The Promise and Perils of Radical Left Populism: The Case of Venezuela

Mainstream critics argue that populism inevitably leads to economic disaster and political authoritarianism. Venezuela is often pointed to as proof of this. Yet, while the profound crisis gripping Venezuela is undeniable, comprehensive analysis of Chavismo shows that populism, and specifically the radical left populism found in Venezuela, is more ambiguous. From 2005-2013 radical left populism in Venezuela reduced poverty and inequality, deepened democracy, and built popular support for a “transition to socialism.” These gains were erased in the post-2014 crisis, which revealed two flaws of the Chavista model hidden by its earlier success: its unsustainable material foundation and inability to overcome the statist trap. For radical left populism to achieve its potential, and avoid peril, these two problems must be effectively addressed.  

jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.868 commentators to view Venezuela very differently, as proof that populism (despite its contradictions) could further the struggle to create a different and better-more equal, democratic, and socially just-world.
To many, Venezuela's current crisis proves the veracity of the mainstream critique of populism. Venezuela's present socioeconomic situation is disastrous. Since 2013 Venezuela's economy has contracted an astonishing 50%. Oil production, the lynchpin of Venezuela's economy, has collapsed to half its 1999 level (Monaldi 2018:2). There are severe shortages of food, medicine, and basic goods. And hyperinflation has rendered Venezuela's currency all but worthless. Venezuela's political situation is also unenviable: since its landslide defeat in 2015 parliamentary elections, the government has ruled in an increasingly repressive and authoritarian manner. Must scholars, including those who previously viewed Venezuela in a positive light, accept the mainstream critique of populism as accurate, at least in this case?
Venezuela's crisis makes it impossible to see Chavismo as unambiguous proof that "another world is possible" and that the radical left populism found in Chávez-era Venezuela provides a clear path to this world. Yet, comprehensive analysis of the two-decade Chavista era does not fully substantiate the mainstream critique of populism. It shows, instead, the need for a nuanced view of Chavismo, one attentive to the promise and perils-that is, the fundamentally contradictory character-of radical left populism. Venezuela's performance from (roughly) 2005-2013 shows radical left populism's promise. During this period, the Chávez administration established leftpopulist hegemony, comprising high and (initially) rising popular consent for a program of stateled redistribution that dramatically reduced poverty and inequality, fostered significant, albeit uneven popular-class empowerment, and generated substantial popular support for and identification with socialism. Since 2014 this hegemony has crumbled, and Venezuela's subsequent descent into full-borne crisis underscores the perils of radical left populism.
Beyond highlighting radical left populism's contradictory nature, this article also seeks to explain why it was so much more successful in Venezuela from 2005-2013 than 2014-present. the price of oil was much lower and U.S. regional influence high(er) and rising. These differences point to two critical flaws in the Chavista model, which were hidden (by high oil prices, and, secondarily, low U.S. regional influence) during the 2005-2013 period, but abundantly clear post-2014: Chavismo's unsustainable material foundation and its inability to overcome the "statist trap." For scholars of populism, the Venezuelan case offers two broader lessons. First, radical left populism can further the goal of creating "another world," but under conditions that appear rare jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.868 and/or unsustainable within Latin America, often considered populism's "home": historically high commodity prices and low U.S. influence. Second, to sustainably advance transformative goals (reducing inequality, deepening democracy, and, more ambitiously, moving towards socialism), radical left populism must construct a better material foundation and overcome the statist trap.
Doing so would, however, transform radical left populism into a different political form.
The essay begins by defining key terms and reviewing mainstream and left views of (radical left) populism. I then seek to substantiate the argument that radical left populism is a fundamentally contradictory political form by comparing, and seeking to explain, Chavismo's record in the 2005-2013 and post-2014 periods. I conclude by elaborating upon the broader lessons of this case for studying (radical left) populism.

(Radical Left) Populism: Road to Disaster or Empowerment?
Populism is defined herein as state-and/or party-led mobilization of popular and middle sectors in which discourse pitting an ill-defined "people" against "the elite" is central. Drawing on Jansen (2011), this definition differs and incorporates elements from discursive, structural, and "political" definitions positing populism, respectively, as a Manichean discourse counterpoising "the people" versus "the elite" (Laclau 1977;Hawkins 2010); a socioeconomic "stage" related to the expansionary economic policies and multi-class coalitions characteristic of early importsubstitution-industrialization (O'Donnell 1973;Cardoso and Faletto 1979;Vilas 1992); and, a type of political-electoral mobilization in which a charismatic leader discursively appeals to an illdefined "people" versus "the establishment" (Roberts 1995;Weyland 1996). Radical (left) populism is characterized by two additional elements not found in populism generally: extensive mobilization of urban and rural popular sectors and a "more comprehensive assault on pre-existing property relations" (Collier and Collier 1991:788).

The Mainstream Critique of Populism
Mainstream journalists, centrist politicians, and many scholars frequently portray populism as economically disastrous and inherently authoritarian. Both tenets of this "populism as disastrous" thesis appear regularly in leading news and op-ed articles. For example, in a New York Times op- the West" (HRW 2017:2). The essay links populists' failed economic policies and authoritarianism: "[T]here is a long history of [populist] autocrats delivering results for themselves but not their people." Venezuela is seen as a major case of populist "government-imposed suffering …The Bolivarian revolution…has become an economic disaster for the worst-off segments of society whom it ostensibly serves" (HRW 2017:9).
Scholars of Latin America commonly advance the populism-as-disaster thesis, too. Castañeda (2006: 33,42) views populists as "always authoritarian in one way or another," arguing, "[t]he populist left has traditionally been disastrous for Latin America…As in the past, its rule will lead to inflation, greater poverty and inequality, and confrontation with Washington. It also threatens to roll back the region's most important achievement of recent years: the establishment of democratic rule and respect for human rights." Weyland similarly asserts, "Populism will always stand in tension with democracy." Left populists, like Chávez, "weaken constitutional checks and balances and…subordinate independent agencies to their will" (2013: 33). Weyland also criticizes left populist economic policies, such as increased social spending during commodity booms, as unsustainable (2009). These tenets of the populism-as-disaster thesis appear in earlier, as well as other, recent, critiques of populism (Lipset 1960;Germani 1978;Dornbusch and Edwards 1991;Brewer-Carías 2010;Edwards 2010).

Contemporary Left Defenses of Populism
Left-of-center scholars have advanced a contrasting populism-as-empowering thesis, positing "progressive populism" as an effective way to combat inequality and facilitate empowerment.
Proponents of the populism-as-empowering thesis point to Bernie Sanders as a prototypical progressive populist (Smucker 2016). Fraser (2013Fraser ( , 2017 views Sanders' "progressive populism" as key to a counterhegemonic project combining "social protection" (regulating the market) and "emancipation" (wherein historically excluded groups overcome domination and exclusion).
Scholars have put forward populism-as-empowering-type analyses for Chávez, and earlier instances of radical populism, e.g. Venezuela's 1945-1948 "Trienio" (Ellner 2008;Fernandes 2010). Vilas (1992: 98) sees Latin American populism as a "fundamental democratizing force." This section assesses Chavismo's performance during two periods. Chavismo's record from 2005-2013 approximates the populism-as-empowering thesis, while its post-2014 record approximates the populism-as-disaster thesis. Neither perspective fits the full Chavista era, however. Chavismo's ambiguous record is better captured by a third strand of scholarship, to which this article seeks to contribute, which views populism as a contradictory political form that can deliver significant material-cum-political benefits to popular sectors, but rests on unsustainable material and contradictory political foundations (Collier and Collier 1991;Oxhorn 1998;Canovan 1999; de la Torre 2010).

The Contradictions of Radical Left Populism in Venezuela
My analysis draws on twelve months of fieldwork conducted on multiple trips between 2007 and 2016. I conducted participant observation of participatory urban governance in two cities, and over one hundred interviews with municipal, regional, and national officials, party and civic leaders, and academics on participatory governance, state-society relations, and issues related to Chávez's and the ruling MVR-PSUV's political record during these years is impressive (if far from perfect). Electoral data clearly show Venezuelans' high approval of Chávez, who triumphed in all five electoral contests he stood for between 1998 and 2012. Chávez received an absolute majority in each, winning by a low of 11% (2012) and a high of 26% (2006). Turnout increased substantially under Chávez, reversing decades of persistent decline (see Figure 1). The ruling MVR-PSUV won all but two of ten-plus national elections during these years. Chávez immediately conceded after losing the 2007 constitutional referendum and 2010 legislative elections. In both cases, however, Chávez took subsequent actions that clearly subverted voters' will. In 2009 Chávez held, and won, a referendum eliminating term limits for all politicians; a similar issue, ending presidential term limits, was part of the defeated 2007 referendum. In December 2010, the outgoing, PSUV-supermajority legislature granted Chávez 18 months of decree powers, weeks before the newly-elected, more opposition-heavy legislature took office.
Evidence does not, however, support claims that Chávez was a dictator. His victories were not due to fraud. Chávez implemented impressive electoral reform; Jimmy Carter called Venezuela's electoral system "the best in the world.   Sucre citizens often referenced socialism. National, regional, and local state officials, and PSUV leaders, also spoke of socialism, as official state policy, frequently during this period.
Venezuela's economy did not, however, become socialist. Far from disappearing, privatesector control of economic activity increased from 65% to 71% between 1999 and 2011 (Villalona 2013). The Chávez administration did, however, implement many socialistic measures. Key sectors of the economy-healthcare, social services, education, basic goods, food, housing, and 5 For more on these two cases see Hetland (2014). Venezuela's foreign debt was an estimated $123 billion, triple its 1998 debt level of $37 billion (Buxton 2016). From 2013-2017 Venezuela's foreign reserves declined two-thirds, to under $10 billion (Monaldi 2018:2). 8 There is a profound social crisis, with chronic, severe shortages of food, medicine, and basic goods. In 2016 Venezuela's scarcity index was an estimated 80% (Buxton 2016 In June 2016 I interviewed several dozen Venezuelans from the popular and middle classes, who said they were eating less and/or unable to obtain high-quality food. Many reported losing weight. Jesus, a pro-government teacher from rural Lara who had lost 7 kilograms, said, "There These two factors do not, in themselves, explain Chavismo's distinct performance in the two periods, but rather point to two flaws of the Chavista radical left populist model, hidden in the first, but not the second period. The first is Chavismo's unsustainable material foundation. Venezuela's hyper-dependence on oil is longstanding but worsened under Chávez. Between 1998 and 2016, the percentage of state earnings derived from oil grew from 69% to 96%. 11 Oil comprises almost half the state's budget. 12 The post-2014 drop in the price of oil has revealed two problems directly stemming from this dependence: Venezuela's extreme vulnerability to fluctuating commodity prices, and massive corruption. The Chavista model's second critical flaw is falling into the statist trap. This problem is not unique to Venezuela, but common to other countries like Cuba and the USSR, which embarked on transitions to socialism but moved more towards statism than socialism. Here state and party 10 2014 is excluded since oil's price dropped markedly from June-December. Data  leaders, not workers and ordinary citizens, exercise control over key economic and political decisions. Chavismo's statist character is visible in the Maduro administration's inability and/or unwillingness to correct Venezuela's disastrous currency policy, the single leading cause of Venezuela's crisis. This policy dates to 2003, when Chávez implemented currency controls to prevent capital flight. This worked, but the policy was extended well beyond its usefulness (which economists say ended around 2006). A side effect of having a fixed currency is the creation of a higher black-market currency rate. From 2003 to roughly 2011, the black market rate in Venezuela was two to three times above the official rate. From 2013 on this gap has exploded with the difference between the two rates rising above 100 times in 2016 and increasing exponentially to 3,500 times in 2018. 13 Venezuela's yawning official-black market exchange rate gap has spawned four problems.
First, enormous sums (likely US$ hundreds of billions) have been stolen by state officials and businesses, who turn around and sell these dollars on the black market at enormous profit. Second, the gap exacerbates shortages. Third, it leads to sharply declining domestic production since legitimate businesses lack dollars needed to import necessary production inputs. Fourth, Venezuela is locked in an inflation-devaluation spiral, with the real value of the currency plunging while prices rise higher and higher. Economists sympathetic to Venezuela's government have repeatedly told the Maduro administration of the need to fix its currency policy, by implementing a free float against the U.S. dollar. Maduro's refusal to do this is almost surely due to opposition from state (especially military) officials, in cahoots with private businesses, benefitting from the policy.
The problems noted, and underlying cause of the problems-the statist trap-began under Chávez but were hidden by the high price of oil and diminished U.S. regional influence. Highpriced oil meant Chávez could generously fund social programs and turn a blind eye to mounting evidence of rampant corruption. Once the price of oil fell, the Venezuelan government could no long afford such (illicit) luxuries. Venezuela also benefited, in the Chávez years, from the support of left-leaning regional allies.

Conclusion
Chavismo's success during its golden age shows that radical left populism can reduce poverty and inequality, deepen democracy, facilitate (limited) movement towards "twenty-first century socialism," and become a hegemonic force. This challenges the mainstream critique of populism, according to which it inevitably leads to economic disaster and political authoritarianism.
Venezuela's post-2014 collapse shows, however, that radical left populism's success there rested on two unsustainable pillars: high oil prices and low U.S. regional influence. The decline in oil's price and the rise in U.S. influence since 2014 have revealed two major flaws of radical left populism in Venezuela: its unsustainable material foundation, and its inability to avoid falling into the statist trap. These two features are the main underlying reasons for the emergence, and severity, of the profound crisis that has gripped Venezuela since 2014.
The Venezuelan case shows that radical left populism can facilitate movement in the direction of creating a more equitable, deeply democratic, and socially just society, on a short-term basis.
To facilitate such outcomes in a long-term way, radical left populist regimes must figure out a way to build a more sustainable material base and avoid the statist trap. Venezuela provides clues as to what is needed to do both. Constructing a more sustainable material base requires economic diversification. Venezuela clearly failed to do this, but arguably had an opportunity in the midst of Grassroots activists in Venezuela have sought to do so recently, with some success. Doing so on a massive scale, however, requires displacing the corrupt state bureaucracy, and associated privatesector actors who benefit from statism. For radical left populism to fulfill its promise, and avoid peril, requires implementing reforms that would transform this model into a different politicaleconomic form, which more closely approximates ideals of democratic socialism. Doing so is, however, easier said than done.