Cross-Border Labor Organizing in the Garment and Automobile Industries: The Phillips Van-Heusen and Ford Cuautitlan Cases

: The globalization of the world economy has created new opportunities for cross-border labor organizing. In this paper I examine two case studies of cross -border labor organizing. One ca<;e involves Phillips Van-Hernen (PVH) workers in Guatemala City, and the other Ford automobile workers in Cuautitlan, Mexico. The PVH ca<;e illustrates the potential for cross-border labor organizing in the highly mobile garment industry. The PVH workers' union and their cross-border allies adopted a "strategic cross-border organizing model" that included consumer and trade pressure, an active international trade secretariat, and several other strategies, to achieve an amazing victory. However, the Ford Cuautitlan ca<;e demonstrates that corporatist state-labor relations and internal union conflicts have limited cross-border organizing in the automobile industry. These two case studies and their different outcomes have many important lessons for academics and activists interested in cross-border labor organizing. case two case studies indicate that the adoption of labor models and the struggle for and democra tic labor movements are critical for future cross-border labor organizing activities.


Phillips Van-Heusen and Ford Cuautitlan
These examples indicate there have been several "successful" ca..,es of cross -border labor organizing. However, there have also been many "unsuccessful" ca..,es of cross -border organizing. In this article I examine two different ca..,e studies--one successful, the other unsuccessful--of cross-border labor organizing. The first ea..,e involves Phillips Van-Heusen (PVH) workers in Guatemala City, and the other Ford workers in Cuautitlan, Mexico.
In August 1997, after eight long years, PVH workers ratified the only contract in the Guatemalan maquiladora industry (US/GLEP Update #20). International solidarity and a..,sistance were critical element.., of this campaign (Armbruster forthcoming). In contra..,t, in Cuautitlan, Ford workers have struggled for ten years for higher wages, better working conditions, and union democracy (La Botz 1992;Escobar 1997). The Ford Cuautitlan workers have received international support, but their demands have not been achieved (COT 1997). These two ea..,e studies and their different outcomes provide academics and activists who are interested in cross-border labor organizing and globalization with some important lessons.

The Difficulties of Cross-Border Labor Organizing
Despite the recent PVH victory and other successful ca..,es, many academics and activists maintain that cross-border labor organizing is extremely difficult and nearly impossible. 1 These academics and activists contend there are four major factors, among others, that limit cross-border labor organizing. j_ First, the globalization thesis suggests that capital mobility, especially in the garment industry where production can be ea..,ily moved, ha.., undermined the possibilities of cross-border labor organizing and that workers and labor unions have no capacity for agency or resistance (see Herod 1995Herod , 1997a. For exampl e, when confronted with labor rights violations and cross-border labor organizing campaigns, the Gap and Phillips Van-Heusen threatened to leave El Salvador and Guatemala respectively (Bounds 1997;Pattee 1996). Both companies eventually backed down, but other garment manufacturers have simply cut their contracts with their oversea.., producers and moved to new countries. Q The second barrier restricting cross-border labor organizing is state repression (Duefia.., 1997;Mufi.oz 1994). For instance, highly repressive military dictatorships previously controlled Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Chile, and other Latin Am erican nations for many years (Alves 1985;Dunkerl y 1988;Jona.., 1991;Petra.., and Morl ey 1975). Thes e governm ents outlaw ed labor unions at various times, and many labor activists were jailed, beaten, and even killed in these countries. Decades of physical repression often produced small and weak labor movements in these nations. Under these conditions the establishm ent of cross-border linkages with unions in repressiv e nations is extremely difficult (Mufi.oz 1994).
The third factor limiting cross-border labor organizing is corporatist state-labor relations (R. Lujan 1996;Martin ez 1997;Mufi.oz 1994). Th e long-standing alliance between the lnstitutional Revolutionary Party (PRl) and the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) is perhaps the best example of a corporatist state-labor relationship (La Botz 1992). The CTM and the PRl both supported the North American Free Trade Agreement {NAFTA) and have limited the establishment of independent and democratic labor unions for many years {French ct al. 1996;La Botz 1992;Middlebrook 1995). The CTM's activities led some U.S. unions, like the UE, the Steelworkers, and the Teamsters, to develop closer tics with the FAT--a small, independent labor federation which opposcdNAFTA (Lujan 1997;Martinez 1997). The FAT and several new dissident labor organizations, like the Foro, the May First lntcrsindical Movement, and the National Workers Union (UNT), have challenged the CTM's control of the Mexican labor movement (La Botz 1997). However, these new labor organizations have not displaced the CTM (La Botz 1997). The CTM remains a strong and influential force within the Mexican labor movement, and consequently, U.S. and Canadian unions have had limited success in initiating cross-border labor linkages with Mexican labor unions (French ct al. 1996).
The long history of the AFL-CIO's Latin American affiliate, the American lnstitutc for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), is the fourth barrier limiting cross-border labor organizing. AIFLD was established in 1962, and received corporate, CIA, and State Department funding for many years (Sims 1992). AIFLD undermined militant labor unions and established conservative pro-government unions that supported U.S. foreign and economic policies in many different nations (Armstrong ct al. 1989; Barry and Prcusch 1990;Cantor and Schor 1987;Morris 1967;Scott 1978;Spalding 1988aSpalding , 1988bSpalding , 1992Weintraub and Bollinger 1987;Herod 1997b). For example, AIFLD wa<; active in El Salvador in the 1980s (Spalding 1992). AIFLD divided labor federations that opposed their policies, bribed labor leaders, and supported El Salvador's labor rights record, even though military and death squad officials killed thousands of unionists (America< ;Watch 1988;Armstrong ct al. 1988). These activities, termed "trade union imperialism," have created lingering suspicions of the AFL-CIO in Latin America and arc an important barrier to the establishment of cross-border labor linkages and international solidarity. lntcrcstingly, three of these four factors, capital mobility, state repression, and trad e union imperialism, were present in the Phillips Van-Heusen ca<; c. Despite these barriers, cross-border labor organizing and the ratification of the only contract in the Guatemalan maquiladora industry were achieved. The PVH ca<;c then challenges established a<;sumptions about the impossibility of cross-border labor organizing in the highly mobile garment industry, in a nation notorious for repression against labor unions, involving a labor federation who in the pa<; t received :financial support from AIFLD. However, th e Ford Cuautitlan ca<;c indicates there arc some significant barriers that have limited crossbordcr labor organizing. These two cases and the differences between them arc discussed below. [Page 22] Journa I of World-S,ystems Research Methodology In this paper I describe and analyze the PVH and Ford Cuautitlan cases using in-d epth interviews, newsletters, and other primary and secondary sources. In 1996 and 1997, I conducted interviews with academics, government officials, and repre sentatives from the international garment workers trade secretariat (ITLGWF), UNITE, UAW , AIFLD , CTM, STECAMOSA, US/GLEP (sec the appendix for a listing of these organizations), and many other organizations, in Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States. In th e next two sections I describe the history of the Guatemalan labor movement and the emergence of the Guatemalan maquiladora industry. This overview is critical for under standing the context of the PVH case.

The Guatemalan Labor Movement: Repression and Resistance
The history of the Guatemalan labor movement is one of repres sion and resistanc e. In 1954, a U.S.-backcd military coup overthrew the short-lived democratic government of Guatemala (Kinzer and Schlesinger 1982;Gleijcscs 1991). The new military dictatorship quickly dismantled the burgeoning labor movement, and the main labor federation, the Confcdcracion de Trabajadorcs de Guatemala (CGTG) (Larravc 1975). Despit e military repression, several labor federations, including the militant Confcdcracion Nacional de Trabajadorcs (CNT), were founded in the 1960s and 1970s (Larravc 1975) . In 1976, a broad and unifi ed labor and popular front, the Conlitc Nacional de Unidad Sindical (CNUS) was established (Albizurcs 1980). The CNUS was a broad-based labor organization that challenged the polici es of the state and ruling elite (Albizur cs 1980). In addition, student, religious, and campcsino organizations, like the Comitc Unidad Campcsina (CUC), also emerged in this period (Menchu 1984;Jonas 199 1).
However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the CNT, CNUS, CUC, and other labor unions and popular organizations were virtually eliminated throu gh arrests, disappearances, assassinations, and massacr es. For example, CNUS lawyer Mario Lop ez Larravc was assassinated in 1977, and 39 protcstors, including 27 CUC activists, wer e burned inside the Spanish Embassy in 1980 (Menchu 1984). In addition, military agents captured and disappeared 27 CNT leaders on June 21, 1980, and on August 24, 1980, another 17 CNT members were assassinated (Levenson-E strada 1994. Thes e repressive policies decimated the labor movement, and for the next several years, workers, labor activists, and some labor unions organized themselves in a clandestine and underground manner (Duenas 1997;Robles 1997;Recd and Brandow 1996).
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Guatemalan mili tary also adopted "scorched-earth" policies and killed thousands of Mayan Indians (Falla 1994;Manz 1988). Military and death squad officials claimed the Mayan population supported guerilla organizations, like the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and the Organization of the People in Arms (ORP A).1 Some Mayan Indian s join ed these guerilla organizations, but many were innocent bystanders and were tortured and killed in the army's campaign of mas s terror (Harbury 1994;Jonas 1991;Mon tejo 1987). In this period alone, over 75,000 Guatemalans were killed, 440 villages were burned, and one million people were displaced (Man z 1987).
Despite these overwhelming odd<;, Coca-Cola workers in Guatemala City resi sted thes e policies and formed the Coca-Cola Company Workers' Union (STEGAC) in the 1970s (Albizurcs 1988;Levenson-Estrada 1994;Robles 1997). Company officials responded with force and killed eight Coca-Cola union members between 1978and 1980(Levenson-Estrada 1994. Coca-Cola workers and union members continued organizing, and obtained national and international solidarity from organizations, like CNUS, the International Union of Foodworkers (IUF), the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), and Amnesty International (Gatehouse and Reyes 1987;Frundt 1987). These organizations initiated a corporate campaign against Coca-Cola which included "production stoppages and consumer boycotts in over fifty countries" (Frundt l987a). These actions, combined with a year-long factory occupation, were successful, and Coca-Cola workers and union members obtained a collective bargaining agreement in 1985 (Frundt 1987). The Coca-Cola case illustrated the potential of cross-border labor organizing and provided academics and activists with some important lessons (Levenson-Estrada and Frundt 1995).

Export-L ed Development Policies and The Guatemalan Labor Movement
The Coca -Cola ca<;e occurred in the cont ext of an economic crisis. For man y years Guatemala depended on stable prices for agricultural exports (Jonas 1991 ). How ever, fluctua ting prices often created economic crises and high unempl oyment (Barry 1990;Jona<;. Therefore, in the 1970s, Guatemalan military and economic elites, along with officials from the U.S . Embassy and the Agency for International Develop ment (AID), adopted a new development strategy that empha<;ized non -traditional exports and tourism (Jonas 1991; Peters en 1992). Guatemala's military and economic elites also rep resse d labor unions and provid ed foreign investors with low-wage labor, tax incenti ves, and other subsidies (Peters en 1992). Guatemalan and U.S. officials claimed these polici es would crea te economic growth, and that Guat emala would follow the four East A<;ian "Tiger" economi es of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and become the "Jaguar" of Latin America (Jona<;Petersen 1992).
Howev er, Gua temala's new export -oriented development model was limit ed by the requirement<; of the U. S.-sponsored Generali zed System of Preferences (GSP) (Petersen 1992). The GSP mandates that recipient nations protect internati onally recogniz ed worke r rights prov isions, like the right to organize and collec tively bargain, in exchang e for tari ff exempti ons on imports and dev elopme nt a<;sistance (Petersen 1992). Nations that fail t o protect worke r rights po licies can lose their GSP benefits , or they can be plac ed und er "review" until they "take steps" to enforce these policies (Donnan 1989). Given thes e conditions, the Guatemalan military accepted the formation of a new labor federation, the Confedcracion de Unidad de Guatemala (CUSG), in 1983 (Frundt 1995).
In it<; early years, CUSG cautiously adopted pro-government positions and accepted financial a<;sistancc from AIFLD (Alfaro 1997;Frundt 1995;Slaughter 1987). Howev er, CUSG later embraced anti-government policies and briefly joined the militant, and non-AIFLD supported, Unidad Accion Sindical y Popular (UASP) (Frundt 1995). In addition, two other labor federations, the militant and independent Union Sindical de Trabajadorcs de Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA), and the Christian Democratic Confcdcracion General de Trabajadorcs de Guatemala (CGTG) were respectively established in 1985 and 1986 (Coj 1997;Ducila<;. UNSITRAGUA became one of the leading organizations ofUASP, and provided CUC and other popular organizations with support (Barry 1990). CGTG mostly organized public sector employees, and did not join UASP in the late 1980s (Goldston 1989). CUSG, CGTG, UNSITRAGUA, and several other labor unions represented less than 3% of Guatemala's labor force in the 1980s and 1990s (Doumitt 1996;Robles 1997).
The Emergence of the Maguiladora<; The adoption of the non-traditional export model, the pa<;sagc of the GSP, and the election of Guatemala's first civilian president in over thirty years created the foundat ion for increased foreign investment in the mid-l980s (AVANSCO 1994;Ducila<;. In this period, a new non-traditional export industry, known a<; the maquiladora<;, emerged. Maquiladora<; arc off-shore factories that produce garment<; for export markets-particularly the United States (Petersen 1992). In 1984, ther e were only six maquiladoras in Guatemala, but some sources indicate there arc currently over 400 maquiladora<;, employing nearly l 00 ,000 workers (Grafico 1996).B. Most maquila workers arc young women who earn less than three dollars per day and who often work sixty or mor e hours per week (Ca<;crtano 1997;Ccrigua 1994;Petersen 1992). One union activist stated that maquila workers arc sometimes forced to take amphetamines to complete long workshifts (Galacia 1997). Many maquila workers labor inside locked warehouses where bathroom breaks arc timed and their supervisors often verbally and physically hara<;s them (Ccrigua 1994;MJ Moda'l 1997;Salguero 1997).2.
Maquiladora workers have periodically formed unions in opposition to these poor working conditions and low wages. How ever, when confronted with unrest, many maquila owners simply fire their workers or dose down (Ca<;crtano 1996;Coj 1997;Doumitt 1996). For example, UNSITRAGUA ha<; organized fourteen unions, but only three still exist (Coj 1997). 10 There is one other union in the maquiladora indust ry. This union is affiliated with CUSG and it is only one with a collectiv e bargaining agreement (Alfaro 1997, US/GLEP Update #20). This union's members work for Phillips V an-Hcuscn, a U.S.-ba'lcd manufacturer .

Phillips Van-Heusen
Phillips Van-Heusen is one of the largest shirtmakcrs in the world and produces 300,000 dozen shirts per year in Guatemala (Human Rights Watch 1997: 47). PVH opened two factories, called CAMOSA I and CAMOSA II, in Guatemala City in 1988 (Petersen 1992).ll One year later, PVH began contracting out production to smaller factories, called "submaquilm;," located in the nearby community of San Pedro, Sacatcpcquc z (Petersen 1992). PVH also contracts out production to two other Guat emala City-ba-;cd maquila-; (Human Rights Watch 1997: 47). Over 70% of PVH's 660 workers arc young women who earn far less than the living wagc--most earn 75 cents an hour, which is only half of what they need to raise their families above the poverty level (Ca-;crtano 1997). PVH ha-; claimed that their workers receive higher than average wages and benefits , and that the company provides ergonomic working conditions (Petersen 1992;Bounds 1997).
The Phillips Van-Heusen Workers' Movimicnto (1989 Despite the company's carefully crafted public image, PVH workers began organizing over unstable piece-rate prices, declining wages, and poor treatment from supervisors in 1989 (Petersen 1992). Over the next three years, PVH workers and activists were fired, hara-;scd, and one union leader, Aura Marina Rodrigu ez, wa-; shot and nearly kill ed (Coats 1991 ). However, the PVH workers eventually obtained union recognition in 1992. The newly recognized union, called STECAMOSA (Sindicato de Trabajadorcs de Camosa), won recognition after the United States/Guatemala Labor Education Project (US/GLEP), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILG WU), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), and several other U.S. unions filed a worker rights petition against the Guatemalan government under the Generalized System of Preferences ( Coats 1991 ). The threat of losing these trading benefits created a "window of opportunity" and pressured the Guatemalan govern ment into recognizing the first maquila union--STECAMOSA--in six years (Coats 1993). Despit e this victory , PVH refused to negotiate with STECAMOSA since the union did not represent 25% of the workers a-; is requ ired by the Guatemalan labor code (Coat-;. The company's resistance weakened the union over the next several years (STECAMOSA 1996;Ca-;crtano 1996).
However, in June 1995, STECAMOSA beca me interested in initiatin g an "int ernal organi zing" campaign (STECAMOSA 1996). Initially, the PVH workers' union contact ed their federation, the tiny Guatemalan Text ile Workers Federation (Ca-;crtano 1996). The textile workers federation, which is affiliated with CUSG, then requested a-;sistancc from the Internati onal T extile, Garment, and Leather Workers Secretariat (ITGL WF) (Coats 1996). ITGL WF is an internat ional trade secretariat that coordinates the activities of national labor unions in the garment indust ry. The garment workers trade secretariat ha-; a regional office in Latin America, called the Inter-American Textile and Garment Workers Federation (FITTIV). FITTIV, which had already been instrum enta l in the formation of maquila unions in the Dominican Republic and Honduras, responded to the union's request and sent a full-time organizer to work with STECAMOSA (Ca<;crtano 1996).
The PVH workers' union, FITTN, US/GLEP, and the U.S. garment workers union, UNITE, then developed a "strategic cross-border labor organizing model" that included new organizing strategics, trade pressure, and consumer action. After extensive planning , the PVH workers conducted an "organizing blitz" in late August 1996 (Coats 1996;Hermanson 1997). The union successfully signed up over 100 members in an effort to reach the 25% level and begin contract negotiations (Coat<;. After the blitz, the union determined it had attained the required 25% membership level, and filed a petition to negotiate. However, the company disputed the union's claim that it represented over 25% of all PVH workers, and refused to negotiate (Human Rights Watch 1997: 25). The Guatemalan Labor Ministry conducted an investigation on whether or not 25% of the PVH workers were union members. The Labor Ministry claimed it wa<; "unable to determine the union's membership level" and closed the ca<;c in November 1996 (Human Rights Watch 1997: 35). However, the union's records clearly indicated that over 25% of PVH's workers were union members (Human Rights Watch 1997: 26).

[Page 25] Journal of World-Systems Research
After three tense months, PVH, US/GLEP, and the PVH workers' union requ ested that Human Rights Watch conduct an independent investigation of the 25% issue (Human Rights Watch 1997: 2). PVH CEO Bruce Klatsky, who sits on Human Right s Watch's Board of Directors, agreed to negotiate if investigators determin ed the union reached the 25% level. Human Rights Watch determin ed over 25% of PVH's workers were union members, and PVH rclca<;cd a statement on March 11, 1997 promising to negotiate with the union (Human Rights Watch 1997: 4). In April 1997, contract negotiations between the PVH workers' union and PVH began (US/GLEP Update # 19). On August 14, 1997, after an eight-year struggle, PVH workers ratified the only contract in the maquiladora industry (US/GLEP Update #20). The two-year contract includ es provisions for an 11 % wage increa<;e in the first year, and 12.5% incrca<;c in the second year, subsidies for transportation, lunch, child care, grievance procedures, money for an off-site office, and the preservat ion of current employment levels "a<; long a<; ba<;ic productivity lev els are met" (US/GLEP Update #20).

Strategic Cross-Border Labor Organizing and Lessons from the Phillips Van-H eusen Ca<;c
The PVH workers and their cross-borde r allies defied the conventional wisdom about cross-border organizing and produced a stunning victory. The crucial question is --how were they able to achieve this victory? There were five key clements of this campaign. First, a<; mentioned above, the PVH workers' union contacted the international garment workers secreta riat who provid ed them with a full-time organiz er from FITTN . This organizer worked directly with the PVH workers' union and regularly discussed organizing issues with UNITE representatives (Hermanson 1997). The active involvement of this organizer and other forms of technical a~sistancc from FITTN were invaluable parts of this campaign.
The second key factor wa~ the application of a new organizing model that had never been used before in the maquiladora industry (Coats 1996). Previously, maquila workers organized spontaneously or formed unions with very few members (Ca~crtano 1997). In Guatemala, a union can be legally recognized with only twenty members (Petersen 1992). However, obtaining recognition often takes months and in the interim period many companies have fired union members or closed down production (Ca~crtano 1997;Hermanson 1997). These factors explain the weaknesses of the existing maquila unions and the failure of pa~t organizing efforts.
The PVH workers' union, FITTN, and UNITE believed a strategic organizing model, which generated organizational strength and an active membership, would limit PVH's use of these traditional union-busting tactics. Therefore, STECAMOSA, FITTN, and UNITE developed a clandestine labor organizing model and established a small group of union supporters within the factory (Hermanson 1997). These union supporters recruited new members and planned for months before launching an "organizing blitz" of PVH workers (Hermanson 1997). During the blitz, PVH union members conducted "house visits" of their fellow workers and signed up enough new members to reach the required 25% level (Ca~crtano 1997). This strategy wa~ designed to surprise company supervisors and avoid ma~sivc firings. Teresa Ca~crtano (1997), explains this organizing model: If you have a majority of workers signed up, the company cannot intimidate that many workers over the 30-day recognition period. Also, after a union reaches the 25% level they can demand contract negotiations right away. So the union's strength, goals, and demands for recognition and contract negotiations depend on organizing a significant amount of workers.
JcffHcnnanson (1997), UNITE's Director of Organizing, contends that most crossbordcr labor organizing campaigns have adopted an "overt organizing model." In this model, workers organize themselves publicly and establish a large ba~c of supporters. However, this strategy ha~ created fear, intimidation, firings and very little support for unionization (Hermanson 1997). In these situations, labor, human rights, and religious organizations in the Untied States, and in other countries, have initiated consumer boycott~ and letter-writing campaigns on behalf of fired maquiladora workers. However, these strategics have limitations. Hermanson (1997) maintains, "on-the-ground organizing, careful planning, and a strong membership ba~c, along with these other strategics and tactics, arc absolutely critical." The PVH ca~c supports this perspective and illustrates the effectiveness of clandestine labor organizing model~. [Page 26] .

Touma I of' World-Systems Research
The third critical clement of the PVH case was the involvement of solidarity and labor rights organizations like US/GLEP, Witness for Peace, Campaign for Labor Rights, NISGUA (Network in Solidarity With the Guatemalan People), and many other groups (Coats 1996). For instance, US/GLEP coordinated three days of grass-root<; lcaflctting of major department stores in the United States, like JC Penney's, which purchases PVH product<;. These stores were lcaflctted during the Christma<; holida y shopping season and on International Women's Day. These leafleting actions were designed to incr ea<;e consumer awareness and put pressure on PVH to negotiate with STECAMOSA. These solidarity organizations, and the consumer pressure they created, were key aspects of the PVH campaign (US/GLEP Update #18).
During the PVH campaign, US/GLEP raised the issue ofGSP pressur e again. In late 1996, Guatemala had been under GSP review for four years for labor rights violations, and many believed that the country's peace negotiations would lead to the lifting of the review. However, Guatemalan labor federations, US/GLEP, and several U.S. unions claimed that labor rights were still not protected and that the GSP review should be maintained. The PVH campaign affected the long-awaited GSP decision, and prompted U.S. Labor Department official, David Parker (1997), to state, "the Guat emalan Labor Ministry's and PVH's actions arc factors in delaying the decision on GSP. 11 This comment illustrates that US/GLEP effectively used trade pressure as 11 lcvcragc 11 in their efforts to support the PVH workers' union. 12 The fifth strategic clement of this campaign involved undermining PVH's "socially responsible" image. PVH CEO Bruce Klatsky has carefully cultivated a progr essive image of PVH through his involvement with Human Rights Watch, Busin ess for Social Responsibility, and the White House's Apparel Industry Partner ship. Howe ver, when Human Rights Watch relea<;ed its findings on the 25% issue, Klatsk y realized he was trapped and the company began negotiations with STECAMOSA. US/ GLEP, FITTN, and the PVH workers' union reali zed PVH's corporate image was vulnerable and they skillfull y used this point to their advantage.
These were the key clements of the PVH casc--an active international trade secretariat, a new organizing model, a broad-based coalition of solidarity and labor rights organizations, consumer and trade pressure, a strong and active membership, and company vulnerability. The combination of these elements produced a remarkabl e victory for the PVH workers and the Guatemalan labor movement. The PVH case demonstrates the potential of "strategic" cross-border labor organizing. How ever, the Ford Cuautitlan case illustrates the barriers to cross-border labor organizing. In the following sections I briefly describe the Mexican labor movement and Mexico's deep economic crisis. This discussion situates the Ford Cuautitlan case in the broad er context of wid espread economic and social change in Mexico.  Botz 1992;Middlebrook 1995). In the 1930s and 1940s, the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) and its successor, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) recognized the CTM a..:; the "official" representativ e of th e labor movement and incorporated the CTM into the structure of both parties (Cockcroft 1983). This corporatist relationship between the CTM and the PRI ha..:; la..:;tcd into the 1990s. These corporatist state-labor relations have provided the CTM and PRI with mutual benefits. For instance, the CTM ha..:; often supported the PRI' s political and economic policies like wage control..:;, peso devaluations, and trade liberalization. In exchange, the PRI ha..:; provided the CTM and it..:; officials with government positions and financial subsidies (Middlebrook 1995). The CTM and the PRI have also vigorously limited rank-and-file dissent and the emergence of democratic and independent labor unions through violence and intimidation. For instance, in the 1940s and 1950s, the PRI and the Mexican military crushed militant strikes organized by the railroad, electrical , mining, and petroleum workers' unions (Alonso 1979;Carr 1992;La Botz 1988;Middlebrook 1995). The PRI and the CTM also purged leftists an communist labor leaders and install ed new pro-government labor leaders, or charros, in these unions (La Botz 1988). The AFL, the CIO, and AIFLD's predecessor, the Inter-American Federation of Labor (ORIT), supported these policies and worked closel y with the CTM during this period (Caulfield 1997).

Journa I of World-Systems Research
The CTM and the PRI have also controlled the labor movement through legal procedures and mechanisms. For example, the Mexican Constitution established the Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration to mediate labor disputes and conflicts (Carr 1976;La Botz 1992). The Boards (sometimes called the Junta..:;) include representativ es from capital, labor, and the state (Middlebrook 1995). The junta..:; have the power to register labor unions and they can also declare strikes ille gal or legal (Middlebrook 1995). PRI and CTM officials have served on these boards for years, and they have limit ed strikes and the registration of independent and democratic labor unions (although the PRI ha..:; occa..:;ionally favored other charro unions, like the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers [CROM] and the Revolution ary Confederation of Work ers and Pca..:;ant..:; [CROC ] in the registration process) (La Botz 1992;Middlebrook 1995). These legal machinations strengthened the CTM's control of the labor movement and limit ed the establishm ent of independent unions. However, Mexico's corporatist state-labor relationship ha..:; often produced opposition movements within many labor unions and confederation s. For instan ce, in the 1970s, a period of prolonged labor conflict (known as the insurgcncia obrcra) emerged and some independent and democratic labor unions were established (Carr 1991;De la Garza Toledo 1991). Presidential labor policies created a brief "political opening" for some of these movements. However, low wages, rising unemployment, and the CTM's antidemocratic practices also generated working-class discontent and unrest (De la Garza Toledo 1991; La Botz 1988). Automobile workers, electrical workers, and teachers organized these democratic labor movements (De la Garza Toledo 1991). For example, in the 1970s, a new democratic teachers' movement, known as the National Coordinating Committee ofEducation Workers (CNTE), emerged within the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) (Cook 1996). In addition, five automobile unions introduced democratic reforms and three of these unions (at Dina, Nissan, and Volk~wagcn) severed their tics with the CTM and joined the Independent Worker Unit (UOI) (Aguilar Garcia 1982;Middlebrook 1995;Roxborough 1984). Moreover, Rafael Galvan established the Democratic Tendency, which was a rank-and-file movement of electrical workers, within the Mexican Electrical Workers' Union (STERM) (La Botz 1988). Leftist organizations, like the Proletarian Linc, the Mexican Workers' Party, and the Revolutionary Workers Party, influenced some of these labor organizations (Carr 1992).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, conflicts between the CTM and the PRI also emerged (Middlebrook 1995). The PRI and the CTM clashed over the PRI's economic policies which generated rising inflation, high unemployment, and declining wages (Middlebrook 1995). The CTM initially opposed these policies and called on the PRI to improve wages and introduce price controls on basic commodities (Middlebrook 1995). The CTM also threatened to call general strikes if their demands were not achieved (Middlebrook 1995: 260). The PRI rejected the CTM's demands and supported other "official" labor confederations, like the CROC and CROM, which strongly embraced the PRI's economic policies. The PRI and CTM eventually resolved their differences. However, periodic disputes between the PRI and CTM emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s (Teichman 1996).
The establishment of democratic labor movements and the divisions between the PRI and the CTM indicate that Mexican state-labor relations arc often complex. These democratic labor movements, and the emergence of the Foro, the May First Intcrsindical Movement, and National Workers Union (UNT), illustrate that the CTM and the PRI cannot completely control working-class mobilization and discontent. However, these new labor organizations arc politically and ideologically divided, and they, along with democratic and independent unions, like the FAT, have not replaced the CTM (La Botz 1997). Corporatist state-labor relations in Mexico arc relatively strong, and the PRI and the CTM can still effectively defeat democratic labor movements like the one at Ford Cuautitlan.

Mexico's Economic Crisis
Mexico's economic crisis and its adoption of export-oriented development policies arc critical for understanding the Ford Cuautitlan case. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Mexico's import-substitution model collapsed and its foreign debt exploded (Teichman 1988). This deep economic crisis generated a prolonged period of economic and industrial restructuring. For instance, Mexico's political and economic elites adopted "structural adjustment policies" and privatized state-owned enterprises, introduc ed strict wage controls and currency devaluations, and limited social spending in the 1980s and 1990s (Teichman 1992). In addition, the PRI passed trade liberalization policies, lik e the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), provided foreign investors with various incentives, and emphasized export-oriented development policies (Moody 1995;Teichman 1992). [Page 29] Journa I of World-Systems Research U.S. government officials, international financial institutions, and foreign investors welcomed Mexico's turn towards neoliberalism and free trad e. However, these neoliberal policies devastated the Mexican working class as wages dramaticall y declin ed, unemployment soared, workplace injuries and deaths increased, and class inequality widened (Lustig 1992;La Botz 1992;Moody 1995). For example, real wages fell by 50% between 1982 and 1991, and 25% of all Mexicans were either unemplo yed or under employed in 1996 (La Botz 1992, Mexican Labor News and Analysis 1997). Thes e conditions produced working-class discontent and unrest. How ever, the CTM opposed and then supported the PRI's economic policies in a series of "solidarity pacts II (Middlebrook 1995). These pacts and the CTM's and PRI's control of th e juntas limit ed labor militancy and the formation of independent labor union s and explain th e labor movement's silence in this period of deep economic crisis (Middlebrook 1995).

The Mexican Automobile Industry and the Labor Movement, 1920s -1970s
Mexico's export-ori ented development policies dramatically affected its automobile industry and shifted its orientation and focus. The history of Mexico's automobile industry is critical for understanding this shift. Mexico's automobile indust ry emerged in the 1920s and 1930s when Ford, General Motors (GM), and Fabricas Auto-Mex (a Mexican-owned firm that assembled Chryslers) estab lished factori es in the Federal District (Mexico City) (Arteaga 1993). These factories assembled automobiles from imported kits, but did not manufactur e them (Arteaga 1993;Moreno 1988).
However, in the 1960s, Mexico passed legislative decrees that encourag ed domestic vehicle manufacturing (Bennett and Sharpe 1985;Moreno 1988). Thes e policies generated new levels of foreign investment in the automobile industry. For instance, Chrysler, GM, Ford, Nissan, and Volkswagen built new automobile factories in the states of Mexico, Morel os, and Puebla in the 1960s (Arteaga 1993;Bennett and Sharpre 1985). These factories manufactured cars for Mexico's domestic market and sparked the expans ion of the auto parts industry (Arteaga 1993;Moreno 1988).
The CTM controlled most of the labor unions in the automobile industry between the late 1930s and the early 1960s (although Ford's Mexico Cityworkcrs challenged the CTM in the late 1940s, and GM's Mexico City workers joined the CROC in 1952) (Middlebrook 1995;Roxborough 1984). However, in the mid-l960s and 1970s, automobile workers resisted the CTM's anti-democratic policies, shopfloor alienation, and wage freezes, and established democratic and independent unions (Middlebrook 1995). For exampl e, five automobile unions introduced democratic reforms, like the election of union officials, and three of these unions (Dina [a Mexican-owned company], Nissan, and Volkswagen) cut their tics with the CTM and joined the Independent Worker Unit (UOI) (Aguilar Garcia 1982;Middlebrook 1995;Roxborough 1984). Some of these unions acquired new personnel policies and grievance procedures, and in some ca-.cs, they 1 imitcd the hiring of temporary workers (Middlebrook 1995). however, these unions did not obtain substantial wage increa-.cs (Middlebrook 1995).

Mexico's New Automobile Factories and the CTM, l980s-l990s
In the 1980s, Mexico's automobile industry shifted its focus again. Falling wages eroded internal demand and limited domestic automobile production and sales (Middlebrook 1995;Moreno 1988). The Mexican government responded and pa-.scd new legislation that encouraged export-oriented production (Bennett and Sharp e 1985;Moreno 1988). For instance, Mexico lowered tariff barriers, reduced wages, and provided some automobile companies, like Ford, with tax incentives and subsidies for the establishment of new factories (Bennett and Sharpe 1985;Middlebrook 1995). Chrysler, GM, Ford, and Nissan embraced these policies and opened up new factories in central and north ern Mexico (Arteaga 1993;Micheli 1994;Middlebrook 1995;Shaikcn and Hcrzcnbcrg 1987).
The major automobile companies realized that the democratic labor mo vements of th e 1970s limited their decision making-power over production, promotion, and grievancerclated issues (Middlebrook 1995). Therefore, Ford, GM, Chrysler, and Nissan signed contracts with the CTM at their new factories which provided them with flexible wor k rules, work teams, fewer job categories, and greater power and influence over their workers (Middlebrook 1995). Automobile workers in these factories also worked longer hours and received lower wages and benefits than their counterparts in older automobile factories (Arteaga 1997;Micheli 1994). These contracts, along with the CTM's limit ations on rank-and-file dissent, provided these companies with greater control over the production process and they began exporting hundreds of thousand s of en gincs and automobiles into the U.S. market in the late 1980s and 1990s (Arteaga 1993;Middlebrook 1995).

Ford Motor Company
Mexico's adoption of export-led development policies and the restructuring of the automobile industry greatly affected Ford. For instance, in the 1980s, Ford closed two of its three Mexico City-ba~cd automobile factories that produced for the domestic market (Middlebrook 1995). However, in 1983 Ford built a new engine factory in Chihuahua, and, in 1986, Mazda and Ford opened up a new automobile plant in Hermosillo (Carrillo 1995;Micheli 1994). These two factories export nearly 100% of their products to the United States (Carrillo 1991;Micheli 1994). In addition, Ford Workers at these two factories arc members of the local sections of the National Ford Workers Union, which is affiliated with the CTM (Middlebrook 1995). The CTMNational Ford Workers Union negotiated contract~ with Ford at these two plants that provided the company with flexible job categories, ''.just-in-time" production policies, work teams, and low wages (Carrillo 1995;Middlebrook 1995).
Ford ha~ one other automobile factory, which is located in Cuautitlan, Mexico. The Cuautitlan factory wa~ established in 1964, and primarily produced cars for Mexico's internal market until the 1980s (Carrillo 1995;De la Cueva 1997). However, a shrinking domestic market, along with tariff reductions and trade liberalization policies, prompted Ford to shift towards export-oriented production in Cuautitlan (Carrillo 1995). Thus, in the 1980s, Ford reduced wages and benefits, introduced flexible job policies, and integrated its Cuautitlan plant into the export care market (Carrillo 1995;La Botz 1992). Ford also reduced its number of employees in Cuautitlan from 7000 in 1981 to 3200 in 1987 (Middlebrook 1990: 53).
The Ford Cuautitlan Workers' Struggle for Union Democracy (1987Democracy ( -1997 Ford Cuautitlan workers resisted the company's new policies. In the mid-1980s, Ford Cuautitlan workers enjoyed better than average salaries and working conditions (La Botz 1992). However, in July 1987, Ford refused to provide its Cuautitlan workers with an emergency 23% salary incrca~c authorized by the federal government (Middlebrook 1990). Ford's position provoked a sixty-one-day strike (Middlebrook 1995). In late September 1987, Ford ended the strike, closed the factory, and fired all 3200 Cuautitlan workers (Becerril 1987;De la Cueva 1997). Ford rehired 2500 workers and reopened the factory several week~ later with a new contract (Middlebrook 1990). This new contract with the CTM "dramatically reduced salaries and benefits, compacted job titles, and eliminated whole job categories" (La Botz 1992: 148). Middlebrook (1995: 276) notes, "after October 1987, wage and benefit levels at Cuautitlan were much closer to those at Ford's northern plants" (in Hermosillo and Chihuahua).
A new series of protest~ and conflicts emerged in Cuautitlan two years after the factory reopened. In 1989, the General Secretary of the CTMNational Ford Workers Union, Lorenzo Vera, wa~ replaced and the CTM appointed a new general secretary, Hector Uriatc (Escobar 1997). A group ofCuautitlan workers, called the Ford Workers Democratic Movement (FWDM), challenged this appointment and demanded a democratic local union election (Escobar 1997). A local election wa~ scheduled and FWDM representatives won and gained control of the local union (De la Cueva 1997). FWDM members, some of whom were active in the 1987 strike and in earlier protest, called for higher wages and benefits, and challenged the CTM's control of the National Ford Workers Union (De la Cueva 1997;La Botz 1992).
However, in June 1989, the CTM pressured Ford into firing the local union's executive committee members (La Botz 1992;Escobar 1997). The Cuautitlan workers responded with demonstrations and hunger strikes and continued organizing (Escobar 1997). However, Ford did not rehire the fired executive committee members (De la Cueva 1997). In December 1989, Ford reduced the annual Christma'l bonus of its workers (La Botz 1992). This decision mobilized the Cuautitlan workers and they organized an occupation of the factory and demanded their "full bonus, the rehiring of the executive committee members, and the right to elect their own union leaders" (La Botz 1992: 149). The Ford Cuautitlan workers also met with CTM General Secretary Fidel Velazquez who promised to hold democratic local and national union elections (Escobar 1997;La Botz 1992). However, these elections were never held (Escobar 1997).

[Page 31] Journal of World-Systems Research
The plant occupation turned violent on January 8, 1990. Raul Escobar (1997), one of the leaders of the FWDM, describes the situation on that morning: • When the workers arrived at six AM. they discovered 250 CTM pistol eros (thugs) inside the factory. The thugs ordered the workers to work and threatened to shoot them. The workers [there were approximately 2500 workers inside the factory at that moment] grabbed some tools and surrounded the CTM thu gs, but they took out their guns and shot and killed one worker, Clcto Nigmo, and injured eleven others.
Ford officials paid the CTM pistoleros, and the government failed to protect the Cuautitlan workers inside the factory (La Botz 1992). This incident clearly reveale d th e active collusion between Ford, the CTM, and the PRI, and illustrated the difficulties of establishing democratic local unions.
In the aftermath of this violence, Cuautitlan workers received support from Ford workers in Chihuahua and Hermosillo and other unions in Mexico (De la Cueva 1997). The Cuautitlan workers also received international solidarity from United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 879 (St. Paul, Minneso ta) members who organized a Trinational Workers Justice Day on the one-year anniversary of Nigmo's death (Moody and McGinn 1992). On January 8, 1991, Ford workers from various plants in Mexico, Canada, and the United States wore black ribbons honoring Clcto Nigmo (De la Cueva 1997). The Ford Cuautitlan workers welcomed this assistance, but the CTM still retained its tight control over the local union.
The CTM's repressive activities led the Cuautitlan workers to file a petition to change their union affiliation to the Revolutionary Workers Confederation (COR) (De la Cueva 1997). The COR is another "official" labor confederation affiliated with the PRl and the Labor Congress (CT). A union election wa.., conducted on June 3, 1991, and the CTM won by a thin margin (Middlebrook 1995). However, a committee of observers, which included representatives from UAW Local 879, the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), and other labor and human rights organizations, discovered numerous electoral irregularities (La Botz 1992: 157-158). Hector de la Cueva, director of the Center for Research and Union Advising (CJLAS), and a former Ford Cuautitlan worker, described some of these violations: The election occurred inside the factory, while the workers were "on the line" working. Each worker voted in front of company officials, the police, and the CTM. Ford also brought in non-workers into the factory to vote. The result wa.., that the CTM won by a very small margin--it wa.., very close, but it wa.., still not a legitimate election.

Journa I of World-Systems Research
The Cuautitlan workers called for new elections, but they were never held (La Bot z 1992). The CTM remained in control of the local union.
1n August 1996, local CTM union elections were held again at the Ford Cuautitlan plant. Nine different CTM slates qualified for the ballot, but the FWDM's slate (called the Brown Slate) wa.., removed from the ballot (De la Cueva 1997). CTMNational Ford union officials claimed that the FWD M's activities undermin ed the CTM's legitimacy and that international unions influenced the FWDM (Valenzuela 1997). The FWDM, fearing further violence and electoral fraud, invited labor unions and human rights and popular organizations to observe the election (Working Together N ewslctter 1997). Th ese organizations formed the Clcto Nigmo Trinational Observers Committee (COT 1997). Union members from the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) and UAW Local 879 and UAW Region lA (located in Michigan) served on the committ ee (COT 1997).
The CTM won the local union election and excluded the Trinational Obs crvers Committee from observing the electoral process (R. Gonzal ez 1997). The committee challenged the CTM's decision and the election results and filed a complaint with the Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration (Calderon l996a). However, the Junta.., claimed the election was an "internal union affair" and refused to hear the ca..,e (Calderon l996b).
Nonetheless, mem bers of the trinational committee interviewed more than 150 Ford Cuautitlan workers and discovered that many workers believed that the Brown Slate should have been on the ballo t (R. . Rodridgo Gonzal ez, a member of the trinational delegation and a researcher with Centro de Reflexion y Accion Laboral (CEREAL) summarized the workers' feelings about the election: Many workers were upset because the cafe planilla (brown slate) was left off the ballot . But, many workers also stated they were afraid to talk to the committee's members because they feared they would be fired.
In addition, many workers reported there was no secret ballot, and that they voted in front of CTM officials (R. . These accounts indicate the CTM intimidat ed the Cuautitlan workers and that the CTM successfully manipulated the outcome of the election ( Calderon l 996b). La Botz and Guerrero ( 1996: 5) describe the consequences of the 1996 election, "these recent event.., represent a defeat for union democracy and a victory for corporatism." However, these events also illustrate the difficulti es of crossborder labor organizing.

The Ford Cuautitlan Case and Cross-Border Labor Organizing
Mexico's neoliberal and export-led development policies depend on strict labor control, low wages, and working-class :fragmentation. The Ford Cuautitlan democratic workers movement for higher wages (most workers currently earn $1.50-$2 per hour), better working conditions, union democracy, and the development of cross -border labor linkages with U.S. and Canadian unions challenged these polici es. A democratic labor movement, even at the local level, seriously threatened the CTM's dominance, Mexico's stable investment climate, and Ford's competitive position in the global economy . For these reasons, the Ford Workers Democratic Movement was crushed on several different occasions. The Ford Cuautitlan case illustrates that corporatist state -labor relations not only limited the establishment of a democratic local union, but also limit ed the establishment of a democratic local union, but also restricted cross-bord er labor organizing in the automobile industry.

[Page 33] Journal of World-Systems Research
The Cuautitlan case also indicates the UAW has not fully embrac ed cross-border organizing. Within the UAW, some UAW locals and regions have actively supported cross-border labor organizing and have provided the Cuautitlan workers with internationa l solidarity. For instance, UAW Local 879 and the UAW Region l A International Labor Solidarity Network have worked carefully with the Ford Cuautitlan workers over the last six years (Markell 1996 ). UAW Local 879 and the FWDM have even signed a formal "solidarity agreemen t " which calls for worker exchanges, information-sharing ( on wages, working conditions, and Ford company policies) and Local 879's partial funding of one full-time FWDM organizer (Working Tog ether Newsl etter 1994).
The UAW has not supported nor condemned Local 879 or Region lA for their activities (Beckman 1997;Markcll 1996). However, the UAW has criticized the CTM and Ford for their collusion in repressing the Ford Workers Democratic Movement (Beckman 1997). Y ct, the UAW has not become directly involved in the Cuautitlan case. Steve Beckman (1997), UAW International Economist, explains the union's positions on the Ford Cuautitlan case and cross-border labor organizing: The union has a very strained institutional relationship with the CTM and this prevents the UAW from intervening in local union matt ers. The CTM and the UAW distrust each other, but we cannot interfere in local disputes. Cross-border organizing requires a set of opportunities that do not currently exist in Mexico. The UAW has its own set of priorities right now and cross-border organizing is among them, but it competes with other issues as well.
These statements indicate that the UAW has adopted cautious policies towards the FWDM and cross-border labor organizing. However, some Local 879 and Region lA members have criticized this approach. These UAW (some of whom previously or currently belonged to New Directions, a dissident caucus within the UAW) members favor working directly with grass-roots, democratic labor movements in Mexico and they contend that cross-border labor organizing is critical for improving wages and working conditions for Mexican and U.S. auto workcrs . .U These internal union conflicts and differences within the UAW have also limited cross-border labor organizing in th e automobile industry.

Discussion
The theoretical literature contends that cross-border labor organizing is limit ed by capital mobility, state repression, corporatist state-labor relations, and trade union imp erialism. Three of these four factors were present in the PVH case, but cross-border labor organizing and the ratification of a collective bargaining agreement were achieved. However, the Ford Cuautitlan case demonstrates the limitations of cross-border organizing. The following sections analyze the relationship between these two cases and the theoretical literature.

Journa I of World-Systems Research
The PVH case illustrated that structural barriers, like capital mobility, state repression, and trade union imperialism , contained their own specific limitation s. For instanc e, PVH's emphasis on preserving its "socially conscious" image limit ed the threat and possibility of capital mobility. In addition, the relative decline in violence and repression in Guatemala has created some "breathing space" for the Guatemalan labor movement. This space enab led UNITE, US/GLEP, and the international garment workers trade secretariat to establish linkages with the PVH workers' union. Lastly, the PVH workers' union is affiliated with CUSG, and CUSG previously received funding from AIFLD (Frundt 1995). However, CUSG adopted its own positions, and some we re critical of U.S. economic and foreign policy (Frundt 1995). In addition, AIFLD wa-; involved in the establishment of maquila unions in Hondura-; and the Dominican Republic over the la-; t several years (ICFTU 1996). Moreover, the AFL-CIO recentl y closed down AIFLD and created the new American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS). AFL-CIO President John Sweeney appointed Barbara Shailor, a long-time critic of AIFLD's policies, a-; Director of ACILS (Working Together 1997). AIFLD's recent activities and the emergence of the ACILS open up new possibilities for U.S. and Latin American labor unions that arc interested in cross-border organizing, and indicate that the long history of trade union imperialism may finally be waning.
The PVH workers' union, US/GLEP, FITTN, and UNITE developed a "strat egic" crossbordcr labor organizing model that exploited these structural weaknesses. This model included the following clemcnts--an active international trade secretariat, new organi zing strategics and tactics, trade and consumer pressure, the involvement of solidarity and labor rights organizations, and the manipulation of PVH's corporate image. The combination of these clements produced a stunning victory for the PVH workers and their cross-border labor allies.
The Ford Cuautitlan ca-;c also demonstrat ed that capital mobilit y did not limit crossbordcr organizing. Ford closed down its Cuautitlan factory in 1987, but neve r moved to another country. In addition, AIFLD wa-; nev er invo lved in the Ford Cuautitlan ca-;c. Therefore, trade union imperialism had no impact on the outcome of this specific ca-;c. However, the CTM, the Mexican government, and Ford collaborated and repressed the Ford Workers Democratic Movement and their demand-; for union democrac y, higher wages, and the establishment of cross-border labor linkages with U.S. and Canadian unions. The CTM National Ford Workers Union remains in control of the local union and they have not developed tics with the UAW, the CAW, or any gra-;s-roots netw ork of auto workers. The Ford Cuautitlan ca-;c demonstrates that corporatist state -labor relations limited union democracy and cross-border labo r organizing in the automobile industry.
There is one other factor that affected the outcome of the Ford Cuautitlan ca-;c. Internal conflicts and differences within the UAW prevented the union from acting a-; an effective agent and limit ed cross-border labor organizing in the automobile industry. A mor e committed and unified UAW might have generated a mor e favo rable outcome for th e Ford Cuautitlan workers. UNITE's involvement in the PVH ca-;c, and the UAW Intcrnational's lack of part icipation in Ford Cuautitlan ca-;c, indicate that a union's "level of comm itment" also affects the poss ibilities of cross-border labor organizing. 14 Corporatist state-labor relations and internal conflicts within the UAW limit ed the possibili ties for union democracy and cross-border labor organizing in the Ford Cuautitlan ca-;c. However, there arc three additional rca-;ons that explain why the Ford Cuaut itlan wo rkers were unsuccessful. First, the Internat ional Metal Workers Federation (IMF), the international trade secretariat for automobile and metal worke rs, wa-; not involv ed in this ca-; c. The PVH ca-; c demonstrated that international trad e secretariats can be effective. Second, there were no solidarity and labor rights organizati ons like US/GLEP that assisted the Ford Cuautitlan workers on a permanent bm,is. Most solidarity and labor rights organizations arc focused on Central America and the garment industry . A new labor rights organization that emphasized Mexico and the automobile industry could be helpful in future campaigns. Third, the Ford Cuautitlan workers never attacked the company's image . The PVH and Gap cases have illustrated a corporation's public image is often vulnerable to media and consumer campaigns (Armbruster forthcoming ;Pattee 1996). These three factors were instrumental in the PVH campaign, but they were not present in the Ford Cuautitlan case. [Page 35] Journa I of World-Systems Research Summary Cross-border labor organizing is very complex. The PVH case demonstrates that "strategic" cross-border labor organizing models can be effective even in the highly mobile garment industry and in a nation with a long history of labor repr ession. ln contrast, the Ford Cuautitlan case demonstrates that corporatist state -labor relations and internal union conflicts have limit ed cross-border labor organizing in the automobile industry. These two case studies and their different outcomes provide academics and activists with some valuable lessons.
However, these two case studies also have broader implications. On a wider theor etical level, these two case studies illustrate the complex relationship between structure and agency. Most theories of cross-border labor organizing contend that structural barri ers, like capital mobility or state repression, are so powerful that agency and social change are inconceivable . The Ford Cuautitlan case demonstrates that structural barriers did limit cross-border labor organizing. However, the PVH case indicates that structural factors have their own specific limitations . These limitations provided the PVH workers and their cross-border allies with an "opening" and they developed a strategic cross -border labor organizing model. These structural weaknesses and this new cross -border labor organizing model transformed the PVH workers into actors and makers of hist ory. Th ese two case studies illustrat e that structures do not necessarily determine outcomes, and they indicate that a nuanced analysis of the relationship between structur e and agency is critical for studi es of cross-border labor organizing.
Cross-border labor organizing is still relatively new. Th e PVH case illustrat es that crossborder labor organ izing is possibl e, but the Ford Cuautitlan ca-.e demonstrates that ther e arc some significant barrier s that have limit ed cross -border labor organizing. These two case studies indic ate that the adoption of "strategic" cross-border labor organizing models and the struggle for com mitted and democra tic labor movements are critical for futur e cross -border labor organizing activities.