your money” (Africa Confidential 1999c). South Africa’s semi-peripheral position in the MWS makes the country more likely to sustain such positive developments in terms of state capacity whereas peripheral countries (like Zambia) will likely see the continuation of poor extractive and distributive capabilities, thus further exacerbating state and civil society weakness, antagonistic class relations, and authoritarian tendencies.

South Africa’s semi-peripheral role in the world economy can help with external affairs as well. The relationship between Washington D.C. and Pretoria has evolved into the closest relationship the U.S. has with any African country. The institutionalization of this relationship began with the Bi-National Commission launched by presidents Bill Clinton and Nelson Mandela in 1996 (Africa Confidential 1999a). Pretoria is also asserting its position in the semi-periphery by embracing “strategic partners,” such as Argentina, Brazil, Britain, China, and Germany.

On the other hand, negotiations over trade relations between South Africa and the EU, assumed to become South Africa’s core “benefactor” in terms of promoting a trade relationship conducive to South African development and democratic consolidation, have become increasingly conflictual since they began in 1994. The EU wishes to export cheap manufactures to South Africa while at the same time protecting the EU market from competitive South African agricultural goods (Africa Confidential 1997a). The situation is illustrative of the pressures put on developing countries like South Africa today when world markets and their core-led representatives (e.g., the EU, U.S., IMF, and World Bank) insist on economic liberalization and openness. The inability to enjoy relatively higher levels of protection of home industries, as countries who in the past moved up rapidly in the global division of labor did (e.g., Japan and South Korea), gives semi-peripheral countries like South Africa an additional hurdle to overcome in their quest for economic development and democratic consolidation.

A democratizing country with a strong and diversified economy is more likely to balance the oftentimes conflicting demands of international and domestic capital and societal pressures for redistribution that might threaten the consolidation process, but South Africa’s economic progress since the 1994 dem-
AIDS crisis is proving particularly devastating for the African continent. According to the World Health Organization, approximately 80 percent of all AIDS cases worldwide occur in sub-Saharan Africa. The southern African region is the hardest hit by AIDS today, and 20 percent of South Africa’s adult population is HIV positive with about 2000 new infections occurring daily (UNAIDS 2000).

While employment in the government sector (which, due to less generation of actual revenue, is less desirable) has decreased from over 4 percent per year in the 1970s to just over 2 percent per year in the early 1990s; job growth in the (more desirable) private sector has declined from roughly 15 percent to less than 2 percent (a total loss of jobs) in the same time frame (Ginsberg 1998:86).

Democratic consolidation in South Africa faces several challenges, most notably those relating to poverty, crime and health. When asked to list the most pressing problems South Africa faces, survey respondents consistently mention job creation/unemployment (75 percent) and crime (61 percent) as the top concerns. Housing comes in as a distant third concern (34 percent) (IDASA Opinion ’99). The AIDS crisis is proving particularly devastating for the African continent. According to the World Health Organization, approximately 80 percent of all AIDS cases worldwide occur in sub-Saharan Africa. The southern African region is the hardest hit by AIDS today, and 20 percent of South Africa’s adult population is HIV positive with about 2000 new infections occurring daily (UNAIDS 2000).
The U.S. State Department (2000b) considers the Zambian government's human rights record as generally poor. The government has taken some steps to address these problems, but political rights were seriously infringed upon during the 1996 national elections, police killings and routine beatings and abuse of criminal suspects remain a widespread problem, and the independent press is harassed by the government through the courts. A state of emergency was declared in Zambia in October 1997 and lasted until March 1998 following an alleged coup plot on October 29. During this time government was granted freedom of action beyond the restrictions of constitutional rule. According to Amnesty International (2000b) there is still fallout from the trials of those accused of involvement in the 1997 coup attempt with several death sentences handed down. The drunken coup plot, leading to a purge of the Zambian military by President Chiluba, is illustrative of how weak peripheral states often fail to maintain domestic stability and in trying to do so relapse into authoritarian behavior which further alienates international donors that the state is economically dependent upon. The abuse of detainees in this case simply gave Western donors yet another reason to withhold aid (Africa Confidential 1997b).

Judging from recent developments the consolidation project has been a failure in Zambia and it remains doubtful whether Zambia can regroup and salvage the remains of the democratic transition that took place in 1991. The November 4, 1999 assassination of Major Wezi Kaunda (the son of former President Kenneth Kaunda) turned Zambia into a “political powder keg.” Following allegations that Major Kaunda was involved in funneling aid to UNITA rebels in Angola and training guerillas in eastern Angola close to the Zambian border, the assassination might have been a pre-emptive strike aiming at preventing a military overthrow of Zambia’s President Chiluba (Johannesburg Mail & Guardian 1999). On July 6, 2001 former MMD Deputy National Secretary Paul Tembo was assassinated in his Lusaka home by gunmen on the same day he was scheduled to testify before a tribunal investigating alleged large scale fraud by three MMD ministers in the Chiluba government (The Post [Lusaka] 2001b). These events indicate that continued political volatility is to be expected in Zambia.

Zambia’s impoverished economy and history of one-party rule means that the current government faces enormous challenges in terms of balancing the demands for liberalization by the international community with the redistributive demands of the Zambian citizenry. The government is heavily reliant upon other nations and non-governmental organizations for aid, loans, concessions, credit, and support (see Table 6). When the MMD promised delivery and improvements in living conditions by campaigning under the slogan “The Hour has come” it benefited from the frustration and alienation Zambians felt toward the previous regime and its inability to improve the economy, human rights and overall living conditions (Ihonvbere 1996:169–172). However, the “revolution of rising expectations” might result in increasing protests and instability if promises cannot be fulfilled. A volatile societal climate emerges in which the “normality” of democratic society fails to materialize, and as expected Zambia has not been as resilient as South Africa in terms of safeguarding initial democratic success.

IMF and World Bank demands for economic liberalization have resulted in significant privatization of copper mining assets in Zambia. While such privatization has boosted Zambia’s competitiveness ranking to twelfth among 24 ranked African countries according to the Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001 (World Economic Forum 2000), it runs the risk of (re)igniting political and economic rivalries (Africa Confidential 2000b). Quarrels between new and old copper mining interests that create societal unrest in Zambia’s “copper belt” are the unfortunate outcome of policies (allegedly) designed to strengthen Zambia’s economy. Instead the result might very well be a further weakening of Zambia’s deteriorating democracy. Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) Deputy President Japhet Moonde echoes the concerns about negative effects of core-mandated reforms having a dire impact on Zambian society.

The economic reform measures under the MMD regime became synonymous with retrenchments, redundancies, and joblessness for the majority of Zambians where it is estimated that about 70 or 80 percent of Zambians live in absolute poverty today, a record that surpasses even the colonial era (The Post [Lusaka] 2001a). Countries like Zambia that have not established firm “ownership” of their reform programs are heavily dependent on external economic support in order for reform initiatives to be continually supported by the government, not to mention the populace. Difficulties associated with demands for structural adjustments and economic reforms result in the government blaming IFIs and international and local non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) for “plotting” to sabotage the national economy (Africa Confidential 1999e). Zambia, due to its peripheral position in the MWS, is less capable than semi-peripheral South

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21 The Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001, designed to predict medium to long term growth, ranks South Africa seventh and Zambia twelfth among 24 African countries surveyed. Zambia’s relatively high position is due to its recently initiated privatization program. The report identifies South Africa as an Africa leader whose performance is very important for an African Renaissance. The report also addresses the issue of debt forgiveness that is considered key for continued economic progress on the continent. Jeffrey Sachs contends that the process of granting relief to heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) remains inadequate. “The process is too slow, too stingy, and too arbitrary” as it does not properly take into account real social needs (World Economic Forum 2000).
Africa of acquiring “ownership” and key, if not broad, support for neoliberal economic reforms.

Following the suspension of balance-of-payment support to Zambia by European donors after the problematic presidential election in 1996 and continued poor economic performance, the future of the Zambian government was at stake when the World Bank’s consultative group met in Paris on May 26–28, 1999. Donors seemed somewhat pleased, however, and indicated that further support would be forthcoming pending Zambia’s privatization of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (Africa Confidential 1999d). Earlier on, the Zambian economy was surviving partly due to a US$70 million IMF loan that was granted with the understanding that the sales of copper mines would be finalized by the end of March 1999 (Africa Confidential 1999b). The dependency of Zambia’s government on international donors to shore up support for reforms was again manifested when only the promise of large sums of money to the Zambian government made at the Consultative Group meeting in Lusaka on July 16–18, 2000 likely prevented the dismissal of Zambian Finance Minister Katele Kalumba and strengthened the position of the relatively few reformers in the government (Africa Confidential 2000b).

The typical “strong-arm” tactics employed by peripheral states like Zambia on the political front and in dealing with societal upheaval are partly the result of stresses associated with a dependent and vulnerable economic situation. A vicious cycle of economic dependence is set in motion, leading to desperate measures by the state that in turn exacerbate economic dysfunctionality. Thus, following privatization of the Zambian mines in March 2000 (selling major copper and cobalt businesses to South African Anglo American Plc and a Canadian-Swiss consortium), international aid donors have now shifted their focus from Zambian macroeconomic policy initiatives to the government’s human rights record (Johannesburg Mail & Guardian 2000).

An examination of the empirical evidence of Zambia’s transition to democracy and subsequent struggle to maintain and consolidate it supports the prediction that Zambia lacks resources necessary for consolidation. While the transition in Zambia is more directly linked to its economic vulnerability and susceptibility to external pressures than the South African one, it has also become clear that Zambia has not been able to diffuse the high costs of economic adjustment and democratization. The economic costs of Zambia’s economic restructuring and democratic transition remain within the country, affecting a citizenry already desperate for improvements in living standards. The economy remains exposed to volatility, and as the state is unable to improve living standards conflict escalates and ultimately the government clamps down on civil society and democratic rights. Zambia’s peripheral status in the world-system is seemingly a key factor in explaining the country’s struggle to break out of the vicious cycle of poverty and undemocratic governance.

V. CONCLUSION

South Africa shares many economic and social problems with peripheral countries. How can economic growth be encouraged while the government at the same time seeks redistribution as a means of uplifting the impoverished masses? South Africa also enjoys some of the advantages associated with semi-peripheral states; its economy is more diversified and modern than those of its peripheral neighbors and its modern administrative and commercial infrastructure makes it better positioned to compete in the global economy and to efficiently administer domestic economic and social activities. For South African democracy to prevail and fully consolidate, its leaders and citizens will have to carefully utilize the economic and political advantages that semi-peripheral status entails. The irony is that South African success will likely come at the partial expense of its peripheral neighbors (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998b).

Zambia’s misfortunes since the democratic transition in 1991 are illustrative of its inferior situation as a peripheral country. Zambia has remained a weak, vulnerable, and peripheral state where authoritarian leaders can prey upon the citizenry. Widespread poverty and peripheral status in the world-economy does not make successful democratization impossible (as Botswana, one of the world’s poorest countries at independence, has shown), but in the case of Zambia all the weaknesses and disadvantages usually attributed to peripheral status seem to have combined to make successful democratization an elusive goal.

Overall we see that an inferior position in the global division of labor leads to state weakness and a drain on resources needed for development, and thus it also tends to have a disruptive impact on civil society and class relations. Using an MWS approach to understand processes of democratization is especially useful because it allows us not only to see the obvious linkage between higher socioeconomic development and democratic stability that modernization theory posits, but also how development in the non-core is greatly affected by decisions made in the core and how even some (short term) success with economic growth and management can be offset by the vulnerability and characteristic weaknesses that a peripheral position in the MWS entails.

The empirical evidence on the divergent democratization trajectories in South Africa and Zambia appears to support Hypothesis 1 somewhat and Hypothesis 2 more clearly. Based on the experience of South Africa it seems reasonable to suggest that semi-peripheral states are better equipped to mitigate external pressures for economic and political change and thus undertake democ-
ratization on their “own terms.” Based on the experience of Zambia, peripheral states are arguably much less able to democratize on their “own terms” due to a lack of economic resources and a weaker state and civil society.

The central irony of the MWS is manifested in these two case studies of democratic consolidation. The weakest states in the MWS can be pushed around by core powers and thus more easily forced to democratize (e.g., Zambia and many other African states). At the same time, these weak states are the least likely to possess the resources necessary to consolidate their democratic transition. On the other hand, semi-peripheral states can maintain their independence vis-à-vis the core to a higher degree (e.g., South Africa’s decades long resistance to sustained internal and external pressures for democratization), but if the decision is made to undertake a democratic transition they are more likely to possess the resources necessary for successful consolidation.

Bringing back the research question that prompted this article: can a MWS approach help us explain processes of democratization within states? It becomes clear that the MWS approach has indeed been valuable, as the processes of democratization and consolidation in both South Africa and Zambia have been shaped by each country’s position in the MWS. Of course, agency is not irrelevant, and Frederick Chiluba has not provided the leadership for Zambia that Nelson Mandela or (arguably) Thabo Mbeki have for South Africa. However, because location in the MWS matters, conventional (modernization) theories of democratization and consolidation that emphasize internal factors need to be revised and embrace a more holistic approach to democratization. To this end a MWS perspective can serve as a valuable theoretical complement.

The MWS approach underscores the importance of taking exogenous, systemic factors into serious consideration when discussing democratization and consolidation (cf. Martin 2000:258). This understanding ought to impact the way in which social scientists approach all societal phenomena that are global in nature:

For social scientists, internationalization of the world economy should sound the death-knell to the anachronistic divisions, institutionalized in universities, between “comparative politics” and “international relations.” Cross-national comparisons are meaningless without placing the countries being compared in the context of a common world political economy within which they operate. Likewise, theories of international relations that treat all countries as fundamentally similar provide only limited insight into the variations in policy and institutional change. Neither comparative politics nor international relations can be coherently understood without aid from the other (Keohane and Milner 1996:257).

While it might seem obvious that states with more resources have a higher likelihood of consolidating democracy, the MWS approach is especially valuable for understanding the causal pathway between position in the MWS and democratic consolidation. Furthermore, the MWS approach is particularly useful for exposing the primary importance of factors such as external pressures and economic vulnerability. In the end, approaching democratic transitions and consolidation from a global perspective is necessary for discovering the secrets of democratic success and failure.

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I. INTRODUCTION

I intend to address a critical element of world-systems theory, and in doing so illuminate some larger concerns with international relations theory in general. Specifically, I will be examining the concept of the “external arena” and its relation to the international system as an expanding whole. The goal is to re-think the incorporation of new regions (‘states’ and peoples) into the world-system in order to understand world-system processes more completely. This should be taken as a positive critique of both Wallerstein’s analysis of incorporation (European, state-centric, ‘inside-out’) and Hall’s analysis of incorporation (external, indigenous peoples, ‘outside in’).

In turn, my position is embedded in a larger critique of international relations theory in political science. I argue that world-systems theory is better positioned to address important issues (e.g., globalization, democratization) than are traditional realist, neorealist, or institutionalist approaches. Simply put, if social scientists are to understand and predict anything to do with these ‘emerging’ trends, a globalist paradigm must be adopted. At the broadest level, this research...
is intended as a call for a paradigm shift away from traditional power issues of international politics toward a more interdisciplinary approach to understanding politics. How is incorporation related to this broad theme? Because incorporation, and the structuring of frontiers and boundaries, reflects the very essence of what is politics.

In essence, I am exploring the broad question: “What drives the expansion of the global state system?” The status of being ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to the international system provides a source of debate within the literature, as does the way in which this status is represented. This prompts a narrower question: “What is the nature of incorporation into the system?” This narrower question is fueled by the argument that if I am to understand the broader question, I must get a close-up view of the actual process of the system expanding. By gaining a clear understanding of this fundamental process, I will be more able to broadly critique existing theory purporting to explain the expansion of the modern global system.

I am using a world-systems approach to examine and explain the process of incorporation into the system. This world-systems explanatory outlook should be contrasted to other systemic-level explanations of expansion (e.g. Waltzian neorealism, Bull’s international society). In doing so, I will also be positioned to critique realist explanations of expansion (e.g. Snyder’s ‘Myths of Empire’). By using a world-systems approach to understanding the expansion of the international system, I will differentiate my research in several ways from four primary problems that plague much of traditional international political research: state-centrism, the treatment of politics as autonomous, a temporal scope of analysis limited to the recent past, and a tendency toward Eurocentrism (Denemark 1999).

It is my argument that an explicitly world-systems approach will provide a much more nuanced and insightful explanation of how European-style political structures either emerge from or are inserted into peripheral regions than is currently provided by traditional international relations literature.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY DEVELOPMENT

In international relations theory there is an ever-present ebb and flow of ideas, which results in a shifting swell in the prevailing tide of current theory. A prime example is provided by tracing the evolution of theory from political realism, to a neorealist ‘refinement,’ through a realist backlash, and finally to a cry for alternative considerations characterized by the agent-structure debate.

The realist concern with concepts of “power” and “interests” lent credence to criticisms that these ideas were too “woolly” to use effectively in the pursuit of “science.” Indeed, even Morgenthau (1978:11, emphasis added) posits “the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated.” Political realism was in turn “refined” with a more “structural” approach to international politics provided by Waltz (1979). Though neorealism (or ‘structural realism’) has been roundly debated and criticized as a theory, neorealism and world-systems are recognized as primary influences in the academic discourse on international relations (Wendt 1987).

These two approaches have suffered very different fates. Even defenders of neorealism argue that “structural realism, qua theory, must be viewed as deeply and perhaps fatally flawed. Yet at the same time, qua paradigm or worldview, it continues to inform the community of international relations scholars” (Kapstein 1995:751). Kapstein argues that structural realism will continue to be the cornerstone of international relations theory” until an alternative takes its place (à la Kuhn). But he only addresses the issues presented by realists emphasizing domestic sources of international relations (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Rosecrance and Stein, eds. 1993; Snyder 1991), and does not address any potential alternative.

Wendt (1987:344) views world-systems understanding of structure as a “progressive problem shift over neorealism.” In addition, as a research program, world-systems has developed a diverse network of scholars and a theoretically rich body of literature which continues to be refined. While neorealism has stagnated and been largely supplanted by domestic realist explanations, world-systems has continued to evolve as an active research program or paradigm.

III. WORLD-SYSTEMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM

Much like the world-system itself, the application of the world-systems approach has expanded and developed to encompass many different areas of academic concern. In fact, there are so many variations on the world-systemic approach, that it has long ceased to be a single “theory,” and is more accurately

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2. Understanding this dynamic is more salient once one realizes that Wallerstein’s ‘moment’ of incorporation can occur over a period of 100 or more years, and can involve vast geographic regions. A region does not just become part of the system, something—some change—must occur.

3. See Keohane 1986 as a consolidation of the discourse.
referred to as a Lakatosian “research programme,” or a “paradigm” in the traditional Kuhnian sense. Lakatos (1970) recognizes that all great scientific theories are engulfed in an ‘ocean of anomalies’ from the moment of their inception. Instead of discarding an individual theory once it has proven inadequate, Lakatos places emphasis on sequences of historically related theories. In essence, “a research programme is the sum of the various stages through which a leading idea passes” (Larvor 1998:51). This ‘leading idea’ provides the ‘hard core’ of the research program, which is the set of commitments that cannot be abandoned without abandoning the research program altogether. Around this core, there is a ‘protective belt’ of auxiliary hypotheses that serve to shield the core from falsification. This belt of auxiliary hypotheses is continually changing. This change takes place in response to empirical findings, but also according to a research program’s ‘heuristic’—the set of problem-solving techniques that guide a scientist engaged in a particular research program. Thus, within the realm limited to international relations theory, a world-systems approach may quite accurately be described as a research program.

A. Addressing Globalization

Sklair (1991, 1999) argues that the central feature of globalization is that many contemporary problems cannot be adequately be studied at the level of nation-states, but need to be seen in terms of global processes. While he misidentifies the world-systems approach as one of four (the others being a global culture, a global society, and a global capitalism approach), I more explicitly include these processes in the framework of a world systems view. Support for such a world-systems approach is made even more pertinent if we agree that, “globalization is not just a current thing but has been going on for centuries or, in some views, millennia” (Hall, 2002a:6). Indeed, Chase-Dunn (1999) observes that intercontinental economic integration (‘economic globalization’) has been a long-term trend since the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. Arrighi (1999:199; see also Hirst and Thompson 1996) echoes this reevaluation of the notion of globalization as ‘recent’ by pointing out that “a world-encompassing economy sharing close to real-time information first came into existence not in the 1970s but the 1870s, when a system of submarine telegraph cables began to integrate financial and other major markets across the globe in a way not fundamentally different from today’s satellite-linked markets.”

Interestingly, some realist scholars also recognize that “Globalization is not new…Challenges to the authority of the state are not new… Transnational flows are not new” (Krasner 1994:13 quoted in Burch 2000:194). Instead, Krasner argues that these factors have always comprised the traditional Westphalian system. As Burch (2000:194) notes, “Krasner thus transforms the realist simile of states as billiard balls to states as whiffle balls, but most of the realist worldview endures.”

While Krasner may be correct, he misses the point. These factors may have been part of the traditional state system, however the degree of globalization, the volume of transnational flows (especially financial flows), and the resulting challenges to the authority of the state are new. Their increased relevance is seriously eroding the traditional realist explanation of the system, and actually serves as an argument for alternative explanations that hold more water than do “whiffle balls.”

B. Toward an Unidisciplinary Approach

The world-systems approach undermines the classical lines of division within social sciences, as it sets out to study the system as a dynamic whole, eschewing the division of the world into individual groups or organizations. As Wallerstein (1974:11, emphasis added) notes:

Anthropology, economics, political science, sociology—and history—are divisions of the discipline anchored in a certain liberal conception of the state and its relation to functional and geographical sectors of the social order. They make a certain limited sense if the focus of one’s study is organizations. They make none at all if the focus is the social system.

Instead of a ‘multidisciplinary’ approach, the study of a social system requires a ‘unidisciplinary’ approach. World-systems theory adapts this unidisciplinary outlook and provides an interactive and dynamic paradigm for understanding global history and political behavior in a context that is not explicitly state-centric. Wallerstein continues to rail against the contrived segmentation of the social sciences, arguing that they are in fact a single, unified field (Wallerstein 1991, 1998b, 1999). At the very least, it seems that a world-systems approach provides an invaluable lingua franca in a situation where academics often miss out on the ‘cross-pollination’ of ideas due to the tendency to talk past scholars in other disciplines (and often in their own).

While there is a recognized difficulty in applying world-systems theory in its entirety to pre-capitalist settings, it has been modified for such (Pailes and Whitecotton 1979; Schneider 1977; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991, 1997). This arena of research is especially fruitful for my purposes. By looking at a pre-capitalist system, and what happens when a pre-capitalist system and agents of a capitalist...
or ‘modern’ world-system meet, I can gain an understanding of the pre-capitalist societal interactions, but also an improved understanding of social and political ‘evolution’. It is this interaction between groups that has appealed to researchers in the field of sociology, as a world-systems approach appears to have ready application to the concept of social evolution. It is not a stretch to recognize the ready application to the realm of international politics. It is not a stretch to recognize the ready application to the realm of international politics. Hall (1999c:5, emphasis added) argues:

My claim can now be restated: a fundamental unit of social evolution is the world-system or core-periphery system. The claim is dialectic. The system itself evolves, and as it evolves it transforms its constituent members. Conversely, changes in constituent members collectively produce change in the overall system. To focus solely on the constituent members (conventional “societies”) is to miss a good deal of the action, and to fundamentally misunderstand social evolution. The converse is equally valid.

The processes of the system should be manifest throughout the system, even on the frontiers or peripheries. By studying these systemic processes on the periphery, they are more clearly perceived, as much of the ‘noise’ of the systemic core is absent. Thus, by understanding the frontier, we are able to understand the system as a dynamic whole.

IV. UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMIC EXPANSION

It is the desire to understand how the system itself evolves and expands that is at the heart of this work. Theories explaining the development of sovereign states and the sovereign territorial state system (STSS) provide a rich source for debate. Scholars argue that sovereign territorial states (STS) emerged because they were more ‘efficient’ than other political arrangements in the international system (Spruyt 1994, 2000), or because local elites opted for a new property rights “contract” (North 1981). Others take the approach that non-European polities were “quasi-states” that lacked the empirical political and economic capacity to emerge as fully functioning sovereign states in the international community (Jackson 1990), or that tribal societies “exploded from within” because they were unable to compete in the expanding Euro-centric system (Doyle 1986). On a systemic level, it is argued that STS emerged as a manifestation of a universal international society that began among European states and was gradually extended to non-European states “when they measured up to criteria of admission laid down by the founder members” (Bull 1984:113). An alternate explanation of expansion argues that interest groups may appropriate strategic concepts as an ideology, and then use it to promote expansion and colonization for “security” (Snyder 1991).

However, in a critique of this revisionist wave of literature as applied to West Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries, Warner (1999:235, emphasis added) argues:

[F]irst, that the ‘quasi-states’ present in these areas prior to colonization were stronger and more state-like, at least judged by conventional European standards, than is often acknowledged; second, that among their attributes was the ability (all-important according to this second wave of literature) to sustain and promote commerce; and third, that as a consequence, they did not collapse by virtue of their own ‘weakness’ but were deliberately destroyed by Western states acting at the behest of merchants and officials who sought not a general property rights regime capable of supporting commerce, but economic regimes that privileged their own commerce.

While not writing from a world-systems perspective, Warner’s case studies (1998, 1999) make obvious the economic underpinnings of socio-culturally motivated political decisions, which are manifested ultimately in military conflict. Local elites did not opt for new “contracts,” nor did tribal societies disintegrate, nor were they inefficient pseudo-states that were unable to compete with Europeans. Instead, in these cases it seems that the local polities were too efficient and competed too well with European trading interests. At least in this instance, private, economic interests, not state-level power-struggles or systemic supranational factors drive political change. This is in sharp contrast to the explanation of state formation and systemic expansion put forth by the scholars above, and other realist explanations like that of Snyder (1991). Krasner’s view that neorealism and neoliberalism are the “proper” ways to investigate global affairs seems equally questionable (1994:17, 1999:6, in Burch, 2000:183).

Other scholars echo Warner’s criticisms. Webb (1975) contends that state formation is based on an interaction of commercial and military factors, and Chase-Dunn (1981) maintains that the interstate system is more accurately portrayed as the political side of capitalism, not an autonomous system. Building on this, Arrighi (1994) argues for the need to pay greater attention to the institutions associated with the capital accumulation process, and how this is related to the emergence of global powers (Arrighi and Silver 1999). Therefore, to understand the system we must reject any artificial differentiation of social, economic, or political spheres (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1993, 1997; Wallerstein 1974, 1991, 1998b). Some scholars, myself included, contend that we must study social interactions before states insert their power structures, if we are to recognize initial political and social changes (Hall 1987, 1989).

While there may be a certain degree of ‘intellectual’ opposition to a world-systems approach within the field of political science because of its Marxist
roots, it is not a serious problem. First, a considerable amount of opposition to neo-Marxist approaches is simply a visceral reaction based on the linking of all Marxist theory to the ideological aspects of the Cold War. This is in no way a practical application or critique of Marxism qua theory. Rather, it is more accurately what Derrida (1994:87) refers to as the “spirit of Marxism” that continues to “haunt” the neo-liberal hegemonic discourse. By stridently disavowing these neo-Marxist ghosts, the hegemonic discourse not only confirms the ‘haunting,’ but also betrays a concern with the specter of communism yet to come.

As a related point, the issues centrally related to the world-systems outlook—such as global inequality—are growing in importance in the international political environment. It makes sense to utilize a body of theory that already deals with issues like polarization, instead of trying to retrofit a diametrically opposite theoretical approach. Finally, simply put: in certain important respects Marx was right. Developed nations are shifting policy and values (e.g. Inglehart 1997) to include what are “socially conscious” positions, albeit within a capitalist framework. This is not to say that the European model of a full-blown ‘welfare state’ is what the future holds. Rather, it seems that states will be increasingly responsible for dealing with issues produced by social inequality, but that these issues will be created within an internationally-responsive (as opposed to domestically-responsive) market system.

Shannon (1996) also relates the relevance of the world-systems approach to imperialism (see also McGowan and Kordan 1981; Arrighi 1978), its roots in the Annales school of French historical thought à la Fernand Braudel (1977, 1981, 1982, 1984) and the outgrowth of world systems theory from the dependency approach to development and politics in the periphery. In fact, it is hard to consider any approach to either political economy or cyclical behavior (e.g. “long cycles,” cycles of war, Kondratieff waves, cycles of hegemony) that does not have relevant ties to the world-systems outlook. Hall (2000a:6) notes that the dialectic nature of world-systems analysis exhibits several trends with embedded continuing cycles, ‘somewhat akin to the wire that holds spiral notebooks together.’ These trends are ever-present themes in international relations: commodification, proletarianization, state formation, increasing size of enterprises, capital intensification, and globalization.

Understanding the incorporation process is the linchpin to understanding these systemic dynamics of expansion and dominance. A world-systems approach provides the framework for a more complete and intellectually satisfying explanation of how the international system expands. A world-systems approach allows one to address not only traditional political aspects, but also economic and socio-cultural factors of systemic expansion.

V. THE WORLD-SYSTEM & INCORPORATION: ORIENTING CONCEPTS

Many scholars have extended the world-system beyond the temporal scope originally proposed by Wallerstein (1974). Janet Abu-Lughod (1989, 1993; see also Fitzpatrick 1992) argues that the modern world-system may be traced back to the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and is a result of the withdrawal of the East, rather than the rise of the West. Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills (1993; see also Frank 1990, 1999; Gills and Frank 1991) push the temporal boundary, echoing Abu-Lughod’s claim but proposing a 5,000-year-old system. Chase-Dunn and Hall one-up Frank and Gills by attempting to extend world-systems theory some 10,000 years into the past—to the Neolithic revolution—though they admittedly have had to “stretch some concepts considerably” (Hall, 1999c:7). The world system approach is also being used to study long-term social change in more ‘recent’ historical eras, though still well before the emergence of Wallerstein’s ‘modern’ world-system (Denemark, et al. 2000).

While these works provide good source material for understanding pre-capitalist and emerging capitalist societies in the world-system, I will operate more explicitly within the chronological frame of Wallerstein’s world-systems work. This is not to say that the insight gained from this work on pre-capitalist settings has no relevance to my work. Quite to the contrary. By using these findings, I will further the understanding of the initial interactions that take place between agents of capitalist societies and other (possibly pre-capitalist) societies in an effort to more accurately theorize the incorporation and state-formation processes. With this in mind, I will turn my attention to the modern world-system as described by Wallerstein.

Wallerstein (1974:15) identifies the “modern” world-system as arising in the “long sixteenth century” (ca. 1450–1620), with the emergence of a “European world-economy.” He describes this new social system as:

...an economic but not a political entity, unlike empires, city-states and nation-states. In fact, it precisely encompasses within its bounds (it is hard to speak of boundaries) empires, city-states, and the emerging “nation-states.” It is a “world” system, not because it encompasses the whole world, but because it is larger than any juridically-defined political unit. And it is a
"world-economy" because the basic linkage between the parts of the system is economic, although this was reinforced by cultural links and eventually, as we shall see, by political arrangements and even confederal structures.

Wallerstein later backs off this strict characterization of the world-system after being criticized as being overly "economistic" (Skocpol 1977; Garst 1985). Yet this still provides insight into his initial conceptualization and offers a good understanding of the interrelated arenas within the system: economic, cultural/social, and political. These different arenas may be used to examine the potential incorporation of external venues. The most basic elements of the system are economic linkages, which are related reciprocally to socio-cultural factors, which in turn are supported by political arrangements. I use this delineation to analyze the processes of the "peripheralization"—or more accurately the "incorporation"—of formerly external regions.

Other scholars have used a similar approach. Alvin Y. So (1984, 1986) discusses the incorporation of China in the nineteenth century, and separates the incorporation process into economic and political indices. He notes that the two usually occur together, but does question the characterization of an area if there is a certain degree of one without the other. Similarly, P. Nick Kardulias (1990) examines the economic and social impact that the fur trade—as one segment of a world-system—had on Indian cultures. I will merge these approaches and use all three indices. This is similar to the approach of Gills and Frank (1991:67), who based their study "like a three legged stool, on economic, political, and cultural analysis." This will allow me to examine the differential and reciprocal rates of incorporation among the three "legs," and to explore any broader implications this may hold for the consideration of the external arena.

Peregrine (1992, 1999) uses a three-pronged approach in his study of the social reproduction of rise and decline in prehistoric worlds. The model he uses is adapted from that of Habermas (1973) and provides a good initial conceptualization of how these three indices may very easily be seen as interrelated and interactive.

From this model, one is able to see how the economic system of interaction overlays the local political system, which then has a feedback loop through the sociocultural system. Peregrine then revises Habermas's diagram to give emphasis to social reproduction (see Figure 2).

So, how would Wallerstein react to this type of approach? Since he places great emphasis on the need for a 'unidisciplinary' approach to studying the social sciences, it is natural to assume that his opinion would not be favorable. Indeed,
he is of the opinion that, “One ideological product of this system ... has been the dubious epistemological tenet that there exist three different and empirically separable realm of human activity—the economic, the political, and the social and/or cultural—that are in effect subsystems with autonomous logics and/or sets of actors and/or motivations” (1991b:38). Let me say now and for the duration of this work: I agree with this position. I do not advocate treating these indices as unique, compartmentalized fields and will strive to treat them as interrelated and reciprocal systems of behavior founded on choices of individual actors. My design in dividing these indices is a heuristic tool meant to more easily identify particularized characteristics of the system that may otherwise be lost in the system writ large. By their very nature, these three categories of activity (economy, polity, society) are all part of a larger whole, and to understand one we must understand the others.

A. Why Incorporation? The Process Driving Expansion

Why should I examine “incorporation” as a worthwhile concept in international relations? Simply put, if I am to understand the expansion of the international system, I must understand the process of that expansion. Examining how a region is incorporated, and how actors in the system absorb that region, breaks down the process of expansion. Accordingly, I briefly outline some key concepts inherent in the idea of an expanding international system.

1. The Role of Multiculturality

The concept of multiculturality implies that the economic and socio-political linkages in question need to occur between groups that consist of culturally distinct societies. This indicates differences in language, religion, normative institutions, mode of governance, and various other fundamental characteristics of everyday life. How are these differences reconciled? What happens when these societies interact? For Wallerstein, an important structural distinction arises from this requirement of multicultural exchange. Like Polanyi (1944), Wallerstein identifies three historical modes of production: mini-systems, world-empires, and world-economies.6

World-empires are two or more culturally distinct groups integrated by the forcible accumulation of surplus (‘tribute’; thus referred to as the ‘tributary mode’ of accumulation) organized around a single political center.7 In contrast, world-

6. Chase-Dunn and Mann (1998) is an example of work that actually addresses ‘mini-systems’.

7. There is a fourth division of labor that Wallerstein feels is on the horizon: a socialist world government. His more recent works (1991b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) are concerned with the perceived upcoming transition to this mode.

8. Eric Wolf (1982) uses these distinctions as well.

9. It is evident that Wallerstein has a dualistic conception of states. When he refers to “states” in general, he is plainly referring to whatever administrative polity or political structures are responsible for government in the external arena. However, this general conception is not what is meant when he refers to “states within the system”. Here he obviously means European-style states. This means that empire-states and other systems of socio-economic linkages are by definition not part of the system until the political arena has become “Europeanized”, or operates as a proxy for European state powers (e.g. colonial administration). While not writing from a world-systems view, Spruyt (2000: 68-9; 1994) echoes this perspective: “one might argue that the current script in the international system legitimates only sovereign territorial states as actors of that society. Other actors are excluded.”

8. Wallerstein asserts that:

Incorporation into the world-economy means necessarily the insertion of the political structures into the interstate system. This means that the “states” which already exist in these areas must either transform themselves into “states within the interstate system” or be replaced by new political structures which take this form or be absorbed by other states already within the interstate system. (1989:170)

Incorporation reflects the very essence of what is international politics. Several aspects of the incorporation process related to state development need to be elucidated.9

While polities other than traditional European states plainly have existed—either as empires, kingdoms, city-states, or as more traditional kin-based tributary polities—only those that are sufficiently similar to the European model of the sovereign territorial state or are transformed to this model (either internally or by external, usually European interests) are able to enter the system (e.g. Japan
after 1866).\textsuperscript{10} Otherwise, extant polities that already fit this model of the “state” and are already part of the European world-system assimilate them. For example, Meyer et al. (1997) discuss requirements of being a modern state, and describe the pervasive nature of these characteristics by the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Warner (1998, 1999) offers examples of two West African polities that were fully functioning and competitive with the regional agents of core powers and were actively sabotaged by European powers for economic advantage. One can see that this process of converting to ‘state-ness’ is an integral part of peripheralization.

This indicates that the actual process of ‘incorporation’ starts much earlier than previously held, since trade-induced political evolution is a necessary first step toward full incorporation. Therefore, it seems likely that the actual process of incorporation may begin with the initiation of contact between two distinct regions, assuming one is already part of the system. More importantly, Warner’s cases indicate that the primary function behind the expansion of the system is economic. While realists would argue that the security of a region is an important motive (Snyder 1991), this presupposes an initial source of cross-cultural contact that needs to be secured, or that at the very least a certain amount of knowledge needs to be exchanged in order to perceive a threat to drive these larger security concerns.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, the initial contact must be based on other (most likely economic) factors.

What is the nature of this economic contact? Do private companies acting in ‘state-esque’ capacities of legitimated authority drive it, or is it genuinely driven by geo-political power interests? Regardless, this economic function ultimately provides the incentive for domestic European political action to support possible military intervention, which is then used to implement a more favorable political regime in the region being incorporated. This still neglects those areas and polities that are external to these trade linkages. How do they become relevant?

\textsuperscript{10} Though for Bull’s conception of ‘international society’, Japan was not considered ‘evolved’ or ‘civilized’ enough to join international society until around 1900.

\textsuperscript{11} Similarly, Hall (1989) argues that a major reason for the colonization of New Mexico, and later recolonization after the Pueblo Revolt in 1680, was for pre-emptive purposes. This served to protect the silver mines of Mexico and the frontier of New Spain. While this could be interpreted as a security concern (especially for realists), I take the position that the security concern is driven by economic factors (e.g., silver mines). In any case, this points out the tremendous difficulty inherent in trying to delineate between political, economic, and social arenas, which is part of my argument for a world-systems approach in the first place.

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2. \textit{The Role of Bulk vs. Prestige Goods}

In addition to implications of political and cultural differentiation, the issue of whether or not trade goods need to be “necessities” for an area to be considered part of the system is relevant for our understanding of incorporation. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993:854) note that Wallerstein “originally defined necessities in terms of food and raw materials that are necessary for everyday life. Subsequently he has also included bullion and ‘protection.’” Lane (1979) reaffirms this need to include ‘protection rents’ as a sign of incorporation, as it is an important political tool responsible for considerable historic transfers of wealth. Structured trade between recognized polities is not enough to be considered part of the world-system as described by Wallerstein. The specific kind of interconnectedness becomes relevant to whether or not a particular arena is internal or external to the system. Otherwise, Wallerstein considers “non-essential” trade to be “preciosities,” or exchange of prestige goods, which do not produce important systemic effects and therefore does not indicate inclusion in the world-system.\textsuperscript{12}

It is apparent that some involvement and process had to occur prior to the ‘emergence’ of any trade in bulk, but this era prior to bulk-trade is largely ignored in the current political science literature. Elsewhere, more attention has been paid to the role luxury goods play (Schneider 1977; Feinman 1999; Peregrine 1992, 2000). Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993:855) argue “prestige-goods economies constitute systemic networks because the ability of local leaders to monopolize the supply of these goods is often an important source of stability and change in local power structures.” It is not unreasonable to presume that these networks could then have important systemic effects. (see Figure 3)

While a crude conception, if this is at all accurate important social, political, and economic changes occur well before an area is considered “incorporated” into the world-system.

\textsuperscript{12} I use the terms ‘bulk goods’ and ‘necessities’ interchangeably. Similarly, ‘luxury goods,’ ‘preciosities,’ and ‘prestige goods’ are similarly interchangeable.
While it is fairly obvious how contact between two societies can have immediate socio-cultural impact (e.g. introduction of disease, transfer of new technology, new supply of precious resources, mere ‘awareness of other,’ questions of identity), it may not be quite so clear as to how luxury trade then impacts the political, and ultimately economic, arenas. To help with this, I refer back to Perigrine (1999:40), although Perigrine’s ‘prestige system’ is somewhat different from a prestige-goods trading system. For him, a ‘prestige system’ represents the myriad of ways in which prestige is accrued and maintained in the society. It includes knowledge, rituals, and symbols that convey and display status (1999:39). I do expect, however, that the interaction among the indices is similar in a strictly trade-related system.

This introduces two additional points for consideration. First, can we treat ‘knowledge’ as a luxury good? Dealing with information networks and exchange of knowledge is one area of world-systems theory that needs to be expanded upon, so this will likely prove fruitful. Second, what roles do symbols and rituals associated with ‘prestige’ play in the arenas of change that result after the initiation of trade? Peregrine (2000) raises the question of whether or not the exchange of information or ritual can create systemic interdependence. These are prime points to consider when identifying cultural and social change, and they should become good measures of cultural and social incorporation.

3. Broadening the System: Gathering, Craft Specialization, and Organized Production

Another key orienting concept of the world-system has to do with how goods and wealth are accumulated. For Wallerstein, a key ‘tipping-point’ for whether or not a region is part of the world-system depends on the organization of economic activity (division of labor) in a region—or “zone”—at a given time. This is at the heart of his conceptions of “external arena,” “incorporation” and “peripheralization.” Wallerstein (1989:129–30, emphasis added) clarifies:

The question we are dealing with now is the nature of the process by which a zone which was at one point in time in the external arena of the world-economy came to be, at a later point in time, in the periphery of that same world-economy. We think of this transition as a period of medium duration and we denominate it the period of “incorporation.” Hence, the model we are using involves three successive moments for a “zone”—being in the external arena, being incorporated, and being peripheralized. None of these moments is static; all of them involve processes.

Regarding the difference between incorporation and peripheralization, Wallerstein continues:

And here we must make a distinction between the moment (however long) of “incorporation” and the subsequent moment of “peripheralization.” If an analogy may be permitted, incorporation involves “hooking” the zone in the orbit of the world-economy in such a way that it virtually can no longer escape, while peripheralization involves a continuing transformation of the ministructures of the area in ways that are sometimes referred to as the deepening of capitalist development (1989:130).

Indeed, since this “moment” of incorporation may run well over 100 years (e.g. West Africa, ca. 1750–1880; pg. 189), we may more easily view incorporation as a period of “broadening” capitalist development. Since the drive to broaden and deepen the system is inherent in the functioning of capitalism, an area carrying on any trade-based relationship with Europe may be considered effectively “hooked,” as incorporation into the system is tacitly inevitable. Quite simply, incorporation may be viewed as the continued broadening of the world-system, while peripheralization is the deepening of the world-system.

Regarding modes of production, “incorporation” is taken to mean that “at least some significant production processes in a given geographic location become integral to various of the commodity chains that constitute the ongoing dividing of labor of the capitalist world-economy” (Wallerstein 1989:130). The notion of commodity chains is crucial for Wallerstein, and is meant “to describe the production of goods as they move from raw to cooked, slave-cultivated cotton becoming Manchester textiles, peasant-grown Columbian coffee becoming Detroit labor power, and so on” (Goldfrank 2000:168–9; see also Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). A process is “integral” if “its production responds in some sense to the ever-changing ‘market-conditions’ of this world-economy (whatever the source of these changes) in terms of efforts by those who control these production processes to maximize the accumulation of capital within this market—if not in the very short run, at least in some reasonable middle run” (Wallerstein 1989:130, parenthetical reference in original). So, capital accumulation coupled with market responsiveness are the hallmarks of when a process (commodity chain) is considered “integral to” the world-economy, and a particular arena thus officially incorporated.

Additionally, Hall (2000b) argues contra Wallerstein that ‘regularized plunder’ also has important incorporating effects, though Wallerstein maintains the need to be linked to integrated chains of production. Potentially, this should serve as a measuring point along the spectrum of processes of incorporation.
This raises an interesting differentiation of “gathering” vs. “producing.” In relation to African incorporation, Wallerstein remarks: “This assumes, which may not be incorrect, that the infrastructural base of ‘gathering’ as opposed to ‘producing’ is much thinner and that, therefore, the costs of expansion and contraction of the quantity of gathering activities is significantly less than that involved in productive activities” (1989:133). It would seem, then, that “gathering” processes would be more responsive to market conditions than “productive” processes, if only because they have less associated infrastructure and entry cost. The question of just when organized gathering transposes into production becomes more relevant. As a partial answer, it is worthwhile to borrow the anthropological concept of a “specialized activity.”

The idea of “specialized activity” requires development. Kardulias (1990:25) observes that craft specialization is often treated as an indication of cultural complexity that develops in response to a variety of influences, including “economic emoluments offered by the European market.” Specialized production can be defined as: “non-subistence activity which is performed by a particular or restricted number of households within a community; the individuals in such households then exchange their products or services for foodstuffs and items produced by other specialists” (1990:32). However, when contact is between societies at different levels of development, the group operating at a more advanced level may be able to offer extra incentives or previously unavailable goods. So, new contact may serve to induce new specialization, or increased levels of existing specialization. The key to the concept of craft specialization is that “the specialist offers some product or service which is his/her particular domain, due to particular skills, knowledge, or aptitudes” (1990:32).

Two traits are generally present in regions engaging in specialization. First, there should be restricted access to the resource area in order to regulate production, distribution and consumption of the particularized commodity. Second, a need for efficiency must be present, which is often provided by the profit motive in a commercialized system (Kardulias 1990:31). In essence, there needs to be a motivation for the specialization, which is usually trade-related when dealing with issues of capitalist incorporation. Additionally, one can use the concept of craft specialization as a midpoint in the discussion of mode of production, situating this ‘specialized activity’ between the very basic accumulation strategy of ‘gathering’ and that of full-scale ‘production.’ In doing so, a greater ability to distinguish between types of economic activity is achieved, and one should be able to use this to trace relevant impacts along other arenas of incorporation.

4. Spatial Boundaries: From Core to ‘Zone of Ignorance’

The process of incorporation plays a crucial role in the definition of external arena. Not only is this arena undergoing incorporation seen as ‘not internal’ and yet ‘not quite external,’ but as “a given zone is incorporated into the world-economy, this often led to an adjacent further zone being pulled into the external arena. It is though there were an outward ripple of expansion” (Wallerstein 1989:167, emphasis added). This delineation is relevant, because as Wallerstein observes, “As a zone became incorporated into the world-economy, its transfrontier trade became ‘internal’ to the world-economy and no longer something ‘external’ to it” (1989:171). Although this occurs at the tail-end of the incorporation process (and consequently the beginning of peripheralization), it serves as yet another additional reason to clarify the overall process and the spatial concepts associated with it.

This indicates that there is some sort of ‘supra-external’ arena that is defined by the capitalist world economy and exists as what is essentially a “zone of ignorance.” This raises interesting definitional considerations for what is really an external arena and what is not. One is literally talking about the known universe at any single point in history, and that is not known. Additionally, this indicates that instead of a three-tiered working definition of the world-system (core, semi-periphery, periphery), there are actually six tiers (core, semi-periphery, periphery, incorporating zone, external arena, zone of ignorance).

Wallerstein identifies an external arena in relation to the capitalist world-economy as a “zone from which the capitalist world-economy wanted goods but which was resistant (perhaps culturally) to importing manufactured goods in return and strong enough politically to maintain its preferences” (1989:167). China and Japan in the eighteenth century both serve as examples. Presumably, the relevant governing agents in any zone bordering the expanding capitalist world-economy have three potential paths: (1) they can be strong enough to maintain their preferences and not choose incorporation, (2) they can be strong enough to maintain their preferences yet choose incorporation, or (3) they can be too weak to maintain their own preferences. In the latter case, the zone is pre-

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14. “The spice trade in the South Pacific serves as a good example of the difference between gathering and producing. Originally, spices were gathered by locals and sold to the Dutch (and others). This was the status quo until the latter half of the 19th century when the Dutch took the extra step of establishing plantations for the production of spices (e.g. nutmeg).

15. I use the terms “craft specialization,” specialized activity” and “specialized production” interchangeably.

16. This activity also roughly corresponds to the historical emergence of craft guilds in Medieval Europe, prior to the emergence of full capitalist activity in the long sixteenth-century. (See Smith, 1991).
From the known universe of a system. This is of comparable size, but not coincident with, the information network. The third bounding mechanism is the boundary of political/military interaction [PMN]. The fourth, and most narrow, consists of the flow of bulk goods, and makes up the bulk goods exchange network [BGN]. Obviously, this directly corresponds to Wallerstein’s effective world-system. Typically, these four networks are “nested” within one another [See Figure 1.4]. While Wallerstein’s world-system lies at the center, the answers to many of my questions are likely in the more “external” networks.

5. Frontiers

Wallerstein never explicitly deals with the concept of frontiers, other than to note that they are formed and transformed when new areas are absorbed into an expanding world-system. Otherwise, he only addresses the issue of transfrontier trade briefly in his explanation of incorporation (1989:128–189). How are frontiers formed and transformed? What do we mean when activity (e.g., trade, information exchange) is ‘transfrontier’? The idea of a frontier is part and parcel of incorporation.

Hall (1986, 1999c, 2000b) offers more clarification on the issue of ‘frontiers’ as implicit in the process of incorporation and how they relate to other bounding mechanisms. From a working definition, Hall (2000b:241) offers that a frontier is “a region or zone where two or more distinct cultures, societies, ethnic groups, or modes of production come into contact.” Like a membrane—an image Hall borrows from Slatta (1998)—a frontier’s permeability varies with the direction and type of things (information, goods, people) moving through it. While Wallerstein posits that the incorporation process is always driven from the center outward, the image of a membrane allows one to recognize that influences on this process can (and often do) flow from the area being absorbed toward the center. The question becomes one of understanding how much influence these
Frontiers are, in essence, the zone just beyond the “state.” Frontiers are the region just past the contrived political markings of ‘borders.’ This is where the rules of the system are laid bare, and where anything goes.

B. Building a Model of Incorporation

To appropriately understand the expansion of the modern ‘state’ system one must examine the actual process of this expansion, and this is reflected in the incorporation of new regions, polities, and cultures. Regarding the nature of incorporation, Hall observes that, “[v]ast disruptions of social, economic and political processes accompany the expansion of states, whether the expansion is based on accumulation of capital or plunder” (1986:397–8). This supports the argument that significant change occurs before the point scholars traditionally assign as the start of incorporation. Indeed, Hall maintains that the very conception of incorporation is problematic: “(a) with respect to incorporating state or system; (b) with respect to types of incorporated groups; (c) with respect to both timing and degree of incorporation; and (d) with respect to a variety of factors that can affect the process” (1986:398; see also 1999c, 2000b). Obviously, refinement of the concept of ‘incorporation’ is needed!

What can be said about the process of incorporation and what can be offered to refine its conceptualization? To begin with, there are two separate, yet related, aspects involved with the incorporation and eventual peripheralization of an external region into the world-system. First, we need to recognize that overall we are talking about a series of ongoing processes, which may be divided into separate phases. Second, against this background of ongoing process, a zone will nominally pass through—or experience—different ‘states of being’ or conditions within that process. This will necessarily depend on the degree of involvement with the world system, as well as the impact of case-specific factors.

1. The Processes

Something, some process, is involved in the ‘hooking’ of an arena into the external (and ultimately internal) domain. Accordingly, I conceive of three sub-processes in the larger incorporation process. First, a ‘zone of ignorance,’ or mythic domain, largely unexplored and unknown to the current members of the world-system is contacted; here the ‘grooming’ process of conditioning the area toward capitalist exchange and production is initiated. This may be the process in which most social and behavioral change takes place. In particular I am interested in examining the way in which organized production develops, and the notion of ‘craft specialization’ will prove instrumental in exploring this. As a related topic, I am also interested in how the consumerism central to capitalism is introduced or developed. To explore this notion I borrow the notion of ‘induced wants’ from Sklair (1991:131), who also observes that Marcuse (1964) talks about ‘false needs’ in a similar context.

The next procedural phase is one of incorporation, whereby an external area’s contact and involvement with the world-system is developed, ultimately producing ‘nominal incorporation,’ building toward ‘effective incorporation.’ Here the processes that began during the grooming process become more developed and socially pervasive. Once the incorporation process is well advanced, the process of ‘peripheralization’ may be seen as taking over. Within this, an effectively incorporated arena may be conceived as moving into the actual periphery of the world-system, and ultimately may proceed into the semiperiphery. Beyond this, it seems like additional refinement may be needed to understand the processes behind transition from one ‘level’ to another within the world-system, but that is not my concern at this time, as this has been more fully explored by Wallerstein and others.

2. The States of Being

Against the background of procedural change that occurs over time, a geographic region may be contextually fixed in various ‘states of being’ depending on the specific historic time-period under examination. As such, it would be nice to be able to examine a ‘snapshot’ of a given region at a particular time in question. Since the “patterns that we see on a map are actually freeze-frame snapshots of complex processes of incorporation” (Hall 1999c:11), it makes sense to take this one step further and actually use historically contemporary maps to ‘operationalize’ the different phases of incorporation. Furthermore, from a methodological standpoint there is a growing body of literature evaluating ‘maps as text.’

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17. Of course, we can conceive of the world system in general as an ongoing process, with a multitude of nested processes. For example, see Modelski (2000).

18. It has been historically possible to become ‘peripheralized’ directly into the semiperiphery. The United States entered the system in the semiperiphery, as did Japan and (arguably) Russia.

19. While I am not doing this in this particular work, future case study research will use this operationalization in context of the model developed here.

20. For an introduction to this use and its accompanying rhetoric, see Wood and Fels (1992). Mitchell (1999) also provides a specific example of how this may be carried out. Mitchell says that “we must remember that the map is a picture, that every picture tells a story, and that every story makes part of the text” (1999: 41), and that “Like any story,
Evaluating maps made during incorporation is essentially a method of reading the text of the process, and should provide the ability to clarify the different ‘states of being’ within the overall process.

For example, some regions may exist beyond the bounds of what is considered the external arena. While these regions may have trade links, social links, or geographic proximity to regions considered external, they may not be ‘known’ to members of the world-system (e.g., pre-Columbian America, interior Africa). Thus, these regions exist in only a mythic sense beyond the boundary of the information network, or in what I have termed a ‘zone of ignorance’ (outside the information network). This zone would not appear on the maps of the members of the world-system, and is characterized by the ‘Cave, Hic Dragones’ approach to mapmaking.

The next state of being (toward increased involvement with the world-system) is the state of being in the external arena. Here a region is known to the members of the world-system, but is not in any significant way productively involved with it (being in the information network). Here, the system members know of a region and can place its name roughly on a map, but it will not reflect any geographic accuracy and is commingled with regions that only exist in myth.

Eventually some type of priming, luxury trade develops. Trade increases. This includes prestige goods, along with an increase of information exchange and cultural pollution. The region is still considered in the external arena (being in the prestige goods network). Maps will begin to reflect a region, but lack significant detail. Outlines of continents should be fairly accurate, but little knowledge of internal features will be evident.

As involvement increases and economic linkages develop with the world-system, a region may be seen as having moved into a state of being nominally incorporated (being in the political-military network). Maps will have some detail of major cities and geographic features, but still be incomplete, missing major features beyond the areas central to network interactions.

This develops into a state of being effectively incorporated, whereby a given region enters the periphery (being in the bulk goods network). Here, there should be complete detail on maps, as the region is now part of the system. Beyond this, a region may develop out of the peripheralization process into a state of being semi-peripheral. And, as I have mentioned, addressing processes involved beyond incorporation is not my immediate concern.

maps are propaganda, but maps have the full weight of science behind them, and this obscures our sight of the pervasive nature of maps” (40-41).

To clarify, I conceive of this dual-natured typography in Figure 5.

It should be recognized that this typography is merely a heuristic tool for visualizing what may be relevant characteristics of the larger processes associated with incorporation into the world-system. Keep in mind, these processes are in no way discrete. Instead, they segue into one another, which means that the transition between phases is likely “fuzzy.” Along this same line of consideration, the transition between states of being is likely to be similarly indistinct, even though the kernel of each may be readily distinguished. It is to be expected that at different points in the processes, or in different states of being, particular emphasis on socio-cultural, political, or economic factors may be more relevant than for others. This should allow both a refinement of world-systems theory, as well as a better practical application of the theory to particular periods of systemic expansion.

Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997:63) use a similar organizational tool in an effort to break apart the processes of incorporation. This is an invaluable reference for deciphering the various verbiage different scholars have used for aspects of the incorporation process. By using Wallerstein’s terms as a baseline reference, one can correlate the various terms discussed.

It is important to add a caveat to the use of this diagram. While I argue that regions pass through various states of being, one should not take this to mean that I endorse the conversion of these states into linear stages or some predestined, lockstep evolutionary process. I am talking about zones within a social system, and a given zone may rapidly transition from one state of being to another, without necessarily ‘existing’ in an intermediary state of being. Certainly these zones may embody distinct geographic areas, but they more relevantly capture the notion of social, economic, cultural, and political interactions that are happening in a given area (the system of interactions).

This is especially relevant if one is examining the incorporation of settings that may be categorized as pre-capitalist, and necessitates the following refinements:

First, incorporation is not unidimensional, but multidimensional along the four types of world-system boundaries. Incorporation can be economic (for
either bulk goods or luxury goods), political/military, or socio-cultural, which includes all types of information and symbols; second, incorporation creates multiple frontiers, corresponding to each of the boundaries; third, \textit{ceteris paribus}, incorporation will begin at the furthest boundaries, (cultural, symbolic, informational, or luxury goods) and proceed to narrower, more intense forms along the political-military boundary, and finally along the bulk goods dimension; and fourth, relations among the dimensions of incorporation and the resulting frontiers is complex theoretically and empirically. (Hall 1999a:444).

In addition to these needed refinements, it is important to note that incorporation takes place at different rates and to differing extent for various members of the system. To clarify, a region may exist only in the information network of one system member, yet be involved in the trade of luxury (or perhaps even bulk) goods with another member of the same system. Taken with the recognition of the multiple frontiers involved, it is no understatement to argue that incorporation is a complex phenomenon.

3. Discussion of Comparative Cases

As a basis for examining the related concepts of “external arena” and “incorporation,” what Alexander George (1979) refers to as a structured, focused comparison seems most promising as a method of investigation, or as a way in which to study these issues empirically.\textsuperscript{22} To examine the actual process of incorporation, one can individually trace relevant ‘markers’ over any time period in question. These markers may be degree of political autonomy, type and volume of trade carried on with the system and the core specifically, or alterations in traditional social or cultural behavior. Additionally, some type of “pre-contact” baseline for these factors should be laid out, so that any change may then be studied in relation to the change in type of interaction with the system. While it is recognized that these processes are inter-related and reciprocal, by addressing them as separate facets, one is able to develop a clearer understanding of the incorporation process as a dynamic whole.

With an eye toward theory building, a careful comparison of cases of incorporation is likely to be beneficial. In selecting my own sample cases, particular attention is given to trade networks along coastal areas, largely due to the patterns of European trade expansion. Additionally, I am concerned with regions that have had no ‘polluting’ contact with the European world-system in order to get a ‘cleaner’ picture of the incorporation process. Specifically, sample cases are:

\textbullet\ The Nootka Indians of the northwest American coast and the fur trade.
\textbullet\ The Asante Kingdom of West Africa and the emergence of the slave trade.
\textbullet\ Abyssinia/Ethiopia and its independence from, yet relation with, the trans-Arab trade.

\textsuperscript{21} While I am not carrying out a comparative case study here, my current research centers upon doing exactly that (in context of this model). So, this discussion is also laying the foundation of what to expect.\textsuperscript{22} See also George and Bennett (2002, \textit{forthcoming}) for a description of how case studies contribute to theory development.\textsuperscript{23} These are only the case studies I plan on carrying out in the near future. A multitude of others are possible, including the pre-Columbian civilizations of meso-America, Hawaii and other Polynesian kingdoms, other instances of African incorporation, and even further study on how systems incorporate one another. Here, the absorption of the Ottoman Empire looks like an intriguing research venue.
• Japan and its ability to (temporarily) resist encroachment of Western trade.

Each case has been chosen in the hopes that it will provide some answers to other fundamental questions involved in the incorporation process. Each of the first three should provide some clues to the differentiation between mere gathering and formalized production, as well as variation between non-state and state-like political entities. The case of the fur trade raises questions surrounding the role of luxury goods in the incorporation process, and provides an example of a ‘pristine’ pre-European contact and pre-capitalist setting.

The second case, the slave trade on the western coast of Africa, gives the interesting situation where the ‘good’ being traded is labor. This poses an intriguing question for the consideration of an area as incorporated or not: Is an area linked into the production cycle if it is the source of labor that is used elsewhere, which is part of the formalized production network? More basically, one may argue that more than just labor is being extracted. In essence, wealth is being plundered in that all the human and real capital involved in producing adults (and their own future productive capacity) is removed. Additionally, since the local polities were (presumably) more ‘developed’ than on the northwest coast of America, one should get differentiation along the spectrum of incorporation and its effects. Finally, taken in conjunction with Warner’s work, looking at the Asante Kingdom in particular should offer additional insight into political interaction on the frontier of the expanding world-system and state development.

The third case will be an examination of the incorporation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). It is potentially interesting because as a region, it was eventually linked to the emergent world-system through a considerable amount of trade, but maintained its political independence well into the twentieth century. It also is a classic example of a region existing on the boundary of the zone of ignorance and the external arena for a considerable amount of time. This will provide a nice case of a region that effectively ‘resisted’ colonial political domination while still maintaining trade ties with the system. Additionally, Abyssinia should provide a case of how non-European polities may resist being undermined (as was the case in West Africa) yet be increasingly recognized by European states within the system.

Finally, the case of Japan may be seen as the odd choice. But, quite simply, Japan serves as an example of how a region may join the system after having negotiated externality. Also, since it had prior linkages to the Chinese world-system, it should be worthwhile to examine the ability of an area to ‘reverse’ the incorporation process, in addition to the aforementioned ability to ‘resist’ political sublimation. Finally, Japan is also often used as a singular non-European case in much extant international politics literature (e.g. Bull 1984; Snyder 1991; Johnson 1993; Kupchan 1994), and will provide a touchstone for engaging these competing explanations.

4. Measures of Incorporation

When specifically analyzing the socio-cultural arena of incorporation, the development of structural change in the societies in question (due to their exposure to the “internal” area) should be evident. This may take the form of alteration of traditional lifestyles, coercion of labor, or other fundamental social change. Initially, this may include alteration of traditional patterns of movement, changes in gender roles, alteration of spiritual bases, or identity shifts. As one moves up the spectrum of incorporation, changes in classes and mode of production are likely indicators. If early change is present, then it seems likely that an argument for the initiation of incorporation may be strengthened. When looking at the political-military arena, whether or not political structural change has occurred (e.g. “state-building,” changes in laws, regime change, alteration of local power structures), or if some sort of formalized political relationship with the “internal” area has been instituted, may be relevant. If either of these changes are present, then again the argument for that society’s incorporation, and against its consideration as an external arena, would be strengthened. Finally, with regards to the economic facet of incorporation, the type and quantity of goods being exchanged, as well as how they are ‘produced,’ serve as measures of the process.

However, this still leaves the question of how to measure the various states of being at any given point during the overall incorporation process. To establish the timing of a respective case’s movement through the incorporation process (refer to Figure 1.5), historical maps serve as an important data source for establishing this timing. As mentioned, maps may be thought of as ‘freeze-frame snapshots’ of incorporation. When a region is in the zone of ignorance, it will not appear on the maps of system members. When a region is in the external arena (yet in the information network), the region’s name should appear on maps, but it will not be reflected with any geographic accuracy. As luxury trade develops and a region moves into the prestige goods network, accurate outlines of regions and continents should appear on maps, but little additional information will be apparent. As a region moves into the political-military network, maps will have major details correct, but will still lack complete information. As a region enters the periphery as part of the bulk goods network, more complete information should appear on system-members’ maps, as the region is effectively part of the system.

This avenue of investigation is appealing for several reasons. First, it offers the potential for a concrete examination of what would otherwise be theoretic posturing. One is able to ‘see’ historical processes in action, as opposed to just being able to hypothesize about them. Second, as information (and maps in
particular\textsuperscript{24} was jealously guarded during the time periods under investigation, using maps as an empirical measure will allow a way to track the transmission of information among system members. Third, this will in turn make it easier to distinguish just when various states knew what about a region on the frontier. Thus, one is able to distinguish the variable rates of incorporation among relevant actors in a region. Finally, this should be taken as a method to understand not just the important role information plays in the expansion of the system, but the incredible impact that lack of information has. Indeed, geographic ignorance or dis-information often was actively promoted as a tool of imperial expansion.

VI. CONCLUSION

Why the vast divergence between so called traditional “realist” theories of the international system and world-system theories of expansion? One possible answer lies in the very subject that is the central unit of analysis in the study of the world-system: the social system itself. Because the object of study is a “social” system, it is mandatory that such a system be recognized as historically constructed. By this, it is necessary to acknowledge that history—both as a record of events and as a prescription for future behavior—is primarily written by the “winners” of history’s conflicts. This conflict includes and is manifested in all aspects of social, political, and economic expansion and development. As such, it necessarily reflects the views, ideals, desires, and ‘needs’ of the winners. This particularized historical outlook serves not only as a source of legitimation for, but a reification of, the status quo.

By examining the broader aspects of the emergence and development of the modern world-system in this context, a richer understanding of history is provided. World-systems theory is even more relevant to the study of modern politics because it provides a ‘political program’ for the ‘losers’ of history; it provides a version of history that ‘losers’ might appropriate. By looking beyond the emphasis on the ‘state’ and ‘power’ relations, and by paying attention to the socially-driven economic motivations of actors below the state level, one is able to call into question not only the assumptions driving state-level activity, but the very theories derived from these assumptions. Thus, it is increasingly evident that the field of international relations is not just in crisis because of the end of the Cold War, but is facing a paradigmatic crisis as well. By undertaking a comparative case study such as this, questions regarding the ‘best’ way to go about studying international politics are raised. The traditional approaches to the study of international politics offer decreasingly satisfactory explanations, and it is time for a shift to a more beneficial research program. A globalist paradigm should be adopted, and the world-systems perspective provides an appealing and established research program through which this may be accomplished.

This model of incorporation should benefit the body of world-systems analysis in several ways. First, it offers a better understanding of the tremendous changes that occur before a region is traditionally considered part of the system. Thus, one can bridge the gap between much of the work done on non-state peoples and work centered upon states. Second, this model provides a clearer picture of the impact that external actors can have on the system and actors within the system. Related to this, one may recognize that external actors often have an ability to negotiate some terms of incorporation, and in some instances are able to negotiate externality. Fourth, this approach can also provide insight into the dynamics that drive the expansion of the system as a whole; it can parse out the more fundamental causes pushing the broadening of the capitalist system, which has application to current debates on globalization. To do this in a historic context, it is necessary to include additional concepts relating to “production” (e.g. craft specialization) and more clearly conceptualize the process of incorporation. Fifth, this model of incorporation tells a more complete story of how the system expands, which can then be compared to other explanations in various competing bodies of literature (e.g. realism, neorealism). Finally, the world-systems perspective is better positioned as a progressive research program (in the Lakatosian sense), and offers a more interdisciplinary approach to the study of global politics than is currently available. Many scholars give voice to the need to utilize such an interdisciplinary approach to studying international relations yet ignore viable options. Hopefully, this framework takes a step toward remedying this shortcoming in the international relations literature.

\textsuperscript{24} While there was an active trade in charts and maps in Europe, this trade dealt mainly with decorative wall-maps or charts for public consumption (See Koeman, 1980). Portugal and Spain (and later Britain) established chart-making offices that developed charts specifically for their own navy’s exclusive use. Mitchell (1999: 25) summarizes in context of the exploration of the New World: “Spain and Portugal led European nations in hoarding their maps of the New World, convinced that knowledge was power, and consequently that power rested, at least in part, in maps.”
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INTRODUCTION

The present paper is a study of development which differs from other such studies in two major respects. First, rather than analyzing what factors have promoted the development of a previously underdeveloped area, I will try to assess what factors may lead to the decline of a previously highly developed area. In doing so, I will try to show that development is fragile and precarious, because it depends on both domestic/institutional and international/economic factors and conditions.

Second, this study differs from most other studies of development because instead of focusing on modern events, I will devote my attention to a rather small sub-region of Western Africa between 1526, when Leo Africanus visited Timbuktu and described it as one of the richest cities he had seen in his travels, and 1830, when Rene Caillié noted that Timbuktu was “nothing but a mass of ill-looking houses, built of earth” (Caillié 1830:49).

There are several reasons why I decided to utilize Timbuktu's history as a case study: I focus on Timbuktu because its decay can be used to test competing explanatory models and, most importantly, because it can be used to show that Timbuktu's decline was neither an accident nor the result of inevitable natural

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the present paper is to investigate Timbuktu's economic decline in the three centuries elapsed between 1526, when Leo Africanus reached the Mysterious City, and 1830, when the first European explorers arrived in Timbuktu. It is argued that Timbuktu's decline was neither an accident nor the result of inevitable natural conditions. Timbuktu's decay was the product of historical and social forces. Specifically, it is argued that Timbuktu lost power and prestige because its market decayed. However, it is also suggested that no single factor can account individually for this event. The crisis of Timbuktu's market was provoked by the interaction of two factors: first, the general decline of Mediterranean trade resulting from the emergence of the new Trans-Oceanic trade, and the crisis of the system's component parts at the individual level, and their inability to function as a system; and second, the institutional decay which followed the fall of the Songhai empire, which made Trans-Saharan trade particularly risky and, henceforth, economically inefficient. Building on this, the paper ends on a methodological note as it underlines the theoretical inability of moncausal explanations to capture the inherent complexity of social phenomena.
Timbuktu: A Lesson in Underdevelopment

Timbuktu’s decay was the product of clear historical (social) forces and as such it needs to be analyzed. Specifically, I will argue that Timbuktu decayed when it lost, with the decline of its commercial activities, the source of its wealth. In the present paper, it will be suggested that this outcome was produced by the interaction of two factors: the decline of the Mediterranean trade system on which Timbuktu’s trade was dependent, and the demise of the efficient economic organization and institutions following the fall of the Songhai empire.

The paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides a theoretical justification for my research, i.e. why it is worth investigating the determinants of Timbuktu’s economic decay. The second section places Timbuktu’s economic decay in historical perspective by analyzing the memoirs of Arab and European travelers who have visited Timbuktu. This discussion allows me to localize the timing of Timbuktu’s decline. Building upon this discussion, the third section of the paper addresses the determinants of Timbuktu’s wealth. It will be argued that Timbuktu’s wealth was mainly generated by the intense activity of its market, where Western Sudanese goods were exchanged for the commodities brought from North Africa and also for the goods brought from the near-forest and the forest-land in the South. In the fourth section, I will argue that the economic decay of Timbuktu is associated with, and I believe caused by, the decay of its market, which was promoted by the interaction of both international/economic and domestic/institutional factors. In the fifth and final section, I will assess what lessons can be learned from the experience of Timbuktu.

THE MYSTERIOUS TIMBUKTU AND ITS MYSTERIOUS DECAY

Timbuktu has often been referred to as to the mysterious city, as its location, name2 and origins3 have long been unknown to the European powers. Yet, none

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2 In a letter written by Antoine Malfante and addressed to Giovanni Mariano at Genoa in 1647, Timbuktu is called Tambet or Thambet. Thambet is also the name used by Ca Da Mosto in his “Voyages of Cadamosto, who also adopts the name Tumbuctu and Tumbutu. Gerald Roe Crone, in his introduction to the 1937 English edition of The Voyages of Cadamosto (Crone, 1937: xii) noted that in a Catalan Atlas made for Charles V by Abraham Cresques in 1375 Timbuktu was referred to as Tenbuc. A few years later, Diogo Gomes called it Tumbucuto. When Pory translated Leo Africanus’s The History and Description of Africa and of the Notable Thing Therein Contained in 1600 (Africanus 1896), the name of the city was translated as Tombuto. Yet, René Caillié in his Travels through Central Africa to Timbuctoo and Across the Great Desert to Morocco (Caillie 1830) prefers the word Timbuctoo, and Heinrich Barth used alternatively the diction Tumbuktu and Timb’kutu in his Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa (Barth 1965 [1857]). The best example of this confusio linguum is represented by William Allen’s Narrative of

3 The mystery surrounding the proper spelling of the name of the city would not be of particular interest, if it were not associated with the mystery concerning the origins of name and, in the end, of Timbuktu itself. What are the origins of the name Timbuktu? Even in this respect, our knowledge is far from being unshakably certain. In fact, if we reject, as Cissoko suggests, Miner’s argument that the meaning of “Timbuktu” is purported to be “the woman of the big navel” (Miner 1965:4-5) we are then left with three major etymological and historical interpretations of Timbuktu’s name. Leo Africanus believed that the name of the city and the city itself were of Songhai origins as he argued that “the name Tombuto (was) imposed on the kingdom from the name of a town so called which (they say) king Mansa Suleiman founded in the yeere of the Hegeira 610” (1896:824). If this were true, the story told by Mohamed Lamina would not be as surprising as it sounded to Allen’s ears. This said, according to Leo Africanus the name Timbuktu is made up of two components: tin (wall) and buktu and it means, henceforth, the wall of Buktu. Unfortunately, Leo Africanus does not resolve the most interesting aspect of the puzzle, i.e. who or rather what is this buktu. The belief that Timbuktu and its name had a Songhai origin was also shared by Heinrich Barth, who suggested that “the original form of the name was the Songhai form Tumbu, from whence the Imoshagh made Tumbaykto, which was afterwards changed by the Arabs into Tumbuktu” (Barth 1965:1857: 284). According to Barth “the town was probably so called, because it was built originally in a hollow or cavity in the sand hills. Tumbuto means hole or womb in the Songhai language: if it were a Temkishight word, it would be written Timbuktu. The name is generally interpreted by Europeans well of Buktu, but tin has nothing to do with well” (Barth 1965: 284-285 footnote). In addition to this interpretive line, that identifies Timbuktu as a Songhai word, Cissoko (1996) recalls that some scholars have suggested that the name Timbuktu has a Berber origin and was imposed upon the city by its Tuareg founders. If this interpretation is believed, then the word Timbuktu is made up of two parts: tin feminine form of In, which means “place of and boute, which is a contraction of the Arab word nbkba (small dune).” Timbuktu would then mean “place covered by small dunes” (Cissoko 1996:19). A third interpretive line holds that Timbuktu was founded by the Tuareg as their summer camp. This interpretation is suggested by Es-Sadi in his Tarikh Es-Sudan, where he wrote that “in the beginning it was there that travelers arriving by land and water met. They made it the depot for their utensils and grain. Soon this place became a cross-roads of travelers who passed back and forth through it. They entrusted their property to a slave called Timbuctoo, word that, in the language of those countries means the old” (Es-Sadi 1981:36). It is interesting to note, as Hodes noted in his 1898 translation of Tariks Es-Sudan that “this etymology would indicate that the Tuareg would not have designed this town with a name belonging to their own language” (Es-Sadi 1981:36). Modern historiography has suggested that the second and the third interpretations should be preferred to the first one, because there seems to be archeological evidence of Timbuktu’s Tuareg origins (July, 1970). Yet, this evidence does not provide sufficient evidence to decide whether the second interpretation is to be preferred to the third or whether our preferences should be ranked the other way around.
of these mysteries is as mysterious, interesting and intriguing—for the social scientist—as the fall of Timbuktu, i.e. as the process that transformed Timbuktu from one of the wealthiest cities of the Middle Age into the dusty city encountered by European explorers in the early 19th century.

Why did Timbuktu decay? The literature has emphasized the role of three main factors. The first factor is represented by the transformation of the climatic conditions that made Trans-Saharan trade more difficult and, hence, had a negative impact on Timbuktu’s commercial activities. The exhaustion of the extractive capacity of the goldmines in the region also had a negative impact on Timbuktu’s trade, as gold trade represented a considerable portion of Timbuktu’s commercial transaction. The exhaustion of the extractive capacity represents the second factor harming Timbuktu’s economy. The third contributing factor is the collapse of the third major empire in the region, i.e. the Songhai empire, which was defeated by the Moroccans in 1591.

Important as these factors may have been, they do not provide, however, a satisfactory explanation of Timbuktu’s decay. The climatic explanation is not entirely satisfactory, because, in spite of climatic changes travelers and explorers were still crossing the Sahara with some ease, as shown by the successful expedition of the Moroccans in 1591. Similarly, the crisis of Timbuktu is not adequately explained by the exhaustion of the extractive capacity in the region for two separate though related reasons: Timbuktu’s economy was mostly commercial and not industrial (or productive) and gold was only one of the various commodities exchanged on the Timbuktu’s market. In this respect, it is well to recall that salt was as an important as gold for Timbuktu’s trade, and very important were also Tortoise shell, ivory and ostrich (Davidson 1991). Finally the decay of Timbuktu cannot even be conceived as a necessary or inevitable consequence of the fall of the Songhai empire, because Timbuktu managed to survive successfully not only the fall of the Ghana empire, which created the conditions for the rise of the Mali empire, but also the fall of the Mali empire itself. This second event is of particu-

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4. That the climatic conditions in Western Sudan underwent a profound change has recently been suggested by James Curry (1999:160-161). Note that there is no unanimous agreement on the point. For example Davidson (1991:172), argued that the climatic conditions in the region remained fairly stable over time and that climatic changes were rather negligible.

5. This point, which had been originally made by Oskar Lenz (1886:153), was more recently proposed by Mauny (1954).

6. July (1970:59) also emphasizes the importance of the spices, copper and slaves trade.

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7. On this aspect, see at least July (1970:56, 59).
lished in 1912. These accounts tell us of some encounters between the European explorers and the Mysterious City, encounters characterized by satisfaction and surprise. The account given by Caillié deserves to be quoted at some length: “at length, we arrived safely at Timbuctoo, just as the sun was touching the horizon. I now saw this capital of the Sudan, to reach which had so long been the object of my wishes. On entering this mysterious city, which is an object of curiosity and research to the civilized nations of Europe, I experienced an indescribable satisfaction. I never before felt a similar emotion and my transport was extreme… I looked around and found that the sight before me, did not answer my expectations. I had formed a totally different idea of the grandeur and wealth of Timbuctoo. The city presented, at first view, nothing but a mass of ill-looking houses, built of earth” (1830:49). The day after Mister Caillié, after paying the due respects to his host, took a tour of the city. His impressions were not much better than the one he had received “at first sight.” In his tour of the city, he noted, “I found it neither so large nor so populous as I had expected. Its commerce is not so considerable as fame reported (1830:50). At the time of Caillié’s visit, Timbuktu had “at most about ten and twelve thousands inhabitants” (1830:56). Timbuktu was not even the shadow of its past glory. In sum, although we still ignore the causes of Timbuktu’s decay, we know that it must be temporally localized between the visit of Leo Africanus and the visit of Caillié. These three centuries are the temporal ort, the locus, the place in which Timbuktu’s decay occurs. Yet, the temporal localization of the crisis does not provide an explanation and the puzzle for the social scientist is, at this point, to discover what were the determinants of this collapse and to assess whether and to what extent scholarly hypotheses and theories help provide an explanation.

THE RISE OF TIMBUKTU

In order to understand what factors are responsible for the decay of Timbuktu, it is necessary to understand what was the basis on which Timbuktu’s wealth, power and prestige hinged. In a first approximation, it is possible to say that Timbuktu’s wealth and prestige resulted from its being an important trade center. Timbuktu was the market where the Western Sudanese goods could be traded for the goods brought from Northern Africa and it was at the same time the market where Western Sudanese commodities were traded with the goods coming from the near-forest or forest-land in the South. Timbuktu owned its status to its commercial activities.\(^8\)

The wealth generated in Timbuktu, as it was previously recalled, created the conditions for the existence and development of a bourgeois culture and a cosmopolitan population. Mansa\(^9\) Musa developed an important cultural center in Timbuktu, which attracted a very large number of scholars and men of religion, and was considered as important as some of the most renowned European universities. This is consistent with Leo Africanus’s remarks on the large market of books and manuscripts in Timbuktu that were previously quoted.

However, knowing that the wealth, the power and the prestige of Timbuktu resulted from its commercial activities, still does not tell us what factors favored the development of Timbuktu into a prominent trade center. No mono-causal explanation can be provided in this respect, since several factors were involved in making Timbuktu develop. Geographic factors certainly played a crucial role in development of Timbuktu’s market. Timbuktu was strategically located between the Southern boundary of the Sahara desert, which could be reached using the Trans-Saharan trails, and the northernmost part of the Niger river, which allowed merchants from the South to bring gold and their other commodities to the market. Second, because of its strategic location Timbuktu was not only the closest market for the Southern goods, but it was also the closest market for the salt extracted in Taghaza and Toudenî. Finally, because of its strategic location Timbuktu could entertain dense commercial exchanges with the most developed cities in the region, Djenné and Gao.

As important as location may be for the efficient functioning of an economy (Krugman 1997:37–58), the location of Timbuktu was not and could not possibly have simultaneously been a necessary and a sufficient condition for the flourishing of its economic activities. Two other factors were required for the development of the commercial activities: first, the demand for the goods and the commodities produced in Sudan and in the forest-land in the South; and second, the creation of what North and Thomas (1973) call an efficient economic organization.

In the first respect, historical studies have shown that there was a large demand for the Western Sudanese goods, especially gold, ivory and tortoise shell (Davidson 1991:71; July 1970). Western Sudanese goods were in demand in Spain and Morocco in the West as well as in China in the East. The best analysis of the development of Western African trade was elaborated by Davidson, who argued that “the expansion of West African trade dates back to the ninth century. Started by Muslim demand in North Africa and Near east, it increased steadily

\(^8\) On the point see, Curtin et al. (1978:93)

\(^9\) Mansa is generally translated as King, see e.g. July (1970:56). However, a more appropriate translation would be Sultan.
as the cities of Southern Europe embarked on their own expansion after the XII century. West African gold became a staple export to Europe and without it there would have been no general use of gold as medium of exchange in high medieval times” (Davidson 1991:76).

Neo-institutional economists have suggested that the creation of an efficient economic organization is conditio sine qua non of economic development. The creation of an efficient economic organization, in turn, requires the creation of the proper economic incentives for economic actors. The efficacy of these economic incentives is due to the fact that they “channel individual economic effort into activities that bring the private rate of return close to the social rate of return” (North and Thomas 1973:11). Property rights are among those institutions that make acceptable to risk private resources for social gains. In the Trans-Saharan trade, the enforcement of property rights reduced the costs of commerce and increased its extent. The only major departure between the Western Sudanese history and the analysis of North and Thomas (1973) is represented by who enforces the property rights. This task, which according to North and Thomas (1973) should be performed by the state, in the case of Trans-Saharan trade was performed by the various empires10 that ruled in the area and by the Islam. Several travelers, including, Ibn Battuta and Leo Africanus were greatly impressed by the relative safety of crossing the desert. The interaction of these three factors favored the economic development11 of Timbuktu and of its neighboring cities, including those that are now lost or forgotten.12

10. The two empires I am referring to are the Empire of Mali and, in its wake, the Songhai Empire.
11. If innovation, economies of scale, education, capital accumulation, etc. “are not causes of growth; they are growth” (North and Thomas, 1973:12), then one of the most evident aspects of the economic development of Timbuktu and the neighboring area is represented by remarkable increase in the number of Trans-Saharan trails and wells. In the first respect, it is possible to note that in contrast to the past, when the Berbers were using mainly two Trans-Saharan trails (a westward one from Morocco to Mauritaania; and a southward one from the Fezzan to the Middle Niger and Lake Chad), many more trails were used by the growing Trans-Saharan trade. In the second respect, it is possible to recall that the increase in the number of wells was realized by digging again the old wells and also by making new wells. On this and related aspects, see Davidson (1991:71).
12. In this respect, the case of Audogast is emblematic. This city, which had been a major city in Sudan at least since from the tenth century, today is just, to quote Davidson (1991:76), nothing more than “a puzzle for archeologists”. Similarly, the city of Kumbi, which was the largest city of Western Sudan with a population of about 20,000 inhabitants today is just “a mark on the Kaarta region—200 hundred miles in the Southern fringe of the desert from Bamako” (Davidson 1991:76), the capital of Mali. On this, see Basil Davidson, Africa in history. Themes and Outlines, New York, Collier, 1991; see also Basil Davidson, The Lost Cities of Africa, New York, Little, Brown and Company, 1987.

THE FALL OF TIMBUKTU AND ITS CAUSES

Why did Timbuktu decay? Timbuktu decayed because it lost the very source of its wealth and prestige: Timbuktu lost its status of leading trading center. What is important to determine is why Timbuktu lost its status of major international/economic market.

In this respect, it is possible to note that the decline of Timbuktu’s market and, therefore, Timbuktu’s crisis, are intimately connected, and, I suggest, are caused by a the interaction of two factors. The first factor is represented by the crisis of the Mediterranean trade system, on which Timbuktu’s market was dependent, while the second factor is represented by the demise of those institutions that had made Trans-Saharan trade an efficient enterprise during the Songhai empire.

In the first respect, we may recall that Timbuktu was part of a trading system which was centered on/around the Mediterranean sea and the Mediterranean trade (Fage 1988: 216–218). As July aptly put it, Timbuktu was part of a trade system and trade routes “which stretched as far as Venice, Genoa and Cairo” (1970:59) and also included Spain and Turkey, or, to be more precise, Istanbul. In other words, Timbuktu’s economy was on the semi-periphery13 of the Mediterranean economy. The implications of this connection are quite intui-

13. According to Wallerstein (1974), world economies are “divided into core-states and peripheral areas...there are also semiperipheral areas, which are in between the core and the periphery on a series of dimensions, such as the complexity of economic activities, strength of the state machinery, cultural integrity, etc. Some of these areas had been core-areas of earlier versions of a given world-economy. Some had been peripheral areas that were later promoted, so to speak, as a result of the changing geopolitics of an expanding world-economy” (Wallerstein 1974:349). This said, and this is the most relevant aspect for the purposes of the present discussion, Wallerstein also notes that “the semiperiphery, however, is not an artifice of statistical cutting points, nor is it a residual category. The semiperiphery is a necessary structural element in a world economy” (Wallerstein 1974:349).
tive: Timbuktu’s fortunes and prosperity were associated with and subordinate to those of the system as a whole, i.e. to the core. The inevitability of this link, and its potentially destructive consequences, became apparent after the discovery of the Americas in 1492 and “the opening of the Southern sea route to the Indies round the Cape of Good Hope” (Glamann 1977:210).

In fact, with the development of these new, trans-oceanic sea-routes European trade (could) “no longer be treated in isolation but (had) to be viewed in a more or less global context” (Glamann 1977:190). With the emergence of the trans-oceanic trade, there occurred what Braudel calls (Braudel 1977:66–67) “a shift of the center of gravity.” This transformation was particularly relevant with regard to the Mediterranean trade. In fact, the Mediterranean sea (and trade for that matter) lost its previously hegemonic status as trade started to follow alternative routes.

Although the impact of the Trans-Oceanic trade on the Mediterranean economy was not immediate, its effects were quite evident by the second decade of the seventeenth century (Braudel 1949). Following Braudel, economic historians have, correctly, underlined that the crisis of the Mediterranean powers, most notably Spain and Italy, could not be entirely ascribed to the emergence of the Trans-Oceanic trade. This argument holds true, as it will shortly be demonstrated, also in the case of Timbuktu. However, it is also undoubtedly true that neither the Venetian trade nor that of Timbuktu benefited from the new patterns in international trade.

This said, Timbuktu’s trade partners, and Timbuktu itself, were not simply hurt by the fact that Mediterranean trade had lost its previous hegemonic position in the world economy. They were also hurt because the trading system, that resulted from their interaction and in which they had prospered, was rapidly falling apart for two related reasons: first, the crisis of each of the system’s component parts; and second, the system’s component parts’ inability to function as a system. With regard to the first, it is possible to note that the crisis of both Spain and Italy were clear and were clearly illustrated by several socio-economic indicators. First of all, analysis of the demographic trends in Spain has recently suggested that Spanish population either stagnated or diminished in the course of the 17th century (Vives 1970:122–124). In contrast, the Italian population suffered a marked decline in the same century. This decline is well documented in the literature. Table 1 reports demographic trends in eighteen Italian cities from the end of the 16th century to the end of the 17th century. The data show that in ten out of the eighteen cities under study the population declined, though the magnitude of this decline varies from city to city. In this respect, note that while the population dropped by more than 40% in Verona and Catania (respectively by 40.9% and 43%), it declined only by 10.8% in Napoli and by 7.11% in Venice.

On the contrary, the population remained fairly stable in Modena, where it grew from 18,001 inhabitants in 1581 to 18,025 in 1683, while it grew in Vicenza, Milano, Roma, Bologna, Torino, Reggio Emilia and Livorno. It is probably interesting to note that the population declined in all the maritime cities with the exception of Livorno.

The Spanish and Italian data, which show, at least, demographic stagnation and, at worst, depopulation draw a picture of demographic decay in the two Southern European countries. This decay becomes particularly evident, and one should probably say dramatic, when Spanish and Italian demographic trends are compared and contrasted with those of Northern European capitals.

As the end of the 16th century, Venice was the second largest city in Italy after Napoli and it had a larger population than London, Amsterdam and Lisbon. Only Paris, among the European capitals under consideration, was larger than Venice. At the end of the 17th century, the picture has dramatically changed. The Venetian population has declined by slightly more than 7%, while the population...
has increased in all of the other European capitals. Specifically, during the 17th century the population grew by 1014% in London, by 127% in Paris, by 362.5% in Amsterdam and by 53.8% in Lisbon. The implication of this change is that, at the end of the 17th century, only Lisbon had a smaller population than Venice. Venetian decline continued during the 18th century, so much so Venice was the smallest European capital at the end of that century. Data are reported in Table 2.

This said, it is also worth recalling that the crisis of the previous Mediterranean powers—Spain and Italy—was not just a demographic crisis. It was, above all, a crisis in the industrial/productive activity. This crisis was quite evident both in the Spanish and in the Italian case. Vives (1970:139) illustrates the collapse of the Castillian industry by presenting and discussing the data concerning the “population decline in the old and industrial and mercantile cities of Castile” (1970:139). The decline is truly impressive: from 1594 to 1694 the industrial population in Burgos declined by 29.4%, by 55.2% in Valladolid, by 68.2% in Palencia, by 51.2% in Salamanca, by 65% in Avila, by 70.7% in Segovia and by 54.2% in Toledo. In sum, the population decreased in all major Castillian economic centers. These data are interpreted to reflect the severe economic recession in the region. Data are reported in Table 3.

It is, however, worth noting that the Italian crisis was as severe as the Spanish one. Cipolla (1970) presents very interesting data in this regard. The number of cloths produced in Como fell from an yearly average of 8000 per year to just about 400 cloths a year at the mid of the seventeenth century; in Milano the production of cloths dropped from an yearly average of 15000 cloths at the beginning of the 17th century to a yearly average of about 3000 cloths around 1640; “in Genoa the silk industry was in full decline by the last decade of the sixteenth century. A seventeenth century tradition holds that, whereas there had been 18000 silk looms in the territory of the Republic, by 1608 there were only 3000 and scarcely more than 2500 in 1675. The total of 18000 weavers for the middle of the sixteenth century must be considered an exaggeration. However, there can be no doubt that the silk industry did decline during the course of the century” (Cipolla 1970:199).

Among the various data on the Genovese economy presented by Cipolla, the most relevant for the purposes of the present analysis is represented by the fact that the annual value of goods imported and exported by the port dropped from 9 million lire at the beginning of the century to 3 million lire at the end of the century. As dramatic as the recession might appear, we should probably recall that few places in Italy were hit as hard as Venice by the economic crisis. Cipolla (1970:196) showed that the production of cloths dropped by almost ten times in the course of the 17th century. Yet, the Venetian crisis did not simply affect the clothing industry, but it affected every aspect of the Venetian economy. This problem can be highlighted by looking at the number of contracts of Garzoni15 registered every year. In contrast to the last decade of the sixteenth century, when an average of 1309 contracts were registered, the seventeenth century had an yearly average of about 1174 registered contracts. In other words, there was a drop of more than 10%. Data concerning the number of contracts of Garzoni are presented in Table 4.

In sum, the demographic indicators as well as the industrial indicators consistently show that the economy of two, previously crucial, component parts of the...
and Dutch services and goods were offered at lower prices” (Cipolla 1970:203). Cipolla ascribes the higher prices of Italian goods to a variety of factors: the quality of the Italian goods was higher, the Italian productive system was obsolete, the pressure of taxation in Italy was very high and the cost of labor was very high (Cipolla 1970:204–209). Yet, there is another reason why Venetian goods and services lost their competitiveness: the Turkish custom maintained a 5% import tax on all Venetian goods, that had been established in 1505. In contrast, “the Austrians were allowed, already in 1600, to pay only 3%, and the same privilege will be obtained by the French in 1673, by the English in 1675 and by the Dutch in 1680” (Zorzi 1991:391). Finally, the Venetian trade with the Near East was negatively affected by the fact that Italian ships were not as fast and technologically advanced as the English and the Dutch ships. High prices, high import taxes and an anachronistic shipping industry made it impossible for Venice and the other component parts of the previously hegemonic trade system in the Mediterranean to function as a system.

Given Timbuktu’s economic dependence on the Mediterranean market and trade system, it is not terribly surprising that the combined effects of the emergence of the Tran-Oceanic trade, the decline of the previous commercial powers in the Mediterranean and their inability (and unwillingness) to function as a system had catastrophic consequences on Timbuktu’s economic life and wealth. This said, Timbuktu’s economic decay—as that of Italy and Spain—cannot be entirely ascribed to the action of international/economic economic factors. Domestic/institutional factors also played a major role in provoking Timbuktu’s crisis.

The most important of these domestic/institutional/regional factors is represented by the fall of the Songhai empire, which had been attacked and defeated by the Moroccans in 1591. This event is of particular importance in the history (and especially for the fortunes) of Timbuktu because it created a vacuum of power in the region. The creation of a vacuum of power represents the major difference between the fall of the Ghana and the Mali empires on the one hand and that of the Songhai empire on the other hand. The Ghana empire was directly followed by the Mali empire and this, in turn, was immediately succeeded by the Songhai empire. In neither case, did the transition from one empire’s rule to the other’s leave a vacuum. On the contrary, the region was left in a state of anarchy, in which no power was able or willing to maintain

Table 4 – Number of Contracts of Garzoni

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contracts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>1447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1597</td>
<td>1078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1598</td>
<td>1402</td>
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<td>1621</td>
<td>1120</td>
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<td>1626</td>
<td>1240</td>
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<tr>
<td>1643</td>
<td>1080</td>
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<tr>
<td>1645</td>
<td>1022</td>
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<tr>
<td>1646</td>
<td>842</td>
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<td>1656</td>
<td>1057</td>
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<td>1658</td>
<td>1044</td>
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<td>1663</td>
<td>1150</td>
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<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>1504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670</td>
<td>1180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


efficient institutions or acceptable institutional performances. The institutional
decay was particularly evident with regard to property rights. With no power left
in the region to protect property rights and to prevent caravans and traders from
being robbed in their Trans-Saharan journeys, both the risks and the costs of
trade increased. These increasing costs are responsible—in the end—for a fur-
ther decline in the size of Trans-Saharan trade and for the irreversible crisis of
Timbuktu.17

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of the rise and, more importantly, the fall of Timbuktu, with
its many mysteries, seems to have several important implications. The purpose
of this section is to discuss the most important lessons that can be learned from
Timbuktu’s history.

The first lesson concerns the nature of development: development is very
fragile, it is difficult to achieve and very easy to lose. In a few years the rich,
cultured, civic and developed Timbuktu degenerated into what July calls “an
isolated town, a handful of unimpressive mud buildings housing a listless popu-
lation which time had finally passed by” (July 1970:60). Culture, wealth and large
stocks of social capital were not sufficient to prevent Timbuktu from decaying.

The second lesson is that neither development nor decay are promoted
(at the ontological level) or explained (at the theoretical level) by any single
factor. Although some factors might individually have a larger effect, or a better
explanatory power, than others, causation and/or explanation result only from
the interaction of multiple factors. The case of Timbuktu is exemplary in this
respect: Timbuktu lost power and prestige because its market decayed. However,
no single factor can account individually for this event. In the present paper
we have suggested that the crisis of Timbuktu’s market was provoked, among
other things, by the interaction of two factors: first, the general decline of
Mediterranean trade in the world trade resulting from the emergence of the new
Trans-Oceanic trade, and the crisis of the system’s component parts at the indi-
vidual level and their inability to function as a system; second, the institutional
decay which followed the fall of the Songhai empire, which made Trans-Saharan
trade particularly risky and, henceforth, economically inefficient.

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This said, two points need to be stressed: first, the survival of an hegemonic
Mediterranean trade system would not have preserved by itself the wealth of
Timbuktu in the absence of an adequate institutional framework. Similarly, a
stronger institutional system—per se—would not have prevented Timbuktu
from decaying but would have certainly limited the extent of the decay.

In sum, the third and final lesson to be learned from Timbuktu’s story is
that social phenomena result from different factors, and, of course, their com-
plex interactions. Phenomena, especially social phenomena, become meaningful
only when they are analyzed in what critical phenomenologists (or neo-phenom-
enologists) call the infinite web of relationship in which they exist. In this case,
Timbuktu’s decay becomes meaningful only if it is analyzed in the light of the
relationship between external and internal factors. To focus on one set of fac-
tors, instead of focusing on both of them, might increase the elegance and the
 parsimony of our explanatory model, but it undermines its precision and reliabil-
ity. But this is not the purpose of social research, whose objective is (and should be)
the understanding of reality rather than its misrepresentation. This objective
can be achieved only if we constantly remember that words of Guicciardini, who
noted in his Ricordi Politici e Civili “it is a great error to speak of the affairs of this
world in absolute terms, without discrimination, and—so to speak—by rule; for
they almost always involve distinctions and exceptions, because circumstances
vary, and they can never be subject to one single measure. These distinctions and
exceptions are not to be found in books: this must be taught by mature discre-
tion alone.”

17 July (1970:59-60) observes that “Timbuktu flourished as long as the civilization
it represented was able to provide peace and political stability for its trade. With the col-
lapse of the Songhai empire, the fortunes of Timbuktu took a permanent turn which
saw the once thriving city degenerate into an isolated dusty town.”


Immanuel Wallerstein
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In 1994–98 Immanuel Wallerstein was president of the International Sociological Association. In this capacity he was invited to many parts of the world to deliver keynote addresses to local associations, and speeches at universities. This book prints the texts of fifteen such addresses, culminating in Wallerstein’s long presidential address to the ISA itself at the 1998 World Congress of Sociology, under the title “The Heritage of Sociology, the Promise of Social Science.” The topics covered range from communism, anti-colonialism, the environmental crisis, liberalism, the future of the world system, rationality, Eurocentrism, epistemology, the internal organization of social science, the sociological “classics,” and the value of social science.

The book is divided into two parts, called “The World of Capitalization” and “The World of Knowledge.” These titles understate the scope of Wallerstein’s thought.

I would start by registering admiration for Wallerstein’s energy and dedication. This book records a huge commitment to colleagues in many parts of the world, including Poland, Japan, South Africa, the Netherlands, the USA and Korea. The wear and tear alone would be formidable. In the course of this traveling, Wallerstein has persistently tried to link the experience of politics and social science in different parts of the world to his understanding of the world system, and thus to move beyond the conventional perspectives and intellectual boundaries of North Atlantic sociology.

Because of the way it was put together, this is a difficult book to read or review. There is a good deal of overlap between chapters as Wallerstein pursues favorite themes (e.g. the history of Western political thought) with different audiences. Most of the argument is presented at a high level of generality and moves quickly from topic to topic. This is understandable in the context of agenda-setting keynote addresses, but it can be frustrating for a reader who wants to come to grips with Wallerstein’s arguments as distinct from his attitudes and world-view. It’s not too helpful to be referred, in the notes, to five or six other Wallerstein books for the detail.

This book impresses for its boldness. Wallerstein tackles large themes, makes large claims, ventures predictions, puts ideologies and disciplines in their place. Here is someone who is not afraid of grand narratives.

Within the large scope of Wallerstein’s interests, certain issues show his talents to greatest advantage. He has a fine sense of the dynamics of the world system, especially the interplay of classes and political ideologies. This is well shown in the address Wallerstein gave to the South African Sociological Association (Chapter 2 in this book) where he surveys the history of “anti-systemic movements,” linking the story of colonial struggles with the story of class struggle in the metropole, in a way only the broad world-system perspective allows. Wallerstein goes on to offer a fourfold characterization of the present crisis of the system, which he sees as destabilized simultaneously by the approaching end of the rural labor pool, ecological crisis, democratization, and the decline of state power.

At its best, Wallerstein’s approach produces intoxicatingly wide perspectives combined with moments of sharp insight. I loved his brilliant short essay (pp. 63–6), embedded within an address on states and sovereignty, on why a genuinely free market is bad for capitalism—only a strong state, and various forms of monopoly, make quick accumulation possible. (Though Wallerstein doesn’t use the example, Bill Gates and Microsoft make his case perfectly.) When he turns to the world of knowledge, he is equally insightful and acerbic on the mad proliferation of specialties and sub-fields within the old framework of “disciplines.”

But at other points, and the other issues, Wallerstein’s touch is unsure. His idea of politics, for instance, remains largely within the framework of class struggle and he has difficulty grasping other forces. Gender relations, for instance, are pretty much outside Wallerstein’s understanding of the world system. While he mentions feminism (especially as a challenge to sociology), his treatment of it is sketchy and the coverage arbitrary. Cultural politics are marginal in his world-view (except as political ideologies), and his account of “cultural studies” (pp. 215–6) is thin. It’s not surprising, therefore, to find his treatment of postmodernism and deconstruction also thin and disdainful. This is a significant weakness, I think, in Wallerstein’s survey of intellectual challenges to sociology. For an author concerned to assess the state of knowledge across all the disciplines, it is a little disturbing to find that Wallerstein takes not the slightest notice of Lyotard’s famous and immensely influential essay of twenty years ago on the same topic, “The Postmodern Condition.”

When the different essays are put together, as they are in this book, there do seem to be some inconsistencies. In Chapter 1, a speech delivered in 1996, Wallerstein usefully reviews the different forms of Eurocentrism in social science and argues for transcending it. But in Chapter 15, the presidential address of 1998, Wallerstein not only recalls but emphasizes and elaborates the utterly Eurocentric
tale of Marx-Durkheim-Weber as the founding fathers of sociology. It’s hard to understand why Wallerstein of all people, who has done so much to show the importance of real history—global history at that—for sociology, should give a new airing to this jaded and parochial fiction.

More broadly, there seems to be an inconsistency or divergence between the second half of the book and the first. In the later chapters, Wallerstein emphasizes the challenges to conventional models of knowledge, giving particular prominence to Ilya Prigogine’s idea of an end to Newtonian science. Complexity, unpredictability and qualitative change are emphasized. In the essays in the first part of the book, however, Wallerstein seems to emphasize the positivistic side of world-systems analysis, schematizing history, emphasizing economic cycles and the seemingly inevitable capture of anti-systemic movements by the system, and finally developing an impressive analysis of crisis tendencies in the capitalist world-system and predicting its breakdown and transformation in the foreseeable future. If we believe the critique of rationality and predictive science in the second half of the book, why should we believe the model of crisis in the first?

One is left wondering, too, how the substantively rational—read normative—social science Wallerstein argues for in the second half of the book can escape the fate of the other anti-systemic movements outlined in the first. Wallerstein proposes that social science is now becoming a meeting-ground for other types of knowledge, that there is a certain convergence of humanities (via cultural studies) and natural sciences (via complexity studies) on the territory of social science. I suppose it is all in the point of view, but I am more impressed by the revival of biological reductionism under the aegis of the new genetics, by the revival of a kind of imperialist stance in philosophy, and by the influence of deconstructionism, than by any movement of natural sciences and humanities towards social science.

I agree with Wallerstein that it matters a great deal what kind of social science becomes dominant. But I think he seriously underestimates neo-liberalism and free-market economics. Apart from some scathing remarks about the “snake-oil salesmen” of the Chicago school, Wallerstein does not give very much attention to contemporary “economic rationalism” (as it is called in Australia). But here is a substantively-rational social science of the kind Wallerstein calls for (though not the version he wants). And these particular snake-oil salesman are backed by the largest and most influential social science discipline (the only one, notably, to have its own Nobel Prize), by the political leadership of all major states (plus a lot of minor ones), and they have favor and funding from corporate capital to be going on with.

Wallerstein’s model of a unified (or at least de-disciplined) social science is attractive, but do current historical conditions really allow it? I’m inclined to think the future of sociology must be thought out first and foremost as a response to the current global dominance of market ideology, and that might suggest a significantly different trajectory from the one proposed in Wallerstein’s stimulating argument.

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There Is Still A Better Tomorrow

In an era of the TINA Syndrome (“there is no alternative” to industrial agriculture) and the end of the Grand Narrative, it is very encouraging to find the publication of a book that refuses to join the current fashionable bandwagon of celebrating postmodernism, capitalism, and free trade/markets. Boswell and Chase-Dunn’s book rubs current history against its grain by suggesting the future remains open, and that we have not reached the ‘end of history’ as Fukuyama (1992) has gleefully celebrated. Through agency, they argue, the possibility of socialism (not Soviet nor Chinese style) in the form of global democracy remains a historical possibility. In a nutshell, this is their theoretical and practical project.

Boswell and Chase-Dunn’s theoretical lineage is derived from the world-systems perspective a la Wallerstein albeit with some additions and revisions. The argument they pose is that progressive social change can occur only if we theoretically conceive the world as being organized within the dynamics and trends of a world-system, and that such a transformation is possible only if its implementation occurs at the global level and not at the societal/national level. The progressive march of socialism from nation to nation has inherent flaws if the modern world is organized around a world-system with its rhythms and trends. The ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ (“you do it your way”) articulated in the past, will also not work for the future. In view of this, the macro-level analysis of world-systems theory has much to contribute to our global future.
With the above intentions, Boswell and Chase-Dunn proceed to lay the structural and material grounds for reaching global democracy. The initial chapter outlines very succinctly the world-systems perspective that has evolved since Wallerstein’s *Modern World-System I*, noting the important structural trends and cycles of the system, which would structure the emergence of a possible future. For them, this is also the strength of the world-systems perspective—it’s potential to identify a possible future as the theory has identified historical cycles and trends such as hegemonic rises and declines, phases of expansion and contraction, core-periphery relations, and ceaseless accumulation.

Boswell and Chase-Dunn also identify rightly that the world-systems perspective has been weaker in the area of agency because it is more structurally oriented in terms of approach. The chapter that follows then proceeds to address this weakness. Here we find an explication of various theories of revolutions. Revolutions are examined as world-historical events rather than as occurrences at the societal level, and their relatedness over time is demarcated. In this context, the events of 1989 for Boswell and Chase-Dunn have world-historical proportions because the revolutions and unrests that occurred were the final institutionalization of democracy that was initiated by the world revolution of 1789. Such events have wide sweeping transnational transformations because of the specific conjunctures in which they occur. These historical conjunctures are periods of transition for the world-economy when its cycles and secular trends exhibit tendencies that are the opposite to that of the prior conjunctures. Boswell and Chase-Dunn define such moments as world divides when the world-economy presents moments of transition. Thus, what occurred in 1989 should be placed and understood within such a context.

Given these conditions, during the current historical conjuncture, Boswell and Chase-Dunn argue for a tendency for a transition to global democracy, of course contingent on events and political practice. Using the trends and tendencies of the world-system, several likely scenarios of the future of the world system are sketched for our consideration. It is up to history to confirm or refute their projections. The scenarios are based on the trends and cycles of the world-economy placing weight on processes such as commodification (leading to proletarianization and individualism), hegemonic competition, decolonization, and democratization. Environmental collapse as a consequence of ceaseless accumulation is mentioned briefly as a likely historical possibility. In the sketching of these possible outcomes, Boswell and Chase-Dunn tend to emphasize anthropocentric factors that structure the future of the world-system, instead of giving equal weight to how other factors such as climate changes, tectonic shifts, Culture-Nature relations may affect a possible future. The question is whether ‘economy in command’ should basically underscore our analysis or whether we should also consider that it might very well be ‘ecology in command’ that ultimately determines systems transition. Since these elements are included in some of Chase-Dunn’s previous works (e.g., Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997), it is surprising that Boswell and Chase-Dunn have not incorporated these elements into their model.

Albeit interesting, what is important about Boswell and Chase-Dunn’s contribution is not their articulation of a possible future, but their attempts to operationalize how global democracy can work and the institutions that are required to make such a social-political setup endure. They have taken up what Marx did not do. Marx wrote about socialism and communism but never explained fully the specific organizational and operational features for such social systems to function effectively. It was up to those that came after him, and who have won political power within a nation-state context, to design the blueprint for a functioning social system. Realizing all the mistakes and failures of such past economic and political exercises, Boswell and Chase-Dunn specify for us in fine detail what functioning institutions and organizations should be in place in order for the system to be enduring and non-exploitative. They do this by culling socialist economic writing (such as those of John Roemer), and suggest ways in which a world organized around global democracy could economically function. They also sketch for us the social and political global institutions that need to be in place to ensure global democracy. They have drawn a blueprint for us to consider should a transition to global democracy become possible. The book thus provides hope in a hope-less era of homogenization and continuing globalization. It should generate debate about the practical aspects of organizing a global system of political and economic democracy—a project that has been absent in academically social progressive literature to date.

References


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In this ambitious work, Stephen Sanderson singles out key transitions in human history and discusses theories of why they happened. His own orientation is “evolutionary materialism,” a general economistic view grounded in world-systems theory. He is careful to point out that, unlike 19th century evolutionistic theories, his does not imply teleology or value-laden ideas of “progress.” Drawing heavily on Marx, Immanuel Wallerstein, and cultural ecologist Marvin Harris, Sanderson seeks to develop general principles that explain the development of the major milestones. For him, as for most scholars in this tradition, the milestones include agriculture, civilization and the state, the consolidation of agrarian empires, capitalism, industry, and eventually the modern world-system with its global economy. He speculates on the future, but wisely refrains from excessive confidence in anyone’s prognostications. Finally, he provides a chapter on sociobiology and its possible relevance. This represents a departure from his earlier version of this book, and from most of the people he cites; scholars like Wallerstein make little use of sociobiology, and Harris has frequently and sharply critiqued it.

A very valuable feature of the book is the clear statement of his theoretical principles (pp. 3–16). These are excellent guidelines, well laid out. They will provoke considerable debate. Those who do not agree with them will have to make a serious case, rather than dismissing them as mere old-fashioned evolutionism.

After that, this book is best in the center, worst at the two ends. The beginning chapter, on the development of agriculture, relies heavily on Mark Cohen’s theory that agriculture arose from population pressure at the end of the Ice Age. Cohen held that the huge animals, previously hunted, died off; population growth forced people to work harder to feed themselves, and agriculture was born. Sanderson seems unaware of the fate of this theory. It led to predictions that agriculture would arise where megafauna had been most important, and would follow after a period of increasing stress visible in malnutrition and stunting. These predictions could be archaeologically tested on a worldwide scale, and turned out to be problematic, as Cohen has admitted (Cohen and Armelagos 1984). The earliest agriculture supplied an inconsequential amount of food, and made no detectable difference in nutrition. Nutrition, as shown by analysis of skeletons, remained basically good until agriculture began to provide much or most of the food supply—at which point nutrition levels generally declined. There remains a possibility that the invention of agriculture had something to do with population growth, but few would see such growth as an adequate explanation by itself. In fact, agriculture arose in areas that saw a rapid increase in plant growth after the Ice Age; that were ecologically complex; and that were nodal in large trade networks. Opportunity and trade seem to have been the drivers (MacNeish 1977).

With the origin of the state, we are on firmer ground. Sanderson provides an excellent account of evolutionist theories on this subject, and comes to the reasonable conclusion that rising population and conflict over resources led to the triumph of certain groups. This process, iterated over time in areas where population could concentrate and build up, led to the development of a true ruling class and thus of a state. Comparisons of the world’s early civilizations, and their immediate antecedents, show something like this to be a general process.

The great agrarian states that emerged at the end of this process rose and declined, for reasons ably discussed in the following chapter. They also expanded the known world. Substantial world-systems grew in the Near East, East Asia, and the New World. Eventually a single oikumene dominated the Old World, as population, trade, technology, and communication increased in feedback with each other. Missing from this chapter is Ibn Khaldun’s great work of the 14th century, which still provides as good an account as any of the dynamics of agrarian empires.

The discussions of capitalism and the emerging modern world order take up most of the book, and defy summary. They are well done, thorough, and balanced. They present a good survey of the relevant literature (though not a complete one—that would take hundreds of volumes). However, Sanderson does not take enough account of the puzzle presented by China, which seemed on the very threshold of capitalism as early as 1400, if not indeed 1100—yet stagnated or actually retrogressed until the 19th century. The most challenging literature on this subject has emerged since Sanderson’s book was completed (Pomerantz 2000) or at least well along (Wong 1997), so this is not his fault.

Some of Sanderson’s statements about the decline of the United States and the rise of Japan (pp. 199–200) now seem dated. American hegemony is on the rise again—with Japan in economic agony, and with Europe giving away the store by putting themselves back under nonaccountable and centralized rule of a sort that capitalism, for all its sins, managed (briefly) to reduce.

Finally, he questions “progress,” noting that many would see the modal Third World citizen as not much better off now than centuries ago. Life spans have lengthened, but subsistence levels and options have often declined. Third World subsistence does not “count” in economic reckoning. The World Bank does not provide figures on the loss of land, forests, clean water, game, and other goods once enjoyed free.
The long Afterword on sociobiology is, unfortunately, rather a loss. Sanderson has the theory under control; he fails to make a case for its value, even as a limit on the possible. Sociobiology and its offshoot evolutionary psychology are rooted in a narrowly individualist mode of thinking that tends to reduce all human action to the short-term, narrow calculus of the selfish individual or the “selfish gene” (Dawkins 1976). This body of theory currently cannot explain the sociability, institutions, ideologies, and cultural variations whose evolution is the subject of Sanderson’s book. This situation is changing rapidly, as evolutionists work with kin selection models. Hopeful beginnings are being made, and Sanderson cites some of them. However, at present, sociobiology provides excellent explanations for why people often act like rats, but no adequate explanation for why they sometimes act like humans.

In summary, Sanderson provides valuable summaries of a major body of literature, and—usually—reasonable conclusions. His basic ideas are familiar from the literature of Marxian, world-systems, and cultural ecology. Other writers making creative use of economic history have come to somewhat similar conclusions without invoking “evolutionary materialism” per se. However, Sanderson provides a hopeful start at building a new and predictive theory from these ideas.

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Book Reviews

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Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organization Since 1875 is an important book, one which substantially reshapes our sense of global processes of the last 100 years and should inspire considerable research. At the same time, one suspects that as that research is carried out, the arguments of the volume will need considerable revision. The text takes issue with world systems analysis (although it should be noted that Wallerstein’s highly relevant writings on the ‘geoculture,’ science, and rationality are nowhere directly engaged by this text) and other ‘neorealist’ accounts of the international system, such as state competition theory and neoliberal institutionalism, on grounds defined by its title and subtitle. Neorealists do not problematize the goals and interests of states (their ‘culture’), assuming that they inevitably seek to maximize their wealth and security. And to the extent that they bother at all, neorealist theories account for international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) as a byproduct of the interests of states, which neorealists regard as the primary, almost exclusive, actors in international society (with the addition of multinational corporations). Not only do the authors demonstrate the untenability of these assumptions; they go on to argue that the dynamics of international non-governmental organizing in fact explain much about the goals of states. Lack- ing arms or other means of coercion, INGOs are able to exert considerable ‘rational voluntaristic’ authority by basing themselves on the principals of the world culture, i.e. universalistic rationality in the service of human progress. While sovereignty ultimately resides with states, states find themselves virtually forced to conform to the world culture the INGOs have made. It is a bold and provocative argument.

Although it is an edited volume, the authors share data sources (primarily the yearbook of international organizations), research methods (sophisticated quantitative tests), and theoretical perspective. The work is thus extremely cohesive. Furthermore, all of the topics are well chosen, examining consequential matters for the perspective being advanced. The first two chapters outline the growth of INGO from 1875 to 1988 (the last year for which they had data). Then there are examinations of four ‘social movements’ (environmentalism, the women’s movement, Esperanto, and the Red Cross), and four studies of scientific and technical fields (standardization, population control, development, and science associations). Finally, the conclusion pulls everything together to state the argument in particu- larly bold form.
Readers familiar with INGOs primarily from debates within the development or human rights literature will likely find the authors’ description of the INGO world surprising. Encompassing more than 35,000 organizations, the ones around which controversy has swirled (for example, Greenpeace) actually make up a very small portion of the total. The largest number of organizations relates to Industry/trade/industrial groups—frequently ‘peculiarly invisible’ groups of technical specialists such as radiologists or bridge designers. The authors emphasize a shared culture among INGOs of universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, and a commitment to ‘progress’. Although membership in INGOs (and location of their secretariats) is concentrated in wealthier countries, membership in poor countries has been expanding more rapidly than in wealthy countries in recent years. Curiously, size of country does not matter much in determining the number of INGOs citizens belong to: “Norway’s 3 million people belonged to more INGOs than the United State’s 240 million or Japan’s 120 million.”

In all the case studies, the relationship between the deepening of rationalized discourse and the increase in foundings of related INGOs is emphasized, while functionalist formulations that see INGOs as inevitable responses to ‘global problems’ like pollution or ‘overpopulation’ are decisively refuted. For example, the development of a rationalized discourse about the environment, in which nature is seen as constituted by a set of interdependent parts, the web of life, rather than appreciated as a thing of beauty, facilitated the emergence of environmental INGOs. Discourse which emphasized the embeddedness of nations in global processes (for conservatives, the need for foreign capital), for radicals, dependency theory) facilitated the growth of development INGOs.

The success of INGOs in getting states and international organizations to do what they wished is also emphasized. For example, the Geneva Conventions have more signatories than the United Nations has members, although the conventions originated in an INGO, the International Committee of the Red Cross, rather than in the efforts of states. The idea that states become strong as a result of population growth was replaced with the idea that population growth hinders development largely as a result of the arguments of INGOs. Industrial standards are adopted by multinationals, although the US standards body has tried, unsuccessfully, to intrude on this process and has discouraged its own companies from falling in line. INGOs exert power by either acting autonomously (professional association INGOs typically function entirely outside of state pressure), collaterally (working with states or international organizations) or penetratively (pushing their way into states to foster things like environmental or women’s movements).

By clarifying the importance of international non-governmental organizations and insisting that scholars attend to the culturally constructed reasons states behave the way they do, the authors have done an immense service to understanding global dynamics. But one suspects they overstate their case. International non-governmental organizations, in which individuals voluntarily come together to rationally define agendas to advance progress, simply aren’t the only force shaping world culture. The authors would do well to consider the role of the mass media, which often shapes an agenda for social action based on media imperatives for novelty and attention getting, rather than substantive rationality. Also relevant is the transnational organizing of the capitalist class, which is able to bring considerable pressure on states through network connections and financial power, although it does not follow the principles of the INGO world. Additionally, ‘on the ground’ social movements, engaging in unruly behavior such as protests, strikes, pickets and consciousness raising are a crucial generator of world cultural ideas (it is a little disconcerting to read an account of the expansion of women’s NGOs in the seventies that gives no role to the explosion of feminist activism in the wake of ’68—only to the effect of rationalistic development discourse which could include women). While INGOs may do much to shape the behavior of states, the opposite relationship may also develop. States may attempt to promote their views through the strategic distribution of foreign aid, for example (the US role in promoting ‘overpopulation’ as a social problem to be addressed comes to mind). Although religious organizations constitute a small portion of the INGO sector, their broad appeal may make them more influential than the numbers suggest. The list of additional sources of world culture could be expanded.

Additionally, universalistic, scientific rationality devoted to progress does not monopolize world culture. The authors mention Asian familialism and Islamic Fundamentalism, but only in passing. Postmodernism is mentioned rather derivatively as a romantic revolt—but the notion that the social world must be interpreted culturally has found adherents in the development field, among others. Perhaps most significantly, consumerist rationality devoted to maximizing the purchase of goods by coating everything with a few reliable stimulants and making it all available as pervasively and continuously as possible, also shapes the global social field, although we suspect few INGOs actively approve of its values. Without bringing in these additional actors in constructing world culture, and these additional world cultural principles, one wonders how the authors would explain the near universal shift toward neoliberal policies engaged in by states worldwide over the last twenty years—surely this was not the work of a handful of altruistically inclined individu-

The critical thrust of this book lies in the introduction of women or gender into the discussion of globalization and democratization. Individual articles analyze: the impact of globalization on women; obstacles to the full inclusion of women in formal democratic processes; and obstacles to recognition of the undemocratic, gendered power relations embedded in less obvious social space. Globalization is the driving force in this text, with both gender regimes and democratization following on the contours of globalization. Nine of the 13 essays examine the impact of globalization on women or gender, sometimes with concluding comments on democratization, and three deal directly with democratization; the remaining essay is an introduction. The 13 essays are, in most cases, written by women originating from, or residing in, the countries about which they write. Most are descriptive analyses of cases based on secondary sources or theoretical/conceptual argument. Explicitly or not, most of the articles intervene in the debate over the extent to which globalization represents a new phenomenon. In an early essay in the book, Brigitte Young states that her work contrasts with that of Marian Simms in arguing that “the current phase of the world economy is characterized by significant discontinuities with the preceding periods” (27). Young’s analysis matches regimes of accumulation and gender regimes, drawing on Connell (1987), Aglietta (1979) and Sassen (1996). Simms examines the book’s topics historically, arguing that “[f]rom the perspective of Oceania, globalization is not new but is a process that began almost two hundred years ago” (15). From the historical experience of the “settler colonies,” Simms derives lessons regarding past and present differences between these colonies and Europe in both globalization and gender regimes.

Yassine Fall’s contribution provides a primer in the world-economic history of Africa, but is scant in its attention to gender. Three case studies of neoliberal economic policies (HIPC Debt Relief Initiative, the Chad Oil Project, and privatization in Senegal) offer a barebones treatment of women.

The three articles that report on original data collection or fieldwork examine within and/or between country migration. In these studies, migration becomes a proxy for globalization. Laura Gonzalez’s 20 years of fieldwork is used to analyze the Guanajuatense community in Mexico and the US “to see how globalization in the form of imported mechanized agricultural methods and...labor demand in the North has affected traditional gender relations both in Mexico and the United States” (75). In their essay on Asian Indian immigrant women in the US, Arpana Sircar and Kelly adapt Smith (1968) to draw a flowchart of types of variables (biographical and social structural) relevant to adult political behavior—in this case the sex-role behavior of twenty immigrant women. The world-economic conditions that lead to immigration is background material in this essay and are not included among the correlates of sex-role orientation that are used to analyze the sex-role behavior of the subjects. Finally, Urvashi Soni-Sinha’s study of gender relations among families in the Noida Export Processing Zone in India refers to the literature on the household as a bargaining unit to ground her typology of changes in income control and household work-sharing in the households of 16 women, all but two of whom are migrants, which result from their waged work in the EPZ.

Jane Baynes’ and Kelly’s essay sums up the analysis of the impact of globalization with a conceptual piece that identifies three forces and circumstances that correlate with gender regime change or contestation: when women act to preserve a traditional gender regime; when women from traditional backgrounds find themselves in new circumstances (i.e., waged labor); and when clashes occur between gender regimes (for example, between a national/local regime and that of the UN). They then analyze gender regime changes in three “strategic sites”: Chiapas, the US/Mexico border and the international Human Rights Code.

Two articles in the book deal with sexual trafficking of women in Japan. The first by Seiko Hanochi matches changes over time in the nature of the sex industry in Japan (including the “comfort women”) to changes in “structures of global interdependence” (143). The second article by Kinhide Mushakoji seeks to “clarify the epistemological structure of the double standards discourse” supporting sexual slavery and its impediments to full democratization. The argument refers to Pateman (1988) in making its case for linking the gendered double standard to the public/private duality and its “hidden clandestine sectors” wherein reside undemocratic practices, sexual slavery among them.
Bang-Soon L. Yoon’s essay is one of three which addresses directly women’s movements. She analyzes the “poor linkage mechanism between women’s elective, grassroots movements and the formal political arena” (171) in South Korea. Suranjana Gupta’s analysis of the implementation of the mandate for the election of women to local offices in India focuses on the role of grassroots women’s movements. Finally, Mary Hawkesworth discusses why democratization, celebrated by social scientists and policymakers over the last decade, has failed to produce gender equality. Hawkesworth scans the literature from the classics to modernization theory to the expansion of civil society and the growth of NGOs to assess how democracy is conceived and practiced. She traces how gendered assumptions and the recent “reconstitution of political space as male space” (235) have hampered women’s political equality. Her discussion of the ways in which women’s movements and feminist theorists pose challenges to the dominant conceptualizations is worthwhile.

Each essay offers a page or more of substantive background identifying the relevant characteristics of globalization; the background material reaches back usually to the mid-to-early twentieth century; in the cases of Fall and Simms, a more world-historical perspective is provided. The authors use Connell’s concept of ‘gender regimes’ throughout the text, with more or less success. Connell’s term contributes to, and draws on, the move in gender studies away from analysis in which a single, coherent model of gender relations is applied in cases, in favor of the heuristic conceptualization of gender as a multiple and unstable array of performances or practices. While most authors cite Connell and use the term gender regime, they fall back on conventional examination of how a case illustrates or contests a model of gender relations.

The tendency in the text to study how globalization affects gender, and not the other way around, in several essays posits a meeting of traditional or personal relations—gender relations—and the new, dynamic processes of globalization. In this meeting, of course, the new, dynamic sector shapes the laggard gender sector. However, the resulting changes in gender regimes analyzed in these essays are not simply decried as more of the same gender domination, but are presented more complexly as giving way to both opportunities for and constraints on women’s equality.

This a major theme of the book: the impact of globalization and democratization on women and gender is complicated, at times offering women the chance to make gains and at other times throwing up barriers. Its most important contribution comes as the refusal to reduce recent changes to simplistic readings of gender hierarchy, addressing the need for nuanced approaches to the current state of gender relations.

References


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When I began reading Kevin Bales *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy* (1999), the international community was still reeling over *Eitreno*. And rightfully so. *Eitreno* was the ship off the coast of West Africa found to have 31 slave children on board in April of 2001. After pouring through countless *New York Times* stories on the extent of slavery around the world, I was relieved to pick up this timely piece of social science research. Everyone should read this book. Period.

*Disposable People* is not a book about slavery. It is a book about the “new slavery,” what Bales defines as “the total control of one person by another for the purpose of economic exploitation” (p. 6). Bales cites three main factors that have led to slavery’s reemergence in the post-World War II era: (1) unchecked population growth, (2) economic globalization, and (3) corrupt government and business leaders. Violence and economic exploitation intersect with these trends to produce an estimated 27 million slaves in the world today (Bales’ estimate, p. 8). Most of these slaves—roughly 15–20 million—represent bonded laborers in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Otherwise, slavery is concentrated in South America, Southeast Asia, and North and West Africa.

After an introductory chapter, Bales organizes the book into five qualitative case studies, each featuring a particular country and a specific economic activity. These cases include: female sex workers in Thailand, water carriers in Mauritania,
was equally dismayed to find no case study of slavery in the developed world. Many of Bales' arguments are reminiscent of the modernization hypothesis, which argued that labor processes based on feudal, ethnic, and familial relationships would die out with capitalism. Any economies that featured such traditional relationships were, therefore, backward. Not only was the modernization hypothesis wrong, it had the politically distasteful characteristic of blaming the victim. A number of sociologists have shown recently that traditional labor processes may not only survive, but actually thrive under certain conditions of advanced capitalism (Lee 1998; Portes 1995; Wells 1996). To this end, they have analyzed the intrusion of capitalism into specific local labor markets. Were Bales to analyze the new slavery from this perspective, he might begin to answer how local histories, cultures, and social structures intersect with contemporary global economic processes to pattern the new slavery in each case.

One of Bales more provocative points is that we should distance slavery politically and analytically from other forms of economic exploitation. I disagree with this point politically, feeling that we need to make connections so as to build a larger social movement around ending economic exploitation. I disagree analytically with this statement because the lines between economic exploitation and slavery are too fuzzy to separate neatly. Moreover, the new slavery is tied to the same global economic forces that produce other forms of economic exploitation.

These are perhaps analytic points that distract from the overall value of this book, which is Bales' reminder that this problem is not something we can ignore. On the contrary, it is something we can do something about right now. As for myself, I will be paying a visit to Anti-Slavery International's website tonight (www.antislavery.org). As Astill (2001) reminds us, Etireno may mean “end of story”, but the end of the story it is not.

References


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Ecology and the world-system would seem to be a natural pair. Analyses of both tend to be holistic, systemic, and long-term. World-systems analysis is well suited to the study of unequal flows of productive (and waste) material among various parts of a world divided by power inequalities. Meanwhile, studies in ecology are increasingly cognizant of the social nature of ecology, i.e., the idea that humans are an intimate part of the ecosystem. In addition, the timing of the emergence of world-systems analysis in the early 1970s coincided with the burgeoning of the environmental movement, and both came from core, US intellectual roots. Yet, as with much academic work that is critical or leftist in outlook, world-systems scholars have been surprisingly silent on the real, material bases of production, except in its commodified form. It took another couple decades for the Political Economy of the World-System series finally to publish this volume on *Ecology and the World System*, based on papers presented at the PEWS annual conference in Santa Cruz in 1997.

Let me state up front that there are a number of excellent papers in this collection. But as with many edited collections, *Ecology and the World System* is uneven and sparsely edited. It seems the editors either did not see much commonality among the papers to glean theoretical lessons or they simply could not garner the enthusiasm to write a conclusion. Their two-page “Introduction” divides the papers into global analyses, cases “more delimited in time and space,” and environmental movements—and merely remarks on “the multiple and various ways contemporary scholars are grappling with questions of environmental and social change.”

The most useful chapter in the first part is Timmons Roberts’ and Peter Grimes’ “Extending the World-System to the Whole System,” which might have served as an introduction to the book. They argue for the continued relevance of world-systems analysis to understanding social change and the environment. Specifically, they claim that four key tenets of world-systems analysis (holism, materialism, a Braudelian historical approach, and structuralism that emphasizes position within a global stratification system) are crucial and can be used to study core issues such as the relation between environment and secular trends in the world economy, the causes and effects of cycles of crisis, mechanisms of peripheral exploitation, structural causes of conflict, and post-socialist transitions. These are laudatory themes, but, in fact, most of them are not taken up in the volume under review.

Part I actually starts with a brief (and predictable) excursus by Wallerstein on the impending crisis of capitalism due to both proletarianization and environmental degradation. Because capital is loath to fix the latter through internalization of ecological costs and governments reluctant to impose taxation to pay for fixing it, we are left doing nothing or shifting the costs to the South, i.e., merely a delaying pattern to the demise of capitalism. Peter Grimes’ gloomy “The Horsemen and the Killing Fields” expands on the ecological dimensions of the current crisis leading from capitalist agriculture to atmospheric warming to the four apocalyptic horsemen of starvation, disease, pestilence and war. This reviewer at least finds this kind of world-system analysis too over-generalized and covering too long a durée resulting in ridiculous statements (“in the tropics, the majority of the soil is sterile,” p. 16) and inaccuracies (Chinese “colonization” [sic] of Malaysia and Indonesia, p. 36). Al Bergesen and Laura Parisi’s contribution is an odd hybrid. At first they propose non-“humanocentric” “ecosociology” because all prior social theory, even radical ones, have allowed for “species self-transformation without regard to the larger set of ecosociological relations within which that species is embedded” (p. 46). But the second part of the chapter is an analysis of toxic emissions based on traditional cross-national statistical analysis that does not address the social (let alone “ecosocial”) relations of production and pollution. They are left to speculate, rather than theorize, the possible interrelationship between power and toxicity.

The challenge of theoretically incorporating the material and ecological processes of capitalist development with the development of the world-system is taken up provocatively in Stephen Bunker’s and Paul Ciccantell’s “Economic Ascent and the Global Environment: World-Systems Theory and the New Historical Materialism.” This chapter contributes most directly to the volume’s theme of ecology and the world-system. Contra other theories of hegemony, they argue that “the distinctive feature of the capitalist world-economy is the systematic expansion of the exploitation of nature via a division of labor on an increasing global scale” (p. 107). Through an examination of the ascent of Holland, Great Britain, the US, and Japan (all in 15 pages!), they analyze the “generative sectors” in raw materials and especially the linked transport industries that were crucial for political-economic ascent in each case—timber and shipbuilding for Holland, for example. They argue that each ascendant hegemon reorganizes the global environment and exploits a large number of specific local environments in order to expand capital accumulation (rather than capital accumulation leading to expanded resource exploitation).

There remain a few challenges for their argument and world-systems more generally. First, their concept of a “new historical materialism” remains underspecified. How does it differ from the old historical materialism? How does their argument relate to recent literature such as Foster’s *Marx and Nature* that resuscitates Marx’s
understanding of the material from pure labor theory of value accounts? Second, by focusing on ascent, Bunker and Ciccantell beg the question of descent. As Roberts and Grimes point out, world-systems analysis focuses on cycles. Sing Chew’s chapter on the Bronze Age complements Bunker and Ciccantell by considering the ecological factors, including overcultivation, overgrazing and deforestation that contributed to the contemporaneous demise of Harappa and southern Mesopotamia centers of accumulation. Would Bunker and Ciccantell accept comparable arguments for the decline of the four hegemons? How do phases of decline relate to the ever-expanding material throughput of capitalism? Third, by focusing on the hegemons, they seem to underestimate the ease with which “local social relationships were restructured to permit the extraction of raw materials to support capital accumulation” (p. 114), as opposed to more recent understandings of the hybrid character of imperial relations. In that vein, the broader place of culture and institutions in world systems analysis is highlighted by Zsuzsa Gille’s fascinating chapter on “Wastelands in Transition: Forms and Concepts of Waste in Hungary Since 1948.” Gille notes the shift in ideas and practices of waste management from a socialist ‘cult of waste’ and its productive if inefficient re-use to waste as a cost of production and a distributional problem. Finally, with respect to Japan’s (possible) ascent, Gavan McCormack’s chapter “Modernism, Water, and Affluence: The Japanese Way in East Asia,” raises provocative questions about the impossibility of replicating Japan’s affluent ways. He argues that in the US the anti-dam movements have made strides in limiting future projects and dismantling some old ones.

This leads us into the social movements that are the focus of the last section of the book. Robert K. Schaeffer provides an overview of the US environmental movement’s success in the 1970s and subsequent impasse, particularly as core deflationary policies undermined broad perceptions of environmental scarcity. The last two chapters address environmental movements and their relation to democratization in South Africa and rapid industrialization in South Korea. The cases are interesting in their own right, but the relationship between their semi-peripheral position and the relative (lack of) success of domestic environmental movements is not fully explored.

To conclude, this volume should be of interest to scholars of the world system and of the political economy of the environment, but it will be difficult for classroom use because the chapters are not well integrated with each other (and because of the book’s high cost). Two questions might be asked of this volume. First, what is the unique relevance and usefulness of a world-systems approach to ecological and environmental questions (the two not being distinguished clearly by the authors)? Second, what do the contributions add to our understanding of the interrelations between political economy and environment? The collection does little to answer the first, with the important exception of Bunker and Ciccantell discussed above, but adds much to the second. In fact, a number of the contributions in this volume are interesting precisely because they reject the rigid application of world-systems theory.

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The first part of the title of John Lie’s book, Han Unbound, alludes both to the country’s name, South Korea, and a Korean word, han, which means “resentment, dissatisfaction,” revealing the author’s point of view on the tidal change his country of origin witnessed following its independence from Japan in 1945: something tantamount to a Prometheus is deemed to be unbound but proving to be a mixed blessing. Indeed, Lie considers that real development occurred in South Korea, both in economic terms (higher GNP per capita, industrialization) and political terms (from authoritarian regimes to elected government), albeit at the costs of the overexploitation of labor and political repression. However, Lie strongly disagrees with neo-liberal opinion erecting South Korea as a replicable model of development for the Third World. In his view, the case is unique and its occurrence is made possible thanks to a unique combination of internal factors and particular circumstances in the ‘international political economy,’ the term he prefers for naming the broader context.

In the preface, Lie briefly describes his explanatory strategy as “structural sequence analysis,” meaning “both the structured contexts and the contingencies that unfold in irreversible time,” a “path-dependent process,” a “sequence of structural opportunities and constraints”, and “causal relations that occur in concrete contexts and sequence.” He nonetheless foregoes reviewing both “development literature” and existing debates over South Korea’s course of change. Instead, a few concepts are carefully handpicked in the literature (such as the “developmental state”, “triple alli-
Each of the first five chapters of the book is dedicated to a given period of history of post-Second World War South Korea, up to the end of the eighties. The sixth and final chapter takes the story up to the mid-nineties and provides a brief conclusion. The two leading threads to be followed throughout the book are economic development and political change.

The building blocks of the author’s argument are the following: “Land reform, the developmental state, and low-paid labor—three inextricably intertwined factors—were crucial in propelling South Korean development. These internal factors, however, are necessary but insufficient to explain economic growth. It is impossible to ignore the international environment” (p.166).

The epochal change of the 1945–1952 period is the land reform, deemed to be a crucial condition for ulterior development. Although an “internal” phenomenon, it owes a lot to the geopolitical context, namely the United States’ policy of containment of communism and military presence in South Korea. The rest of the fifties are presented as a sterile decade, plagued with a patrimonial and authoritarian government (the Rhee regime) feeding upon U.S. Aid and moneys and channeling it into “parasitic” incipient chaebol given to rentier types of activities.

The 1960s are presented as the first authentic development decade. A “developmental state,” which Lie carefully characterizes, emerges in the aftermath of a middle class, reformist military coup (the Park regime) triggered by an event seen as of uttermost importance, the 1960 April Student Revolution. If the “developmental state” is considered the result of an “internal” political dynamic, its success in industrializing the country is explained by “contingent, external factors—not planned, internal ones.” So, South Korea’s oft-praised “export-oriented” industrialization is presented not as an intentional strategy from the start but as the result of favorable external circumstances: the Vietnam War during which South Korea was called upon as a supplier of light industrial products and eventually, its being felicitously chosen by Japan as a junior partner, in a position to inherit production and export niches Japan was leaving vacant in foreign markets. The availability of cheap labor was what enabled South Korea to seize upon such opportunities. But labor had to be kept cheap. Hence, the systematic political repression during the Park regime. Once more, an element of the geopolitical context is evoked, namely the United States’ government tacit support for Park’s authoritarian regime.

Like the 1960s, the 1980s begins with an important rebellion, the May 1980 Kwangju Uprising and ends up in the military reasserting its power. But the export-led industrialization of the previous decades had transformed the social make-up of South Korea: a numerically important and more class conscious working class had developed and the middle class had become more secure. By then, South Korea was sanguinely seen as being on the verge of joining the ranks of developed countries. In their long fight against authoritarian rule, the rather politically isolated students found new allies among the middle classes (until then, lukewarm towards their cause) and a populist ideology (the minjung) emerged as a bridge towards the exploited working class. Changing international politics further doomed authoritarian rule, mainly the waning Cold War and weakened U.S. support for hard-line anticomunist rule. The bid for the 1988 Olympics is presented as the last straw for the authoritarian regime. South Korea’s political act had to be cleaned up and authoritarian governments came to be seen as a thing of the past. A considerable anti-government movement took place in 1987 and South Korea then veered towards duly elected and representative governments, thus reaching a new stage of “political development.” With the lifting of systematic repression, wages rose steadily and labor unrest diminished.

Lie does not address the Asian financial market crisis and the debate over the nefarious effects of “globalization,” but does inform us of new realities: South Korea being pressurized to liberalize its import and financial markets; escalating wage costs hurting the competitiveness of exports; the restructuring of many chaebol. But, unfortunately for the reader’s natural curiosity, he does not venture into the question of whether South Korea’s development process has halted or goes on, given the new circumstances.

As a whole, the book provides an insightful view into South Korea’s outstanding economic and political changes over the last decades. A convincing rectification to viewing South Korea as a paragon of development, it should be read by anyone interested in the still oddly called field of “sociology of development” and by any reader interested in South Korea, whatever the reason may be. The book is also remarkable for the sober elegance of its style.

While John Lie’s study could be taken as emblematic of the heuristic value of world-system analysis, not even the shadow of an allusion to it is to be found in the whole book. Lie prefers to talk of the “international political economy,” not the world-system. This is his prerogative, of course! However, in this particular case, there is a serious drawback in ignoring the world-system perspective all together. The fact is that Immanuel Wallerstein’s tripartite stratification scheme of the world economy is particularly useful as an analytical framework for such cases of “development” as South Korea, for it draws attention to the fact that countries’ mobility, while possible, is not the rule; it carries the question as to whether a country’s “development” will peak or go on; it invites the researcher to study the unique set of circumstances under which a country’s mobility takes places and the particular ways in which it occurs (whether the mobility is sponsored or is the result of seizing opportunities).
Lie’s methodological stance is most congenial with that of world-system perspective and, despite its astonishing silence about it, his book can certainly be taken as a valuable contribution to the realm of world system studies.

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The book is composed of 11 articles, one introduction and a lucid postscript. Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa (CTHA) is primarily focused on a vast area which includes (a) Ethiopia, (b) Eritrea, (c) Somalia and Somaliland, (d) Sudan, and (e) Djibouti. Although each author has his or her own specific intellectual orientation, nevertheless they all agree on one point: the so-called internal problems of the Horn could not be understood, let alone solved, if the pressures created by the forces of globalization are not profoundly explicated. That is to say, famine, repression of dissent, military dictatorships, state terrorism, and ostensible ‘clan’ wars are directly related to the combined forces of past colonialism and ongoing globalization. In my view, this is the backbone of all contributors’ overall argument.

In order to substantiate this argument Pat Lauderdale and Randall Amster investigate the Horn of Africa in dual terms: Local versus Global. In their view, the Global is, in terms of mechanism and structural impacts, the continuation of Colonialism in a more refined and complex guise. Seen in this light, Annamarie Oliverio views ‘terrorism’ as a by-product of or an inherent result of statecraft in the Horn of Africa. The reason is not to be found in an essentionist approach to African culture. On the contrary, she thinks a critical approach to the recent history of the Horn would demonstrate the deep relation between modernist aggression and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. John Sorenson is a theoretical-cum-empirical approach to the ideas and ideals of Human Rights in the Ethiopian context. After a long discussion on the African case, he argues that the ideals of equality and egalitarianism should not be abandoned if they have not been realized yet in their institutional sense. He is not clear about his own position as an analyst. It seems he thinks that ideas qua ideals are in the Platonic sphere. Sorenson neglects the fact that these ideas qua ideals should have some institutional back-up in the indigenous cultural matrix.

However, his position reposes the question of ‘ideas’ and context of ideas as an urgent problematique in Development Studies. The relation between terrorism and Western foreign policy is the theme investigated by Asafa Jalata. The substantial merit of his argument is that ‘oppression’ or other forms of injustice did not originate in the Horn of Africa by the emergence of the West in the Black continent. On the contrary, Jalata’s case study demonstrates very vividly that native African imperialism had had a major role, as did the Western one. However, Jalata neglects that issues such as ‘civil liberty’ and ‘democracy’ did not come about even in the West but through a bloody process. This is an important fact for those who seek an institutionalization of universal human rights. T. M. Vestal’s utopian yearning is aimed at the process and progress of ‘democratization’ and the ways in which this could be realized and operationalized in the Horn of Africa. It is not, nevertheless, clear if democracy in terms of Western tradition is not applicable to the Horn, then what is applicable? Or to put it differently, what do we have there in substantive terms? Is there anything called an African point of view? If there is, then what it is? As Ernest Gellner once rightly argued, nationalism is not born out of a nation’s cry for being ‘realized’; but the reverse is the case. By the same token, one should argue that the same applies to the creation of the state. Nevertheless, Mesfin Araya does not take this logic into consideration. However, one thing is striking in his analysis (which could be seen as the prevalent romantic mode of conceptualizing Kultur) and that is a romantic faith in ‘people’ as the guiding-force of politics in the Horn. Maybe!

Crisis in Somalia, by Pietro Toggia and Pat Lauderdale, is discussed in intercivilizational terms. Their main argument is that Somalis do not find a meaningful existence by being treated as modern individuals where modernity is termed an Occidental way of being. Julia Maxted rectifies what Araya did not heed in relation to nationalism and its birth. Besides, Maxted remarks that in order to rectify the proliferation of militarism in Somaliland, the role of the international community and above all Western foreign policy should be taken into consideration. However, the role of Islamism is treated in a very simplistic terms. Maxted takes its emergence in Somalia as a result of an external element and does not see the historical importance of this movement in Africa in general and the Horn in particular. (p.176), Pietro Toggia’s positive assessment of the idea of civil society in a stateless Somalia is one of the unorthodox approaches within modern social and political theory. His approach is not aimed at the state of affairs but the ‘fruits’ of current affairs in Somalia in terms of universal human rights: free speech and free media.

Islamization in Sudan and its relation to the question of non-Muslims is what Korwa G. Adar investigates. The main issue which Adar thinks is of a global significance and has deep implications for Africa is the status of non-Muslims in a state that is pursuing Islamizing policies. In other words, what would happen, globally and locally speaking, to universal human rights in the light of ‘global islamizing
forces. Although he has consistently ‘autopsized’ the politics of the ‘North’ in relation to ‘Sudanese national’ identity, nevertheless Adar does not offer the same approach to the discourse provided by the ‘South’. Abebe Zegaye and Julia Maxted have tried to reply to the central question raised by Adar in their attempt to contextualize the plight of minorities in the Horn of Africa by resorting to the dual approach of internally assessing the external pressures and externally delineating the internal issues. That is to say, some constitutional changes are inevitable but Western support should find the ‘right’ avenues for allocating funding and economic resources.

It seems that the authors in this work have some kind of ‘Nativist-Claim’; i.e. they know that people in the Horn do not desire a modern ‘civilization’ as the Western one (xviii). Although it is very hard to assess the desire of a people for a civilizational level, nevertheless they ignore the same civilizational fact. In other words, the civilizational processes are not always voluntarily chosen and freely selected. On the contrary, most often they are imposed. The very nature of imposition (or how the culture in question receives the force) is related to the internal strength of the cultural unit that receives the force.

Last but not least, it should be noted that all contributors in this highly vibrant scholarly work suffer from a naïve interpretation of Western history. They think, at least in implicit terms, that the external coercion imposed on the ‘Horn of Africa’ is confined to the external realm of Western civilization. They don’t extend their historical gaze beyond the pre-World War II western context in order to see the prevalence of coercion even inside the West. In one way or the other, they all lament that Western policies have been unjust to the Horn but they are unaware that the logic of modernity or the forces that brought about the modern world-system, if you like, were neither internally nor externally free of coercion.

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Book Reviews


Human beings are bad for the environment. This is the story that unfolds in Sing C. Chew’s survey of “Culture-Nature relations” (p. 173) over the millennia. World Ecological Degradation aims at an “ecocentric” reading of world history that challenges the “anthropocentrism” of mainstream as well as radical scholars. To this end, Chew makes three decisive choices. In the first place, he adopts Andre Gunder Franks (1990) conception of a single world system whose history stretches back some five or six millennia. In this scheme of things, the accumulation of capital is the accumulation of things. Rather than a dialectic social relation, as for Marx, for Chew “capital” is “surplus.” It should not be confused with Marx’s value theory, which among other things identified the contradiction between capitalisms presumption of unlimited monetary capital accumulation and the sustainability of the “original sources of all wealth—the soil and the worker” (1977: 638). In reducing the theory of capital accumulation to the accumulation of things, Chew reduces to mere quantitative variation the fundamental differences between historical systems. Second, while (so-called) “accumulation” emerges as the prime mover of environmental degradation, Chew posits two additional sources: population growth and urbanization. And third, “world ecological degradation” is conceptualized primarily in terms of deforestation. Although other problems are discussed, such as air pollution and soil erosion, Chew argues for the centrality of deforestation, which “is a good proxy for our understanding of the intensity of the relationship between Culture and Nature” (p. 4). Regrettably, Chew does not really argue as much as assert the importance of forests—one would think that an “ecocentric” world history of deforestation might include discussions related to the role of forests in the hydrological cycle, the significance of forest variation across climactic zones, and so forth.

I do not think that Chew makes a strong argument in World Ecological Degradation, which suffers from inadequate theorization and an uneven empirical basis.

At the most basic level, Chew is trying to synthesize world-systems analysis with deep ecology. Yet, the reader will search in vain for an assessment of these two perspectives. Frank’s globalist ‘one world system’ perspective is favored over Wallerstein’s conception, which stresses regionally-bounded social systems with distinct modes of political economy (such as feudalism versus capitalism). But Chew offers no argument for why Frank rather than Wallerstein is most useful for understanding world environmental history. Both Frank and Wallerstein are lumped together in the camp of anthropocentric historians who ignore “Nature.” Only Braudel escapes this indignity. Unfortunately, Braudel’s potential utility for world environmental
Unfortunately, Chew’s book does not stand up well against John Bellamy Foster’s concise and theoretically lucid 1999 *The Modern World-System*. The first volume of which is replete with references to environmental transformation, including the idea that a reorganization of “world ecology” was necessary for the emergence of a capitalist world-economy (1974: 44; see also Moore, 2000: 129-136). Moreover, while the comparability of different “cultural relations with Nature between epochs” (p. 12) is one of Chew’s key questions, the Frankian “one world system” perspective undermines comparative inquiry. In this regard, the lack of engagement with Chase-Dunn and Hall’s (1997) work on comparing world-systems is particularly conspicuous.

Probably most importantly, Chew does not elaborate his central concepts—capital accumulation, population dynamics, and urbanization. Of course the great classical theorist of all three social processes is Marx. But Marx is barely mentioned and never cited, despite his extensive discussions of capital accumulation, population dynamics, and the town-country division of labor—not to mention the explosion of Marxist scholarship on the environment during the 1990s (e.g. O’Connor, 1998; Burkett, 1999; Foster, 1999). Even if ultimately rejected, Marx and Engels’ frequent and sustained discussions of the division of labor in the history of human society—an issue that Chew is presumably committed to discussing insofar as urbanization and population growth are central to his argument—can hardly be ignored.

Bereft of theory, *World Ecological Degradation* is not much better empirically. This becomes especially evident in Chew’s treatment of modern world environmental history. The discussions of Asia’s environmental history since 1500 are extensive, but read more like a collection of notes uneasily integrated into a cogent world-historical narrative. Most conspicuous is the almost total neglect of Europe’s environmental history. Chew recapitulates Perlin’s (1989) account of Venice’s problems with deforestation and wood scarcity in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but here the story ends. The remainder of the chapter on the rise of Europe has practically nothing to say about Europe at all! Rather, Chew turns his focus to European intervention in the Indian Ocean world. Given that European states and capitalists were much more effective at transforming the landscapes of, in the first place, *Europe*, and in the (very close) second place, Latin America, the focus on Asia seems misplaced. Even this more focused discussion is plagued by curious omissions. Chew does not mention, for instance, the United Provinces’ destruction of clove trees in Southeast Asia in the 17th century as a crucial ecological precondition for Dutch hegemony in the Indian Ocean.

*World Ecological Degradation* invites comparison to Clive Ponting’s *A Green History of the World* (1999) and John Bellamy Foster’s concise and theoretically lucid 1994 *The Vulnerable Planet*. Unfortunately, Chew’s book does not stand up well against these and other recent ventures in the emerging field of world environmental history. It is neither as empirically dense as *A Green History*, nor as theoretically sophisticated and accessible to a broad popular audience as *The Vulnerable Planet*. Part of the problem is that *World Ecological Degradation* is really mis-titled. This is really a book about deforestation and not the broader patterns of world ecological degradation. The latter task would have required an examination of a broader range of decisive environmental transformations—soil erosion, the production of water infrastructures such as dams and canals, successive “green revolutions” (and before that successive “agricultural revolutions”), the exploitation of the oceans, the impact of ranching, and so forth. Most of these are mentioned, to be sure, but they appear to be tacked on to the manuscript in an essentially ad hoc fashion.

Finally, while Chew argues for a materialist perspective on social history, his fondness for deep ecology undercuts the materialist argument. In the final paragraph, Chew makes a decisively idealist turn. Humans are “natural aliens” on the earth, whose numbers have “exploded... without any predatory checks” (p. 172). Humans are “maladapted,” seemingly incapable of developing a rational relationship with the surrounding environment (p. 173). All hope, it seems, is lost. Ecological consciousness and environmentalism may have a very long history but their relation to the distinctive contradictions of successive historical systems is never explored—indeed, such exploration is ruled out by the very framework that Chew employs.

*World Ecological Degradation* embodies three trends in recent world and environmental historiography. The first is the retreat from a critique of capitalism. All societies have degraded the environment and so, it is reasoned, capitalism is no different. Or different only in degree. Having jettisoned capitalism as a meaningful analytical category, Chew cannot explain what identifies it—the rapid acceleration of deforestation and ecological degradation more generally in the 20th century. Even less is he able to account for the ways that the contradictions of capitalism not only destroy nature but produce new social forces that struggle for fundamentally new social relations predicated on the rational governance of the metabolism of nature and society. Among others, this is what the environmental justice movement in the core and various peasant movements in the periphery are all about. The second trend that *World Ecological Degradation* embodies is neo-Malthusianism, where population grows independently of social relations. (Here Chew joins Chase-Dunn and Hall in the neo-Malthusian wing of world-systems analysis.) And third, Chew propounds a naïve version of ecological determinism—humanity’s goal should be to place “ecology in command” (p. 171). This is essentially a hard-line version of Barry Commoner’s famous dictum that “nature knows best” (1971). Chew takes this line of reasoning too far. While it is of course sound to follow nature’s laws, our knowledge
of such laws is socially constructed, reflecting and instantiating contradictory social relations. Thus “ecology” can be “in command” no more than “economy” or “society.”

World Ecological Degradation indicates just how far world environmental history has yet to travel. A more fruitful line of inquiry might at once theorize and investigate the distinct forms of environmental crisis—especially the distinct spatialities and temporalities of such crises—in varying historical systems. It might also consider the role of environmental crisis, itself an underdeveloped concept in the literature, in the transition from one historical system or “mode of production” to another. Such investigations would highlight the ways in which historically specific class relations not only shape the landscape, but also the ways in which these reshaped ecosystems become dependent upon such class relations for their very reproduction. At the most fundamental level, this would require a rejection of the sterile dualism of anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism in favor a dialectical view in which nature and society coevolve.

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References

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The growth in awareness and concern over environmental issues has manifested itself in a “greening” of the social sciences. This ecological revolution is beginning to influence world systems theory as well. Ecology and the World-System, edited by Walter Goldfrank, David Goodman and Andrew Szasz, served to initiate that dialogue. Now one of the contributors, Sing C. Chew, has produced a longer work to explore the larger dimensions of the ecological crisis in light of world systems theory. World Ecological Degradation builds on his earlier paper, “Ecological Relations and the Decline of Civilizations in the Bronze Age World System: Mesopotamia and Harappa 2500 B.C.–1700 B.C.” from that collection to explore an array of societies in the period from 3000 B.C.– to the present. The resulting work offers distinct contributions to both world systems theory and environmental theory.

A sympathetic critic of world systems theory, Chew challenges its theorists to give greater consideration to the role of what to Chew calls “Culture-Nature relations” in understanding historical change within world systems. By bringing in this ecological dimension, Chew is able to shed new light on key concepts in world systems theory, such as the ecological effects of core-periphery relations, as well the ecological bases for both the rise of core powers and also their decline. Central to his analysis is the contention that “ecological limits become also the limits of socioeconomic processes of empires, civilizations, and nation-states, and the interplay between ecological limits and the dynamics of societal systems defines the historical tendencies and expansionary trajectories of the human enterprise.” (p. 57)

The incorporation of a world system approach is a welcome alternative to the isolated island examples and metaphors that have been used frequently in ecological analysis.

As Chew insightfully notes, “though isolated island communities offer a controlled method for our understanding of the relationship between Culture and Nature, it is limiting, as throughout world history there have always been numerous interactions between social systems, and in most circumstances, social systems handle their environmental resource constraints via conquests, promotion of migration (voluntarily and involuntarily), and trade exchanges.” (p. 3) When, for example, more than 240,000 trees were cut in New England between 1771 and 1773 for consumption in the West Indies (pp. 128–9), it becomes clear that the fate of a given ecosystem cannot be understood in isolation. As long as there are material exchanges between societies, that trade will produce ecological effects for both ends of the exchange.
These effects become all the more troubling when they take place in the context of core-periphery relations; "Core-periphery relations are very degradative of the environment, especially when the periphery is providing a vast amount of resources to meet the high consumptive needs of the core, with its highly urbanized population and exuberant lifestyles. This is exacerbated further with the adoption by peripheral elites of lifestyles and ideologies that mirror those of the core." (p. 26)

The resultant environmental degradation is experienced disproportionately by ecosystems in the periphery. Chew describes these effects on the periphery as the "ecological-degradative shadow" of the core. Chew adds, "These shadows are thus a consequence of core-periphery relations beyond those ecologically degradative effects that might be generated by the periphery itself." (p. 11) This point serves as an important corrective to some Northern environmentalists who might otherwise consider the environmental degradation of the South only in terms of the policies and actions of the Southern nations.

One of Chew’s best contributions is to make explicit the natural origins of the objects crucial to the rise and dominance of core societies—such as naval fleets—and the intense environmental destruction that accompanied their production. After reading this book, one won’t be able to discuss 16th century British naval power without simultaneously picturing the two thousand old-growth oak trees that were felled to make each warship. (p. 122)

If the rise and reign of core powers comes through the appropriation of nature, it is reasonable to postulate that the resultant environmental degradation will play some part in the decline of a core power. And indeed, Chew argues that nature has a role in delimiting the life course of nations and empires. But disappointingly, he doesn’t take the next logical step of systematically evaluating the significance of ecological factors to societal collapse. There is only one compelling example offered where environmental degradation played a central role in the decline: the loss of Venetian dominance in shipping in the sixteenth century due to the scarcity and increased costs of wood for shipbuilding. (p. 121) But elsewhere, the link between environmental degradation and national decline is unexpectedly vague and even overstretched, such as in the accounts of Mesopotamia and the Roman Empire.

Regardless of its causes, Chew provides a useful insight into the ecological dimensions of this decline by considering its impacts not only for society, but also for nature. "Ecocentrically speaking, dark ages should be appreciated as periods for the restoration of the ecological balance that have been disrupted by centuries of intensive human exploitation of Nature." (pp. 9–10) Thus, the regeneration of nature provided by these periods of societal collapse is actually an important precondition for the subsequent renewal of the society.

As these examples illustrate, *World Ecological Degradation* makes clear contributions to understanding the ecological dimensions of historical change. However, it is somewhat less satisfying for understanding the roots of ecologically degradative behavior. This is surprising. The temporal scope and geographic scale of the work seems ideally suited for a historical-comparative analysis of the different manifestations of ecological degradation across societies and modes of production. Comparison of these differences could then serve as a basis for understanding the social roots of environmental degradation.

Chew takes a different path, however. Rather than compare the differences, he highlights the commonalities of environmentally degradative behavior. In reviewing the "historical trajectory of human 'macro parasitic' activity," Chew contends that "viewed from this long-term perspective, our present relationship with Nature has not changed significantly over time." (p. 1) This conclusion is not untenable, but it must be established through careful evaluation of the differences in human relations with nature between societies.

Instead, Chew takes it as a premise, and in his efforts to identify a common pattern of degradation, he neglects the counterexamples. For example, large parts of the world are absent from his account, most notably the pre-European Americas and Australia. And he only examines the past 5000 years of human history, when there are examples of notably different culture-nature relations prior to that time. I suspect that some of these cases would have provided some important counterpoints to his contention that environmental degradation is "as old as the hills." (p. 12)

Part of the limitation of this analysis is that Chew focuses on three factors that serve as good proximate markers of environmental degradation, but not as root causes: the accumulation of capital (broadly defined), urbanization, and population growth. There is no clear effort to account for the motivating causes for these factors. Instead, the factors become reified and power relations are strangely absent from the discussion. While the book gives central concern to the culture-nature relation, it does not give close consideration to how the relations within societies shape that dynamic.

A greater consideration of the forces behind accumulation, urbanization, and population growth might account for the differential presence of these three factors in various societies. It could then help to explain how and why some societies cause less environmental degradation than others, and thus point to more sustainable forms of social organization. However, Chew seems content simply to note the presence of the three factors in various societies as evidence of the consistency of societal degradation of the environment.

One consequence of this approach is the rather jarring conclusion to the book where Chew compares human communities to a cancer: "In medical diagnoses... confirmation of any two characteristics in the above cellular-differentiation process would establish the conditions for malignancy. It would be safe to say that from our examination of ecological relations throughout the last five thousand years of world
history, these criteria have often been met by the human communities across time and space.” (p. 173) While it provides a stark expression of the magnitude of humans’ impact on nature, it is hard to see how that sort of analysis can offer much guidance out of the environmental crisis.

Nonetheless, Chew’s work is an important contribution to the growing clarion call alerting us to the scope and severity of the ecological crisis. In doing so, it points to the need for further research in the social sciences to explore and address the social roots of that crisis. And in particular, *World Ecological Degradation* offers helpful insights into the potential role for world systems theory in that work.

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