Contents

David Wilkinson        The Status of the Far Eastern Civilization/World System: Evidence from City Data                292
Shelton A. Gunaratne   An Evolving Triadic World: A Theoretical Framework for Global Communication Research         330
Nikolay N. Kradin      Nomadism, Evolution and World-Systems: Pastoral Societies in Theories of Historical Development 368
Jon D. Carlson          The ‘Otter-Man’ Empires: The Pacific Fur Trade, Incorporation and the Zone of Ignorance          390

Review Essay

Kristin Marsh          Two Steps Forward and One Step Back: Conflict and Contradiction in Post-War Guatemala          444

Book Reviews

John Tomlinson         Globalization and Culture
                      Reviewed By Albert J. Bergesen

David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Ferraton
                      Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture
                      Reviewed By David M. Mednicoff

Robert A. Denemark, Jonathan Friedman, Barry K. Gill, and George Modelski
                      World System History: The Social Science of Long-Term Change
                      Reviewed By Richard E. Lee

Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, Margaret Lock, Mamphela Ramphele, & Pamela Reynolds
                      Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery
                      Reviewed By James V. Fenelon
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The main editorial goal of the Journal of World-Systems Research is to develop and disseminate scholarly research on topics that are relevant to the analysis of world-systems. We especially want to include works that proceed from several different theoretical stances and disciplines. These include, but are not limited to, civilizationists, evolutionary approaches, international political economy, comparative, historical and cultural analysis. We seek the work of political scientists, historians, sociologists, ethnographers, archaeologists, economists and geographers.

We especially encourage works that take theory seriously by confronting problems of conceptualization and making definitions of concepts explicit, by formulating hypotheses, constructing axiomatic theories and causal models. Theoretical research programs that combine theory construction with comparative research are badly needed to take the world-systems approach beyond the stage of a perspective.

We also want to encourage the application of comparative, quantitative and network-analytic methods to world-systems research, though we will certainly also publish pieces that do not use these methods. Any empirical study that is deemed relevant to world-systems analysis may be published even if it uses a very different conceptual framework.

And finally we also want to publish discussions of future trajectories and options for the modern world-system and considerations of what can be done to create a more humane, peaceful and just world society.

The Purposes of JWSR are

to produce a high quality publication of world-systems research articles; to publish quantitative and comparative research on world-systems; to publish works of theory construction and codification of causal propositions; to publish data sets in connection with articles; to publish reviews of books relevant to world-systems studies; and to encourage authors to use the hypermedia advantages of electronic publication to present their research results.

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INTRODUCTION

Andre Gunder Frank’s Re-Orient and Centrality of Central Asia raise several interesting issues of a potentially empirical character, some of them relevant to our current topic of “city systems in East Asian civilization.” Did a separate Far Eastern civilization/world system ever coexist with some others in the Old World, loosely united by a single trading network or oikumene? Or were Old World cities always a single “world-system” so strongly integrated as to be part of a single social process? And whatever the degree of organization of the Old World cities, as loose trading oikumene or tightly bound social system, was that collective entity always, sometimes, or never Sinocentric?

Frank would, I believe, defend the answers (a) that all the Afro-Eur-Asian civilizations/world-systems were tightly bound into a single system and process, through a linkage in Inner Asia (as we shall call it for the purposes of this paper); and (b) that at least for some time before the 19th century the single world-system into which they were bound was Sinocentric, or at least not Eurocentric, and specifically not Eurocentric for the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.

One set of data that may bear on these questions, and serve at least in part as a source of answers, is to be found in Tertius Chandler’s pioneering collection of city size data estimates (1987). Chandler’s table set titled “Tables of World’s Largest Cities: The Largest 75 Cities, 2250 B.C.–1975” (1987: 460 ff.) seems rel-
Evidence bearing on the empirical “centrality of Central Asia,” upon the integration through Inner Asia of the Old World oikumene as a world-system, and conversely upon the individuality of its various components, should be present in the answers to the questions. How many of the largest cities were Inner Asian; and, What relation is there between the population of the largest Inner Asian cities, and that of the largest Old World cities? When and if Inner Asian cities were many, and large by comparison with outlying cities of what I have labeled (1987, 1992–93) “Central Civilization” (mostly found in Southwest Asia, North Africa and Europe), “Indic Civilization,” and “Far Eastern Civilization,” both the integration of an Old World world-system and the “centrality of Central Asia” become more plausible propositions than when Inner Asian cities are few and relatively small.

Chandler’s tables for 2250 BC (only 8 cities @ a threshold of circa 30,000) and 2000 BC (9 @ 25k) show no cities east of present Iran (see the maps for these years). At these dates, on these data, there is no evidence of an Old World-wide world-system.

An Indic city appears in the 1800 BC table (10 @ 20k), and there is at least one Indic city from 1200 BC (15 @ 24k) on. Far Eastern cities appear in Chandler’s tables for 1360 BC (16 @ 24k) and thereafter. Furthermore, the populations of the largest Far Eastern cities (e.g. Sian, Loyang, Lintzu) and, to a lesser degree, the largest Indic cities (e.g. Ayodhya, Hastinapura, Kausambi), become comparable to those of the largest cities—Egyptian Thebes and Memphis, Mesopotamian Babylon) of what I have labeled “Central Civilization” (the polycultural fusion of Egyptian/Northeast African with Mesopotamian/Southwest Asian Civilization after c. 1500 BC). For these times, then, an Old World world-system is conceivable.

However, no cities appear in Inner Asia in Chandler’s tables for 1800 BC, 1600 BC (11 @ 24k), 1200 BC, 1000 BC (14 @ 25k), 800 BC (17 @ 25k), 650 BC (20 @ 30k), or 430 BC (51 @ 30k). This seems consistent with a reading which finds separate Central and Far Eastern (and Indic) world systems coexisting at these times.

From 200 BC on (55 @ 30k), however, Inner Asian cities begin to be found in Chandler’s tables. An Inner Asian convergence and joining of the three major world systems becomes possible, and should be explored in appropriate detail.

**200 BC**

One city in western Inner Asia, Balkh, appears, as the easternmost urban extension of what I would call Central Civilization; the simultaneous appearance of Peshawar, a city on the northwest Indic frontier, and the absence of any other Inner Asian city, suggests that the trade nexus here does not include the Far Eastern Civilization. Balkh is 1/4 the size of the largest Central system city, Alexandria; Peshawar is 1/9 the size of the largest Indic system city, Patna. I would accordingly incline to view Balkh and Peshawar as parts of the semiperipheries of two world systems/civilizations, each of which is growing toward the other along a linking trade route.

**AD 100 (75 @ 30K)**

Now a collection of Inner Asian cities appears in Chandler’s list: Merv and Balkh; Peshawar; plus westward extensions of the Far Eastern system, Tunhuang and Kanchow. Peshawar, the Kushan capital, is the largest Indic city, but Balkh is 1/10 the size of the largest Central city (Rome), and Kanchow 1/9 the size of the largest Far Eastern city (Loyang). I would therefore interpret this distribution as the further extension eastward of the Central semiperiphery, the beginning of a matching extension westward of the Far Eastern semiperiphery, and a noteworthy northward movement of the Indic core.

**AD 361 (50 @ 40 K)**

All the Inner Asian cities listed AD 100 turn up missing. This is not just an artifact of the shrinkage of the list (75 to 50) and rise of the threshold (30k to 40k); had the same restrictive criteria been applied to the AD 100 list, only Tunhuang would have dropped out. The “rimland” world-systems seem to have pulled their semiperipheries back from Inner Asia.

**AD 500 (50 @ 40K)**

Merv and Balkh have returned. They are 1/9 the size of the largest Central cities, Constantinople and Ctesiphon. There is no matching extension of the Indic city set northward, or of the Far Eastern westward. I would therefore read this as evidence that Central Civilization is extending its semiperiphery into western Inner Asia.

**AD 622 (51 @ 40)**

Merv remains; Samarkand replaces Balkh; Kashgar appears, soon to be a target of the T’ang Far Eastern state. Merv is 1/10 the size of the largest Central city, Ctesiphon, Kashgar 1/8 the size of the largest Far Eastern city, Changan. Because of its trade connections, Kashgar might be seen as a shared Indic-Far Eastern semiperipheral extension into Inner Asia now matching that of Central Civilization; but hardly more than that.
AD 800 (56 @ 40K)

In this table, Bokhara joins Merv and Samarkand; Jayapuram extends Indic northward; Lhasa complements Kashgar as an Indic-Far Eastern link. But Samarkand is 1/9 the size of the largest Central city, Baghdad (Merv and Bokhara are smaller), Lhasa 1/6 the size of Changan. Jayapuram is 3/5 the size of Kanauj, the largest Indic city. The Indic core seems to have shifted northward somewhat, the Far Eastern somewhat westward, but a bit less; Constantinople having declined precipitously, the Central core has also shifted eastward somewhat, though not to Inner Asia. If this movement were to continue, an Inner Asian confluence might ensue.

AD 900 (61 @ 40K)

Bokhara, Samarkand, Kashgar and Lhasa remain; Jayapuram and Merv are gone; Balasaghun is added. Again comparing the largest Inner Asian extension of a civilization to its largest city, Bokhara is 1/9 the size of Baghdad, Kashgar 1/10 the size of Changan; Indic has no northward extension. The Indic core has shifted south again, as has its semiperiphery; the Far Eastern core has shifted east again. In the net, the rimland world systems have moved apart, losing all the ground gained in the previous table.

AD 1000 (70 @ 40K)

A larger clustering of cities appears in western Inner Asia: Bokhara, Samarkand, Kashgar, Balasaghun and Lhasa continue; Ozkend (Far Eastern), Ghazni (Central) and Thaneswar (Indic) are added. But Bokhara and Samarkand are 1/6 the size of Cordova, Ozkend 1/6 the size of Kaifeng; Thaneswar is 3/5 the size of Kanauj. The situation seems to repeat AD 800, with a bit more emphasis: the lost ground has been more than made up, the rimland systems are flowing toward each other again.

AD 1100 (70 @ 40K)

Bokhara, Samarkand and Balasaghun remain; Lahore replaces Ghazni; Ozkend, Thaneswar and Lhasa are gone. Bokhara is now 1/3 the size of Constantinople, Balasaghun 1/10 the size of Kaifeng. Central Civilization has continued to "flow" eastward, but Indic and Far Eastern have pulled back.

In any series of snapshots taken at intervals, intervening transitory events are lost. I did not map Chandler’s table for AD 1150 (nor his later tables at less than hundred-year intervals). But AD 1150 may have been Inner Asia’s chance for true centrality: in that table, Seljuk Merv equals Constantinople as the world’s largest cities. But this amounts to a core shift eastward in central Civilization: no comparable core shift toward Inner Asia is shown for either Indic or Far Eastern civilizations, and Merv’s size will soon decline again.

AD 1200 (73 @ 40K)

To Merv, Bokhara, Samarkand and Balasaghun, this table adds Herat and Ghor. Afghanistan-based Islamic conquerors of Delhi have momentarily erased the boundary between Central and Indic civilizations. Balasaghun is 1/6 the size of Hangchow, Bokhara 1/3 the size of Fez. What is implied is some net movement since 1100 of the Central and, to a lesser degree, the Far Eastern semiperipheries towards each other. Unification of the Old World world-systems seems nearer in sight then ever. But....

AD 1300 (75 @ 40K)

All of the Inner Asian cities of AD 1200 have vanished. This is one consequence of the Mongol destruction of the Khwarezm state (Khorasan), an Inner Asian semiperipheral extension of Central Civilization. (The Mongol destruction in Inner Asia, and the failure of their invasions of India, incidentally restore the autonomy of Indic civilization, as well as its relative isolation.) Two westward extensions of Far Eastern civilization are seen, Turfan and Kashgar, the latter 1/9 the size of Hangchow.

AD 1400 (75 @ 45K)

Only Samarkand is found in Inner Asia, 1/3 the size of Cairo; as Tamerlane’s capital, its size reflects a real power shift, but his invasions of India have eliminated Delhi and forced Indic civilization even farther from any Inner Asian convergence. Ming-Mongol wars have also removed the westward extensions of Far Eastern civilization are seen, Turfan and Kashgar, the latter 1/9 the size of Hangchow.

AD 1500 (75 @ 50K)

There has been a partial recovery in Inner Asia: to Samarkand add resuscitated Bokhara and Turfan. But Samarkand is only 1/7 the size of Cairo, and Turfan but 1/11 the size of Peking. The wounded Central and Far Eastern civilizations have resumed their expansion towards a juncture; so, but to a much lesser degree, has Indic, where Delhi reappears. The move toward fusion is about where it was AD 622.
AD 1600 (75 @ 60K)

Of Inner Asian cities, only Bokhara makes this list, 1/7 the size of Constantinople. A powerful linkage is indeed being established—I would by this time judge that the Indian subcontinent has probably been recruited into the Central world-system; but the linkage is overseas, reflected in the appearance in this table of Goa. No Indic or Far Eastern Inner Asian city outpost appears. Inner Asian linkage is back to about the AD 500 level.

AD 1700 (75 @ 60K)

Bokhara continues, at 1/9 the size of Constantinople. No Far Eastern city-outpost is found in Inner Asia. If an Indic world-system persists, it has a significant northward extension in Srinagar, 1/3 the size of Ahmedabad. (I have however not previously treated Srinagar, which appears in Chandler’s lists in 430 BC, 200 BC, AD 100, AD 361, AD 500, AD 622 as an “Inner Asian” link city, but as a dead end of a north Indic route.)

AD 1800 (75 @ 77K)

Bokhara is gone; Peshawar replaces Srinagar; again, no Far Eastern city-outpost is found in Inner Asia. The Indian subcontinent is by now certainly integrated into the Central system; the second largest British city is Lucknow.

AD 1900 (75 @ 350)

An enormous Eurocentric growth in city numbers and sizes has left Inner Asia completely off the list. Even assuming that a Far Eastern world-system persists—I would suspect that it too has by now been absorbed into the Central system—its connections are in seaports like Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton.

CONCLUSION

I would conclude that Chandler’s data are more consistent with the interpretation that there were several Old World world-systems, the three largest of which merged after 1500 mainly as a result of European states’ overseas imperial, especially trade-imperial, expansions, than with the interpretation that finds only one Old World world-system, with a strong continental connection through Inner Asia. Assuming the Old World world-systems were indeed many, not one, till a modern date, there remains Frank’s other issue: was the real-world history of these world-systems in some sense “Sinocentric,” requiring a “re-Orienting” of our history-writing?

The Chandler data may have a bearing on the “empirical Sinocentrity” issue. As a first approximation, we may ask, at any moment, which competing party had the largest city, implying the largest political extraction of, or industrial exchange for, surplus food production. One could see this as a comparison between the claims of “Europe” and “China” for the status of “most advanced society.” However, neither “Europe” nor “China” seems to me to be genuine world-systems; I will therefore give the question more gradations, and ask it for Central and Far Eastern world-systems as well; and not omit Indic.

As no “European” or “Chinese” city does appear, and no “Central” city could appear, before Chandler’s 1360 BC table, we shall begin this follow-up inquiry at that time. For each date thereafter, the largest city in either “Europe” or “China,” and the largest in either Central, Indic, or Far Eastern civilizations, is named in Tables 1 and 2, in its appropriate column; ties are reflected by multiple entries. (Note that “Thebes” is the Egyptian city, not the Greek city.)
In this set of comparisons, “China” generally outperforms “Europe.” However, Central Civilization (which is usually non-Eurocentric) generally outperforms Far Eastern (which is usually Sinocentric) until late in the Northern Sung dynasty, when the balance radically shifts for 600 years. Both facts are interesting; given the greater antiquity of the Central system, it is the shift that perhaps should seem surprising. There was a noteworthy economic reform struggle in the late Northern Sung. Has inadequate attention hitherto been given to the competitive merits, at the civilization/world-system scale, of the reforms of Wang An-shih (fl. 1069-1074)?

This inquiry by no means exhausts the interesting questions raised by Frank’s arguments, nor indeed has it exhausted the data potentially relevant to such questions in Chandler’s collection. The relative weight of the easterly and westerly ends of the Old World oikumene could be further explored, for instance, by looking at more urban data than only primate city sizes; perhaps a decentralized, multistate, multipolar system will show better on that measurement. Evidence bearing on the empirical Sinocentrism of the history of the oikumene may, for instance, be present in the answer to the question: what proportion of the largest cities, in each snapshot year, was Far Eastern (as a fraction of the whole collection, and also vs. Central or Indic)? What proportion of the total population of the largest cities was Far Eastern?

And of course Chandler’s tables are hardly the last word on city sizes. Historical and archaeological progress will revise such data (cf. e.g. Chandler 1987 vs. Chandler and Fox, 1974), and any conclusions therefore drawn are as tentative as necessary. Normal science may well revise data and theories at a rate proportional to the number of workers in the field (Wilkinson’s Law of Obsolescence?). Ask any astronomer how it feels to find that “Everything you know is wrong”; some are exhilarated, some depressed. Pending future exhilaration and depression—much of both are to be expected from Inner Asian archaeology—we use what there is.

In this necessarily tentative manner, we would conclude, at this point and on the available data, that (1) Frank’s thesis of a single Old World world-system is less well supported than the thesis of a long coexistence of a plurality of world-systems, including a separate Far Eastern system; (2) Frank’s thesis of the general economic lead of “China” over “Europe” is supported, if one accepts these as genuine systemic entities; but even if one does not, as I do not, (3) there yet remains evidence of an interesting medieval outrunning of the Central by the Far Eastern world-system, which begs further investigation.
Cities and Their Civilizations in 2250 B.C.

- Largest cities, threshold c. 30 thousand, 8 total in table, 7 on map (no location posted for Agade), derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in 2000 B.C.

- Largest cities, threshold c. 25 thousand, 9 total, derived from Chandler’s list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Source: Chandler, 1987:460
Cities and Their Civilizations in 1800 B.C.

Largest cities, threshold 20 thousand, 10 total, derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in 1600 B.C.


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Cities and Their Civilizations in 1360 B.C.

* Largest cities, threshold c. 24 thousand, 16 total, derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in 1200 B.C.


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Cities and Their Civilizations in 1000 B.C.

- Largest cities, c. threshold 25 thousand, 14 total, derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in 800 B.C.


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Cities and Their Civilizations in 650 B.C.


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Cities and Their Civilizations in 430 B.C.


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Cities and Their Civilizations in 200 B.C.

Source: Chandler 1987: 461

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 100

- Largest cities, threshold 30 thousand, 75 total, derived from Chandler’s list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 361

- = Largest cities, threshold 40 thousand, 50 total, derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 500

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 622


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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 800

- Largest cities, threshold 40 thousand, 56 total, derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 900

Largest cities, threshold 40 thousand, 61 total, derived from Chandler’s list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Source: Chandler, 1987: 468
Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1000

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1100

- Largest cities, threshold 40 thousand, 70 total, derived from Chandler’s list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1200

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Source: Chandler 1987: 472
Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1300

= Largest 75 cities, 40 thousand +, derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1400

* = Largest 75 cities, 45 thousand +, derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1500

Source: Chandler, 1987: 478

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1600

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Source: Chandler, 1987: 481
Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1700

- Largest 75 cities, 60 thousand +, derived from Chandler's list (1987) via Wilkinson (1992-1993). Map shows only those civilizations which had cities on this list.

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1800

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Cities and Their Civilizations in A.D. 1900


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An Evolving Triadic World: A Theoretical Framework for Global Communication Research*

Shelton A. Gunaratne

The recognition of the process of globalization has drawn attention to the shortcomings of the theories that scholars have so far used to study global communication—a concept that is distinct from but often confused with international communication. The “developmentalism” notion of the Parsonsian structural-functionalist modernization paradigm, which presumed that nation-states changed in parallel lines from tradition to modernity, influenced the work of many inter-national communication researchers until the mid-1970s. Researchers also have paid attention to other communication phenomena associated with globalization—transborder data flows, cultural imperialism, media events, global network organizations, etc.—though many of those studies have generally failed to take a global perspective. Changes in the global power structure, attributable primarily to the ongoing globalization process fanned by the Digital Revolution, require us to reformulate and refine relevant aspects of these approaches.

The purpose of this essay is to develop a theoretical framework for global communication research based on a reformulation of the world-systems perspective. Gunaratne (2001a) has broadly explained the potential for testing global-communication hypotheses within the five components of Frank’s inter-

ABSTRACT

A macro theory that recognizes the world’s three competing center-clusters and their respective hinterlands offers a realistic framework for global communication research. This study has used recent data on world trade, computers, Internet hosts, and high-tech exports to map the triadization of the world in the Information Age. The original dependency theory and world-system theory perspectives emphasized the hierarchical linking of national societies to the capitalist world-economy in a center-periphery structure. The proposed global-triadization formulation looks at the center-periphery structure in terms of a capitalist world-economy dominated by three competing center economic clusters, each of which has a dependent hinterland comprising peripheral economic clusters. These clusters may not necessarily be geographically contiguous. Strong-weak relationships may exist within each center-cluster, as well as within each periphery-cluster, with one center-cluster occupying a hegemonic role. The rudimentary Information-Society Power Index, constructed for this study, can guide the researcher to test an abundance of hypotheses on the pattern of global communication and information flow with particular attention to source, message, channel, and receiver.
An Evolving Triadic World

The findings of this study clearly confirmed both propositions. These findings provide a new theoretical framework for global (holistic) or international (partly holistic) communication researchers to embark on projects to ascertain the inter-and intra-communication patterns/processes of the world’s three competing center-clusters: the center-periphery communication patterns/processes related to each of the three center-clusters, the inter-and intra-communication patterns/processes of the periphery clusters, and the significance of the hegemon cluster vis-à-vis all other macro and micro units in the world system. The particular contribution of this approach is the potential it offers to examine global or international communication patterns/processes (source-message-medium-receiver-effect) holistically by recognizing the part-whole interrelationships of all theoretical components of the world system. Thus, the hermeneutics of communication research findings would have to entail the five dimensions of the world system mentioned in the second paragraph. This study also fits rather well with the continuing tradition of concern with cultural ties (e.g., Galtung 1971) or the network blocks of cultural ties (“blockmodel” analysis) of the world system (e.g., Kick 1987).

The next section of this essay will focus primarily on the more recent literature on the subject and demonstrate how I derived this study’s theoretical framework. The third section will elaborate on the concepts and methods I used in the study. The fourth section will elaborate on the findings. The final section will provide a discussion of the related issues.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The structure of the basic argument of the world-systems perspective, according to Goldfrank (2000:178), is that capitalism is a world-economy comprising “core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral productive regions integrated by market mechanisms which are in turn distorted by the stronger of the competing states, none of which is strong enough to control the entire economy.” Wallerstein’s (1974) formulation of this perspective borrowed the core-periphery concept from the dependency theory (see Gunaratne & Conteh 1988) and added the concept of the semi-periphery. The world-systems theory sees the world “as developed and underdeveloped states, or zones, the interaction of which, through unequal exchange processes, produces a global core-periphery division of labor” (Bergesen 1990:67). It uses totalities as units of analysis to describe social change. It postulates the capitalist world-economy as the basic unit of analysis. Trade and exchange constitute the primary social mechanism that integrates the global system. Bergesen criticizes the world-system theory, as well as the international-relations theory in political science, because “both begin with the individualist assumption that we begin with an aggregate of states and then move toward
international order, rather than the collectivist assumption that we begin with an international order and only then derive the presence of states and national economies” (p. 68). Bergesen says that the world-systems approach should “place culture and power at the heart of the analysis and replace the individualism implied in the idea of a division of labor, unequal or not” (p. 80). Bergesen’s suggestion confirms the need for global-communication research to emphasize the global framework rather than the atomistic nation states.

Unlike the structural-functionalist modernization paradigm, which occupied the center-stage of social science inquiry until the mid-1970s, the new world-system paradigm helped explain not only the historic North-South inequality but also the rise of the newly industrialized countries. It shifted attention from the nation-state to the world-system as the relevant unit of analysis. However, Schramm and Lerner (1976), two of the pre-eminent communication scholars at the time, failed to assess the significance of the world-system perspective’s epistemological and hermeneutical challenge when they edited their book on re-thinking communication and change. Many contemporary developmental-communication scholars (e.g. Shah 1996) also continue to exclude the world system perspective, while a few (e.g. Servaes 1999) have attempted to incorporate it. In general, this perspective has not yet received adequate attention in most discussions on communication theory as a field.

McMichael (2000:669) points out that the world-systems perspective saw development as a systemic process, “where core-periphery relations were the real development dynamic and core states were outcomes, rather than units, of development.” McMichael contends that the accelerated compression of time and space in the current era of “financialization” has helped transform nation states into global states, a phenomenon synonymous with the decomposition of wage-labor as a social institution. This interpretation provides a challenge to researchers engaged in the study of communication and development, as well as the global flow of information. Teivainen (2000) argues that to face the political and theoretical challenges of the futures of the world system, scholars must redraw the modernist map of political space (i.e., the territorialist and single-perspectival conception of social space) used by the traditional world-systems approach.

Skair (1999) asserts that the process of globalization has made it difficult to study many contemporary problems at the level of nation states, that is, in terms of each country and its inter-national relations. Instead, researchers need to conceptualize such problems in terms of global processes. However, Skair points out the clear need to establish a distinction between the inter-national and the global. He categorizes globalization studies into four research clusters: the world-systems approach, the global culture approach, the global society approach, and the global capitalism approach. He argues that the global capitalism approach is the most productive for theory and research in globalization. Vollmer (1999) has called for the “reformulation or reformatting of existing concepts of international communication” to develop a new theory of global communication that would encompass the “various global movements in shaping the diverse, and... continuously diversifying global communication processes” (p. 2). Gunaratne (2000, 2001b) has asserted that the “New Global Age” requires more refined global (or macro-level) theories to dissect the reality of the world as an interconnected unit. Chang, Lau, and Hao (2000) have attempted to incorporate various theoretical approaches in inter-national communication research into the world-systems perspective.

As already documented, contemporary scholars have gone well beyond the ideas of Braudel (1967) and Wallerstein (1974) who broached the idea that a world-economy—an economy wherein capital accumulation proceeded throughout the world—prevailed in the West since at least the 16th century. Wallerstein (1979) argued that capitalism as “a system oriented to capital accumulation per se” (p. 272) began in the 16th century. Frank and Gills (1993) discarded the Eurocentric approach of the world-systems theory and adopted a humanocentric approach to socio-historical analysis arguing that a world economy has been in existence for 5,000 years. Castells (1996) pointed out a significant distinction between a world economy and a global economy, stating that the latter signified “an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale” (p. 92).

Triadization

Louch, Hargittai and Centeno (1999) draw our attention to three dominant interpretations of the process of global interdependence: interdependent globalization (the universal model), civilizations and empires (the clustered model), and hegemonic globalization (the hegemonic model). The universal model presumes a generic and system-wide increase in reciprocal ties between countries. The clustered model presumes an increasing concentration of communication within clusters of countries united by a common cultural

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2. Hier (2001) claims that the initial architect of the world-system perspective was Oliver Cox, who produced a trilogy of volumes on capitalism in 1959, 1962, and 1964 tracing the roots of the capitalist system to medieval Venice.
An Evolving Triadic World

heritage or congruent to ex-imperial links, historical flows of trade, and contemporary financial flows. This perspective recognizes clustering around the three major powers—the United States, the European Union, and Japan. The hegemonic model presumes the increasing centrality of a small core of rich countries, perhaps dominated by a single power. This view sees globalization as merely an acceleration of the concentration of resources and influence in European and North American clusters with some limited East Asian additions.

Louch, Hargittai, and Centeno (1999), who tested international telephone traffic from 1983 to 1995 as a measure of “globalization,” found little evidence to support the universal model. They found a clear hierarchy of telephone contact mostly concentrated in the wealthiest countries with poorer countries being either marginalized or linked asymmetrically to a cluster of the wealthiest. They also found that the United States had consolidated itself as the “center” with the further weakening of Europe’s relative position. In an earlier study, Barnett and Salisbury (1996) traced changes in the international telecommunications network from 1978 to 1992 to examine the process of globalization. Their findings were similar to those of Smith and White (1992), who also found the underlying core-periphery dimension in the world commodity trade flows. At the center were the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; at the periphery were the less-developed countries in Latin America and Africa; and between these two groups were nations generally classified as semiperipheral. This global power configuration, which some scholars identify as “triadization” (Thussu, 2000, p. 77), offers a most tempting meta-theoretical basis for global communication analysis. Mattelart (1996/2000) also identified the construction of the large free-trade economic blocs around the triad powers—North America, East Asia, and the European Union (EU)—as “a major change that has contributed to the creation of new divisions in the world” (p. 98). Bergesen and Sonnett (2001), who analyzed the Global 500, found a very clear three-way split between Asia (29 percent of the firms), Europe (34 percent), and the United States (33 percent), “suggesting a tripartite geopolitical division of the world economy” (p. 1603). Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) also recognized the emergence of three regional international economic blocs—the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the rich Asian economies—to dominate the world economy. Earlier, Galtung and Vincent (1992) had gone to the extent of demarcating the mainly Buddhist-Confucian countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia as a separate world with Japan at the top, and the Four Tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—in the second tier. The triadization concept also ties in with the socio-historical analysis of Frank (1998:328) who points out that “the globe-encompassing world economy/system did not have a single center but at most a hierarchy of centers” even though a single-centered structure of center-periphery relations prevailed “on intraregional and perhaps on some interregional bases.” Frank (1998) also disputes the existence of “semiperipheries” in Wallerstein’s sense.

However, some network analysts have disputed the presumed triadization. Barnett and colleagues, who have conducted several international studies on selected aspects of communication—monetary, telecommunication, transportation, and trade flows (Barnett, Salisbury, Kim, & Langhorne 1999; Salisbury & Barnett 1999; Barnett, Choi, & Sun-Miller 1996; Choi & Ahn 1996; Barnett & Choi 1995), news flows (Kim & Barnett 1996), and telephone networks (Sun & Barnett, 1994)—have concluded that overwhelming empirical findings do not support a triadic world system but a tightly connected group centered on the G-7 countries. Straussfogel (1997), a geographer, on the other hand, describes “the modern world-system as a hierarchically organized complex social structure [comprising] multiple layers of nested and overlapping, cooperating and competing subsystems linked through a variety of types of nonlinear relations” (p. 123). She has proposed the merging of Prigogine’s theory of dissipative structures (Prigogine & Stengers 1984) with world-system theory to derive a framework that is able to account for a large number of spatial and temporal events throughout the history of capitalism.

Castells (1996:145), a sociologist, explained that the new global economy was the outcome of the “interaction between the rise of informationalism and capitalist restructuring.” Its characteristics, he said, were interdependence, asymmetry, regionalization, increasing diversification within each region, selective inclusiveness, exclusionary segmentation, and variable geometry (p. 106). Furthermore, he asserted that the architecture of the global economy reflected “an asymmetrically interdependent world,” a triad area comprising three major economic regions: North America, with Latin America as its hinterland; Western Europe, with Eastern Europe, Russia and South Mediterranean as its hinterland; Japan and the Asian Pacific (plus Australia and New Zealand), with the rest of Asia, including the Middle East, as its hinterland. He called Africa the marginalized region even though South Africa could be the magnet for the region’s resurgence.

Castells (1996) castigated the world-systems theory as “simplistic” because it
made little analytical sense to compartmentalize the deeply asymmetric global economy into a center, a semiperiphery, and a periphery. He argued that the world has several “centers” and several “peripheries” characterizing the “so internally diversified” North and South (p. 108). Despite Castells’ criticism, a triadized configuration of the global center-periphery structure provides a more realistic framework on which to base communication research. In a recent study of 38 countries, Wu (2000) reported trade volume as the leading predictor in international news coverage. In the light of this finding, the “triadization” model offers a framework to test hypotheses on the news flow within and among the three center-clusters and their respective hinterlands.

Hugill (1999) looked at the geopolitics and technologies of the respective communication systems of Britain, imperial Germany and the United States as they struggled for hegemony. He applied the world-systems perspective but confined himself to the “capitalist world-system only as it has developed over the past 150 years” (p. 16). Despite his Eurocentric approach, Hugill makes a useful assertion: that “in the period of multipolarity we are now entering” (p. 18), the chosen communication strategy of regional power groupings—e.g., NAFTA, the European Union, and Japan-led Asia—will determine their ability to achieve hegemony. This observation further supports the notion of “triadization.”

Castells (1996:145) describes the “architecture and geometry of the informational/global economy” as an asymmetrically interdependent phenomenon organized around three major regions—Europe (EU and the European economies affiliated with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), North America (or NAFTA) and the Asian Pacific (Japan and the “China Circle”). He identifies the G-7 countries as “the core of the system” because they accounted for 90.5 percent of high-technology manufacturing in the world (in 1990), and also held 80.4 percent of global computing power. Furthermore, he says that an economic hinterland has sprung up around each of the three major regions with Africa increasingly marginalized in the global economy.

Combining these observations of Castells, Hugill, and others, we can use their triadization framework to empirically observe the information and communication flow among and within the three center-clusters and their respective economic hinterlands. High-technology manufacturing and computing power may serve as the criteria for measuring competitive capital accumulation under informational capitalism. Informational capitalism is what Tehrani (1999) calls “informatic imperialism,” which, in his view, is bifurcating the globe into the “high-tech and high-growth centers” and the “disintegrating peripheries” (p. 26). Gunaratne (2001a) wrote: Where high-technology production and computing power are likely to determine competitive capital accumulation, as well as the concomitant phenomena of hegemony-rivalry and alternating economic cycles, a development approach must recognize the realities of the world/global system. Communication researchers should address this issue to help policy makers stall the proliferation of “disintegrating peripheries.”

Triadization Model

The foregoing review leads us to consider the following essentials for formulating a macro-model for researching aspects related to the global information and communication order.

- Because totalities should be our units of analysis, we should begin with the “collectivist” world system (the capitalist world-economy—in effect, the modern informational economy) as our basic unit of analysis, and only then derive the presence of the “atomistic” states (Bergesen 1990).
- The world system has three center-clusters (Bergesen & Sonnett 2001; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Castells 1996; Mattelart, 1996/2000; Smith & White 1993) one of which occupies the role of the hegemon (Louch, Hargittai & Centeno 1999) while continuously competing with the other two to maintain its hegemony (Hugill 1999). (Such competition goes hand-in-hand with cooperation in the self-interest of each center-cluster as evident in G-7 summits.)
- Each center-cluster has a dependent hinterland of periphery-clusters (Castells 1996), and our subordinate unit of analysis should be these clusters of global states, which have so transformed from nation states as a result of ongoing transnationalization, as well as “financialization” in the informational economy (Bergesen 1990; McMichael 2000; Teivainen 2000).
- These characteristics have made it difficult to study many contemporary problems, which are entangled in global processes, at the level of nation states (Sklair 1999). However, within this structure, we should analyze the phenomena of culture and power (Bergesen 1990), political and cultural effects (Sklair 1999; Chase-Dunn 1999); transnationalization (Teivainen 2000), financialization (McMichael 2000), etc.

Network Model

Whereas the triadization model is based on attributes of the units comprising the world system, the network model is based on relationships among those units. Hargittai and Centeno (2001:1552) extol the virtues of applying network theory and methods to define “the underlying pattern of the literally millions of sets of ties across the globe.” They say network analysis enables precise and concrete means to map the relationships among regions, states, cities or even smaller units. They argue that the two-dimensional perspective reflected in the
core-periphery structure based on attributes has become irrelevant “in an N-dimensional reality,” where N represents the number of forms of international reactions. Categorization by attributes, they point out, may miss the “critical dynamics of global cliques” (p. 1551). Within this scheme, the core units are those that emerge as central to these global cliques. However, Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995:398) say the contention that “network measures are superior to attribute measures has been argued but not demonstrated. The question of method of operationalization is always confounded with the question of the substantive content of the measures.”

More recently, several researchers (Barnett 2001; Kick & Davis 2001; Sacks Ventresca, & Uzzi 2001; Smith & Timberlake 2001; Townsend 2001, and Van Rossem 1996) have improved on the earlier work of pioneer “blockmodel” network analysts (Boorman & White 1976; Breiger 1976; Kick 1987; Knoke & Kuklinski 1982; Mullins, Hargens, Hecht, & Kick 1977; Snyder & Kick 1979) to explore the dynamics of the world-system. Their analyses, accomplished through advanced statistical techniques, have yielded varying core-periphery structures depending on the variables measured. However, the United States and the top G-7 countries in Europe consistently appear as the core though Japan’s appearance is inconsistent.

Smith and Timberlake (2001), who studied the hierarchy of world cities based on the international flow of population by air travel, placed Hong Kong and Singapore ahead of Tokyo in 1997 while asserting that the “key cities in Western Europe and North America have continuously maintained their position as central nodes” (p. 1675) even though six or seven East Asian cities had achieved a remarkable rise in importance. Townsend (2001), on the other hand, found in the global structure of the Internet “a shift in the geography of telecommunications networks and the emergence of a network of network cities” (p. 1697). Kick and Davis (2001), who conducted a multiple-network analysis of eight types of transnational transactions (trade flows, bilateral economic aid and assistance treaties, bilateral transportation and communication treaties, bilateral sociocultural treaties, bilateral administrative and diplomatic treaties, political conflicts, armament transfers, and military conflicts) for 130 countries during 1970–1975, derived a modified world-system structure: core, semicore (capitalist/socialist), semiperiphery, and periphery. Kick and Davis concluded that the “core of Western industrial nations,” including Japan, dominated the world-system across all the networks (p. 1566). No Asian-Pacific country fitted the capitalist semicore although China fitted the socialist semicore. They, however, fitted 12 Asian-Pacific countries, including the East Asian Tigers, in the semiperiphery. Van Rossem (1996), in his role-equivalence model of the world system based on the density of five networks—imports, exports, diplomatic ties, arms trade, and
production, and exports by U.S. high-technology industries accounted for 18.1 percent of world high-technology exports. Japan was second, accounting for 9.1 percent of exports, followed by the United Kingdom with 8.3 percent (NSB 2000). Because the World Bank excluded the data for Taiwan, an important high-tech product exporter, this study estimated the data by deriving the average for the East Asia region. The data show that the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) accounted for 71.1 percent of the world’s high-tech exports in 1998.

Informational Society Power Index

This study constructed the ISPI by allocating appropriate weights to the Computing Power Index and the High-Tech Exports Index and, then, combining the two results. It allocated a weight of 53 percent to the CPI [(78.1 + 149.2) × 100] because the top 10 countries (in descending rank order) accounted for 78.1 percent of this index; and it allocated a weight of 47 percent to the HTEI [(71.1 + 149.2) × 100] based on the same reasoning. Thus the ISPI, just like its two derivate indexes, gives each global state/cluster a score out of 100 that reflects its power position in the triadized center-periphery structure.

Reliability and Validity

Considering the conclusion of Van Rossem (1996) that the absolute size of the economy was the best proxy for world system role, I conducted a regression analysis of the component variables of the ISPI vis-à-vis the Gross National Income of each economy for which relevant data were available. My analysis yielded the following equations: $R^2=82\%$ for GNI v high technology exports (using 1999 data for 92 economies); $R^2=82\%$ for GNI v number of Internet hosts (using 2001 data for 136 economies); and $R^2=96\%$ for GNI v number of PCs (using 2000 data for 116 economies). Thus, we can surmise that all three variables have high reliability, as well as construct validity, because they are significantly anchored to the GNI. The weights allocated to each of these variables—the percentage share of the top 10 economies—to construct the ISPI are quite justifiable, though somewhat arbitrary, because of the remarkable dominance of these few economies over each of the three attributes.6

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4. The top 10 countries shared 82.7 percent of the 1999 total of Internet domains, with Japan occupying the ninth rank (Zook 2001). However, Japan occupied the second rank in the share of Internet hosts.5

5. World Bank (1999:317) identifies high-tech exports, in technical terms, as “goods produced by industries (based on U.S. industry classifications) that rank among a country’s Top 10 in terms of R&D expenditures.”

6. DeVellis (1991:317) says, “Scale reliability is the proportion of variance attributable to the true score of the latent variable.” He clarifies that construct validity is “directly concerned with the theoretical relationship of a variable … to other variables” (p. 46). As for weights, one could argue that no empirical way exists to determine weights although structural equation (or path) modeling could generate an infinity of statistically accept-
Table 1 – Regional Pattern of World Merchandise Exports (based on annual average for 1996–1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>1996-1999 Average of Exports ($ Billions)</th>
<th>Destination Percentage of Exports (shown along the rows)</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>C/E Europe/Baltic/CIS</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5331.75</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2322.69</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1344.57</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>890.44</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>278.20</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/E Europe/Baltic/CIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>216.74</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>163.62</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>115.96</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WTO Annual Report 1999 and 2000 (based on Table A7)

Rows show origin, columns show destination.
Boldface indicates exports within each region.
Boldface Oblique indicates exports from periphery clusters to center-clusters.

FINDINGS

The exports-data attribute supported the “triadization” concept. (Statistical advice I received confirmed that tests of significance would make little sense because the data covered the universe.) The 1996–1999 world merchandise trade data (Table 1) provided evidence to back the notion of three center-clusters and four dependent periphery-clusters, which Castells (1996) refers to as hinterlands. The process of capital accumulation in the global material economy has generated a scenario where world trade is predominantly concentrated in the three centers: Western Europe (42 percent), Asia (22 percent) and North America (20 percent) in that order. In general, most of the Asian continent, including the Middle East, appears to be the hinterland of the Asian-Pacific center—Japan and a half-dozen rising economies.7 (Almost one-half of Asia’s export trade is within Asia, and almost one-half of the Middle East exports go to Asia.) The Central-Eastern Europe/NIS region appears to be the hinterland of the Western-Europe center. Because of Africa’s heavy dependence on Europe for its meager world trade, Africa also belongs to Europe’s hinterland. (More than one-half of the exports from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, as well as more than one-half of the exports of Africa, go to Western Europe.) Finally, Latin America, including the Caribbean, appears to be the hinterland of the North-America center. (More than one-half of the exports from Latin America go to North America.)

The Triad

This study defined the North-America center as the NAFTA cluster of global states, the Western-Europe center as the EU cluster of global states, and the Asian-Pacific center as the cluster of eight global states that topped the region’s Information Society Power Index (i.e., Japan, Singapore, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Australia). These three center-clusters scored 91.2 out of the maximum possible 100 on the ISPI, thereby showing their remarkable dominance over their hinterlands (Table 2). NAFTA was the hegemon of the center-clusters with a score of 42. The EU, with a score of 26.6, was slightly ahead of the Asian-Pacific center with 22.6. Figure 1 illustrates the are among the top 10.” Considering that 46 percent of Middle East’s trade is with Asia (World Trade Organization 1999), this may mean that the trading partners are not using telephone communication alone for trade transactions because of language problems. The Middle East also has considerable trade connections with Western Europe (21 percent) and North America (13 percent). Trade data for 1997 clearly show that Japan was the No. 1 market for exports from Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE (International Monetary Fund 1998). Telephone communication data may well be a reflection of the international language order that has elevated English as the global language, and also of the Middle Eastern diaspora in the EU and the NAFTA center-clusters.

Table 2 – The Three Global Centers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Centers</th>
<th>Computing Power Index</th>
<th>High-Tech Exports Index</th>
<th>Information Society Power Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA Center</td>
<td>57.4769</td>
<td>24.5170</td>
<td>41.9858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Center</td>
<td>18.3091</td>
<td>35.9777</td>
<td>26.6134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian-Pacific Center</td>
<td>13.3023</td>
<td>33.1271</td>
<td>22.6200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.0883</td>
<td>93.6218</td>
<td>91.2191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999

6. The percentage of exports was calculated from the weight of the destination cluster (shown along the rows) and the weight of the source cluster (shown along the columns). It is important to note that the weights of the clusters are equal. Wainer and Thissen (1976) say “increased robustness can be obtained through the use of equal regression weights without severe loss in accuracy.” The weights I have allocated are very close to equal weights.

7. A reader of this manuscript, however, disputed this configuration on the basis of the frequency of telephone calls from the one region to the other. He wrote: “For 1997, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE do not have an East Asian country among the top 20 nations that they call. But the United States and United Kingdom
relative size of the three center-clusters in relation to the ISPI, as well as their relative positions on the two derivate indexes—the CPI and the HTEI.

**NAFTA Center**

Within the hegemon cluster, the United States stands out as the super global state with an ISPI score of 38. Canada and Mexico have relatively little power within the cluster (Table 3 and Figure 2). Because the United States beats the ISPI score of each of the other center-clusters, its influence on the entire world system becomes crystal clear. As a macro-unit, the NAFTA Center has a population of 410.3 million, a gross “national” income of $10.7 trillion, and a per capita income of $26,188 (World Bank 2000).

**EU Center**

Three global states stand out in the EU cluster: Germany and the United Kingdom hold the lead, with France closely behind. The Netherlands and Italy occupy the middle between the Big Three and the other 10 global states of the cluster (Table 4 and Figure 3). As a macro-unit, the EU Center has a population of 376.4 million, a gross “national” income of $8.5 trillion, and a per capita income of $22,654 (World Bank 2000).

**Asian-Pacific Center**

Compared with the other two, the Asian-Pacific center-cluster is geographically not contiguous. Japan leads it with an ISPI score of 8.6 followed by Singapore (Table 5 and Figure 4). Except for Japan, South Korea and Australia, the other global states of this center-cluster do not belong to the OECD—the
An Evolving Triadic World

Sources:
ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999

Table 4 – Components of EU–Center

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU–Center</th>
<th>Computing Power Index</th>
<th>High-Tech Exports Index</th>
<th>Information Society Power Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.1885</td>
<td>7.3775</td>
<td>5.6873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.6339</td>
<td>7.4658</td>
<td>5.4349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.1544</td>
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Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999
* Estimated

Figure 3 – Center Cluster: European Union

Table 5 – Components of Asian-Pacific Center

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asian-Pacific Center</th>
<th>Computing Power Index</th>
<th>High-Tech Exports Index</th>
<th>Information Society Power Index</th>
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<td>Sub-Total</td>
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Sources: ITU, 1999; Netsizer, October 2000; ISC, July 2000; World Bank, 1999
* Estimated

Figure 4 – Center Cluster: Asian-Pacific

Note: Size of Bubble = Information Society Power Index

world’s club of the rich. New Zealand, an OECD member, is not included in this cluster. Hong Kong also is not included although one could justify its inclusion as part of China. Unlike the other two center-clusters, the Asia-Pacific center-cluster is neither an economic union nor a free-trade association. As a macro-
An Evolving Triadic World

As the units comprising the world’s center and the semiperiphery. The Group of Seven (G-7), the world’s super-rich countries, would be the center, and the remainder the semiperiphery. My analysis shows that the OECD cluster accounts for 83.3 percent of the ISPI (Table 6).

Geographical Breakdowns

Table 7 shows the power rankings, in descending order, of each of the traditionally recognized main geographical regions. The Americas head the list followed by Western Europe, Asia-Pacific, East/Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, Middle East, and Africa. It also shows the power rankings of the sub-regions comprising each major region. Nested within each sub-region are the power rankings of each of its principal global states. The data in this table can assist the researchers who may want to redefine center-clusters and periphery-clusters.

DISCUSSION

Although the world merchandise trade data help us identify the clusters comprising the global triad, they do not help us to correctly identify the hegemon of these three center-clusters. With 42 percent of the world trade concentrated in Western Europe, one could mistakenly identify the EU center-cluster as the hegemon. (IMF data for 1997 show that 60.6 percent of EU exports went to other EU countries, 8.7 percent to NAFTA, and 7.5 percent to Asian-Pacific core. See Table 1 for the three-year average for Western Europe.) However, the Information Society Power Index, which highlights the two main resources that presumably engender power inequalities among states, enables one to identify the actual hegemon. In Wallerstein’s parlance, a new world-economy, which Castells calls an informational economy, has replaced the old world-economy. In my formulation of the world system, the three center-clusters would include many, though not all, of the global states that Wallerstein placed in the semiperiphery. Thus, prosperous small global states too have become part of the center. This perspective differs from that of Van Rossem (1996), who placed highly developed small economies in the second-tier periphery in his role-equivalence model of the world system. However, he allowed that global states could “gain

---

**Table 6 – OECD–Member Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD Countries</th>
<th>Computing Power Index</th>
<th>High-Tech Exports Index</th>
<th>Information Society Power Index</th>
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<td>2.1544</td>
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<td>2.6537</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td><strong>77.7483</strong></td>
<td><strong>83.3061</strong></td>
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</table>


* Estimated

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unit, the Asian-Pacific Center has a population of 1.6 billion, a gross “national” income of $6.8 trillion, and a per capita income of $4,200 (World Bank 2000).

**OECD**

The traditional world-system perspective would most likely see the 30 member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as the units comprising the world’s center and the semiperiphery. The Group of Seven (G-7), the world’s super-rich countries, would be the center, and the remainder the semiperiphery. My analysis shows that the OECD cluster accounts for 83.3 percent of the ISPI (Table 6).

---

8. If one were to add up the exports and imports within the 50 states comprising the United States, just as in the case of the 15 components of the European Union, the result would also pinpoint the actual hegemon by smoothening the “inflated” share of world merchandise trade credited to the latter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Computing Power Index</th>
<th>High-Tech Experts Power Index</th>
<th>Information Society Power Index</th>
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prominence in the world system through cooperation and regional alliances that pool their resources” (p. 524).

Adhering to Bergesen (1990), I began with the international order and only then derived the presence of states and national economies. My starting point was the global trade flow pattern, which enabled me to determine the regional clusters that dominated the world economy/system. (However, my configuration was based on the pattern of exports, not imports, because exports represent the competition for world capital accumulation. The relational data derived from network analysis would reflect both exports and imports but with inadequate attention to the magnitude of trade.) Then I hypothesized the factors—computing power and high-technology manufacturing—that enabled these clusters to compete successfully in the global informational economy. Thereafter, I looked at the pattern of distribution of the world totality of computing power and high-tech exports to construct a power index for each center-cluster and its constituent member states. My approach of using attributes for analysis is consistent with that of historical social science that gave birth to the world-systems theory.

As pointed out earlier, adherents of network theory, including Barnett et al. (1999), assert that the proper approach to the analysis of structural theory uses relational data such as the frequency of communication among social systems or nation states. However, network analysis also suffers from major drawbacks. First, the lack of global data sets makes it an impractical method to uncover the historical center-periphery structure of the world economy going back at least to the beginning of the European Age (Wallerstein 1974) or the Asian Age (Frank 1998). Smith and Timberlake (2001) confess “the lack of data on the flows between any units of a network means that relational analysis can never adequately capture its multiplex structure in totality” (p. 1662), and the nature of network analysis made “missing data particularly problematic” (p. 1661). Second, in the absence of solid and unbiased data sets encompassing all global units, network analysis based on partial data will raise questions on validity in spite of statistically derived results on connectedness, centrality, and integrativeness. Although some good network data on commodity trade flows are available, Smith and Timberlake lament the “absolute dearth of relational data on all social phenomena” (p. 1661), i.e., compilations of networks of interactions or flows between global units. In relation to tracing communication networks, Smith and Timberlake point out that although sampling the volume of telephone calls, telex messages, faxes, telegraph, and mail is possible in principle, telephone companies “would probably be reluctant to share such information because of the possible implications for their competitive positions in the industry” (p. 1663). Third, the dearth of data available for network analysis forces researchers to operationalize research concepts to suit the availability of data thereby raising further questions on validity.9 For instance, Kim and Barnett (1996) used the country reports of international newspapers and periodicals trade data—a very narrow category based on self-reporting—to define news flows. Again, Barnett et al. (1999) used data from a U.S.-based credit card corporation to measure global monetary flows that gave an incomplete picture of international transactions related to Japan in particular.

This study has hypothesized that the power structure of the Information Society, to a large extent, is dependent on computing power and high-technology manufacturing. However, one should be conscious that these two variables, in turn, are the consequence of a cluster of antecedent variables, such as those included in the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Program 2000)—the real per capita income, literacy, education, and life expectancy. The emphasis placed on research and development is also a supremely important factor. The Computing Power Index constructed for this study needs further validation through a comparison with mips (million instructions per second) when such data become available for most global clusters. Furthermore, the reliability of the CPI also depends on the accuracy of the estimates of the number of personal computers and Internet hosts. This study’s High Technology Exports Index also needs refinement based on a “more comprehensive notion of high technology” (Chabot c. 1996).

This study provides the following world system perspective. The modern world-economy comprises three competing center-clusters, each of which has a dependent hinterland of periphery-clusters. The relative power of the three center-clusters is unequal. Among them, there is a hegemon cluster led by a global state that has more power in the world system than any other. The relative power of the global states within the center-clusters, as well as those within the periphery-clusters, is also unequal. If one were to presume that the global information and communication flow follows the pattern of this triadized center-hinterland structure, this reformulated world system perspective offers a rich theoretical framework for conducting global communication research.

Barnett and colleagues, as noted earlier, say their network analyses do not show a triadic configuration as postulated by Castells (1996), Mattelart (1996/2000), and others. Barnett and Choi (1995), however, say they found three groupings of a different kind: a Spanish-language based group that included Spain and Latin America; an English-language based group that included East and South

9. Van Rossem (1996:525) says, “The development of better measures of world system role is made difficult not only by the conceptual confusion, but also by the poor quality and limited availability of international data.”
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada; and a group comprising continental Europe, excluding France and Spain. The Barnett team’s Choi and Ahn (1996) confirmed the centrality of the G-7 countries in Europe but found no evidence (Choi & Ahn 1994) of the centrality of Japan in the Pacific Basin community. They placed Hong Kong, as the center of information flow in East Asia. Although WTO data on world trade (Table 1) clearly indicate the triadic domination of the world economy, Barnett et al. (1999) provide no explanation for this discrepancy. They assert:

When comparing the international monetary, telecommunications and trade networks, the overall results suggest these three networks are quite similar. NEGOPY results suggest that these networks share similar core, peripheral, semi-peripheral and marginal countries....In spite of all the recent ideological criticisms of the world system theory,... these research findings support the theory....The consistent regional patterns of organization in the three networks suggest a further anomaly in the world system theory, i.e., factors other than economic ones determine the structure of the world system. These include geographical and cultural factors. (Barnett et al. 1999:43)

Barnett and Choi (1995) and Barnett and Salisbury (1996), however, did find regional clusters for telecommunication flows, as well as for international telephone use. Barnett et al. (1999:42) admitted that these were “somewhat at odds with world system theory.” They said that one explanation could be that the world system may be divided into regional groupings even though “recent research has failed to confirm this finding for international trade” (p. 42). Thus these researchers concede that the world system theory needs some refinement as suggested in this essay. The present study sees the three center-clusters—NAFTA, EU, and Asia-Pacific—as the most evident structure of the contemporary world-economy. Starting from this totality, network analysis could trace relations within each cluster and among the three clusters and their hinterlands in relation to better-conceptualized research problems. Network analysis could provide new insights if it were to analyze the EU as a single economic unit rather than as 15 separate political units thereby reducing the current Eurocentric bias. Each of the three center-clusters can be analyzed similarly.

A crucial need is to answer the following questions: What is international communication; and should there be a distinction between mass communication and other forms of communication such as travel, tourism and migration? Multiple-network analysis encompassing a variety of communication variables would be the most beneficial though the most difficult to do. If the triadization concept were to be incongruent with the pattern of world communication, that may indicate the need to separate the world communication or language order from the world economic order.

The work of Barnett and colleagues in the communication field need further confirmation (for validity and reliability) using all pertinent research approaches. Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) say “some excellent work has attempted empirically to measure the placement of states in the core/periphery hierarchy” (p. 397) using a number of research tools. The essential requirement is to move the research focus away from the atom (i.e., the nation-state) to the whole (i.e., the world system). Thus the analysis of global communication should move in descending order from the world-economy to the center-clusters and their respective hinterlands, i.e., the periphery-clusters, and only then to the global-states within each of the clusters. Researchers could redefine the center-clusters or the periphery-clusters to achieve the desired accuracy. For instance, they could expand the EU cluster (ISPI = 26.613) into a Western Europe cluster (ISPI = 28.024) by adding Western Europe’s OECD states excluded from the European Union: Switzerland, Norway and Iceland.

The arrows in Figure 1 indicate the potential interrelationships between and among the various clusters. The bold double-arrow lines show the hypothetical higher information and communication flow between and among the three competing center-clusters. The thin double-arrow lines show the hypothetical higher information and communication flow between each center-cluster and its hinterland. The broken double-arrow lines show the hypothetical lower information and communication flow between hinterlands and external center-clusters. This model presumes a very low flow among the hinterlands themselves.

Within this framework, researchers can test hypotheses covering all five elements in Lasswell’s (1948) transmission model: Who (Source) says what (Message) to whom (Receiver) through what medium (Channel) with what effect (Impact). Here are two examples of plausible hypotheses related to source-message-receiver elements:

- Information and communication flow within each center-cluster and its respective hinterland would be greater than the flow across competing center-hinterland configurations.10

10 The aforementioned reader also pointed out that Fuentes-Bautista (1999) had examined trade and telecommunication flows in the Americas and found that trade blocs did not have an impact on regional communication, although they did effect trade. The study showed one group centered on the United States. This too points out to the need for more research by different researchers. It also suggests a need to differentiate between communication and mass communication with more widely acceptable operational definitions.
The concept of developmental communication, as well as that of developmental journalism, which is predicated on the modernization paradigm, requires a thorough re-examination. Elevating the quality of journalism globally, and in the periphery-clusters in particular, may serve a much more useful purpose than a restricted brand of developmental journalism that hardly commands an audience.

Although the world system perspective is solidly based on economics, its strength depends on its ability to provide a testing ground of hypotheses associated with all other social sciences. Wallerstein (1979) maintains that history and the social sciences—anthropology, economics, geography, political science, and sociology—are just “one subject matter” that one may call “historical social science” (p. ix); and that the world-systems theory is a by-product of the application of historical social science. If economic criteria are implicitly integral to all social sciences, then the present study’s theoretical approach should be eminently suitable for culture-and communication research as well. Frank and Gills (1993) assert that the world system theory accommodates scholarship in a variety of disciplines. Anthropologists (Kearney 1995) and geographers (Straussfogel 1997) are among the social scientists who have attempted to integrate it into their fields.

Relating the world-systems theory to international communication, anthropologist Kearney (1995) points out the three successive dominant paradigms in the field: the communication and development model, the cultural imperialism model, and the cultural pluralism model, “which is still exploring the dynamics of the world system. Freedom House, for instance, measures press freedom using four criteria solely internal to a state: laws and regulations, political pressures and controls, economic influences, and repressive action (Sussman 2000). My model requires linking the notion of press freedom to global forces, such as the ability of center-clusters to flood the periphery-clusters with a barrage of information-communication notwithstanding the domestic restrictions within a state. So conceived, the measurement of press freedom should include the accessibility of information from non-domestic sources. Moreover, if we were to presume the libertarian concept—“a free flow of information unimpeached by any intervention by any nation” (Hachten 1999:21)—as the best expression of press freedom, then, research must also address the issue of global press freedom vis-à-vis the vast volume of government-sponsored global news flow (e.g., Voice of America, Radio Moscow, Radio France Internationale, etc.).

As noted in the literature review, the world system perspective also provides a challenge to developmental-communication researchers to look into the global links that limit or facilitate a nation’s competitive edge in capital accumulation.

11 The MacBride Report (1980) attempted to place press freedom in a global context. It affirmed everyone’s right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers, as articulated in Article 19 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Note that this right belongs to the individual, not the media institutions.) The report also drew attention to the 1952 Convention on the International Right of Correction (Recommendation 48).
holistically by recognizing the part-whole interrelationships of all theoretical components of the world system. The application of network analysis to macro-units (the triadized economic clusters), where reliable data are available, is likely to produce new insights on the interrelationships of those units. Moreover, the emphasis on part-whole interaction will improve our understanding of press freedom, development, and other communication-related phenomena that researchers have examined “atomistically” for the most part. Because no nation (atom) can exist outside of the world system (whole), research based solely on endogenous conditions will reflect only partial reality.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

In the modern social sciences and history, there are four groups of theories that variously explain basic principles of origin, further change and, sometimes, collapse of complex human social systems. The first of these groups is the various unilinear theories of development or evolution (Marxism, neoevolutionism, modernization theories etc.). They show how humanity has evolved from local groups of primitive hunters to the modern post-industrial world society. The second ones are theories of civilizations. The proponents of these theories argue that there is no unified world history. Rather there are separate clusters of cultural activity that constitute qualitatively different civilizations. The civilizations, like living organisms, are born, live and die (Spengler 1918; Toynbee 1934 etc.).

The world-systems perspective and multilinear theories of social evolution are intermediate between these poles. The world-system approach (Wallerstein 1974 etc.; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Sanderson 1999 etc.), like unilinear theories of development distinguish three models of society: mini-systems, world-empires and world-economies. But they are considered in space rather than in time. This makes the conceptualisation of history more complete. The modern multilinear theories (Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000; Korotayev, Kradin, de Munk, Lynsha 2000 etc.) suppose that there are several possible paths of socio-political transformation. Some of these can lead to complexity, e.g. from a chiefdom to a true state; while others suppose the existence of the supercomplex community without a bureaucracy (e.g. Greek polises); while a third group preserves the tribal system under particular ecological conditions. I propose to call this school multievolutionism.

This article discusses the problem of categorizing the polities and social formations of steppe pastoral nomads in Central Asia in comparative and civilizational perspective and placing complex pastoral society within a general scheme of cultural evolution. It also discusses the role that these societies played in the emergence of a larger Eurasian world-system.
In this paper I will consider the prospects of various methodologies in studying the nomadic societies. I begin with the theories of historical stages.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Social evolution among pastoral nomads has not been well conceptualised. In general essays on cultural evolution nomads are only touched upon indirectly. The emphasis in these books is on the evolution of agrarian cultures and civilizations (Sahlins 1968; Service 1971; Adams 1975; Johnson and Earle 1987; Earle 1997 etc.). Some attention to this problem has been given by Marxist anthropologists (see details on this discussion in: Khazanov 1975; 1984; Markov 1976; Kogan 1980; Halil Ismail 1983; Gellner 1988; Bonte 1990; Kradin 1992; Masanov 1995 etc.). The prolonged debate about the essence of nomadic societies (including the concept of “nomadic feudalism”) did not lead to the emergence of a generally accepted theory. But some theories have been discarded, especially the orthodox Marxist scheme of five formations. Other viewpoints (e.g. pre-class society of nomads, early state, different interpretations of feudalism among nomads, conceptions of nomadic mode of production) continue to contend up to present (see Kradin 1992).

For years in anthropology there has been a tradition of following Herbert Spencer in his understanding of social evolution as “change from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity, through successive differentiation and integrations” (Carneiro 1973: 90). As H.J.M. Claessen (2000) showed in his brilliant review of neoevolutionism, the current concepts of social evolution are much more flexible. It is apparent that social evolution has no single line of development. Many channels of evolution do not lead to the development of complexity. The obstacles in the way of increasing complexity are vast, and stagnation, decline and even collapse are just as typical of the evolutionary process as any progressive increase in complexity or structural differentiation. One can agree with Claessen’s characterization of social evolution as a qualitative reorganization of society from one structural state into another.

Nomadic societies are a good confirmation of these ideas. A cyclical movement among pastoral cultures has predominated over the development of complexity (but this is a feature not only of nomadic societies [see Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Hall 2001]). Nomads have many times united into large political formations and created great empires that have subsequently disintegrated. The “xenocratic” empires of nomads (based on conquest or extraction of surplus from agrarian societies) represent the upper limits of complexity reached by pastoral societies (Barfield 1991; 1992; Hall 1998). Central Asian steppe nomads did not independently evolve beyond this stage of integration. There was an insuperable barrier determined by the rigid ecological conditions of the arid steppe environment. This view of nomadic societies is shared by the majority of nomadologists of different countries (Lattimore 1940; Bacon 1958; Krader 1963; Khazanov 1975; 1984; Markov 1976; Kradin 1992; Masanov 1995 etc.).

Regarding the problem of general evolution, I think that three levels of cultural integration of pastoral nomads are revealed, falling into an order of increasing political complexity as follows:

1. acephalous segmentary clan and tribal formations;
2. ‘secondary’ tribe and chiefdom;
3. nomadic empires and quasi-imperial pastoral polities of smaller sizes.

A changeover from one level to another could occur in either direction (Kradin 1994; 1996b). It is the critical peculiarity of nomadic social evolution that transformation of the political systems did not correlate with other criteria of social complexity. The political system of nomads could easily evolve from the acephalous level to more complicated organizations of power and vice versa, but such formal indicators as increase in population density, complex technologies, increase in structural differentiation and functional specialization did not occur. When transforming from tribal pastoral systems to nomadic empires only a growth in the total population (due to the addition of conquered populations) takes place. The political system becomes more complex and the total number of hierarchical levels increases.

From the viewpoint of anthropological theories of social evolution, the key problem is whether or not the nomads could create their own statehood? How should the nomadic empires be classified in anthropological theories of evolution? These questions are currently discussed by researchers of different countries and, especially, by Marxist anthropologists. It should be noted that for the Marxist theory of historical progress, nomadism has become a stumbling block similar to the ‘Asiatic mode of production.’ How could changing or cyclical nomadic societies be interpreted within a framework of the common march of the production modes? A unilinear Marxist theory of social progress assumed, primordially, changes from lowest economical forms to the highest ones. However, the economic ‘basis’ of pastoral societies has remained unchanged: the similarities among the modern Masai and Arabs with the ancient Hsiung-nu is very great. Thus, nomadism drops out of a unilinear Marxist dialectic of history. On the other hand, if the economic ‘basis’ of society did not change, then the superstructure should be unchanged. But the superstructure of the pastoral nomads varied greatly. The nomads created giant steppe empires, which later disintegrated to separate Khanates or acephalous lineage societies and all of this
contradicts the principles of a unilinear Marxist theory of historical evolution (Gellner 1988:93–97, 114).

The advocates of the concept of nomadic feudalism and the Engels/Stalin scheme of five modes of production emphasized the difference in economical and cultural development between nomads and agrarian civilizations, thereby overestimating the level of the economic ‘basis’ of pastoralism. In these theoretical schemes, many facts were falsified and fitted to the Procrustean bed of the dogmatic Marxism of the Soviet Union. So, the erroneous division into ‘early’ (pre-feudal and slave-owning societies in ancient Eurasia) and ‘late’ (medieval feudal) nomads has arisen.

Advocates of the concept of the pre-class development of nomads subjected the concept of ‘nomad feudalism’ to criticism (Markov 1976 etc.). As ‘true’ Marxists, they concentrated on the development level of the economic ‘basis’ of pastoralists. If the ‘basis’ of ancient nomads was not a class one, then the ‘basis’ of the later pastoralists must not be based on class either. On the other hand, primitive ‘superstructure’ should be adjusted to primitive ‘basis’. Therefore, nomads in this approach to social evolution have only approached the late primitive (pre-class, pre-feudal etc.) stage.

This development in the discussions of Russian nomadologists was already obvious. For example, analysis of the samples from the Ethnographic Atlas of George Murdock (1967) indicates that almost all ethnohistorical known nomads have not approached the state level and nor have they had class stratification (see Korotayev 1991:157, table XI). But the conclusion relative to the pre-state nature of all nomads led to underestimating the development level of the ‘superstructure’ for a number of pastoral societies – the great steppe empires. These empires were also declared pre-state, but were their political organizations really of the same type as that of the Nuer, Hottentots or Kazaks and Kalmyks?

At present there are two popular groups of theories explaining the origin and essence of the early state. The conflict or control theories show the origin of statehood and its internal nature in the context of the relations between exploitation, class struggle, war and interethnic predominance. The integrative theories were largely oriented to explaining the phenomenon of the state as a higher stage of economic and public integration (Fried 1967; Service 1975; Claessen and Skalnik 1978; 1981; Cohen and Service 1978; Haas 1982; 1995; Gailey and Patterson 1988; Pavlenko 1989 etc.).

However the majority of nomadic empires cannot be unambiguously interpreted as either chiefdoms or states from the viewpoint of either the conflict or the integrationist approaches. The similarity of the steppe empires to true states clearly manifests itself in relations with the outer world only (military-hierarchi-
of thousands of people, or more. Some of the nomadic confederacies of Central Asia have had as many as one and half million pastoral nomads. And their territory was several orders greater than areas needed for simple and complex chiefdoms. Nomads need a great area of land for pastures!

From the viewpoint of neighboring agricultural civilizations (developed preindustrial states), such nomadic societies have sometimes been perceived as independent subjects of international political relations and, quite often, as equal in status to the agrarian empires. These chiefdoms had a complex system of titles of chiefs and functionaries, held diplomatic correspondence with neighboring countries, contracted dynastic marriages with agricultural states, neighboring nomadic empires and "quasi-imperial" polities of nomads.

With regard to their settlement systems and urban constructions the nomadic societies had more than temporary camps. Already the Hsiung-nu began to erect fortified settlements, while the 'headquarters' of the empires of the Uighur and the Mongols were true towns. The construction of splendid burial vaults and funeral temples for representatives of the steppe elite (e.g. the Pazyryksky burial mounds at Altai, the Scythian burial mounds in Northern Black Sea Area, the burials located in Mongolian Noin-Ula, the burial mounds of the Saks time in Kazakhstan, the statues of Turkish and Uighur Khagans in Mongolia etc.) were monumental achievements. In several supercomplex chiefdoms the elite attempted to introduce written records (e.g. Hsiung-nu and Turks), while there is a temptation to call some of the nomadic empires (especially the Mongolian Ulus of the first decades of thirteenth century) true states. This is supported by the existence of a system of laws (Yasa, the so-called Blue Book - Koko Defer Bichik), as well as legal organs of power, written clerical work and efforts to introduce taxation under Ögedei (Kradin 1995b).

NOMADIC EMPIRES AND MULTILINEAR EVOLUTION

The empire is one of the forms of the state. Specific signs of empires are: (1) the presence of large territories; and (2) the presence of a "metropolis" of the empire and peripheral subsystems dependent on the metropolis (Eisenstadt 1963; Thapor 1981; Kradin 1992; Barfield 2000). The fundamental difference between the nomadic empires was that their "centers" were highly developed only in the military aspect, while they were less developed than the exploited or conquered territories in socio-economic complexity and other attributes of civilization. They were actually "peripheries" in themselves. In this case, the nomadic empire can be defined as nomadic society organized on the military-hierarchical principle, occupying a quite large space and exploiting the nearby territories, as a rule, by external forms of exploitation (robbery, war and indemnity, extortion of "presents," non-equivalent trade and tribute). One can identify the following attributes of nomadic empires: (1) multistage hierarchical character of the social organization penetrated at all levels by tribal and super-tribal genealogical ties; (2) dualistic organization (into ‘wings’) or triadic organization (into the ‘wings’ and center) as the principle of administrative division of the empire; (3) military-hierarchical character of the social organization of the center of the empire, more often, on the 'decimal principle'; (4) coachman service (yam) as a specific way of organizing the administrative infrastructure; (5) a specific system of power inheritance (empire as the property of the whole khan clan, the institution of co-government—'kuriltai'); and (6) specific character of relations with the agricultural world (Kradin 1992; 1995a; 1996a; 2000).

It is necessary to distinguish the classical steppe nomadic empires from (1) the similarly mixed agricultural/pastoral empires in which the nomadic element played a great role (the Arabian caliphat, the states of Seljuks, Dunai and Volga Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire) and (2) the 'quasi-imperial' nomadic state formations which were smaller than empires (European Huns, Avars, Hungarians, Priazov Bulgaria, Kara-kitans, and the Tatar khanates after the collapse of the Golden Horde).

Nomadic empires were organized in the form of 'imperial confederations' (Barfield 1981; 1991; 1992; 2000). The confederations had an autocratic and state-like look from the outside. They were created to bring the surplus products of agrarian peasants to the steppe nomads. Their inner structure was consultative and tribal in form. The stability of steppe empires directly depended on the ability of the imperial confederation to extract silk, agricultural products, handicraft articles and delicate jewels from the settled territories. As these products could not be produced under conditions of a stockbreeding economy, obtaining them by use of force and extortion was the priority task of the ruler of nomadic society. By becoming the sole intermediary between China and the Steppe, the ruler of a nomadic society endeavored to control the redistribution of plunder obtained from China and, thereby to strengthen his own power. This organized accumulation allowed him to maintain the existence of an empire that could not have existed on the basis of the extensive pastoral economy.

The chiefs of the tribes that made up a steppe empire were incorporated into a military hierarchy of the 'hundreds' and 'thousands.' However, their internal policy was to a certain degree independent of the policy of the center. This peculiarity has been thoroughly analyzed by Thomas Barfield using the example of the Hsiung-nu Empire (1981, 1991; 1992: 32–84). A certain degree of autonomy of the pastoral tribes was promoted by the following factors: (1) economic independence made them potentially independent of the center; (2) basic sources of power (predatory wars, redistribution of tribute and other external subsidies,
The force of power of the steppe society’s ruler was, as a rule, based on his ability to redistribute earnings of trade, tribute and raids from neighboring countries.

From the viewpoint of multilinear evolution the steppe empires were rather different from other early states as well as from most complex chiefdoms. This observation provides justification for telling the story of the particular independent way of evolution of pastoral nomads.

**Nomadic Civilization**

I refer now to the comparative civilizations approach developed by Sorokin, Toynbee and others. In 1934 Toynbee suggested that pastoral nomads could constitute a special form of solidified civilization. It is beyond question that pastoral nomadism is a special world that stands in opposition to the world of agrarian civilizations. But nomadic civilization is a metaphor rather than a scientific definition. If the culture of nomads is defined as a civilization then why not also the “civilizations” of hunter-gatherers or horticulturalists? In other words, all types of human cultures could be characterized as civilizations.

Can the attributes specific to pastoral nomadic civilization be identified? The majority of similar attributes (specific relation to time and space, hospitality custom, developed system of fictive kin relationships, modest needs, unpretentiousness, powers of endurance, militarization of society etc.) can also be found in other types of societies. Perhaps, only the special cult relation to the livestock, main source of subsistence of nomads, distinguishes them from all other societies. In the thinking of Toynbee each civilization is based on a particular psycho-cultural unity and goes through the stages of growth, prosperity and collapse. Nomadism is something other than civilization. Its prosperity occurred during the very long period from the First millennium BCE to the middle of the Second millennium CE. During this period a number of settled-agricultural civilizations appeared and collapsed. The same fate was met for many nomadic societies during the period of nomadic steppe empires. It is not likely that the nomads thought of themselves as a unified cultural group standing in opposition to other nations and civilizations. Hyksos and Hsiung-nu, medieval Arabian and Mongolian Kereyid, Nuer from Sudan and reindeer-breeder from Arctic have been assigned not only to different ethnic groups, but belonged to different cultural communities. Of course some pastoral nomadic societies could contribute to the core of an emergent civilization (e.g. Arabians), while others could play the role of “barbarian” periphery of an agrarian civilization (Hyksos before the conquest of Egypt) while others could appear beyond the civilizational process prior to the beginning of modern Western colonialism (e.g. Nuers, Chukchi).

It is more accurate to tell about the separate large nomadic patterns rather
Nikolay N. Kradin

Nomadism, Evolution and World-Systems

In accordance with the world-systems approach, the main unit of development is a great system which includes groups of polities rather than a single country. In this group, the center (core) is identified, which exploits a periphery. The core has a higher level of technology and production and more complex internal structure and gets maximum profit. The core societies pump out the resources of the periphery, organize financial and trade flows, and arrange the economic space of the system (Wallerstein 1974; 1980; 1984; Ekholm and Friedman 1979; Santley and Alexander 1982; Rowlands, Larsen, and Kristiansen 1987 etc.; Frank, Gill 1994; Hall 1996; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; 2000; Chase-Dunn 1998; Sanderson 1999 etc.).

I. Wallerstein identifies three modes of production: (1) mini-systems based on reciprocation, (2) redistributive world-empires, (3) capitalist world-system (world-economy) based on the commodity and money relations (1984: 160ff).

The world-empires exist to exact tributes and taxes from provinces and captured colonies that are redistributed by the bureaucratic government. The distinctive feature of world-empires is administrative centralization and the predominance of the polity over the economy, according to Wallerstein.

However, such an approach to the evolution of preindustrial systems is incomplete. It is necessary to note two important circumstances. First, in addition to the hierarchical world-empires, there were also peer-polity systems (Frank 1992; Frank, Gill 1994; Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997). Ancient Greece and medieval Europe served as examples of the coexistence of multi-polity systems (see Renfrew and Cherry 1986). Andrey Korotayev has shown that the West was no exception. In ancient Arabia, several centers and peripheral systems have coexisted in what he calls a ‘multipolity’ (Korotayev 1995; 1996). Therefore, in the preindustrial period, a division of labor between separate elements of regional systems could be performed on the basis of different models of interaction.

Secondly, it is necessary to clarify how many such models and preindustrial modes of production (I use here this term so as it is understood by Wallerstein) there could, in principle, be? This question was formulated by Andrey Fursov who moved an emphasis from the traditional Marxist problem ‘how many modes of production have existed in history’ to another plane (1989:298).
Two models of interaction are known: redistributive “World-empires” and polycentric “World-economies” (Chase-Dunn 1988; Frank, Gills 1994). As to the modes of production, it is more complex. Fursov has created a solid social philosophical theory in which all the main present-day theories were synthesized. In this opinion, living labor manifests itself in two forms—individual and collective. The more developed is production, the more independent is collective labor. In preindustrial systems, a relationship of collective (C) and individual (I) is fixed in the social organization (Gemeinwesen). Only three types of relationship are possible: C > I, C = I, C < I. They correspond to the ‘Asiatic’, ‘Ancient’, and ‘Germanic’ forms of Gemeinwesen identified by Marx.

I would like to add something to Fursov’s classification. His classification lacks an important type: C > C, when one collective exploits another one. The pastoral nomadic empires occupy this place. They were also redistributive societies. But they differed from the agrarian empires and the ‘Asiatic’ mode of production (where a government levied a tribute and taxes on its subjects) On the steppes the pastoral economy of nomads was carried out within the family-related and lineage groups and based on mutual aid and reciprocation. Redistribution only affected the external sources of the empire’s income: plunder, tribute, trading duties and gifts. The nomads, in a given situation, took the part of ‘class-society’ and ‘state-society’, rising as a building over the settled-agrarian foundation. For this, the nomad elite performed the functions of bureaucracy and commanders, while the ordinary pastoralists were the soldiers of expansion and repression. Such a society might be called xenocratic (Kradin 1992; 1993; 1995a; 1996a; 1996b; 2000).

There is some similarity between the xenocratic pastoral polity and ‘African’ mode of production of K. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1969) as well ‘tribute-paying’ formation S. Amin (1976:13–19; 1991). They are made similar by a dependence of the government on the external sources of subsistence as well as by the semiperipheral position in the international division of labor. The concept of semiperiphery was introduced by Wallerstein to designate the intermediate zone between the center and periphery. The semiperiphery is exploited by the core but itself exploits a periphery as well as being an important stabilizing element in the world division of labor. I. Wallerstein argues that the three-tiered structure is characteristic of many organizations. The intermediate tier provides flexibility and elasticity of the whole system (e.g. centrist parties, middle classes, etc.).

The concept of the semiperiphery was developed mainly to describe processes in the present-day capitalist world-system. In the preindustrial period, some functions of the semiperiphery could be performed by the trading city-states of ancient times and the middle ages (Tyre, Carthage, Venice, Genoa, Malacca). Marcher states that conquered core regions to form larger empires were often also originally located in semiperipheral regions (e.g. Akkad in Mesopotamia, Macedonia, Rome) (Chase-Dunn 1988; Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997.

The Central Asian steppe empires of nomads were also the militarist “satellites” of agrarian civilizations as this process was figuratively pictured by O. Lattimore (1962)—“barbarism is a result of civilization.” However, the nomads also performed important intermediary functions between distant core regions. Similar to seafarers, they provided the connections for flows of goods, finances, technological and cultural information and epidemic diseases between the islands of the settled economy and urban civilization.

However, it would be an error to consider the nomadic empires as representing the semiperiphery. The semiperiphery is often exploited by the core, whereas the nomadic empires were never exploited by agrarian civilizations. Any society of the semiperiphery aspires to technological and production growth. The mobile mode of life of pastoral nomads did not provide the opportunity to make great accumulations (livestock could be accumulated but the quantities were limited by the productivity of the pastures and this natural ‘bank’ could at any instant go bankrupt due to drought or snowstorm) and their society was based on the gift economy. All plunder was distributed by the rulers of the steppe empires between the tribal chiefs and stockbreeders and consumed during mass festive occasions. The nomadic societies were doomed to remain peripheral. Only conquest of the core allowed them to become a ‘center’. But for this purpose it was necessary to cease to be a nomad. The Great Yeh-lu Chi’s-t’ai realized this: “Although you inherited the Chinese Empire on horseback, you cannot rule it from that position.”

There is a close temporal relationship between the prosperity of the agrarian core state and the power of the nomadic empires. It was most usually the case that the steppe empires arose and were sustained during periods in which the imperial agrarian state was also strong and prosperous. In Inner Asia this correlation is especially clear for here there are many areas of pasture that made possible the formation of a large steppe empire from tribes and chieftoms. The Han dynasty and Hsiung-nu Empire arose during the same decade. The Turkish Khaganate arose just as China was united under the power of the dynasties of Sui and, later, T’ang. And, in contrast, the periods of crisis in the fourth, fifth and tenth centuries in China led to political entropy in the steppe areas.

This phenomenon gave ground to the Japanese historian J. Tamura’s identification of two long cycles in the history of Northern Eurasia: (1) the cycle of ancient nomadic empires within the arid zone of Inner Asia (second century BCE – ninth century CE): Hsiung-nu, Hsien-pi, Jou-jan, Turks, Uighurs; (2) the cycle of the medieval conquest dynasties coming from the forest (Jurchen,
Manchurians) or steppe (Khitan, Mongols) zones (tenth century - beginning twentieth century): Liao, Chin, Yuan, Ch'ing. The societies of the first cycle interacted with China at a distance whereas the states of the second conquered the agricultural South and established symbiotic state structures with dual management systems and new forms of culture and ideology (1974).

The concept of T. Barfield is more complex. He not only established a synchrony between the growth and decline of the nomadic empires and similar processes in China, but noted also that the conquest of China was, as a rule, a business of the Manchurian people. The breakdown of centralized power in China and on the steppes released the forest-dwelling tribes in Manchuria from pressure from both of these adjacent powers. Manchuria's people established their state formations and conquered the agricultural areas on the South when both of their neighboring competitors were weak. The Khitan, Jurchen, and Manchu succeeded in conquest. In Barfield's opinion, a cyclical process of synchronous state formation among the peoples of China and Central Asia was repeated three times over a period of two thousand years (Barfield 1991; 1992:13 table 1.1).

The theories of Tamura and Barfield complement each other. The relations among migrations and crises of agrarian empires and the activities of nomads is evident. In this paper, I pointed out already that the formation of early nomadic empires (Scythia, Parthia, Hsiung-nu etc.) fell within the final period of the axial age when the powerful agrarian empires (Ch'in and Han in China, Persia and Hellenistic states in Asia Minor etc.) were established. The first global demographic crisis of our millennium (third through fifth centuries) occurred at nearly the same time in different parts of Eurasia (Biraben 1979: 13–24). It was not only a coincidence that this was also the epoch of the 'great migration of peoples.' Contrary to popular opinion the nomads did not at all desire to conquer the agrarian territories. In order to rule an agrarian society, the nomads would necessarily have to give up their nomadism and their horses. This they were ill disposed to do. It was only during periods of crisis and collapse of the settled societies that the steppe nomads were forced to enter into closer relations with the farmers and townspeople. As R. Grousset (1939) has vividly written, “vacuum has sucked in them inside the agrarian society.”

The Sui and, subsequently, T'ang successes caused a new joining up of all tribes and chiefdoms of Inner Asia in the imperial confederation of Turks. It is possible that a particular effect on this process was exerted by regular periods of a moister climate on the Mongolian steppes (Ivanov and Vasiljev 1995: 205 table 25). The First Khaganate of the Turks became the first true Eurasian-wide empire. It connected, through trade routes, China, Byzantium and the Muslim World. But this unity was fragile. It quickly collapsed into western and eastern parts. The Second Khaganate of the Turks and Uighurs was unable to restore unity in Eurasia. As a result of the next conflict in China and drought on the Mongolian steppes, the peoples of Manchuria - Khitans and Jurchen - began to play the leading part.

The Mongolian storm of the thirteenth century coincided with a new period of moistening in Mongolia and the steppes of Eastern Europe (Ivanov and Vasiljev 1995: 205 table 25) and with a demographic and economic upturn in all parts of the Old World. This brought the culmination of the history of preindustrial empires. The Mongols merged a chain of international trade into the united complex of land and sea routes. For the first time, all the great regional cores (Europe, Muslim area, India, China, Golden Horde) proved to be united in the first Eurasian-wide empire (Abu-Lughod 1989; Barfield 1991; Hall 1996; Wilkinson 1996; Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997). On the steppe, similar to fantastic mirages, there arose gigantic cities—centers of political power, transit trade, multinational culture and ideology (Karakorum, Sarai-Batu, Sarai-Berke). From this time, political and economical changes in some parts of the world began to play a much greater part in the history of distant other parts of the world.

The existence of the first Eurasian-wide empire did not last long. The plague, the ejection of the Mongols from China and the decline of the Golden Horde became the most important links of the chain of events that conditioned its downfall. Demographers mark the serious crisis in all its main sub-centers in the period of 1350–1450 (Biraben 1979). At the beginning of fifteenth century, the first Eurasia-wide empire disintegrated. Tamerlane's desperate efforts to restore the transcontinental trade met, in the end, with failure. The Ming resumed the traditional policy of opposing the nomads that resulted in the regeneration of an older policy of the Mongols to remotely exploit China (Pokotilov 1976). In the emerging Europe-centered capitalist world-system, the nomads were allotted quite another position. Machine technology, firearms and new sources of energy changed the balance of power to their disadvantage. Since that time, the steppe hinterland has ceased to play an important role in the dynamics of world-system processes.

CONCLUSION

In closing, one can draw several conclusions. More than two and half centuries ago, Montesquieu in L’Esprit des lois worked out the law of ‘political gravitation.’ He argued that democracy is a characteristic of small societies; monarchy—of middle-size ones, while the despotic empire is typical of large societies. I think we can apply this law to describe pastoral nomads. If the neighbors of pastoralists were acephalous segmentary societies (as Nuers in Africa and Ukhians in
Manchuria in the last centuries BCE) then the pastoralists themselves were at the level of tribal formations. In each local regional zone, the political structura-

tion of the nomadic periphery was in direct proportion to the size of the core.

That is the reason why, in order to trade with oases town or to attack them, the

nomads of North Africa and the Near East have united into ‘tribal confedera-
tions’ of chiefdoms, nomads of the East European steppes living on the margins of the Ancient Rus established ‘quasi-imperial’ state-like structures, while in

Inner Asia the ‘nomadic empire’ became such an important mode of adaptation. The imperial and ‘quasi-imperial’ organization of the nomads in Eurasia developed after the ending of the ‘axial age’ (Jaspers 1949), from the middle of the first millennium BCE at the time of the mighty agricultural empires (Ch’in in China, Mauryan in India, Hellenistic states in Asia Minor, Roman Empire in Europe).

The nomadic empire is a distinctive xenocratic form of mode of production. Inside, it was a supercomplex chiefdom. It was based on the redistribution by the khan (chief) of profits from war, extortion, and international trade. On the outside, it was a militaristic collective exploiter of agrarian states and civilizations. I think it is not only a special mode of production but also a unique path of cultural evolution.

On can agree with Thomas Barfield (2000) who referred to the steppe polities as ’shadow empires.’ A.G. Frank has considered Eurasia as a common space that has long related the West to the East (1992) and a similar approach was developed in the works of the Russian Eurasianists of the 1920s. As the world became a single system the steppe was a ‘pipe’ between the ‘vessels’ that were the agrarian civilizations.

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387


I. INTRODUCTION

In an effort to refine the concept of “incorporation” into the world-system, I undertake a specific case study of a region plainly external to the system and trace the processes that correspond to this region’s interaction with systemic actors throughout its period of incorporation. The goal here is to rethink the assimilation of new regions and peoples with the larger purpose of gaining more understanding of the processes driving overall systemic expansion, historically and currently, in order to provide a model for modern development. It is the existence of the zone of ignorance at the edge of the system that often leads to conflict between system members over new regions of expansion. This case study is meant to develop the ‘middle ground’ between Wallerstein’s analysis of incorporation (European, state-centric, ‘inside-out’) and Hall’s research on incorporation (external, indigenous peoples, ‘outside-in’). Furthermore, this may be taken as a critique of international relations theory in general, which tends to be overly Euro-state-centric in its focus and has a tendency to overlook important social, political, and economic adaptations that occur well before state polities develop (or are inserted) in a region of contact or expansion.

The situation in North America is quite relevant for the purpose of carefully examining the incorporation process. A prime reason for this is obvious: there is no question that the area is ‘pristine’; initially it is outside the realm of European contact. This region characterizes a ‘zone of ignorance’ beyond the traditional world-system that must undergo a significant ‘grooming process’ before incorporation is more fully expanded, and this process is partially operationalized by the use of historically contemporary maps. Finally, the case offers a good example of the impact that external regions can exert on internal systemic behavior, as European powers were pushed to the brink of war in their efforts to exploit the resources and peoples of the Nootka Sound region. I conclude by offering a more developed conceptualization of the process of incorporation and related concepts.
no question that the area was ‘external’ to the modern world-system prior to its ‘discovery’ by Europeans. So, its assimilation into the world-system can be examined in a detail that may not be achievable in other, more historically adjacent, geographic arenas. Various changes and developments in the political, social, and economic facets of everyday indigenous life that occurred during the process of incorporation can be analyzed. To understand incorporation, the process must be broken apart in order to recognize early changes that occur when a region moves from a status of existing in a virtual ‘zone of ignorance’ to a status of being “within the system.”

To reduce the incorporation process, I use Chase Dunn and Hall’s (1991, 1997) and Hall’s (1986, 1989, 1999a, 1999b) notion of nested networks of interaction. By treating these networks as various ‘states of being’ through which a given region passes, one can operationalize the process more carefully. Furthermore, since historically contemporary maps are essentially ‘freeze-frame snapshots’ of accumulated knowledge regarding a given region at a particular instance for an actor, these may be used to parse out the status of a region in regard to its position within the networks of interaction. Reference is made to historical maps (in conjunction with traditional textual sources) as a way to give a clearer ‘picture’ of a given region during the period of incorporation. However, this reflects primarily the European perspective as native knowledge is manifested in a different manner and only partially gets transmitted to the formal process of mapmaking.

The Nootka Sound region is of particular import for this study, because it begins as a rather ‘pristine’ environment that is subsumed into the expanding capitalist system. Prior to the encroachment of European explorers and traders, the region and its peoples had developed a rather unique lifestyle that is readily differentiated from that of other native cultures in North America. The Indians of the Northwest Coast were fairly isolated from easy, overland travel by mountain ranges running along the coast, and depended on the ocean for many of their resources. Accordingly, emphasis was placed on sea travel via large, ocean-going canoes and contact with inland tribes was limited. The inhabitants had a highly developed woodworking culture (superior to any other in the Americas), and an established trade-goods network that extended along the coast. Furthermore, the political organization of the region is referred to as a ‘complex chiefdom’ (Diamond 1997) and had a formalized property-rights organization. How then, did this rather pristine region become, over the course of little more than one hundred years, absorbed into the larger, global system of capitalist Europe? To begin this analysis requires that we become familiar with the various systemic actors at work in the region during the time in question.

II. The Stage

Specifically, I will be examining the relations between the European powers and the Native Americans along the northwestern coast of North America, and the concurrent development of the fur trade. While initial European contact with this region began in the first half of the 1700s and reached a climax in the 1790s with the peak of the fur trade, the drive to incorporate the region is best encapsulated in the dispute over a relatively limited geographic area—Nootka Sound. Incorporation necessarily will be considered in context and with reference to other colonial activity in the region at large (e.g., Spain in the American Southwest, Imperial Russia in Alaska) as this colonial activity had policy implications for the adjacent ‘zone.’ Of particular interest is the conflict that arose in this area between systemic powers, known as the Nootka Sound Controversy, which also served to bring Europe to the brink of war. Since one would presume that impact on an external arena is largely monodirectional (i.e., from the core, or internal arenas, outward), this provides an intriguing example of when this is clearly not the case. Instead, contention for external regions and resources leads to considerable internal systemic disturbance.

The reasons for the concentration on the western coast are twofold. First, most initial European activity, and hence impact, centered on coastal areas. So it is only natural to pay specific attention here, as activities inland from the coast developed only after the turn of the century. For example, the Lewis and Clark expedition (1803–1806) did not reach the coast until after the turn of the century, and Russian expeditions into the interior of Alaska were even later in time (see Michael 1967; Khlebnikov 1973; Dmytryshyn 1989). While Spain did have

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2. A discussion regarding the rationale and use of maps in this manner appears in Carlson (2001: 253-54).

3. Nootka Sound lies on the western coast of what is now Vancouver Island in British Columbia, Canada.
a substantial amount of penetration into the continent, this was limited to the Southwest, extending up to present-day Santa Fe, NM. Otherwise, Spanish penetration never developed far inland from the California coast (Hall 1989; Bolton 1914; Bolton and Marshall 1922; Gerhard 1993).

Second, by concentrating on the coastal interactions, the area of geographic concern is limited as are the number of relevant actors that need to be examined. French trade activity in North America, while insightful for providing examples of economic, social, and political impacts of such behavior, did not extend to the western coast (Ray 1974; Krech 1984; Thistle 1986). Instead, French activity in the fur trade was limited mainly to the Mississippi drainage and to penetrating the lakes and rivers of Canada, and did not push westward until later in the 1800’s (Skinner 1991; Rich 1960, 1966). The French were increasingly preoccupied with internal—especially economic—problems after the Treaty of Paris in 1763, which adversely impacted the French colonial struggle with Britain. But the French did manage to mount the major, yet ill-fated, La Pérouse expedition of 1786–17884 to the North Pacific, before being once again distracted by domestic issues—notably, the French Revolution of 1789. Similarly, American activity in the region only becomes relevant late in the 18th Century, since most American attention was diverted toward matters closer at hand for the emerging nation. So, the main European actors are Spain, Russia, to a lesser extent Great Britain, and only later the United States. As we shall see, European rivalry provides an underlying foundation upon which expansion in the New World was built, and which drove much of the policy guiding this particular expansion.

III. THE PLAYERS

A. Spain

Spanish concern with the northwest coast of America began over two centuries prior to the documented voyages of the 18th century. After reaching the Pacific coast in 1522, Hernando Cortés proceeded to organize explorations northward. Later explorers recounted tales of riches and additional indigenous nations to the northwest. Also, a desire to ascertain the possible existence of a strait providing strategic entrance to the Pacific proved to be a recurring source of Spanish cartographic desires. References to the hoped-for strait predate 1562, when geographer Giacomo Gastaldi first called it the “Strait of Anián.” It is believed that he named this imaginary strait either for Marco Polo’s “Ania” (a province of northern China) or after Anus Cortoreal, a Portuguese mariner who explored the Labrador coast around 1500 (Cook 1973:2). The rather common practice of fixing unknown regions with names associated with India, China, or Japan onto then-contemporary maps supports the likelihood that the name is taken from Marco Polo’s reference to a northern province of China (Hull 1962: 23). The name would continue to appear on maps for the next several hundred years.5

For example, on “America 1586” (Plate 1) ‘Anian’ is used to reference the region in the far northwest of America, as well as the strait separating this region from an unnamed landmass to the west. One should not take this to necessarily mean that the Spanish were aware of the true proximity of the Asian continent, but

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4. La Pérouse and his men perished on this expedition. One companion, Baron Jean Baptiste Barthelemey de Lesseps was put ashore in Kamchatka with many expedition journals and maps. He traveled overland to Paris and subsequently published a four-volume account of the voyage (See Cook 1973: 112-113, 115; Batman 1985: 35-38).

5. For example, see also Ortelius (1587) and Philippe Buache’s map of 1752.
rather that ‘straits’ by definition are narrow bodies of water between two landmasses. Thus, it makes perfect sense to at least place something beyond ‘Anian.’ If one looks closely, the California coast is somewhat accurately portrayed up to Cape Mendocino (the inlet just to the south of ‘Anian’), but the entire realm beyond Mendocino is squarely in the realm of myth. Inaccurate mountain ranges and a much hoped-for water route across the top of the map (with ‘Terra Septemtrionalis Incognita’—roughly “Northern Unknown Lands”—above) offset the vast empty spaces toward the interior of the continent. Interestingly, lower California is quite accurately represented. This is expected, given the peninsula’s proximity to the colonial activity in Mexico and Central America.

Similarly, we can see ‘Anian’ plainly in other contemporary representations (e.g., Abraham Ortelius’ map of 1587). Ortelius also has California fairly represented, and limits the fanciful use of mountain ranges in the vast, empty interior of the continent. However, we see neither the ‘Straits of Anian’ nor the northern water passage. Additionally, New Guinea appears as an independent continent linked to Antarctica, providing another instance of a region existing in the zone of ignorance, similar to the reaches of the northwest in America. By pushing into the unknown, the Spanish are literally parting the veil of myth and ignorance.

Interestingly, the early Spanish explorations of the coast were never mentioned or publicized beyond Spain, largely because a policy of silence was deliberately instituted in order to keep geographic details as secret as possible, to protect against piracy and plunder. By 1527, Spanish galleons were crossing from Mexico to the Philippines and Moluccas. Because the Portuguese controlled return access through the Indian Ocean, considerable emphasis was placed on establishing a return route to Acapulco, which was accomplished by 1565. The trip from Acapulco to Manila averaged four months, while the return trip across the North Pacific took six, largely because the ships were so burdened with goods and faced more unfavorable winds. “From Acapulco galleons carried manufactured goods, cloth, tools, arms, and munitions, as well as Mexican silver. They brought back silks, fine china, porcelain, gold coins, cinnamon and other spices, candles, and beeswax in bulk, and other oriental products in demand in Spanish America” (Cook 1973:6). By the late 1500s, several accounts of Manila galleons inadvertently visiting California harbors after being blown northward on their return journey had been established, though contact further up the coast had not.

While Spain managed to keep its activities in the Pacific secret for decades, by 1578 Francis Drake, in the Golden Hind, had discovered a route around South America that avoided interception in the Straits of Magellan. Thus loosed in the Pacific, Drake was making captures off the coast of Costa Rica by 1579, and had seized charts, sailing directions, and acquired first-hand knowledge from captured Spanish sailors. With the Hind of questionable seaworthiness because it was damaged by shipworms and was overladen with booty, Drake headed northward before putting in at a sheltered cove. Here he spent thirty-six days making repairs, taking on water and firewood, and performing an act of possession for Elizabeth I. Debate surrounds the question of exactly where Drake put ashore, but most evidence suggests that ‘Drake’s Bay’ (28 miles north of San Francisco Bay) is appropriately named. After this brief respite, Drake used his newly-acquired navigational information and successfully crossed the Pacific Ocean, reaching Plymouth after two years and ten months at sea (Cook 1973:8). His success prompted imitation by Thomas Cavendish in 1587, who “took particular care to seize pilots and maps on captured vessels, as a means of pulling back the curtain of secrecy with which Spain had cloaked her realms” (Cook 1973:9). Very plainly, acquiring geographical and navigational information was a key goal of British mariners.

The losses incurred by the Spanish led to an increased concern that similar losses would result from further foreign encroachment to the northwest of New Spain. The uncharted northwest coast provided potential havens for marauders, and the appearance of the British in the Pacific Ocean fueled Spanish suspicion that the British had discovered the ‘Strait of Anián.’ A desire to find this legendary passage prompted Spanish explorations along the coast. However, these explorations were soon curtailed, as policy shifted to support the belief that more damage than good could come with the possible discovery of such a passage. If such a passage did exist, its revelation would merely provide an open access through which enemies could more readily enter the northern Pacific. So, throughout the seventeenth century—because of official policy discouraging exploration—Spanish interest in expanding northward was dependent on private capital for exploratory expeditions, which were mainly concerned with pearling ventures. In Cook’s estimation:

Madrid perceived no serious threat in that quarter from foreign rivals, so long as a northwest passage remained unfound. Spanish concern with Mexico’s northern frontier did not die, but official policy put a damper upon explorations by sea and failed to provide knowledge of the coastline beyond Cape Mendocino. Beyond, to Anián, the coast would avoid becoming a source of trouble and expense by remaining terra incognita (1973:19).

By the start of the eighteenth century, Spain purposefully maintained a zone of ignorance with regard to its northern frontier. This was because the area was perceived as not holding sufficient economic basis for exploration and development, coupled with the strategic belief that ignorance actually bestowed a certain amount of security in regards to the unexplored coastline. The fear was that if the Spanish were to find a northern passage word would soon spread of its loca-
tion, making it that much more difficult to keep the English out of the Pacific and necessitating that Spanish resources be diverted to its guard. By not seeking out such a passage, the onus and expense of such an undertaking was placed on the English, with Spain in a position to dispute any British intrusion into the Pacific should it occur. Elsewhere during the seventeenth century, Spanish missionaries extended settlements in Mexico and developed a string of outposts up into what is now New Mexico. Gerhard (1993) provides an adequate description of the extent of formal Spanish incorporation by 1700.6 There is little formalized Spanish control along the outer California coast. Instead, Spanish authority is confined to Mexico proper and the inland ‘islands’ of Santa Fe, El Paso, and Janos-Casas Grandes.

Gerhard’s representation is confirmed by sources from the period. Father Chino’s map of 1702 (Plate 2) represents the body of “Californiae” at the time. We can see that only the southern portion of Baja California is shown, and Spanish place-names are concentrated around the Sea of California (”Mare Californiae”) and inland. Nothing further up the outer coast seems to be relevant (or perhaps known), though we can see that Spanish interests stretch into the interior, up beyond ‘Casa Grande’ (with a mission symbol) in what is now Arizona. This is in contrast to the Spanish position by 1800. Within 100 years, Spain extended its reach up the length of California to Monterey, and solidified the range of Spanish dominion in Mexico and the American Southwest. Santa Fe and El Paso remain ‘islands,’ but are now joined by San Antonio and Nacogdoches. Regardless, the most relevant aspect for this study is the Spanish expansion up the California coast during the 1700s. Even though considerable resources were expended in an attempt to solidify control over the American Southwest, Madrid initially did nothing to explore the northwest coast. This would soon change with the emergence of the potentially lucrative sea otter fur trade, as well as the emergence of challengers for this trade.

The sea otter, *Enhydra lutris*, would prove to be the source of great contention in the northwest. The Spanish were first introduced to international trade in the species in 1733, when Father Sigismundo Taraval described the otters on the western coast of Baja California. At this time, the range of the sea otter extended from Baja California across the northern Pacific to Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands north of Japan. The animals were so docile that Spanish seamen could club them with sticks, and several pelts were cured and sent to Mexico City. Soon they were being included as trade goods sent to China via Manila, though they were not a primary concern of the Spanish because the supply was limited once the otters learned to distrust humans (Cook 1973:43).

When Russian fur traders came to eastern Siberia in pursuit of sable, they soon built up a thriving trade in sea otter pelts with China. An active trade in sea

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Otter fur already existed in the region prior to Spanish and Russian expansion, as China had developed an exchange network with natives of the Kuril Islands and Kamchatka. Thus, we have the case of the European system expanding into an already extant ‘prestige goods network’ (PGN) as described by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997). Russia reached Kamchatka early in the 18th century, and by 1733 orders were given to map the American coast. The reason for this is seen in Philippe Buache’s map of 1752 (Plate 3). While Kamchatka and the north Asian coast are well represented, the region of North America is not. We still see the mythic region of ‘Fou-sang’ that had been associated with an area of China, a great ‘Sea of the West’ (‘Mer de l’Ouest’) where the American Northwest actually lies, and a ‘Great Water’ (‘Grande Eau’) stretching inland, with an outlet speculatively reaching toward Hudson Bay.

By the 1780s, orders were given not only to dispatch a naval squadron to protect Russian possessions, but also to stabilize and expand the Alaskan settlements and enterprises (Dmytryshyn 1988). This Russian trade in the Aleutians, and its by-product of greater geographic knowledge of the North Pacific, eventually drew the attention of the Spanish. Diplomatic relations—which had been suspended for two decades—were reestablished, and a map of the North Pacific showing the extent of Russian discoveries in Alaska was acquired. (Plate 4)

Interestingly, this map was widely republished and detailed images of later versions are also available. One can plainly see that the maps are identical in content, but differ only in title (and language of publication). This provides an indication of the broad impact that these representations had, as this particular map is reproduced several times over a period of twenty years. Not only does it prompt strategic political response by Spain, but it also feeds a social hunger for information of the Americas.

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7. See for example, Carington Bowles, (1780), “Bowles’s New Pocket Map of the Discoveries Made by the Russians on the North West Coast of America” (map). Originally published by the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg (1758). Also republished as, “A map of the discoveries made by the Russians on the north west coast of America” (1761), London: Jeffreys. Electronic image available via Reed College Library, Special Collections Department. [http://library.berkeley.edu/EART/maps/](http://library.berkeley.edu/EART/maps/)
While it is plain that the Russians maintained (at least temporarily) a zone of ignorance inclusive of Alaska and the Northwest, they had already pushed along the Aleutian Islands toward the American mainland. The relevance of the map, however, is that Spain was beginning to feel the threat of foreign encroachment on its territory. Madrid was now presented with definitive evidence that the Russians were poised to expand down the Northwest coast of America, and feared that Spanish claims to the coast would soon be challenged.

Even though Spain had not ventured north of San Francisco, they did claim the entire western coast of America as their exclusive domain according to the ‘right of first discovery.’ Accordingly, Spanish officials closely followed all published reports regarding Russian explorations into the North Pacific. In an effort to counter potential Russian development down the coast toward California, Spain vigorously expanded northward, establishing missions and presidios along the coast from San Diego (1769) and Monterey (1770), to San Francisco (1776). Between 1774 and 1793, Spain dispatched fourteen naval expeditions to the North Pacific in order to check on Russian advancement, the first of which was that of the Santiago in 1774–1775 (Caster 1969; Cook 1973). It is important to note that unlike most of the contemporary English, Russian, and American voyages, these Spanish voyages of exploration “were conducted for reasons of imperial strategy and not for commercial purposes” (Tovell 1995:57) or for largely scientific purposes (Caster 1969, Engstrand 1981). Since this was official governmental behavior, it seems arguable that the Spanish were expanding their political-military network (PMN) concurrently with their information network (IN). More importantly, here the PMN actively subsidizes the growth of the IN, which is in contrast to other strategies of expansion in which profits (or expected profits) from luxury goods are the motivating factor for expansion.

The Santiago, piloted by Juan Pérez, reached as far north as the southern tip of the Alaskan panhandle, but never achieved the goal of reaching 60 degrees north latitude. More importantly, on his journey back to California Pérez became the first European to visit Nootka Sound, which was believed to be the port of greatest strategic importance north of San Francisco Bay. In Nootka Sound, Indians came out to the Santiago and soon were bartering sea otter robes for abalone shells brought from California as well as other goods. For our purposes, “abalone shells and Mexican copper had a tremendous impact upon northwest coast art forms” (Cook 1973:67). So, almost immediately there is a concrete example of socio-cultural change in the external arena due to basic trade with members of the system.

A key event occurred almost by chance that would later serve to support Spain’s claim to Nootka when later challenged by Britain: “several warriors came on board, and one managed to pilfer several spoons belonging to Martinez. When Cook visited Nootka four years later he purchased those spoons, recognized their manufacture, and mentioned in his journal that he regarded them as proof that the Spanish had been at or near the place” (Cook 1973:64–5). As the British would later argue however, there was no evidence that the Spanish ever landed at Nootka to officially take possession.

Other Spanish voyages were made in the latter part of the eighteenth century, especially as the wealth of the fur trade became more obvious. Prior to this becoming relevant, additional Spanish voyages were made in 1775 and 1779. However, the important aspect of the situation is that Nootka Sound will prove to be the focus of considerable systemic-power attention. While Spain would continue to claim the expanse of the northwest coast, the riches coming out of the fur trade would place the region at the center of worldwide attention by 1784. Unfortunately for Spanish strategic aspirations, by 1780 Madrid once again curtailed expeditions to the north because the previous expeditions had proven to be a financial drain on the northern Department of San Blas. Furthermore, Spanish policy of not publicizing the accomplishments of 1774, 1775 and 1779 later undermined their claim to the area by prior discovery.

B. Russia

In contrast to the Spanish, Russians were rather late in arriving in the area of North America, though their expansion into the North Pacific may be dated to the late 1600s. Russian expansion into North America was a natural extension of its drive across Siberia and the importance of furs in the Russian economy of expansion (Ohberg 1955). As Dmytryshyn (1988:xxxv) observes, Russian expansion into North America can be defined as falling into three distinct—though temporally overlapping—categories:

The first was the initial phase by the government, 1700 to 1743. The second was a carefully government-controlled and monitored phase of private interests, 1743 to 1799. The final phase, 1753 to 1795, in part concurrent with the second phase, consisted of a series of secret government-sponsored expeditions to promote and defend Russian interests in the North Pacific.

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8. Esteban José Martinez was a second pilot on the Perez expedition, but would rise to command the later expedition that was at the center of the Nootka Sound controversy.

9. San Blas was a small town on an inlet about 140 miles west of Guadalajara and about 80 miles north of Puerto Vallarta. It was selected as a naval base of operations in 1767, and “was considered Spain’s most important naval station on Mexico’s Pacific coast” (Magnaghi 1999: 43). The Department of San Blas included the Californias and the coast up to Nootka.
Interestingly, these ‘phases’ roughly correspond to Hall’s (2000b) nested networks of interaction (See also Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991, 1997). Phase 1 involves moving into the ‘Information Network’ (IN), phase 2 corresponds to the ‘Prestige Goods Network’ (PGN), and phase 3 is arguably the beginning of the ‘Political-Military Network’ (PMN).

The initial phase mainly consisted of a series of information gathering expeditions, a main goal of which was to determine if Asia was connected by land to America. By 1733, the Russian government organized an expedition with the expressed purpose of reaching and claiming the western shore of North America. This expedition (the Second Kamchatka Expedition) ‘discovered’ and described the shores of Alaska and some of the Aleutian Islands, and opened a vast and unclaimed area to Russian expansion. This exposed an area rich in furs and other resources to the exclusive claim of Russians for a generation and initiated a new phase in Russian expansion. Expansion into the Aleutians gave Russia its first overseas colony. In turn, this necessitated that additional resources be devoted to the relatively new navy of the traditionally land-based power, in order to support Russian proprietary interest in the North Pacific. Suddenly, Russia had legitimate imperial interests and would need to display appropriate naval capability if it hoped to compete successfully in the last New World arena of international rivalry (Dmytryshyn 1988; Makarova 1975; Golder 1971; Gibson 1969).

The second sphere of Russian expansion, that of private undertakings, began as soon as the Second Kamchatka Expedition completed its mission. The movement was triggered by the arrival of furs brought back by members of the expedition, and Russians increasingly began to move toward Kamchatka. Russian private entrepreneurs organized themselves into small venture companies, which then purchased permits from the government to acquire furs (as well as to take along an official government agent). Estimates put the number of such companies at over forty, operating between 1743 and 1799. Since many ships were lost at sea it is difficult to estimate the total value of all the furs taken. However, the parties that did return carried furs valued close to 8,000,000 rubles (Dmytryshyn 1988:xli; Makarova 1974:209–216). Similarly, Cook (1973:404) notes that within a decade, “cargoes from the Aleutians grossed millions of dollars, and the trade became important to the Siberian economy,” which provided impetus for Russian expansion into America. Permit holders also pledged to collect yasak (tribute in furs) from the natives as a sign of their submission to Russian rule. This tribute was initially to be turned over to royal authorities upon the ship’s return, but a tribute collector soon accompanied every vessel during its voyage. Additionally, the private ventures agreed to give a tenth of their furs to the Treasury, and supply the government with any relevant information about the expedition.

The third phase of Russian expansion ran largely concurrent to the second, but is characterized by government-dispatched expeditions. These were developed by four departments of government with particular interest in the area: the College of the Admiralty, the College of Foreign Affairs, the College of Commerce, and the Academy of Sciences. These expeditions often were developed to further particular government objectives in the region, but also had to fill in the gaps of information provided by the private entrepreneurs, as their data were often useless because many of the private traders were illiterate. Hull (1966:35) makes the point that “Siberian officialdom, which tended to be grasping and mainly interested in levying its tax on cargoes and collecting the yasak tribute imposed in the newly conquered regions, provided an additional reason why fur traders often suppressed their findings.”

The first government-sponsored expedition lasted from 1753 to 1764, and led to the recommendation that Russia gain control of the Amur River in Irkutsk in order to build a shipyard and provide an agricultural and industrial base to support Russian interests in the North Pacific. Government officials studied the first expedition’s proposals, but ultimately did little to act on them. Officials wished to avoid a war with China, which almost certainly would have resulted from taking this action on China’s northern frontier. Also during this time, attention in Moscow was increasingly focused on events in Europe, where Russia had become involved in the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) (Dmytryshyn 1988:xlvii; Gibson 1969).

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11. The last two companies merged to form the Russian American Company in 1799. As a government-supported monopoly company, it lasted until Russian holdings in North America were sold to the United States in 1867. See (Okun 1951; Tikhmenev 1978) for histories of the Russian-American Company.

12. Dmytryshyn (1989) places the value of a silver ruble at roughly 50 cents, which indicates that Russia officially extracted approximately $4 million in US dollars (circa 1800) from the region over this period. This says nothing of the value of goods smuggled out or unreported.

13. Alternately spelled iasak, this is a system of taxation dating from Genghis Khan’s code of laws in which tribute equal to one-tenth the annual yield is extracted (Cook 1973:44; see also Rich 1955).
The purpose of the second government expedition (1764–1767) was primarily to monitor the sea-borne fur trade carried on by the private entrepreneurs. A second purpose was to survey the islands lying between Kamchatka and America (the Aleutians), as well as to determine their resources. This expedition, as well as a third one undertaken in 1764–1769 to check on reports of abuses in the fur trade, did not meet expectations. Partly due to bad leadership and partly due to bad luck, the reports and maps submitted were filled with exaggerations and inconsistencies that took years to clarify (Golder 1971; Makarova 1975; Dmytryshyn 1988:xlvi–xlviii).

This is a central aspect of the zone of ignorance: misinformation often carries as much weight as valid fact, but can take years to identify. Indeed, once something is placed on a map—for whatever reason—it takes on the aspect of ‘reality’. Only once the incorporation process is well advanced can these ‘hauntings’ of myth and fantasy be dispersed. In this particular case, the Spanish were better served than the Russians because the Spanish (with considerably more seafaring experience) used official scientific expeditions to extend their ‘information network’ (and arguably their political-military network), instead of relying on the information provided by wanderers, traders, and private explorers. In contrast, the Russians had to return 20 years later to verify earlier reports and findings.

The fourth Russian expedition was organized in 1786–87, and had very broad objectives to guard Russian interests in the North Pacific, and was commanded by Grigory Mulovsky. As its goals, this expedition was to verify and claim all discoveries made by Russia from the southern Kurils to the southern tip of Alaska. To this end, the expedition was outfitted with 1,700 iron and copper plates engraved in Russian and Latin proclaiming, “This territory belongs to the Russian Empire” (Dmytryshyn 1988:xlxi).¹⁴

This reflects the common use of the claim of discovery as producing a fundamental claim to territory, as such plates would serve as future proof of ‘prior discovery’. The Spanish and English followed similar procedures. The Spanish commonly erected a cross with a cairn of stones covering a declaration of possession, or erected a cross over such a declaration. Similarly, Captain Drake posted a bronze plate on a tree north of San Francisco Bay during his initial trip into the Pacific, laying a somewhat tenuous base for later British claims to territory in North America.

Specifically, the purposes of this Russian expedition were fourfold: to warn Spanish, British, and French intruders to stay out of Russia’s sphere of influence; to establish a permanent Russian naval presence in the North Pacific; to open commercial relations with China and Japan; and finally to undertake additional scientific investigations. The expedition was to total some 639 men on 5 ships, with a considerable international contingent of astronomers, historiographers, natural historians, and navigators (Gibson 1969, 1999; Dmytryshyn 1988).¹⁵ Unfortunately for those involved, on the eve of their departure, this mission was aborted because of imminent war with Sweden (1788–1790) and the Ottoman Empire (1787–1792). The experience later proved helpful in organizing the first Russian circumnavigational voyage (1803–1806). Also, another (and final) government-sponsored expedition did take place during this time and carried out similar objectives (Dmytryshyn 1988; Makarova 1974).

Here it is important to clarify an important difference between Russian expansion into the region and Spanish expansion along the coast. The Russians built small wooden blockhouses or fortresses (ostrogs) on key river islands, which were then used to dominate the surrounding region. While this is similar on the surface to the Spanish use of the feudal encomienda system, it differs significantly. The Russians required tribute to be given in the form of the yasak, and thus are operating in a tributary mode of production for world-system concerns (Wallerstein 1974). The Spanish encomienda system also required that the Native Americans give tribute, but in the form of periodic labor in the mines, haciendas, and other public works. Thus, one is able to begin to differentiate levels of incor-

¹⁴ Gibson (1999:56) puts the number of cast iron markers (bearing the imperial coat of arms) at 200. But he states, “1,700 special medals of gold (110), silver (430), copper (660), and iron (500) were struck as awards for exceptional service”.

¹⁵ Crews of different nationalities were fairly common during this time, especially if ‘skilled’ crews were needed. This is even more so in the case of Russia, as it did not have an extensive oceanic naval tradition and no significant population of experienced seafarers on which to draw. This is not only a common method of information diffusion, but contributed to a rather interconnected community of seafarers. For example, Gibson (1999: 55-56f) points out that one of the foreign officers recruited for the expedition was a Cornishman, James Trevenen, who had been a midshipman on the Resolution during Cook’s third voyage to the Pacific. In an attempt to exploit the wealth of the fur trade for himself (and thus avoid the monopolistic control of the British South Sea Company), Trevenen applied to the Russian minister in London to support a plan for ‘discovery and enterprise’ in the North Pacific in the name of Empress Catherine. Assured that his proposal would be accepted, Trevenen then declined a proffered British naval command. Curiously, the ship he was offered to command was the now notorious Bounty. Trevenen subsequently was killed during the Russo-Swedish War in 1790, again having been recruited by Mulovsky.
poration between the natives under Russian control and those under Spanish control. The Russian model operates at a purely tributary mode of accumulation while the Spanish model goes beyond the ‘grooming’ process of gathering tribute and resembles a system of full-blown production (Hull 1966:1–17; See also Wolf 1982).16

Because of their penetration into the North Pacific and the lack of any northern development by Spain, the Russians enjoyed a monopoly on the region for the first half of the eighteenth century. However, the secrecy surrounding their activity, combined with traditional Russian reluctance to share information, ultimately led to increased suspicion among other European powers and to outright challenge by Spain in the 1760s. Great Britain also expressed concern and American claims were pressed in the latter half of the century. More important national security concerns subsumed Russian imperial aspirations, and Russia was hard-pressed to recover its prior status in the North Pacific. However, Russia maintained a colony on Sitka Sound,17 and eventually expanded Russian presence southward to Fort Ross in California in 1810. Until the sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867, the colony “was serviced approximately every year by either a Russian Navy or a Russian-American Company ship from the mother country” (Gibson 1999:60; Dmytryshyn 1989).

C. Britain

Despite Spanish efforts to keep activities on the northwest coast a secret, news of the first two Spanish expeditions soon filtered out to other countries. In particular, these reports were relevant to the British, who were interested in any information that might pertain to the existence of a northwest passage and a shorter route to Chinese ports. This desire had led Parliament to post a reward for the first British ship to find such a passage. Since Captain James Cook had led two successful expeditions in the South Pacific, he was a logical choice to lead an expedition in search of such a passage. His instructions were to approach the coast at 45 degrees north latitude and proceed northward to 65 degrees, since that was the latitude at which knowledge of central Canada had relegated such a strait.

This is an interesting aspect of the ‘zone of ignorance’ in North America and its interaction with policy decisions for the British. Although some knowledge of the area had been gained, all hope for a desired passage lay in the fact that an expanse of unexplored territory still existed. In turn, this necessitated its exploration. This is just the opposite of the earlier Spanish policy of purposeful—and possibly blissful—ignorance. The Spanish realized a strait may exist, but preferred not to explore since finding another entrance into the Pacific would require it be defended and would hasten foreign intrusion. As it was, the limited northern expeditions already were a strain on the limited resources of Spain at San Blas.

Although the search for a northwest passage was a major objective, “Cook’s chief purpose was to visit and explore the northwest coast of America with a view to determining its future economic and strategic relevance to Britain’s imperial interests” (Cook 1973:86, emphasis added). Cook set sail from Plymouth in July of 1776 with two warships—the Discovery and the Resolution—despite the hostilities in the American colonies, and took two years traveling by way of the Indian Ocean, Tasmania, New Zealand and Tahiti.18 The course traversed across the Pacific was midway between the westward and eastward routes of the Spanish Manila galleons, and provided Cook with the ‘discovery’ of the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands.19

In March of 1778, Cook sighted the Oregon coast at about 44 degrees north. Traveling north, Cook was forced out to sea by bad weather, and when he once more sighted land he was off the entrance to a promising moorage, which he named King George’s Sound. This was actually Nootka Sound, and while there he purchased the silver spoons mentioned above.20 In addition, “with little effort

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16. Elsewhere, Barth (1950) discusses Franciscan education and Trigger (1965), Donohue (1969) and Massey (1974) describe Jesuit missionary behavior, all of which may be viewed as furthering incorporation. Similarly, Thomas (1932) and Rock (1981) offer views of official ‘policy’ in New Spain, and Naylor and Polzer (1986) deal with what may be considered the ‘political-military network’ of interaction in their coverage of the role of the militia and the institution of the presidio.

17. American and Tlinget opponents of the Russians burned Archangel St. Michael on Sitka Sound in 1802. It was rebuilt in 1804 as New Archangel, but commonly referred to as Sitka, and became the capital of Russian America in 1808 (Okun 1955; Golder 1971; Tikhmenev 1978).

18. As a peculiar historical sidenote, the sailing master of the Resolution was one William Bligh, who would later gain notoriety as captain of the Bounty.

19. Some Spanish reports of islands in this region exist before Cook’s visit, though the Spanish never solidified the information with an official claim. (See Dahlgren 1977).

20. It should also be noted that the Spanish had learned of Cook’s objective of visiting the northwest coast, and actually followed through with efforts to stop him. These were based not only on their concern with territorial encroachment, but the belief that English activity in the area would lead to an increased trade in contraband along the coast with Spanish subjects (Cook 1973: 88–89).
some 1,500 sea otter pelts were acquired by the crew, who were not aware of their actual worth in China” (Cook 1973:87). The crew used them mainly as bedding.

Continuing northward, Cook performed his first act of possession at 61°30’ north, perhaps purposely waiting until he was beyond land previously interpreted as being claimed by Spain (which had been placed at about 58 degrees north). From here, Cook’s expedition visited the Russian areas along Alaska and the Aleutians, where Russian officials received him and offered him their support. Traveling into the Arctic Ocean, he continued along the American coast until the ice made any further advance impossible, and led to the conclusion that the hoped for northwest passage was not there. From the Aleutians Cook’s convoy traveled to Hawaii to winter, where Cook was killed. After further explorations along the Asian coast, the expedition finally reached Macao where the crew discovered that the cheaply gotten furs obtained as much as 100 Spanish dollars a pelt, and nearly mutinied in their desire to return for more pelts (Cook 1973; Hull 1966; Coughhey 1933:188).

Upon their return to England in October of 1780, elaborate precautions were taken to prevent the spread of the news of the sea otter wealth. Despite these efforts, two anonymous accounts of the voyage were published in 1781 and the official journal was published by 1784. In addition to alerting the Spanish to British intrusions into the Pacific, this also had the effect of making the Spanish aware of the true, more limited extent of Russian expansion into the Gulf of Alaska (Hull 1966:92). Commercially, the spread of the news from Nootka caused an ever-increasing number of vessels to head for the northwestern coast. After the peace treaty of 1783 with Spain21 the British merchant marine was effectively unleashed, and the competition to exploit the fur trade in the north Pacific rose dramatically as other nations also sought to carve out their share.

III. THE DRAMA

A. Systemic-Power Competition for Nootka

With the publication of Cook’s voyage to the Northwest and the subsequent sale of sea otter pelts in China, any nation with a claim to trade made an attempt to exploit the riches of the northwest coast. Spain was the best positioned to take advantage of the situation, and had long known of the value of sea otter pelts from those taken in Baja California and subsequently sold in China. However, this trade had stagnated for lack of native hunters of sufficient ability or experience; the natives in the south did not commonly hunt the animal. Six years before the first British fur traders emerged along the coast, officials in the Philippines learned of Cook’s crew selling pelts in Canton. This led the padres of the missions in California to encourage converts to bring in pelts, which began to flow to the Orient in growing quantities. In fact, there was discussion relating to official participation in the sea otter trade as early as 1782. Ideally, the pelts could be used to purchase quicksilver (mercury) in China, which could then be used to refine gold ore in New Spain (Cook 1973:107).

This raises two points for consideration. First, this provides an interesting example of a role ‘preciosities’ play in the expansion of the system. In this case, we have the example of luxury goods (furs) being used to finance the production of bullion, which Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989) has considered a ‘necessity’ in terms of systemic incorporation. One could make the argument that these luxury goods are integral to the initial ‘hooking’ of an arena to the world-system, financing the initial expansion of the system into new areas, and then subsidizing the increased incorporation of a region. Luxury goods provide a potentially highly compensatory incentive for systemic actors to broaden the scope of their activities, then serve as a mechanism to underwrite the deepening of development by offsetting otherwise prohibitive ‘start-up’ costs associated with colonial expansion.

This brings up the second point for consideration. Specifically, it appears that the initial leg of the familiar ‘triangular trade’ pattern of economic flows may be under-appreciated in its relationship to the larger linkages of the world-system and the relevant ‘commodity chains’ of global production (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). For example, in the traditional triangular trade with Africa and the West Indies, slave labor was shipped to the West Indian plantations, “West Indian molasses went to the northern colonies, whose rum and trinkets went to Africa” (Wallerstein 1979:237).22 Yet Africa’s slave-regions are initially considered external to the world-system. The trade on America’s northwest coast developed similarly, though only the leg of trade including bullion from the East is considered part of the system according to a Wallersteinian interpretation of incorporation.

21. With the Convention of Aranjuez (April 12, 1779), Spain had openly joined the war (American Revolution) against the British, which diverted Spanish resources from the northwest coast to more crucial areas in the Caribbean, the Philippines, and an unsuccessful attempt to retake Gibraltar. As part of the treaty in 1783, Spain retained the Floridas, which had been in British hands until being retaken by Spain in the war.

22. As Wallerstein (1980:238) also observes, we must recognize that these flows are analytic constructs and reflect flows of commodities rather than the movements of individual ships.
While furs from beyond San Francisco did not figure into the initial Spanish plans of 1782, their relevant impact on the larger, truly global trade networks was increasingly realized. There was a seemingly inexhaustible supply of sea otters along the central California coast, as long as the native Indians could be encouraged to participate in the hunt. The Franciscans aided in supervising the ongoing collection, though the California Indians were largely unaccustomed to fur garments and had little practical experience in killing the fur-bearing sea otter, as they neither hunted it for food nor clothing.

In contrast, the Indians of the northwest coast were more culturally predisposed to the hunting of the sea otter for two primary reasons. First, while the natives of the northwest coast were mainly fishermen, hunting was “a source of luxury foods, of hides and pels, and a way of demonstrating personal prowess. Anyone could catch fish, but only a man of special talents, and one favored by the spirit powers, could be consistently successful in the pursuit of the wary sea mammals or the animals of the forests and mountains” (Drucker 1965:17). Indeed, skill at ocean hunting was considered admirable and could even have the advantage in the pursuit of the wary sea otter. Anyone could catch fish, but only a man of special talents, and one favored by the spirit powers, could be consistently successful in the pursuit of the wary sea mammals or the animals of the forests and mountains” (Drucker 1965:17).

Second, because of the proliferation of the potlatch, considerable prestige was achieved with the acquisition of sundry trade goods provided by the Europeans, as well as more traditional surplus goods of Indian origin—which include sea otter pelts. The potlatch-system is common from Oregon up to Alaska, wherein “social and political prestige hinged upon feasts at which the host enhanced his status by outdoing rival chiefs in the abundance and quality of gifts distributed” (Cook 1973:55). This tendency toward acquisition inherent in the potlatch-system resulted in an escalating competition for status, with “resultant sociopolitical fluidity” (Cook 1973:67). Thus, the mere introduction of a new source of luxury goods (i.e., European traders) had important impacts on the social and political structures of a region being incorporated, almost immediately upon the initiation of trade.23

The cultural importance of the potlatch should not be underestimated, as Goddard (1972:85) observes that the “Indians of the Northwest Coast differ

23. Drucker (1965) has a good discussion of the potlatch as an aspect of social organization, including the use of sheets of beaten copper as a means of transmitting wealth, and Barnett (1968) discusses the cultural background as well as socio-political aspects of the potlatch. Bracken (1997) provides a detailed history of the colonial administration and subsequent banning of the potlatch in Canada.

24. The information responsible for sparking American merchant interest can be traced to the rather fascinating story of John Ledyard, a Connecticut native who dropped out of Dartmouth to go to sea. Happening to be in London in 1776, the 24-year-old joined James Cook’s third expedition just before news of the Declaration of Independence reached Britain. After Cook’s return with the Resolution, Ledyard spent two years in an English barracks instead of transferring to a warship, but volunteered for a man-of-war heading to America after hearing of Cornwallis’ surrender. There, he managed to desert and went into hiding with an uncle in Hartford, where he wrote an account of Cook’s voyage that was published after the war. In an attempt to find backing for a return trip to Nootka Sound, Ledyard made his way to Paris (after finding no support in the economically depressed post-war United States). In Paris he found brief support from Commodore John Paul Jones, but more importantly impressed the American minister to France with the potential value of the northwest coast to the United States. This minister, Thomas Jefferson, encouraged Ledyard to try to reach the North Pacific with a Russian expedition, and then proceed alone (and on foot) to the Western frontier of the United States. Ledyard was turned back after reaching Yakutsk, and was thrown out of Russia on the Polish border, accused of being a spy. Disappointed, he made his way to London where he joined an expedition to explore the interior of Africa. Ledyard fell ill and died in Cairo in January of 1789 without ever returning to the North Pacific. However, Jefferson continued to urge others to undertake this challenge, and as President, he sent the Lewis and Clark expedition across the continent. Ironically, Ledyard’s book had sparked enough interest among Boston-area merchants that two ships, the Columbia and the Lady Washington, arrived at Nootka in September of 1788 and remained through the crisis of the following year (Cook 1973:104-106; Batman 1985:101-106; Buell and Skladal 1968:71-85).
In the context of this blooming interest in the northwest coast, Spain made the decision to occupy Nootka Sound. Several factors contributed to this decision. First, Spanish authorities were now aware that the English were operating between Canton and Nootka. Second, it was believed (erroneously) that Russia intended to send an expedition down the coast to occupy Nootka Sound by 1789, or 1790 at the latest. Finally, the decision was based on the recognition that Spain needed a northern buffer for its territory along the coast. Otherwise, every indication was that Nootka Sound, as well as the long coastline down to San Francisco that Spain claimed by right of prior discovery, would be lost by default to the encroaching European powers.

As part of Spanish hopes to consolidate their claim on the region, by 1790 the governor of New Spain was planning the creation of a private joint-venture company to engage in the sea otter trade. As conceived, this company would take advantage of two popular trade commodities in New Spain—beaten copper from mines in Mexico and abalone shells from the fisheries of California. The Spanish would be able to offer more for pelts than the competition from other nations because of the much shorter shipping distances and greater supply of trade commodities, and would be effectively cutting off the competition’s ability to turn a profit. When this happened, foreign intrusion would cease. The envisioned company would engage in a triangular trade, and “carry cattle and supplies from Monterey and San Francisco. Furs and lumber could be shipped from Nootka to the Orient, and cloth and garments obtained in China and the Philippines should be shipped to the northwest coast for the Indian trade, the garrisons, and the crews operating there” (Cook 1973:197).

International and domestic political circumstances resulted in this company not being realized, but that is not relevant for my investigation. Rather, for my purposes it offers crucial insight into the motivation and the process behind the planned incorporation of new regions. Very specifically, private interests would be used to fund the exploitation of primarily luxury goods, in place of official political-military expansion on an empire’s frontier. The high return on luxury goods allows for the development of the infrastructure needed to support trade in bulk goods, through which an imperial presence would eventually be supported. Additionally, the potential costs associated with failure are passed to the private venture until appropriate levels of return are realized, when governmental involvement becomes either warranted or cost-effective. Similarly in the North Pacific, the Russians were first drawn into the fur trade by private interests, and were soon contemplating agricultural stations and harbors on China’s northern frontier in order to support this trade and solidify their imperial expansion (Gibson 1969, 1999).

The competition for the strategic natural harbor of Nootka Sound commenced in earnest, which brought the European powers to the brink of war. Somewhat ironically, the controversy at Nootka Sound began as a rather minor dispute between sea captains at the edge of the known world. Simply put, the Spanish—in support of their claims to sovereignty—seized British ships operating under Portuguese papers in 1789. Other ships present at Nootka, the American vessels the Columbia and the Lady Washington, maintained amiable relations with the Spanish commander Martínez and were allowed to proceed to China. Later that summer, an additional American vessel was also seized for operating in violation of Spanish sovereignty.

These seizures occurred in an atmosphere of resentment and distrust in Europe, and England used the situation to press diplomatic advantage over Spain. Because of the European political situation, Spain was isolated from its international connections.

26. See Cook (1973). The clash at Nootka provides an intriguing potential case of the impact an external arena can have on behavior in the system. As such, it is hoped that a more detailed examination of the crisis at Nootka can eventually be undertaken with this in mind. For an intricate discussion of the diplomatic and personal intrigues involved in the crisis, see (Cook 1973:146–270; also Manning 1966; Pethik 1980).

27. Esteban José Martínez (who also had his silver spoons pilfered on the earlier Pérez expedition) was the Spanish officer in charge. The Felice and Iphigenia were seized and released under a bond that stated, if the Spanish courts requested, the ships were to be turned over to Spanish authorities. Later, British ships Northwest America, Princess Royal, and Argonaut were seized and sent south to San Blas.

28. The Columbia, captained by Robert Gray, returned to Boston on August 9th, 1790 and became the first American ship to circle the globe, and the first to start the triangle trade between the northwest coast, Canton and Boston (Buell and Skladal 1968).

29. The schooner Fair American, captained by eighteen-year-old Thomas Metcalfe, who was accompanying his father, Simon Metcalfe, and the brig Eleanora out of New York. They had been separated and were to rendezvous at Nootka. The Fair American was sailed to San Blas, where viceroy Conde de Revillagigedo ordered the ship and crew released. Unfortunately, young Metcalfe immediately set sail for the Sandwich Islands where King Kamehameha’s warriors overpowered the ship. All were killed except for one crewmember, Isaac Davis, who was enslaved. Four years later, Simon Metcalfe and a younger son, along with the entire crew of the Eleanora, were killed by the Haida on the northwest coast (See Cook 1973:198).

25. Juan Vicente de Güemas Pacheco de Padilla Horcasitas y Aquayo, conde de Revillagigedo governed New Spain from 1789 to 1794.
traditional ally, France, and Britain argued that the “seizures at Nootka Sound in time of peace were an insult to His Britannic Majesty and an offense ‘against the law of nations’” (Cook 1973:206). Britain demanded satisfaction on claims incurred by the seizure before any discussion on Nootka could even take place. This had the effect of requiring Spain to give reparations for an offense it denied having committed, without providing means for discussion about the grounds which justified its action (Spanish claims to sovereignty on the coast). British Prime Minister William Pitt knew from the outset that Madrid would refuse, and thus hoped to parlay the situation into a confrontation. The rationale behind such an approach is as follows:

Construed as an insult to flag and nation and employed adroitly, it could extort assent to a principle never before conceded by Madrid: recognition of a British right to make settlements in any unpopulated area nominally claimed by Spain by right of prior discovery, but never colonized. Pitt would contend that unless an area were settled and effectively controlled, titles based on prior discovery were not binding. The principle of occupation, once recognized in a treaty, would not only provide unhindered access to the northwest coast, but it would legitimize beachheads anywhere that Madrid’s territorial claims were not bolstered by settlement. The ploy, if successful, would facilitate the achievement of a long-sought British objective: economic and political penetration of Spanish America (Cook 1973:206).30

The British recognized that if they acceded to Spanish claims of sovereignty they would effectively be shut out of the nascent fur trade. So, Pitt used the affront of the seizure at Nootka Sound to press for a diplomatic advantage over Spain. Additionally, the Nootka incident became tied to resentment over Spanish claims to Pacific islands and the “sore question of fishing grounds off southern South America and the Antarctic” (Cook 1973:215).31

Essentially, the crisis at Nootka Sound was used as a rallying point for systemic power interests (particularly the hegemonic interests of Britain). Since the two sides’ positions were mutually exclusive—and the issues involved seemed of sufficient import to go to war—the network of alliances at the time put Spain, France, Austria, Denmark, Russia, and the United States against the forces of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Prussia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey (assuming that every nation lived up to its alliances). As Manning (1966:284) notes: “For a
time it seemed that all Europe would be drawn into a war over what, on the face of it, appeared to be an insignificant quarrel between two obscure sea captains.” The dispute that began over exploitation of a ‘luxury good’ in an external arena was pushing the powers of the system toward a conflict that could engulf the entire Western world and would involve conflict on every ocean. Indeed, this had the potential to become a truly world war, with the victor gaining the spoils of hegemony in the continuing struggle for colonial possessions.

The Nootka Convention of 1790 avoided the outbreak of war. This agreement was vague and somewhat ambiguous (and thus open to considerable interpretation), especially when translated from the original French to English or Spanish (Manning 1966:284; Cook 1973:235–236).32 However, the essential result of this and subsequent Conventions was that Spanish territorial claims were undermined, and Britain gained its first internationally recognized access to the Pacific coast of North America.33 From then forward, the dispute would center on how far south British claims could be pushed, since Britain had also reached agreement with Russia regarding the southernmost extent of exclusive Russian claims in the northwest. Additionally, the crisis served to break the diplomatic ice between London and Washington, largely because of British desire for a neutral United States if war broke out with Spain.34

Eventually, further conflict on the European continent, in the form of the French Revolution, served to draw European interest away from the northwest

30. It is important to recognize that Britain itself had traditionally observed and argued for the right of prior discovery as a means of protecting British interests.
31. Nor would this be the first time Britain waged war for the control of fur-trading areas, as this was a prime motive for the French and Indian War of 1754–63 (a.k.a. the Seven Years’ War).
32. Cook (1973:236) gives an example of the difficulty in strict interpretation of the Convention: “The French original reads depuis the month of April, 1789, which translates into Spanish as either desde (since) or después de (after). When published in Spanish and English translations, depuis was rendered as desde and since. Floridablanca interpreted the pact as entitling Britain to coastal access solely from Nootka northward. The British consistently construed article five as giving subjects of both nations free access to the coast north of the northernmost Spanish settlement extant in April 1789. (Martínez had arrived at Nootka on May 5.) The latter interpretation allowed the British to make settlements anywhere north of San Francisco Bay, to which the Spanish would also have free access.”
33. “By the terms of the convention on Nootka signed in late 1790, both powers had agreed to equal rights with respect to trade with the Indians and fishing and navigation in Pacific waters, although English ships were barred from sailing within ten leagues of the Spanish American coast in that part of the new World” (Hull 1966:142).
34. Pitt also cultivated relations with the Republic of Vermont (which was independent of the United States) as part of an ongoing British effort to develop buffer communities under British protection.
coast. This was complemented by the rise of America in the eastern part of North America. With the eventual arrival of Lewis and Clark overland in 1805 (despite Spanish efforts to thwart their expedition), as well as American purchase of key areas of land from the Indians around Nootka, by the turn of the century the area was falling under increasing American influence. Incursions on former Spanish territory would continue, and the debate would soon shift to one of contention between competing British, Russian and American interests.

B. Marking Territory: Formalizing Borders and Solidifying Claims

The Spanish concession of exclusive sovereignty over Nootka Sound marks an ebb from the high-water mark of the Spanish Empire in the Americas. Never again would Spain contend for new territory, but was forced instead to fight a rear-guard action in an effort to protect what possessions it already held. Other powers—notably Britain, Russia, and a nascent United States—were not hesitant to step into the void produced by imminent Spanish decline and would continue to encroach upon former Spanish holdings. In a context of Spanish domestic distractions and resultant international decline, the struggle for control over the northwest coast of America became a two-pointed question. The issue (as Britain had exploited) was not only which country had the most legitimate claim to the region, but also (and perhaps more relevantly) which country was best positioned to support and defend its claim.

35. Cook (1973:460, see 446-483 for full account of Spanish efforts) notes that four successive expeditions set out from Santa Fe for this purpose between 1804 and 1806. Cook concludes that the triumph of Lewis and Clark “damaged Spain’s chances of retaining sway over the vast hinterland between New Mexico and Nootka” and that “Spain’s primary interest in the Pacific Northwest was in retaining it as an unexplored buffer zone of protection for Mexico’s mines” (1973:485). Once again, we see the Spanish actively attempting to maintain a ‘zone of ignorance’ for their imperial benefit.

36. Recognizing the enormous potential of the area, John Kendrick, captain of the Lady Washington, had purchased large tracts of land during his initial visit, and subsequently recorded the deed with Samuel Shaw, the United States consul in Canton (See Buell and Skladal 1968:93). Cook (1973:323) records that Kendrick negotiated a purchase from Ma-kwee-na and five subaltern chiefs. In return for ten muskets the chiefs put their ‘X’s’ to a deed of sale of everything within a nine-mile radius of Chastacktoos harbor “on condition that natives be allowed to continue residing and fishing there.” A year later the Spanish also secured a deed of purchase from Maquinna (Ma-kwee-na), though the chief expressly exempted the land already conveyed to Kendrick. Kendrick was killed in Hawaii in 1794, accidentally hit by a British trader’s (the Jackal) cannon charge being fired as a salute to a recently victorious king of Oahu.
a region has goods of sufficient import to drive trade linkages, property rights eventually have to be codified, and territory delineated.

By the beginning of the 19th Century, the region was fairly familiar to the outside world. For example, if we examine John Cary’s map of 1806 (Plate 5), the former zone of ignorance is considerably pushed back. The coast is well defined, and only regions inland lack considerable definition.

Indeed, since Lewis and Clark had not yet returned with their wealth of information by 1806, we can see that the zone of ignorance is pushed toward the interior of the American West, north to Alaska, and now holds sway over the “Icy Sea” beyond. Upon the return of Lewis and Clark, the interior of the American West would be drawn into the “information network” of the United States, and the political-military network shortly after. Even then, however, the information network had important distortions, as exhibited by American settlers bypassing the ‘American Desert’ of the Great Plains in their desire to reach Oregon and California.

Once trans-frontier trade has begun (because some good is deemed to be “worth” more in the expanding capitalist world-system than in the goods’ native region), the eventual transition of a region from external arena to inclusion within the political-military network (PMN) is most explicitly characterized by the formalization of boundaries through treaties or other “official” documentation. This newly formalized territory is almost immediately reflected in updated, contemporary maps, which may be evaluated to ascertain the “real” extent of the system. Thus, the process of drawing boundaries is a basic reflection of, and one of the first steps toward the insertion of, the political structures of the system into (formerly) external arenas.37 Much in the same way that a region is removed from the realm of “myth” and deemed “real” by merely placing it somewhat accurately on a map, the same region is moved further along the spectrum of incorpo-

37. It is no coincidence that the notion of territoriality is also central to the definition of ‘state’, as is the notion of distributing resources. It is noteworthy, however, that the definition of territoriality and notion of borders extends to external regions that have economic or political worth, yet often remains unresolved in regions that are “within” the system but relatively “worthless.” For example, some modern states still have unresolved border disputes but feel no pressing need to resolve them (e.g. China and India, Peru and Ecuador, Western Sahara), while others maintain “undesignated” boundaries (e.g. internal areas on the Arabian peninsula) because the undesignated regions contain no extractable resources or populations. It does not seem unreasonable to recognize that these phenomena exist only because these regions are perceived as not being worth the effort to formally codify.

The Nootka Conventions marked the beginning of the process of formalization for the northwest coast of America. Suitably, the diplomatic squabbling over the placement of the “official” border provides a framework for the final stages of the region’s formal incorporation. Spanish interests were first to thwart American expansion for fear that the northern frontier would prove vulnerable and Mexican mines would be threatened. While Jefferson’s purchase of Louisiana did bridge the gap between the Mississippi and the Pacific, American claims were still vague and inconclusive on the Spanish frontier. This was solved in the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819, which fixed the southern boundary of Louisiana. As a consequence, Spain surrendered to the United States any claim to territory west of the Rockies and north of the 42nd parallel, and withdrew from the stage of the northwest coast (Graebner 1988; Walker 1999).

By contrast, the United States and Britain both maintained an interest in the region and had—through the Convention of 1818—agreed “to leave the region west of the mountains equally and freely accessible for a period of ten years to the vessels and citizens of either nation without prejudice to their respective claims” (Graebner 1988:8). This situation was brought back to the forefront of international diplomatic circles in September, 1821 when Czar Alexander I issued an imperial decree that declared the entire coast of North America above 51 degrees to be exclusively Russian (because this lay midway between the Russian settlement at New Archangel and the Columbia River). This decree complicated American claims based on the assumption of Spanish rights under the Treaty of 1819 up to 60 degrees, and considerably lowered the previous line of 55 degrees granted to the Russian American Fur Company in 1799. Vigorous British and American protests ultimately led to the Conventions of 1824 (with the US) and 1825 (with Britain), in which the Russians agreed to a southern boundary of 54.400 degrees. This allowed Russia to maintain control of Prince of Wales Island and effectively solidified the disputed border between contending Russian and British claims (Graebner 1988; Walker 1999).

In his examination of then-contemporary maps, Walker (1999) makes an observation that is of interest for the consideration of the ‘zone of ignorance.’ He displays a portion of H.S. Tanner’s “A Map of North America” with the boundary and notation “Boundary as claimed by Russia” far inland, but also asks us to “note the presence still of…the Caledonia River…an imaginary river system
The ‘Otter-Man’ Empires

The ‘Otter-Man’ Empires

The Oregon Country (as the region was now known). The British and Americans agreed on a joint occupancy without partition of the region, but such are the vagaries of international diplomacy and history. Originally, during the first three boundary negotiations of 1818, 1823, and 1826, the British and Americans agreed on a joint occupancy without partition of the Oregon Country (as the region was now known).

The Americans, however, maintained claims to the 49th parallel (and some as high as 54°40’ due to the assumption of prior Spanish rights), and argued that prior discovery conferred rights to the Columbia River drainage system. The presence of a Pacific Fur Company post (an American enterprise) at the mouth of the Columbia added support to this claim, and American negotiators argued that the principle of contiguity favored the extension of the 49th parallel to the Pacific. In contrast, the British were not willing to give up access to such a long stretch of coastline and its resultant frontage on the Pacific. Even though Vancouver readily admitted that Robert Gray had discovered the Columbia and that its course was first explored by Lewis and Clark, British diplomats “hoped that by neutralizing American claims of prior discovery, exploration, and settlement they could reduce the contest to a matter of actual occupation” (Graebner 1988:9). This was a stronger position for Britain, since the region north of the Columbia had been consistently in the possession of the Hudson’s Bay Company. However, negotiations stalled, and no settlement was reached. The principle of joint occupancy was extended indefinitely, with each nation holding the privilege of terminating the agreement with twelve-month’s notice. This state of affairs continued into the 1840s (Graebner 1988; Walker 1999; Cook 1973).

By 1842, the ‘Oregon Question’ was gaining increased political attention in the United States. President Tyler riled congressional interest when he placed the onus on the British for not resolving the boundary. Senator Linn of Missouri introduced a bill designed to encourage American occupation of Oregon, which was then narrowly rejected by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs because it violated the joint occupancy convention. Nevertheless, the combination of the great westward emigrations of 1842 and 1843, the completion of John C. Fremont’s trans-Mississippi West survey in 1843 (with its resultant maps and publications), and increased public interest given to the Monroe Doctrine’s claim that the American continents “were not thenceforth to be considered subjects for future colonization by any foreign power” greatly increased political pressure to resolve the issue of Oregon. With Britain abandoning its claim to the Columbia River, by 1846 the Oregon Treaty was signed and the boundary was fixed at the 49th parallel. It was quickly ratified in Congress and Parliament. The dispute over the actual water-route boundary through the Straits of Juan de Fuca was not settled until October 1872, nearly 100 years after the start of the fur trade around Nootka Sound (Graebner 1988; Walker 1999).

C. Impact of the Sea Otto Trade - External Arena

Up until now, I have largely ignored the impact of the sea otter trade on the residents of the external arena. I shall briefly distinguish some significant ways in which the trade did impact the Indian material culture, economy and government along the Northwest Coast, and in the Nootka Sound area in particular. In order to do this, it is important to characterize the geography of the region, as this shapes the inhabitants as well as their pre-contact society.

The northern Pacific Coast of America resembles that of Scandinavia in many ways. It is heavily forested with mountain ranges rising abruptly from the water, but the warm ocean flow of the Japanese current moderates the climate and prevents snow from remaining for any length of time. Rainfall, however, is a consistent characteristic during the period from October through April. The coast is characterized by many islands (large and small) with a multitude of navigable straits. Because of the steep mountain ranges running along the coast, the region is isolated from easy overland contact with the rest of the continent and has evolved largely as an ‘island’ unto itself with a very distinguishable native coastal culture. The waterways and sheltered channels along the coast formed natural highways for native travel, and there were few overland trails and trade routes (Drucker 1965, Goddard 1972).

Because of the rather moderate climate and abundant rainfall, the region is densely covered with vegetation. This includes a variety of trees: hemlock, Douglas fir, spruce, and cedar (red and yellow) which is especially important because of the ease with which cedar wood can be worked and its resistance to decay in moist environments. Several varieties of edible berries are prevalent, including blueberries, huckleberries, strawberries, thimbleberries and salmonberries. These complement other useful flora, such as a selection of ferns, reeds and mosses.

The fauna of the region is also diverse. The important land animals include deer, elk, mountain goat, and along some river drainages, moose. Bears were also common, though the grizzly was generally found only in the north. Sea mammals, however, were of greater importance. These include the whale, seal, sea lion...
The ‘Otter-Man’ Empires

region reflected a variety of techniques. The main materials used were “the tough extended family group). Finishing the wooden beams of the communal houses (rectangular plank houses were bent to create containers and boxes, and considerable effort was put into utilitarian items (often stylized into zoomorphic shapes, and great skill was put into making even used to make numerous everyday items. Wooden containers and dishes were used to make numerous everyday items. Wooden containers and dishes were often of sufficient size to yield canoes up to sixty or more feet in length from cedar logs. Cedar is soft and easily worked, yet resistant to decay, and logs were often of sufficient size to yield canoes up to sixty or more feet in length (Drucker 1965; Goddard 1972).

The woodworking aspects of society should not be underemphasized, as woodworking skill in this region was unrivaled by anything else in the Americas. Cedar provided the essential basis for travel (canoes and paddles), and was also used to make numerous everyday items. Wooden containers and dishes were often stylized into zoomorphic shapes, and great skill was put into making even utilitarian items (e.g. sea otter clubs, cradles) functional and attractive. Boards were bent to create containers and boxes, and considerable effort was put into finishing the wooden beams of the communal houses (rectangular plank houses were universally used at important permanent locations, and each housed an extended family group).

Weaving was also an important craft, and the basketry and the textiles of the region reflect a variety of techniques. The main materials used were “the tough flexible roots of the spruce, inner bark of both red and yellow cedar, cattail or tule stems, bark of the wild cherry tree, mountain goat wool, dog wool, down of ducks and other birds, the ‘down’ of various native plants, and for decoration grasses, fern stems and the like” (Drucker 1965:34). Some groups wove cedar-bark garments and blankets, though otter-fur robes were also worn when available. Additionally, conical hats of spruce root covered with cedar bark were common, as may be expected in such a rainy climate (Drucker 1965; Goddard 1972).

The main focus of life in the region, though, is on the ocean. Many tribes in the region depended on the annual salmon run to set in stores for the winter, and porpoise, as well as the sea otter. Above all, the greatest food source was fish, and especially salmon. Salmon was a great staple in the region, and was as important to the natives of the Northwest as buffalo was in the Plains region. A variety of other salt-water fish—cod, herring, smelt, halibut, and eulachon—supplemented this diet, and shellfish (oysters, clams, mussels, and crabs) were also of importance (Drucker 1965, Goddard 1972).

1. Pre-contact Status Quo

The society, economy and culture of any region are shaped by the geography and resources available (or unavailable) to the people of that region. The northwest coast of America is no exception. The material culture of the region is dominated by two factors: extensive dependence on exploiting resources from the sea, and the development of a very skilled woodworking society. As may be imagined, the natives of the region were skilled fishermen, and equally adept at hunting sea mammals. Travel was almost entirely by water, in large canoes made from cedar logs. Cedar is soft and easily worked, yet resistant to decay, and logs were often of sufficient size to yield canoes up to sixty or more feet in length (Drucker 1965; Goddard 1972).

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The main focus of life in the region, though, is on the ocean. Many tribes in the region depended on the annual salmon run to set in stores for the winter, and would transport large cargoes of dried salmon to their winter villages by lashing two canoes together and placing planks over the space between. The Nootka were no exception. They were exceptional, however, in their pursuit of whales and other large sea-mammals, often miles out to sea. Whaling is relevant not just for the food and oil it provided, but it also had important religious significance as whaling rituals were used to influence supernatural forces. Regardless, the Nootkan skill at sea hunting exceeded that of most other societies in the region.

The social organization of the region is best described as chiefdoms. Social groups were organized around kinship and associated with a geographic locality. Diamond (1997) notes that chiefdoms develop a redistributive economy based on tribute, and that complex chiefdoms often start to take on the characteristics associated with a ‘traditional state.’ He also notes that the American Indians of the Pacific Northwest, such as the Nootka, were in some ways unusual in that organized agricultural food production did not arise. Instead, the region was rich enough in sea and wildlife to support a complex hunting-gathering society and agricultural cultivation was largely absent. There was a considerable level of societal complexity as “food surpluses generated by some people, relegated to the rank of commoners, went to feed the chiefs, their families, bureaucrats, and crafts specialists, who variously made canoes, adzes, or spottoons or worked as bird catchers or tattooers” (Diamond 1997:274). In general, signs of social complexity in addition to a stratified society include slavery (which was present in the northwest), the utilization of luxury goods by the elite (evident in the process of the potlatch), public architecture ( communal buildings, totems) and indigenous literacy. While not literate, the natives of the region exhibit many other characteristics of a complex society (Diamond 1997, see also Wolf 1982, Fried 1967).

The role of wealth is closely related to the social organization of the region, as the emphasis placed upon wealth and property and the ceremonial distribution of wealth distinguishes the natives of the Northwest Coast from other North American societies. Wealth, in turn, allowed a family to show its greatness. A variety of objects were regarded as valuable: sheets of beaten copper from placer deposits, pelts of sea otter, robes of mountain goat wool, and rare shells (particularly Dentalium pretiosum). Drucker (1965:49) notes that “these shells are the only valuable that can be compared to money and then only in the southern part of the area, distant from the source of supply, where the slender tapered creamy-white shells were minutely graded into sizes with fixed standards of value.” This is reminiscent of a similar practice in Africa, where cowrie shells were widely used as currency, though not as widely accepted or used (Hogendorn and Johnson 1986). Regardless of whether we consider this to be a genuine primitive currency, objects of value were traded in networks stretching hundreds of miles up and down the Pacific coast. A very active trading system and culture of
accumulation was present prior to European encroachment. This is most plainly manifested in the function and nature of the potlatch, as previously discussed.

Various foodstuffs, materials for shelter, clothing, and means of transportation were also calculated as wealth. Accordingly, so were the places from which these materials came, to the extent that each group regarded the areas it utilized as the exclusive property of the group. This led to the creation of an intricate system of property rights. Each group “used habitation sites, fishing grounds, clam beaches, hunting and berrying grounds, forest areas where timber and bark were obtained, through right; outsiders entered by invitation or in trespass” (Drucker 1965:49). Great emphasis was placed on the controlled access to specific areas and their unique resources, and certain family groups even held rights of salvage along any given beachfront. This paid big dividends if a dead whale happened to wash up, and special varieties of whaling rituals were even performed in hopes that this would be the outcome. Controlled access to resources is an integral element to the accumulation of wealth.

As Kardulias (1990:31, citing Torrence 1986) notes, restricted access to a resource area is a key trait in distinguishing specialized production. The other trait is the need for efficiency if a commercialized system is involved, which is also evident in Native American cultures involved in the fur trade. In reference to indigenous development, specialized production may be defined as “non-subsistence activity which is performed by a particular or restricted number of households within a community; the individuals in such households then exchange their products or services for foodstuffs and items produced by other specialists” (Kardulias 1990:31–32). Additionally, specialization may also develop as a community-wide phenomenon. The Indian culture around Nootka Sound was definitely specialized, but such specialized production is not limited to the sea otter trade. Another example of specialization is found by examining the practice of dentalia fishing.

The species of dentalium valued by the natives grows in beds at moderate depth and in only a few places on the seaward side of Vancouver Island. The fishing grounds were the property of particular family lines, and the knowledge of how to locate them was a closely held secret. The beds were located by calculating an angle between two natural features onshore, though knowledge of the approximate angle and of the appropriate onshore features was crucial if one was to locate the dentalia beds. Rather ingenious gear was used to acquire the mollusks from the sea floor. “[T]he device was fairly efficient, the dentalia beds rich, and the Nootkan dentalia fishermen must have been industrious at their trade, for they obtained great quantities of the molluscs, which they carefully cleaned, sorted into three sizes (long, short, and in-between), and traded to neighbors packed in neat wallet-like cedarbark baskets or in fathom-long strings” (Drucker 1965:152). The shells increased in value the farther from the fishing grounds one got, and were actively traded along the North Pacific coast.

The preceding section should serve to give a quick overview of social, political and economic aspects of life in the region prior to contact with Europeans, though a number of detailed studies are available for those wanting more information. However, we should recognize that the region had a well-developed and distinguishable culture. Additionally, it had a robust network of trade and a defined property rights system. Finally, the social and political order was well evolved and possessed intricate rules of hierarchy and status. So what were the effects of European contact on this region?

2. Post-Contact Alterations

I make no claim that the region was static and utopian prior to contact with European powers. Indeed, as there were two main language groupings among the coastal societies and some contact with other Indians from the interior, the coastal societies underwent modification as a result of interaction with one another and the environment. However, once European colonization and exploration began, the pace of this change accelerated rapidly.

Changes among the native inhabitants’ social order are readily apparent and traceable, almost to the moment of initial contact with Europeans. One of the most commonly discussed ways in which European expansion into the external arena of North America impacted native life is by the introduction of new diseases. Considerable literature exists relating the depopulation of Native American populations in general, with some areas experiencing up to a ninety-percent decrease in population (Reff 1991; McNeill 1998). While death rates this high were not experienced among populations on the northwest coast, reports of epidemics of measles and smallpox correspond to Spanish voyages and subsequent contact in the region (Cook 1973). With each smallpox epidemic capable of killing 10–30% of the natives, it is not unreasonable to accept estimates that between 1774 and 1874 the native population along the Northwest Coast (from southern Alaska to the Oregon-California border) declined by 80%, or from about 200,000 to approximately 40,000 individuals (Boyd 1999).

The establishment of trading posts and missions served to further the spread of such diseases in the Spanish Southwest, as they served as centers of contagion as well as centers of commerce. In the Northwest, the second phase of the fur trade—that of land-based trading—began in the 1820s with similar consequence. Land-based traders established fixed forts and posts (e.g., Astoria, at the mouth of the Columbia), opened up interior routes of travel, and cultivated increased contact with basin, plateau, and coastal Indians. Boyd (1999) notes that commerce between natives and non-natives vastly increased the contacts...
between peoples that accelerated the spread of disease. While this second phase of the fur trade lasted until about 1846, and eventually expanded to exploit other resources such as timber, fish, farmland and pastures, the deleterious impact on native populations would not be undone.

Disease may play a particularly important role in the examination of the incorporation process as it is applied to different geographic regions. Specifically, it is due in large part to the differing disease vectors (direction of infection) between North America and Equatorial Africa that the historical experience of colonization and incorporation differs. In North America, the local population suffered, thus easing conquest and expansion. In contrast, in the tropics of Africa the Europeans were more likely to fall ill and perish, necessitating the use of local middlemen resulting in the rise of a merchant elite.

In the Northwest, contact with European traders also generated new wants and created new trade flows among the northwestern Indians. Specifically, since the goods provided by the Europeans greatly enhanced the status of a chief who could give away such goods at a traditional potlatch, more emphasis was placed on gathering goods that the Europeans would want in exchange (e.g., sea otter pelts). This had several additional consequences beyond merely the creation of new wants. Despite the abundance of wildlife on the northwest coast, sources confirm that during some winters after regularized trading, tribes in the Nootka Sound area experienced unaccustomed famine. After traders came with tempting trade goods, “Nootka males became excessively preoccupied with sea otter hunting, whereas in former times they had dedicated more time to whaling, salmon fishing, and other pursuits connected with laying in a food supply for the lean season.” (Cook 1973:313).

Among the goods most in demand by the Indians were copper, cloth, abalone shells, and almost anything metal. These new goods had a considerable impact on native art forms, and desire for metal was strong enough that initially Indians were seen taking down Spanish crosses (erected as means of claiming territory) in order to get the nails that held the crosses together. This thirst for iron is reflected in other accounts, as Cook (1973:147) relates that Captain Gray had to replace barrels “as the natives had stolen most of his barrels to get the hoops” (though we should note that stealing was an acceptable way for a native to obtain property, and was not considered morally wrong). Captain Kendrick, on the Columbia, narrowly averted total failure on his first trip to Nootka when the trade goods he had brought failed to interest the locals. Noting their interest in iron, he quickly had any unneeded iron (e.g., the spare anchor, capstans) fashioned into “chisels” by his blacksmith to trade with the natives (Buell and Skladal 1968:80). Buell and Skladal also note that on the next voyage, “a more adequate supply of trade goods was carried: sheets of copper, red, blue, and green cloth, iron chisels, shoes, pea jackets, buttons, gimlets or boring tools, penny nails, old muskets and blunderbusses” (1968:90). Soon, any trader headed to the northwest coast regularly carried quantities of iron “toes” that could be fashioned into desired implements.

Why would the Indians have such a desire for metal? The answer should be obvious to anyone with even a basic understanding of carpentry. Metal implements are far superior to bone or stone tools when working with wood, the importance of which is magnified when taken in context of the highly developed indigenous woodworking culture. In fact, because of apparent benefits such as the introduction of metal, scholars continue to debate how destructive the early fur trade was. Some indicate that the trade was beneficial to both parties and produced the high point in Northwest Coast cultures (Fisher 1977). Others either take a more balanced tone, noting both advantages and disadvantages (Gibson 1992) or describe a native world much more dislocated because of the fur trade (Harris 1997).

The Indians should not be viewed as passive recipients of European trade. They very actively entered into the arrangement, seeking items that would benefit their lifestyle and negotiated accordingly. For example, the eagerness for iron indicates that it was in short supply, yet it has little directly negative impact on the culture. In fact, an abundance of iron likely resulted in an increase in woodworking and carving. Similarly, the introduction of sails on canoes, the trade in blankets and cloth, and even the introduction of firearms did not directly disrupt the social patterns of native culture, but increased efficiency and comfort. Other introductions, like smoking tobacco and the cultivation of potatoes, were similarly ambiguous. Tobacco was already cultivated in the region, but was chewed. Potatoes were introduced and quickly spread wherever conditions were favorable.

From the beginning the Indians were skilled at trading. Members of Cook’s expedition observed, “they are very keen traders getting as much as they could for everything they had, always asking for more than what you would give” (Fisher 1977:140). Indeed, many chiefs were able to shape the trade so that it took place largely on their terms. Cook (1973:312) relates that after the first exposure to Europeans, “the chiefs had become exceedingly choosy in bartering their pelts.” Chief Maquinna38 grew adept at playing one nationality against another, and

38. Alternately spelled Maquilla or Ma-kwee-na, he was chief of the Indians at Friendly Cove in Nootka Sound, and is reported to have died in 1795. Some confusion appears on this point because the word ‘ma-kwee-na’ also corresponds to ‘chief’; though there is little question that one individual was known by this name during the contro-
was well known by all the captains calling at Nootka. His first exposure to the
British, however, may have disinclined him to favor them in particular:

Upon visiting the Harmo'n,\(^{39}\) Chief Ma-kwee-na was invited to sit in a chair
on deck. A sailor sprinkled a small pile of gunpowder under the seat, with a
thin trail of the substance leading out from it as a fuse. Ma-kwee-na was given
to understand they were rendering him a salute reserved to honored person-
ages, and he assumed the powder to be black sand until it was lit. Before he
could get up, a blinding flash and roar elevated him from the deck. His robe
offered scant protection from the searing blast, wounding both person and
chiefly dignity; as proof he showed the Spanish the scars still visible on his
rump (Cook 1973:101).

Over time the trade moved from the decks of the ship to shore and was
drawn out over several days, which was more in keeping with native custom.
Maquinna and other chiefs became more sophisticated about the prices they
charged, eventually learning to wait until two or more trading ships arrived.
Then they could get the traders to bid against one another and drive prices
higher. Clearly, the Indians were trying to maximize their own benefit and were
not just being passively exploited by the ship-borne traders.

Some of the indirect impacts of trade do tend to be more negative, how-
ever. For example, the impact of disease has already been discussed. In addi-
tion, some native groups clearly benefited more than others did. They tried to
monopolize relations with the traders, and drive competitors away. This resulted
in increased local conflict and accelerated the cycle of warfare in the region
(which was further accelerated with the introduction of firearms). The combina-
tion of increased conflict and the presence of the fur traders also resulted in an
increase in the practice of taking and selling slaves, particularly children. Slaves
were often taken during raids, but the presence of the traders opened up a new
“market” for the children, as “the purchasing of slave children, ostensibly to save
them from cannibalism, continued to be common” (Cook 1973:314). An increase
in the use of female slaves as prostitutes—and a concomitant rise in venereal
disease—is another of the darker aspects of the contact with the fur traders and
the encroachment of capitalism.

In addition to the introduction of disease, creation of new wants, and altera-
tion of domestic cycles of accumulation, the contact with Europeans served to
alter traditional modes of production/accumulation. Traditional socio-political
patterns were impacted, as lesser chiefs were able to exploit newfound wealth as
the traders represented a source of wealth that was not subject to existing under-
standings of property rights. This resulted in a drastic increase in social fluidity
throughout the region and destabilized traditional power structures. Eventually
this change resulted in a drastic alteration of the traditional potlatch ceremony
into what became known as the spectacular ‘rivalry potlatch’ (Drucker 1965:
61–65; Barnett 1968; Bracken 1997).

Additionally, the introduction of the trading post as an institution in the
1800s altered traditional demographic movements and served to create a local-
ized dependent population (Krech 1984). The Spanish mission system similarly
served as a mechanism of incorporation in the Californias (Pike 1956; Hall
1986). Missionaries arrived on northwest coast in the mid-nineteenth century
with similar influence. Finally, once the region was more formally incorporated,
native populations were either moved onto reservations or limited to a fraction
of their traditional territory.

Regardless of the actual mechanism, it is evident that considerable impact
is being exerted on a given region’s inhabitants well before it is traditionally
considered “incorporated.” It is likely that the “grooming” or preparatory process
begins immediately upon contact. This process takes hold to a varying extent
dependent upon the presence or absence of certain environmental variables.
Potentially, it seems plausible that diverse factors such as the disease vectors,
geography, strength of indigenous polities, presence of multiple distinct popul-
ations, and population densities all play a significant role in determining the rela-
tive impact of core intrusion on an external area. Once effective trade patterns
are established and appropriate desires ingrained, then a more active process of
incorporation begins. It is at this critical juncture that control of the situation
shifts to outsiders and the indigenous population is increasingly left out of the
dialogue of incorporation.

**EVALUATION OF INCORPORATION**

The strength of the incorporating state necessarily should be expected to
play a significant role in the incorporation process. For the purposes of this
case, in the late eighteenth century Spain may be seen as a state that was losing
strength. While Spain did have sufficient authority to fend off initial advances
into its territory, it lacked sufficient resources to bring previously unexplored, yet
claimed, territory under its control. Instead, Spain institutionalized the existence
of a ‘zone of ignorance’ within its own claimed territory through conscious policy
decisions. Why? Because exploration and discovery of a northern water route
into the Pacific would have eased foreign intrusion (as secrets of such magni-
...and required considerable expense to defend. Only when threatened with potential challengers (e.g., perceived Russian expansion from the north, eventual British incursion into the Pacific, later overland and maritime advances by the United States) did Spain attempt to expand its control to these new areas of contention. Unfortunately for Madrid, it was incapable of fully meeting the challenge.

This also supports Hall’s contention that incorporation is a matter of degree, can be a volatile process and that location within, on, or beyond the frontier of state control is important (Hall 1986, 2000b). Further, this case also points out ways in which the type of society being incorporated may shape the incorporation process. Particular cultural, political, and economic aspects of the northwestern Indians (e.g., the institution of the potlatch, emphasis on woodworking, skill at ocean hunting) made them more easily adapted to engaging in the sea otter fur trade, as they had an increased utility for the trade goods—and hence prestige—that were provided in exchange. In contrast, the Indians of the California coast lacked similar social institutions and peculiarities, yet were more easily assimilated into the Spanish mission system because of different environmental parameters and their more agriculturally oriented society.

If we recall the typography of incorporation used elsewhere, specific dates can be assigned to particular phases of incorporation in this particular case. One can develop the concept of a ‘signaling event,’ or ‘trigger,’ to mark the delineation of new phases of the incorporation process. For example, the ‘signaling event’ underlying the shift from zone of ignorance to being in the ‘external arena’ of the European system is the voyage of the Santiago in 1774–1775 and its visit to Nootka Sound. This opened an era of ongoing trade and ‘grooming,’ which moved the region increasingly into the system. Eventually the region became more nominally incorporated with the arrival of settlers. Up to 1841, Americans in Oregon consisted of fur traders, missionaries, mission helpers, government explorers, or similar trans-frontier occupants, but no farmers or settlers per se.

In 1841, the first band of 32 settlers arrived. Their significance is not in the numbers of individuals, but rather that they blazed what would become the Oregon Trail and provided a venue for increased interest in local mission projects. The following year witnessed the additional immigration of more than a hundred persons, and the Great Migration of 1843 saw more than a thousand. Newspaper accounts purported that such migration was patriotic and holy, as mission (and national) interests in Oregon needed the protection that migration would afford. However, the economic motivations based on reports of free land, fertile soil, pleasant climate and abundant salmon, lumber, and waterpower had a significant impact as well. In any case, Caughey (1933:241) notes that succeeding years saw continued use of the Trail: “For 1844 the figures are uncertain, but estimates waver between 475 and 700, though there is mention of a round thousand. The next year brought more than three thousand…. In 1846 there was a slump to 1,350, followed by 4,500 in 1847, and 700 in 1848.” While migration was reduced (and possibly reversed) the following year with news of gold in California, over 11,000 settlers moved to the region over just 8 years. Indeed, while the American claim to Oregon was formalized with the Oregon Treaty of 1846, “As clearly as in Texas the American settlers won Oregon” (Caughey 1933:246, emphasis added). By 1846, the region was well on its way to being effectively incorporated. Agriculture, and not the fur trade, would prove to be the focus for settlers.

The case of the sea otter fur trade also serves to illustrate that different policies of state expansion can have different implications for incorporation. For example, Russian expansion and colonization was characterized by a tributary method of accumulation, and most of their behavior and policy was geared accordingly. In contrast, Spanish colonization was oriented toward what is considered more traditional capitalist incorporation (the encomienda system), especially in the regions of California and the Southwest. However, it is important to realize that most of the processes going on in the area in question would not necessarily be considered part of the capitalist world-system according to Wallerstein. Instead, we have an example of the transitional ‘grooming period’ that occurs prior to the emergence of incorporation, when a region moves from pre-contact zone of ignorance to post-contact external arena. Then the process of incorporation can begin.

The case of the fur trade on the Pacific Coast is illustrative for another reason. It offers potential answers to the question, If ‘contact’ or ‘marginal’ incorporation does not contribute to the accumulation of capital, either for the core or some class or class segment within it, then why does it happen? The answer to highlights two shortcomings of the Wallersteinian conception of incorporation. First, by concentrating on the requirement of bulk trade in necessities, Wallerstein under-appreciates the role that ‘preciosities’ play in the expansion of the world-system, as well as the role they play in ‘hooking’ new areas into the
incorporation process. Second, by concentrating on the areas considered incorporated, the relevance of external arenas (frontiers) is overlooked. As this case illustrates, luxury trade in an external arena can have tremendous impact on the core and other incorporated areas within the system.

Why? Partially the answer lies in the desire for pre-emptive colonization. However, the underlying drive for such pre-emption, at least in the case of the northwestern coast of America, is for control of a profitable luxury trade and future income from it. Luxury goods appear to offset the otherwise prohibitive costs of expanding the capitalist system, and as such seem to play a key role in the broadening process. This indicates that the role such trade plays in the world-system is severely under-appreciated; it certainly indicates that the role luxury goods play in the process of incorporation needs to be more carefully considered.

In fact, if one looks at American policy immediately following the emergence of the fur trade, it becomes increasingly clear that this trade is instrumental in initializing the incorporation process. After Americans first entered the Pacific, ship owners supported the idea of official exploring expeditions. This would lower the risk of navigating little-known or uncharted waters, and would allow a foundation for increased naval protection. The United States Navy responded with limited patrols by 1820 and the formation of the Pacific Squadron, which expanded regular patrols ever westward across the Pacific to Southeast Asia. This expansion of official US naval presence was solidified by the eventual acquisition of California and Oregon, and saw the establishment of the East India naval station in 1835. Dudden (1992:15) observes that:

Indeed foreign policymaking was being imposed upon the United States, as it was upon Great Britain and France, by the growing numbers of its citizens active in the central and southern Pacific together with the increasing value of their properties there. The comparative abundance or lack of trade, then, created the policies to be formulated and enforced.

The US Navy took on the role of official constabulary, and served to support American interests in the commercial rivalry between American and British competitors. Leaders of both parties in America hoped that the North Pacific Ocean would become “a vast American lake,” the bridge to the wealth of the Far East from trading and whaling (Dudden 1992:17). It is clear that economic issues were driving political decisions in this period.

Finally, by taking a close look at various maps of the region as it is being incorporated one can actually “see” a degree of differentiation in the stages of incorporation. That the region first exists squarely in the zone of ignorance is not in question, as maps of this period make clear: there are broad unmapped regions and fanciful, mythical names (Anián) appear regularly. Clearly, this region is even outside of what is the ‘information network’ of the world-system, and more solidly in the realm of myth. Similarly, this is the case for the Buache Map (Plate 3). Lower California is reasonably accurate, but the northwest has been replaced with “Fou-sang des Chinois” and an inner sea leading to the fabled Northwest Passage.

Even when a region is falling into the ‘information network’ anomalies still occur. First, not everyone has access to the same information. This imperfect dissemination leads to considerable time-lags between countries having the same information, and the same literal world-view. Second, until more information is acquired (and a region is firmly in the realm of the “real”) it is easy for misinformation to thrive. To illustrate the first point, see the Russian Academy (1758) map (Plate 4). This Russian map of 1758 triggered Spanish efforts to thwart Russian expansion, as the Spanish were unaware of the true extent of Russian presence in the Pacific. The same map still appears virtually unchanged over twenty years later, but translated into English and popularly marketed.

To illustrate the second point (that misinformation thrives), one need only view other contemporary cartographic offerings. Recall that Lower California was represented with reasonable accuracy in the early maps of the region (e.g., Ortelius [1587], Author Unknown [1586], and even Chino [1702] maps). However, by the late 17th and early 18th centuries, California had achieved the status of an island on many depictions of the region. For example Homann (1707), has the North American continent tenuously stretching far to the northwest and California adrift in the Pacific.

The appearance of California as an island is not a singular occurrence. Rather, it was quite common for Lower California to appear on maps as an island throughout the late 17th century. This is after being quite accurately repre-
sent by 1587! It is a telling case of a region existing in the fuzzy realm between the ‘zone of ignorance’ and actually being in the ‘information network.’ The region had slipped just far enough back into the realm of fantasy to require that more definitive proof be gathered if California was to be ‘reattached’ to North America. Similarly, Seutter (1731?) portrays California as an island, does not speculate as to the nature of the rest of Northwest America, but instead employs a well placed cartouche to fill in the otherwise empty region.

Finally, as the northwest was more fully absorbed by the expanding system and drawn into the ‘prestige goods network’ of the fur trade, an accurate depiction of the coastline was forthcoming. However, even when the region was being pulled into the ‘political-military network’ and more formally incorporated (as characterized by the boundary negotiations between Russia, Britain and the United States), elements of the zone of ignorance crop up in the form of make-believe rivers or non-existent mountain ranges. Taken as a whole, the maps used in the boundary negotiations between Britain and the United States are illustrative of the wider region being absorbed into the global political networks of the expanding system (Walker 1999).

And what of Nootka Sound and the sea otter? How did they fare in the telling of this historical tale? The sea otter was all but eliminated from the waters around Nootka by 1820, though the animals were still commercially hunted until the beginning of the 20th century. In 1911 an international treaty protecting fur seals, sea otters, and polar bears from indiscriminate hunting was signed by Great Britain, Japan, Russia and the United States, and conservation efforts have seen the return of the sea otter to much of its original habitat, though in reduced numbers. As a catalyst of history, the sea otter led to the mapping and settlement of the shores along a 6000 mile ‘river of fur,’ and resulted in the eventual marginalization of the natives that had originally dominated the region.

With the decline in the fur trade, Friendly Cove and Nootka Sound receded from the realm of interest for the players in the system. Instead, the seal hunters and whalers that followed the initial expansion into the Pacific shifted interest elsewhere. Vancouver Island existed as a preserve of the Hudson’s Bay Company and was only formally admitted (as part of British Columbia) to provincial status in 1871. Logging had a start in 1914, though the first sawmill was not actually built around Nootka until 1938 (in conjunction with a gold rush in the area). More modern mills have been built, and once again ships from around the world sail into Nootka Sound. However, now the ships take lumber, pulp and newsprint to world markets, and leave the sea otter to amuse the growing number of tourists that are drawn to the region for its sea kayaking and sight seeing attractions.

As should now be evident, important changes, processes, and interactions take place well before a given region is traditionally considered incorporated into the world-system. Using historically contemporary maps allows one to parse out a more accurate interpretation of when a given region enters various stages of the incorporation process, particularly in regards to the information network. This provides a ‘snapshot’ of a region at a given time, and taken in context with more traditional historic accounts provides a more complete story of the expansion of the global state system. As we see with the case of the Northwest Coast, a tremendous amount of action takes place well before the region is traditionally considered incorporated, and this is a part of the story that has been largely overlooked. By shifting the focus to what happens prior to contact with systemic actors and then tracing social, cultural and economic alterations that occur during the period of incorporation, insight into the broader functioning of the expanding capitalist system is provided.

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43. Mattaeus Seutter (1731?), “Novus Orbis sive America Meridionalis et Septentrionalis” (New World with South and North America), Augsburg. Electronic image available at the Reed College Library, Special Collections Department. [http://simeon.library.reed.edu/collections/antmaps/](http://simeon.library.reed.edu/collections/antmaps/)

44. Cook (1773:Appendix E) places the number of vessels visiting the Northwest coast between 1774 and 1820 at 450. This number does not include Russian vessels unless they traveled south of Sitka. The busiest year was 1792, in which 32 vessels were active on the coast.


Cary, John. 1806. "A New Map of America from the Latest Authorities" (map). Courtesy of Reed College Library, Special Collections Department. http://simeon.library.reed.edu/collections/antmaps/


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The ‘Otter-Man’ Empires


The ’Otter-Man’ Empires


Ortelius, Abraham. 1587. “Americae Sive Novi Orbis, Nova Description” (America with New World, New Description) (map), from Abraham Ortelio, Theatro de la Tierra Universal, originally published in Amsterdam. Electronic image courtesy of Reed College Library, Special Collections Department. 
http://simeon.library.reed.edu/collections/antmaps/


Seutter, Mattaeus 1731. “Novus Orbis sive America Meridionalis et Septentrionalis” (New World with South and North America) (map), Augsburg. Electronic image courtesy of the Reed College Library, Special Collections Department. 
http://simeon.library.reed.edu/collections/antmaps/


Two Steps Forward and One Step Back: Conflict and Contradiction in Post-War Guatemala

Kristin Marsh


What are the real prospects for lasting peace and greater prosperity in post-war Guatemala? This is the central question underlying Susanne Jonas’s *Of Centaurs and Doves* and Christopher Chase-Dunn, Susanne Jonas, and Nelson Amaro’s *Globalization on the Ground.* As events continue to unfold for Guatemalans, these scholars tackle the very current issues of democratization, development, justice, and peace in post-war Guatemalan society. The cruel irony is that the very urgency with which these issues must be addressed belies any concrete prediction or even refined characterization of the existing situation.

Post-civil war transitions are never easy or clean, particularly when the outcome reflects a negotiated compromise between committed adversaries. For Guatemalans, whose 36-year conflict finally came to a close with the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, the future appears particularly tenuous. Electoral participation remains at a regional low; street violence is widespread; poverty remains high; and constitutional reform has been aborted via a failed referendum. In spite of these setbacks, Guatemalans...
continue to work toward peaceful stability, popular democratic participation and legitimacy, and economic development. The full implementation of peace in Guatemala remains elusive, and it is this very uncertainty that makes the study of this case so crucially important and potentially useful.

In *Centaurs*, Jonas continues her contribution to our understanding of Guatemala, providing an interpretation of the peace process and assessment of the Peace Accords themselves. The book is divided into two major sections. First, Jonas traces the background and summary of the conflict period (Chapter 1); the period leading to negotiations and settlement (Chapter 2); and the various peace accords signed between 1994 and 1996 (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, Jonas tackles the questions of democracy and social justice; in Chapter 5, she focuses on the changing role of the U.S. These chapters contextualize her analysis, but do not quite fit in the overall logic of the book. In the second major section, Jonas addresses the implementation phase, from 1997 to mid–1999, including broad interpretation of the period as a whole (Chapter 6), as well as focused discussions of the struggles over tax reform (Chapter 7) and constitutional reforms (Chapter 8). In her conclusion, Jonas weighs the successes and failures of the peace process in view of the larger global and comparative context. And in the Epilogue, she reports the results of the 1999 November referendum, considering implications for the peace process.

The roots of insurgency in Guatemala can be traced directly to the U.S.-sponsored overthrow of the Arbenz government in 1954, ending the democratic nationalist Revolution of 1944. Not unlike conditions elsewhere in Central America, the revolutionary impulse in Guatemala was deeply rooted in class relations following the organization of coffee production, but furthered by dependent relations with, and interference by, U.S. interests. The important difference, however, is the added centrality of race in Guatemala, where the indigenous population is much larger than in neighboring El Salvador or Nicaragua. In addition, the Guatemalan conflict is notorious among recent Central American conflicts for both its duration (36 years) and its death toll (over 200,000 civilian casualties). It was also the last to be resolved, following Nicaragua’s 1990 elections and El Salvador’s 1992 settlement. Negotiations began with initial dialogue between the insurgency (URNG) and the government in 1986, continuing through the signing of the final accords in 1996. During formal negotiations, the U.N. served as moderator of the negotiations and via the U.N. verification mission (MINUGUA). Terms of settlement included agreements concerning democratization, human rights, refugee resettlement, historical clarification, socioeconomic reforms, and reforms of the armed forces.

Challenging the usefulness of prevailing models of democratization to the Guatemalan experience, Jonas distinguishes between procedural and popular democracy. While contested elections now prevail, political legitimacy is quite low, as evidenced in low electoral participation rates. She also addresses the compatibility of peace and social justice, a question that can be seen as linking the concerns of area specialists and world-systems theorists. In recognizing that socio-economic justice is the common sacrifice of compromised insurgencies, Jonas implicitly pinpoints the contradiction of post-war Guatemalan society and the essential contradiction of the role of the international community as mediator and guarantor of peace processes in developing countries. For war-weary Guatemalans, however, the U.N.–brokered peace settlement provided the only hope out of conflict. In recounting the half-hearted role of the U.S. in the Guatemalan peace process, Jonas tells a familiar story of U.S. intransigence in regional peace making, evident in both Nicaragua and El Salvador. Continuing to display entrenchment in military interests throughout the region, the U.S. is increasingly willing to take a back seat to organized expressions of international interests and norms via the U.N., regional organizations, and international financial organizations.

If Part I of Centaurs reflects her optimism at the signing of the peace accords, Jonas admits that Part II reveals her growing discouragement in the 2 1/2 years since settlement. The settlement itself departs in important ways from other compromises in which political democratization has been traded for postponement of the economic goals of the revolutionaries. In Guatemala, the insurgents seem to have won nearly all the issues in principle, but very little in concrete terms of accountability and guaranteed implementation. In principle, all parties agreed to historical clarification, progressive and increased tax liability, and constitutional reforms. In practice, implementation proved difficult because none of the details had been worked out prior to settlement. For example, the accord on socioeconomic issues established crucial reform principles, particularly an increase in the tax ratio, intended to help underwrite modest social spending targets and implementation of other aspects of the accord. Nevertheless, the government and the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF) successfully resisted the very changes to which they had agreed. Further, the problems with tax reform paralleled other socio-economic issues, and Guatemala’s failure to implement adequate taxation, land tenure, social services, and job provision places severe restrictions on the state’s ability to foster programs of sustainable development.

The story of constitutional reforms has no happier a conclusion. Judicial reform and indigenous rights depended on a legal basis for such changes. By the time Congress passed the constitutional reforms and the package came up for
popular referendum, the populace had grown increasingly disillusioned with the whole process, and the reform package was rejected by a vote of 55 to 45 percent. However, a full 81% of registered voters (only 60% of those eligible to vote are registered) did not participate in the referendum: The “no” vote represented 9.4 percent of registered voters.

Jonas concludes that institutional structures curtailed realization of the peace settlement’s full potential. What she neglects is the extent to which the Peace Accords themselves structured both limitations and strengths as they reflected the mix of interests and the proximate balance of power existing between the state, the opposition, international actors, and various civil organizations at the time of negotiations. Compared with the opposition in El Salvador, for example, the URNG was much less a threat to the state and wielded insufficient bargaining power at the table to give it a sufficient voice in determining terms of implementation.

The strength of *Centaurs* is its contribution to our understanding of the difficulties of the Guatemalan peace process. As a whole, the analysis is somewhat fractured, but this reflects not only Jonas’ own shifting perspective as events unfold, but also the currency of the questions addressed and her unwillingness to see the many setbacks as indicative of failure. In this, she implies a critique of the international community’s tendency to assess peace processes in dichotomous terms of success vs. failure—do we have peace or war? democracy or dictatorship? justice? inclusion? Peace implementation can neither be pure success nor pure failure, but contains the same inherent complications reflective of the conflict and the compromise itself and the same contradictions inherent in the larger global order within which all compromises are constructed. Finally, foreshadowing some of the central themes in *Globalization*, Jonas concludes in *Centaurs* exactly where she, Chase-Dunn and Amaro begin in *Globalization*—with the balanced assertion that post-war Guatemala represents a great advance over the previous forty years of authoritarianism and political violence while simultaneously coming up quite short of the cooperative consolidation of peace and popular democratization that so many had hoped for.

While *Centaurs* focuses on the trajectory of settlement implementation, *Globalization* addresses current and future needs of Guatemalans working toward political democracy and economic development. Based on the proceedings of the 1998 Seminar on Guatemalan Development and Democratization held at the Universidad del Valle de Guatemala, Guatemala City, *Globalization* brings together the perspectives of Guatemala specialists (both U.S. and Guatemalan), world-system and development scholars, and social scientists as well as policy makers and practitioners. *Globalization* is organized into four main sections. In Part I, following the brief introductory chapter by Jonas and Chase-Dunn, Gert Rosenthal argues for the potential for development in the context of social justice. Rosenthal sets forth the basic premise underlying many of the selections to follow: The success of the development project in Guatemala depends on the corresponding implementation of policies for sustainable growth, as well as greater social equity.

The contributors in Part II tackle the institutional issues facing Guatemala—demilitarization, security, and local vs. centralized governing structures. John Booth (“Global Forces and Regime Change”) places the Guatemalan transition in regional context, assessing the potential for democratic consolidation in terms of the geo-political context and relative strength of the country’s economy and political culture. Public opinion indicators in the 1990s show low levels of commitment to democratic processes; nevertheless, in context of Guatemala’s recent and ongoing turmoil, this should be taken as healthy skepticism. The long-term trajectory, Booth argues, is likely to favor a consolidated democratic regime. In “Democratization through Peace,” Jonas echoes Booth’s analyses and many of the themes underlying *Centaurs*, particularly her critique of the democratic transition literature and the peace/justice tension in peace settlements. Likewise, Nelson Amaro (“Decentralization, Local Government, and Citizen Participation”) calls for greater decentralization of political power, increased citizen participation, and the professionalization of local government office. And A. Douglas Kincaid argues that the experience of El Salvador provides reason for optimism regarding the immediate future of civil-military relations in Guatemala, but that the long-term maintenance of public security in both cases depends on the embeddedness of security issues within a larger strategy of sustainable and just development.

Edelberto Torres Rivas and Stephen Bunker both emphasize the relationship between the state and the economy. Pointing out the contradictory logic of expanding political democracy within neo-liberalism, Torres Rivas argues that the supremacy of the free market assumes a weak state, limiting political participation to the economic elite. Instead, a strong state is needed—one that is free to act independently of private military and economic interests. Stephen Bunker provides a potential test case. Recognizing that sustained development depends on a reversal of patterns of land distribution, labor control, and environmental degradation, Bunker points out that bulk coffee (produced on larger plantations typical of Guatemalan coffee production) is experiencing a drop in prices, while the market for premium, higher priced coffees (better suited to smaller holdings) has expanded considerably. These unique sectoral market opportunities could conceivably allow for reorganization of production that would be politically feasible both domestically and internationally.

In Part III, Kay B. Warren, José Serech, and Michael Richards and Julia Richards focus on the Guatemalan signature issue of indigenous rights, includ-
ing cultural rights and the central importance of indigenous access to development and democratic processes. Warren (“Pan-Mayanism and the Guatemalan Peace Process”) speaks to the extent to which citizen groups participated in the negotiation process. Popular and Maya groups coordinated efforts in articulating and demanding inclusion of their concerns, while the economic elite recognized the link between international norms of indigenous human rights and the necessity to regain external legitimacy. Success of the settlement continues to depend on cross- and intra-class coalition building and meaningful institutional reform, but the efficacy of such popular mobilization among ethnic groups in Guatemala is evident.

Serech (“Development of Globalization in the Mayan Population of Guatemala”) considers the impact of globalization and regionalization on the construction of ethnic identities. The future role of Mayan populations will reflect a directly negotiated position with the centers of economic and political power, nonetheless displaying persisting inequalities and uneven adaptation of groups previously excluded from the global project. Clearly, language is a central aspect of adaptation, and Richards and Richards (“Linguistic Diversity, Interculturalism, and Democracy”) identify recent shifts in language patterns, including a growing bi-lingualism that maintains advantages of Ladinos while simultaneously advancing the use of English and Spanish at the expense of a number of indigenous languages. In order to prevent the extinction of these spoken languages, intercultural educational programs must explicitly work to preserve them.

Part IV places the current crisis in Guatemala in its global context, incorporating the effects of broader structures and processes as they shape potential outcomes “on the Ground” in Guatemala. Alejandro Portes (“Theories of Development and Their Application to Small Countries”) claims that world-systems theory has never been very good at explaining the unique historical experiences of single societies. Aside from ignoring the extent to which world-systems theory was built on historical and case specificity, Portes’s argument undermines the analytic necessity of bringing the broader political-economic context to bear on the uniqueness of historical trajectory. The point is not to privilege the “broad strokes” of world-historic processes when trying to understand particular phenomena, but to take the larger economic and political structures seriously as constraining factors. In spite of Portes’s insistence that world-systems theory has been blind-sided by the experiences of certain individual cases (in this experience, world-systems theory is in good company), there are also many instances in which the world-systems perspective has furthered our understanding considerably. Guatemala is one example, and the scholars who have contributed to this volume, while not all identifying as world-systems theorists, nevertheless understand the extent to which the logic of global capitalism shapes the interests and options of relevant actors.

The articles by William I. Robinson and the Christopher Chase-Dunn and Susan Manning illustrate the usefulness of the world-systems perspective in locating the contradictions facing Guatemalans today. Robinson is poignant in his critique of the neoliberal project. In fact, we owe the clarity of this critique as incorporated by other authors throughout Globalization (as well as in Centaurs) to Robinson. Neoliberal ideology is so incipient and so internalized that it shapes the language of our dialogue. Robinson reminds us that we mistake polyarchy for democracy; Chase-Dunn and Manning concur that debates on development assume neoliberalism, rather than contest its form. In particular, it is not enough to understand that the agro-industrial elite is the emergent economic/political actor throughout Central America; rather, in order to understand this elite segment’s shifting interests and power, it must be recognized as a fraction of the transnational elite. Thereby, negotiations are seen in their global context: There are never only two oppositional parties at the bargaining table, but many interested actors (class segments) weighing in on terms of settlement—indigenous groups, external state powers, INGOs, IFIs, in addition to the insurgency and the state.

Is comprehensive, cohesive analysis too much to expect from an edited volume of conference papers? This one comes impressively close, effectively bridging local realities with a global logic. Globalization represents an important complement (in some ways, a corrective) to Jonas’s view, from within Guatemala, of a unique and internally driven historical experience. Further, Jonas takes us through the Constitutional referendum of 1999, while Globalization is explicitly forward looking, with concrete discussion of current organizational and policy issues. Taken together, these volumes reflect the long-term nature of post-conflict transitions. Successes and disappointments continue along the way, and the longer-term projects are really just emerging. Still, while the prospects for social justice and popular democracy appear few, it helps to recall the 36 years of political violence and just how far the people of Guatemala have come.
Book Reviews

John Tomlinson
Globalization and Culture
Reviewed By Albert J. Bergesen

David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton
Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture
Reviewed By David M. Mednicoff

Robert A. Denemark, Jonathan Friedman, Barry K. Gills, and George Modelski
World System History: The Social Science of Long-Term Change
Reviewed By Richard E. Lee

Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, Margaret Lock, Mamphela Ramphele, & Pamela Reynolds
Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery
Reviewed By James V. Fenelon

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This is a very good book on globalization and culture. The author does a great job reviewing the existing literature. But there is a tendency to reinvent the wheel: globalization, “complex connectivity,” is, in some very real sense, what we mean by “world-system,” and that is not a phenomena that began in the last quarter of the 20th century.

One of the main topics is “deterritorialization”—having one’s experiences “mediated” by the signs, symbols—culture—of the global system. Well what about the culture of Roman law, politics, and religion. How did the Gauls, Britons, and German tribes feel about Roman “global” culture? The Roman Empire may not have been global, but it was the world for those within it.

So how new is this globalization of culture? Sailing to the Americas must have been deterritorializing for the Europeans, or the Silk Road in its time no doubt compressed space/time. Expansion and intensification of long-distance connections may be larger and quicker now, but since we are already used to a certain shrinkage the added quickness might not be as dramatic, or deterritorializing, as earlier shrinkages were.

Some of this shock at “globalization” may be a consequence of distance from the change in question. So for French social critics McDonald’s and Disneyland seem to be shallow, non-real, a simulation of “real” experience. For me, growing up in California, these artifacts are just a place to get a bite to eat or to take the kids. Perhaps foreign artifacts seem more alien, which gives you a perspective on them, making it easier to theorize about their operations. So postmodern theories tend to originate more often in Europe. The closer they are, the more you just live them and do not see them as different, strange, let alone alien and shallow. I enjoy my Big Macs. We read postmodern theory and are told we are living alien lives. It doesn’t feel that way. Think what people from the provinces must have felt entering Rome or Beijing and seeing all those imperial buildings, guards, different clothes, and the rest. Email and the Silk Road are different. But “complex interconnectivity” goes back further in history than most of the theorists of globalization realize.

Globalized culture is often depicted as inauthentic. So, whose authentic experience was the Baroque? Are Baroque churches in Latin America “shallow” or “fundamentally artificial” as one critic of today’s globalization calls our culture (p. 100)? They would seem to fit the globalization problem: “globalization fun-
This book at once commands attention as a strong candidate for the leading social scientific synthesis and analysis of contemporary globalization theory. Chock full of graphs, clear definitions, historical context, useful data and methodological rigor, Global Transformations is a welcome addition to a literature which can be mired in imprecision and indeterminacy. World-systems scholars will take special note of the book's account of globalization's roots in global empires in Chapter 1 and its broader argument that contemporary globalization is both distinct from and continuous with prior periods of globalization. (p. 429)

Yet the work touches on nearly every major field of inquiry in which globalization exists as a current buzzword.

Held and his co-authors organize the vast array of issues grouped under the rubric of globalization into a series of discrete trends and arguments. The aim of the book is to balance conceptual clarity without simplifying the multifaceted nature of the subject. In pursuit of this aim, the authors describe globalization in four distinct dimensions, and then proceed to discuss in successive chapters how these describe global flows in the areas of politics, arms, trade, finance, corporations, people, cultures and the environment. This organizational approach pays off in allowing for a nuanced consideration of the diverse and potentially disparate subject areas often taught or lumped together under the heading of globalization without sacrificing a common theoretical apparatus.

Held and his collaborators delimit the four dimensions of globalization as (1) the extensity of global networks, (2) the intensity of global interconnectedness, (3) the velocity of global flows and (4) the impact propensity of global interconnectedness (p. 17). To phrase these in simpler terms, looking at the number, activity, speed and influence or weight of global networks seems useful to Held because it invites both quantitative and qualitative measures. In other words, Held has explicitly adopted a framework that he hopes can embrace a wide variety of social scientific research and data on globalization. This methodological choice means that this volume successfully integrates an extremely comprehensive set of works on globalization into its text.

The danger of such inclusiveness is in the potential for the book to lose or lack an individual voice or conclusion. To some extent, this concern is not unfounded.
depth of underlying analysis in Held’s book are ultimately of great value to any with an abiding interest in the subject.

The book has several flaws. First of all, one may quibble a bit with the choices made by the authors on which subjects to stress. Held and company deserve credit for devoting entire chapters to state politics serves to de-emphasize an important piece of their argument that globalization is moving the political world away from the unchallenged authority of nation-states. Discussing more specific examples than the human rights regime (pp. 65–70) of the increasing globalization of law and legal institutions might allow Held to amplify his conclusion about the possible shift towards the cosmopolitan global political order (pp. 448–451) that is embraced in his other books.

Two more serious concerns are the book’s orientation towards advanced industrial societies and its slow-going, jargon-filled text. These problems may be inter-related to the extent that contemporary Anglo-American social science more generally tends to privilege data of the sort often reliably available in advanced industrial societies and a dispassionate, scientific tone. One misses both the perspectives and passion of postcolonial and subaltern works on globalization, grounded as these works generally are in humanities disciplines. Global Transformations admits that it is looking primarily at globalization’s effects in what it calls “SIACs” (states in advanced capitalist societies); yet this emphasis leaves out some, albeit by no means all, of the arguments about injustice and disproportionate power in much of the critical scholarship on globalization. Indeed, this is evident in the book’s omission of globalization critics in its typology of hyperglobalizers, skeptics and transformationalists. This is an important omission, given the possibility that some of the hostility behind the September 2001 terrorist attacks may connect to a broader anger against the socioeconomic and political inequities of globalization.

With its ambition to be inclusive of major social scientific scholarship published in English on globalization, it is perhaps inevitable that Global Transformations is full of jargon, such as the terms in the above paragraph. The authors are keenly aware of this, and write in a style that is quite readable, as long as one has some social scientific background and reference to the table of acronyms at the beginning of the book (pp. xxi–xxiii). As clear, cogent and compelling as its analysis is, the plentiful jargon means that Global Transformations is not an easy book. It will be read more by professors and social science graduate students than the public at large [I should mention, however, that both a supplemental reader and a simplified introductory volume, edited by Held, are likely to work in tandem with the volume under review to reduce this problem, at least for the undergraduate university population].

With these limitations, and in contrast with many other major works on globalization, especially those that may be more familiar to non-academics, Held’s volume is the book equivalent of a well-designed Japanese car. Comparatively unstylish and far from trendy, it will reward its consumers with reliability and a depth not necessarily apparent from the outside. Indeed, the care of its construction means that it is likely to outlast significantly its more glittery competitors.

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Robert A. Denemark, Jonathan Friedman, Barry K. Gills and George Modelski.

Robert A. Denemark, Jonathan Friedman, Barry K. Gills and George Modelski.

The papers comprising this collection were presented at a special conference in 1995 at the University of Lund in Sweden. The world(-)systems community is indeed indebted to the organizers of the conference, the authors, and the editors of the volume for the subsequent refinement of the individual chapters in light of the discussions that took place at the meeting, the remarkable degree of cross-referencing displayed, and especially, the commitment to clearly delineate the formulations presented, including the relationships among them. The volume is structured around four general perspectives on “world system history.” As the editors note (xxii), Part I presents each of these theoretical approaches in a separate chapter. Part II illustrates instances of key processes in a set of transdisciplinary regional and temporal studies; Part III considers a set of global macro processes; and Part IV is concerned with comparison, cumulation, and future development of the field.

The first approach, spelled out by Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, posits a “world system continuity thesis,” which amounts to the idea of a “continuous history and development of a single world system in Afro-Eurasia for at
least 5,000 years” with the dominance of the West “only a recent, and perhaps a passing event” (3). Their advocacy of a humanocentric, rather than Eurocentric, history expresses the normative aspiration to “rechannel the impulses of rebellion so prevalent in the present world crisis situation in a more positive direction” and “learn to accept our differences while recognizing our common history and working toward our common future” (23).

The second approach, delineated by George Modelski, conceives world system change as the “product of an evolutionary process, or better still, of an array of evolutionary processes” (24) at “three major levels of analysis: institutional, organizational, and agency” (53), in contrast with “both rational choice, and functionalism” (31). The evolution that Modelski is talking about is the “story of humans learning to be human” and his world system is “a form of species organization” (24–25).

The third approach, outlined by David Wilkinson, recognizes civilizations as world systems and, generally, world systems as civilizations. His civilizations are “not identical to a culture, a language, a religion, a race, a class, a state or a nation” but are macrosocieties “whose boundaries ordinarily include many national, state, economic, linguistic, cultural and religious groups”; at present only one civilization “exists on Earth, of global scope, without a periphery into which to expand further” (61).

The fourth approach, described by Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, takes “world-systems, properly conceptualized and bounded, [as] the fundamental unit of analysis of social change” (85). This makes possible comparisons, which can lead to the “study of both differences and transformations as well as similarities and continuities” (108). Their “eventual goal” is “address the real problems and possibilities of the contemporary system” (110).

The detailed studies, many marshaling exhaustive empirical evidence, would be of value in themselves even if they did not contribute to an understanding of the parameters of the field.

In Part II, Andrew Sherratt makes a call for a “new kind of discipline” that would “see the world as being made up, not of cellular units of culture, but of growing arenas for competing regimes of value” (116) and suggests that “[l]ong-lasting structures which expand through time (the calyx image) seem to be a better representation of important phenomena as they can be reconstructed over long periods than does the more passive image of successive layers” (119). While emphasizing “strong systemic continuity in world systemic history,” Jonathan Friedman also recognizes that “there are important structural transformations as well, even if the latter do not change the basic parameters of the system” (133). He goes on to discuss similarities in economic organization (e.g., Greek capitalism) and continuities in modes of cultural identification—“not worlds apart from the modern world system” (152). In the first part of a longer study, Kajsa Ekholm-Friedman begins by stating that a contemporary problem of “today’s global system is the lack of political control over the globalized economy” while realizing that “this lack of political control is exactly what has made the international economy so dynamic for thousands of years” (153). Positing 5,500 years of continuous evolution of the global system with recurrent regional shifts and local collapses, this chapter follows the evolution of the state in southern Mesopotamia.

David Warburton applies Keynesian principles to ancient Egypt—classifying its economy as “a kind of nascent capitalism, for we have wage labor, a market for land, production for the market, and state involvement” (116)—to illustrate how Egyptian fiscal policy, rather than simply a system of slavery in the service of the state, created significant “wealth, employment and economic growth” (193).}

459 Book Reviews 460

Journal of World-Systems Research

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worth. He hopes that the study will attest to the “merits of evolutionary theory for formulating and testing hypotheses of long-term, large-scale social change” and, finally, that “there are advantages in retiring nations as primary units of analysis in favor of species-wide structures like the world-city system” (283).

Each of the four approaches presented, and the substantive research associated with them, has previously given rise to serious questions and reservations, to which authors have provided appropriate rejoinders. Although each chapter of this book would deserve a deepening of an already extensive critical engagement, this is not the place to rehearse those debates. The significance of this book, rather, lies in the effort to present a field, a field repeatedly alluded to in the singular. On the one hand, as William R. Thompson affirms, these four approaches, and the empirical studies they ground, share a “commitment to the idea that contemporary structures and processes are embedded in a long-term, historically contingent context” and agree that “1500 is not a or the basic watershed” (287, 288). On the other hand, however, Thompson goes on to carefully describe the seemingly irresolvable differences; indeed, “the deeper one probes, the more superficial the similarities begin to appear” (296). Nonetheless, Robert A. Denmark argues that convergence and cumulation are taking place, particularly “in terms of the asking of like questions” (302).

One is still left with the nagging impression that the constitution of the “field” may have some other, unspecified pedigree. Perhaps, one might argue, in the spirit of fraternal debate, that it could be conceived as constructed in opposition to an absent “other,” “historical social science,” for which neither economic structures such as trade networks, political structures such as empires, nor socio-cultural structures such as civilizations, however seemingly extensive and long-lasting, suffice singly to characterize the unique nature of the contemporary world. This might legitimately be assumed from Thompson’s assertion that 1500 does not represent a fundamental caesura for these authors, as it does for those that view the contemporary world in terms of a historical social system whose spatial and temporal dimensions have been defined by the extent of analytically differentiable, but existentially inseparable, relational processes—of production and distribution, decision making and coercion, and cognition and intentional-ity—all of which are conceived as co-constitutive of the system and therefore none of which is dominant, and thus none of which are reflective, superstructural, or epiphenomenal. Although the issues are real, especially as regards research agendas and social action, unfortunately they cannot be pursued here. What does seem certain is that this excellent compendium will find a place on the syllabi of those of us who “teach the debates.”

There are a growing number of social scientists linking “psychological” trauma issues, including historical and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) issues, with larger social group conflicts, often of great injustice. In this “post September 11th” world that we now live in, questions such as these are especially relevant, whether working on the global or local level. And in respect to the disproportionate amount of social suffering carried by women during and after the violence, and their central placement in recovery and family formation, we need look no further than our indigenous populations in North America, or as far away as the Taliban treatment of women, with Afghanistan proving to be a window into the worst of fundamentalist gender subordination. “Remaking a World” illustrates these and other issues with an ironic and timely poignancy.

This work fills a void in the world-systems literature—the relationship of violent domination (and) in the nation state global systems and subsumed populations within those states, usually “minority” groups. An important “voice” for indigenous peoples is also established within this paradigm that ranges from predictable results of warfare, including nuclear, to the often-subtle effects of long term systemic dominance that used violent oppression to maintain social order.

This work also illustrates the dark underbelly of (these) incorporation processes, including those of “internal” or “post” colonialism, as the violent and socially disruptive acts they commonly are to the societies and the peoples experiencing domination. Moreover, they typify both forms of “cultural resistance” and “social survival” through discussing the often remarkable efforts these people make in “reconstituting” their worlds, however distorted or destroyed they have become.

Although Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery, does not specifically illustrate a broader world-systems analysis in terms of how struggles
tend to transform many macro interactions, and at times even informs us about micro resistance to global stratification, case studies such as are presented and analyzed in the book demonstrate the processes very well.

When discussing the “distressing consequences of murder, rape, torture, molestation, and other forms of brutality” as an ongoing “marginalization” of oppressed peoples in their case studies, the authors discuss how “collective memories” are constructed both to retell history and toward resisting and perhaps adjudicating their current struggles. For instance, in the Cree in Canada, (Adelson), or the Kui in Thailand (Chuengsatiansup) chapter case studies, being “excluded from participation in the collective life of the polis” connects to “their history has been incorporated into that of other states” so that they are seen as “wild” leading to an expression of nationhood, subaltern or otherwise, so as to contest the hegemony of the state” historically and currently.

The Kui make a strong example of how “political marginality” is induced by state structures, (pgs. 34, 36-39) “in a systematic way to deprive its citizens of their memory.” Similar to Indians from the Americas, they are pan-ethically re-categorized under the name of “Suai” or “tribute people” further fragmenting their “official” identities in Siamese historiography. “Modern Siamese national history was thus fabricated to demonstrate emphatically the submissive links by which the peripheral realms were subjugated to the center” (pg. 42). This fascinating discussion of how state structures marginalize indigenous peoples is then posed as “counter hegemonic practice” (pgs. 54–58) that must be excluded or suppressed, as a voice would “potentially subvert the moral and political legitimacy of the dominating centers.” This is an important analysis for indigenous metaphors for Daycare resistance, as framed in a Gramscian “cultural-ideological hegemony” with a distinction between globalized corporatism as a state-building process against movements for true “nation” building or civic society.

The Cree make the case for the “yoke of colonialism” in Australia and Canada as a “cumulative effect of two hundred years of racism, hatred and white arrogance” that produced internally colonized nations with traumatic histories and institutionalized racism. Original occupancy of land and “ethnocultural distinctiveness” are ironically seen as the “two most important issues at stake for the sovereigntists and the Cree nation alike” in Quebec. The definition of aboriginality itself becomes locked into an authenticity of history as the “people continue to reimage and renegotiate their cultural and political worlds” in a changing global struggle.

Remarkably similar sets of issues further inform the analysis of long-term, protracted suffering, such as with “atom bomb” women survivors and effects on reproduction in Japan (Todeschini), compared with “spirit possessions” as “mechanisms of coping and remembering” in Sri Lanka, (Perera), and the import-
They also see the future of healing—communities where the “physical abuse of women in detention” and their previously silenced testimony on the state-induced “absence of men from family life”—can be slowly and painfully redressed. In these narratives on “the depths of apartheid” we observe “destruction of kinship…the power of economies in shaping experience, the intrusion of the state. Their stories bear testimony to attempts to create and maintain families against all odds” (pg. 270) in remaking a world that was produced in the violent destruction of conquest, exploitation and ongoing racial subordination, itself a product of global expansion of post colonialist capitalist economies.

These selections, and the editorial comment, demonstrate an under-told result of war and systemic violence—the destructive effects on families, usually disproportionately on women. In these days of “collateral damage” and “unintended” target damage such effects must be analyzed in depth and brought out into the open, similar to the testimony and case study conclusions discussed in this text. Whether in Canada, Thailand, Japan, Sri Lanka, India, South Africa, or Afghanistan, these voices must be heard.

Finally, the combined analytical weight of these case studies should now be applied in rigorous analyses of cases such as the trial of Milosevic for genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo, and United Nations official acceptance of the noted systematic rape of women as “crimes against humanity” and the families that make-up the oppressed groups in those social systems. In a re-made world, with a focus on healthy communities and healing processes for those who survive the violence, testimony from a global conference on racism, or on reparations for groups trying to revitalize, re-build and re-enter their world as partners in its future, books such as this one can remind us of the importance of family, of women, of testimony, and the “voices of the oppressed” in any true recovery.

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