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DEFINING AND THEORIZING TERRORISM:
A GLOBAL ACTOR-CENTERED APPROACH

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ABSTRACT

*Arriving at a consensual definition of the phenomenon of terrorism has been a particularly difficult undertaking. Some definitions are either too specific or too vague, concentrating on some essential "terrorist" aspect of the actions, strategies, or types of non-state organizations that engage in terrorism. In this paper I draw on global approaches from international relations and world systems theories to propose a definition of terrorism that skirts these issues by concentrating on terrorist **actors** rather than terrorist **behavior**. I argue that this approach has several advantages, including the dissolution of several empirical and analytical problems produced by more essentialist definitions, and the location of terrorism within a two dimensional continuum of collective-violence phenomena in the international system which discloses important theoretical insights. I proceed to examine the characteristics of terrorism by comparing it with other forms of violence in the international system. I propose that terrorism may be part of the cycles and trends of unrest in the world system, responding to the same broad families of global dynamics as other forms of system-level conflict.*

INTRODUCTION

It is no secret that arriving at a consensual definition of terrorism is a difficult task. Some might say that constructing a characterization of terrorism that would be satisfactory for everyone is a downright impossible undertaking. It is much easier to point out the flaws in extant conceptions and usages of the term than to come up with a definition that would be free of those same faults, while being comprehensive enough to be both acceptable to most lay observers and useful for the conduct of academic research on the subject. Taking a birds-eye view of the field, it is clear what is wrong with current characterizations of terrorism: they are either too specific or too vague, they concentrate on particular (and theoretically arbitrary) aspects of the phenomenon while de-emphasizing others, or are too normatively oriented, mixing up descriptive and prescriptive terminology.

Using inconsistent definitions of the term is not helpful for a variety of reasons (see Gibbs 1989:329; Goodwin 2006:2027-2028). First, semantic vagueness has served to make it

difficult for researchers to consistently study the phenomenon, as people use the same term to refer to a wide variety of events, ranging from state oppression and killing of civilians, to shootings in public places by lone gunmen. Second, normative definitions of the term attempt to arrive at a characterization of terrorism in the abstract without either trying to a) look at terrorist phenomena as examples of a more inclusive category of events or *in relation* to other forms of political violence or b) define terrorism using a strategy in which it is contrasted with other phenomena that already have relatively consensually established definitions. In this respect, "the use of legal or a moral model may obscure important variables that influence the development of terrorist groups and terrorist actions" (Ruby 2002:13). Thus, normative definitions do not help in the task of situating the phenomenon of terrorism as a possible structural variant of collective action phenomena that are better understood.

In this paper, I argue that much can be gained from following this latter route. In what follows, I will attempt to clarify and expand the definition of the phenomenon of terrorism by situating it within the larger theoretical framework of the study of collective violence from an international relations and world systemic point of view (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1998). The advantage of this approach is that terrorism can be seen to occupy an important place in the collection of "species" of collective violence phenomena that can be observed in the international arena—and for which global correlates have been theorized and measured (Goldstein 1988)—ranging from all-out interstate major power wars, to civil wars and riots (the more established topics of studies of collective violence in political science and sociology).

I do this by taking an *actor-centered* approach to the definition and theorization of terrorism. From this perspective, the most important consideration in typologizing terrorism is: what type of actor—given the current institutional understandings and procedures that define what actors are in the interstate system (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994)—initiates the action and what type of actor is the target? This approach allows us to define a two-dimensional space of possible forms of collective violence, in which different variants of terrorism occupy an important, yet under-researched region. I propose that this definition of terrorism is advantageous because it is neutral as to issues of motivation, grievances, and the historically specific standards of moral valuation of terrorist violence.

This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I introduce the actor-centered approach by way of arguing against essentialist definitions of terrorism. In section three, I introduce my own definition of terrorism using the case of the relationship between terrorism and the nation-state as a backdrop. Section four introduces a new typology of actors and violent interaction in the interstate system, which includes terrorism in the same framework as civil wars, ethnic conflict and global warfare. Finally, section 5 discusses the theoretical implications of analyzing terrorism from the perspective of the dominant contemporary approaches to the analysis of systemic conflict in international relations and world-systems theories.

ACTORS, LEGITIMACY AND TERRORISM: IS 'TERROR' THE DEFINING FEATURE OF TERRORISM?

Most definitions of terrorism attempt to characterize the phenomenon by focusing on the apparent *goal* of terrorist organizations, which most analysts presume (but seldom empirically establish in

an objective manner) is to inflict, or spread a sense of "terror" or general psychological distress in their victims for politico-ideological purposes. Terrorism from this point of view is simply the most adequate "means" to the actualization of those goals. From this perspective, it is taken for granted that the intended aim of terrorists is to terrorize, and thus most people attempt to define what terrorism is by defining what terrorizing is, which usually involves some mention of 'intimidation," "influence" and "coercion" (Schmid and Jongman 1988).

However, because what counts as acceptable practices of violence and therefore what terrorizes a particular population may exhibit wide historical and/or cultural variation (Foucault 1977), these attempts to define terrorism ultimately serve as grist to the pessimist nominalism which throws up its hands and declares any attempt at a definition of terrorism impossible. I argue that if we are to come up with an operationally and theoretically justifiable definition of terrorism, the focus should not be on what "terror" could be. After all, as most normativists point out, this is the value-laden term that was selected and popularized by modern (non-state) terrorism's first victims—Western European states in the second half of the 19th century—and as such focusing on the terror component as an essential feature of what some coherent set of "terrorist" actors strive for may be theoretically misleading (Tilly 2004:5). However, in order to argue that the goal of "terrorizing" should not be used as the primary criterion with which to characterize the phenomenon of terrorism, I will propose a sociological explanation as to why so many terrorist organizations appear to engage in actions apparently contrived for no purpose other than to "terrorize" a particular audience. But first let us examine some extant definitions of the phenomenon.

Definitions

A lot of the theoretical work on terrorism revolves around definitions (see the discussions in Cooper 2001; Gibbs 1989; Hoffman 1998: 13-15; Jenkins 2001; Ruby 2002; Schmid and Jongman 1988: 32-38; for a collection of definitions, see Goodwin 2006, table 1). For example, for Enders and Sandler "Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of *extranormal* violence or *brutality* by subnational groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through *intimidation* of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence" (2002:145-146, italics added). The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as "politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (quoted in Ruby 2002:10). This is similar to Chomsky's (2001:19, italics added) definition: "Terrorism is the use of *coercive* means aimed at populations in an effort to achieve political, religious, or other aims". Tilly (2004:5, italics added) tell us that terrorism is "asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall *outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating* within some current regime." Stern (1999:30, italics added) defines terrorism as "an act or threat of violence against non-combatants, with the objective of *intimidating* or otherwise *influencing* an audience or audiences." Peter Chalk offers a definition similar to the ones above when he conceptualizes terrorism as "the systematic use of *illegitimate* violence that is employed by sub-state actors as means of achieving specific political objectives, these goals differing according to the group concerned" (Chalk 1999:151, italics added).

Notice that most of these definitions—with the exception of Chomsky and the State Department—point to some ineffable "extranormal", brutal and extraordinary aspect of terrorist

violence, which is designed to mostly to "intimidate" civilian audiences. Surely the term "extranormal" cannot in this context be used to imply that terrorists are *more* violent than state armies. As has been amply demonstrated in various historical studies (e.g. Oliverio 1998), not only have state-affiliated agents been responsible for the bulk of civilian deaths not caused by famine, disease or natural disasters throughout history, but modern terrorism itself began as a military tactic designed to subdue the enemy during warfare. It was used to great effect during the Northern incursion into the South in the American Civil War as noted by Carr (2001), even if the name comes from the French state persecution of civilians after the revolution of 1789. It is in this sense that terrorism "is one of the oldest techniques of psychological warfare" (Wilkinson 1977:49).

Thus, terrorist activities cannot be characterized and differentiated—and therefore terrorism as a form of political violence cannot be defined—by pointing to their specific viciousness and/or brutality, since these have been exceeded during the course of more legitimate forms of warfare, as in the allied bombings of Dresden (Graham 2004). In this respect it is important to separate *terror* as a psychological state of affairs (or as a goal of a particular violence producing organization) from *terrorism* as a specific form of politico-military interaction between two actors (O'Sullivan 1986).

Extranormal, therefore can only here be taken to mean *illegitimate* (Gibbs 1989:330)*, illegal* or as Tilly puts it, "outside of the *routine* forms of political [and I would add military] struggle" (2004: 5). In O'Sullivan's (1986:5) words, terrorists resort to "methods which…subvert or ignore the requirements of domestic and international law." This is consistent with an understanding of institutions as *rules* that assign cognitively constituted actors to certain types of actions and preclude certain actors from engaging in certain types of actions (March and Olsen 1989). However, socially agreed upon definitions of legality evolve and vary through time and space (Durkheim 1997[1933]), which would make a definition which focused on the legality of the type of violence subject to the charge of nominalism and historical relativism. In this respect, even though "brutality" or its status as "extranormal" is not a useful criterion with which to arrive at a useful definition of terrorism, Jenkin's (2001) and Tilly's (2004) suggestion that what is characteristic of terrorism is its very illegitimacy and non-routineness appears as a more promising—and less essentialist—pathway.

Constraints on Terrorist Organizations: Legitimacy and the State Monopoly of Violence

In order to begin tackling the question of the theoretical justification of excluding the explicit goal of "terrorizing" a given audience as a defining feature of terrorism, it is important to make an important distinction between two forms of collective conflict. I refer to the difference between *ritualized*, *legitimated* and *symmetric* forms of organized collective violence such as interstate war, and *illegitimate*, *asymmetric* interactions such as those that are usually classified as terrorist attacks. In the former, both parties recognize implicit rules of engagement (Hoffman 1998:34-36) and hold each other accountable for following them; in the latter, one partner (usually the state-actor that is the target), does not recognize the other as a legitimate partner in violence and as a rule refuses to define their interaction as a properly recognized episode of warfare.

It is surprising how little the question of (cognitive) legitimacy—as opposed to say, illegality—enters into the discussion (and definitions) of terrorism. In this respect, it is possible to argue that the apparent inability to "comprehend" terrorist actions—both on part of lay and

academic audiences—is directly tied to the fact that both terrorist organizations as actors and the output of those organizations as actions and events are not considered legitimate forms of intercourse in the international arena. Institutionalization is important, because it pertains both to how entities and their actions are perceived and responded to by other entities in their immediate environment, and how the behavior of actors is constrained in their interactions with other entities (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994). This is because institutions provide observers with cognitive limits as to what makes sense and what falls outside of the "possible" and the expected (March and Olsen 1989; Scott 2001).

Thus, it is possible to argue that illegitimate entities and actions—especially when those entities violate our most well established expectations—will always have trouble finding a coherent place in most established frameworks for understanding the world, including social-scientific ones. While we may be surprised upon hearing news of a civil war or a war between two nation states these events hardly ever cause the shock and horror that comes from terrorist attacks. This is true even if the first set of events causes more harm and destruction than the second (for instance the human toll of the war of Iraq has far exceeded that of the 9-11 attacks, yet it is the latter which still produces fright and confusion).

In this respect, the recourse of some terrorist organizations to what are perceived as "shocking" acts of violence, and the very perception of the acts as disturbing the normal course of events, as opposed to say the way war casualties are perceived, can be explained as a result of this very illegitimacy (Poggi 1990). The reason for this is that warfare as a form of violent interaction in the international system is ritualized and cognitively legitimated (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1998; Giddens 1987). This legitimation of warfare is no doubt connected with the legitimacy of the state as the primary actor (and source of agency) in the international system (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997). This is also the reason why state actors respond more swiftly with repression when they perceive an act of insurgency to be "culturally deviant" net of frequency (Davenport 1995). In the case of war, the state actors involved can draw on a virtual armamentarium of centuries-old rules and conventions (Martin 2005). On this shared normative structure, they can regulate their moves and countermoves and justify their actions—using consensually defined "vocabularies of motive" (Mills 1940)—in the eyes of the larger international community. From a world-systems perspective, war, far from being chaotic, is an integral part of the international state system's processes of order maintenance, normative structuration and economic and political selection (Bergesen 1985; Modelski and Thompson 1996).[1]

Terrorists, however, are the international state system's outlaws, incapable of justifying their actions within this nation-centric "Westphalian" system of rules and conventions, and unable to lean on tradition and custom in their attempt to engage in political violence. It is possible therefore, that the apparent "chaotic" nature of terrorist violence may simply be endogenous to the illegitimate status of the activity in the international system, and not inherent to the specific behaviors and strategies that terrorist organizations usually engage in and deploy. It

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[1] This observation is meant to apply to inter-state war.   The phenomenon usually referred to as major power or "general" war (Goldstein 1988; Kennedy 1987), is indeed an indication that the system has entered a state of chaos (Arrighi and Silver 1999), out of which will emerge a renewed global order arrangement (Modelski and Thompson 1996). Whether this form of warfare is itself "functional" is still a contentious issue (see Levy 1985 for a classic statement).

is likely that most of the definitions of terrorism proposed so far flounder due to the fact that without putting forth normative demarcations inherent in the Westphalian institutional system (i.e. differentiating civilian casualties produced by state armies as justifiable "collateral damage" from those produced by non-state agents), there is no *qualitative* characteristic of terrorist actions that would be sufficient to distinguish terrorism from other types of military or violent interaction or sufficient to distinguish violence-producing organizations that specialize in terrorism from other non-state affiliated violence-producing organizations (e.g., guerrillas). Restricting terrorism to the targeting of civilians and non-combatants for the purposes of political violence (Goodwin 2006), or the usage of violence in order to create an atmosphere of psychological and moral disorganization (Schmid and Jongman 1988), is not sufficient.

This analytic strategy fails for two reasons: first, it is overly exclusivist, leaving out a large part of "routinized" terrorist activity that does not aim to produce extraordinary and shocking events, but which is closer to guerrilla warfare and is still directed at the state and its symbolic representatives. Second, it is overly narrow, in that it does not suffice to make terrorism distinctive from inter-state war at the level of empirical observation and behavioral interaction. After all, the killings of civilians, the targeting of non-strategic symbolic targets (such as famous landmarks), or sustained bombings of cities for demoralization purposes, are all strategies that have been put to use during interstate war, but are not usually branded as terrorist (Graham 2004). Furthermore, terrorist attacks have—admittedly not with the same frequency—been directed at military targets (as in the USS Cole incident).

This situation then leads to the nominalist pessimism that terrorism is what people, authorities and ideologues decide to *label* as terrorism, without a theoretical defining feature of its own. I argue that, while it is correct to note that there is no set of *actions* or behavior pattern that is exhibited exclusively by terrorist groups and that would serve as a unique criterion that could be used to distinguish terrorism from other types of violent phenomena produced by different actors in the interstate system, the nominalist conclusion that terrorism has no theoretical substance of its own does not follow (see also Bergesen 2007 for a related but distinct attempt to define terrorism as a *sui generis* phenomenon).[2]

If particular actions cannot be used as measuring rod to arrive at a definition of terrorism, then where does this leave us? Here I suggest that the unique perspective afforded by a more global viewpoint can be used advantageously to move beyond the limitations generated by looking at terrorism from strictly intra-societal or social-psychological viewpoints (Bergesen and Lizardo 2005).   From an international relations perspective for instance, one important component of any violent interaction is the *type of actor* that performs the deed and the type of actor that is seen as the target (Bergesen and Han 2005).

Given two equivalent actions (such as a surprise attack against a state), one performed by a recognized actor in the international system (such as Japan in during World War II), and another by a loosely defined network of infra-national actors (informal groups, non-state-affiliated organizations), the first would be characterized as an act of *war* while the second would

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[2] A similar problem plagues definitions that focus on the types of non-state organizations that resort to terrorism (such as the oft noted slogan that terrorism is a "weapon of the weak").   As noted by Goodwin (2006) there are too many empirical counter examples to support *any* view that restricts terrorism to any particular *type* (weak, strong, elite, mass, conservative, revolutionary, etc.) of non-state organization.

most likely be referred to as a *terrorist* attack. Conversely, a civilian who kills another civilian is a *murderer*, not a terrorist. But a civilian who kills another civilian and then posts an elaborate rationale on the internet for his actions connecting his victim to a prestigious corporate entity (such as a nation state) would immediately be branded a terrorist. Conversely, if an individual *as a representative of a nation state* kills a civilian, then we can say that an episode of *state terrorism* has taken place.

In all of these cases, focusing on the kinds of *actors* (and the institutionalized rules that constitutively define certain actors as "representative" of certain macro-actors in the interstate system) instead of the kinds of *action* (which remains constant), allows us to get away from the thorny normative and conceptual issues that come to the fore during any attempt to arrive at a definition of terrorism by focusing on the "terror" part of the output of terrorist organizations.[3] After that first hurdle is cleared, we will have an operational characterization, one that may be utilized when conducting research without having to worry about subjective and cultural incommensurabilities.

TERRORISM AND THE NATION-STATE: AN ACTOR CENTERED PERSPECTIVE

The Targets of Terrorist Organizations

In this section I analyze the long-standing relationship between terrorism and the nation-state (Wilkinson 1977) from the actor-centered viewpoint sketched in the preceding section, while elaborating on the institutional argument that the qualitative "terror-producing" feature of terrorist violence should not count towards its definition.

I begin with the observation that when talking about non-state related episodes of terrorism, the intended target of terrorist attacks is almost invariably a recognized actor in the larger inter-state system or a *proxy* for such an actor; in what follows I argue that *this* is the defining feature of terrorism. Not its clandestine or apparently "indiscriminate" quality, since both of these are a necessary by-product of the forced choices foisted upon any non-state-affiliated organization that aims at the production of violent events under contemporary institutional arrangements (and not a direct goal or ideal choice of means of terrorist organizations). In essence these are the "rational" expediency strategies that Rapoport (1984:674-675) thinks of as distinctive of modern terrorism. Furthermore, both the relative clandestine status and the relative level of target discrimination vary systematically across different types of terrorist organizations as we will see below.

By the phrase "contemporary institutional arrangements", I mainly refer to the classic Weberian observation (see also Price 1977:55; Tilly 1990:70) of the taken-for-granted monopoly of the state to engage in violent military action (along with the routinized rules and conventions of war developed in the Westphalian system), and the necessary lack of legitimacy of any other

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[3] Notice that this does not lead us to conclude that terrorism is some sort of platonic, ahistorical category.   Since actors themselves are historical constructions subject to time bound material, cultural and institutional elaboration (Thomas and Meyer 1984), what terrorism is and what type of collective violent interactions in general are structural possibilities of the system *co-evolves* along with the system itself and the types of actors that it produces and destroys (Pollins 1996).

non-state entity that produces violence. As Tosini (2007:665) has recently noted, labeling terrorist activities "unconventional" or "extra-normal," already "implies a specific legal and political position, generally expressed by all states." In this respect, non-state affiliated violence-producing organizations are tagged as "terrorists," "because of their challenge to the monopoly of (the legitimate use of) political violence held by a state within a territory" (2007:665).

Taking this stance prevents us from getting sidetracked by giving undue focus to the the alleged—and presumably normatively definable—"extranormal" essence of terrorist actions, strategies or exploits throughout history (as does Rapoport 1984:660). Paying attention to institutional rules instead allows for a more analytically advantageous focus on the *structural* and *relational* features that all episodes of non-state terrorism in the modern (Westphalian) system have in common: *a violent interaction between representatives of a non-state organization and representatives of a nation-state (or other territorial, violence-monopolizing actors)*. From this viewpoint the study of terrorism begins by answering two questions: (1) where is the violence producing organization situated vis-a-vis other violence-producing actors in the system? And (2) what type of actor is the target of the attack?

Thus, our actor-centered perspective leads us to our first conclusion: in the contemporary Westphalian system, *terrorists attack actors linked to territorial states* (Pape 2003). Civilian attacks are a by-product of the larger goal of terrorists to attack *representatives* of nation states; and within the modern citizenship incorporation system (Marshall 1950)—civilian-citizens happen to be the most logistically attractive and tactically available representatives. It is this sense that modern terrorism and relatively historically recent mechanisms of polity incorporation, such as citizenship, have been mutually constitutive throughout history. Thus, if terrorist organizations harm civilians, they harm them in their status as *representatives* of states, or what Goodwin (2006) refers to as "complicitous civilians."[4] Although I believe that the term "civilian" and the specific requirement that these civilians be seen as receiving some sort of instrumental benefit or "collaborating" with the state in question is too restrictive in this context.

Instead, terrorists attack *symbolic representatives of territorial, violence-monopolizing state actors*. All that needs to exist is a publicly accepted and institutionally recognized cultural linkage mechanism —such as citizenship—between those representatives and the state-actor in question. This has been the case throughout the history of terrorism, from the Zealot's attacks against the Roman occupying forces in the first century A.D. (Hess 2003; Rapoport 1984) and the Assassins' famous 13th century exploits against high-standing state representatives in the Muslim Caliphate (Rapoport 1984), to Russian anarchist attacks against representatives of the Tsarist regime in the second half of the 19th century (Joll 1979).[5] Furthermore, it is not a requirement

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[4] According to Goodwin (2006:2037), "Revolutionaries view these categories of civilians as complicities insofar as they are believed to (1) routinely *benefit from* the actions of the government or state that the revolutionaries oppose, (2) *support* the government or state, and/or (3) have a substantial capacity to *influence* or to direct the government or state."

[5] Notice that under this definition, even the fact that modern terrorism focuses on representatives of *nation-states* is not a critical feature of terrorism.   Instead, this is simply a by-product of the fact that in the post-Westphalian world-system, states happen to be the most legitimate, obdurate and powerful violence-monopolizing territorial corporate actors around.   If world-empires still existed, then terrorists would attack imperial representatives (i.e. as with Zealots and *Sicarii*). Notice that under conditions of state failure in which other corporate agents come to acquire more

under this characterization that the representatives that are the target of attacks be natural persons. Objects (monuments, buildings, etc.) can also play that role (Gibbs 1989:331). Furthermore, the more prestigious and the more symbolically associated with the territorial actor in question (i.e. the White House vis-a-vis the United States) the more likely it is to be desirable as a terrorist target. This explains why targeting the head of state directly (i.e. Leon Czolgosz's shooting of U.S. President William McKinley on September 6, 1901 in Buffalo, NY or the Naradnoya Volya's successful attempt on the life of Tsar Alexander II on the first of March of 1881)—as the ultimate representative of the modern nation-state—has always been the holy grail of terrorist organizations since the emergence of modern terrorism in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Categorical Terrorism

Terrorists usually take civilians and public figures as *standing for* the states that they wish to target. Why do they do this? As noted above, the peculiar status of terrorists as illegitimate violence-producing actors in the international system can be used to account for this phenomenon.[6] First, while national armies engaged in war do not have to solve the problem of identifying each other as mutual targets (given the availability of true and tried conventions such as different uniforms). Terrorist actors suffer the problem of being unlawful initiators of a military interaction against representatives of a nation-state and have therefore, throughout history resorted to a *generalizing* strategy (Rapoport 1988): everybody that is, by virtue of some citizenship or other symbolic mechanism, associated with the corporate (usually a state) actor that they wish to target becomes a representative of that actor and therefore a potential target for attack.

Thus, the civilian-combatant boundary becomes blurred not because of some mysterious "barbaric" or "indiscriminately violent" predisposition among actors branded as terrorist, but due to the very illegitimate position that they occupy in the interstate system. From this point of view, the indiscriminant *modus operandi* of most terrorist organizations is simply a forced-choice produced by their very peripheral position among the entities endowed with the legitimate capacity to engage in violence (i.e. national armies, national police forces, secret commandos, etc.). Here is a case when positioning terrorist organizations in the context of other violence-producing entities in the interstate system and focusing on violent interaction and warfare as a historical institution (Giddens 1987), can help us explain an apparently puzzling facet of their behavior pattern.

This last statement also has an important empirical implication, which is that as terrorist organizations become *more legitimate actors in a particular struggle, indiscriminate attacks*

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legitimacy than the state (i.e. legal corporations, drug cartels or other collectively organized criminal actors) then terrorism may be directed at its representatives. This explains why terrorists who were ideologically motivated by Marxist political theory (i.e. the various European "Red Armies" and the German Baeder Meinhoff "gang" of the 1960s and 1970s) which points to the ultimate controlling role of *private*, capital-accumulating actors and not territorial state actors as the primary agents in the world system, sometimes targeted corporate symbols and human representatives of transnational corporations rather than states.

[6] Terrorist organizations may of course enjoy local legitimacy in certain circumscribed settings.

decrease and more targeted operations increase.   This connection between organizational legitimacy and discriminate selection of targets of violent interaction also explains why state terrorism is seldom indiscriminate, but on the contrary, it is usually highly targeted and discriminate (Price 1977:53), with specific "lists" of potential political enemies carefully prepared before-hand by state agents as in the Argentinean transitional military regime of the 1970s (Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991).

The state in contrast to non-state-affiliated (or supported) terrorist organizations is usually a highly legitimate entity in the current state-centric world-system and therefore can *afford* to be discriminate. We can explain the indiscriminate "total terror" of the French state during the immediate post-revolutionary period of 1789 or the indiscriminate counter-terror of the Batista regime in Cuba in the late 1950s (Price 1977:54) by the fact that the revolutionary state in France and the U.S. supported Batista regime in Cuba both exhibited extremely low levels of legitimacy.   If this hypothesis is correct, we should also expect that indiscriminate acts of terrorism on the part of state agents should increase as state legitimacy and structural strength decreases or is seriously put into question by a strong domestic challenger (Mason and Krane [1989] provide support for this hypothesis).[7]

This is also the reason why colonial states (whether "internal" colonialists or traditional metropolis-satellite systems), which tend to be more illegitimate—such as the French in Algeria—tend to be (*ceteris paribus*) more indiscriminate than local state actors when resorting to terrorism. In the very same way, non-state actors who are oriented toward the dominant, legitimacy-conferring institutions of the international system seldom engage in terrorism. This was the case of the South African ANC, who went as a far as to sign the engagement protocols of the Geneva convention (Goodwin 2007).

The "new" religious terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2001; Stern 1999) has been characterized precisely because of its "indiscriminateness", reviving older theories about the dispositional blood lust of terrorists. However, from our legitimacy perspective, indiscriminateness on the part of organizations that have a religious identity is to be expected, since in the current global context of the dominance of Western, secular models of political and social organization, terrorist *religious* organizations have a double legitimacy handicap, as both terrorist *and* religious. If an initially religious organization is over time transformed into a more conventional political terrorist organization, we should expect its indiscriminateness to decrease.

This would explain why for instance Hamas (a quasi-religious organization) tends to be more indiscriminate in its attacks than Fatah (a product of the 1960s Arab secular Left) and why the paramilitary wing of the IRA has been much more indiscriminate than the Basque ETA (de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2006, table 1). In a pre-modern context, of course, there should be no correlation between target discrimination and the status of an organization as both terrorist and religious.   The Assasins for instance, had the ability to orchestrate highly targeted killings throughout their long history (Rapoport 1984, 1988).

Second, as noted above, terrorists face a double cognitive (and "sense-making" [Weick 1995]) problematic as organizations that is not experienced by members of national armies: one

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[7] This is also one way to put empirical content on Gianfranco Sanguinetti's otherwise purely rhetorical thesis that "All States have always been terrorist but they have been so most violently at their birth and at the imminence of their death" (Sanguinetti 1982:99), since these are the two periods in which state actors are expected to reach their lowest point in terms of legitimacy.

is related to the *agreed upon conventions* (Lewis 1969) that convey information as to the type of actors involved in the situation, and the other stems from the legitimacy gained by a recognized association with a national entity. The first I will call the *informational* problem (who is a proper representative of the target I wish to attack?). The second is a different variant of the legitimacy problem, and this is tied to the reluctance of the larger international order to recognize some entities (nation states) and not others (non-state organizations) as proper wielders and monopolizers of the means of collective violence (not surprising, given that the dominant actors in the international system are nation states).

In terms of the informational problem, terrorists are not afforded the set of conventions that are granted to legitimate combatants. Soldiers—when not involved in irregular activities such as urban warfare—know beyond a shadow of a doubt which personal agents are to be considered representatives of the enemy. That is why soldiers who attack civilians are considered war criminals by international law; the very act of attacking civilians is not considered an involuntary error but a deliberate act of murder. The reason for this is fairly obvious. Given the existence of internationally shared social conventions it would be impossible for a soldier to kill a civilian without realizing it (unless he or she is mentally incapacitated in some way).

Terrorists, given the lack of a base of social norms for delineating the guidelines for the activity that they engage in, must consider every person that by virtue of geography, language or culture (a much "fuzzier" set of criteria) gains an association with the enemy state a representative of that enemy state. Soldiers who belong to national armies do not have to face that quandary as they are aware of their legitimate status as proper bearers of their own nation state's capabilities and monopoly over the means of violence. International actors who are branded as terrorists, however, are groups who are not recognized as official entities in the international system (akin to pirates and smugglers in the world economy), and who therefore cannot have access to the set of conventions reserved for "rightful" representatives of nation state.

This indiscriminate "nature" of terrorism is the "categorical" feature that has been noted by many commentators (Black 2004; Goodwin 2006). However, from an actor-centered perspective, this feature of terrorism is best seen as deriving from the position of terrorist organizations in the contemporary international context—and thus as a temporal and spatial *variable* not a constant (de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2006)—and under the contemporary rules of organization for the production of collective violence, rather than an essential defining feature of terrorist activity.[8]

It is important to clearly appreciate why the above considerations also disqualify the killing of civilians (or other noncombatants for that matter) as the defining feature of terrorism. Incidents such as Al Qaeda's October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole demonstrate that

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[8] Goodwin (2006) differentiates categorical terrorism from terrorism directed at individuals *qua* individuals—what he terms "targeted assassination."   However, it is doubtful that we can find episodes of terrorism proper in which the victims are selected purely in terms of their individual identity some form of corporate identity is always attached to the individual even if this identity is not purely national(member of a police force, executive of a corporation, etc.) —this itself is a historical variable connected to the rise of prominence of the nation-state as the dominant actor in the modern system (Meyer et al. 1997).   Purely individual terrorism, collapses into murder, and other types of group violence, such as lynchings (Senechal de la Roche 1996) or "mob" violence used by protection rackets to enforce their dominance in circumscribed geographical areas.

terrorists may target non-civilians. And without denying the obvious pragmatic reasons as to why the majority of terrorist attacks do occur with civilians as the primary target (publicity, feasibility, the relative vulnerability of the civilian population), it is useful to realize that beyond the civilian/soldier, combatant/non-combatant demarcation, the criterion of *representation* (is the target associated with the nation state that I wish to target?) is the primary decisive factor in the selection of a particular target (whether human or infra-structural).[9] The second important thing concerns how the state-actor that is attacked "defines the situation."

In the current system, being a member of state army or a recognizable citizen of a nation state are fairly strong linkage mechanisms. But these are specific to the present historical setting, and clearly not the only possible ones. This means that a definition of terrorism should be neutral as to the specific institutionally defined practice of "symbolic linkage" that terrorist actors use to connect persons to the corporate actors they wish to target (although in the present setting, citizenship is a pretty safe bet). For instance, it is clear that the Israeli athletes killed in the 1972 Munich Olympics by the Black September organization were not attacked in their public roles as athletes, but in their role as representatives of the Israeli *state* in the global arena. Thus, this attack was tantamount to a politico-military violent interaction between the terrorist organization and the Israeli state (the subsequent covert manhunt of those thought responsible for the killings by Mossad agents can be seen as the obverse of the initial interaction).

It is clear that most episodes of terrorism-counter-terrorism cycles are indistinguishable at a behavioral level from what has been referred to as "total war" (O'Sullivan 1986:16) when this occurs between two formally recognized state-actors. The *only* difference is that the non-state actor in the interaction is usually not formally recognized as a valid "partner" in the military interaction by the state-actor (i.e. in the state-centric international system only representatives of other state actors count), and therefore the situation cannot be institutionally defined as "warfare" (note that the Bush administration declared a war on "terror" but not on al Qaeda). Therefore, any attack by a non-military, non-state affiliated organization upon representatives of a nation state qualifies as "terror." Analytically, there is no reason why this same criterion should not apply. One thing to keep in mind is that this process of definition of what is happening in the situation is dynamic and to a certain extent, self-fulfilling: if the non-state actor gains enough strength to be able to confront the state's military forces *on its own terms* (i.e. following the conventionally established rules of warfare), then the situation moves from one featuring terrorism to one that can safely be defined as a "civil war."

In the case of contemporary sub-state terrorism, therefore, we can arrive at a minimal definition: *Modern terrorism refers to a type of violent interaction initiated by a non-state actor, which is not formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of violence or a valid initiator of violent interactions, directed against the representatives (human, material or symbolic) of a formally recognized state actor in the international system, which does not follow the institutionalized rules and conventions of military engagement.*

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[9] As Goodwin (2006) notes, citizenship is not the only representation mechanism, and different groups will cut the "representational pie" in different ways, with some groups taking *all* members of the nation state they wish to target as potential victims (more likely to occur in democracies), and with others using an overlapping set of criteria in which citizenship is necessary but not sufficient (i.e. a revolutionary leftist group who attacks only those who are American *and* businessmen).

The division between "domestic" and "international" terrorism corresponds to the special cases in which the members of the organization attack representatives of a state with which they share a territorial and political affiliation or attack representatives of foreign states (Enders and Sandler 2002). The above definition also points to the need to differentiate terrorism as a *tactic* (which may be used by military organizations such as state-affiliated armies or formally organized guerrillas) from terrorism as a generic violent interaction between non-military organizations and state representatives. As it stands, this definition is still incomplete (or rather it remains at too specific a level): it leaves out terrorist activity that is not directed at formally recognized territorial actors   (nation states), but at private corporate actors such as major corporations (i.e. an animal rights group burns a McDonald's) or at *coalitions of nation-states* (incipient Intergovernmental Organizations).   However, notice that the problems with the definition are not insurmountable from the present perspective, since they point to *other types of actors* that may be the target of terrorist organizations and such objections should thus be amenable to conceptualization within an actor-centered approach. But first, it is important to elaborate on the full implications of this actor-centric perspective for organizing the "forms of violence" that can be observed in a given world-system at a particular point in history.

A TYPOLOGY OF INTERSTATE SYSTEM VIOLENCE

The conceptual and definitional problems posed by the question of terrorism in the international state system can be used as a springboard to address other conceptual difficulties in the treatment and theoretical status of war and international conflict in current debates in the international relations literature. The world-systems approach lead to a re-conceptualization of international conflict as a constant and recurring feature of the interstate system (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1998), rather than as a random or historically contingent occurrence.   This represented a tremendous advance over previous social scientific views of the phenomenon as simply chaotic and unexplainable or inherently tied to exclusive intra-societal dynamics. Nevertheless, serious conceptual problems remain.   Most of these problems can be traced to a set of analytic assumptions regarding the nature of the *entities* that are postulated to interact in the interstate system and the theoretical framework that is usually resorted to in order to explain their behavior.

Interstate System Actors and Violent Interactions

In the international relations and world systems literature, military interaction is considered to be one type of linkage between the elements of the world system (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997), with economic, cultural and political interactions comprising the other major types of contact, it is always assumed that these interactions occur between nation-states or other established macro-political entities such as empires and city-states (this is in spite of the fact that one of the most important of recurrent military interactions in the history of the Eurasian system came from a non-state entity: the Mongols).[10]

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[10] The fixation with the nation—rather than the "entire system" as first proposed by Wallerstein (1983)—as the exemplary acting unit in world system theory has recently been challenged due to the emergence of forms of economic and political interaction that transcend national boundaries

As Vinci (2008) has recently highlighted, this theoretical blind-spot has been built-in to the neo-realist perspective since its inception due to its implicit allegiance to the Hobessian dichotomy between state-based "order" and state-less "anarchy." However, it has become increasingly clear that states are not the only actors in the international system capable of producing local (and regional) forms of order, nor are they the only actors capable of interacting with one another in an organized fashion (and thus forming "systems" or being embedded into larger state-dominated systems [Mann 1986]). Accordingly, taking into account recent structural re-organizations in the interstate system, and re-framing the nation state as a meso-level of analysis (nested within an already macro level of analysis), it becomes clear that interstate war is one of a number of possible military interactions between different types of actors in the interstate system. Using a crude form of classification, we can therefore distinguish between national actors, infra-national actors and supra-national actors.

Within this framework, military conflict can occur either between two nations (what has traditionally been referred to as interstate war), between a supra-national entity (such as NATO) and a particular nation state (e.g., Serbia), or between an infra-national entity (Al Qaeda) and a nation state (The United States). There are two other possibilities of course: a military conflict between two infra-national entities (i.e. organized ethnic violence), or two supra-national entities. The former, given that they occur within the boundaries of specific nation states, pose no conceptual difficulties and have been the province of standard studies in the sociology of revolutions and social movements (there is a now growing literature in Political Science and Peace Studies designed to explain the origins of civil war). The latter however, comprise what has been referred to in the literature (Gilpin 1981; Goldstein 1988; Levy 1985; Modelski and Thompson 1996) as *general wars* (such as the 30 year war of 1914-1945), where a major conflict occurs between two mutually opposed interstate alliances or coalitions (which can be considered a temporary intergovernmental organization), and thus represents an example of conflict between two supra-national entities. This is consistent with Chase-Dunn and Sokolovsky's (1983 :366), definition of a "world war" as "those military engagements that involve *rival coalitions* of state forces where at least one core power is a member of each of the opposing alliances (italics added)."

Regional and major power wars are sometimes treated as simply a subset of the category of nation-to-nation war (or vice versa). However, the point that is usually missed by this analytic decision is that these wars do not occur between isolated nation states, but between allied groups of nation states or formal supranational organizations composed of a league of nation states, and therefore represent a distinct type of phenomenon. This is because—following an old Durkheimian truism of the emergence of collective actors out of individual actors—major power warfare engages a distinct type of actor distinguishable from the nation state, and is thus empirically and analytically distinct from interstate warfare.[11] Figure 1 shows how various forms

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(i.e. NGO's and TNC's) either from the supra-national (Robinson 2001) or the infra-national side, as in the new preoccupation with the global-local nexus.   While recent developments in world system theory have moved to accommodate these newly prevalent phenomena, the analysis of military interaction has remained tied to the level of the nation-state.

[11] The first such supra-national actor in the history of the European interstate system is widely recognized to have been "The League of Venice" formed during the first Italian War of 1494-1498.

of collective violence in the international arena can be organized within this structural framework of types of actor (organized by their "scale") from non-state organizations—the most minimal of which is the lone perpetrator—to supranational coalitions of states.

Figure 1: Forms of Violent Interaction by Type of Actor in the Interstate System

Notice that the phenomena located along the main diagonal of the figure are the "official" subjects of studies in Sociology and Political Science (evincing the propensity of researchers to remain focused on cross-actor interaction at the same level of analysis). Long and well established literatures exist on the subject of religious and ethnic conflict, civil war, interstate-war, regional war and major power warfare and even interactions that have all of the characteristics of terrorism (i.e. being illegitimate, illegal, etc.) but which happen to occur between two different non-state actors in a given territory (Vinci 2008). There is a good reason for this, since these types of violent interactions are also the most historically common occurrences, and thus examples extend far and wide both geographically and chronologically enabling the construction of data sets that can be subjected to rigorous empirical analysis (e.g. Hironaka 2005) or to detailed comparative analysis across different historical periods.

Of particular interest in the present context, since that is where most of the violent interaction usually referred to as terrorism lies—are those phenomena located "off the diagonal" of this figure. These represent events that cross levels and that due to the specific re-organization

of the interstate system in the present transition period (with the more active role played by supra-national entities and the proliferation of non-state affiliated actors) represent *increasingly likely structural possibilities* (although they have occurred recurrently throughout the entire history of the Westphalian system). Thus, military action initiated by infra-national or national actors against a supra-national entity (lower and middle right-hand side of the figure),[12] and violence initiated by supra-national actors or national actors and directed at a non-state actor (upper left hand of the figure) may become common future occurrences.[13] A cold-war example of this type of phenomenon consists of *Operation Condor* in which a coalition—and thus a supra-national actor—of right-wing governments from the Southern Cone of South America engaged in a concerted campaign of military repression against various left-wing nonstate actors—mostly revolutionary guerrilla groups—throughout the entire region. Finally, in the upper-middle region of the figure we can find the case of a supra-national entity engaging in violent interaction with a national actor.[14]

It is important to retain the analytic distinction between phenomena located in the lower left hand side of the figure (civil wars, revolutions, religious and ethnic violence) and those in the lower-middle region, labeled as terrorism, since there is a long-standing tendency to attempt to reduce the latter to the former. Many revolutions and civil wars begin under the guise of a state-terrorism/domestic terrorism cycle of violent interaction (Alimi 2006; Lichbach, Davenport, and Armstrong 2004) and I argue that they should retain that denomination as long the target nation-state retains its integrity and coherence as a *state* actor. A national revolution or civil war can only be said to occur when a particular nation state, after a prolonged period of oppositional terrorist and/or guerrilla warfare challenge, devolves into an infra-national actor located at the same level as the challengers (a case of state "collapse", "state fragmentation" or "state failure"). Therefore, civil wars should be thought of as infra-national contests occurring in a common geographic location between two non-state actors (or actors located at a level "below" that of a full-fledged state actor [Vinci 2008]). If the challenger wins the contest, a new national actor can be said to come on the scene, while if the challenger loses and is incorporated, the old national actor re-emerges. If a split occurs, then two new national actors enter the international arena. It is important to note that "terrorism" as here defined cannot occur unless there is a formally recognized state actor is a part of the focal conflict.

Keeping our attention focused on the types of actors allows us to realize that the type of conflict that we may observe can change over time as new actors enter or leave the scene (or are "promoted" and "demoted" into different types of actors), going back and forth from its original denomination—say a civil war—to others and back again. This is a common insight in the analysis of interstate war—where a traditional interstate war between two states can be transformed into a world war or regional war with the entrance of other states into the conflict—but seldom applied beyond this realm of activity.

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[12] The case of Somali guerrillas attacking NATO troops would be a close empirical instance of this type of phenomenon.

[13] A United Nations special task force or a coalition of States attacking representatives of terrorist organizations or subnational groups of "nations without states" (such as tribal collectives in Afghanistan) represent an example of this.

[14] It can be argued that the NATO bombings in Serbia are an example of conflict phenomena that fit in here.

The type of interaction that I want to focus on here is that between an infra-national actor and a national actor proper (lower middle region). This is what I propose should be referred to as terrorism.[15] Of course, terrorism can take both domestic and international forms, but in both of these cases the analytical commonality remains and only the national actor that is targeted changes: in domestic terrorism non-state groups target a national actor (or its symbolic human and material representatives) that encompasses them both politically and geographically, while international terrorists aim their attacks at symbolic or humans representatives of a foreign national entity (but which may occur in a foreign location, such as an embassy located in the terrorist own "home base" [Bergesen and Han 2005]). Given the above, the blindness of previous sociological theory to phenomena such as terrorism, cannot be justified by pointing to empirical factors (terrorism under this definition has occurred regularly throughout the history of the interstate system) but must be admitted to be conceptual, generated by the difficulty of theorizing violent interactions between entities that go beyond (or below) the scale of nation states.

In addition, this actor-centered typology does not require that we draw a clear line of demarcation between the different types of terrorism. One advantage of focusing of actors is that we can arrange the various forms of conflict that incorporate terrorist actors and appreciate the continuity across different types of violent interaction. As shown by the dotted curved line in the figure, terrorism can encompass everything from coalition troops attacking civilian combatants, to traditional terrorism against local civilians enacted by state authorities, to attacks on the state by terrorist organizations, to attacks on IGO representatives or national coalition representatives by a non-state organization. In this way, our previous anomalous example, that of a terrorist organization attacking a McDonald's establishment can be conceptualized as simply another structural variant of the scheme shown in Figure 1: that of a non-state organization attacking a supra-national actor.   This is so since a particular McDonald's establishment is best conceptualized as a *representative* of the transnational corporation (TNC) that bears its name, and thus the event should be located toward the lower right-hand side of the figure.

TERRORISM AND GLOBAL THEORIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The above considerations directly touch the theoretical issue of the genesis of conflict in the interstate system. It is important to note that most international conflict theory has been designed to explain conflict among nation states, while most social movement theory in sociology and political science is designed to explain (non-military) conflict between the state and challenger groups, or between two or more substate factions (ethno-religious violence). Still various studies have proposed that all of these phenomena mentioned above, from wars (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1998), to state-repression and revolutionary movements (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000) and intrastate conflict and civil war (Hironaka 2005; Olzak 2006) are embedded in and are directly affected by global rhythms and processes and as such, theories of conflict developed in the international and world systems literature offer useful explanatory vantage points. It is therefore unclear, why terrorism—both state and non-state—should be left out of this list

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[15] This classification also has the advantage of disentangling state terrorism from terrorism proper.   While state terrorism is simply the converse of terrorism (a state attacks and infra-national actor) its dynamics and correlates maybe of a different sort than terrorism.

(Bergesen and Lizardo 2005). In this section I sketch some of the global processes most likely to be connected to non-state terrorist activity. I limit my discussion to the possible impact of the following global factors: long-term economic cycles, global political and normative factors, phases of system structure (unipolar, bipolar, hegemonic, multicentric, etc.) and global cultural factors.

Terrorism and Global Long-term Economic Cycles

World-economic cycles and trends have always figured in World-systems and international relations explanations of interstate conflict and intrastate violence such as state-led repression and civil war (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1998; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000). To explain interstate conflict, some argue for the primacy of economic factors ("the resource view") while others point at the political structure of the international system, with a unicentric arrangement reducing conflict and a multicentric structure inducing it (Arrighi and Silver 1999).[16] Political scientist Brian Pollins (1996) has argued that the general strategies that most researchers utilize in order to deal with this theoretical issue can be classified into three different types: *conflation*, *reduction* or *co-evolution*. Those who conflate economic and political (global order) processes simply do not make any distinction between economic and political systemic properties, or view them as perfectly reducible to one another. A second group tries to reduce one to the other arguing that either economic or political processes are determining in the final instance. The third group takes a more integrative stance admitting that the two processes, while analytically and empirically autonomous, have a certain degree of interconnection.

In the explanation of terrorism, most analysts who pay serious attention to global economic and/or political factors follow a similar tack: reductionist economic theses, in which terrorism is seen as a byproduct of economic exploitation along the North/South, Core/Periphery axis abound, although empirical support for most of their contentions is ambiguous at best (Li and Schaub 2004; Lizardo 2006). One problem with purely economistic theories is that world economic flows and exchanges are usually conceptualized solely as *the root motive* of terrorist activity (from the exploitation model), but seldom seen as an actual *facilitator* of terrorist action (by way of resource provision as in interstate warfare theories).

Purely political theories – e.g., terrorism as "blowback" from major power imperial games and interventions (Johnson 2003) – err in a similar way, by downplaying cultural and normative factors and ignoring global linkages beyond the satellite-metropolis political domination connection. Instead of engaging in one-sided attempts to explain terrorism as resulting from the simple effect of a single global force, I suggest that it is more helpful to look at the co-evolution of political, cultural and economic processes and particular *configurations* of global system parameters that help facilitate (or curb) terrorist activity, both domestically and internationally.

If we are to take seriously the suggestion that terrorism is but one more species of violent interaction in the global system, we should attempt to seriously explore whether extant theories designed to explain violent interaction among nation-states in the international system can be

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[16] This argument can take mirror image opposite forms, as some maintain that war is more likely to occur during the upswing of an economic wave (Goldstein 1988) or as result of the setting in of a downturn (Bergesen 1985).

applied to the explanation and prediction (or retrodiction) of terrorist activity. Where extant theory does not appear to handle the case of cross-level interactions such as terrorism particularly well we can take the opportunity to suggest some recommendations and extensions.

Terrorism and the Resource View of International Conflict

The phenomenon of terrorist political violence and terrorist organizations as ambiguously recognized actors in the transnational arena makes problematic the distinction between economic and political factors in international relations theory. Resource views of the connection between long waves and violent conflict implicitly conceptualize nation states as rational actors. Those who argue that warfare is more likely to occur during economic upswings—the "war chest" hypothesis—assume that nations always want to go to war and that it is more convenient to do so when resources are abundant (as war is resource intensive). Those who argue that nations go to war during downswings, assume that they do so as a way to jumpstart their stagnant economies through the large-scale mobilization that usually accompanies interstate warfare.

But for infra-national interstate actors economic considerations (at least in the sense of an economic system organized under national auspices) are not of primary relevance. While they obviously require resources if they are to engage in military action (especially against more powerful national targets), the availability of those resources can be independent of the fate of the formal world economy as they can be amassed through informal (underground) economic channels. Thus, the sole focus of international relations research on the legitimate economy, ignoring the possible influence of the black market as a resource base for outlaw groups, becomes a problematic theoretical and empirical issue. If black market activity tends to become more prevalent under certain interstate system power configurations (i.e. multicentric or periods of "hegemonic decline"), then this could be a possible route of explanation for the noted association between waves of transnational terrorism and hegemonic decline (Bergesen and Lizardo 2005).

Terrorism and Normative-Political Order Perspectives

When it comes to the systemic factors affecting the occurrence of terrorist phenomena, it should be expected that *normative* considerations related to issues of global order and system governance (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Modelsky and Thompson 1996) should be of primary importance. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that terrorism as a special form of systemic unrest is inherently connected to the dynamics the larger systemic properties of capitalism as a global mode of production (Chase-Dunn 1998). However, the more proximate causal factors may be tied to those related to political order issues connected to the breakdown of the normative consensus under conditions of system strain and the transition from a unicentric (hegemonic) phase to a multicentric international arrangement (Bergesen and Lizardo 2005).

Among the factors that are to be considered the primary constituents of this global order are the rules of diplomacy and military engagement that are espoused as necessary for the maintenance of interstate system coherence. Terrorists violate these rules both by breaking the implicit compact that determines what types of entities are to be considered legitimate monopolizers of the means of violence in the interstate system (both within and between political borders) and by directing their attacks at actors (nation-states) who are already recognized as proper members of the existing system.

Terrorism and Hegemonic Transition Perspectives

However, in the international system norms do not exist in a vacuum. In the absence of system-wide order produced by a supra-state, global norms of conduct necessitate their continuing and active espousal by self-appointed system leaders – usually the era's dominant economic and political power – who use their influence to steer the system along their preferred direction (e.g., espousing the global propriety of the values and practices related to democracy and free trade). As noted in hegemonic transition theories in both sociology and political science (Chase-Dunn 1998; Modelski and Thompson 1996), leading powers ("hegemons") experience cycles of ascent, maturity and decline (Boswell and Sweat 1993). Most hegemonic transition theory consists of predictions connecting various global rhythms and trends (i.e. world economic growth, innovation, global war, etc.) with specific phases of the hegemonic sequence of ascent, maturity, decline and succession (Goldstein 1988). In regards to the study of terrorism; therefore, a key question is whether terrorism is more or less likely to occur during different phases of this cycle. I propose that there is a connection: terrorism is more likely to occur during periods of hegemonic decline. There are several reasons for this.

First, insofar as the capacity of the system leader to protect the integrity of the larger normative structure is affected by its position within the hegemonic sequence, and if terrorist activity is aided by breakdowns in the system's normative and political order structure, then some forms of terrorism may be more likely when the system is undergoing transition or the system leader in a state of decline.   Second, because the composition and connectivity (or "network") structure of the system are transformed (e.g., during decolonization periods in which a new population of state actors enters the scene producing various new possibilities for possible violent interaction across these entities) as the leading power experiences transitions along these phases, the types of action and the types actors that may garner legitimacy to engage in violent action in the interstate system may not be the same in periods where an undisputed system leader is able to control the system than in periods where multiple sources of control are vying for authority.

What sorts of mechanisms might be responsible for the hypothesized connection between the dynamics of hegemonic decline and the emergence of terrorist phenomena? We know that hegemonic decline is associated with both the proliferation of particularisms and subjectivities and the breakdown of universal conceptual systems (Bergesen 2000; Friedman 1994).   Further, periods of transition are characterized by a breakdown of the previous political order secured through hegemonic equilibrium and balance of power (Arrighi and Silver 1999). Among the processes that conspire to destroy the interstate order balance espoused by the hegemon, the most important is the expansion of the region of order that is bequeathed to the hegemon at the beginning of a cycle. Expansion—and the strains that it bestows—is of course a direct consequence of hegemonic dominance, but ironically it is also the cause of decline and subsequent succession (Kennedy 1987).

According to Arrighi and Silver (1999) with expansion, both the *volume* (the sheer number of actors who are able to join the international arena after adopting the requisite framework) and *density* (interaction ties within the periphery and between the core and the periphery increase as a result of the increase in volume within the system) of the interstate system increase. This qualitative change at the level of system processes creates strains in the extant hegemonic organizational scaffolding, eventually proving too much for the system to manage, as

new "interstitial" organizational forms are produced outside of the hegemon's declining sphere of control. The fact that terrorist organizations appeared to have proliferated after the end of the cold war is consistent with this view (Hoffman 1992). Terrorist organizations can be thought of as an example of a new organizational form, what some have referred to in the contemporary period as a "network organization" (Hoffman 2002), as they are loosely bounded and demographically fluid sub-national entities that are characteristic due to their specialization in political violence, and their unabashed attempt to destroy the nation-state's monopolization of this resource in the international system.

We can thus expect the overall volume of entities of all the different types identified above—sub-national, national and supra-national—to increase during periods of transition: Supra-national entities proliferate as core states band together in an attempt to protect themselves from economic competition and upstart politico-military challenges from other core and semiperipheral actors; the number of national entities expands as bouts of nationalism splinter old multi-ethnic states previously supported by the declining core states (i.e. Yugolasvia, the Ottoman empire) and older imperial peripheries decolonize (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980); and finally, infranational actors multiply as subjectivities and proto-nationalisms spread in the more disadvantaged areas of the periphery and semi-periphery (Friedman 1994).[17]   In the modern period, it is important to add the diffusion and legitimation of the very template of non-state *organization* itself (Boli and Thomas 1999), which has resulted in the production and gradual progression toward a taken-for-granted status of various international non-state actors chartered with the most diffuse and generalized goals (Meyer et al. 1997).

CONCLUSION: CROSS-LEVEL VIOLENT INTERACTIONS AND HEGEMONIC DECLINE

The sheer proliferation of all types of actors – sub-national, national and supra-national (i.e. increases in overall organizational density [Hannan and Freeman 1986]) – in the interstate system, coupled with global normative crisis (the delegitimation of the declining hegemonic state [Arrighi and Silver 1999]), should increase the probability of *cross-level* conflict interaction among actors (off diagonal cells in the figure) during periods of hegemonic transition and succession. At the global-cultural level, non-state actors are empowered and emboldened by the relative gain in legitimacy in relation to both national and supranational collective actors (Boli and Thomas 1999), which opens up both political and cultural opportunity-structures that facilitates the activity of non-state organizations (Lizardo 2006).

In addition, terrorist organizations transpose and adapt extant organizational models (Clemens 1996) from both the non-profit and for-profit sectors (Hoffman 2002), facilitating their survival and adaptability. For their part, the new supranational military organizations turn against "rogue" or otherwise non-compliant nation states, especially those who dare to organize in ways that threaten the established principles of legitimacy (e.g., theocracies, or regimes founded on ethno-nationalist exclusion), increasing the chances of supranational coalitions of major powers engaging in violent interaction against nation states with weaker militaries. In this respect, the

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[17] Of course all three of these tendencies are also facilitated by the B-phase downturn in the world economy that characterizes transition periods.

globalization of resources, techniques and organizational forms makes the struggle between state and non-state organizations much less symmetrical (Naim 2003) increasing both the potential geographical regions that may serve as a haven for non-state organizations, and the chances that an actual state apparatus might fall at the hands of one of these organizations. As Cronin (Cronin 2003:30) points out "The current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats from nonstate actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it."

Furthermore, the proliferation or "weak" or partially degenerate "quasi-states" in the system's periphery—as a consequence of the partial diffusion of the nation-state form, late-decolonization and empire-splintering processes—increases the chances of state terrorism directed at civilians and other non-combatants on the part of illegitimate state actors struggling to sustain their integrity (Mason and Krane 1989). This dynamic in its turn heightens the chances of civilian proto-military organization against abusive state entities. This results in increasing violent interactions between states and non-state affiliated violence producing organizations in the periphery (what Alimi [2006: 273] has referred to as "interactive contention"). This may result in "spillover" effects as some terrorist organizations flee from particularly vicious state-terrorist machines and direct their attention to safer targets, such as the core state to which their local state is a client or other neighboring states known to support it, resulting in a reluctant transnationalization of terrorism.

While all phenomena along the diagonal (save for major power wars) can occur during hegemonic periods, without violating the integrity of the interstate system (as the hegemon lays out implicit rules that aim at regulating them), cross level conflicts directly contravene standard interstate system rules and their occurrence is a sure sign that the system has entered a state of transition and/or crisis. Chase-Dunn's (1998) world system constants-cycles-trends framework can be a useful organizing device in our consideration of terrorism. It is well known that violent conflict of all types is a constant feature of the interstate system; and research shows that both conflict severity and incidence present cyclical patterns (Goldstein 1988; Pollins 1996). Further, we know that rising conflict severity represents a real trend in the interstate system (Boswell and Sweat 1993; Chase-Dunn 1998).

Is it possible to fit terrorism, as a particular form of cross-level conflict, within this analytical frame? We know that there have been terrorist waves in the Euro-American centered world-system in the past, most recently the string of anarchist attacks in Europe at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th (Joll 1979). Bergesen and Lizardo (2005) have argued that this last wave was a product of the hegemonic transition from Britain to the United States finalized after the wars of 1914-45. While most of those terrorist attacks represented examples of domestic terrorism, some of the most notable cases (especially those concerned with the assassination of famous political representatives) produced international reverberations (e.g., the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 by Gavrillo Princip a member of the Young Bosnians, an organization dedicated to pan-Slavic autonomy).

Therefore it is reasonable to hypothesize that terrorism may also be characterized by a recurrence connected with the cycles of the decline and succession in the hegemonic sequence (Bergesen and Lizardo 2005). From this perspective, the primary factor to keep in mind may be the *synchronization* of two cyclical patterns: one having to do with the spread of non-state violence producing organizations targeting states in the system and the other having to do with recurrent states of stability and instability in the system of states itself. High levels of terrorist

activity may only have repercussions for the interstate system when the system is closer to a state of "chaos" (Arrighi and Silver 1999), and may have little global impact when a hegemon is able to produce system-level order (Modelski and Thompson 1996). The present conditions are particularly dangerous in this respect (Bergesen and Lizardo 2005).

Nevertheless, the anarchist terrorist attacks of the 19th century seem to pale in comparison to incidents such as 9/11. This seems to suggest that there is a qualitative difference between modern forms of terrorism and similar incidents from the past. We can explain this apparent divergence by pointing to world systemic *trends*: linear, progressive tendencies endogenous to the interstate system (the imagery of the trend can be combined with that of the cycle to lead to the blended concept of a *spiral* [Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000]). The most relevant of these constitute the increasing *integration* among the actors in the world system facilitated by developments in communications and transportation technology. Technological advances also increase the availability and destructiveness of weapons of war.[18] Although we must be wary of reducing the differences between modern and pre-modern terrorism purely to technological factors (Rapoport 1984).

During the 19th century anarchist wave for example, *international* terrorism almost always took the exclusive form of high-profile assassinations, while *domestic* terrorism involved the targeting of civilians (Joll 1979). However, this apparent operational division between the two forms of terrorism had more to do with the logistic difficulties faced by international terrorists due to their limited access to technological resources, than with some inherent difference between the two. In contrast, given the facilitation of mobility and access produced by recent technological advancements, modern domestic terrorism is as likely to consist of the assassination of high profile individuals as modern international terrorism is to be characterized by attacks on civilians who are seen as representatives of the target country, both by way of terrorists traveling to the country of interest (i.e. 9/11,. 3/11, the London Bombings) or citizens from those countries being attacked in foreign sites.[19] Given that both military (weapons) and non-military (communications and transportation) technology has increased the reach and ability of terrorists to inflict damage on civilian populations, we should expect this type of terrorism, both in its domestic and international forms, to be the most severe form that the phenomenon will take during this transitional period.

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[18] This produces a situation in which national actors must now worry not only about between-nation competition for military advantage, but also of the prospect of infra-national entities obtaining access to mass destruction resources previously monopolized by national and supra-national actors.

[19] Note that this is a statement about severity, not incidence. In terms of frequency, we should expect both assassinations and civilian attacks to occur at similar rates.

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Table 1. Examples of Violent Interaction Across Actor Types.

		Target		
		Infra-National Actor	National Actor	Supra-National Actor
Initiator	Infra-National Actor	Military interactions between nonstate armed-groups or warlords in the context of state failure (Vinci 2008).	Al Qaeda attack on the United States on September 11th, 2001.	Members of the Mujahideen insurgency attack Soviet troops during the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
	National Actor	State-led military repression against insurgent nonstate actors (Lichbach et al 2004).	Traditional interstate war (i.e. the Franco-German War of 1870).	French attack on members of the Third Coalition (1805) during the Napoleonic wars.
	Supra-National Actor	Members of NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) attack Taliban fighters during on Operation Medusa on September of 2006.	NATO aerial attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999.	"General" or "hegemonic" war (Levy 1983; i.e.: a member of the Allied Powers attacks a member of the Central Powers during World War I).

HÊGEMONÍA: HEGEMONY, CLASSICAL AND MODERN [1]

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ABSTRACT

"Hegemony" is a term from the vocabulary of classical Greek history which was deliberately revived in the 19th century to describe a modern phenomenon. In its classical context, the clear denotation of "hegemony" is a military-political hierarchy, not one of wealth or cultural prestige; although both economic and cultural resources could serve to advance military-political hegemony, they were not at all of the essence. Hegemonic relations were conscious, and based upon complex motives and capacities. Individuals, peoples and states could desire, seek, struggle for, get, keep, lose and regain hegemony. Hegemony was sought or exercised over nations, over territories, over the land or the sea, or over tôn holôn, "the whole"; but "territories" turn out to be the states and nations thereon, "the land" and "the sea" actually meant "the mainland states" and "the island states," and tôn holôn was the world system, the whole system of interacting states. Hegemonic power relationships in the classical style are alive and well today; far from being time-bound, place-bound or culture-bound, hegemony in the classical sense is a transhistorical and transcultural fact that merits comparative-civilizational and comparative-world-systems study. While bilateral, alliance, and regional hegemonies are far more frequent both today and in the past, the most useful hegemony for study in a comparative civilizations/world systems context is systemwide hegemony: a unipolar influence structure that falls short of universal empire.

INTRODUCTION

Hegemonie (grch.), eigentlich Oberbefehl oder Obergewalt, nannte man in Griechenland namentlich die diplomatische und militaerische Fuehrung, die einem einzelnen Staate wegen seiner Machtfuelle, Tapferkeit und Kriegserfahrung seiner Buerger von einer Anzahl anderer Gemeinden eingeraeumt wurde. Zuerst trat Sparta, nachdem es zeit der Mitte des 6. Jahrh. v. Chr. der Vorort der peloponnes. Staaten geworden war, zur Zeit der

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Perserkriege an die Spitze von Hellas, indem damals die meisten griech. Staaten sein Fuehrerschaft sich unterordneten. Doch entstanden bald Spaltungen in dieser Verbindung. Sparta geriet seit 461 in Konflikt mit dem seemaechtigen Athen, welches selbst seit 476 an der Spitze eines grossen Inselbundes stand, und nun den Spartanern ueberall als ebenbuertige Macht die Spitze bot. Erst als die Macht Athens im Peloponnesischen kriege gebrochen war (404), konnten die Spartaner ihr frueheres uebergewicht wiedererlangen. Unter Epaminondas' fuehrung machte hernach Theben, welches Sparta in der Schlacht bei Leuktra (371 v. Chr.) demuetigte, eine Zeit lang mit Erfolg den Versuch, die H. an sich zu ziehen. Nach Epaminondas' Tode riss dann bei dem unaufhoerlichen inner Hader der Griechen Koenig Philipp von Macedonien als Sieger in der Schlacht bei Chaeronea (338 v. Chr.) die H. an sich.

Hegemony (Greek), literally, supreme command or supremacy, in Greece in particular designating the diplomatic and military control which was granted to an individual state because of the authority, bravery and war experience of its citizens by a number of other states. Sparta, having since the mid-6th century BC attained the first place among the Peloponnesian states, first reached the pinnacle of Hellas at the time of the Persian Wars, through most of the Greek states' subordinating themselves to its leadership at that time. But divisions soon developed in this connection. From 461, Sparta clashed with Athens, powerful at sea, which itself since 476 had headed a large island-league, and now offered its leadership everywhere, as a power equal to Sparta. Only after the power of Athens was broken in the Peloponnesian War (404) could the Spartans regain their earlier ascendancy. Afterwards, Thebes, under Epaminondas' guidance, which humiliated Sparta in the battle of Leuctra (371 BC) , tried to acquire the Hegemony, with success--for a while. Then after Epaminondas ' death, by reason of the incessant internal strife of the Greeks, King Philip of Macedon, as victor in the battle of Chaeronea (338 BC), seized the Hegemony (*Allgemeine deutsche Real-Encyklopaedie fuer die gebildeten Staende,* 1824, s.v. Hegemonie).

Hegemony! The Greeks had a word for it: Ἡγεμονία, *hêgemonía*. Near the beginning of the 19th century, the Germans did too: *Hegemonie*. Continental classical scholars revived the ancient study of hegemony: landmark scholarly works were the 3 volume study of the rise and fall of Spartan "*Hegemonie*" by J.C.F. Manso (1800-1805) and the Dutch historian-politician Groen van Prinsterer's (1821) discussion of the "*hegemonia*" of Athens. The concept, directly appropriated with the classical meaning and references, but rendered into the appropriate vernacular, soon entered German popular encyclopedias and "Conversations-Lexica" such as those of F.A. Brockhaus (*Allgemeine deutsche Real-Encyklopaedie fuer die gebildeten Staende,* 1824) or H.A. Pierer (1840-1846), where it found enduring lodgement.

Indeed, the Greeks had so many words for or about hegemony that, when we look at the classics, we can hardly avoid the conclusions that hegemony is more than simply an ancient concept: it is an ancient subject of learning, well developed over centuries, and one which deserves to be examined in its own context in evaluating hegemonic theory in the current context, and in the comparative study of civilizations and world systems. What, then, do the Greeks have to say about

hegemony, and its associated ideas? Quite a bit, in fact, and the topic is worth tracing even to its archaic roots.

For instance, the Greeks had a word for hegemon: Ἡγεμων, i.e. *hêgemôn.*

THE HEGEMON IN HOMER

The term *hêgemôn*, and some of its associates, can be found in Homer's *Iliad.* What is today called the "Catalogue of Ships" in the *Iliad* (2: 494-759) is labeled in the text itself (2.487, 2.760) as a list of the *hêgemones Danaôn***,** giving the personal names of the headmen of 29 allied forces, which had converged upon Troy in more than a thousand ships--such names as Ajax, Diomedes, Agamemnon, Menelaus, Nestor, Odysseus, Idomeneus, Achilles, and dozens of others. In translation, the *hêgemones* become, variously, "captains" (1924 [Murray]: I:87; 1950 [Lang, Leaf and Meyers]: 33; 1997 [Lombardo]: 35), "chiefs" (1942 [Butler]: 33), "leaders" (2002 [Johnston]: iliad2, line 565), "lords" (1992: [Fitzgerald]: 51), and those "Who of the Greeks at Troy commanded men" (1844 [Hobbes]: 22). In action, the *hêgemones* give orders, lead others into combat, and take the forefront in battle. While none of the translations is wrong, I would incline to say that the best English rendering of Homeric *hêgemôn* is "commander."

While classical Greek adds other meanings for *hêgemôn*, the most frequent application of the term remains Homeric: it denotes an individual holding a military command, frequently also a political power-holder, king or emperor (Liddell and Scott 1968, s.v. *hêgemôn*).

GREEK *HÊGE-* TERMS WITHOUT ENGLISH DESCENDANTS

A further and substantial complex of Greek words deriving from the root *hêge-* refers to leadership, guidance, governance, and command, especially in war. Some members of the complex have not made their way into English: e.g. *hêgemoneuô* (lead the way, lead in war, rule, command, govern), as in the Iliad (2.816).

Trôsi men hêgemoneue megas koruthaiolos Hektôr Priamidês…

"The Trojans were led by (*hêgemoneue*) great Hector of the flashing helm, the son of Priam…. " (1924 [Murray]: I:111; "led" also in translations of 1844 [Hobbes]: 28, 1967 [Lombardo]: 47, and 1992 [Fitzgerald]: 62); "great Hector of the glancing helm was leader" (1950 [Lang, Leaf and Meyers]: 42); "Priam's son, great Hector of the gleaming helmet, commanded (*hêgemoneue*) the Trojans…."(1942 [Butler]: 40).

Like *hêgemoneuô*, *hêgemoneus* (governor), *hêgemoneô* (have authority), *hêgemonis* (imperial), *hêgeomai* (go before, lead the way, lead or command in war, rule, have dominion), *hêgêsis* (command), and *hêgêtôr* (leader, commander, chief) have also left no English descendants. (For each of these terms, see Liddell and Scott,1968, s.v. id.) But the case of *hêgemonía* is quite other. From it derives the enormously influential English term "hegemony." (One cognate term, "*hêgemonikos*," has also revived, as "hegemonic").

HÊGEMONÍA AND "HEGEMONY"

Hêgemonía has a flourishing modern descent: not just English "hegemony" and German "*Hegemonie*" but also "*hegemonía*" (Spanish), "*egemonia*" (Italian), and "*hégémonie*" (French). Why this progeny? The modern writers recognized that the classical concept of *hêgemonía* had contemporary relevance.

To the Greek writers, *hêgemonía* might imply no more than being a guide, going first, or setting an example; but more often it carried a weightier meaning--the authority or rule of a dynasty or nation, or of a general or officer; political leadership, political supremacy, chief command, imperium (Liddell and Scott, 1968 s.v. *hêgemonía*). It is the latter sense which was revived in the 19th century. The largest portion of the entry for *hêgemonía* in the "middle Liddell" Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon is the most concise and relevant reference: "**hêgemonia**...[II.2] *the hegemony* or *sovereignty of one state over a number of subordinates,* as of Athens in Attica, Thebes in Boeotia--*the hegemony* of Greece was wrested from Sparta by Athens; and the Peloponn[esian] war was a struggle for this *hegemony*." (Emphasis in original.)

The 19th century classicists recognized contemporary state-subordination phenomena that resembled the subordinations of classical history. The dominance of Holland within the confederate "Republic of the Seven United Provinces" (1581-1795), the dominance of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France over dozens of client republics, duchies and kingdoms, notably the "Confederation of the Rhine" (1806-1813), the dominance of Austria in the "German Confederation" (1815-1866), and, later, the dominance of Prussia in the "North German Confederation" (1866-1871) provided a striking set of current analogues. Accordingly, the English term "hegemony," like its cognates in other Western languages, deriving from an extension of classical studies to modern history, was quite consciously made close in its meaning to the Greek original: "Leadership, predominance, preponderance; esp. the leadership or predominant authority of one state of a confederacy or union over the others: originally used in reference to the states of ancient Greece, whence transferred to the German states, and in other modern applications" (*Oxford English Dictionary* 1933, s.v. hegemony).

This suggests that an examination of the ways in which the Greek historians used the term *hêgemonía* (and its cognates), and of how the hegemonies they observed rose, continued and fell, might be of more than merely antiquarian interest. The abstract concept *hêgemonía* is classical rather than Homeric, and occurs most frequently in the works, not of poets, but of historians and politicians--most frequently in Diodorus Siculus, Flavius Josephus, Appian, Polybius and Isocrates. Let us undertake an examination of classical "hegemony."

Leaving aside the many references to the personal "hegemonies" of monarchs and commanders (Josephus, for instance, is concerned especially with the "hegemonic" ambitions of would-be Roman emperors), the classical writers investigated the state "hegemonies" or struggles for hegemony of Assyrians, Medes, and Persians; of Syracusans, Carthaginians and Romans; and, especially, of Spartans, Athenians, Thebans and Macedonians in the 5th and 4th centuries BC.

TRANSLATING *HÊGEMONÍA*

The various English translations given to the classical Greek *hêgemonía* offer a constellation of interconnected concepts. Some translators – Strabo's translator H.L. Jones (1924), for instance –

solve the problem by simply choosing "hegemony," but most, interestingly, choose one or another of a collection of not-quite-synonyms. These more nuanced renditions seem worth reviewing, and perhaps evaluating. The *hêgemonía* that hegemonizers sought, and hegemons achieved, has been variously translated as *power, leadership, command, supremacy*, *dominance, dominion, lordship, sovereignty*, and *empire*.

Hegemony means "power": in the Second Punic War, Scipio "crushed the Carthaginian power [*tên hêgemonían Karchêdonious*]" (Appian, *The Foreign Wars: The Punic Wars*, 1.2); "Scipio…humbled the Carthaginian power [*ho Karchêdonious...tên hêgemonían*]" (Appian, *The Foreign Wars: The Syrian Wars*, 2.9).

Hegemony means "leadership": the Scythians "originally possessed little territory, but later, as they gradually increased in power, they seized much territory by reason of their deeds of might and their bravery and advanced their nation to great leadership [*eis megálên hêgemonían*]" (Diodorus, 2.43.1). The legendary Athenian hero-king Theseus "accomplished ... the incorporation of the demes, which were small in size but many in number, into the city of Athens; ... from that time on the Athenians were filled with pride by reason of the importance of their state and aspired to the leadership of the Greeks [*tês tôn Hellênôn hêgemonías*]" (Diodorus, 4.61.9). When Xerxes the Persian invaded European Greece, the Athenians, to avert quarrels among the Greek resistance, waived their claim to command at sea, "seeing that if they quarrelled over the leadership [*tês hegemoníês*], Hellas must perish" (Herodotus, 8.3.1).

Hegemony means "command": before Xerxes' invasion of Greece, the allied Greek resistance asked Argos to join. The Argives replied that they would do so if they were awarded command of half the allied forces, although by right they should have had command [*hêgemoníên*] of the whole (Herodotus 7.148.4). When Gelon of Syracuse, whose power "was said to be very great, surpassing by far any power in Hellas," offered the Greek envoys an immense force with which to resist Persia, on condition of his being made "general and leader," the Spartan envoy indignantly denounced the idea that the Spartans should be "bereft of their command [*tên hêgemoníên*]" of the Greeks by a mere Syracusan (Herodotus, 7.145, 158-159). Command went to the Spartans; but the Spartan king Pausanias led the Greek alliance in an overbearing way, and, despite the allied victory at Plataea, the Athenians "made a pretext of Pausanias' highhandedness and took the command [*tên hêgemoníên*] away from the Lacedaemonians" (Herodotus, 8.3.2).

Hegemony means "supremacy": the Athenian general Cimon led an expedition to Cyprus (450-449 BC) with the objective of the "dissolution of the [Persian] King's entire supremacy [*holês ... tês basileôs hêgemonías*]" (Plutarch, "Cimon," 18.5). Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador to Camarina in the Sicilian Expedition of 415 BC, boasted that "after the Persian wars we acquired a fleet and rid ourselves of the rule and supremacy [*arkhês kai hêgemonías*] of the Lacedaemonians" (Thucydides, 6.82.2-3). After their defeat at Leuctra by Thebes, the Lacedaemonians "were never able to regain the supremacy over the Greeks [*tên tôn Hellênôn hêgemonían*] which they once possessed" (Strabo, *Geography*, trans. Jones, 9.2.39). In 314 BC Italy found "the Samnites, fighting bitterly against the Romans for supremacy [*tês hêgemonías*] in a struggle lasting many years" (Diodorus, 19.72.3). Scipio urged Rome to make a peace treaty with Carthage after the Second Punic War because "he considered it a sufficient success for Rome to have taken the supremacy [*tên hêgemonían*] away from Carthage" (Appian, *The Foreign Wars: The Punic Wars*, 9.65).

Hegemony means "dominance": "in this present Book we shall set forth the events which took place in Asia in the ancient period, beginning with the time when the Assyrians were the dominant power [*tês tôn Assuríôn hêgemonías*]" (Diodorus, 2.1.3). Themistocles the Athenian "had recourse to many ... ambitious undertakings which would serve to increase the dominant position [*hêgemonías*]" of Athens (Diodorus, 11.41.2).

Hegemony means "dominion": "Thus was the dominion of the Romans [*tên Rhômaiôn hêgemonían]* divided by the triumvirate among themselves" (Appian, The Civil Wars, 4.1.3). The Romans prepared Italy "as a centre from whence to enforce their universal dominion [*tên sumpasan hêgemonían*] " (Strabo, *Geography*, trans. Hamilton and Falconer, 6.4.2).

Hegemony means "lordship": after Cyrus the Persian overthrew the Mede Astyages son of Cyaxares, he heard, but deprecated, a petition from his nobles to take advantage of the fact that "Zeus grants lordship [*hêgemoníên*] to the Persian people," by resettling the Persians in some softer and more fertile land (Herodotus 9.122.2).

Hegemony means "sovereignty": after Cyrus destroyed the "sovereignty [*hêgemoníê*]" of Astyages the Mede (Herodotus, 1.46.1), his successor Cambyses, on his deathbed, charged the Persian nobles "not to suffer the sovereignty [*tên hêgemoníên*] to fall again into Median hands" (Herodotus, 3.65.6).

Hegemony means "empire": under (the legendary and feckless last Assyrian emperor) Sardanapallus "the Empire of the Assyrians [*hê tôn Assuríôn hêgemonía*] fell to the Medes" (Diodorus, 2.21.8). Cyaxares, their king, "was the first to try to attach to himself the neighboring peoples and became for the Medes the founder of their universal empire [*tês tôn holôn hêgemonías*]" (Diodorus, 2.32.3). Cyrus "transferred the Empire [*tên hêgemonían*] of the Medes to the Persians" (Diodorus, 2.33.6) and founded "the Persian Empire [*tês Persôn hêgemonías*]" (Diodorus, 2.22.3); Julius Caesar "advanced the Roman Empire [*tên hêgemonían tês Rômês*] as far as the British Isles" (Diodorus, 1.4.7).

Power, leadership, command, supremacy, dominance, dominion, lordship, sovereignty, empire: classical *hêgemonía* sits somewhere in their company. Can its nature be further specified than by such synonyms alone?

THE CHARACTER OF HEGEMONY

As the diversity of its translation-terms may suggest, the classical hegemonic relationship could have any of several different characters. Hegemony could be accepted willingly or unwillingly. "The Thessalians, Phocians, Aetolians, and all the other peoples of the region, … [Leosthenes] made his allies, bringing under his control (*tên hêgemonían*), by their own consent, the men whom Philip and Alexander gloried in controlling (*hêgoumenoi*) against their wish" (Hyperides, "Funeral Speech," *Speeches,* 6.13).

Imposed hegemony could equate to *collective slavery*: "after enslaving many great peoples which lay between the Thracians and the Egyptians they advanced the empire of the Scythians [*tên hêgemonían tôn Skuthôn*] on the one side as far as the ocean to the east, and on the other side to the Caspian Sea" (Diodorus, 2.43.5).

Hegemony could entail a more limited form of control over a subordinate state's exterior relations, allowing it to maintain internal self-rule. By the terms of a treaty of 314 BC mediated by a Carthaginian, "of the Greek towns in Sicily, Heraclea, Selinus, and Himera were to be

subject to the Carthaginians as they had been before, and all the others were to be autonomous [*autonómous*] under the hegemony [*tên hêgemonían*] of Syracuse" (Diodorus, 19.71.7).

Less often, but importantly, consensual hegemony could be an *elective authority*, a submission freely given, such as the Greeks gave to Athens on account of their respect for the justice of Aristides (Diodorus, 11.47.3), or the Sicilian Greeks to Syracuse on account of the fairness, humaneness, and mildness of Gelon (Diodorus, 11.67.2-4). Willing subordination produced allies, but in an alliance characterized by freedom without equality.

The style of hegemony could evolve. The Athenian ambassadors to Sparta (432 BC) admitted that they had become unpopular and obnoxious to their allies in their exercise of hegemony [*têi hegemoníai*], and had either to give it up, or to begin ruling the allies "with a strong hand." Motivated by pride, fear and self-interest, they chose to enforce their rule (Thucydides, 1.76.1-2).

Whether in the form of imposed slavery or voluntary submission, the common feature of all these styles of hegemony was *obedience* of the subaltern states or peoples to the commands of the hegemon, especially expressed by the hegemon's supreme command of joint military action.

HEGEMONY AND EMPIRE

Just as the English term "hegemony" derives from a Greek term, *hêgemonía*, whose earlier usage applied to a military command, so the English term "empire" derives from a Latin term, *imperium*, whose early usage also applied, very precisely, to military command. Following the displacement of Greek by Latin as the lingua franca of the learned of the West, and the later rise of vernaculars which quarried the established language of the learned to fit the circumstances needing to be described, "empire" entered the English vocabulary long before "hegemony" arrived. Do we need both these cognate terms? Have they usefully distinguishable meanings?

As there was great variation in the character of hegemonic relationships in classical Greece, there was also terminological ambivalence in the Greek description of hierarchical relationships. Like *hêgemonía,* the Greek term *arkhê* is also often translated as "empire" (or as "command"), but *arkhê* tends to denote a stronger form of subordination than *hêgemonía*. Indeed, there was some attempt among the Greek historians to distinguish *arkhê* from *hêgemonía*, making *arkhê* mean rule of and by force, while *hêgemonía* should rest upon merit and upon a conditional consent to obey. But there was also a tendency to conflate the two; according to Wickersham, the *arkhê--hêgemonía* distinction, most clear-cut in Herodotus, is ambiguous in Thucydides and Xenophon, and absent in Ephorus (Wickersham 1994: 20-21, 45-47, 58-61, 82-84, 126-127; see also his General Index, s.v. hegemony). Similarly, when Strabo (trans. Jones, 6.4.2) speaks of the Romans by the time of Tiberius having subjected, fought down, acquired, conquered, subdued, subjugated, etc. many countries, while others are ruled by dependent kings, and even the very powerful Parthians give Rome hostages and send to Rome for kings, it seems fair to expect an analysis of an "empire"; but Strabo repeatedly speaks instead of Rome's "hegemony" and of her "allies" [*summakhoi*]. Is it then worthwhile for us to draw a sharp distinction between *hêgemonía* and *arkhê*, or between hegemony and empire?

I would argue for the value of retaining a distinction (at least as between the English terms). Underlying the question of the degree to which subaltern states consent to their status, that

status itself implies that they retain a collective existence, a coherent identity – political, civic, cultural, territorial, demographic – which empire blurs, whether by the erasure or redrawing of traditional boundaries or by colonization and assimilation.

Even as we retain the distinction between hegemony and empire, we must accept that it cannot be very sharply drawn. There were many institutional transitions during the transformation of the Delian League into an Athenian Empire. Over time, entry into the alliance, and maintenance of membership, went from voluntary to coerced. Armed allies, providing autonomous forces to the alliance, became disarmed subjects paying tributes assessed by Athenian surveyors. Alliance decisions upon the employment of alliance funds and forces were replaced by unilateral Athenian decisions. Common funds once used for common military projects were diverted to provide benefits to the people and politicians of Athens. Eventually, Athens took hostages from suspect "allies," drove their citizens thought unreliable into exile, revised their constitutions, or settled Athenian overseers, garrisons and colonists upon them. (Diodorus 11.47, 70, 78, 83, 85; 12.5-7, 22, 27-28, 34, 37, 38, 40, 55, 46, 55, 72-73, 76; 14. 34, 36, 107; Plutarch, "Themistocles" 21.1; "Aristides" 24, 25; "Cimon" 11.1; "Pericles" 9, 12, 14, 16, 22-29, 34; Thucydides, 1.96-101, 105, 108, 111, 113-117; II 9, 63, 70, 102; III 2-6, 8-19, 25-28, 35-50). Considered together, all these measures constitute a repertoire of steps from hegemony to empire; yet there is no clear division point between the two very distinguishable conditions at either end of the multidimensional spectra.

With this caveat, let us proceed to examine the scope, motives, and natural history of Greek hegemony – i.e. *hêgemonía* and not *arkhê*, but *hêgemonía* that could always transform toward or into *arkhê* – as recorded and analyzed by the Greek historians.

THE SCOPE OF HEGEMONY

A hegemony could be held or sought with respect to a *nation*, e.g. the leadership of the Greeks, "*tês tôn Hellênôn hêgemonías*" (Diodorus, 4.61.9), or dominance over the Siceli, "*tês tôn ... Sikelôn hêgemonías*" (Diodorus, 12.29.2). Hegemony over a nation might be "homoethnic," whereby a tribe or other part of a nation took leadership of the whole, as the hegemony of the Trinacians over the Sicels, "*tês tôn homoethnôn ... hêgemonías*" (Diodorus, 12.29.2), or that of Saul the Benjamite "over the other tribes [*tên tôn ethnôn hêgemonian*] (Josephus, *Antiquities* 6.131)." Or the hegemony might be alloethnic, as of the Assyrians over many other nations (e.g. Diodorus, 2.2.3).

The venue of hegemony could be a *territory*: rule over Sicily, "*tês katà Sikelían hêgemonías*" (Diodorus, 13.22.5); over Boeotia, "*tês hólês Boiôtías hêgoúmenoi*" (Diodorus, 15.50.5); over Asia, "*tên hêgemonían ... tês Asías*" (Diodorus, 2.22.2).

A state could hold hegemony over the *land*, "*tên ge katà gên hêgemonían*" (Diodorus, 13.52.6) or the *sea*, "*tês katà thálattan hêgemonías*" (Diodorus, 11.50.3; cf. Polybius, 1.20.12), or both land and sea, "*tên hêgemonían katà gên háma kaì katà thálattan*" (Diodorus, 15.23.3-5).

There was hegemony over space, and hegemony over time: in 369 BC, the main issue of the Spartan-Athenian negotiations for an alliance against Thebes was whether to divide the land and sea commands [*tês hegemonías*], or to alternate them; a 5-day alternation in the command was the result (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.1.1-14).

Several forms or aspects of hegemony might coexist. Athens in the time of Pericles possessed "tributes, armies, triremes, the islands, the sea, the vast power derived from Hellenes, vast also from Barbarians, and a supremacy [*hêgemonían*] that was securely hedged about with subject nations, royal friendships, and dynastic alliances" (Plutarch, "Pericles" 15.1).

Hegemony could be bounded, and several coexisting hegemons could then accord one another recognition. Thus the Persian king Artaxerxes II brokered a settlement, mainly between Sparta and Athens, in which "the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, who had constantly been rivals for the hegemony [*tês hêgemonías*], now yielded one to the other, the one being judged worthy to rule on land, the other on the sea" (Diodorus, 15.38.4).

Or the hegemony claimed, desired or acquired, could be boundless, even world-embracing: over "the whole [*tôn holôn*]," over "Earth [*gê*]"; over "everything" [*hapantôn*]." Cyaxares "became for the Medes the founder of their universal empire [*tês tôn holôn hêgemonías*]" (Diodorus, 2.32.3). Alexander "framed his hopes to gain world dominion" [*tên tês oikoumenês hêgemonían*] (Demades, "On the Twelve Years," 1.50). Before the battle of Cannae, Hannibal promised his troops that a Carthaginian victory over Rome would make them "leaders of the world" [*hêgemones ... pantôn*] (Polybius, 3.111.9). The Romans prepared Italy "as a centre from whence to enforce their universal dominion" [*tên sumpasan hêgemonían*] (Strabo, trans. Hamilton and Falconer, 6.4.2). At the battle of Zama (202 BC), the Roman commander Scipio promised his troops that, if they were to defeat Carthage, they and their country would have not only Africa, but the "command and sovereignty of the rest of the world [*tês allês oikoumenês tên hêgemonían kai dunasteían*]" (Polybius, 15.10.2). After the defeat of Carthage, "[t]here was great rejoicing at Rome that this mighty city, which had brought so many calamities upon them and had been the second or third in the leadership of the world [*tôn epi tês gês deuteran ê tritên eichen hêgemonían*], had been completely vanquished" (Appian, *The Foreign Wars: The Punic Wars*, 9.57). It was the (perceived) boundlessness of the resulting Roman empire, which brought "all the known parts of the world under one rule and dominion" (Polybius, 8.2.4), that animated Polybius to write the "general history of the world as a whole [*tês katholikês kai koinês historías*]," (8.2.11) so that how the Romans attained to "universal empire" [*tês hapantôn h*êgemonías*] (8.2.6) might be learnt.

Today the subject of such boundless, all-embracing, universal hegemony would likely be styled "*the world system*."

MOTIVES OF THE HEGEMONIZERS

The Athenian ambassadors to Sparta, defending their acquisition of the Delian League, and its conversion from a voluntary to an enforced hegemony, gave as their motives honor (*timê*), fear (*deos*), and self-interest or profit (*ôphelia)*. They feared Persia, then Sparta, and sought a large naval following to protect themselves; they wished to be revered, respected, looked up to; and they enjoyed collecting tribute from their subject allies (Thucydides, 1.75.3-76.2). Sparta also turned hegemony into *ôphelia*: "In Greece the Lacedaemonians, now [404 BC] that they had brought the Peloponnesian War to an end, held the supremacy [*tên hêgemonían*] by common acknowledgement both on land and on sea." They proceeded to make use of this supremacy to appoint Spartan governors for the cities, and to levy tribute upon the conquered peoples (Diodorus, 14.10.1-2).

Power for its own sake, and for profit, mingled in the motives of hegemonizers. In 475 BC, the Spartan Assembly contemplated an attack upon Athens, with a war "to recover the leadership [*tên hêgemonían*], most present "believing that, if they could secure it, they would enjoy great wealth, Sparta in general would be made greater and more powerful, and the estates of its private citizens would receive a great increase of prosperity" (Diodorus 11.50.2-3).

If a hegemon led its followers to victory in war, it would gain *glory* (*doxa*). When the allied Greeks fought the army of Xerxes at Plataea (479 BC), the Spartans abjured the place opposite the Persians in the line of combat, and ordered the Athenians to take it up; and the Athenian Aristides urged his reluctant countrymen to accept this offer of "the leadership [*tên hêgemonían*] among the Hellenes on account of the "reputation" [*tên doxan*] that could thereby be gained (Plutarch, "Aristides," 16.2-3).

Achieving local hegemony could attract diplomatic conciliation, flattery, and offers of alliance from outside hegemons. By 380/79 BC, the Spartans "reached their greatest power, and won the overlordship of Greece on both land and sea [*tês Helládos...tên hêgemonían katà gên háma kaì katà thálattan*]. For the Thebans were secured by a garrison; the Corinthians and the Argives were safely humbled as a result of the previous wars; the Athenians had a bad reputation with the Greeks; the Lacedaemonians...were become an object of terror to all because of the strength of their following. Consequently the greatest rulers of that time, the Persian King and Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, paid court to [*etherapeuon*] the Spartan overlordship [*tên Spartiatôn hêgemonían*] and sought alliance with them" (Diodorus, 15.23.3-5).

LEVERAGING HEGEMONY

Hegemony in one venue could be employed as a means to mobilize the capabilities and victories needed to achieve (or aspire to) a still more extensive hegemony. In their war against Xerxes (480-479 BC), the Athenians "increased their leadership [*tên hêgemonían*] to such a degree that, by their own resources and without the aid of Lacedaemonians or Peloponnesians, they overcame great Persian armaments both on land and on sea, and humbled the famed leadership [*tên hêgemonían*] of the Persians to such an extent that they forced them by a treaty to liberate all the cities of Asia" (Diodorus, 12.2.1-2).   In this way the Athenians "won for themselves the leadership of Greece [*tês Helládos tên hêgemonían*]" (Diodorus, 13.25.2).

And again in 427 BC, "the Athenians, having won the supremacy of the sea [*tên tês thaláttês hêgemonían*] and accomplished great deeds, not only enjoyed the aid of many allies and possessed powerful armaments, but also had taken over a great sum of ready money, since they had transferred from Delos to Athens the funds of the confederacy of the Greeks, which amounted to more than ten thousand talents; they also enjoyed the services of great commanders who had stood the test of actual leadership; and by means of all these assets it was their hope not only to defeat the Lacedaemonians but also, after they had won the supremacy over all Greece [*tês Helládos tên hêgemonían*], to lay hands on Sicily" (Diodorus, 12.54.3).

In the 360s BC, Athens was sea-hegemon, Sparta was the declining land-hegemon, Thebes the ambitious and rising land-hegemonizer. Athens annoyed Thebes by assisting Sparta in its unsuccessful resistance to the growth of Theban land-power. In consequence, the Thebans decided in 364/3 BC that, having obtained the mastery on land, they should now "strive for the supremacy on the sea [*tês katà thálattan hêgemonías*]." They proceeded to order ships and

dockyards and to create and send out to sea a force which overawed the Athenian admiral and "made the cities friendly to Thebes," i.e. gained island and coastal allies (Diodorus, 15.78.4 – 79.2, 88.4).

Without local hegemony to leverage, one's ability to acquire hegemony in a wider arena remained in doubt. The Athenian politician Nicias, objecting in 416 BC to Athens' projected expedition against Syracuse, asked: "so long as they [the Athenians] were unable to secure their supremacy over the Greeks [*tôn Hellênôn tên hêgemonían*], how could they hope to subdue the greatest island in the inhabited world? [when] even the Carthaginians..., who possessed a most extensive empire [*megístên hêgemonían*] and had waged war many times to gain Sicily, had not been able to subdue the island…" (Diodorus, 12.83.6).

HOW HEGEMONY WAS GAINED

Hegemony was usually acquired by victorious war. In 455 BC, the cities of Sicily chose sides between Acragas and Syracuse and a general war ensued. The Syracusans won (Diodorus, 12.8). Thereupon, "the Greek cities of Sicily ... voluntarily conceded the hegemony [*tên hêgemonían*] to the Syracusans..." (Diodorus, 12.26.3). When in 404 BC Sparta finally crushed Athens to end the great Peloponnesian War, one of the terms of the peace required the Athenians to recognize the hegemony of the Lacadaemonians [*Lakedaimonios hêgeomai khrêsthai*] (Diodorus, 13.107.5). Rome's victory in the Mithridatic War "brought the greatest gains to the Romans, for it pushed the boundaries of their dominion [*tên hêgemonían*] from the setting of the sun to the river Euphrates" (Appian, *The Foreign Wars: The Mithridatic Wars* 17.119).

Establishing a friendly, or puppet, government after a victory or by intervening in civil strife was both a form of, and a means to, hegemony. Under the Peace of Antalcidas (387 BC), Sparta settled its dual war against Greeks and Persians by conceding dominance over the Greek cities in Asia to the Persian king, and independence to the other Greeks; but the Spartans soon "made up their minds to recover their supremacy [*tên hêgemonían*]" (Diodorus, 15.9.5), and to that end made use of factions of their friends in the Greek cities, including exiles whom they restored by force; "they at first enslaved the weaker cities, but afterward made war on and forced the more important cities to submit" (Diodorus, 15.5.3).

But the victory needed to be convincing to all. Upon defeating the Spartans at Leuctra (371 BC), the Thebans "claimed the hegemony of Greece [*tês tôn Hellenôn hêgemonian*]," but the Spartans refused to acknowledge defeat, and the Thebans lacked full faith in their victory (Polybius, 2.39.8), and indeed were never able to get the submission of Sparta, nor of Athens.

Good behavior by a powerful state could increase its influence. The transfer of Greek hegemony from Sparta to Athens in 477 BC was stimulated by the (deliberately) good behavior of the hegemonizer, by contrast with the bad behavior of the hegemon. "When [Aristides the Athenian] was sent out as general along with Cimon to prosecute the war, and saw that Pausanias and the other Spartan commanders were offensive and severe to the allies, he made his own intercourse with them gentle [*praiôs*] and humane [*philanthrôpôs*], and induced Cimon to be on easy terms [*euarmoston*] with them and to take an actual part in their campaigns, so that before the Lacedaemonians were aware, not by means of hoplites or ships or horsemen, but by tact [*eugnômosunêi*] and diplomacy he had stripped them of the leadership. For, well disposed as the Hellenes were toward the Athenians on account of the justice [*dikaiosunên*] of Aristides and the

reasonableness [*epieikeian*] of Cimon, they were made to long for their supremacy still more by the rapacity of Pausanias and his severity" (Plutarch, "Aristides," 23.1-2). "Consequently, the allies no longer paid any heed to the commanders who were sent from Sparta, but in their admiration of Aristides they eagerly submitted to him in every matter." Thus Sparta lost "the supremacy at sea [*tên katà thálattan hêgemonían*]" to Athens without a fight (Diodorus, 11.44.5-6, 11.46.4-5). This episode was, however, unusual enough to inspire nostalgic reminiscence more than a century later; the Athenian orator Isocrates declared, "in former times....as the result of keeping our city in the path of justice and not coveting the possessions of others we were given the hegemony [*tên hêgemonían*] by the willing consent of the Hellenes" (Isocrates, "On the Peace," 30) .

Nicolaus of Syracuse made a similar nostalgic argument in 413 BC: "those who lay claim to leadership [*tês hêgemonías*], men of Syracuse, should not strive to make themselves strong in arms so much as they should show themselves reasonable [*epieikeis*, "fair," "mild"] in their character. The fact is that subject peoples bide their time against those who dominate them by fear and, because of their hatred, retaliate upon them, but they steadfastly cherish those who exercise their leadership humanely [*philanthrôpôs*, "benevolently"] and thereby always aid them in maintaining their supremacy [*tên hêgemonían*]." He reminded them that their historic "leadership in Sicily [*tês katà Sikelían hêgemonías*]" arose because the cities of Sicily had willingly put themselves under the authority of Gelon, drawn to him by his "fairness [*epieikeia*]" and his "sympathy for the unfortunate" (Diodorus, 13.21.8-13.22.5).

Xenophon's Socrates makes the same case, apparently on behalf both of individual fitness to command and state fitness to lead: those who are observed to behave justly, to abide by laws, are trusted, sought as friends and allies, and given leadership and command [*hêgemonían*] of garrisons and cities ("Memorabilia," 4.4.17). And in chapter V of his "Ways and Means," Xenophon addresses those who wanted to recover Athens' "ascendancy" [*hêgemonían*] by making an eloquent case for what might in a different context of today be called a "peaceful rise," or in Chinese Pinyin, *Zhōngguó hépíng juéqǐ*:

> [T]here are some who wish the state to recover her ascendancy, and they may think that it is more likely to be won by war than by peace. Let such, in the first place, call to mind the Persian Wars. Was it by coercing the Greeks or by rendering services to them that we became leaders of the fleet and treasurers of the league funds? Further, after the state had been stripped of her empire through seeming to exercise her authority with excessive harshness, did not the islanders even then restore to us the presidency of the fleet by their own free will, when we refrained from acts of injustice? And again, did not the Thebans place themselves under the leadership of the Athenians in return for our good offices? Yet once again, it was not the effect of coercion on our part, but of generous treatment, that the Lacedaemonians permitted the Athenians to arrange the leadership as they chose. And now, owing to the confusion prevalent in Greece, an opportunity, I think, has fallen to the state to win back the Greeks without trouble, without danger, and without expense. For she has it in her power to try to reconcile the warring states, she has it in her power to compose the factions contending in their midst. And were it apparent that you are striving to make the Delphic shrine independent, as it used to be, not by joining in war, but by sending embassies up

and down Greece, I for my part should not be in the least surprised if you found the Greeks all of one mind, banded together by oath and united in alliance against any that attempted to seize the shrine in the event of the Phocians abandoning it. Were you to show also that you are striving for peace in every land and on every sea, I do think that, next to the safety of their own country, all men would put the safety of Athens first in their prayers (Xenophon, 1925:"Ways and Means," 5.5-10).

Self-interested calculations could produce hegemonic subordination; powerful states could persuade weaker states to accept their hegemony by offering to defend their autonomy and their regimes, in return for submission. Referring to the Athenian-led "Delian League," to which Athens' allies contributed ships or money, Isocrates claimed that "our ancestors...acted for the advantage of the states which paid them tribute...not because we had so commanded, but because they themselves had so resolved at the very time when they conferred upon us the supremacy [*tên hêgemonían*] by sea.... [T]hey paid their quotas...to preserve their own democratic polity and their own freedom" (Isocrates, "Panathenaicus," 67-73).

Any state which could assemble armaments and money could enter the struggle for hegemony, sometimes simply by making a hegemonic claim, whose success however was by no means guaranteed. Gelon demanded that the Greek resistance to Xerxes willingly submit to Syracusan hegemony, or at least give him an equal share of the supreme command, on the grounds that he could provide the largest army and the largest navy of all the Greeks; but his demands were angrily rejected by the two next-most powerful states, Sparta and Athens (Herodotus, 7.157-162). In 370/69 BC, "Jason, tyrant of Pherae, because of his superior shrewdness as a general and his success in attracting many of his neighbors into an alliance, prevailed upon the Thessalians to lay claim to the supremacy in Greece; for this was a sort of prize open to those strong enough to contend for it." Sparta had just been defeated at Leuctra, "the Athenians laid claim to the mastery of the sea only," Thebes had only just freed herself from Sparta, and Argos was sunk in civil war; absent other claimants, Jason and Thessaly put themselves forward. Perhaps coincidentally, Jason was shortly thereafter assassinated, which terminated the Thessalian candidacy (Diodorus, 15.60.1-2).

Defeated hegemonizers could try again at once. 412 BC: "When the Athenians learned of the total destruction of their forces in Sicily, they were deeply distressed at the magnitude of the disaster. Yet they would not at all on that account abate their ardent aspiration for the supremacy [*tês hêgemonías*], but set about both constructing more ships and providing themselves with funds wherewith they might contend to the last hope for the primacy [*tôn prôteíôn*]" (Diodorus, 13.36.1). Or nostalgic ex-hegemons could seek a later, even much later, resurrection: when Alexander died in 323 BC, "the Athenians ventured to assert their liberty and to claim the leadership of the Greeks [*tês koinês tôn Hellênôn hêgemonías*]," since they had money and soldiers enough at hand to sustain the inevitable war (Diodorus, 18.9.1); and the Argives fighting Sparta at Mantinea 418 BC were inspired to reclaim the "ancient hegemony" [*palaías hêgemonías*] they had possessed in the days of Agamemnon, 8 centuries or so before (Thucydides, 5.69.1). And in 279 BC, the Athenians were awarded command [*hêgemonían*] of the Greek forces that unsuccessfully resisted Brennus' invading Gauls at Thermopylae "because of their ancient reputation" (Pausanias, 10.20.5).

Hegemony in a voluntary alliance could be rotated or divided. The anti-Spartan defensive-retaliatory Quadruple Alliance of 420 BC (Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis) promised the supreme command [*tên hêgemonían*] of any defensive coalition force to whichever allied state the Spartans might have attacked; but in retaliatory expeditions, the command [*tês hêgemonías*] was to be equally shared (Thucydides 5.47.7). Athens and Sparta rotated the command at set times in their alliance of 369 BC; the anti-Theban Peloponnesian League of 362 BC agreed that each people should hold the leadership [*hêgemonías*] of League forces within its own territory (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.1.14, 7.5.3).

HOW HEGEMONY WAS KEPT

Hegemony was subject to constant challenge, and might have to be maintained by constant war. Xerxes, preparing the Persians for their expedition against Athens, declared: "We have never yet remained at peace since...we won this our lordship [*tên hêgemoníên*] from the Medes" (Herodotus, 7.8A.1).

Hegemons feared the rise of new and independent powers, and obstructed it wherever they could. Preventive war was the usual means. In the late 6th or early 5th century BC, "since the city [of Heracleia, on the southern coast of western Sicily] grew rapidly, the Carthaginians, being jealous of it and also afraid that it would grow stronger than Carthage and take from the Phoenicians their sovereignty [*tên hêgemonían*], came up against it with a great army, took it by storm, and razed it to the ground" (Diodorus, 4.23.3). And in 468 BC, Argos, hegemonic in its vicinity, felt threatened by the independence of Mycenae. "The Mycenaeans, because of the ancient prestige of their country, would not be subservient to the Argives as the other cities of Argolis were, but they maintained an independent position and would take no orders from the Argives.... [T]he Argives were suspicious of the Mycenaeans, fearing lest, if they got any stronger, they might, on the strength of the ancient prestige of Mycenae, dispute the right of Argos to the leadership [*tês hêgemonías*]." Therefore, at a moment when the Mycenaeans were isolated, "the Argives, gathering a strong army from both Argos and the cities of their allies, marched against the Mycenaeans," defeated them in battle, besieged them, stormed the city, "sold the Mycenaeans into slavery, dedicated a tenth part of them to the god, and razed Mycenae" (Diodorus, 11.65.1-5).

440 BC:

The Syracusans had made subject to them all the cities of the Siceli with the exception of Trinaciê, and against it they decided to send an army; for they were deeply apprehensive lest the Trinacians should make a bid for the leadership of the Siceli, who were their kinsmen...[*tês tôn homoethnôn Sikelôn hêgemonías*]. Consequently the Syracusans marched against [Trinaciê] after having mustered all their own armaments and those of their allied states. The Trinacians were without allies, since all the other states were subject to the Syracusans, but they none the less offered a strong resistance. They held out valiantly against the perils they encountered and slew great numbers, and they all ended their lives fighting heroically.... And the Syracusans, after conquering in brilliant fashion men who had never before been subdued, sold the inhabitants into slavery and

utterly destroyed the city, and the choicest of the booty they sent to Delphi as a thank-offering to the god (Diodorus, 12.29.1-4).

In 382/1 BC, "mindful of the danger that Thebes, if a suitable occasion arose, might claim leadership [*tês hêgemonías*] of Greece," the Lacedaemonians seized the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes, defeated Theban resistance, expelled some Thebans, terrorized the rest, and stationed a Spartan garrison there. "So the Thebans in this way lost their independence and were compelled to take orders from the Lacedaemonians" (Diodorus, 15.20.3).

The Thebans having remained outside some treaties made in 372/1 BC to divide hegemony in Greece between Athens and Sparta, the Spartans "decided to lead a large army against them as common enemies, for they cast an extremely jealous eye upon their increase of power, fearing lest with the leadership of all Boeotia [*tês hólês Boiôtías hêgoúmenoi*] they might break up the Spartan supremacy [*tên hêgemonían tês Spártês*], given a suitable opportunity" (Diodorus, 15.50.5).

Since hegemony often rested on the competence and charisma of a single person, a new ruler of a hegemonic state could expect to be challenged, and had to be prepared for a quick response. Upon the death of Philip II of Macedon, "the Athenians were not ready to concede the leading position among the Greeks [*tês hêgemonías tôn Hellênôn*]" to his son Alexander, and instigated a general revolt; but Alexander "brought everything into order impressively and swiftly. Some he won by persuasion and diplomacy, others he frightened into keeping the peace, but some had to be mastered by force and so reduced to submission" (Diodorus, 17.3.3-6).

The hegemon's claim to lead implied the obligation to lead, and to bear the costs of leadership, and was sustained thereby. Facing insuperable odds against the Persian invaders of Greece at Thermopylae (480 BC), the Spartan king Leonidas told his Lacedaemonians that "they must remain and not abandon the defence of the pass, for it was fitting that those who were the leaders of Hellas [*toùs hêgouménous tês Helládos*] should gladly die striving for the meed of honor"; the other Greeks he sent away (Diodorus, 11.9.1). The Spartan defenders of Thermopylae were slaughtered, but Sparta retained the supreme command of the allied Greek resistance to Persia.

HOW HEGEMONY WAS LOST

Thermopylae notwithstanding, hegemony unraveled fastest after military defeat,. In 446 BC, the Athenians were disastrously defeated at Coroneia in Boeotia, whereupon many cities revolted from them (Diodorus, 12.7.1). The Spartans were defeated by Thebes at Leuctra in 371/0 BC, and then again at Mantinea in 362 BC were "utterly routed and hopelessly lost their supremacy [*tên hêgemonían*]" (Diodorus, 15.33.3; see also Polybius 9.8).

Subject allies were most likely to defect when the circumstances of the hegemon's defeat produced not admiration but contempt (*kataphronêsis*). In 412 BC, "after the Athenians had collapsed in Sicily, their supremacy [*tên hêgemonían*] was held in contempt [*kataphronêthênai*]; for immediately the peoples of Chios, Samos, Byzantium, and many of the allies revolted to the Lacedaemonians" (Diodorus, 13.34.1-2).   Similarly, when in 396 BC the Carthaginians suffered a decisive defeat before Syracuse, and abandoned their Libyan subject allies, the Libyans, "who had long hated the oppressive rule of the Carthaginians [*to baros tês tôn Karkhêdoníôn*

hêgemonías]... were inflamed against them. Consequently, being led on partly by anger [*orgê*] and partly by contempt [*kataphronêsantes*] for them because of the disaster they had suffered, they endeavored to assert their independence" (Diodorus, 14.77.1-2).

Not just military defeat, but any disaster which gave an impression of loss of power could evoke *kataphronêsis* and cause hegemonic relations to unravel. In 379/8 BC, "a plague broke out among the inhabitants of Carthage which was so violent and took off so many of the Carthaginians that they risked losing their commanding position [*tên hêgemonían*]. For the Libyans, undervaluing [*kataphronêsantes*] them, seceded, and the Sardinians, thinking they now had an opportunity to oppose the Carthaginians, revolted, and making common cause, attacked the Carthaginians" (Diodorus, 15.24.2).

Indeed, a hegemony based upon the prestige of a single leader could vanish at the moment of his demise. When Epaminondas died in victorious battle at Mantinea (362 BC), leaving no competent successor, he took with him the Theban "primacy of Hellas" *[tên hêgemonían tês Helládos*] and Theban hopes for command of the sea (Diodorus, 15.78.4-79.2, 15.88.4).

Just as hegemony was more durable when the subalterns perceived their hegemon as kindly (*eunoïkos*) and fair (*dikaios*), so the abuse of hegemonic power, or a sense of its abuse, could provoke revolt against it. "[T]he superiority of those who enjoy leadership [*tôn hêgemónôn*] is maintained by goodwill [*eunoiai*] and justice [*dikaiosunêi*], and is overthrown by acts of injustice [*adikêmasi*] and by the hatred [*misei*] of their subjects" (Diodorus, 14.2.1). Abuse-engendered hatred of a hegemon could inspire its subject to transfer their submission to a rival. After leading the allied Greeks to victory at Plataea (479 BC), the Spartan commanders were "offensive" (*epakhtheis*) and "cruel" (*khalepous*) to their allies, showed "rapacity" (*pleonexia*), "severity" (*barutês*) and "angry harshness" (*orgês ... kai trakheôs*); in consequence, the Greek allies repudiated Spartan leadership [*tên hêgemonían*] (Plutarch, "Aristides" 23.1-5). In 477, the Athenians "succeeded…to the leadership [*tên hêgemonían*] over the allies, who freely chose them on account of their hatred [*misos*] of Pausanias," the violent and tyrannical Spartan commander (Thucydides, 1.96.1).

And after 386 BC, the Lacedaemonians once again proceeded to lose "the supremacy over the Greeks [*tên tôn Hellênôn hêgemonían*]" because they "used their allies roughly (*biaiôs*, "violently") and harshly (*khalepôs*), stirring up, besides, unjust and insolent (*huperêphanous*, "arrogant," "brutal") wars against the Greeks, and so it is quite to be understood that they lost their rule because of their own acts of folly. For the hatred of those they had wronged found in their disasters an opportunity to retaliate upon their aggressors..." (Diodorus, 15.1.2-4).

Greed (*pleonexia*) seemed to be the downfall of more than one hegemon of Greece. The accusation of rapacity laid against the Spartan commander Pausanias by the Greek allies in 478 BC was doubtless related to the war-taxes paid by the Greeks, who wanted to be assessed, but equably, and were satisfied by the tax-assessment of Aristides the Athenian. But as time passed, Athens trebled the assessments, spent them on its own spectacles, images and temples (Plutarch, "Aristides" 24.1-3), and in its turn earned the disaffection and rebellion of its subject-alliance.

Excess in general (*hubris*) could provoke rebellion. When the Romans conquered the Gallic Senones, expelled them from their territory, occupied the emptied land and colonized it with Romans, the Boian Gauls, who had been conquered and subjected, became convinced that

Rome intended not just supremacy (*hêgemonías*), but ethnic cleansing – "expulsion and extermination" – and so revolted once again (Polybius 2.21.9).

Hegemonic subjects might also be provoked to revolt by the blandishments of an antihegemonic coalition. In 395 BC, all the other major powers of Greece – Thebes, Athens, Corinth and Argos – allied against Sparta. "It was their thought that, since the Lacedaemonians were hated by their allies because of their harsh (*baros*) rule, it would be an easy matter to overthrow their supremacy [*tên hêgemonían*], given that the strongest states were of one mind. First of all, they set up a common Council in Corinth to which they sent representatives to form plans, and worked out in common the arrangements for the war. Then they dispatched ambassadors to the cities and caused many allies of the Lacedaemonians to withdraw from them..." (Diodorus, 14.82.1-2).

Hegemony might even be voluntarily forsworn, though such abnegation was rare. After losing their command of the Greek alliance to Athens in 479 BC, the resentful Lacedaemonians at first threatened the Greeks who had fallen away from them with "appropriate punishment" and "considered making war upon the Athenians for the sake of regaining the command of the sea [*tês katà thálattan hêgemonías*]," but were influenced toward retrenchment by evidence that their commanders had been "corrupted by the great powers entrusted to them." Tired of the Persian war, fearing new corruption should they send out new commanders, uncertain that their interests required command of the sea, and persuaded that Athens was both capable and friendly, the Spartans decided that it was in Sparta's interest to "leave the Athenians with their leadership [*tês hêgemonías*]" (Diodorus, 11.50.1-6; Plutarch, "Aristides" 23.6; Thucydides, 1.95).

A fallen hegemony did not mean a reversion to general independence; successful rebels aspired to be masters. In 382 BC, Sparta installed a garrison in the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes, to return the latter to its previous subject-ally condition. The Thebans resisted, and expelled the garrison in 379, defeating a relieving force as well. But that successful resistance to being subjugated led Thebes to entertain the greater ambition of subjugating others. By 375/4 BC, the Thebans, with good commanders and troops, were "elated in spirit and eager to dispute the supremacy on land [*tês katà gên hêgemonías*]" (Diodorus, 15.39.1). In 371/0 BC, the Thebans, led by Epaminondas, inflicted a severe defeat upon the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra (Diodorus, 15.55-56), then celebrated the role-reversal by invading and devastating Laconia (Diodorus, 15.63-66). Thus the Thebans, "who for many generations had been subjects of their superiors [the Spartans], when they defeated them to everyone's surprise, became supreme [*hêgemónes*] among the Greeks" (Diodorus, 15.1.5 – the "Theban hegemony" is however not generally accepted, though the Theban desire to possess such hegemony is conceded).

HEGEMONY AND IDEOLOGY

While most of the propaganda disseminated during hegemonic struggles appealed to the freedom and pride of the states, the long struggle between Sparta and Athens also involved a conflict of political ideology with respect to regime type, and their conflicting ideologies attracted appropriate support. "[T]he foremost Corcyraeans, who desired the oligarchy, favoured the cause of the Lacedaemonians, whereas the masses which favoured the democracy were eager to ally themselves with the Athenians. For the peoples who were struggling for leadership [*tês hêgemonías*] in Greece were devoted to opposing principles; the Lacedaemonians, for example,

made it their policy to put the control of government in the hands of the leading citizens of their allied states, whereas the Athenians regularly established democracies in their cities" (Diodorus, 13.48.4) . "[E]ach of the two states that in the past held the leadership [*hêgemoníai*] of Greece took as a pattern the form of government that existed among themselves and set up in the one case democracies and in the other oligarchies in the cities, not considering the interest of the cities but their own advantage" (Aristotle, *Politics* 4.1296a).

SUBHEGEMONY

One could seek a delegated or local hegemony under the hegemony of an overlord. In 367 BC, the Thebans, "who were continually planning how they might obtain the leadership [*tên hêgemonían*] of Greece," hit on a means to use their past services to the Persians as a means to obtain Persian endorsement of their plan to get control of a Greek alliance to constrain Sparta and Athens; but both the wealth and the fighting capacity of the Persians were judged inadequate to convince the Greeks of the need to bend to Persian directives with Theban enforcers (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.1.33-40).

Other applications for subhegemony were more successful. In 457 BC, Sparta and Athens were at war. The Thebans, having lost their ancient influence and reputation, were held in disdain by their Boeotian neighbors, who no longer paid any attention to them; Thebes "asked the Lacedaemonians to aid them in winning for their city the hegemony [*tên hêgemonían*] over all Boeotia," in return for which the Thebans would attack the Athenians; and indeed the Lacedaemonians assented, and "compelled the cities of Boeotia to subject themselves to the Thebans" (Diodorus, 11.81.2-3). In 387 BC, it was Sparta's turn to apply for subhegemon status: the Spartans, questing for "supremacy in Greece [*tên tôn Hellênôn hêgemonían*]" needed Persian money to finance their seizure of power, and for that money negotiated and enforced the Peace of Antalcidas, under which the Greek cities of Asia were abandoned to Persian rule, while the leagues led by Thebes and Athens were dissolved, and Sparta got a free hand to order affairs in Greece (Polybius, 6.49-50).

ROOTS OF HEGEMONY

Of all the classical writers, it is Strabo, writing at the height of Roman expansion under Augustus and Tiberius, who gives greatest attention to the underlying factors which advantaged some states in the competition for hegemony. Strabo attributes the Spartan hegemony to their (ultra-militaristic) Lycurgan constitution: "after they had intrusted to Lycurgus the formation of a political constitution, they acquired such a superiority over the other Greeks, that they alone obtained the sovereignty both by sea and land, and continued to be the chiefs of the Greeks, till the Thebans, and soon afterwards the Macedonians, deprived them of this ascendency [*tên hêgemonían*]" (*Geography*, trans. Hamilton and Falconer, 8.5.5). A warlike culture was also serviceable to non-Greek hegemonizers: referring to the Arsacids of Parthia, and their governance of a large country and many nations, Strabo declares that the magnitude of their domain "is to be attributed to their mode of life and manners, which have indeed much of the barbarous and

Scythian character, but are very well adapted for establishing dominion [*hêgemonían*], and for insuring success in war" (*Geography*, trans. Hamilton and Falconer, 11.9.2).

Militarism alone was not enough, however; there was a place for diplomacy as well. Thebes' sudden loss of hegemonic prospects after the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea in 362 BC inspired Ephorus to reflect upon the requisites of durable hegemony, some of which Thebes lacked. As cited by Strabo, Ephorus praises Thebes' home region, Boeotia, for its fertility and its good strategic position, and judges that:

> [I]t has natural advantages for obtaining supreme command [*hêgemonían]*, but… from want of careful education and learning [*paideiai*], even those who were from time to time at the head of affairs did not long maintain the ascendency they had acquired, as appears from the example of Epaminondas; at his death the Thebans immediately lost the supremacy they had just acquired. This is to be attributed, says Ephorus, to their neglect of learning [*logôn*], and of intercourse [*homilías*] with mankind, and to their exclusive cultivation of military virtues. It must be added also, that learning and knowledge are peculiarly useful in dealing with Greeks, but in the case of Barbarians, force is preferable to reason. In fact the Romans in early times, when carrying on war with savage nations, did not require such accomplishments, but from the time that they began to be concerned in transactions with more civilized people, they applied themselves to learning, and so established universal dominion (Strabo, *Geography*, trans. Hamilton and Falconer, 9.2.2).

The hegemony of Rome being to Strabo the most impressive, he discussed its sources at some length, and gave particular emphasis to the local geopolitics and geoculture of Italy:

> And while I have already mentioned many things which have caused the Romans at the present time to be exalted to so great a height, I shall now indicate the most important things. One is, that, like an island, Italy is securely guarded by the seas on all sides, except in a few regions, and even these are fortified by mountains that are hardly passable. A second is that along most of its coast it is harborless and that the harbors it does have are large and admirable. The former is useful in meeting attacks from the outside, while the latter is helpful in making counter-attacks and in promoting an abundant commerce. A third is that it is characterized by many differences of air and temperature, on which depend the greater variation, whether for better or for worse, in animals, plants, and, in short, everything that is useful for the support of life. Its length extends from north to south, generally speaking, and Sicily counts as an addition to its length, already so great. Now mild temperature and harsh temperature of the air are judged by heat, cold, and their intermediates; and so from this it necessarily follows that what is now Italy, situated as it is between the two extremes and extending to such a length, shares very largely in the temperate zone and in a very large number of ways. And the following is still another advantage which has fallen to the lot of Italy; since the Apennine Mountains extend through the whole of its length and leave on both sides plains and hills which bear fine fruits, there is no

part of it which does not enjoy the blessings of both mountain and plain. And add also to this the size and number of its rivers and its lakes, and, besides these, the fountains of water, both hot and cold, which in many places nature has provided as an aid to health, and then again its good supply of mines of all sorts. Neither can one worthily describe Italy's abundant supply of fuel, and of food both for men and beast, and the excellence of its fruits. Further, since it lies intermediate between the largest races [i.e. Iberians, Celts and Germans] on the one hand, and Greece and the best parts of Libya [i.e. modern Tunisia] on the other, it not only is naturally well-suited to hegemony [*hêgemonían*], because it surpasses the countries that surround it both in the valor of its people and in size, but also can easily avail itself of their services, because it is close to them (*Geography*, trans. Jones, 6.4.1).

Polybius attempts to move toward a comparative study of hegemonies and their several roots. In his view, the hegemonies of Persia, Sparta and Macedon were so noticeably inferior to that of Rome, who subjected "nearly the whole of the world [*skhedon de pasan ...tên oikoumenên*]" that it was important to learn how Rome succeeded where others failed (*Histories*, 1.2.7). Polybius proposed that it was the Romans' "schooling themselves in …vast and perilous enterprises" – long, unbroken wars involving unprecedentedly large forces – that gave them both the ambition and the capacity to achieve "universal dominion [*têi tôn holôn hêgemonia*]" (*Histories*, 1.63.9), while the ability to mobilize such forces was a consequence of their political institutions (1.64.1-2) and their abundant revenues (6.50.6), as well as of customs and institutions which assigned public glory to the heroic dead (6.51-56).

CONCEIVING HEGEMONY, CLASSICAL AND MODERN

These episodes in classical history, as narrated by the inventors of the concept of hegemony, seem to provide a reasonably consistent theory of what hegemony is, and how and by whom it is, or may be, desired, sought, acquired, kept, shared, passed onward, and lost.

We can derive some useful shades of meaning of "hegemony" from the need felt by the translators of classics to translate *hêgemonía* differently in different contexts, as *power, leadership, command, supremacy*, *dominance*, *dominion, lordship, sovereignty*, and *empire*. But the historically most central meaning, and the most useful for both comparative and contemporary usage, appears to be *command*, especially *supreme command*.

Hegemony is clearly a political, or politico-military relationship, not an economic nor a cultural one, though wealth and culture may be resources that enable hegemony. More particularly it is a power relationship of great inequality, most particularly one not of unbalanced *capabilities* only, but of asymmetric *influence*, influence consciously intended, consciously exerted and consciously accepted.

There is a wide range of bases of hegemonic influence. Some sources of politico-military hegemony might reasonably be called "cultural" or "moral" – this when willing compliance is awarded because of admiration and a good reputation. Some sources of hegemony might be called, broadly or narrowly, "economic" – broadly when they involve an calculation of self-interest and an exchange of value for value, narrowly when they entail money going one way (subsidy from the

hegemon, or tribute to the hegemon), in return for the use or the availability of force (in the hegemon's enterprises, or for the defense of the subject ally). And some sources of hegemony seem quite narrowly politico-military: the threat of force and the use of force by the hegemon to compel or reward alliance and allied compliance; the hegemon's intervention in the ally's constitution, so as to empower a faction preferred by or loyal to the hegemon.

Classical hegemony entails conspicuous agency; classical hegemons consciously contemplate and intend hegemony. Hegemons and hegemonizers want hegemony for its own sake, for security against fear, and for the wealth, glory, respect, and flattery it can bring in its train.

Hegemony may be sought or exercised over nations, over an alliance, over territories or regions, over the land or the sea, or over *tôn holôn*, "the whole." "Territories" turn out to be the states and nations thereon, "land" and "sea" are actually "the mainland states" and "the island states," and *tôn holôn* is the world system, the system of states. Thus the targets or subjects of hegemony are also conscious actors.

A <u>bilateral</u> hegemonic relationship between states would involve a hegemon that led, and was followed by, some less powerful state – call it an ally, an auxiliary, a subject ally, a subaltern, a protectorate – over which it exercised its influence through some combination of charisma, morality, defense, extortion, assistance, deception, threat, intervention, or coercion. A key locus of the hegemonic relationship would be joint warfare, in which the hegemon would take the lead and the joint command, whosoever interests were at stake.

The hegemon of a <u>region</u> or of a multilateral <u>alliance</u> would procure followership in the same ways as the hegemon in a bilateral relationship, and additionally by leading the combined force of the alliance against its own rebellious or recalcitrant members, as well as against external enemies. Either a set of bilateral arrangements or a single multilateral structure (or even both) could institutionalize a regional hegemony: i.e. the hegemon's several allies might or might not also be mutually allied; they could even be quite hostile to one another;

<u>Systemwide</u> hegemony is more than power unipolarity, but less than universal empire. On the one hand, a unipolar capability distribution would not be a hegemony until accompanied by a unipolar influence structure of actual leadership and followership; on the other hand, a systemwide hegemony would become a systemwide empire when the subject peoples and states were remixed and reordered as provinces, nomes, satrapies, prefectures – as the internal segments of a new large state. A world system with a hegemon would have a unipolar influence structure, perhaps a collection of bilateral connections to the hegemon, perhaps a general confederation with the hegemon its permanent president, perhaps some more mixed and complex structure. The hegemon of a world system would exercise its influence similarly to a regional/alliance hegemon; but as all states in the system would be under its hegemony, there would be no external enemies to combine against, but only the occasional rebellious confederate ally to be put down.

We can learn much from study of the most frequent hegemonies (bilateral, regional, and alliance hegemonies) that can be applied to the study of the much rarer civilization-wide, systemwide hegemony. But for purposes of theoretical development, and even of policy discussions concerning the power structure of the current global civilization/world system, I would judge that the concept of greatest interest, and the topic most in need of comparative-historical study, is systemwide hegemony, "*hê tôn holôn hêgemonía.*"

Those who revived the classical term for modern application found ample scope for its employment in the context of the 19th century. That much of the phenomenology of "classical" hegemony is evident in 20th century world politics, and in the contemporary world, probably

requires no extensive proof. Perhaps the insights of the classical writers can still be of service to analysis and policy, to scholarship and to statecraft.

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BRINGING THE MILITARY BACK IN:
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1990 TO 2003[1]

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ABSTRACT

After the "peace bonus" era, global military expenditures have escalated sharply despite some worldwide declines in military personnel. Theories on the economic impacts of the military institution and escalated military spending greatly differ and include arguments that they either improve domestic economic performance or crowd out growth-inducing processes. Empirical findings on this matter are inconclusive, in part due to a failure to disentangle the various dimensions of military expenditures. We further suggest that modern sociology's relative inattention to such issues has contributed to these shortcomings. We explore a new dimension of military spending that clarifies this issue—military expenditures per soldier —which captures the capital intensiveness of a country's military organization. Our cross-national panel regression and causal analyses of developed and less developed countries from 1990 to 2003 show that military expenditures per soldier inhibit the growth of per capita GDP, net of control variables, with the most pronounced effects in least developed countries. These expenditures inhibit national development in part by slowing the expansion of the labor force. Labor-intensive militaries may provide a pathway for upward mobility, but comparatively capital-intensive military organizations limit entry opportunities for unskilled and under- or unemployed people. Deep investments in military hardware also reduce the investment capital available for more economically productive opportunities. We also find that arms imports have a positive effect on economic growth, but only in less developed countries.

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INTRODUCTION

Research on the "military", broadly construed, has been largely absent from the major general sociological journals in the recent past. Since the beginning of this century, our search of the literature identified only 3 articles in the three primary journals (*American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces*) with the term "military" in the title.[2] (Lundquist 2004, 2008; Teachman 2004). In the previous decade (1990-1999), we found a total of 7 publications on the military in these journals, and only 3 articles in the 1980s. There is, of course, an ASA journal dedicated to the military; *The Journal of Political and Military Sociology*. However, articles published in this journal appear have little impact on the discipline, as evidenced by an average impact factor of approximately 0.053 for 2005 through 2007 (Journal Citation Reports 2008). This is somewhat surprising given the enormous direct and indirect impact the military has had on society throughout history. There are many possible explanations for the dearth of publications in this area, including the end of the draft, a general aversion of many sociologists to the military, and the "closed" nature of the military establishment. Whatever the reason, we believe it to be a significant omission. The current Iraq War highlights some of the direct and indirect impacts of the military establishment, with thousands dead and many more thousands wounded, massive population dislocations, and billions of dollars spent. It is estimated that the military now consumes between 21% and 50% of the annual U.S. budget, with estimates varying principally due to data source (e.g., U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] versus Stockholm Peace Research Institute) and the operationalization of the construct "military expenditures" (e.g., military personnel, operations and maintenance, research and development, international security, homeland security versus retirees pay, among others). But the more ubiquitous aspects of the military are also significant globally in terms of military aid, weapons sales, etc. Though it may not be apparent, the military impacts many aspects of our social, political, and economic lives.

We draw attention to one aspect of the military – its increasing capital intensiveness - and its impact the labor force and economic development. We will argue (with support from empirical findings) that the military establishment's growing reliance on material over "boots on the ground" limits its traditional role as employer of last resort and pathway of upward mobility for the uneducated and unskilled in our society. This inhibits the growth of the labor force, which slows economic growth. In raising these issues we also hope to bring the military back into focus as a significant actor that is a legitimate area of study for mainstream sociology.

Military Expenditures and Economic Development

Coupled with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new "neoliberal order," hopes were raised globally for a peace dividend" that could lead to economic growth and improvements in social well being. World military expenditures in constant dollars declined significantly in the 1990s despite advances in military technology, as the total armed forces in the world dropped

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[2] Four additional articles were published in these journals that included some aspect of military in their analyses as control variables (e.g. Jenkins and Scalan 2001). While we do not claim that in its many aspects militarism has uniformly and monumentally increased in recent times, it is surprising that it is so relatively understudied by sociologists.

from 28,300,000 to 22,3000,000 (ACDA 2000:61). But world military expenditures began to rise again in the late 1990s and escalated to $956 billion in 2003, an 18% increase in just two years (SIPRI 2004).

For many the logic is clear: had global *reductions* in military expenditures been sustained, they could have promoted near-universal improvements in economic growth and human welfare; thus, the "guns or butter" choice is an unambiguous one favoring reductions in military spending (Kourvetaris 1991). Yet militarization-economic growth linkages are complex (Scanlan and Jenkins 2001) and some contend that "guns *and* butter" better describes the empirics of this relationship (Benoit 1973; Firebaugh and Beck 1994). The estimated 2007 military budget inclusive of military personnel, military construction, and other defense-related activities was over $571 billion. This figure makes other governmental expenditures pale by comparison. For example, despite the national determination of an energy and environmental crises, when taken *together* the amount the government has earmarked for these functions is less than 7 percent of that which is put into the military (Budget of the U.S. Government 2008).

Questions over the military impact extend well beyond the U.S., Western Europe and global powers such as China and Russia, who also have escalated their military outlays in recent years. Indeed the military is the largest single component in most government bureaucracies in developing nation-states. Close to two-thirds of the world's soldiers now are in developing countries alone. Even with the global spread of democracy in over sixty developing countries the military institution exercises significant executive, judicial and legislative power over the citizenry (Sivard 1993).

When these circumstances are coupled with post World War II evidence from Japan and West Germany showing favorable connections between de-militarization and economic growth, questions about the influence of military spending on economic advance are germane. In ensuing discussions we develop competing theorizations on the impacts of the military institution and military expenditures on growth and review the evidence. Theory and evidence suggest the need for analyses that decompose military spending effects on growth, with a focus on disentangling the impacts of military spending on personnel *versus* equipment as a key axis for judging these effects.

LITERATURE REVIEW[3]

The Evolution of the Modern Military Establishment

Tilly (1994) argues that the current inter-state system is the result of a merging of coercive and economic power between A.D. 1000 and 1800. Prior to this time, economic and coercive, or military, power were separate. Political units, such as states, feudal areas and empires, were essentially containers of coercive power, used this power to acquire the necessary goods, and people, to maintain their systems and to defend against external threats. Economic power resided

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[3] There is little extant literature on the impact of military expenditures on labor force changes to guide our work. Angrist (1998) finds that soldiers received higher pay than comparable civilians in the early 1980s and that military participation is associated with higher rates of employment after service for veterans.

within cities, the centers of economic activities in these times, and where capital was accumulated by the emerging burgher class. As military technology progressed and warfare became more expensive, these political organizations were forced to look to cities for the financing of their military activities. The resulting relationship between state and city, of coercive and economic power, solidified over this 800 year period, giving rise to the modern nation-state system.

If the historical role of the military described above seems straight forward, this is no longer the case. The coalescence of military and economic power has clearly intensified over the last two hundred years. In scholarly circles sociologists adopting global perspectives have been particularly likely to address the mutually reinforcing roles of military and economic dynamics and the states that wed them (see e.g., Frank 1969; Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn 1998). In parallel fashion, President Eisenhower himself, in his farewell address (1961) to the nation treated the rise of this "new" military institution saying:

> "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of
> unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial
> complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
> persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties
> or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and
> knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial
> and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that
> security and liberty may prosper together."

Eisenhower's musings aligned with C. Wright Mills' (1956) earlier description of the power elite of America. A decade before Eisenhower's speech, Mills (1956:215) warned of a great structural shift in America toward a permanent war economy with institutionalized militarism, as "military men and policies have increasingly penetrated the corporate economy."

These configurations undoubtedly have changed with the advent of new forms of military bureaucracy and electronic warfare, which depends more heavily on outsourcing and privatization - what some refer to as a "neoliberal" era. And among other things, they have been altered worldwide by transitions in global formations that only partially resemble those in force during the Eisenhower era.

The Determinants of Military Expenditures

The funding for this "new" military establishment reflects the increasing integration of this institution with private enterprise. A review of the literature suggests that military budgets are not exclusively, or even primarily, a function of external threats. In a study of eight East Asian countries between 1983 and 1993, Li (1997) finds that defense budgets were not driven by either internal or external security threats. Instead, Li finds that subsidized military industries and military corruption are the prime determinants of these expenditures. Similarly, Seiglie (1996) and Seiglie and Liu (2002) report that only a portion of military expenditures in developing countries can be accounted for by external threats and that a significant portion of these budgets are predicted by other factors.

This integration of the military and private economic spheres of the economy complicates the budget process. This is exacerbated by the emergence of "revolving elites" discussed by Mills

(1956), a group of individuals who move from a position of power in one sphere (military, government, corporate) to another. Military and/or political decision makers may be influenced by the possibility of obtaining employment in the private sector at a later point in time. Furthermore, corporate elites who become political elites may also influence expenditures because of previous business relationships and the possibility of a subsequent return to the private sector.

Military as a Modernizing Institution

Guns *and* butter advocates contend that the military institution may generate modernizing and prodevelopmental results (Pye 1962; Janowitz 1964; Weede 1983, 1986, 1993; Davis, Kick and Kiefer 1989; Bullock and Firebaugh 1990; Kick et al. 1998). Modernists argue that especially in Third World countries militaries are leading social institutions that serve a vital role in producing modernized attitudes and cultivating the foreign investment and aid necessary for economic growth (Pye 1962; Stockwell and Laidlow 1981). When militaries in the developing world model their countries after successful market economics they serve integrative functions by inducing values of discipline, achievement motivation and pride in national citizenship (Andreski 1968). These are the major forces behind modernized societal development more generally (Pye 1962; Benoit 1973; Stockwell and Laidlow 1981). This argumentation directly parallels Weber's (1921) interpretations that modern military forces break down old, rigid and traditional value systems while building the individual and group discipline and rationalized approaches that promote economic growth (see also Benoit 1973, p. 88).

Benoit maintains that the military introduces both military personnel and the civilian population to:

> Important industrial and urban skills and attitudes such as: following and
> transmitting precise instructions; living and working by the clock; noticing and
> reading signs; spending and saving money; using transportation (bicycles,
> motorcycles, autos, buses, boats, planes, etc.); working with, repairing and
> maintaining machinery; listening to radios; becoming interested in national and
> even international news; etc. (Benoit 1973:17).

Similarly, the modernized military are more open to an increasingly global "universalism" (Meyer et al. 1997) that binds conflicting national communities (tribes, ethnicities) through the recruitment of officer corps and rank-and-file military personnel from all sectors of society.

The military also is argued to contribute to economic growth across societies through its provision of housing, clothing, food, education, training, medical care and income in a manner which would not otherwise be possible. Military training relatedly fosters human capital as it heightens basic literacy and numeracy, as well as general and technical education levels. These create more rationalized and efficient means of
organization and production, inducing economic growth (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Weede 1983, 1986, 1993). With these functions the military becomes a key national institution, channeling large segments of the population into civilian sectors across the spectrum of nations (Pye 1962;

Janowitz 1964; Johnson 1964; Russett 1969; Benoit 1973; Weede 1983; Kick and Sharda 1986; Davis et al. 1989; Kick et al. 1998).

Proponents maintain as well that militaries require national infrastructures that have widespread benefits (Benoit 1973; Sen 1984). Military transportation and communication requirements simultaneously facilitate the national infrastructure, heightening "moral density" and thereby contributing to economic growth (see Delacroix and Ragin 1981; Durkheim [1893]1984). Further, military personnel impact national growth when they participate in civic programs and agricultural production. This they have periodically done in infrastructural programs in Latin America (the construction of roads, bridges, schools and health facilities—see Agüero 1994; Bustamante 1998) as well as the U.S. and Western Europe (Samuelson 1979; Looney 1990:41). Parallel dynamics are visible in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East (see e.g., Hestman 1978; Newman 1978; Kurian 1982; Looney 1990; Sanday 1991). Cheung (1988) identifies comparable contributions in China, where the PLA has been responsible for developing communication lines, training 1.5 million technicians, and bringing internal integration to the Xinjian region. The military's "opening-up" of otherwise inaccessible hinterland areas also is said to foster economic expansion and labor force opportunities, especially in developing societies (Newman 1978; Kurian 1982; Babin 1990; Looney 1990; Bunbongkarn 1991; Chowdhury 1991; Sanday 1991; Firebaugh 1992; Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva 1996; Kick et al. 1998).

Despite some key differences in argumentation, similar predictions are made by defense economists who identify favorable effects of the military on economic growth. These economists theorize that the military can enhance state security and enforce the property rights and market dynamics that produce growth in a global capitalist system. Military expenditures also can stimulate growth through increasing public demand and capacity utilization based on a Keynesian-style demand and related spin-offs (Baran and Sweezy 1968; Kidron 1970; Benoit 1973; Bluestone and Havens 1986). Military research and defense expenditures may also yield technological innovations with broader applicability that can enhance more widespread production and growth.

As a modernizing institution, the military can create socioeconomic conditions that fuel economic growth in both developing and developed countries. This is true insofar as the military addresses idle capacity, unemployment and underconsumption resulting from low domestic demand, while increasing profits and related investments, leading to "multiplier effects" and longer-run growth (Benoit 1973; Deger 1986; Chowdhury 1991). Payoffs for already developed countries such as the U.S. can be greater during slack economic periods and as a result of a mounting convergence between military and civilian technologies. While there always has been at least some overlap between useful technical innovations in the military and market economies of advanced societies, the emergence of information and network-centric technologies in both sectors suggest that synergies, rather than "trade-offs" may increasingly typify military-market relationships. To be sure, this is relevant to national economic growth as well as the institutionalizing of the "permanent war economy" (Eisenhower 1961; Mills 1956).

In sum, modernization theorists in sociology and a number of defense economists share the view that in many ways the military bolsters national economies. The causal mechanisms they focus upon differ in a number of ways, but regardless of pathway they come to comparable conclusions about favorable military inputs to national economic well-being. However, whether the arguments are cast at more abstract or concrete levels, political economy approaches reach an

opposing conclusion. In concert with a different clustering of defense economists, they conclude that "guns <u>or</u> butter" more aptly describes the impact of the military on the national economy.

The Political Economy of Military Expenditures

In sharp contrast to the "guns *and* butter" interpretation, political economy and dependency theorists contend that militarization negatively impacts national socioeconomic processes, including economic growth (see Kaldor 1976; Eide 1976; Albrecht 1977; Lock and Wulf 1977; Senghaas 1977; Wolpin 1977; Abell 1994; Levy 1998). Poorer countries have relied heavily on foreign, particularly U.S., political-military support in return for domestic investment concessions. These arrangements contribute to a variety of economic and social ills, including economic stagnation (Senghaas 1977; McKinlay and Mughan 1984:251-258; Trumper and Phillips 1997). For example, insofar as the military in developing countries depends upon foreign patrons such as the U.S., domestic economic policies favor patron capital accumulation requirements rather than domestic needs.

The military also may not bring about the social integration emphasized by modernists. Military culture and national culture need not be mutually supportive and can in fact be disarticulated due to the patron-conditioned functions that third-world militaries perform. Further, recruitment into the military may be restricted to groups and communities that are already comparatively privileged and powerful. A number of dependency economists level even more serious indictments of military expenditures as a retardant to economic growth. It is argued that when military participation is relatively low, its role in training citizens for the economy is marginal. Further, unless military and economic institutions are well articulated, military training can be largely irrelevant to the rest of the economy. These theorists thus emphasize "guns *or* butter" as a crucial economic growth alternative.

A number of defense economists also argue for unfavorable effects of the military on economic growth, although from a vantage. Their contentions extend broadly to both poorer and richer nations. Some defense economists claim when labor is in short supply and skilled workers are at a premium, military employment of skilled labor becomes an "opportunity cost" for the rest of the domestic economy. Put another way, if the military and productive civilian sectors of a society are in competition rather than a synergy, the military will be a human capital drain rather than an overall economic stimulant for both wealthy and poorer nations (Russett 1979; Samuelson 1979; Knight et al. 1996).

Comparable arguments apply to military expenditures generally. Samuelson (1979) questions reliance upon a "permanent war economy," arguing that similar attention to civilian alternatives would yield equivalent employment and income multiplier effects, as well as more favorable, long-term positive impacts (Abell 1994). While the education and skills military personnel receive can benefit both the individual and society, these benefits may not be optimal as "spillovers"—instead, specific training in other skill-related areas probably produces greater payoffs to economic growth (Russett 1979).

Writers for the International Monetary Fund (Knight et al. 1996:1) claim that, in general, military spending may reduce resources available for investment in "productive capital, education, and market-oriented technological innovation." Thus, military expenditures may adversely impact investments, savings and human capital, and infrastructure programs, which could make far greater contributions to economic growth through their inputs to other

components of the economy (Mintz and Chan 1991; Mintz and Huang 1991; Ward and Davis 1992; Frederiksen and Looney 1994; Heo and DeRouen 1998). More concretely, increased military spending must be paid for by increased taxations, and it usually results in budget deficits which reduce savings, consumption and returns on fixed capital. Since military spending is not governed by more efficient "market processes" it creates "relative price distortions," "dead-weight losses to total productive capacity," and non-competitive rent-seeking activities (Knight et al 1996). These circumstances are aggravated insofar as military technologies are disarticulated from the technologies that are most relevant to the market and to consequent economic growth. These arguments align with political economy interpretations in advancing "guns *or* butter" interpretations.

Military Expenditures, Labor Force Growth, and Economic Development

It is theorized that military expenditures expand the labor force. Griffin, Devine, and Wallace (1982) argue, from a new-Marxian perspective, that expenditures are used by national policy makers to regulate levels of unemployment during periods of economic contraction. Their empirical findings of the effects of aggregate military expenditures on labor force growth between 1949 and 1976 support their argument. These findings are replicated by Mintz and Hicks (1984).

It is argued further that labor force expansion should have a positive effect on economic growth. Crenshaw, Ansari, and Christenson (1977) outline several reasons for this relationship. First, labor force growth boosts aggregate demand (Bloom and Freeman 1988, Barlow 1994), In addition, there are economies of scale due to expansion of the domestic market, reductions in the cost of the public infrastructure, and a greater complexity in the division of labor (Todaro 1989).

Combining these two arguments, we might reasonably expect military expenditures to increase economic development by expanding the labor force. It is this pathway we intend to examine.

Empirics of Military Spending and Growth

Unfortunately, the empirical literature offers divided assessments of military-economic growth interdependencies. Benoit's (1973) landmark cross-national study shows that defense spending may stimulate aggregate demand leading to economic growth, although his effort has been critically evaluated in subsequent research (Ball 1983). Others report favorable defense spending effects (Kennedy 1974; Whynes 1979), especially over the longer term (Babin 1990), in resource-rich lesser developed countries (Fredericksen and Looney 1982) or in service-related sectors only (Hall 1988). Contrasting results show no consistent defense spending effects (Chowdhury 1991), inconclusive findings (Biswas and Ram 1986) or negative effects for industrialized countries (Smith 1977).

There are a variety of plausible reasons for these divided assessments. One is the unit of analysis; whether these processes are examined for individual states (Mintz and Hicks 1984; Mintz and Huang 1991; Ward and Davis 1992; Frederiksen and Looney 1994), or geographic regions such as Asia (Heo and DeRouen 1998), Latin America (Looney and Frederiksen 1986), or Africa (Looney 1988).

Another concerns the lack of model specificity. For instance, Mintz and Huang (1991; Deger 1986) argue that it is important to consider the intervening mechanisms by which military expenditures impact economic development.

Also, expenditures may effect economic growth differently, hinging on differences in national characteristics. For example, Frederiksen and Looney (1982, Looney 1988) find that expenditures as a whole spur economic growth for developing countries that are not "resource constrained" (i.e. debt, access to credit) but hinder growth for those that are. Mintz and Stevenson (1995) suggest that expenditures may have a positive effect for a small group of wealthier countries, such as Israel, Taiwan, Iran, and Iraq, but this positive effect may not be true for poorer countries.

We address these concerns in our subsequent analyses. We analyze a cross-national sample, reducing bias in generalizations which is more likely in analysis of single countries or regions. We further statistically adjust for the effects of national characteristics, providing better estimates of real military expenditure – economic growth linkages (e.g., labor force). And we focus on what we feel is a particularly important factor in military expenditure effects – the disaggregation by type of military expenditures.

Disaggregating Military Expenditures: A Capital Intensive Military

There are many critiques of prior research. For instance, Griffen, Devine and Wallace (1982a, 1982b; see also Mintz and Hicks 1984; Kick and Sharda 1986) argue that when total military expenditures effects only are estimated, the different effects of its parts are missed. This position finds empirical support in the literature. For instance, prior results, while somewhat inconsistent, show that military expenditures in total may not foster economic advance, money spent on soldiers ("military participation") specifically serves a "modernizing function" (Kick and Sharda 1986; Babin 1990; Bullock and Firebaugh 1990; Weede 1993; Kentor 1998; Kick, Davis, and Kentor 2006). Findings such as these justify separating military expenditures into those supporting military personnel versus those for military equipment (although we note that. institutions such as secondary education may promote human capital growth even better than military participation) (Kentor 1998; Kick et al 1998; Kick et al. 2006).

In this study, we examine a new aspect of military expenditures—***military expenditures per soldier***. This measure, introduced by Kentor (2004), reflects the level of capital intensiveness of the military. Capital intensiveness taps the quality, or structure, of this form of military expenditures in a way that total military expenditures cannot. The capital-intensiveness of the military is very important to a world undergoing significant changes in military equipment and personnel. For example, modern warfare depends more on electronics, communication, and information technology than it has before. Artificial intelligence, robotic planes and other unmanned vehicles, imaging sensors, and wireless communications increasingly define modern warfare. Consistent with these changes are transformations in personnel themselves. Mobile armed forces now are trained in operating highly technical and complex systems. The parallel need for greater and greater coordination results in more emphasis on key functions performed by bureaucrats, specifically officers, than in the past.

We suggest this new focus of military spending inhibits economic growth, in part, by limiting the military's traditional role as "employer of last resort" and "pathway of upward mobility." "Hi-tech" armies need highly trained soldiers to use the more sophisticated weaponry.

This requires, first, a higher level of intelligence and education for many inductees than was previously needed. This excludes some of those who in earlier times used the military as an employer of last resort. Second, a capital intensive military requires significantly increased training costs and a larger bureaucratic apparatus. The more restrictive recruitment policies associated with growing bureaucracies and high technology capabilities places relatively higher limits on the number of uneducated (undereducated) and unemployed (underemployed) people. This prospective labor pool might otherwise use skills acquired in the military to obtain jobs in the private sector. The dynamics of the new military thus restrict the labor pool and increase private sector training costs. Long-term, a more selective military may perpetuate an "underclass" that can no longer avail itself of the upward mobility previously afforded by the military. We conjecture too that this may increase social welfare costs and exacerbate income inequality. Finally, a more limited military focused on high-technology warfare can be disarticulated in social and economic ways from the broader societal needs it once served. It is not uncommon among more agrarian societies with labor-intensive militaries to find soldiers assisting farmers and the construction of basic infrastructures such as roadways and bridges. The "new hi-tech military" will be less likely to provide the socially integrative and infrastructural functions discussed by modernists and others (e.g., Andreski 1968).

Following the above arguments, we derive our primary research hypothesis: *Military expenditures per soldier will inhibit economic growth by slowing the growth in the labor sector*. It is the empirical testing of this hypothesis to which we now turn, alongside our examination of other military impacts on economic growth.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

We examine cross-national linkages between economic growth and "decomposed" military antecedents to growth for a wide range of countries. We introduce appropriate statistical controls from prior efforts, but also controls and technical adjustments that have not been employed in most prior studies, while treating a contemporary but essentially unanalyzed time period, 1990 to 2003. This relatively unique analytical undertaking thus focuses upon the post Cold War period, including a time when the global "peace dividend" was in operation. Another important aspect of these forthcoming analyses is that the period examined is one of the first treated in the literature in which information technology has played a central role in weapons production and military engagements around the world.

Methodology

In the first part of the analyses, we use panel regression models to estimate the impacts of various aspects of military on economic growth.[4] In this research design, the dependent variable,

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[4] Many scholars (Frees 2004; Halaby 2004; Wooldridge 2006) argue that fixed and random effects models are preferable to the panel models used here due to heterogeneity bias. We agree. However, FEM/REM models require multiple time periods for analysis. This would be inappropriate for this study, since we are arguing that the time period under question (1990-2003)

measured as a change score ((2003 – 1900) / 1990) is regressed on the independent variables at Time 1 (1990). We also include a measure of the dependent variable at Time 1 as an independent variable. This "lagged" dependent variable is included to control for prior states of the countries examined and the possibility of reciprocal causality. [5]The resulting parameters estimate the effect of the independent variables in 1990 on the *change* in the dependent variable over the time period in question. In the second phase of the analyses, we use structural equation models to estimate the direct and indirect effects of the exogenous military variables on labor force growth and economic development.

Countries Included in the Analyses

Researchers have chosen various ways to define the appropriate population for cross-national analyses on economic growth. Some choose to exclude wealthy countries from their analyses, arguing that the processes that affect less developed countries differ from those for developed nations (Chase-Dunn 1998; Kentor 1998, 2000, 2001; Kentor and Boswell 2003). The sample is typically determined by national scores on measures such as the GDP per capita. Others include all countries for which data are available, due to an otherwise very limited case base, or argue that there is insufficient theory to warrant a separate sample. We estimate our model for two samples. The first sample includes all countries for which complete data are available (N=67). The second sample excludes countries with GDP per capita of $15,000 or greater. This excludes developed countries such as the United States, France, and Germany (N=50). This dual sample methodology allows us to examine the sensitivity of the results to sample selection. A list of countries included is provided in Appendix A.[6]

Variables Included in the Analyses[7]

Three aspects of military expenditures are included as independent variables. The primary variable of interest is *Military Expenditures per Soldier1990* (MEPS), which was discussed above in some detail. This is calculated by dividing total military expenditures by the number of military personnel.[8] These data are taken from Kentor (2004). This measure is an indicator of the level of

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is a unique period due to widespread adoption of hi-technology military technology during this time.

[5] The lagged dependent variable may be highly correlated with the dependent variable, resulting in an artificially high R^2. It also reduces the size of the standardized coefficients of the other independent variables. For this reason, we have chosen to use a change score measure of the dependent variable, which more accurately reflects the magnitudes of the betas.

[6] A lack of data results in the exclusion of some notable countries, such as China. This is an unfortunate, but unavoidable, aspect of cross-national research.

[7] In analyses not presented, we included the military personnel ratio (military personnel/total population), which Kick, Davis, and Kentor (2005) find has a negative effect on income inequality. It had no significant impact on our findings.

[8] While we intend this variable to measure expenditures on costly hi-tech equipment, it will also include items such as uniforms and other "low tech" materials. However, the vast majority of these expenditures will be for technologically sophisticated goods (SIPRI 2004).

capital intensiveness of the military.[9] This variable is highly correlated with another independent variable, GDP per capita. The bivariate correlation is .84 in the "all country" sample, raising the issue of multicollinearity as reflected in unacceptably high VIFs It is therefore necessary to use a residualized measure of MEPS by regressing MEPS on GDP per capita and using the residuals for this sample. The resulting variable reflects that aspect of MEPS not accounted for by GDP per capita. Fortunately, the bivariate correlation is somewhat lower for the less developed country sample (.63), and so the model can be estimated without residualizing MEPS.

Therefore, we estimate models for the LDC sample with both the residualized and non-residualized form of MEPS. The second variable is total *Military Expenditures/GDP 1990*, taken from the World Bank (1998). These data are logged (Ln) to reduce the skewness of the distribution. The third aspect is *Arms Imports* as a percentage of total imports, also obtained from the World Bank (1998) and logged. This is a potentially significant variable, as it could be argued that purchases of foreign goods will not generate the same "spin-off" effects as purchases of domestic equipment.

Several theoretically significant control variables measured in 1990 are included in the analyses. *Gross Domestic Product (logged)* is included to control for the overall size of the economy. The argument is that the impact of the military establishment will have a lesser impact on relatively larger economies. *Secondary School Enrollments* is included as a measure of human capital. There should be less of a need for the military to be "employer of last resort" in countries with a relatively highly educated population that is more likely to be employable in the private sector. This variable is residualized due to its high correlation with GDP per capita. *Gross Domestic Investments/GDP* is included to control for its positive effect on the domestic economy. These data are taken from the World Bank (1998). Also included is a dummy variable for Africa (coded 1 for African country, 0 for others), to control for specific geographic effects (Lenski and Nolan 1984). Finally, we include per capita GDP in 1990 (logged) as the lagged dependent variable.[10] Correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables are given in Appendices B1 (N=67) and B2 (N=50).

RESULTS[11] [12]

Several key findings emerge from our analyses. Foremost among these is that military expenditures per soldier in 1990 inhibit growth of per capita GDP between 1990 and 2003, net of

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[9] It is worth emphasizing that this variable is expenditures *PER* soldier, and does not reflect expenditures *ON* a soldier.

[10] In analyses not shown, two other control variables were included, military personnel / population and foreign direct investment flows. Neither variable was statistically significant in its effects, nor did their inclusions alter the other parameters.

[11] Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were examined for possible multicollinearity problems. None were found. Cook's D statistics were all within normal ranges, indicating no influential cases.

[12] In results not shown, models were estimated with level scores of the dependent variables. No substantive differences were found.

Table 1: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of GDP per capita Growth 1990-2003 on Military Expenditures per Soldier and Other Independent Variables in 1990: All Countries (Model 1) and Less Developed Countries Only (Models 2 and 3)

Independent Variables 1990	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
GDP per capita	-.026	-.028	.042
	-.169	-.121	.178
	(.032)	(.043)	(.047)
Gross Domestic Product	.014	.015	.014
	.113	.095	.084
	(.024)	(.029)	(.029)
Gross Domestic Investment	.012*	.015**	.015**
	.406	.537	.545
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Africa	-.121	-.100	-.102
	-.219	-.182	-.186
	(.084)	(.091)	(.091)
Secondary Education Enrollments	.005*	.004*	.004*
	.263	.249	.239
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Total Military Expenditures/GDP (residualized)	.007	.002	
	.021	.007	
	(.052)	(.063)	
Total Military Expenditures/GDP (Ln)			-.003
			-.008
			(.063)
Arms Imports	.014	.032	.034
	.115	.260	.277
	(.019)	(.022)	(.022)
Military Expenditures per Soldier (residualized)	-.082*	-.102*	
	-.233	-.292	
	(.048)	(.054)	
Military Expenditures per Soldier (Ln)			-.089*
			-.327
			(.052)
Constant	.058	.048	.363
Adjusted R^2	.170	.256	.246
Cases	67	50	50

 Note: *p<.05 (one-tailed tests), **p<.01 (one-tailed tests); Standardized coefficients appear in brackets, standard errors in parentheses.

control variables.[13] It does so, at least in part, by slowing the growth of the national labor force, which in turn retards economic growth. This process is most pronounced in the least developed countries. The second key finding is that arms imports appear to stimulate the growth of the labor

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[13] Inspection of a scatterplot of MEPS in 1990 and GDP per capita 2003, given in Appendix C, indicates a negative bivariate relationship with no obvious outliers.

force in less developed countries, but has no significant impact on the labor force in the larger sample.

The initial findings are detailed in Table 1. Three models are presented. In Model 1 we include all countries for which data are available (N=67), while Models 2 and 3 excludes developed countries (N=50). In these analyses, per capita GDP growth 1990 to 2003 is regressed on the three military measures, along with the controls of GDP, GDP per capita, gross domestic investment, secondary education, the AFRICA dummy variable, and per capita GDP in 1990 (the lagged dependent variable). As noted above, only one military measure, military expenditures per soldier, has a significant (negative) effect on GDP per capita growth. Neither total military expenditures nor arms imports have a systematic effect on economic growth. As expected from the literature, control variables of gross domestic and secondary education enrollments have positive effects on the dependent variable. Finally, the dummy variable for Africa does not have a significant negative effect.

The findings for the reduced sample (models 2 and 3) mirror those for the full sample described above. Model 2 includes the residualized form of MEPS and Model 3 uses the non-transformed variable. In both cases, military expenditures per soldier in 1990 has a significant negative effect on GDP per capita growth between 1990 and 2003, net of other independent variables in the model. Neither of the other two aspects of military expenditures, total military expenditures/GDP or arms imports, have a significant impact on economic growth. Gross domestic investment and secondary education have significant positive effects, while the Africa dummy variable is not significant.

A comparison of the effects of military expenditures per soldier across the three models is instructive.[14] First, the consistency of the effects indicates that the finding is not an artifact of the countries included in the analyses, or whether or not MEPS is residualized. Second, the impact of MEPS on GDP per capita growth is greater in less developed countries than in developed countries. The unstandardized coefficient for MEPS in model 2 is nearly 25% greater than that for MEPS in model 1. Moreover, The beta for MEPS in Model 1 (-.168) is the weakest of the three significant variables (the others being gross domestic investment and secondary educational enrollments), while in Models 2 and 3, the relative impact of MEPS is greater than that of educational attainment.

In the second set of analyses, we test our hypothesis that military expenditures per soldier retards growth of the labor force during this time period. In these panel regression models, (see Table 2), the labor force as a percentage of the total population 1990 to 2003 is regressed on military expenditures per soldier and other independent variables, including the lagged dependent variable, in 1990. Two key findings emerge. First, military expenditures per soldier significantly slow the growth of the labor force, using either the residualized or non-residualized forms of MEPS. Again, the effects appear to be greater in less developed countries. The unstandardized effect of MEPS in Model 2 is nearly 20% greater than in Model 1, and the relative (standardized) effects are also larger. Second, arms imports have a significant positive effect on labor growth over this period, but only for the LDC sample. It is worth noting that for less developed countries

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[14] An alternative method for comparing effects within sample subgroups involves inclusion of an interaction term in which the independent variable is multiplied by a dummy variable for each subgroup. This is referred as a "slope dummy" (Kick et al. 1998). In analyses not shown, the results of the slope dummy analyses were consistent with the split sample findings given above.

the relative magnitudes of MEPS and arms imports are nearly identical, though opposite. Total military expenditures have no consistent effect. Two control variables, gross domestic product and gross domestic investment, have significant positive impacts on labor force growth over this period.

Table 2: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of Labor Force/Pop Growth 1990-2003 on Military Expenditures per Soldier and Other Independent Variables in 1990: All Countries (Model 1) and Less Developed Countries Only (Models 2 and 3)

Independent Variables 1990	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Labor Force/Pop 1990	-.808**	-.766**	-.771**
	-.745	-.660	-.664
	(.087)	(.108)	(.108)
GDP per capita	-.008	-.004	-.009
	-.184	-.069	.151
	(.006)	(.008)	(.009)
Gross Domestic Product	.010*	.009*	.009*
	.310	.215	.213
	(.004)	(.005)	(.005)
Gross Domestic Investment	.002**	.002**	.002**
	.243	.313	.320
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Africa	-.011	-.009	-.009
	.074	-.060	-.061
	(.015)	(.017)	(.017)
Secondary Education Enrollments	.000	.001	.001
	.076	.142	.134
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Total Military Expenditures/GDP	-.004	-.010	-.010
	-.042	-.104	-.106
	(.010)	(.012)	(.012)
Arms Imports	.004	.007*	.007*
	.133	.219	.226
	(.003)	(.004)	(.004)
Military Expenditures per Soldier (residualized)	-.016*	-.019*	
	-.168	-.207	
	(.009)	(.004)	
Military Expenditures per Soldier (Ln)			-.081*
			-.251
			(.009)
Constant	.338*	.306**	.317**
Adjusted R^2	.622	.626	.626
Cases	67	50	50

Note: *p<.05 (one-tailed tests), **p<.01 (one-tailed tests); Standardized coefficients appear in brackets, standard errors in parentheses.

Causal Models

As discussed earlier, we theorize that MEPS inhibits economic growth, at least in part, by slowing the growth of the labor force. A causal model was developed to estimate this hypothesis. In this model, military expenditures per soldier, arms imports, total military expenditures, and control variables in 1990 are exogenous predictors of labor force growth 1990 – 2003 and GDP per capita 2003 (Ln).[15] Both full and reduced sample models were estimated with AMOS software. All exogenous variables were permitted to covary, as were the error terms for the endogenous variables. The primary path coefficients are presented for the full and reduced samples in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Complete results for both models are given in Appendices D and E.

 The primary finding in these analyses is that the apparent negative effect of MEPS on economic growth found in the panel regression models above is actually an indirect effect mediated by the negative effect of MEPS on Labor Force Growth. A second important finding is that Arms Imports has an indirect positive effect on GDP per capita, via a direct positive effect on Labor Force Growth.

 The results of these structural equation models are similar for both samples. The findings for the theoretically significant variables for the two samples are presented in Figures 1 and 1B, and the maximum likelihood estimates for all variables are given in Appendices D (N=67) and E (N=50).

 Military expenditures per soldier in 1990 slows Labor Force Growth 1990-2003, while Arms Imports has a positive impact on labor growth. Both Gross Domestic Investment and Secondary Education Enrollments also have positive effects on labor growth. In turn, Labor force growth 1990 – 2003 has a significant direct positive effect on GDP per capita in 2003.

 A comparison of the unstandardized coefficients across samples indicates that the impact of MEPS and Arms Imports on Labor Force Growth is greater in the reduced sample of Less Developed Countries. The negative effect of MEPS on Labor Force Growth is more than a third larger in the reduced sample, with an unstandardized coefficient of -.022 versus -.016 for the full sample. The effect of Arms Imports on Labor Force Growth is 50% larger in the reduced sample (b=.006 vs. b=.004 for the full sample). Finally, the impact of Labor Force Growth on GDP per capita is slightly larger in the full sample, (b = 4.486, vs. 3.394 for the reduced sample).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this research was to theoretically and empirically clarify the debate on the impact of military expenditures on economic development, which usually rests on "guns *and* butter" or "guns *or* butter" formulations and, in so doing, to "bring the military back in" to a crucial area of sociological inquiry. We did so by examining the structure, or quality, of one aspect of these expenditures rather than aggregate levels. Foremost, we find that military expenditures per

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[15] Initially, a saturated model was estimated. A second model was then estimated that included only significant paths.

**Figure 1. Causal Models of the Effect of Military Expenditures per Soldier
and Arms Imports in 1990 on Labor Force Growth 1990-2003
and GDP per capita 2003. All Countries (N=67) and
Less Developed Countries (N=50).**

1A. All Countries (N=67)

1B. Less Developed Countries Only (N=50)

(Standardized Coefficients in parentheses)

soldier, a measure of the capital intensiveness of the military organization, inhibits economic growth. It does so, in part, by restricting expansion of the labor force.[16] We argue that a capital intensive military apparatus is less likely to facilitate upward mobility for uneducated and unemployed people than would be a more labor intensive military. The Center for Defense Information (2005) quantifies the magnitude of this "transition." They point out that the 2005 U.S. military budget will surpass spending at the height of the Vietnam War (in constant dollars), while maintaining a military one-third the size of that amassed during Vietnam, and with less than 200,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

   Recent trends world-wide support our hypothesis that "marginalized" people are increasingly denied access to military training. In the United States, for example, the educational level of military inductees has risen significantly over the past 30 years.[17] Recruits with high school degrees ranged from 52% to 72% of total inductees in the 1970s, compared to approximately 94% currently. This is due to the military's increasing need for soldiers with advanced technical skills (e.g., warrant officers). This shift in the composition of the military workforce is reflected in the dramatic decline in the ratio of enlisted soldiers to officers, the "E:O ratio," which has declined from a high of 20:1 during the Spanish-American War to a current low of 5.1:1 (Nestler 2004).

   According to Richard B. Meyers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, this transition to an increasingly technologically-based military is likely to continue, both at home and abroad:

> Global proliferation of a wide range of technology and weaponry will affect the character of future conflict… Advances in automation and information processing will allow some adversaries to locate and attack targets both overseas and in the United States… Access to advanced weapons systems and innovative delivery systems could fundamentally change warfighting and dramatically increase an adversary's ability to threaten the United States.
>
> The challenge over the next decade will be to develop and enhance joint capabilities in a time of global war, finite resources and multiple commitments. What is required is a transformation achieved by combining technology, intellect and cultural changes across the joint community. (Myers 2004:15)

   This process is occurring in less developed countries as well. A recent article in the *Washington Post* highlighted the "hi-tech" reorientation of the Chinese military:

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[16] Our findings are not sensitive to sample composition. In analyses not shown, Finland, Ireland, and Israel are excluded from the analyses, in line with Snyder and Kick's (1979) composition of the "core" of the world economy. No substantive differences in the findings were found, although the t-values were somewhat increased.

[17] This trend may be changing, if temporarily, in the U.S. The U.S. military's recent difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of inductees has necessitated and test score standards. However, there is no indication that other countries are also altering their requirements.

A little-discussed but key facet of China's military modernization has been a reduction in personnel and an intensive effort to better train and equip the soldiers who remain, particularly those who operate high-technology weapons…forming a core of skilled commissioned and noncommissioned officers and other specialists who can make the military run in a high-tech environment may be just as important in the long run as buying sophisticated weapons. (Cody 2005:1A)

The reduced sample analysis indicates that the economies of the least developed countries are those most affected by MEPS. This may be because there are fewer alternative employment opportunities in these countries than in developed nations, due to a relatively weak economy and a lack of domestic capital stocks.

Our finding that Arms Imports has a positive effect on Labor Force Growth in less developed countries supports the orthodoxy as well as specific hypotheses of a number of defense economists. They argue that a domestic arms industry requires significant amounts of capital, which reduces the investment capital available for more economically productive opportunities than those generated by military investments (Looney 1989:152). Specifically, arms imports are a widely used functional alternative to indigenous arms productions in much of the world. Apart from a few wealthier arms producing countries such as the U.S., the emphasis on an indigenous arms industry in lieu of reliance on arms importation may lead to continuously higher levels of military expenditures to maintain employment in defense plants or to avoid technological "lag" in regional or international arms races. This strategy may open up other domestic investment and labor-related opportunities that may be more productive. This is a worthwhile avenue for further research, especially since our finding, while in alignment with conventional reasoning and findings reported in prior efforts, contrasts with the alternative results and interpretations offered by Looney (1989).

The policy implications of findings such as ours are significant. Coupled with its implication for more adverse economic outcomes, components of the new military configuration may be found to be far more broadly consequential. As a pertinent illustration, we note that in addition to economic and labor force growth recent evidence highlights links between capital intensive militaries and the environmental footprint of nations (Jorgenson 2006). Consider as well that restricting the traditional military pathway to upward mobility may foster a bourgeoning "underclass" of permanently under or unemployable people, increasing social welfare costs along with the possibility of social unrest. We suspect that this increasing marginalization will exacerbate income inequality, an important question for future research. For these reasons, it would be prudent once again for policy planners to consider the creation of alternative paths to mobility, such as government funded civilian work programs, in order to address these issues. The Center for Defense Information (2005) appears to be equally concerned:

The major escalations of the U.S. military budget in recent years, exacerbated by increases for current military operations, and compounded by a series of major tax cuts, has increased the pressure on spending for our citizens' education, health care, environmental protection, social security, and other public services. The priority for the military should not be another generation of expensive aircraft, ships, and missiles designed to combat a superpower, but rather the more

basic equipment and skills needed to counter adversaries who have less technologically-advanced equipment, but intense commitment to their struggle.

Further, these more concrete directions for subsequent research should be complemented by deeper theoretical treatment of contemporary state-market-society linkages as they intersect with changes in the "new military." One of these areas of particular interest is the emergence of "revolving elites" alluded to earlier. Increasingly, the same individuals take turns being political, economic, and military elites. The impacts of these elite overlaps are fertile grounds for further examination. Our hope is that this sort of macro-theorization helps to drive a new wave of middle-range theory and concrete hypothesis testing on the determinants and consequences of military forms the world over. While we have focused on economic growth, it is equally (or perhaps more) important to examine other outcomes, including human/social wellbeing, income inequality, and environmental degradation, to mention only a few.

We close with a call to "bring the military back in" to the forefront of sociological inquiry. This work draws attention to the impact of the military establishment on economic development, but there are many other areas in which coercive power plays a central role. Foremost among these is the role of the military in the debate over the strength of the state vis-à-vis transnational corporations discussed above. And the current Iraqi War highlights the potential policy implications of this area of study. Ignoring the military won't make it disappear.

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APPENDIX A: COUNTIRES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSES FOR ALL COUNTRIES (N=67) AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTIRES (N=50)

Algeria	Malawi
Argentina	Malaysia
Australia*	Mauritius
Austria*	Mexico
Bangladesh	Netherlands*
Bolivia	Nicaragua
Botswana	Nigeria
Brazil	Norway*
Cameroon	Panama
Canada*	Papua New Guinea
Chile	Paraguay
Colombia	Peru
Congo, Rep.	Philippines
Costa Rica	Poland
Denmark*	Portugal*
Ecuador	Senegal
El Salvador	Singapore
Ethiopia	Sri Lanka
Finland*	Sweden*
France*	Syrian Arab Rep
Gambia, The	Tanzania
Ghana	Thailand
Greece*	Togo
Guinea	Tunisia
Hungary	Turkey
India	Uganda
Indonesia	United Kingdom*
Ireland*	United States*
Israel*	Uruguay
Italy*	Venezuela
Jamaica	Vietnam
Japan*	Zambia
Kenya	
Korea, Rep.	
Lesotho	

* Denotes countries included in the "all country" sample.

APPENDIX B1. Bivariate Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for All Variables in the Analyses: All Countries (N=67)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9a	9b	10	11	12	Mean	Std. Dev.
GDPpc Growth 1990-2003 (1)	1	.131	.146	.295	.071	.224	.067	-.244	-.146	.046	.248	.106	.177	.270	.261
GDPpc1990 (2)		1	.731	.143	-.187	.067	-.027	-.605	-.135	.837	.257	.215	-.034	7.766	1.642
GDP 1990 (3)			1	.004		.136	-.012	-.581	.074	.705	.318	.212	.071	10.267	2.110
GDI 1990 (4)				1	-.321	-.103	.016	.025	.079	.190	.161	.081	.091	22.836	8.816
Arms Imports 1990 (5)					1	.061	.457	-.114	.017	-.156	-.072	-.129	.202	-.560	2.084
Secondary Ed 1990 (6)						1	.162	-.106	.153	.128	-.061	-.101	.139	-3.141	14.664
Mil. Expend/GDP 1990 (7)							1	-.118	.363	.179	-.116	-.112	.068	.906	.735
Africa (8)								1	.118	-.485	-.142	-.035	-.149	.298	.461
Mil. Exp. Per Soldier 1990 (9a) (residualized)									1	.426	.029	.093	-.181	-.016	.723
Mil. Exp. Per Soldier 1990 (9b) (Ln)										1	.244	.241	-.126	9.415	1.365
Labor/pop 2003 (10)											1	.927	-.433	.462	.051
Labor/pop 1990 (11)												1	-.732	.438	.064
Labor/pop Growth 1990-2003 (12)													1	.061	.069

APPENDIX B2. Bivariate Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for All Variables in the Analyses: Less Developed Countries (N=50)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9a	9b	10	11	12	Mean	Std Dev.
GDPpc Growth 1990 - 2003 (1)	1	.170	.256	.345	.168	.201	.111	-.258	-.159	.394	.362	.212	.137	.261	.272
GDPpc1990 (2)		1	.502	.193	-.113	-.091	-.141	-.548	-.315	.629	-.087	-.240	.366	7.007	1.132
GDP 1990 (3)			1	.013	.289	.114	-.076	-.531	-.050	.387	.079	-.125	.410	9.486	1.685
GDI 1990 (4)				1	-.367	-.082	.032	.044	.124	.325	.178	.072	.143	22.650	9.864
Arms Imports 1990 (5)					1	.129	.466	-.199	.019	-.091	-.039	-.116	.230	-.380	2.245
Secondary Ed 1990 (6)						1	.237	-.063	.209	.026	-.092	-.162	.202	-4.347	15.317
Mil. Expend/GDP 1990 (7)							1	-.101	.436	.247	-.144	-.124	.045	.868	.766
Africa (8)								1	.156	-.352	-.014	.144	-.306	.400	.490
Mil. Exp. Per Soldier 1990 (9a) (residualized)									1	0.535	-.068	.035	-.213	-.024	.772
Mil. Exp. Per Soldier 1990 (9b) (Ln)										1	-.147	-.180	.128	8.833	.998
Labor/pop 2003 (10)											1	.919	-.352	.452	.051
Labor/pop 1990 (11)												1	-.686	.424	.060
Labor/pop growth 1990–2003 (12)													1	.071	.069

APPENDIX C. Scatterplot of the Relationship Between Military Expenditures per Soldier In 1990 and GDP per capita 2003.

APPENDIX D. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Regression Weights for Causal Model in Figure 1: All Countries (N=67)

Exogenous Variables 1990		Endogenous Variables	Unstand. Reg. Weights	Standard. Reg. Weights	Stand. Error
Labor Force	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.804	-.742	.081**
Military Expenditures/Soldier	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	-.016	-.164	.006**
Gross Domestic Investment	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.002	.245	.001**
Arms Imports	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.004	.131	.002*
Gross Domestic Product	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.005	.166	.002**
Educational Enrollments	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.001	.130	.000*
GDPpc 1990	-->	GDPpc 2003 (Ln)	.987	.961	.016**
Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	-->	GDPpc 2003 (Ln)	4.486	.183	1.296**
Labor Force 1990	-->	GDPpc 2003 (Ln)	4.010	.151	1.154**

R^2

Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	0.652
GDP per capita 2003	0.982

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01

APPENDIX E. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Regression Weights for Causal Model in Figure 1: Less Developed Countries Only (N=50)

Exogenous Variables 1990		Endogenous Variables	Unstand. Reg. Weights	Standard. Reg. Weights	Stand. Error
Labor Force	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	-.722	-.627	.093**
Military Expenditures/Soldier	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	-.022	-.240	.006**
Gross Domestic Investment	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.002	.338	.001**
Arms Imports	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.006	.200	.002**
Educational Enrollments	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.001	.168	.000**
Gross Domestic Product	-->	Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	.008	.198	.003**
GDPpc 1990	-->	GDPpc 2003 (Ln)	.990	.950	.025**
Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	-->	GDPpc 2003 (Ln)	3.934	.231	1.008**
Labor Force 1990	-->	GDPpc 2003 (Ln)	3.667	.187	.922**

R²

Labor Force Growth 1990-2003	0.691
GDP per capita 2003	0.966

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01

BOOK REVIEWS

Roberts, J. Timmons and Bradley C. Parks. 2007. *A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 404 pages, ISBN-13: 978-0-262-18256-0 Cloth ($65.00). ISBN-13: 978-0-262-68161-2 Paper ($26.00).

In *A Climate of Injustice*, Roberts and Parks use a theoretically and empirically integrated approach to examine non-cooperation on climate change policy. They argue that in order to understand why nation-states are either willing or unwilling to participate in climate protection policies is fundamentally tied to international inequality and patterns of mistrust between nation-states. Particularly, for the case of climate change, Roberts and Parks frame their argument with the idea of the "triple inequality" of vulnerability, responsibility, and mitigation. They further argue that each one of these components is fundamentally tied to larger issues of economic, political, and social injustice in the world-system.

Roberts and Parks's analysis is unique and innovative as it combines a variety of theoretical and empirical perspectives. They apply a wide range of interdisciplinary approaches by integrating structuralist theorization, like world-systems theory, with more mainstream theories in International Relations that have typically been used to explain international cooperation. Roberts and Parks also employ classic quantitative techniques, such as OLS regression and path analysis, along with qualitative case-study investigation. This holistic and integrative approach makes *A Climate of Injustice* an excellent tool in a variety of settings, including graduate and undergraduate classes.

A Climate of Injustice begins by demonstrating that responses to climate change are inherently tied to larger problems of global inequality in both direct and indirect ways. Directly, the shortage of technical, financial, and administrative capacity in poor nations puts them at a severe disadvantage in climate policy negotiations. Indirectly, Roberts and Parks argue that global inequality fosters perceptions of generalized mistrust, differential worldviews, and perceived unfairness between nations. In short, the authors argue that global inequality leads to "structuralist" world views. The preliminary chapters serve to ground readers in theoretical explanations of the North-South stalemate on climate policy, primarily by exploring three dominant perspectives: structuralist theories about the behaviors of states, intermediate theories of international environmental politics, and issues related to the problem structure of climate change. These explanations are combined to produce a model of North-South non-cooperation, where global inequality hinders the adoption of shared understandings of "fair" solutions.

Roberts and Parks then move on to their "triple inequality" of climate change. They explore these three facets in four separate chapters, using a variety of empirical techniques. The authors adopt a qualitative approach in one of the chapters, exploring the historical and structural causes of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, a trio of hurricanes in Mozambique, and rising waters in the island nation of Tuvalu. Although these case studies represent very different climate disasters, they share common attributes which serves to guide later quantitative analysis, such as unequal (and often unsure) land tenure characteristics, income inequality, and environmental vulnerability.

Cross-national exploration of climate-disaster vulnerability is undertaken in the following section. The authors take a large step forward for risk and vulnerability analysis by redefining

how we should measure vulnerability, particularly in less-developed countries. They state, "that rich nations pay for climate change with dollars and poor nations pay with their lives" (37). Roberts and Parks measure vulnerability by incorporating this critique of economistic approaches by three factors, number of people killed, made homeless, and affected by climate-related disasters, from 1980 to 2002. The authors test whether disadvantaged insertion into the world economy, as indicated by a narrow export base, impacts various measures of vulnerability, such as geographical vulnerability (living on the coast) and social vulnerability (income inequality) and overall climate risk. Using path analysis and OLS regression, Roberts and Parks conclude that a narrow export base is strongly predictive of national patterns of risk for climate disasters. Although critics might argue that using narrowness of export base as a sole indicator of disadvantaged insertion in the world economy is a severe limitation in their analyses, their "admittedly imperfect" measure does posses a significant degree of explanatory power when applied to climate change vulnerability, responsibly, and mitigation.

In exploring climate change responsibility, Roberts and Parks assert that the industrialized world, particularly the United States is clearly responsible for a disproportionate amount of carbon dioxide emissions and the consequent global warming. They cover four major fairness principles for climate change policy that have been argued for during recent climate negotiations; grandfathering, carbon intensity, per capita, and historical responsibility. Most importantly, the authors argue that in the current policy climate, none of these fairness principles will work alone. They then focus on the four principle ways of measuring emissions that come from these fairness principles, and test for factors driving variation in responsibility across these four outcomes. Roberts and Parks find that regardless of how we measure climate change, there are geographic and economic factors that are consistently linked with increasing emissions, such as state location in cold climates and economies focused on manufacturing. These common factors may help point to "fairness focal points" in future policy negotiations. Their analyses also provide further support for theories of ecologically unequal exchange and the ecological debt perspective, as trade was shown to have differential impacts on emissions based on world-system position.

Last, the Roberts and Parks empirically address who is participating in environmental treaties and global efforts to reduce emissions. They develop an index of twenty-two international environmental agreements from 1963-1999 and examine the factors affecting the participation of 192 countries. They include the influence of proximate political factors, like civil society pressure, and deeper social and historical determinants of state action, such as narrowness of export base. Indeed, their multi-stage approach proves useful as both of the factors mentioned above are closely linked to participation in environmental treaties.

A Climate of Injustice serves to provide a new route through which we can study climate change. Roberts and Parks use an integrative approach to demonstrate that climate change is fundamentally an issue of global inequality; thus the solutions will likely require unconventional policy interventions, such as wealth redistribution policies and the use of "green" and "brown" aid for less-developed nations. *A Climate of Injustice* reminds readers that climate negotiations take place in an unequal world, and that historical legacies have created a hostile environment in which these negations take place. Roberts and Parks argue that reaching shared perceptions of fairness will be crucial as world-wide consensus and participation is needed to combat this global problem. By bridging theories, looking at both root and proximate causes, and employing

inventive qualitative and quantitative analyses, Roberts and Parks begin the quest for climate justice and expose the root cause of non-cooperation on climate change, global inequality.

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Spencer, Roy W. 2008. *Climate Confusion: How Global Warming Hysteria Leads to Bad Science, Pandering Politicians, and Misguided Policies That Hurt the Poor*. New York: Encounter Books, New York. 191 pages. ISBN-10: 1594032106, ISBN-13: 978-1594032103; $21.95 (Hardcover).

This book is very readable and accessible to non-specialists, but presents some interesting issues for world-systems analysis. It presents the weather processes and uses these as the context of the major points of the debate on climate change. Thus, it locates the contribution of human activities to climate change and clearly argues that the debate is not about the fact of global warming. Rather, it is about explaining the changes and visualizing their consequences. It cites the resiliency of nature and humans. Thus, there should be no need to renounce the modern lifestyle that entails utilizing the resources from the environment - including its role as "sink" of byproducts. In the cycle that leads to the greenhouse effect, Climate Confusion argues that the contribution of human activities is small compared to that of natural processes. A balanced view would lead to a reasonable approach in devising measures or policies relative to global warming. People can influence what goods and services to consume (and the technologies needed to produce them - including the "kinds of pollution" [168] they produce to affect global warming). Constituents can vote for representatives who would formulate public policies that are acceptable or desirable.
        For all its clarity and cogency to allay fears of climate change, the book also highlights the intractable problem of uncertainty in deciding on policy measures. As solutions, policies are "largely depend upon an informed public" (168). The uncertainty is not only with regard to the scientific analysis of climatic processes. It also operates through what has become the prevailing view through social epistemology. The book provides illustrative observations and comments on how scientists who do not subscribe to this view are treated differently (in a congressional hearing). The mass media are shown to characterize those who do not subscribe to the now widely accepted view on global warming.
        Between the lines, a loop appears to undergird the intractability of the problem - and in two strands. If constituents (the public) are to decide what kind of pollution they can afford, so to speak, they face the difficulty of having to judge which group of scientists (say, those who are alarmed with global warming or those who are not) has the correct analysis of the problem.

Laymen (some of whom might be the policymakers) are being asked to evaluate the analyses of specialists! On what basis could they do this, given that the specialists themselves cannot do away with uncertainties? A related point is the juxtaposition of what is "good for human progress" (170) with what is "bad for the environment" (170). Humans would valorize the environment in terms of their interests and values. But problems would arise at the practical and local level. The tastes and preferences of consumers in one part of the globe could impact populations that might have different conceptions of their interests and welfare - let alone human progress. The interconnectedness of events lies at the bottom of the scenario where humans as producers and stewards (rather than as consumers and polluters) are not a monolithic bunch. There are differing - even outright conflicting - interests across the globe. Hence, the calibration of what is good for humans (let alone progress) in differing local contexts (but nevertheless subject to global-scale processes) is a daunting task. Climate Confusion provokes deep questions more by its observations and comments on the behavior of social actors than by its persuasive presentation of the science concerning climate change. How does the public choose the "valid" knowledge and standards? The difference between scientists who look for trends and those who take feedback loops into account - meteorologists among them - comes to the fore.

Communication between specialists and the public (including the policymakers) matters a great deal. As it were, specialists attempt to mobilize public opinion, which takes shape under the influence of other factors than what science depicts and explains. Thus, this book engages world-systems theory by punctuating the role of location relative to putative causes (e.g., distribution of the type of technology used and backlash, population needs, etc) of environmentally undesirable conditions. At the same time, it shows location practically transcended in terms of perceived and projected effects because of the acknowledged interconnectedness of things environmental. Climate change is emblematic of this point even as resiliency and leapfrogging prospects do not fade in the background. So, getting publics in different sections of the globe properly informed virtually makes "affected populations" - those who can articulate demands or who can have advocates on their side - into constituents of policymaking beyond borders. This corroborates the single-unit view in world-systems.

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Bunker, Stephen G. and Paul S. Ciccantell. 2005. *Globalization and the Race for Resources*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 263 Pages, ISBN 0-8018-8242-5 Cloth, ISBN 0-8018-8243-5 Paper.

This book and its authors are likely to be familiar to many readers of this journal. *Globalization and the Race for Resources* won an award from the Political Economy of the World System section of the American Sociological Associations in 2006, and Stephen Bunker and his former student and colleague Paul Ciccantell have published in *JWSR*. Sadly, Stephen Bunker died in 2005 as this book was in press.

Globalization and the Race for Resources is a complicated book based on the very simple, but essential, idea that power—in this case global power—is based on the possession or control of resources. As the authors have it, the world we live in today is the result of the successive efforts over the past six centuries by capitalist nations—Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan—to achieve and maintain global trade dominance by gaining control over the natural resources upon which economic growth and social development depend. In this sense the title of the book is a little misleading; these nations have not raced around for the past half millennium looking for and grabbing resources in order to "globalize" the world, but rather to dominate it. Globalization, i.e. the emergence of world-scale social, economic, and political relations, has been the largely unintended outcome, not the point, of these efforts. And while the author's various arguments are certainly relevant to the debates about globalization, a more accurate title for the book might have been "Global Power and the Race for Resources."

In any event, to appreciate the authors' argument one has to recognize that they have little patience with social constructionist ideas about "resources." When it comes to resources these guys mean *resources*, as in the raw materials, such as trees, minerals, coal, water, rubber, and animals that are used to create profitable commodities. And while acknowledging the myriad variations in cultural expression and social organization, they anchor much of their argument on the principle that humans can create only what the natural world will allow. As they write, "Matter and space are naturally given. Technologies that mediate between them and human actions and goals are socially created, but they can only achieve the human goals for which society invents and finances them if they conform to the natural (i.e., biological, geological, locational, physical, and chemical) features of the raw materials they transform" (p. 11).

This naturally occurring and highly unequal distribution of resources across and under the earth and in its oceans establishes, for these authors, the central contradictory dialectic between a nation's attempt to achieve and sustain economic dominance and its need to capture and control those resources. Nations first make use of the raw materials that are close at hand, but as these are exhausted and technologies develop to make use of more exotic and more distant resources, economies of scale must be put into place to make the exploitation of less accessible resources profitable. But these economies of scale inevitably create diseconomies of space which must then be overcome by even greater economies of scale. And so it goes. The authors argue that nations rise and fall depending on their ability to solve—if only for a time—the economies of scale puzzle presented to them at a particular point in history. "Because social production can expand more rapidly than the natural production from which it draws matter and energy and because expanding production requires greater volumes and diversity of materials, each nation that ascended to trade dominance had to devise ways to obtain stable access to larger and more distant sources of more distant kinds of matter" (p. 224-5). These and related theoretical assumptions and principles are sketched in Chapter One, entitled "Matter, Space, Time and Globalization."

Bunker and Ciccantell developed this perspective primarily by studying the history of the exploitation of the Amazon, and they show us what they learned in Chapter Two, "Globalizing Economies of Scale in the Sequence of Amazonian Extractive Systems." In this chapter we learn how the Portuguese came looking to grow sugar, but instead ended up taking cacao, rosewood, manatees, and turtle eggs; the British and Americans came for rubber; and most recently the Europeans, Americans and Japanese came to open and exploit the largest iron ore mine in the world. Perhaps needless to say, each wave of exploitation resulted in various levels of death and

destruction for the Amazon's animals, people, and environment, and the enrichment and empowerment of those who came to exploit it. And each wave of exploitation was made possible, and necessary, by the even bigger and more complex technologies needed to achieve the economies of scale that would make such efforts profitable in a given epoch.

With Chapter Three, "Between Nature and Society: How Technology Drives Globalization," Bunker and Ciccantell develop what they learned from studying the Amazon into a theory of the relationship between technology, cycles of national economic dominance, and globalization. This theory posits, in the abstract, that "Transitions from one systemic cycle to the next occur when an ascendant economy adapts technologies developed by the established trade-dominant economy to the larger scales and broader spaces that the ascendant economy's particularly favorable materio-spatial situation makes possible" (p. 81). Thus, globalization—the ever enlarging inclusion of global space into social and economic relations—does not happen unless the logistical problems that the colonization of that space (and, one might add, everything and everyone within it) requires are solved. And whoever solves those problems gets to be on top.

Having formalized the discoveries made from studying the Amazon, Bunker and Ciccantell spend the remaining chapters analyzing the rise and eclipse of each nation, with a lot of attention paid, naturally, to technological innovations in navigation and shipping. Chapter Four, "Bulky Goods and Industrial Organization in Early Capitalism," considers Portugal in the fifteenth century; Chapter Five, "From Wood to Steel: British-American Interdependent Expansion across the Atlantic and Around the World," includes Holland as well as Britain and the U.S., while Chapter Six, "Raw Materials and Transport in the Economic Ascendancy of Japan," brings us back to present, where quarter-mile long container ships roam the seas and apartment building-sized dump trucks move the earth around.   Taken together, these chapters provide substantial empirical evidence to support the contention that the economic fate of each of these nations depended to a great extent on their logistical and technological capabilities supported by emerging social and political structures designed to capitalize on those innovations.

In the concluding chapter of the book the authors summarize what has been learned and "…consider what further analysis and what kinds of action we, as citizens and as scholars, can undertake to reduce the social and environmental disruption and destruction that broadening searches for raw materials have engendered" (p. 222). While not a central focus on the book—it is almost assumed from the start—one of the more important things that the authors suggest we should do is debunk the myth that resource extraction will lead to economic development for anyone other than those doing the extracting. In this view the authors are not alone, of course; it is a view they share with all those who see global inequalities as the result of dependent and exploitive relationships between core and periphery. To these voices, however, the authors helpfully add their particular emphasis on the way in which raw materials extraction has contributed to these inequalities.

Finally, the authors propose that we can begin to mitigate the social and environmental damage the race for resources has caused by making raw materials more expensive "… thus reducing their consumption in the core, reducing the inequality between core and periphery, and reducing our destruction of the natural environment" (p. 246). Well, as we write, a barrel of oil is nearing one-hundred and fifty dollars, steel is hard to find, and food prices are on the rise. These events point to the queasy realization that the race for resources is speeding up, there are new

contestants (China, India, etc.), and that policy proposals along these lines might well be redundant or, more likely, futile. After all, this is a race that is unsustainable.

Globalization and the Race for Resources is theoretically challenging and empirically grounded, and is a must read for specialists. On the other hand, the book is not easy to read and will torture the unwary undergraduate or general reader, who will most likely give up on it if they have a choice. The authors are much too fond of writing page upon page of abstract jargon unrelieved by example or anecdote. And, have mercy, they often repeat themselves. Nevertheless, mindful of the trying conditions under which it was written, *Globalization and the Race for Resources* is an important and valuable work, and we are grateful to have it.

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