

BROADENING AND DEEPENING: SYSTEMIC EXPANSION, INCORPORATION AND THE ZONE OF IGNORANCE

Jon D. Carlson

I. INTRODUCTION

I intend to address a critical element of world-systems theory, and in doing so illuminate some larger concerns with international relations theory in general.[1] Specifically, I will be examining the concept of the "external arena" and its relation to the international system as an expanding whole. The goal is to re-think the incorporation of new regions ('states' and peoples) into the world-system in order to understand world-system processes more completely. This should be taken as a positive critique of both Wallerstein's analysis of incorporation (European, state-centric, 'inside-out') and Hall's analysis of incorporation (external, indigenous peoples, 'outside in').

In turn, my position is embedded in a larger critique of international relations theory in political science. I argue that world-systems theory is better positioned to address important issues (*e.g.* globalization, democratization) than are traditional realist, neorealist, or institutionalist approaches. Simply put, if social scientists are to understand and predict anything to do with these 'emerging' trends, a globalist paradigm must be adopted. At the broadest level, this research

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[1] While the three volumes of Wallerstein's *The Modern World-System* (1974, 1979, 1989) provide the foundation for this theoretical concern, a considerable body of work has blossomed around various facets of the world-systems approach. Accordingly, I will review some of these briefly, and pay more attention to those areas touching more closely on my research agenda [*e.g.* Thomas Hall's (1986, 1987, 1989, 1999b, 2000b) work on frontiers].

JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH, VII, 2, FALL 2001, 225–263
http://jwsr.ucr.edu
ISSN 1076-156X

is intended as a call for a paradigm shift away from traditional power issues of international politics toward a more interdisciplinary approach to understanding politics. How is incorporation related to this broad theme? Because incorporation, and the structuring of frontiers and boundaries, reflects the very essence of what *is* politics.

In essence, I am exploring the broad question: "What drives the expansion of the global state system?" The status of being 'internal' or 'external' to the international system provides a source of debate within the literature, as does the way in which this status is represented. This prompts a narrower question: "What is the nature of incorporation into the system?"[2] This narrower question is fueled by the argument that if I am to understand the broader question, I must get a 'close-up' view of the actual *process* of the system expanding. By gaining a clear understanding of this fundamental process, I will be more able to broadly critique existing theory purporting to explain the expansion of the modern global system.

I am using a world-systems approach to examine and explain the process of incorporation into the system. This world-systems explanatory outlook should be contrasted to other systemic-level explanations of expansion (*e.g.* Waltzian neorealism, Bull's international society). In doing so, I will also be positioned to critique realist explanations of expansion (*e.g.* Snyder's 'Myths of Empire'). By using a world-systems approach to understanding the expansion of the international system, I will differentiate my research in several ways from four primary problems that plague much of traditional international political research: state-centrism, the treatment of politics as autonomous, a temporal scope of analysis limited to the recent past, and a tendency toward Eurocentrism (Denemark 1999). *It is my argument that an explicitly world-systems approach will provide a much more nuanced and insightful explanation of how European-style political structures either emerge from or are inserted into peripheral regions than is currently provided by traditional international relations literature.*

II. AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY DEVELOPMENT

In international relations theory there is an ever-present ebb and flow of ideas, which results in a shifting swell in the prevailing tide of current theory. A prime example is provided by tracing the evolution of theory from political realism, to a neorealist 'refinement,' through a realist backlash, and finally to a cry for alternative considerations characterized by the agent-structure debate.

The realist concern with concepts of "power" and "interests" lent credence to criticisms that these ideas were too "woolly" to use effectively in the pursuit of "science." Indeed, even Morganthau (1978:11, emphasis added) posits "the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political *and cultural* context within which foreign policy is formulated." Political realism was in turn "refined" with a more "structural" approach to international politics provided by Waltz (1979). Though neorealism (or 'structural realism') has been roundly debated and criticized as a theory,[3] neorealism and world-systems are recognized as primary influences in the academic discourse on international relations (Wendt 1987).

These two approaches have suffered very different fates. Even defenders of neorealism argue that "structural realism, qua theory, must be viewed as deeply and perhaps fatally flawed. Yet at the same time, qua paradigm or worldview, it continues to inform the community of international relations scholars" (Kapstein 1995:751). Kapstein argues that structural realism will continue to be the "cornerstone of international relations theory" until an alternative takes its place (*á la* Kuhn). But he only addresses the issues presented by realists emphasizing *domestic* sources of international relations (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Rosecrance and Stein, eds. 1993; Snyder 1991), and does not address any potential alternative.

Wendt (1987:344) views world-systems' understanding of structure as a "progressive problem shift over neorealism." In addition, as a research program, world-systems has developed a diverse network of scholars and a theoretically rich body of literature which continues to be refined. While neorealism has stagnated and been largely supplanted by domestic realist explanations, world-systems has continued to evolve as an active research program or paradigm.

III. WORLD-SYSTEMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM

Much like the world-system itself, the application of the world-systems approach has expanded and developed to encompass many different areas of academic concern. In fact, there are so many variations on the world-systemic approach, that it has long ceased to be a single "theory," and is more accurately

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[2] Understanding this dynamic is more salient once one realizes that Wallerstein's 'moment' of incorporation can occur over a period of 100 or more years, and can involve vast geographic regions. A region does not just become part of the system, *something*—some change—must occur.

[3] See Keohane 1986 as a consolidation of the discourse.

referred to as a Lakatosian "research programme," or a "paradigm" in the traditional Kuhnian sense. Lakatos (1970) recognizes that all great scientific theories are engulfed in an 'ocean of anomalies' from the moment of their inception. Instead of discarding an individual theory once it has proven inadequate, Lakatos places emphasis on sequences of historically related theories. In essence, "a research programme is the sum of the various stages through which a leading idea passes" (Larvor 1998:51). This 'leading idea' provides the 'hard core' of the research program, which is the set of commitments that cannot be abandoned without abandoning the research program altogether. Around this core, there is a 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses that serve to shield the core from falsification. This belt of auxiliary hypotheses is continually changing. This change takes place in response to empirical findings, but also according to a research program's 'heuristic'—the set of problem-solving techniques that guide a scientist engaged in a particular research program. Thus, within the realm limited to international relations theory, a world-systems approach may quite accurately be described as a 'research program.'

A. Addressing Globalization

Sklair (1991, 1999) argues that the central feature of globalization is that many contemporary problems cannot be adequately be studied at the level of nation-states, but need to be seen in terms of global processes. While he misidentifies the world-systems approach as one of four (the others being a global culture, a global society, and a global capitalism approach), I more explicitly include these processes in the framework of a world systems view. Support for such a world-systems approach is made even more pertinent if we agree that, "globalization is not just a 'current thing' but has been going on for centuries or, in some views, millennia" (Hall, 2000a:6). Indeed, Chase-Dunn (1999) observes that intercontinental economic integration ('economic globalization') has been a long-term trend since the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. Arrighi (1999:199; see also Hirst and Thompson 1996) echoes this reevaluation of the notion of globalization as 'recent' by pointing out that "a world-encompassing economy sharing close to real-time information first came into existence not in the 1970s but the 1870s, when a system of submarine telegraph cables began to integrate financial and other major markets across the globe in a way not fundamentally different from today's satellite-linked markets."

Interestingly, some realist scholars also recognize that "Globalization is not new... Challenges to the authority of the state are not new... Transnational flows are not new" (Krasner 1994:13 quoted in Burch 2000:194). Instead, Krasner argues that these factors have always comprised the traditional Westphalian system. As Burch (2000:194) notes, "Krasner thus transforms the realist simile of states as billiard balls to states as whiffle balls, but most of the realist worldview endures."[4]

While Krasner may be correct, he misses the point. These factors may have been part of the traditional state system, however the *degree* of globalization, the *volume* of transnational flows (especially financial flows), and the resulting challenges to the authority of the state *are* new. Their increased relevance is seriously eroding the traditional realist explanation of the system, and actually serves as an argument *for* alternative explanations that hold more water than do "whiffle balls."

B. Toward an Unidisciplinary Approach

The world-systems approach undermines the classical lines of division within social sciences, as it sets out to study the system as a dynamic whole, eschewing the division of the world into individual groups or organizations. As Wallerstein (1974:11, emphasis added) notes:

> Anthropology, economics, political science, sociology—and history—are divisions of the discipline anchored in a certain *liberal conception of the state* and its relation to functional and geographical sectors of the social order. They make a certain limited sense if the focus of one's study is organizations. They make none at all if the focus is the social system.

Instead of a 'multidisciplinary' approach, the study of a social system requires a 'unidisciplinary' approach. World-systems theory adapts this unidisciplinary outlook and provides an interactive and dynamic paradigm for understanding global history and political behavior in a context that is not explicitly state-centric. Wallerstein continues to rail against the contrived segmentation of the social sciences, arguing that they are in fact a single, unified field (Wallerstein 1991, 1998b, 1999). At the very least, it seems that a world-systems approach provides an invaluable *lingua franca* in a situation where academics often miss out on the 'cross-pollination' of ideas due to the tendency to talk past scholars in other disciplines (and often in their own).

While there is a recognized difficulty in applying world-systems theory in its entirety to pre-capitalist settings, it has been modified for such (Pailes and Whitecotton 1979; Schneider 1977; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991, 1997). This arena of research is especially fruitful for my purposes. By looking at a pre-capitalist system, and what happens when a pre-capitalist system and agents of a capitalist or 'modern' world-system meet, I can gain an understanding of the pre-capitalist societal interactions, but also an improved understanding of social and political 'evolution.' It is this interaction between groups that has appealed to researchers in the field of sociology, as a world-systems approach appears to have ready application to the concept of social evolution. It is not a stretch to recognize the ready application to the realm of international politics. Hall (1999c:5, emphasis added) argues:

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[4] For Lakatos, this would serve as a prime example of realists reconstructing the 'protective belt' of theory in an attempt to save the 'hard core' of realism.

> My claim can now be restated: a fundamental unit of social evolution is the world-system or core-periphery system. The claim is dialectic. The system itself evolves, and as it evolves it transforms its constituent members. Conversely, changes in constituent members collectively produce change in the overall system. To focus solely on the constituent members (conventional "societies") is to miss a good deal of the action, and to *fundamentally misunderstand* social evolution. The converse is equally valid.

The processes of the system should be manifest throughout the system, even on the frontiers or peripheries. By studying these systemic processes on the periphery, they are more clearly perceived, as much of the 'noise' of the systemic core is absent. Thus, by understanding the frontier, we are able to understand the system as a dynamic whole.

IV. UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMIC EXPANSION

It is the desire to understand how the system itself evolves and expands that is at the heart of this work. Theories 'explaining' the development of sovereign states and the sovereign territorial state system (STSS) provide a rich source for debate. Scholars argue that sovereign territorial states (STS) emerged because they were more 'efficient' than other political arrangements in the international system (Spruyt 1994, 2000), or because local elites opted for a new property rights "contract" (North 1981). Others take the approach that non-European polities were "quasi-states" that lacked the empirical political and economic capacity to emerge as fully functioning sovereign states in the international community (Jackson 1990), or that tribal societies "exploded from within" because they were unable to compete in the expanding Euro-centric system (Doyle 1986). On a systemic level, it is argued that STS emerged as a manifestation of a universal international society that began among European states and was gradually extended to non-European states "when they measured up to criteria of admission laid down by the founder members" (Bull 1984:123). An alternate explanation of expansion argues that interest groups may appropriate strategic concepts as an ideology, and then use it to promote expansion and colonization for "security" (Snyder 1991).

However, in a critique of this revisionist wave of literature as applied to West Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries, Warner (1999:235, emphasis added) argues:

> [F]irst, that the 'quasi-states' present in these areas prior to colonization were stronger and more 'state-like, at least judged by conventional European standards, than is often acknowledged; second, that among their attributes was the ability (all-important according to this second wave of literature) to sustain and promote commerce; and third, that as a consequence, they did not collapse by virtue of their own 'weakness' but were *deliberately destroyed by Western states acting at the behest of merchants and officials* who sought not a general property rights regime capable of supporting commerce, but economic regimes that privileged their *own* commerce.

While not writing from a world-systems perspective, Warner's case studies (1998, 1999) make obvious the economic underpinnings of socio-culturally motivated political decisions, which are manifested ultimately in military conflict. Local elites did not opt for new "contracts," nor did tribal societies disintegrate, nor were they inefficient pseudo-states that were unable to compete with Europeans. Instead, in these cases it seems that the local polities were *too efficient* and competed *too well* with European trading interests. At least in this instance, private, economic interests, not state-level power-struggles or systemic supranational factors drive political change. This is in sharp contrast to the explanation of state formation and systemic expansion put forth by the scholars above, and other realist explanations like that of Snyder (1991). Krasner's view that neorealism and neoliberalism are the "proper" ways to investigate global affairs seems equally questionable (1994:17, 1999:6, in Burch, 2000:183).

Other scholars echo Warner's criticisms. Webb (1975) contends that state formation is based on an interaction of commercial and military factors, and Chase-Dunn (1981) maintains that the interstate system is more accurately portrayed as the political side of capitalism, not an autonomous system. Building on this, Arrighi (1994) argues for the need to pay greater attention to the institutions associated with the capital accumulation process, and how this is related to the emergence of global powers (Arrighi and Silver 1999). Therefore, to understand the system we must reject any artificial differentiation of social, economic, or political spheres (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1993, 1997; Wallerstein 1974, 1991, 1998b). Some scholars, myself included, contend that we must study social interactions *before* states insert their power structures, if we are to recognize initial political and social changes (Hall 1987, 1989).

While there may be a certain degree of 'intellectual' opposition to a world-systems approach within the field of political science because of its Marxist roots, it is not a serious problem. First, a considerable amount of opposition to neo-Marxist approaches is simply a visceral reaction based on the linking of all Marxist theory to the ideological aspects of the Cold War. This is in no way a practical application or critique of Marxism qua theory. Rather, it is more accurately what Derrida (1994:87) refers to as the "spirit of Marxism" that continues to "haunt" the neo-liberal hegemonic discourse.[5] By stridently disavowing these neo-Marxist ghosts, the hegemonic discourse not only confirms the 'haunting,' but also betrays a concern with the 'specter of communism' yet to come.

As a related point, the issues centrally related to the world-systems outlook—such as global inequality—*are* growing in importance in the international political environment. It makes sense to utilize a body of theory that already deals with issues like polarization, instead of trying to retrofit a diametrically opposite theoretical approach. Finally, simply put: in certain important respects Marx was right. Developed nations *are* shifting policy and values (*e.g.* Inglehart 1997) to include what are "socially conscious" positions, albeit within a capitalist framework. This is not to say that the European model of a full-blown 'welfare state' is what the future holds. Rather, it seems that states will be increasingly responsible for dealing with issues produced by social inequality, but that these issues will be created within an internationally-responsive (as opposed to domestically-responsive) market system.

Shannon (1996) also relates the relevance of the world-systems approach to imperialism (see also McGowan and Kordan 1981; Arrighi 1978), its roots in the *Annales* school of French historical thought *à la* Fernand Braudel (1977, 1981, 1982, 1984) and the outgrowth of world systems theory from the dependency approach to development and politics in the periphery. In fact, it is hard to consider any approach to either political economy or cyclical behavior (*e.g.* "long cycles," cycles of war, Kondratieff waves, cycles of hegemony) that does not have relevant ties to the world-systems outlook. Hall (2000a:6) notes that the dialectic nature of world-systems analysis exhibits several trends with embedded continuing cycles, "somewhat akin to the wire that holds spiral notebooks together." These trends are ever-present themes in international relations: commodification, proletarianization, state formation, increasing size of enterprises, capital intensification, and globalization.

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[5] This image is made more clear if we note that "the term *hantise*, translated here as 'haunting,' also has the common sense of an obsession, a constant fear, a fixed idea, or a nagging memory" (Derrida 1994: 177f).

Understanding the incorporation process is the linchpin to understanding these systemic dynamics of expansion and dominance. A world-systems approach provides the framework for a more complete and intellectually satisfying explanation of how the international system expands. A world-systems approach allows one to address not only traditional political aspects, but also economic and socio-cultural factors of systemic expansion.

V. THE WORLD-SYSTEM & INCORPORATION: ORIENTING CONCEPTS

Many scholars have extended the world-system beyond the temporal scope originally proposed by Wallerstein (1974). Janet Abu-Lughod (1989, 1993; see also Fitzpatrick 1992) argues that the modern world-system may be traced back to the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and is a result of the withdrawal of the East, rather than the rise of the West. Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills (1993; see also Frank 1990, 1999; Gills and Frank 1991) push the temporal boundary, echoing Abu-Lughod's claim but proposing a 5,000-year-old system. Chase-Dunn and Hall one-up Frank and Gills by attempting to extend world-systems theory some 10,000 years into the past—to the Neolithic revolution—though they admittedly have had to "stretch some concepts considerably" (Hall, 1999c:7). The world system approach is also being used to study long-term social change in more 'recent' historical eras, though still well before the emergence of Wallerstein's 'modern' world-system (Denemark, *et al.* 2000).

While these works provide good source material for understanding pre-capitalist and emerging capitalist societies in the world-system, I will operate more explicitly within the chronological frame of Wallerstein's world-systems work. This is not to say that the insight gained from this work on pre-capitalist settings has no relevance to my work. Quite to the contrary. By using these findings, I will further the understanding of the initial interactions that take place between agents of capitalist societies and other (possibly pre-capitalist) societies in an effort to more accurately theorize the incorporation and state-formation processes. With this in mind, I will turn my attention to the modern world-system as described by Wallerstein.

Wallerstein (1974:15) identifies the "modern" world-system as arising in the "long sixteenth century" (ca. 1450–1620), with the emergence of a "European world-economy." He describes this new social system as:

> ... an economic but not a political entity, unlike empires, city-states and nation-states. In fact, it precisely encompasses within its bounds (it is hard to speak of boundaries) empires, city-states, and the emerging "nation-states." It is a "world" system, not because it encompasses the whole world, but because it is larger than any juridically-defined political unit. And it is a

Figure 1 – Habermas's Conception of Capitalist Sociopolitical Organization



'Legitimation Crisis' by Jurgen Habermas. German text: Copyright 1973 © by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main Introduction and English translation: Copyright ©1975 by Beacon Press. Reprinted by permission of Beacon Press.

> "world-*economy*" because the basic linkage between the parts of the system is economic, although this was reinforced by cultural links and eventually, as we shall see, by political arrangements and even confederal structures.

Wallerstein later backs off this strict characterization of the world-system after being criticized as being overly "economistic" (Skocpol 1977; Garst 1985). Yet this still provides insight into his initial conceptualization and offers a good understanding of the interrelated arenas within the system: economic, cultural/social, and political. These different arenas may be used to examine the potential incorporation of external venues. The most basic elements of the system are economic linkages, which are related reciprocally to socio-cultural factors, which in turn are supported by political arrangements. I use this delineation to analyze the processes of the "peripheralization"—or more accurately the "incorporation"—of formerly external regions.

Other scholars have used a similar approach. Alvin Y. So (1984, 1986) discusses the incorporation of China in the nineteenth century, and separates the incorporation process into economic and political indices. He notes that the two usually occur together, but does question the characterization of an area if there is a certain degree of one without the other. Similarly, P. Nick Kardulias (1990) examines the economic and social impact that the fur trade—as one segment of a world-system—had on Indian cultures. I will merge these approaches and use all three indices. This is similar to the approach of Gills and Frank (1991:67), who based their study "like a three legged stool, on economic, political, and cultural analysis." This will allow me to examine the differential and reciprocal rates of incorporation among the three "legs," and to explore any broader implications this may hold for the consideration of the 'external arena.'

Figure 2 – Perigrine's Revision Of Habermas, Emphasizing Social Reproduction in a Prestige System



Adapted from 'Legitimation Crisis' by Jurgen Habermas in Peregrine (1999:46). German text: Copyright 1973 © by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main Introduction and English translation: Copyright ©1975 by Beacon Press. Reprinted by permission of Beacon Press.

Peregrine (1992, 1999) uses a three-pronged approach in his study of the social reproduction of rise and decline in prehistoric worlds. The model he uses is adapted from that of Habermas (1973) and provides a good initial conceptualization of how these three indices may very easily be seen as interrelated and interactive.

From this model, one is able to see how the economic system of interaction overlays the local political system, which then has a feedback loop through the sociocultural system. Peregrine then revises Habermas's diagram to give emphasis to social reproduction (see Figure 2).

So, how would Wallerstein react to this type of approach? Since he places great emphasis on the need for a 'unidisciplinary' approach to studying the social sciences, it is natural to assume that his opinion would not be favorable. Indeed, he is of the opinion that, "One ideological product of this system ... has been the dubious epistemological tenet that there exist three different and empirically separable realm of human activity—the economic, the political, and the social and/or cultural—that are in effect subsystems with autonomous logics and/or sets of actors and/or motivations" (1991b:38). Let me say now and for the duration of this work: I agree with this position. I do not advocate treating these indices as unique, compartmentalized fields and will strive to treat them as interrelated and reciprocal systems of behavior founded on choices of individual actors. My design in dividing these indices is a heuristic tool meant to more easily identify particularized characteristics of the system that may otherwise be lost in the system writ large. By their very nature, these three categories of activity (economy, polity, society) are all part of a larger whole, and to understand one we must understand the others.

A. Why Incorporation? The Process Driving Expansion

Why should I examine "incorporation" as a worthwhile concept in international relations? Simply put, if I am to understand the expansion of the international system, I must understand the process of that expansion. Examining how a region is incorporated, and how actors in the system absorb that region, breaks down the process of expansion. Accordingly, I briefly outline some key concepts inherent in the idea of an expanding international system.

1. The Role of Multiculturality

The concept of multiculturality implies that the economic and socio-political linkages in question need to occur between groups that consist of culturally distinct societies. This indicates differences in language, religion, normative institutions, mode of governance, and various other fundamental characteristics of everyday life. How are these differences reconciled? What happens when these societies interact? For Wallerstein, an important structural distinction arises from this requirement of multicultural exchange. Like Polyani (1944), Wallerstein identifies three historical modes of production: mini-systems, world-empires, and world-economies.[6]

World-empires are two or more culturally distinct groups integrated by the forcible accumulation of surplus ('tribute'; thus referred to as the 'tributary mode' of accumulation) organized around a single political center.[7] In contrast, world-economies are integrated via the market rather than a single political center (thus referred to as the 'capitalist mode' of accumulation). Left out of this discussion are the mini-systems, which are small-scale economies, integrated through reciprocity-based family relationships (referred to as a 'lineage' or 'kinship mode' of accumulation).[8] Even though it may be true that "mini-systems have now been swallowed up by capitalist expansion" (Goldfrank 2000:166; also see for summary of these concepts), looking at *how* they were swallowed up should help us conceptualize the process of capitalist expansion.

The very process of incorporation centers on the distinction between political organizations and how they are co-opted into the system as functioning, European-like "states." Wallerstein asserts that:

> Incorporation into the world-economy means necessarily the insertion of the political structures into the interstate system. This means that the "states" which already exist in these areas must either transform themselves into "states within the interstate system" or be replaced by new political structures which take this form or be absorbed by other states already within the interstate system. (1989:170)

Incorporation reflects the very essence of what ***is*** *international politics*. Several aspects of the incorporation process related to 'state' development need to be elucidated.[9]

While polities other than traditional European states plainly have existed—either as empires, kingdoms, city-states, or as more traditional kin-based tributary polities—only those that are sufficiently similar to the European model of the sovereign territorial state or are transformed to this model (either internally or by external, usually European interests) are able to enter the system (*e.g.* Japan after 1866).[10] Otherwise, extant polities that already fit this model of the "state" and are already part of the European world-system assimilate them. For example, Meyer *et al.* (1997) discuss 'requirements' of being a modern state, and describe the pervasive nature of these characteristics by the 20th century. Warner (1998, 1999) offers examples of two West African polities that were fully functioning and competitive with the regional agents of core powers and were actively sabotaged by European powers for economic advantage. One can see that this process of converting to 'state-ness' is an integral part of 'peripheralization.'

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[6] There is a fourth division of labor that Wallerstein feels is on the horizon: a socialist world government. His more recent works (1991b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) are concerned with the perceived upcoming transition to this mode.

[7] Eric Wolf (1982) uses these distinctions as well.

[8] Chase-Dunn and Mann (1998) is an example of work that actually addresses 'mini-systems'.

[9] It is evident that Wallerstein has a dualistic conception of 'states'. When he refers to "states" in general, he is plainly referring to whatever administrative polity or political structures are responsible for government in the external arena. However, this general conception is not what is meant when he refers to "states within the system". Here he obviously means European-style states. This means that empire-states and other systems of socio-economic linkages are by definition not part of the system until the political arena has become "Europeanized", or operates as a proxy for European state powers (*e.g.* colonial administration). While not writing from a world-systems view, Spruyt (2000: 68-9; 1994) echoes this perspective: "one might argue that the current script in the international system legitimates only sovereign territorial states as actors of that society. Other actors are excluded."

This indicates that the actual process of 'incorporation' starts much earlier than previously held, since trade-induced political evolution is a necessary first step toward full incorporation. Therefore, it seems likely that the actual process of incorporation may begin with the initiation of *contact* between two distinct regions, assuming one is already part of the system. More importantly, Warner's cases indicate that the primary function behind the expansion of the system is *economic*. While realists would argue that the security of a region is an important motive (Snyder 1991), this presupposes an *initial* source of cross-cultural contact that needs to be 'secured,' or that at the very least a certain amount of knowledge needs to be exchanged in order to perceive a 'threat' to drive these larger security concerns.[11] Thus, the *initial* contact must be based on other (most likely economic) factors.

What is the nature of this economic contact? Do private companies acting in 'state-esque' capacities of legitimated authority drive it, or is it genuinely driven by geo-political power interests? Regardless, this economic function ultimately provides the incentive for domestic European political action to support possible military intervention, which is then used to implement a more favorable political regime in the region being incorporated. This still neglects those areas and polities that are *external* to these trade linkages. How do they become relevant?

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[10] Though for Bull's conception of 'international society', Japan was not considered 'evolved' or 'civilized' enough to join international society until around 1900.

[11] Similarly, Hall (1989) argues that a major reason for the colonization of New Mexico, and later recolonization after the Pueblo Revolt in 1680, was for pre-emptive purposes. This served to protect the silver mines of Mexico and the frontier of New Spain. While this could be interpreted as a *security* concern (especially for realists), I take the position that the security concern is driven by economic factors (*e.g.* silver mines). In any case, this points out the tremendous difficulty inherent in trying to delineate between political, economic, and social arenas, which is part of my argument for a world-systems approach in the first place.

Figure 3 – A Preliminary Flowchart: Arenas of Change Leading to Incorporation


Incorporation:
CONTACT
LUXURY TRADE
BULK TRADE
Arena:
Socio/Cultural Change
Economic Change
Political Change
Change Via:
Resource Supply, Disease, "awareness," Technology Diffusion
Craft Specialization/ Emphasis shift
Prestige/Power Structure Alteration

2. The Role of Bulk vs. Prestige Goods

In addition to implications of political and cultural differentiation, the issue of whether or not trade goods need to be "necessities" for an area to be considered part of the system is relevant for our understanding of incorporation. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993:854) note that Wallerstein "originally defined *necessities* in terms of food and raw materials that are necessary for everyday life. Subsequently he has also included bullion and 'protection.'" Lane (1979) reaffirms this need to include 'protection rents' as a sign of incorporation, as it is an important political tool responsible for considerable historic transfers of wealth. Structured trade between recognized polities is not enough to be considered part of the world-system as described by Wallerstein. The specific *kind* of interconnectedness becomes relevant to whether or not a particular arena is internal or external to the system. Otherwise, Wallerstein considers "non-essential" trade to be "preciosities," or exchange of prestige goods, which do not produce important *systemic* effects and therefore does not indicate inclusion in the world-system.[12]

It is apparent that some involvement and process had to occur prior to the 'emergence' of any trade in bulk, but this era prior to bulk-trade is largely ignored in the current political science literature. Elsewhere, more attention has been paid to the role luxury goods play (Schneider 1977; Feinman 1999; Peregrine 1992, 2000). Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993:855) argue "prestige-goods economies constitute systemic networks because the ability of local leaders to monopolize the supply of these goods is often an important source of stability and change in local power structures." It is not unreasonable to presume that these networks could then have important systemic effects. (see Figure 3)

While a crude conception, if this is at all accurate important social, political, and economic changes occur well *before* an area is considered "incorporated" into the world-system.

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[12] I use the terms 'bulk goods' and 'necessities' interchangeably. Similarly, 'luxury goods', 'preciosities,' and 'prestige goods' are similarly interchangeable.

While it is fairly obvious how contact between two societies can have immediate socio-cultural impact (*e.g.* introduction of disease, transfer of new technology, new supply of precious resources, mere 'awareness of other,' questions of identity), it may not be quite so clear as to how luxury trade then impacts the political, and ultimately economic, arenas. To help with this, I refer back to Perigrine (1999:40), although Perigrine's 'prestige system' is somewhat different from a prestige-goods *trading* system. For him, a "'prestige system' represents the myriad of ways in which prestige is accrued and maintained in the society. It includes knowledge, rituals, and symbols that convey and display status (1999: 39). I do expect, however, that the interaction among the indices is similar in a strictly trade-related system.

This introduces two additional points for consideration. First, can we treat 'knowledge' as a luxury good? Dealing with information networks and exchange of knowledge is one area of world-systems theory that needs to be expanded upon, so this will likely prove fruitful. Second, what roles do symbols and rituals associated with 'prestige' play in the arenas of change that result after the initiation of trade? Peregrine (2000) raises the question of whether or not the exchange of information or ritual can create systemic interdependence. These are prime points to consider when identifying cultural and social change, and they should become good measures of cultural and social incorporation.

3. Broadening the System: Gathering, Craft Specialization, and Organized Production

Another key orienting concept of the world-system has to do with how goods and wealth are accumulated. For Wallerstein, a key 'tipping-point' for whether or not a region is part of the world-system depends on the organization of economic activity (division of labor) in a region—or "zone"—at a given time. This is at the heart of his conceptions of "external arena", "incorporation" and "peripheralization." Wallerstein (1989:129–30, emphasis added) clarifies:

> The question we are dealing with now is the nature of the process by which a zone which was at one point in time in the external arena of the world-economy came to be, at a later point in time, in the periphery of that same world-economy. We think of this transition as a period of medium duration and we denominate it the period of "incorporation." Hence, the model we are using involves three successive moments for a "zone"—being in the *external arena*, being *incorporated*, and being *peripheralized*. None of these moments is static; all of them involve processes.

Regarding the difference between incorporation and peripheralization, Wallerstein continues:

> And here we must make a distinction between the moment (however long) of "incorporation" and the subsequent moment of "peripheralization." If an analogy may be permitted, incorporation involves "hooking" the zone in the orbit of the world-economy in such a way that it virtually can no longer escape, while peripheralization involves a continuing transformation of the ministructures of the area in ways that are sometimes referred to as the deepening of capitalist development (1989:130).

Indeed, since this "moment" of incorporation may run well over 100 years (*e.g.* West Africa, ca. 1750–1880; pg. 189), we may more easily view incorporation as a period of "broadening" capitalist development. Since the drive to broaden and deepen the system is inherent in the functioning of capitalism, an area carrying on *any* trade-based relationship with Europe may be considered effectively "hooked," as incorporation into the system is tacitly inevitable. Quite simply, incorporation may be viewed as the continued broadening of the world-system, while peripheralization is the deepening of the world-system.

Regarding modes of production, "incorporation" is taken to mean that "at least some significant production processes in a given geographic location become integral to various of the commodity chains that constitute the ongoing divisioning of labor of the capitalist world-economy" (Wallerstein 1989:130). The notion of 'commodity chains' is crucial for Wallerstein, and is meant "to describe the production of goods as they move from raw to cooked, slave-cultivated cotton becoming Manchester textiles, peasant-grown Columbian coffee becoming Detroit labor power, and so on" (Goldfrank 2000:168–9; see also Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). A process is "integral" if "its production responds in some sense to the ever-changing 'market-conditions' of this world-economy (whatever the source of these changes) in terms of efforts by those who control these production processes to maximize the accumulation of capital within this 'market'—if not in the very short run, at least in some reasonable middle run"(Wallerstein 1989:130, parenthetical reference in original).[13] So, capital accumulation coupled with market responsiveness are the hallmarks of when a process (commodity chain) is considered "integral to" the world-economy, and a particular arena thus officially incorporated.

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[13] Additionally, Hall (2000b) argues *contra* Wallerstein that 'regularized plunder' also has important incorporating effects, though Wallerstein maintains the need to be linked to integrated chains of production. Potentially, this should serve as a measuring point along the spectrum of processes of incorporation.

This raises an interesting differentiation of "gathering" vs. "producing." In relation to African incorporation, Wallerstein remarks: "This assumes, which may not be incorrect, that the infrastructural base of 'gathering' as opposed to 'producing' is much thinner and that, therefore the costs of expansion and contraction of the quantity of gathering activities is significantly less than that involved in productive activities" (1989:133).[14] It would seem, then, that "gathering" processes would be *more* responsive to market conditions than "productive" processes, if only because they have less associated infrastructure and entry cost. The question of just *when* organized gathering transposes into production becomes more relevant. As a partial answer, it is worthwhile to borrow the anthropological concept of a "specialized activity."

The idea of "specialized activity"[15] requires development. Kardulias (1990:25) observes that craft specialization is often treated as an indication of cultural complexity that develops in response to a variety of influences, including "economic emoluments offered by the European market." Specialized production can be defined as: "non-subsistence activity which is performed by a particular or restricted number of households within a community; the individuals in such households then exchange their products or services for foodstuffs and items produced by other specialists" (1990:32). However, when contact is between societies at different levels of development, the group operating at a more advanced level may be able to offer extra incentives or previously unavailable goods. So, new contact may serve to *induce* new specialization, or increased levels of existing specialization. The key to the concept of craft specialization is that "the specialist offers some product or service which is his/her particular domain, due to particular skills, knowledge, or aptitudes" (1990:32).[16]

Two traits are generally present in regions engaging in specialization. First, there should be restricted access to the resource area in order to regulate production, distribution and consumption of the particularized commodity. Second, a

need for efficiency must be present, which is often provided by the profit motive in a commercialized system (Kardulias 1990:31). In essence, there needs to be a motivation for the specialization, which is usually trade-related when dealing with issues of capitalist incorporation. Additionally, one can use the concept of craft specialization as a mid-point in the discussion of mode of production, situating this 'specialized activity' between the very basic accumulation strategy of 'gathering' and that of full-scale 'production.' In doing so, a greater ability to distinguish between types of economic activity is achieved, and one should be able to use this to trace relevant impacts along other arenas of incorporation.

4. Spatial Boundaries: From Core to 'Zone of Ignorance'

The process of incorporation plays a crucial role in the definition of external arena. Not only is this arena undergoing incorporation seen as 'not internal' and yet 'not quite external,' but as "a given zone is incorporated into the world-economy, this often led to an adjacent *further* zone being *pulled into* the external arena. It is though there were an outward ripple of expansion" (Wallerstein 1989:167, emphasis added). This delineation is relevant, because as Wallerstein observes, "As a zone became incorporated into the world-economy, its transfrontier trade became 'internal' to the world-economy and no longer something 'external' to it" (1989: 171). Although this occurs at the tail-end of the incorporation process (and consequently the beginning of peripheralization), it serves as yet an additional reason to clarify the overall process and the spatial concepts associated with it.

This indicates that there is some sort of "supra-external" arena that is undefined by the capitalist world economy and exists as what is essentially a "zone of ignorance." This raises interesting definitional considerations for what is really an external arena and what is not. One is literally talking about the known universe at any point in history, and that that is not known. Additionally, this indicates that instead of a three-tiered working definition of the world-system (core, semiperiphery, periphery), there are actually six tiers (core, semiperiphery, periphery, incorporating zone, external arena, zone of ignorance).

Wallerstein identifies an external arena in relation to the capitalist world-economy as a "zone from which the capitalist world-economy wanted goods but which was resistant (perhaps culturally) to importing manufactured goods in return and strong enough politically to maintain its preferences" (1989:167). China and Japan in the eighteenth century both serve as examples. Presumably, the relevant governing agents in any zone bordering the expanding capitalist world-economy have three potential paths: (1) they can be strong enough to maintain their preferences and *not* choose incorporation, (2) they can be strong enough to maintain their preferences yet *choose* incorporation, or (3) they can be too weak to maintain their own preferences. In the latter case, the zone is presumably assimilated and transformed if it has resources or goods that agents in the world-economy desire. Perhaps the best possible outcome (for the external zone) is that the zone is somehow ignored and left for future capitalist broadening and deepening. In any case, it appears logical that any zone adjacent to the world-system will eventually be absorbed, either in the short or middle run.

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[14] The spice trade in the South Pacific serves as a good example of the difference between gathering and producing. Originally, spices were gathered by locals and sold to the Dutch (and others). This was the *status quo* until the latter half of the 19th century when the Dutch took the extra step of establishing plantations for the production of spices (*e.g.* nutmeg).

[15] I use the terms "craft specialization", specialized activity" and "specialized production" interchangeably.

[16] This activity also roughly corresponds to the historical emergence of craft guilds in Medieval Europe, prior to the emergence of full capitalist activity in the long sixteenth-century. (See Smith, 1991).

The puzzle of boundaries and bounding mechanisms is precisely one area Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997; Hall 1999c:7, 2000b:239) have been addressing. They argue that there are four types of "bounding mechanisms" within any single world-system, which only rarely coincide. The broadest type is a boundary of information or cultural flows; it may be considered an information exchange network [IN]. This is what I have referred to as the 'known universe' of a system. The next type of boundary is that of luxury or prestige goods flows; it is referred to as the prestige goods network [PGN]. This is of comparable size, but not coincident with, the information network. The third bounding mechanism is the boundary of political/military interaction [PMN]. The fourth, and most narrow, consists of the flow of bulk goods, and makes up the bulk goods exchange network [BGN]. Obviously, this directly corresponds to Wallerstein's effective world-system. Typically, these four networks are "nested" within one another [See Figure 1.4]. While Wallerstein's world-system lies at the center, the answers to many of my questions are likely in the more "external" networks.

5. *Frontiers*

Wallerstein never explicitly deals with the concept of frontiers, other than to note that they are formed and transformed when new areas are absorbed into an expanding world-system. Otherwise, he only addresses the issue of transfrontier trade briefly in his explanation of incorporation (1989:128–189). How are frontiers formed and transformed? What do we mean when activity (*e.g.* trade, information exchange) is 'transfrontier'? The idea of a frontier is part and parcel of incorporation.

Hall (1986, 1999c, 2000b) offers more clarification on the issue of 'frontiers' as implicit in the process of incorporation and how they relate to other bounding mechanisms. From a working definition, Hall (2000b:241) offers that a frontier is "a region or zone where two or more distinct cultures, societies, ethnic groups, or modes of production come into contact." Like a membrane—an image Hall borrows from Slatta (1998)—a frontier's permeability varies with the direction and type of things (information, goods, people) moving through it. While Wallerstein posits that the incorporation process is always driven from the center outward, the image of a membrane allows one to recognize that influences on this process can (and often do) flow from the area being absorbed toward the center. The question becomes one of understanding how much influence these

Figure 4 – Spatial Boundaries of World-Systems



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'outside-in' flows can have on the process. How much is inevitable, and to what extent can one 'negotiate peripherality' (Kardulias 1999; Morris 1999) or even 'negotiate *externality*,' and thus effectively resist incorporation? What factors are relevant to this ability? Concern with these factors, and attention to the detail of how local groups come to terms with larger social systems, "is not simply a way to fill in the details which the grand theorists gloss over. Rather it is fundamental to any serious attempt to understand the expansion and contraction of world-systems" (Morris 1999:63).

Hall shares the position that close attention to local conditions, actors and actions is necessary in understanding incorporation. While the frontier is relatively 'narrow and sharp' from a global perspective, "from nearby it is a broad zone with considerable internal spatial and temporal differentiation" (Hall 2000b: 240). It is in this zone of historical interaction that conflict often arises from contact, and where "no one has an enduring monopoly on violence" (Baretta and Markoff, quoted in Hall 2000:241). This is the stuff that makes politics!

Frontiers are, in essence, the zone just beyond the "state." Frontiers are the region just past the contrived political markings of 'borders.' This is where the rules of the system are laid bare, and where anything goes.

B. Building a Model of Incorporation

To appropriately understand the expansion of the modern 'state' system one must examine the actual process of this expansion, and this is reflected in the incorporation of new regions, polities, and cultures. Regarding the nature of incorporation, Hall observes that, "[v]ast disruptions of social, economic and political processes accompany the expansion of states, whether the expansion is based on accumulation of capital or plunder" (1986:397–8). This supports the argument that significant change occurs *before* the point scholars traditionally assign as the start of incorporation. Indeed, Hall maintains that the very conception of incorporation is problematic: "(a) with respect to incorporating state or system; (b) with respect to types of incorporated groups; (c) with respect to both timing and degree of incorporation; and (d) with respect to a variety of factors that can affect the process" (1986:398; see also 1999c, 2000b). Obviously, refinement of the concept of 'incorporation' is needed!

What can be said about the process of incorporation and what can be offered to refine its conceptualization? To begin with, there are two separate, yet related, aspects involved with the incorporation and eventual peripheralization of an external region into the world-system. First, we need to recognize that overall we are talking about a series of ongoing *processes*, which may be divided into separate phases. Second, against this background of ongoing process, a zone will nominally pass through—or experience—different 'states of being' or conditions within that process. This will necessarily depend on the degree of involvement with the world system, as well as the impact of case-specific factors.

1. The Processes

Something, some process, is involved in the 'hooking' of an arena into the external (and ultimately internal) domain. Accordingly, I conceive of three subprocesses in the larger incorporation process.[17] First, a 'zone of ignorance,' or mythic domain, largely unexplored and unknown to the current members of the world-system is contacted; here the '*grooming*' process of conditioning the area toward capitalist exchange and production is initiated. This may be the process in which most social and behavioral change takes place. In particular I am interested in examining the way in which organized production develops, and the notion of 'craft specialization' will prove instrumental in exploring this. As a related topic, I am also interested in how the consumerism central to capitalism is introduced or developed. To explore this notion I borrow the notion of "induced wants" from Sklair (1991:131), who also observes that Marcuse (1964) talks about "false needs" in a similar context.

The next procedural phase is one of *incorporation*, whereby an external arena's contact and involvement with the world-system is developed, ultimately producing 'nominal incorporation,' building toward 'effective incorporation.' Here the processes that began during the grooming process become more developed and socially pervasive. Once the incorporation process is well advanced, the process of '*peripheralization*' may be seen as taking over. Within this, an effectively incorporated arena may be conceived as moving into the actual periphery of the world-system, and ultimately may proceed into the semiperiphery.[18] Beyond this, it seems like additional refinement may be needed to understand the processes behind transition from one 'level' to another *within* the world-system, but that is not my concern at this time, as this has been more fully explored by Wallerstein and others.

2. The States of Being

Against the background of procedural change that occurs over time, a geographic region may be contextually fixed in various 'states of being' depending on the specific historic time-period under examination. As such, it would be nice to be able to examine a 'snapshot' of a given region at a particular time in question. Since the "patterns that we see on a map are actually freeze-frame snapshots of complex processes of incorporation" (Hall 1999c:11), it makes sense to take this one step further and actually *use* historically contemporary maps to 'operationalize' the different phases of incorporation.[19] Furthermore, from a methodological standpoint there is a growing body of literature evaluating 'maps as text.'[20]

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[17] Of course, we can conceive of the world system in general as an ongoing process, with a multitude of nested processes. For example, see Modelski (2000).

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[18] It has been historically possible to become 'peripheralized' directly into the semiperiphery. The United States entered the system in the semiperiphery, as did Japan and (arguably) Russia.

[19] While I am not doing this in this particular work, future case study research will use this operationalization in context of the model developed here.

[20] For an introduction to this use and its accompanying rhetoric, see Wood and Fels (1992). Mitchell (1999) also provides a specific example of how this may be carried out. Mitchell says that "we must remember that the map is a picture, that every picture tells a story, and that every story makes part of the text" (1999: 41), and that "Like any story,

Evaluating maps made during incorporation is essentially a method of reading the text of the process, and should provide the ability to clarify the different 'states of being' within the overall process.

For example, some regions may exist beyond the bounds of what is considered the external arena. While these regions may have trade links, social links, or geographic proximity to regions considered external, they may not be 'known' to members of the world-system (*e.g.* pre-Columbian America, interior Africa). Thus, these regions exist in only a mythic sense beyond the boundary of the information network, or in what I have termed a *zone of ignorance* (outside the information network). This zone would not appear on the maps of the members of the world-system, and is characterized by the '*Cave, Hic Dragones*' approach to mapmaking.

The next state of being (toward increased involvement with the world-system) is the state of being in the *external arena*. Here a region is known to the members of the world-system, but is not in any significant way productively involved with it (being in the information network). Here, the system members know of a region and can place its name roughly on a map, but it will not reflect any geographic accuracy and is commingled with regions that only exist in myth.

Eventually some type of priming, luxury trade develops. Trade increases. This includes prestige goods, along with an increase of information exchange and cultural pollination. The region is still considered in the external arena (being in the prestige goods network). Maps will begin to reflect a region, but lack significant detail. Outlines of continents should be fairly accurate, but little knowledge of internal features will be evident.

As involvement increases and economic linkages develop with the world-system, a region may be seen as having moved into a state of being *nominally incorporated* (being in the political-military network). Maps will have some detail of major cities and geographic features, but still be incomplete, missing major features beyond the areas central to network interactions.

This develops into a state of being *effectively incorporated*, whereby a given region enters the periphery (being in the bulk goods network). Here, there should be complete detail on maps, as the region is now part of the system. Beyond this, a region may develop out of the peripheralization process into a state of being *semiperipheral*. And, as I have mentioned, addressing processes involved beyond incorporation is not my immediate concern.

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maps are propaganda, but maps have the full weight of science behind them, and this obscures our sight of the pervasive nature of maps" (40-41).

Figure 5 – Typography of Incorporation



* with Fuzzy Transitions in Temporal Condition

To clarify, I conceive of this dual-natured typography in Figure 5.

It should be recognized that this typography is merely a heuristic tool for visualizing what may be relevant characteristics of the larger processes associated with incorporation into the world-system. Keep in mind, these processes are in no way discrete. Instead, they segue into one another, which means that the transition between phases is likely "fuzzy." Along this same line of consideration, the transition between states of being is likely to be similarly indistinct, even though the kernel of each may be readily distinguished. It is to be expected that at different points in the processes, or in different states of being, particular emphasis on socio-cultural, political, or economic factors may be more relevant than for others. This should allow both a refinement of world-systems theory, as well as a better practical application of the theory to particular periods of systemic expansion.

Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997:63) use a similar organizational tool in an effort to break apart the processes of incorporation. This is an invaluable reference for deciphering the various verbiage different scholars have used for aspects of the incorporation process. By using Wallerstein's terms as a baseline reference, one can correlate the various terms discussed.

It is important to add a caveat to the use of this diagram. While I argue that regions pass through various states of being, one should not take this to mean that I endorse the conversion of these states into linear stages or some predestined, lockstep evolutionary process. I am talking about zones within a social system, and a given zone may rapidly transition from one state of being to another, without necessarily 'existing' in an intermediary state of being. Certainly these zones may embody distinct geographic areas, but they more relevantly capture the notion of social, economic, cultural, and political interactions that are happening in a given area (the system of interactions).

This is especially relevant if one is examining the incorporation of settings that may be categorized as pre-capitalist, and necessitates the following refinements:

> First, incorporation is not unidimensional, but multidimensional along the four types of world-system boundaries. Incorporation can be economic (for

Figure 6 – Continuum of Incorporation

Strength of Incorporation	None	Weak	Moderate	Strong

Impact of Core on Periphery	None	Strong	Stronger	Strongest
Impact of Periphery on Core	None	Low	Moderate	Strong
	Names for Types of Peripheries			
Hall and Chase-Dunn and Hall	External Arena	Contact	Marginal or Region of Refuge	Full-Blown/ Dependent
Wallerstein	None	External Arena	Incorporation	Peripheralization
Arrighi	None	Nominal or Formal		Effective or Real
Sherratt		Margin		Periphery or Structural Interdependence
Frank and Gills		Hinterland		Periphery

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> either bulk goods or luxury goods), political/military, or socio-cultural, which includes all types of information and symbols; second, incorporation creates multiple frontiers, corresponding to each of the boundaries; third, *ceteris paribus*, incorporation will begin at the furthest boundaries, (cultural, symbolic, informational, or luxury goods) and proceed to narrower, more intense forms along the political-military boundary, and finally along the bulk goods dimension; and fourth, relations among the dimensions of incorporation and the resulting frontiers is complex theoretically and empirically. (Hall 1999a:444).

In addition to these needed refinements, it is important to note that incorporation takes place at different rates and to differing extent for various members of the system. To clarify, a region may exist only in the information network of one system member, yet be involved in the trade of luxury (or perhaps even bulk) goods with another member of the same system. Taken with the recognition of the multiple frontiers involved, it is no understatement to argue that incorporation is a complex phenomenon.

3. *Discussion of Comparative Cases*[21]

As a basis for examining the related concepts of "external arena" and "incorporation," what Alexander George (1979) refers to as a structured, focused comparison seems most promising as a method of investigation, or as a way in which to study these issues empirically.[22] To examine the actual process of incorporation, one can individually trace relevant 'markers' over any time period in question. These markers may be degree of political autonomy, type and volume of trade carried on with the system and the core specifically, or alterations in traditional social or cultural behavior. Additionally, some type of "pre-contact" baseline for these factors should be laid out, so that any change may then be studied in relation to the change in type of interaction with the system. While it is recognized that these processes are inter-related and reciprocal, by addressing them as separate facets, one is able to develop a clearer understanding of the incorporation process as a dynamic whole.

With an eye toward theory building, a careful comparison of cases of incorporation is likely to be beneficial. In selecting my own sample cases, particular attention is given to trade networks along coastal areas, largely due to the patterns of European trade expansion. Additionally, I am concerned with regions that have had no 'polluting' contact with the European world-system in order to get a 'cleaner' picture of the incorporation process. Specifically, sample cases are:[23]

- The Nootka Indians of the northwest American coast and the fur trade.
- The Asante Kingdom of West Africa and the emergence of the slave trade.
- Abyssinia/Ethiopia and its independence from, yet relation with, the trans-Arab trade.

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[21] While I am not carrying out a comparative case study here, my current research centers upon doing exactly that (in context of this model). So, this discussion is also laying the foundation of 'what to expect'.

[22] See also George and Bennett (2002, *forthcoming*) for a description of how case studies contribute to theory development.

[23] These are only the case studies I plan on carrying out in the near future. A multitude of others are possible, including the pre-Columbian civilizations of meso-America, Hawaii and other Polynesian kingdoms, other instances of African incorporation, and even further study on how *systems* incorporate one another. Here, the absorption of the Ottoman Empire looks like an intriguing research venue.

- Japan and its ability to (temporarily) resist encroachment of Western trade.

Each case has been chosen in the hopes that it will provide some answers to other fundamental questions involved in the incorporation process. Each of the first three should provide some clues to the differentiation between mere gathering and formalized production, as well as variation between non-state and state-like political entities. The case of the fur trade raises questions surrounding the role of luxury goods in the incorporation process, and provides an example of a 'pristine' pre-European contact and pre-capitalist setting.

The second case, the slave trade on the western coast of Africa, gives the interesting situation where the 'good' being traded is labor. This poses an intriguing question for the consideration of an area as incorporated or not: Is an area linked into the production cycle if it is the source of labor that is used elsewhere, which *is* part of the formalized production network? More basically, one may argue that more than just labor is being extracted. In essence, wealth is being plundered in that all the human and real capital involved in producing adults (and their own future productive capacity) is removed. Additionally, since the local polities were (presumably) more 'developed' than on the northwest coast of America, one should get differentiation along the spectrum of incorporation and its effects. Finally, taken in conjunction with Warner's work, looking at the Asante Kingdom in particular should offer additional insight into political interaction on the frontier of the expanding world-system and 'state' development.

The third case will be an examination of the incorporation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). It is potentially interesting because as a region, it was eventually linked to the emergent world-system through a considerable amount of trade, but maintained its political independence well into the twentieth century. It also is a classic example of a region existing on the boundary of the zone of ignorance and the external arena for a considerable amount of time. This will provide a nice case of a region that effectively 'resisted' colonial political domination while still maintaining trade ties with the system. Additionally, Abyssinia should provide a case of how non-European polities may resist being undermined (as was the case in West Africa) yet be increasingly recognized by European states within the system.

Finally, the case of Japan may be seen as the odd choice. But, quite simply, Japan serves as an example of how a region may join the system after having negotiated externality. Also, since it had prior linkages to the Chinese world-system, it should be worthwhile to examine the ability of an area to 'reverse' the incorporation process, in addition to the aforementioned ability to 'resist' political sublimation. Finally, Japan is also often used as a singular non-European case in much extant international politics literature (*e.g.* Bull 1984; Snyder 1991; Johnson 1993; Kupchan 1994), and will provide a touchstone for engaging these competing explanations.

4 .Measures of Incorporation

When specifically analyzing the socio-cultural arena of incorporation, the development of structural change in the societies in question (due to their exposure to the "internal" area) should be evident. This may take the form of alteration of traditional lifestyles, coercion of labor, or other fundamental social change. Initially, this may include alteration of traditional patterns of movement, changes in gender roles, alteration of spiritual bases, or identity shifts. As one moves up the spectrum of incorporation, changes in classes and mode of production are likely indicators. If early change is present, then it seems likely that an argument for the initiation of incorporation may be strengthened. When looking at the political-military arena, whether or not political structural change has occurred (*e.g.* "state-building," changes in laws, regime change, alteration of local power structures), or if some sort of formalized political relationship with the "internal" area has been instituted, may be relevant. If either of these changes are present, then again the argument for that society's incorporation, and against its consideration as an external arena, would be strengthened. Finally, with regards to the economic facet of incorporation, the type and quantity of goods being exchanged, as well as how they are 'produced,' serve as measures of the process.

However, this still leaves the question of how to measure the various *states of being* at any given point during the overall incorporation process. To establish the timing of a respective case's movement through the incorporation process (refer to Figure 1.5), historical maps serve as an important data source for establishing this timing. As mentioned, maps may be thought of as 'freeze-frame snapshots' of incorporation. When a region is in the zone of ignorance, it will not appear on the maps of system members. When a region is in the external arena (yet in the information network), the region's name should appear on maps, but it will not be reflected with any geographic accuracy. As luxury trade develops and a region moves into the prestige goods network, accurate outlines of regions and continents should appear on maps, but little additional information will be apparent. As a region moves into the political-military network, maps will have major details correct, but will still lack complete information. As a region enters the periphery as part of the bulk goods network, more complete information should appear on system-members' maps, as the region is effectively part of the system.

This avenue of investigation is appealing for several reasons. First, it offers the potential for a concrete examination of what would otherwise be theoretic posturing. One is able to 'see' historical processes in action, as opposed to just being able to hypothesize about them. Second, as information (and maps in particular)[24] was jealously guarded during the time periods under investigation, using maps as an empirical measure will allow a way to track the transmission of information among system members. Third, this will in turn make it easier to distinguish just when various states knew what about a region on the frontier. Thus, one is able to distinguish the variable rates of incorporation among relevant actors in a region. Finally, this should be taken as a method to understand not just the important role information plays in the expansion of the system, but the incredible impact that *lack* of information has. Indeed, geographic ignorance or *dis*-information often was actively promoted as a tool of imperial expansion.

VI. CONCLUSION

Why the vast divergence between so called traditional "realist" theories of the international system and world-system theories of expansion? One possible answer lies in the very subject that is the central unit of analysis in the study of the world-system: the social system itself. Because the object of study is a "social" system, it is mandatory that such a system be recognized as historically constructed. By this, it is necessary to acknowledge that history—both as a record of events and as a prescription for future behavior—is primarily written by the "winners" of history's conflicts. This conflict includes and is manifested in all aspects of social, political, and economic expansion and development. As such, it necessarily reflects the views, ideals, desires, and 'needs' of the winners. This particularized historical outlook serves not only as a source of legitimation for, but a reification of, the status quo.

By examining the broader aspects of the emergence and development of the modern world-system in this context, a richer understanding of history is provided. World-systems theory is even more relevant to the study of modern politics because it provides a 'political program' for the 'losers' of history; it provides a version of history that 'losers' might appropriate. By looking beyond the emphasis on the 'state' and 'power' relations, and by paying attention to the socially-driven economic motivations of actors below the state level, one is able to call into question not only the assumptions driving state-level activity, but the very theories derived from these assumptions. Thus, it is increasingly evident that the field of international relations is not just in crisis because of the end of the Cold War, but is facing a paradigmatic crisis as well. By undertaking a comparative case study such as this, questions regarding the 'best' way to go about studying international politics are raised. The traditional approaches to the study of international politics offer decreasingly satisfactory explanations, and it is time for a shift to a more beneficial research program. A globalist paradigm should be adopted, and the world-systems perspective provides an appealing and established research program through which this may be accomplished.

This model of incorporation should benefit the body of world-systems analysis in several ways. First, it offers a better understanding of the tremendous changes that occur *before* a region is traditionally considered part of the system. Thus, one can bridge the gap between much of the work done on non-state peoples and work centered upon states. Second, this model provides a clearer picture of the impact that external actors can have on the system and actors within the system. Related to this, one may recognize that external actors often have an ability to negotiate some terms of incorporation, and in some instances are able to negotiate externality. Fourth, this approach can also provide insight into the dynamics that drive the expansion of the system as a whole; it can parse out the more fundamental causes pushing the broadening of the capitalist system, which has application to current debates on globalization. To do this in a historic context, it is necessary to include additional concepts relating to "production" (*e.g.* craft specialization) and more clearly conceptualize the process of incorporation. Fifth, this model of incorporation tells a more complete story of how the system expands, which can then be compared to other explanations in various competing bodies of literature (*e.g.* realism, neorealism). Finally, the world-systems perspective is better positioned as a progressive research program (in the Lakatosian sense), and offers a more interdisciplinary approach to the study of global politics than is currently available. Many scholars give voice to the need to utilize such an interdisciplinary approach to studying international relations yet ignore viable options. Hopefully, this framework takes a step toward remedying this shortcoming in the international relations literature.

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[24] While there was an active trade in charts and maps in Europe, this trade dealt mainly with decorative wall-maps or charts for public consumption (See Koeman, 1980). Portugal and Spain (and later Britain) established chart-making offices that developed charts specifically for their own navy's exclusive use. Mitchell (1999: 25) summarizes in context of the exploration of the New World: "Spain and Portugal led European nations in hoarding their maps of the New World, convinced that knowledge was power, and consequently that power rested, at least in part, in maps."

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