


SPECIAL ISSUE

Journal of World-Systems Research

FESTSCHRIFT FOR IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN PART I

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SOCIAL SCIENCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
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SPECIAL ISSUE: FESTSCHRIFT FOR IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN – PART I

Edited By Giovanni Arrighi & Walter L. Goldfrank

Contents

<i>Giovanni Arrighi & Walter L. Goldfrank</i>	Preface	viii
<i>Walter L. Goldfrank</i>	Paradigm Regained? The Rules Of Wallerstein's World-System Method	150
I. GENERAL ISSUES		
<i>Albert J. Bergesen</i>	The Columbia Social Essayists	198
<i>Andre Gunder Frank</i>	Immanuel and Me With-Out Hyphen	216
<i>William G. Martin</i>	Still Partners and Still Dissident After All These Years? Wallerstein, World Revolutions and the World-Systems Perspective	234
<i>Göran Therborn</i>	Time, Space, and Their Knowledge: The Times and Place of the World and Other Systems	266
II. COLONIALISM & NATIONALISM		
<i>Anna Davin</i>	Flight to the Centre: Winnie Gonley, 1930s Colonial Cosmopolita	286
<i>Michael Hechter</i>	Nationalism and Rationality	308
<i>Ramkrishna Mukherjee</i>	Caste in Itself, Caste and Class, or Caste in Class	332
<i>Antibal Quijano</i>	Colonialidad del Poder y Clasificacion Social	342
<i>B. Verhaegen</i>	Wallerstein: L'Afrique et le monde: une vision provocante au carrefour de l'histoire et de la sociologie	388

III. WORLD-SYSTEMS: HISTORICAL

<i>Amiya Kumar Bagchi</i>	The Past and the Future of the Developmental State	398
<i>Silviu Brucan</i>	The Hard-Earned Integration of the East in the World Economic System	444
<i>Theotônio dos Santos</i>	World Economic System: On the Genesis of a Concept	456
<i>Harriet Friedmann</i>	What on Earth is the Modern World-System? Foodgetting and Territory in the Modern Era and Beyond	480
<i>Henryk Samsonowicz</i>	The Rise and Fall of 'The World of Economy': Eastern Europe in 9th–12th Centuries	518
<i>Nicoletta Stame</i>	Household and Small Business Across the Disciplines	526
<i>Peter J. Taylor</i>	Havens and Cages: Reinventing States and Households in the Modern World-System	544

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FESTSCHRIFT FOR IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN – PART II

Edited By Giovanni Arrighi & Walter L. Goldfrank

Contributors

IV. WORLD-SYSTEMS: CONTEMPORARY

Anouar Abdel-Malek
Samir Amin
Orlando Fals Borda
Jonathan Friedman
Pablo González Casanova
Philip McMichael
Daniel Singer
Teivo Teivainen
Claudia von Werlhof

V. STRUCTURES OF KNOWLEDGE

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Heinz R. Sonntag
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EDITOR Walter L. Goldfrank

ASSISTANT EDITOR Eric W. Titolo

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR Joya Misra

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JWSR EDITORIAL POLICY

The main editorial goal of the Journal of World-Systems Research is to develop and disseminate scholarly research on topics that are relevant to the analysis of world-systems. We especially want to include works that proceed from several different theoretical stances and disciplines. These include, but are not limited to, civilizationists, evolutionary approaches, international political economy, comparative, historical and cultural analysis. We seek the work of political scientists, historians, sociologists, ethnographers, archaeologists, economists and geographers.

We especially encourage works that take theory seriously by confronting problems of conceptualization and making definitions of concepts explicit, by formulating hypotheses, constructing axiomatic theories and causal models. Theoretical research programs that combine theory construction with comparative research are badly needed to take the world-systems approach beyond the stage of a perspective.

We also want to encourage the application of comparative, quantitative and network-analytic methods to world-systems research, though we will certainly also publish pieces that do not use these methods. Any empirical study that is deemed relevant to world-systems analysis may be published even if it uses a very different conceptual framework.

And finally we also want to publish discussions of future trajectories and options for the modern world-system and considerations of what can be done to create a more humane, peaceful and just world society.

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
to produce a high quality publication of world-systems research articles; to publish quantitative and comparative research on world-systems; to publish works of theory construction and codification of causal propositions; to publish data sets in connection with articles; to publish reviews of books relevant to world-systems studies; and to encourage authors to use the hypermedia advantages of electronic publication to present their research results.

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PREFACE

SPECIAL ISSUE

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Publication of a festschrift should be an occasion for reflection, for appreciation, and for hope: reflection on an unusually significant career, appreciation for opening paths that contributors and others have followed, hope for the honoree's well-being in the years that remain. Many far-flung colleagues and friends were invited to participate in this publication, and most were able to accept; so many, in fact, that the impossibility of an old-fashioned book quickly became apparent to us. At the other extreme was the example of the open website through which Noam Chomsky was honored on the recent occasion of his seventieth birthday. Thus we were happy to hit upon the present alternative, a special macro "double double" issue of the on-line *Journal of World-Systems Research*—itself an important institutional by-product of Immanuel Wallerstein's lifework. "Double double:" half the contents will appear in this jumbo summer/fall issue (VI, 2) and half in the fall/winter (VI, 3); each of the two numbers is twice normal size. We hope that our readers will agree that "macro" is indeed appropriate in this instance.

As adumbrated in the introduction that follows, it is convenient to divide Wallerstein's scholarly career into three overlapping temporalities: Africa and colonialism/nationalism; the modern world-system; social science and the structures of knowledge. We have organized this festschrift around this scheme, such that VI, 2 contains the introduction, three general essays, five contributions with a colonial/national thematic, and eight dealing with historical aspects of the modern world-system. The subsequent double issue, to appear in the Winter, includes nine contributions focussed on contemporary global matters and thirteen on questions of social science concepts and methods.

As we salute Prof. Wallerstein at 70, we know that he joins us in thanking those who helped make this publication possible: Donna Devoist of the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University; Christopher Chase-Dunn, founding editor of JWSR; Ben Brewer and Ho-Fung Hung at Johns Hopkins University; and Eric Titolo at Binghamton University and the University of California, Santa Cruz.

G. Arrighi & W. Goldfrank, *Special Issue Editors*

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
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PARADIGM REGAINED? THE RULES OF WALLERSTEIN'S WORLD-SYSTEM METHOD*

Walter L. Goldfrank

The last third of the twentieth century was ushered in by a set of events—wars, rebellions, finally economic crisis—that dealt a crushing blow to the previously dominant paradigm in U.S. social science, the structural-functionalist modernizationism elaborated by Talcott Parsons and his students. Within sociology, the site of much social science innovation in the post-war period, a notable splintering occurred. Already underway in the early nineteen-sixties, this splintering was accelerated by the tumultuous events later in that decade. One of the splinters which has grown and developed most rapidly and fruitfully over the past decade has been the world-systems perspective, a formidable synthesis of continental historicism, “Third World” radicalism, and Marxism. The principal exponent of this perspective has been Immanuel Wallerstein (b. 1930), whose work has built upon and in turn has stimulated advances in both historical sociology and the study of contemporary “development.”

Most important and innovative about Wallerstein's effort are the reconceptualization of social change in terms of totalities as units of analysis, the attempt to historicize the social sciences and overcome the split between the universalizing generalizers (theory) and “idiographic” particularizers (his-

Walter L. Goldfrank
Department of Sociology
University of California, Santa Cruz
235 College Eight
Santa Cruz, California 95064
<http://sociology.ucsc.edu/>
wally@cats.ucsc.edu

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tory), and the dialectical insistence that motion is the essence, especially slow motion. Wallerstein's postulating a capitalist world-economy as the basic unit of analysis for modern social change joins several strands of modern social science in an attack on what he has called "developmentalism," the notion that each national society ("social formation" in Marxist jargon) passes through a similar set of stages, from tradition to modernity (via, e.g., Parsonian differentiation or W. W. Rostow's take-off) or from feudalism to capitalism to socialism (as in Stalinist orthodoxy). This attack strikes also at Anglo-American liberal triumphalism, with its Whiggish celebration of bourgeois constitutional right as the highest achievement of humankind. The equivalent Marxist "whiggery" might be said to lie in making the "English" industrial revolution, rather than the Glorious Revolution, the most dramatic turning point in modern history. As against developmentalism's conceptual tyranny of nation states changing in parallel lines, with urban industry the key change, Wallerstein posits a necessarily differentiating world-economy with necessarily different productive structures located in different zones and differentially strong states competing with and attempting to dominate one another. The sixteenth, not the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, is the pivotal one, and agricultural capitalism as critical as industrial.

Although Wallerstein began his career as an Africanist, becoming highly regarded in that field (he was President of the African Studies Association in 1971), his current reputation rests on work since 1974, when he published the first volume of his *The Modern World-System (MWS I)* as well as his influential article, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis." (The latter first appeared in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*; it has been reprinted along with many other pieces written since 1972 in a collection entitled *The Capitalist World-Economy*, hereafter referred to as *CWE*).

Whereas the book explicates the origins and basic structure of what was not yet a global capitalist world-system, the article attacks head-on the debates about the persistence of feudalism, for example in twentieth century Latin America (Frank vs. Laclau) and about the existence of socialism (Mao vs. Liu). This work of Wallerstein's middle years slowed notably after the publication in 1979 and 1984 of volumes II (through 1750) and III (into the 1840s) of *The Modern World-System*, although one or two more volumes

are projected. Over the last fifteen years, however, Wallerstein has increasingly turned his attention to issues of epistemology, method, and what he calls "utopistics," using the platform of his presidency of the International Sociological Association (1994-98) to call for reorganization and reorientation of the social sciences.

Especially since the formulation of the world-system project in the early 1970s, Wallerstein has either associated himself with or spawned a large number of scholarly efforts at his own and other institutions around the world. Colleagues, acquaintances and students have actively contributed to the elaboration, refinement, and revision of the world-system perspective to such an extent that there now exist different shadings if not entirely different versions of world-systems analysis.

Even so, Wallerstein's work has stimulated historically minded social scientists as no other in recent memory. Attacked both from the right ("too Marxist") and from the left ("not Marxist enough"), it has met with two basic kinds of reception. On the one hand it has been more or less critically embraced by those who have been looking for a new basic paradigm capable of orienting investigations into large-scale, long-term change processes, including the ones unfolding around us in the contemporary world. On the other hand, elements of the world-systems perspective have been taken over by practitioners of more conventional sorts of social scientific analysis. The current focus on "globalization" and the more general trend toward attending to "transnational" variables are both exemplified and furthered by Wallerstein, but he has been notable precisely for making the national state itself a variable and for avoiding usages such as "globalization" or "inter-," "multi-," and "trans-" national. He was well ahead of the curve, and his emphasis on the inequalitarian aspects of world development distinguishes him and his co-workers from the globalization enthusiasts. Not surprisingly, scholars and intellectuals of the periphery have warmed to the world-systems perspective more readily than those of the core.

This introduction includes first a biographical sketch; second, an account of the elements which Wallerstein synthesized into the world-systems perspective; third, a brief review of his general orienting concepts; fourth, an account of his modern world-system; fifth an overview of methodological roles; and finally, a review of some criticisms of his corpus.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Although he retired this year from his 23-year tenure as Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University (a State University of New York campus), Wallerstein's life has basically revolved around three places: New York City, Paris, and sub-Saharan Africa, particularly West Africa. To understand the impact of these places on his intellectual and political formation is to appreciate some of the qualities that distinguish his approach from more narrowly Anglo-American or Eurocentric scholars. These qualities include an astounding spatio-temporal range of concerns, an impatience with scholastic disputations that sometimes becomes sheer haste, a seemingly inexhaustible fund of intellectual and practical energy, and a combative yet often playful style. Perhaps more unusual is his curious combination of political identification with history's victims and intellectual empathy with the wielders of power, a combination that seems the hallmark of New York Jews coming of age in the 1940s and 1950s.

It is difficult to imagine Wallerstein's having come to consciousness outside of New York City, where he was born in 1930 and received all his education. He attended Columbia University both as an undergraduate (B.A. 1951) and graduate student (Ph.D. 1957). The experience of New York City in those years of its blossoming into world primacy was one of cosmopolitanism (the United Nations), visible class and state power (the Rockefeller family, Robert Moses), ethnic social mobility (Fiorello LaGuardia, Herbert Lehman, Jackie Robinson), and cultural and political radicalism (Greenwich Village, the Left). New York was where the action was in business and finance (Wall Street), in fashion and advertising (Fifth and Madison Avenues), in publishing and high culture. Like the London of Marx's maturity, the New York of Wallerstein's youth (he finally left Columbia in 1971) was both a haven for refugee intellectuals and the prime vantage point for seeing the world as a whole. Wallerstein's work is very much that of the inveterate New Yorker looking for the big picture, the politically savvy New Yorker looking through the ethnic garb of class struggles, the Jewish New Yorker deflating the pretentious claims to legitimacy of an Anglophile New England elite.¹

¹ Two features of New York City perhaps help account for what some critics have found unbalanced in Wallerstein's work: the predominance of commerce and finance over

Columbia University in that era partook rather heavily of this New York ethos. Its cosmopolitanism and rebelliousness stand in sharp contrast to the genteel established liberalism of Harvard and Yale, where, ironically enough, Wallerstein is now installed as a Research Scholar. He had the good fortune and/or good judgment to study at Columbia in its heyday, in an atmosphere of heady intellectual activity (Lionel Trilling, Jacques Barzun, Meyer Schapiro, Richard Hofstadter, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann, Karl Polanyi) and embattled resistance to the McCarthyite witchhunts of the time. His primary mentor as an undergraduate was C. Wright Mills, then at work on *White Collar*.

Mills's later reputation as a polemicist has perhaps obscured his notable scholarly contributions, as he had the bad luck to have single-handedly taken on the established pluralist consensus at its zenith. But Wallerstein remembered him for teaching social science, that is, arguing from evidence, and there is more than an echo of Mills's two-front sociological attack on Grand Theory and Abstracted Empiricism in Wallerstein's campaign against maintaining the split in the social sciences between the nomothetic theoretical disciplines (economics, sociology) and the idiographic descriptive ones (history, anthropology). Other legacies from Mills include his historical sensitivity, his ambition to understand macro-structures, and his rejection of both liberalism and to a lesser degree Marxism. Wallerstein's debt on this score is discernible in his article on Mills in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

Wallerstein entered Columbia with an interest in newly independent India; Gandhi's non-violent resistance to British rule had excited great sympathy among democrats in the U.S. But through the accident of personal involvements with foreign students both in New York and in international student political circles, he switched his primary interest to Africa. Paris was a way station, where he first studied African colonialism under Georges Balandier. It was Balandier who taught that the proper unit of analysis for colonial social change was not the tribe but the colony. It was also in Paris, albeit later in his career, that Wallerstein came to know first hand the work

large-scale industrial production, and the prominence of economic as contrasted with military and administrative state activity.

of the *Annales* group of historians and social scientists who were to become a primary source for his interpretation of the capitalist transformation.

But one must not forget that Paris was also the major center for political/intellectual radicalism among Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans, and the center as well for ongoing challenges to Anglo-American liberalism and empiricism. Since 1958, Wallerstein has published numerous articles and reviews in French journals, and he taught one semester a year in Paris for much of the past fifteen years.

Beneath the surface of his work runs a preference for France over England, for Rousseau over Mill, for vigorous politics over tepid compromising. In his attachment to Paris one can perhaps discern the origins of his impulse to reduce England to a perspective in which its advantage relative to France is limited to the two centuries between 1750 and 1950, and explained not by some genius for pragmatic muddling nor yet by a surplus of Protestant ethic but rather by structurally determined success in politico-economic competition, including a large dose of Dutch capital.² Most important, Wallerstein's Parisian experience gave him access to a rich and proud scholarly tradition which could reinforce his New Yorker's disdain for conventional U.S. social science, a tradition which was furthermore free from the rigidities of pre-New Left Marxism. In 1979 the University of Paris awarded him an honorary doctorate.

Africa, particularly West Africa, provided the third formative experience in Wallerstein's political and intellectual development. Alone among scholars leading US macrosociologists of his generation, he spent important years doing field work and interviewing in the Third World. Again the timing was right: he went to the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and the Ivory Coast (still, appropriately for that model of neo-colonialism, the Ivory Coast) to undertake his dissertation research as the independence movements there were moving toward success. The dissertation itself was built around a quite conventional piece of survey analysis as taught by Paul Lazarsfeld, and focused on the social factors accounting for differential par-

² The clearest statement of this Francophile revanchism may be found in Wallerstein's review of Gabriel Almond (1970), *Political Development*, which appeared in *Contemporary Sociology* (Wallerstein 1972).

ticipation in the voluntary associations comprising the independence movement. Published in 1964, as *The Road to Independence: Ghana and the Ivory Coast*, it was unremarkable in theory or method but notable for the high degree of personal involvement in the research.

Indeed, as the synthetic and deft *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (1961) suggests, the dissertation was more an exercise than a labor of love, except for that personal involvement. Published earlier and characteristically sweeping in its judgments, *Africa: The Politics of Independence* is undergirded by a structure of creative self-destruction, the rise and demise of colonial regimes. In that book, in the highly regarded course on colonialism he taught at Columbia for many years, and in his useful reader *Social Change: The Colonial Situation* (1966), Wallerstein presented an ineluctable process of colonial implantation leading to the establishment of new political boundaries and taxes, to the demand for new kinds of labor (mining, administration, infrastructure, cash crops), to a racially based class structure, to urban associations. to contact with democratic ideologies, to movements raising at least the threat of violence, and ultimately to decolonization. This framework of creative self-destruction, or rise and demise, of course underlies his grand project on capitalism.

Wallerstein's self-criticism of his early work on Africa stressed his neglect of the role of world-systemic factors in the achievement of African (and Asian) independence, a process he came to see as almost precisely analogous to the decolonization of Spanish America after the defeat of Napoleon and the achievement of British hegemony in the early nineteenth century. The newly hegemonic U.S. wanted nothing to interfere with the freedom of trade in the post-war world, and was in addition pressured by competition with the U.S.S.R. to champion democratic progress. But he also noted the vastly over-optimistic picture he drew of the immediate future of independent Africa, both there and in his *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (1967), which might be read as a correct general prediction of Third World "syndicalism" (e.g. OPEC) with an incorrect specific hope for African unity against imperialism.

In any case, Wallerstein's African experience greatly sharpened his political sensibilities, reinforcing the New Yorker's awareness of the importance of race and ethnicity. It also showed him that the accumulation of misery predicted by Marx's general law was not to be found in the so-called advanced

countries, as some Marxists are still attempting to demonstrate. Perhaps most important, Africa (and Paris) brought him into contact with the literature of *negritude*, almost pristine in its polar opposition to white Euro-America's self-conceptions, and into contact with the writings and finally the person of Frantz Fanon, subject of his other article in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Wallerstein first met Fanon in 1960 in Accra, defended and extolled his work at some length (see especially the careful textual analysis of Fanon's understanding of "class" in *CWE*, pp. 250-268), and was instrumental in securing the US publication of *The Wretched of the Earth*. Fanon is best known for his explication of the creative and destructive aspects of revolutionary violence. But it was his analysis of "the pitfalls of national consciousness"—a savage critique of the post-colonial urban elite—that helped to propel Wallerstein in the direction of a world-systems perspective.

For it was clear to many students of the Third World in the mid-1960s that processes of change there require an understanding of world politico-economic forces, and parallel to the efforts of the so-called "dependency" theorists, most of them Latin Americans, Wallerstein began groping toward his mature formulation (*MWS I*, pp. 5-7). In collaboration with his long-standing friend and colleague, the late Terence Hopkins (to whom he dedicated Vol. I in 1974 as well as his most recent book—*The Essential Wallerstein* [2000]), in seminars and lectures at Columbia, and with the research assistance of Michael Hechter, he began to investigate the development of early modern Europe. At first, seeking an appropriate method for "The Comparative Study of National Societies," (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967) Hopkins and Wallerstein moved toward a conception of the modern world-economy as the necessarily inclusive totality from which the analysis of change in any individual country should proceed. In contrast to the *dependentistas* they stressed the dialectical effects of core and periphery on one another as well as the impossibility and futility of "de-linking" as a development strategy.

From 1967 to 1974 may seem like a long gestation period, but one must realize that dramatic events were occurring in which Wallerstein became deeply involved. The 1968 student revolt at Columbia was a crucial turning point in Wallerstein's career. While it delayed the research and writing of *The Modern World-System*, it pushed him further to the left politically, resulting indirectly in his leaving Columbia after an association of almost twenty-

five years, and impelling him further towards a kind of sublimated revenge against the academic establishment. Three issues converged in the 1968 protests: anti-war sentiment, defense of the predominantly black neighborhood against university encroachment, and student political rights. Wallerstein became very active in the basically pro-student group among the faculty. He was one of a very few white professors trusted by the black students in the undergraduate college, and took a leading role in drafting the left faculty's proposed reforms. He ended up writing a book and editing a two-volume reader on the crisis in the universities. (Wallerstein 1969; Wallerstein and Starr 1971) But his faction lost in the undergraduate college, and his position in the graduate sociology department, which had contributed numerous activists to the struggle, was weakened. Hence in 1971 he accepted a position at McGill University (Hopkins left for SUNY Binghamton in 1971) whence he moved on to Binghamton in 1976. In quite another context (why Spain rather than Portugal took the lead in exploring the Americas) he wrote (*MWS I*, p. 169) "Imagination is usually nothing but the search for middle run profits by those to whom short run channels are blocked," an apposite description of his personal diaspora.

By 1976, of course, the first volume of *The Modern World-System* had appeared to great critical acclaim and considerable controversy. Wallerstein had become well-known beyond the horizons of African studies. His appointment at Binghamton was as Distinguished Professor and Chair, and included, due in part to Hopkins's institutional maneuvers, several unusual opportunities: a number of faculty positions to fill, a number of "adjunct professorships" for short term visiting foreign professors, support for a research center honoring Braudel and for a new journal, *Review*. Hardly the VIeme Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, *mais pas mal quand meme*.

A second major institutional activity was the formation of a new section of the American Sociological Association (called "Political Economy of the World System"), partially including social scientists from other disciplines. PEWS has sponsored annual conferences since 1977, with the proceedings published in an annual volume, yet the organizational power of disciplinary boundaries has rendered PEWS primarily a venue for sociologists. Rather it has been at the Fernand Braudel Center and in the pages of *Review* that the participation of historians, anthropologists, geographers, and political scientists in the world-systems project has been most notable over the past twenty-five years.

In addition, Wallerstein and two Parisian colleagues edited a monograph series with Cambridge University Press; this series included the 1979 collection (*The Capitalist World-Economy*) of Wallerstein's own most important articles over the previous seven years, as well as subsequent similar collections in 1984 (*The Politics of the World-Economy*) and 1991 (*Geopolitics and Geoculture*). These collections demonstrate the astounding range of Wallerstein's interests and concerns, with papers ranging from general analyses of the world-system in the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, to theoretical papers on class and ethnicity and civilization and culture, to several accounts of socialism in general and the USSR in particular, to analyses of hegemony and crisis, to essays on US slavery and the US South. Yet another group of similarly wide-ranging papers appeared in 1995, *After Liberalism*, published by The New Press.

At the Fernand Braudel Center, Wallerstein launched collective research projects on many topics, eg, households in the long process of the proletarianization of labor, on Southern Africa, the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world. Yet at the same time he continued to do both scholarly and political work on Africa and to move ahead with the subsequent volumes of *The Modern World-System II*, subtitled "Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750," was published in 1980, and Volume III, bringing the story into the 1840s, appeared in 1989.

It should also be mentioned that while Binghamton established itself as the major center of world-system studies, former students and sometime associates of Wallerstein became ensconced at other US universities where world-system studies have progressed, such as Johns Hopkins, Stanford, Arizona, California (Davis, Irvine, Santa Cruz), Cornell, Emory, and Kansas State.

His influence grew rapidly around the U.S., in other disciplines besides sociology. Like the ASA, both the American Historical Association (1978) and the American Political Science Association (1979) devoted panels to his work at their annual meetings. With *The Modern World-System I* available in nine foreign languages, Wallerstein's intellectual "search for middle run profits" attained considerable success in the world market of ideas.

The empirical/historical project of *The Modern World-System* slowed in the 1980s and 1990s—will there be a Volume IV? a Volume V?, as Waller-

stein turned more and more of his energies to critiques of the organization of the social sciences, to prediction and to prophecy. He called for "unthinking" nineteenth century social science and chaired a foundation-sponsored commission to propose a vision appropriate to the twenty-first century. He used his presidency of the International Sociological Association (1994-98) to promote this vision. But unless and until concrete social scientific work thus inspired persuades significant numbers of researchers to alter their own practices, Wallerstein's epistemological and methodological urgings are unlikely to have anything resembling the impact of world-system analysis itself.

INTELLECTUAL SOURCES

Although original insights appear throughout Wallerstein's mature work, its most impressive characteristic is a bold synthetic imagination that accounts both for the leap to a new basic unit of analysis and for the sense of what to do when you get there. The world-systems perspective was ingeniously constructed by marrying to a sensibility informed by "Third World" radicalism three major traditions in Western social science, all of them enunciated in opposition to the dominant strain of Anglo-American liberalism and positivism. These traditions are German historical economy, the Annales school in French historiography, and Marxism.³ We can briefly spell out the contributions of each tradition to the world-systems synthesis.

From the German tradition comes first of all the imprint of Max Weber, not the Weber of the Protestant Ethic nor of legitimate authority, but the Weber of urban imperialism vis-a-vis the countryside and of status groups reconceived in a materialist vein. Particularly useful has been the conception of the "ethno-nation" as a status group within the world economy. In core states this takes the form of nationalism: "Nationalism is the acceptance of the members of a state as members of a status-group, as citizens, with all the requirements of collective solidarity that implies" (*MWS I* p. 145). Ethno-national status-groups structurally divide the workers of the world into mutually exclusive segments as well as joining some of those workers

³ Cf. Wallerstein's own account in the editorial introduction to *Review*. (Wallerstein 1977:3-7).

to capital through citizenship. Wallerstein published class analyses of status-group conflicts in Africa (CWE, pp. 165-183, 193-201) and the USSR (CWE, pp. 184-192), as well as positing "race" as the only international status-group category in the contemporary world (CWE, p. 180).

But Weber is not all. In addition to relying on Karl Bucher and Gustav Schmoller for accounts of particular transformations of production processes, Wallerstein drew from the Austrian Joseph Schumpeter and from the Hungarian Karl Polanyi. Before the Kondratieff revival in which Wallerstein and the Fernand Braudel Center played a large role, it was Schumpeter who most forcefully insisted on the importance of business cycles of varying lengths, of the regular, rhythmic, but discontinuous character of capitalist growth. It was also Schumpeter, "the most sophisticated of the defenders of capitalism" (CWE, p. 149) who insisted that capitalism was sowing the seeds of its own destruction. The political commentator turned economic anthropologist, Karl Polanyi, made a more fundamental contribution to world-systems analysis. For it was Polanyi who worked out the notion of three basic modes of economic organization, or types of social economy, which he termed reciprocal, redistributive, and market modes. These have become rather without modification Wallerstein's three types of totality: mini-systems, world-empires, and world-economies. Here the collaboration of Hopkins was crucial, for Hopkins had worked in a research group under Polanyi at Columbia in the nineteen-fifties.

The second major source of Wallerstein's approach to social science has been the *Annales* school in French historiography. Founded by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, institutionalized by Febvre and Braudel in post-war Paris, the *Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilizations* has been the single most important historical journal in the contemporary world. Several "world-system" contributions of the *Annales* school stand out. Most famous is Braudel's insistence on the long term (*la longue duree*), which Wallerstein understands as an attack against both the episodic and the eternal, both event-centered political history and the universalizing generalizations of abstract social science (Review I, 3/4, p. 222). While there is a tendency among Annalists to focus on the enduring quality of social and economic structures, Wallerstein seems rather to have caught on to their *slowly-changing* basic features (*Ibid.*, pp. 52, 239); like Rome, capitalism was neither built in a day, nor is it falling fast.

An additional contribution of the *Annalistes* has been to focus on geo-ecological regions as units of analysis, either for local histories (e.g., Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie on Languedoc) or "world" histories (e.g., Braudel's Mediterranean in the age of Philip II). Here again Wallerstein has followed a lead, and by combining Braudel with Polanyi, has proposed a conception of a systemic totality comprised of distinct geo-economic regions in which (to jump ahead and add Lenin) national states, the typical units of analysis in macrosociology, are instead variably autonomous actors in competition with one another. However, as Braudel himself admitted (Review I, 3/4, p. 256), the Annalists rather neglected the state in their revolt against conventional political narrative: states too have long-term, slowly changing structures, and Wallerstein has gone only part of the way toward overcoming this inherited bias.

Yet another contribution of the Annalists has been their attention to rural history. They insisted, in Wallerstein's words, that "behind the urban minority lay the rural majority" (Review I, 3/4, p. 6). An unconscious urban bias has been one of the persistent defects of both liberalism and Marxism and it is no accident that the influential works of Wallerstein and Barrington Moore, Jr. have concentrated on the countryside, emphases stressed in their subtitles ("Capitalist Agriculture and the origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century"; "Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World"). For Moore the countryside mattered because its class configuration decided eventual political outcomes. Wallerstein adds to class structure more of the *Annales* vein: the countryside matters as geographic constraint, resource base, and provider of surplus.

Finally, vis-a-vis the *Annales* contribution to Wallerstein, beyond the focus on the sixteenth century, one must notice his overwhelming reliance for empirical materials on Braudel, on Pierre (and to a lesser extent Huguette) Chaunu, and other French Annalists; on the Polish master Marion Malowist and other Europeans (the Italian Ruggiero Romano, the Czech Z. S. Pach, the Spaniard J.-G. da Silva, the Portuguese V. M. Godinho, the Pole S. Hoszowski, the Belgians J. A. van Houtte and C. Verlinden). Although Volume I of *The Modern World-System* makes reference to some seventy-three journals published in seventeen countries, *Annales: E.S.C.* shares with the British *Economic History Review* the most frequent citations, thirty-six, from nineteen of the first twenty-five years. And in terms of individual cita-

tions, Braudel receives by far the most (45), followed by Malowist (19) and Chaunu (19), with Bloch (15) and the Marxist economic historian Maurice Dobb (15) next.

In summing up the *Annales* imprint on Wallerstein, it seems fair to say that it is greatest at a very general methodological level (the long term, the regions, the geo-economic base) and also in terms of direct evidence for the initial two volumes of *The Modern World-System*. Wallerstein shares the Annaliste belief in the bedrock reality of carefully assembled economic historical data (economic history is the one contemporary sub-discipline Wallerstein exempts from the “modernizationist” fallacy [CWE, p. 21]), but he has gone elsewhere, to the Austro-Germans and to Marxism, for most of his theoretical conceptions. At the same time, to name his research center for Braudel, to imitate *Annales* in the titling of *Review* (“A Journal...for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations”), to receive the warm benediction of Braudel himself (*Review* I, 3/4, pp. 243-253), these are more than the clever practices of one for whom liberalism is dead and Marxism at once sullied and imprudent. They symbolize and acknowledge a great debt.

Along with this great debt, however, the heritage of Marxism is at least as great. First, the fundamental reality for Wallerstein is social conflict among materially based human groups (CWE, pp. 175, 230; *MWS* I, p. 347). Second, shared with both the Annalists and with Marxism is the concern with the relevant totality. Third is the sense of the transitory nature of social forms and theories about them. Fourth is the centrality of the *accumulation* process, along with the competitive and class struggles it engenders. Here the stress is on the novelty of capitalism as a social organization, structurally based in the ever-renewed search for profit, and originating in the sixteenth century “primitive accumulation” through the expansion of Europe (colonies, precious metals, slave trade) and the reorganization of agricultural production (enclosure, capitalist ground rent). The long quotation on rent from Volume III of *Capital* (*MWS* I, p. 247), containing one of Marx’s most pregnant adumbrations of the world-systems perspective, is a triumphant moment in the analysis.

Fifth, and perhaps most important, is the dialectical sense of motion through conflict and contradiction, slower motion to be sure than most Marxists wish to perceive, but still the impulse to identify emerging social

groups that carry forward the world-wide struggle for socialism. In the 1960-1980 period, most Western Marxists twisted themselves into scholastic knots weaving ever more arcane theories of the state and of ideology, trying to explain away the failure of the Euro-American urban industrial workers to make the expected revolution. Wallerstein, meanwhile, was explaining it with a world-wide revision of Lenin’s “aristocracy of labor,” based on the direct observation of and participation in the ongoing struggles of non-white and often non-urban workers in the U.S. and in the Third World. This is quite clear, for example, in his review of the usages of class terms by Fanon and his critics (CWE, pp. 250-268).

Nor is this all. Also from Lenin, Wallerstein appropriates the centrality of both inter-imperialist rivalry—he will give it the somewhat antiseptic term “core competition”—and anti-imperialist revolution to the twentieth century. From Mao Ze-Dong Wallerstein seizes upon the notion that class struggle continues after “socialist” revolutions, and moves toward an interpretation of Soviet “revisionism” as a consequence of the U.S.S.R.’s approaching core status in the still capitalist world-economy. At the same time, he insists upon a nuanced view of twentieth-century socialist revolutions as both consolidating world capitalism and providing momentum for its undoing.

In addition, Wallerstein of course draws heavily on the neo-Marxist tendency known as dependency theory. Adumbrated in the nineteen-fifties by Paul Baran, dependency theory was advanced in the following decade by a number of prominent left social scientists, among them Samir Amin, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Theotonio dos Santos, Arghiri Emmanuel, Andre Gunder Frank, Anibal Quijano, and Dudley Seers. The critical entering wedge against “developmentalism” (the idea that each national society could develop in basically the same way), dependency theory focused on the centrality of core-periphery relations for understanding the periphery. From Amin came “peripheral capitalism,” from Cardoso “associated dependent development” to explain Brazilian exceptionalism, from Emmanuel “unequal exchange,” from Frank “satellitization” (Wallerstein’s “layers within layers”), from Seers the “open” economy. It remained for Wallerstein (and Hopkins) to make the core-periphery relation critical for understanding the core. In any case, it is from these sources and from Fanon as well that Wallerstein derives his sense of global class struggle—with its frequently nationalist guise.

One must adduce as well the impact of Marxist historiography. If not so important to Wallerstein as that of the *Annales* school, it has nonetheless played for him a large and significant role. The English historical journal *Past & Present* has served as the forum for the most sophisticated Marxist historical writing in the English language, and it ranks third among journal references in Volume I with seventeen citations. Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, the transplanted Viennese Eric Hobsbawm, Victor Kiernan, and of course R. H. Tawney were most important to Wallerstein, but one can point as well to continental Marxist historians whose work he drew on, most notably Boris Porchnev and Pierre Vilar.

It is, finally, not too much to argue that Wallerstein's ambition has been to revise Marxism itself by reinterpreting the modern world without the blinders imposed by taking the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis. According to him (*CWE*, p. 213), the great problem for Marxists has been "to explain the complicated detail" of transitions and uneven development, "to which there have been three responses: to ignore them, as do the 'vulgar Marxists...' to be overwhelmed by them, as are the 'ex-Marxists'...; to take them as both the key intellectual *and* the key political problem of Marxists." Here Wallerstein identifies Gramsci, Lenin, and Mao as three of the more obvious in the latter category. But it is perfectly clear from the remark's context, a critique of Eugene Genovese's use of the Old South as the unit of analysis for discussing slavery, that Wallerstein sees himself in this light, attempting to solve the riddles of transitions and uneven development. Hence the focus on the debates about feudal "survivals" and about "so-called socialism" in his "Rise and Future Demise" article, and hence the grand design of *The Modern World-System*.

BASIC ORIENTING CONCEPTS

In a brief but savage attack on "modernization" theory (*CWE*, pp. 132-137), Wallerstein outlined a research agenda with five major subjects: the functioning of the capitalist world-economy as a system, the how and why of its origins, its relations with non-capitalist structures in the centuries before it became a fully global system, the comparative study of the historical alternative modes of production, and the ongoing transition to socialism. He claims further that three tasks are necessary to carry out this agenda: "redoing our historical narratives, accumulating new world-systemic quanti-

tative data (almost from scratch), and above all reviewing and refining our conceptual baggage" (p. 136). He himself has concentrated on the third; to a large degree, reconceptualization in tandem with reinterpretation *is* his method.

As elaborated in a number of articles since 1974, the basic orienting concepts can be grouped thus: totalities, axial division of labor, international-state system, cyclical rhythms, secular trends, and antinomies or contradictions. These by no means exhaust the conceptual apparatus but include what has been most extensively worked out. All but the first apply primarily to the work on modern social change, as reconsideration of the problems presented by the analysis of pre-capitalist modes has been carried out by other scholars, most notably Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall (1997).

According to Wallerstein there have existed three and only three types of totality, or modes of production, with a fourth possibility in the future. A totality is the basic unit of analysis for studying change, because it is the arena within which the basic determinants of change are located. Although political, cultural, and even luxury trade relations with other totalities can make a significant difference to the slowly transformative internal processes, the analytic boundary for Wallerstein is established by the regular provisioning of fundamental goods and services (necessities as opposed to luxuries) including, importantly, protection. The three historical modes are, following Polanyi, mini-systems, world-empires, and world-economies. Mini-systems are tribal economies integrated through reciprocity, sometimes called the *lineage* mode. The classic subject matter of anthropology, mini-systems have now been swallowed up by capitalist expansion. In the archaeology of our own way of life we find survivals of this mode in the exchanges of gifts, favors, and labor among family members and friends. Mini-systems, then, involve a single division of labor, a single polity, and a single culture.

World-empires and world-economies are both world-systems. They are distinguished from mini-systems in that they involve multiple cultures, and from one another in the essential fact that the former has a single political center while the latter has multiple centers of differing strength. World-empires include two or more culturally distinct groups linked together by the forcible appropriation of surplus (tribute, hence the alternative designation "tributary mode") and its redistribution to a stratum of rulers if not

more widely for political purposes. A wide range of historical social formations is thus included under this rubric, from the simple linkage of two tribal groups by the exchange of tribute for "protection", all the way to the far-flung, long-lasting high civilizations of China or Rome. The basic pattern of change in world-empires is one of cyclical expansion and contraction, both spatially and temporally: expansion until the bureaucratic costs of appropriating tribute outweighed the amount of surplus so appropriated.

World-economies, by contrast, are integrated through the market rather than by a single political center. In this type of social system, two or more distinct economic and cultural regions are interdependent with respect to necessities such as food, fuel and protection, and two or more polities compete for domination without a single center's emerging quasi-permanently. Before the modern period, world-economies tended to become world-empires: the classical trajectory from the multiple polities of Greece to the single imperium of Rome is the best-known case. According to Wallerstein, the distinctive key to the dynamism of the modern world is on-going interstate competition within the framework of a single division of labor. This structure alone puts a premium on technical and organizational innovations that give groups the opportunity to advance their interests, prevents the total freezing of the factors of production by a single, system-wide political elite, and denies to the exploited majority a focus for its political opposition. This structure stands in sharp contrast to that of world-empires, with their well-known technical sluggishness, "target-tribute" surplus appropriation, and vulnerability to rebellion or conquest.

The great importance Wallerstein attaches to this distinction is demonstrated two ways in *The Modern World-System I*. First is his extended comparison of fifteenth century Europe and China (pp. 52-63) in which great albeit not exclusive weight is given to the Chinese imperial prebendal bureaucracy in accounting for the failure of the relatively more advanced Chinese to make a capitalist breakthrough. Second is in the emphasis given to the failure of Charles V to reestablish the Holy Roman Empire in spite of the resources provided by American treasure (pp. 165-196). One cautionary note on terminology: by world-empire Wallerstein does not mean such entities as the modern Spanish or British "empires," which in his terms are simply strong states with colonial appendages within the larger framework of the capitalist world-economy. Perhaps because European expansion is

noted for the creation of such empires, several critics missed the technical point at issue.

Finally there remains a fourth type of totality, at this time only a possibility, but one which Wallerstein believes and hopes is in the cards. This he has called a socialist world-government. Presumably this form of organization would differ from a world-empire in that the production, appropriation and redistribution of world surplus would be collectively and democratically decided upon not by a bureaucratic stratum but by the world producers in accordance with an ethic of use value and social equality. Although such an alternative mode is barely on the horizon, Wallerstein finds the world currently in a transition to socialism. He has recently adumbrated its likely features in print, in *Utopistics*, (1998), but he found no more than prefigurings in certain unspecified practices of previously existing *soi-disant* socialist states.⁴ He roundly denounced the Soviet claim to have established a socialist world system separate from and alternative to the still existent, singular capitalist one, and the USSR's demise did not come as a great surprise to world-system scholars.

Although some of the remaining orienting concepts have meaning when applied to more than one kind of totality, they have been worked out to apply primarily to world-economies, particularly to the capitalist world-economy or modern world-system. By "division of labor" Wallerstein and his collaborators mean the forces and relations of production of the world economy as a whole. They distinguish five aspects of the division of labor: core and periphery; commodity chains; semi-periphery; unequal exchange; and capital accumulation.

The central relation of the world-systems perspective is that of core and periphery, geographically and culturally distinct regions specializing in capital-intensive (core) and labor-intensive (periphery) production. In Wallerstein's view neither can exist without the other: it is a relational concept describing a relational reality. The notion of "commodity chains" has been put forth to describe the production of goods as they move from raw to cooked, slave-cultivated cotton becoming Manchester textiles, peasant-

⁴ Cf. Lucio Colletti (1972:226): "None of these countries is really socialist, nor could they be. Socialism is not a national process but a world process."

grown Colombian coffee becoming Detroit labor-power, and so on. Thus twentieth century “backwardness” is seen not as the result of a late start in the race to develop but as the continued deepening of a long-standing structural relation. As the capitalist world-economy expanded over the past four centuries, new areas, formerly external, have been incorporated into the system, almost all as peripheries. At the same time, new productive activities have developed and the location of different core and peripheral production processes has shifted. The crucial element is not the product itself (although for many purposes the famous “raw materials exchanged for manufactures” is a convenient shorthand), but rather the capital intensity and skill level of the production processes themselves (U.S. wheat and Indian wheat are not the same). Hence textile manufacture is largely a “core” process in 1600 involving a relatively high capital/labor ratio and some of the most skilled workers of that era. By 1900 it is becoming a semi-peripheral process and by 2000 is well on its way to being a peripheral one, whereas computer software production has become emblematic of core economic life.

If the idea of core-periphery relations derives in large part from the dependency theorists, the notion of “semi-periphery” is original with Wallerstein. At once economic and political, it is a conception around which there is much fuzziness and disagreement, like that of “middle class.” On the political side, semi-peripheral states are said to stabilize the world-system through sub-imperial practices, deflecting and absorbing some of the peripheral opposition to the core. On the economic side, there are two overlapping and not incompatible aspects of semi-peripheral zones. As implied above they are on the one hand recognized as *intermediate* between core and periphery in terms of the capital intensity, and skill and wage levels of their production processes, as with sharecropping in sixteenth century Italy or textile mills in early twentieth century Japan. On the other hand, they are characterized by “combined” development, the coexistence of some core-like and some peripheral production, with their trade flowing simultaneously in two directions as they export little-processed materials to the core and simple manufactures to the periphery. Movement into and out of semi-peripheral status is possible for a region or state, both from above and from below. But upward movement is difficult, and it is further argued that the upward movement of some is largely (though not wholly: the system does expand) at the expense of the downward movement of others. Thus one is

led to anticipate such phenomena as the recent rise of some semi-peripheral states or regions (Taiwan, S. Korea) along with the stagnation or decline of others (Iraq, Colombia).

By “unequal exchange” Wallerstein refers to the processes or mechanisms (eg, transfer pricing) that reproduce the core-periphery division of labor. While there is much continuing debate over the precise nature of the mechanisms, they do result in the systematic transfer of surplus from the subsistence and semi-proletarian sectors located in the periphery to the high-technology, more fully proletarianized core. In this way one finds continuing and increasingly higher levels of living in the core, where high wages, worker political organization, and surplus capital combine to produce pressure for ever greater technical advance. This in turn tends to increase the differentiation between core and periphery.

By capital accumulation, finally, Wallerstein refers to the basic process expounded by Marx, with two important differences from the mainstream of received Marxist opinion. First, the accumulation process is seen as a *world* process, not a series of parallel national processes. Second, it is necessarily involved with the appropriation and transformation of peripheral surplus: geographic expansion and on-going primitive accumulation are not incidental to, but necessary and integral to the very constitution of capitalism. Here Wallerstein and Hopkins’s argument is formally and substantively isomorphic with the socialist-feminist position on housework. This is the source of Wallerstein’s controversial assertion that not wage-labor alone, but the combination of waged and non-waged labor is the essence of capitalism. “When labor is everywhere free, we shall have socialism” (MWS I p. 127).

So much for the division of labor, the basically economic side. But what of the political? A second fundamental family of concepts revolves around the structure of the international state system. A basic parameter of the capitalist world-economy, the competitive system of states provides an escape from stagnation by providing for capital the freedom to escape political restrictions threatened or imposed by other social forces. Wallerstein and his collaborators have singled out three aspects of the state system as crucial: imperialism, hegemony, and class struggle.

Imperialism refers to the domination of weak peripheral regions (whether they are states, colonies, or neither) by strong core states. Semi-

peripheral states are typically in between. Since state strength is a function of productive base, military organization, diplomatic alliances, and geopolitical situation, an occasional newly incorporated territory may have a sufficiently strong state to enter the world-system in a semi-peripheral position; such was the case with both Russia in the eighteenth century and Japan in the nineteenth. States are used by class forces to distort the world market in their favor and may also initiate such distortion by the use of force or diplomacy. They enforce and reinforce mechanisms of unequal exchange. As for the internal structure of states, core-states are far stronger than peripheral ones, as the ruling classes of the latter typically want to preserve open economies and to enjoy local power. But to say strong states is not to say necessarily strong or highly centralized executives (monarchs, presidents). The very strongest states are those which need the least administrative and military machinery to do the jobs of internal coordination and external depredation. Also, there appears to be some regularity in the alternation of informal empire and formal colonization as modes of imperialism.

Hegemony refers to the thus-far thrice recurrent situation of one core state temporarily outstripping the rest.⁵ A hegemonic power is characterized by simultaneous supremacy in production, commerce, and finance which in turn support a most powerful military apparatus. The Dutch enjoyed such supremacy in the middle of the seventeenth century, as Wallerstein details in the second chapter of volume II; the British achieved the same in the nineteenth century and the U.S. in the twentieth. Interestingly, the hegemonic power is characterized by a rickety and rather decentralized state apparatus in contrast to rival core states, having to overcome the least internal resistance to an aggressively expansionist foreign economic policy.

Hegemonic powers take responsibility for maintaining a stable balance of power in world politics and for enforcing free trade, which is to its advantage so long as its economic advantage lasts. Each hegemonic power thus far has contained as well the world financial center of its time, a pattern which goes back to late medieval Venice, and, passing through Genoa and

⁵ Arguments about the regularity of hegemonic situations can be found in the issue of *Review* (11, 4, Spring 1979) devoted to cycles, particularly in the article by Nicole Bousquet (1979:501-517). See also Wallerstein (1983).

Antwerp, takes its characteristic modern form in Amsterdam, then London, and (penultimately?) New York—which ironically started its modern career as Nieuw Amsterdam. The rise of a hegemonic power to its accepted place is typically preceded and accompanied by world wars (1618-1648, 1756-1763 and 1792-1815, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945). And precisely because the hegemonic state is never strong enough to absorb the entire world-system but merely to police it, the phenomenon of hegemony is a necessarily temporary one, due to three processes. First, class struggles raise the wage level, lessening the competitive advantage, so that the hegemonic power can no longer undersell its rivals in the world market. Second, technical advantages are diffused through imitation, theft, or capital export. Third, world-wide technical advance makes possible the effectiveness of larger political units.

The final crucial aspect of the state system is the prominence of class struggle as the stuff of politics within and across state boundaries. Here the unconventional implications of the world-systems perspective are three. First, much attention is directed to the existence of class alliances across state boundaries, as bourgeois in several locations collude to protect surplus appropriation even as they compete over relative shares. Second, states themselves are conceived as mediating actors within the grand drama of a world-economy-wide class struggle. Third, Wallerstein and Hopkins are impatient with descriptive occupational/class terminology (e.g., slave owner, professional, peasant) that reifies social types at the expense of understanding the consequences of their activities for the operation of world capitalism.

In contrast to several friendly if severe critics, Wallerstein insisted on a high degree of interconnectedness between the division of labor and the international state system. Hence the phrase “political economy of the world-system.” Following Otto Hintze, both Theda Skocpol and Aristede Zolberg suggest giving co-determinative weight to world politics and world economy. (Skocpol 1977; Zolberg 1979) This renewal of the Marx-Weber debate at the level of the world-system can be fruitful up to a point; most useful was Zolberg’s noting the contribution of European military and diplomatic interaction with the Ottoman Empire as a causal link in the origins of the capitalist world-economy, a connection Wallerstein missed. Our view is that “co-determination” overly separates the military/political from the economic/social, and enshrines as a theoretical principle what needs to

be explored in specific empirical instances. Here the disputants are in closer accord, in part perhaps because Wallerstein was able to draw in his second volume on Perry Anderson's (1974) account of state formation in Eastern Europe, in part because the further towards the present one comes from the origins of the modern world, the more intercalated economic and political processes become.

This modern political economy is further characterized by regular cyclical rhythms which are asserted to be a third parameter of the system, constitutive of it rather than merely incidental to it. Wallerstein has been relatively uninterested in short-term business cycles, but struck by the regularities of the long waves emphasized by Kondratieff and Schumpeter (from forty to fifty years in length) and of the even longer swings (about 300 years) analyzed by Simiand, Labrousse, and most recently Rondo Cameron, who calls them "logistics." An entire issue of *Review* (II, 4) was devoted to discussions of these long waves of expansion and stagnation, for which time series on population, production, and price movements provide the primary evidence. But these data have not yet been treated as world-system data, and thus far are at best gross summaries of diverse movements in different accounting units (mostly states). Cyclical regularities systematically affect the differentiated zones of the world-economy. In periods of contraction and/or stagnation, for example, most peripheral and older semi-peripheral zones are hardest hit, while core and new semi-peripheral zones do relatively better.

The cyclical rhythms of the modern world-system provide the basis for Wallerstein's periodization of modern history, and hence for the temporal boundaries of his originally projected four (now five?) volumes. The period of growth and expansion called "the long sixteenth century" by Braudel (1450–1620/40) is covered in the first volume; the corresponding period of contraction and stagnation (1600–1730/50) in the second. Economic cycles give part way to political in the dating of the third and fourth stages. Stage three (1750–1917) is marked by the growing predominance of industrial over agricultural capital, the globalization of the capitalist world-economy, and the rise and demise of British hegemony. And stage four (1917–?) witnessed the consolidation of the global world-system, paradoxically through the growth of revolutionary socialist challenges to that system which resulted in the existence of so-called socialist semi-peripheries whose ruling groups had a stake in the continued existence of the system (CWE, pp. 30-34, 108-116).

Why are long cycles basic to the operation of capitalism? Because of the structured separation of economics from politics, the anarchy of the market. Periods of expansion come to an end when production outstrips the world distribution of income and hence effective demand. In fact, the periodic crises are worsened by the initial response of individual producing units to declining profits. That response, typically, is to expand overall production in order to maintain an absolute profit level, and necessarily results in an increased problem of oversupply. The ensuing severe crises are marked by increased concentration and centralization of capital, by geographic expansion, by technical change, and by struggles leading to sufficient income redistribution on a world scale to permit a renewal of capitalist expansion. For example, the crisis of the late nineteenth century saw the rise of corporations, cartels, and trusts; the "scramble for Africa" and frontier expansion in the Americas, Australia, and Asiatic Russia; the invention of the internal combustion engine and of electrical power; and the achievements of social democracy: higher wages for core industrial workers and the benefits of the welfare state.

The resolution of periodic crises, then, furthers the movement of the fourth parameter of the modern world-system, its secular trends. These trends are conceived as *both* the self-reproducing *and* the self-transforming aspects of the entire structure, with asymptotic limits that hypothetically presage its demise. That is, capitalism is understood as a system in the process of slowly transforming itself in the direction of limits beyond which it cannot pass: the secular trends—expansion, commodification, mechanization (accumulation) and bureaucratization—are processes constitutive of this moving system just as are the cyclical rhythms, the interstate competition, and the dividing and redividing of labor.

Geographic expansion is the first and most obvious of modern capitalism's secular trends. Essential to the transition from feudalism by making available to capitalists the labor and commodities of an arena stretching from parts of the Americas to parts of Africa and Eastern Europe, expansion has been a regular if discontinuous feature of modern history. With a few semi-peripheral exceptions, territories controlled both by mini-systems and by world-empires have been incorporated as peripheries with specialized productive roles. By the early part of the 20th century, the capitalist world-economy covered the entire globe extensively. But there has also

been a process of “inner” expansion into regions previously included within colonial or national political boundaries but theretofore existing as “subsistence redoubts,” supplying primarily able-bodied migratory workers to other zones. The expansion process is particularly important in times of contraction, with the press of need for cheaper raw materials, for new markets, and for expanded resources in the intensified interstate competition of such periods. The globe itself sets a finite limit to the expansion process; it is not accidental that in the present moment we hear much about seabed mining, aquaculture, even space colonies.

The second secular trend is “commodification,” the conversion of everything from use value to exchange value. Markets for land and labor are the critical ones: the sub-processes are termed “commercialization” and “proletarianization.” The commercialization of land has already reached a near-limit, as little usable space remains in the hands of tribal or communal groups, not to mention such frozen forms as *mainmorte* or entail. As for proletarianization, it has clearly not yet reached its possible limits. Most households in the core still depend to a fair degree on unwaged obligatory “housework” even if the bulk of their income is derived from wages. And in the periphery, low wage levels depend precisely on the fact that the costs of reproducing the work force are borne by subsistence producers. In a stunning inversion of conventional wisdom, Wallerstein notes that “the slowly developing, slowly eroding, marginal, largely subsistence sector of the world-economy, within which live [a large part] of the world’s rural populations...do not pose a problem to the capitalist world-economy. These areas are and have been from the beginning one of its major solutions” (CWE, p. 123, emphasis added). But if the limits of proletarianization have yet to be reached, surely the world is closer to it now than at any past time. “The world is probably halfway, more or less, in the process of freeing the factors of production” (CWE, p. 162).

The third secular trend is mechanization of production, increasing industrialization, the growing ratio of constant to variable capital. Here Wallerstein questions the centrality of the “English” industrial revolution of the eighteenth century, momentous though that change was. Rather the logic of his own arguments had pushed him in the direction of revaluing upwards the importance of the Dutch innovations in shipbuilding and food processing (some of it aboard ships; were they the first factories?) in the sev-

enteenth century (MWS II, Ch. 2). For the rest, he follows Marx in suggesting that continuing increases in the ratio of constant to variable capital can decrease profitability. He has not suggested what the limit might be in this regard.

A final secular trend is Weber’s bureaucratization, “the strengthening of all organizational structures...vis-a-vis both individuals and groups (CWE, p. 63). Wallerstein asserts that this trend has both stabilized the system by increasing the material capacity of ruling groups to repress opposition and weakened it by decreasing the ability of rulers to control the bureaucracies themselves, which can translate into weakness in enforcing “politico-economic will.” Again, just what limits this trend is up against remain to be specified.

A final set of orienting concepts includes the three primary contradictions in the modern world-system, what Wallerstein has sometimes called “antinomies.” The first is that between economy and polity, creating dilemmas of action for politically organized class groups. Since the world-economy is characterized by multiple polities, economic decisions are primarily oriented to an arena distinct from the bounded territorial control points where state power resides. This contradiction results in renewed pressure to bureaucratize individual nation-states, and, we might add, in the growing pressure to unify the world politically. Socialism in one country is in this view impossible.

The second contradiction is between supply and demand. Since multiple polities make the regulation of supply impossible, anarchy prevails. Demand on the other hand results from the temporary resolution of class struggles within the various states. Capitalists seek both to extract and to realize surplus-value, an impossible balancing act. Never perfectly harmonized, the cyclical rhythms of modern capitalism speed up over time and in addition become more synchronized throughout the entire world market. Regularly, crises push forward the secular trends which constitute capitalism’s approach to its limits.

Third is the contradiction between capital and labor. Here Wallerstein has argued that there are three kinds of workers in the world system, those who work for subsistence, those who work for wages, and those who are “part lifetime” proletarians, the most common type in the world as a whole. He has further asserted that the process of proletarianization reduces the

well-being of most of the world's workers—Marx's accumulation of misery, and that the so-called "new working class" of professionals, technicians, and bureaucrats has been the main exception to and beneficiary of this process. But free labor, especially when

urbanized, brings with it heightened labor organization and political struggle. And so the world bourgeoisie is hamstrung both by having to share increasing amounts of surplus with the intermediate strata—the increasing costs of cooption—(CWE, pp. 163, 35) and by having to face intensified struggle from below (CWE, pp. 63-64). As the concluding paragraph of *The Modern World-System I* puts it (p. 357):

The mark of the modern world is the imagination of its profiteers and the counter-assertiveness of the oppressed. Exploitation and the refusal to accept exploitation as either inevitable or just constitute the continuing antinomy of the modern era, joined together in a dialectic which has far from reached its climax in the twentieth century.

THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM: AN ARCHITECTURAL DIGEST

Although he has been both prolific and wide-ranging in his intellectual labors, Wallerstein will doubtless be primarily judged for his *Modern World-System*. It is in some ways unfair and unfortunate to appraise that work on the basis of only the first three volumes. But they provide at once the most comprehensive application of his evolving theoretical scheme, and the richest vein from which we can extract his methodological principles.

The major purpose and accomplishment of Volume I is to demonstrate the cogency of the world-systems perspective through a reinterpretation of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. It is thus more concerned with establishing the primacy of the whole as a viable and necessary unit of analysis than it is with the detailed reconstruction of how and why each part came to play the role it provisionally held by the end of the long sixteenth century—though to be sure there is plenty of the latter. Wallerstein thus focuses on the new kind of totality represented by this European world-economy (the bulk of ch. 1), on its division of labor (ch. 2) and structure of strong and weak states (ch. 3), and then on the concrete historical trajectories of (A) the failed Hapsburg Empire, most of which becomes the semi-periphery (ch. 4), (B) the ascending core states of England and France (ch. 5)—only in *MWS II* does he do right by the Dutch, and (C) the East European and Spanish American peripheries which he contrasts with the as

yet unincorporated "external arenas" of Russia and the Indian Ocean respectively (ch. 6).

Along with the short concluding chapter seven, the second and third chapters are the most heavily theoretical, and the rest rather more empirical. But reconceptualization, analytic principles, and explanatory interpretations are scattered throughout the work in a way that makes it more confusing and difficult than it needs to be (especially since they are not always articulated), much more so for example than *MWS II* noted, in spite of its often engaging and lively style, the book tells you more than you want to know about some things and less about others. In places it cries out for editing, such as chapter five which switches back and forth from England (pp. 227-262) to France (pp. 262-279) to England (pp. 274-283) and again to France (pp. 283-296). In others it cries out for rewriting, most notably the section on the sixteenth century price revolution, inflation, and wage lag (pp. 70-84). In too many places the text reads like an over-hasty assemblage of quite brilliant reading notes. Just the same, what Wallerstein said about fifteenth century European state-building deserves to be said about his first volume (*MWS I*, p. 30): "Still it would be false to emphasize the difficulties. It is the magnitude of the achievement that is impressive."

In spite of the sometimes overwhelming bulk of information and interpretation, the structure of the basic argument is clear. Capitalism is a world-economy comprised of core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral productive regions integrated by market mechanisms which are in turn distorted by the stronger of the competing states, none of which is strong enough to control the entire economy. It came into being through the more or less conscious efforts of the feudal ruling classes to maintain politico-economic sway in the face of a triple conjunctural crunch: reaching the limits of feudal appropriation (an extremely decentralized tributary mode plus the nascent world-economies of the Hawse and the Mediterranean) as indicated by the fourteenth century peasant revolts; a severe cyclical decline in population and production; and a climatological shift to colder temperatures; the first of these is the crucial one (*MWS I*, p. 37). That response involved three developments which fed upon each other. Spatial expansion was fundamental, from about three to about seven million square kilometers, for it greatly increased the land/labor ratio of the Europe-based economy, making possible the accumulation of capital that would finance the rationalization of

agriculture in the core (*MWS I*, pp. 38, 68-69). Second was the emergence of various methods of labor control for different production processes in the different zones, ranging from wages and petty commodity production in the core to serfdom and slavery in the periphery, point insufficiently stressed in *MWS I*—an institutionalized system of diplomacy and law. How the whole came into being where and when it did, and how each zone and each state came to occupy its particular niche by about 1620 is then the detailed subject matter.

An example of the uneasy juxtaposition of explanatory levels is the long section on the new division of labor (pp. 86-127). Two kinds of causal explanation are going on at once. In a general sense, Wallerstein is attempting to demonstrate the validity of his general model of a capitalist world-economy. To do this he repeatedly asserts the causal importance of a particular region's emerging role in the increasingly specialized world market for the particular configuration that ensues in each region. For example, supplying low-cost bulk goods like grain and sugar is conducive to the organization of large estates with highly coercive labor systems. At the same time, he is setting forth the specific or local causes of these outcomes, and to do this he draws upon an unintegrated assortment of factors. For the "second serfdom" of the East European periphery these factors are the low ratio of labor to land near a frontier to which unbound peasants might escape, relatively weak towns, and the havoc (migrations, destruction, state-weakening) wrought by Turkish and Mongol-Tartar invasions. Other factors adduced in accounting for particular outcomes include indigenous resistance in newly conquered areas, supervision costs, legal structures, soil conditions (pasture or arable, fresh or exhausted), the impact of rich townsmen on agricultural production, and state policy. What is missing is precisely a measured and orderly synthesis of these two kinds of explanation. Wallerstein has sometimes been accused of neglecting the second kind of variables; they are absent from the model, but not from the empirical analyses.

Another criticism of *MWS I* arose from his treatment of state strength in the sixteenth century, which he correlates with core economic activities. The problems derive from his use of the word "strength," by which he means internal administrative and external military efficacy, and its confusion with "absolutism," which refers to the ability of monarchs to get their way: core

states are stronger than their monarchs are absolute. Wallerstein treats this family of problems more satisfactorily in *MWS II* when he analyzes the Dutch, English, and French states at greater length, and also those of the rising seventeenth century semi-peripheral powers, Sweden and Prussia.

The second volume as a whole features the same architecture but needs far less theoretical scaffolding. Subtitled "Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750," it completes the 300-year economic long cycle begun in Volume I by analyzing the trajectory of the whole and its parts in a period of stagnation. The work begins with evidence of the unitary character of the world-economy: roughly coordinated price movements, systematically different movements in the volume of production and trade and in population (the core grows slowly, the semi-periphery stagnates, the periphery declines). A further argument is adduced for the sixteenth century's having been the crucial era of transition: whereas the contraction following feudal expansion (c. 1100-1300) led to crisis and a transformative transition, the seventeenth-century contraction led rather to a consolidation of the structural patterns that emerged in the sixteenth. The overall order of presentation changes, reflecting the greater stability of that epoch, to core—the Dutch (Ch. 2), the English and French (Ch. 3); periphery—Eastern Europe, Ibero-America, the new zone of the extended Caribbean from Brazil to Chesapeake Bay (Ch. 4); semi-periphery—first the declining older zones of the Christian Mediterranean, then the newly rising ones, first Sweden, then Prussia, and also the New England-Middle Atlantic colonies (Ch. 5). The volume concludes with a long analysis of Anglo-French rivalry, the major "world" conflict by the end of the period.

Among its contributions, a number of interesting and/or controversial ones stand out. First, the account of Dutch hegemony rescues this country, later to be outdistanced by its larger rivals, from an obscurity which in comparative macrosociology has been virtually complete, an obscurity, furthermore, which Wallerstein's own first volume tends to perpetuate. Simultaneously, thanks in large measure to the researches of C. H. Wilson, he is able to challenge the stereotype of the Dutch as mere "merchant" capitalists, portraying the remarkable advances in production—dairying, industrial crops, land reclamation, textiles, shipbuilding, food processing, peat mining—underlying the Dutch rise to commercial and financial primacy.

Of interest as well are his treatment of the sinews of the ostensibly rickety Dutch state.

Second, the treatment of England and France in both the third and sixth chapters returns to the delicate comparative task of stressing similarities while attempting to specify consequential differences. Most notable are his arguments that (A) Northern France was much more similar to England than is commonly understood; (B) a large proportion of French industry was not of the “artificial royal” variety made famous by the pro-British historian of mercantilism, Eli Hecksher; (C) ecological exhaustion of forests pushed England both toward the use of coal as fuel and toward the colonization of North America for shipbuilding and naval stores—a kind of seventeenth century energy crisis; and (D) the English edge going into the middle of the eighteenth century was due more than to anything else to superior state finances, which in turn were decisively boosted by large amounts of Dutch investments, just as growing English military superiority relative to France was aided by the Anglo-Dutch alliance.

Third, one of the middle-level theoretical expectations (also an empirical generalization) of the world-systems view is that only a limited number of countries can advance at a given moment, and fewer in times of stagnation than in times of expansion. What Wallerstein does in his discussion of the seventeenth century semi-periphery is to illustrate this proposition by reference to the failure of mercantilism to increase the relative standing of Spain and Portugal; the continued decline of Flanders, the Rhineland, and North Italy; and the upward trajectories of Sweden, Prussia, and the New England/Mid-Atlantic colonies of North America. Here again the historical specificities are accommodated within a supple theoretical framework. For Sweden, the key industries are iron and copper (he compares it to OPEC) and the key alliance with France, which partially subsidized Sweden’s conquests. But Sweden lacked the size and productive base to rise beyond a certain point, and its expansion-based development was stopped after about 1680. For Prussia, the keys were first, the medium (not large) size of states, so that the Junkers were relatively weaker vis-a-vis the state than peripheral landowners elsewhere; second, the luck of inheritance, as the Elector of Brandenburg acquired Cleves in the Northern Rhineland, Prussia, and Pomerania, all strategically important lands, which the great powers allowed Brandenburg to keep as a check on Sweden; third, alliance first with Sweden

against Poland and then with England and Holland against Sweden. Then, as with his explanation of the beginnings of the Swedish rise in the sixteenth century in Volume I, so with Brandenburg-Prussia: basically unpromising agricultural production induced the medium-sized Junkers to *join* with the monarch through state employment rather than to oppose him. Following this build-up of bureaucracy and army came Prussia’s role as English ally in the war against yet another semi-peripheral aspirant, Austria, the outcome of which was its annexation of the rich industrial zone of Silesia. Finally, the discussion of England’s northern colonies in the Americas stresses the role of the shipbuilding industry, which became so important for English shipping that it was allowed to prosper even as the colonial officials were attempting to restrict other industrial production. Shipbuilding, according to Wallerstein, laid the foundations in technology, skilled labor, and capital that would enable those colonies to escape peripheralization and share in the profits of renewed world economic expansion after 1750.

Volume III of *The Modern World-System* picks up where II leaves off. Sub-titled “The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s,” it too is notable in several ways that in sociology, at least, have been almost entirely neglected. Of its four chapters, the first two, on the core, critique received wisdom about the industrial and French revolutions: the former occurred over centuries and not only in England; the latter enabled the ideological superstructure of capitalism to catch up to its material base, and, as a social movement, represented a failed anti-capitalist movement rather than a successful bourgeois one. The comparison between Britain and France and the analysis of their rivalry yields ironic revisions of the standard accounts of why the British came to dominate the world in the nineteenth century.

The final two chapters treat parts of the periphery and semi-periphery, first an extended comparative analysis of the incorporation and peripheralization of India, the Ottoman lands, Russia, and West Africa, and the second an account of the “settler decolonization of the Americas.” Particularly remarkable is Wallerstein’s tracing of the parallel processes of transforming production and reorganizing class structure in the four newly incorporated zones, on the one hand, and the socio-economic contrast between Russia and the others because of its strong state, on the other.

THE RULES OF THE WORLD-SYSTEMS METHOD

In a most general sense, we have already presented Wallerstein's most basic methodological rules, which may be summarized briefly. Pursue the questions of long-term, large-scale social transformation that preoccupied the nineteenth century founders of modern social science. Address the major theoretical and political controversies of the contemporary world. Look at historical processes as constitutive of society (not something that is "background" to it), and look at that history through "the eyes of the down-trodden" with the hope that one's intellectual work can help advance their political interests (*MWS I*, pp. 4, 10). To study change, locate the relevant totality within which change is primarily determined. To study modern social change, locate the phenomena under analysis spatio-temporally, in terms of the orienting concepts discussed above—productive structure cum role in the world market, state structure cum geopolitics, cyclical conjuncture,⁶ cumulative secular trends, ongoing contradictions. Use comparative analysis to establish the validity of the general concepts (e.g., Europe as world-economy vs. China as world-empire, England as core vs. Poland as periphery), to specify consequential differences among basically similar parts of the world-economy (Brandenburg-Prussia vs. Austria as ascending semi-peripheries in the early eighteenth century, England vs. France as core rivals for hegemony), and to portray less consequential but still interesting differences among similar parts (the timing of the shift to slavery in sugar vs. tobacco cultivation). Watch for "layers within layers," not merely regionally, but also in terms of ethnic segmentation of the labor force (*MWS I*, pp. 86-87, 118-119, 122, 139). And, of course, read voraciously and ceaselessly in history, not neglecting works published any time in the last century.

But two further aspects of Wallerstein's method deserve attention: the invocation of middle-level analytical principles, and the eclectic use of explanatory factors as building blocks. Unfortunately, these are the least systematically worked out aspects of his approach, and the distance between

⁶ An interesting instance of Wallerstein's method in this regard is his distinction between "seizing the chance" and "promotion by invitation" as contrasting modes of peripheral advance, the former more likely in periods of contraction, the latter in periods of expansion (*CWE*, pp. 76-81).

the latter and the orienting concepts has caused ample criticism, even the accusation "of creating an impenetrable abyss between historical findings and social science theorizing."⁷ Rather it seems to us that the perceived gap is due to the unintegrated character of Wallerstein's theory. Thus he can tell us that "the cause" (*I*, p.191) of Spain's decline was its failure to erect the right kind of state for its time (pp. 179-181), a general orienting concept, and then go on to adduce nine or ten political, economic, class, and demographic explanations of the same phenomenon (pp. 191-196).

Before discussing these lower-level explanatory factors, however, it is worth looking at the middle-level analytical principles invoked at various points in the work. These principles often show subtle dialectical thought. But even if plausible, their invocation sometimes seems too "magical," that is, serving the analyst just when he is in trouble. The most important such principles might be called "negativities," "Goldilocks" (or "proportionalities"), "cumulation" (following Myrdal), and "temporal paradox" (including Veblen's advantages of backwardness).

Alertness to negativities is one of Wallerstein's great strengths. Positive facts are fine for positivist analysis, and of course we all use them. But so are negative ones. Thus we find part of the explanation for the rise of Prussia in its prior poverty, as it was first left alone and later sponsored by more powerful states fighting over the truly rich prizes of Spain and Italy (*MWS II* Ch. 5). Or, the small size of Holland makes it safe for Spain to continue using it as a bullion outlet (*MWS I*, p. 213). Or, to take a contemporary example, the poverty and rarity of a state like Tanzania are prime factors in its being allowed by stronger powers to try "self-reliance" as a mode of advance (*CWE*, p. 82).

The "Goldilocks"—not too cold, not too hot, but just right—principle is even more important. Repeatedly Wallerstein argues against the linear correlations beloved of positivist social science. For example, to the general correlation of state strength with core production, he adds the nuances that hegemonic core states need less active state machineries than their rivals, and that advancing semi-peripheral states take a more active economic role

⁷ Skocpol (1977). Another reviewer (Markoff 1977:2-8) called Vol. I "almost...two different books."

than any (*MWS II* Ch. 2; *CWE*, pp. 95-118). For sixteenth-century success, city-states were too small, empires too large. For successful national capitalist advance, a medium average wage level is best: too low, and the domestic market is insufficient; too high, and export competitiveness is forsaken. The fate of Venice illustrates both (*MWS I*, p. 219), with its lack of control over a raw materials producing hinterland and its high wages (*MWS I*, p. 262). Or again (perhaps too magically?), to return to Stuart England, the "state machinery was just strong enough to fend off baneful outside influences, but still weak enough not to give too great an edge to 'traditionalist' elements or to the new parasites of the state bureaucracy" who would have absorbed otherwise investible surplus (*MWS I*, p. 257). And the English Civil War, with its commercializing momentum, occurred at just the right moment, too late for rural discontent to make a difference, too soon for a conservative gentry/Court coalition to brake the thrust. These are all plausible and tantalizing arguments, some more convincing than others. The question is, how does one know when to invoke Goldilocks, or, is there more to this method than alertness?

The principle of "cumulation," to which Wallerstein adds the notion of "tipping mechanisms," is by contrast straightforward, although again there are no codified rules of application. It refers at once to the self-reinforcing aspect of the market (in another guise, R.K.Merton's "Matthew effect") and to the mutually beneficial interplay of economic and political power (*MWS I*, pp. 98, 309, 356). In addition to accounting for the increasing gap between core and periphery, Wallerstein uses it in its more narrowly economic sense to describe the spiraling rise to hegemony of the Dutch, as productive advantage led to commercial advantage which reinforced the former while leading as well to financial advantage (*MWS II* Ch. 2). "Tipping mechanism" is a metaphorical fig leaf for the process through which a spiral-starting turning point is reached. For example, once the early modern Western monarchies gained an edge over their nobilities, they were able to increase centralization through increasing taxation which paid for increasing enforcement which gave confidence to those who might finance state deficits.

By "temporal paradox" we mean to suggest several notions including that of the advantages of backwardness, which might be thought of as one of the regular conditions under which new core zones emerge (on sixteenth

century textiles, for instance, see *MWS I*, pp. 125, 279). Of course, in the non-infinite-sum game of world capitalism, not everyone's backwardness is an advantage. The point is that today's disadvantage, say, the vastness of the Russian Empire in the 18th-20th centuries, may become tomorrow's advantage. A second kind of temporal paradox is the pattern of initial receptivity leading to stifling, "whereas initial resistance often leads on to a breakthrough" (*MWS I*, p. 59). Wallerstein invokes this principle to cover the paradoxes that contractual Chinese prebendalism smothered capitalism, while mystical European feudalism gave rise to it; and that Spain, rather than the more experienced Portugal, took the lead in exploring the Western hemisphere. Beyond alertness, it is perhaps impossible to specify when "temporal paradox" as opposed to "cumulation" will occur.

A final sort of temporal paradox is to contrast short-run, middle-run, and long-run consequences. Thus we find Wallerstein echoing the common assertions about the outcome of the struggles culminating in the Fronde, with the French aristocracy losing in the short run, winning in the medium run, and losing big in the long run. Or, more controversially, we find him suggesting that while the short-run consequences of Russia's defeat in the Livonian War (1583) may have been damaging, the long-run effect was to keep Russia out of the European world-economy, thus protecting its strong state and indigenous bourgeoisie from peripheralization (*MWS I*, p. 319).

To summarize, these analytical principles have an oddly detached character when viewed as part of the overall theoretical edifice. They greatly enrich the particular explanatory accounts even if the rules for reproducing such accounts do not yet exist, and perhaps never will, not even in the long run. But they do provide an array of tools for those who undertake to decipher the historical trajectories of complex configurations.

If Wallerstein's analytical principles are detached from his general orienting concepts, his grab-bag of explanatory factors is that and disordered as well. Above we alluded to the schizoid reckoning of Spain's decline, with first *the* cause and then nine or ten explanatory factors. Or, one can point to the disjuncture between a bald *general* statement such as "the different roles [in the world division of labor] led to different class structures which led to different politics" (*MWS I*, p. 157) and the *specific* variables which make up his account, say, of Swedish exceptionalism: poor soil and worsening climate, strong class position of the peasantry, iron and later copper as lead-

ing exports instead of grain, sponsorship by stronger powers (*MWS I*, pp. 312-313; II, Ch. 5). To reduce somewhat the confusion of the great range of explanatory factors, we can group them as follows: geographic, demographic, and ecological; technological and economic; class-relational; legal, organizational, political, and military; ideological and psychological.

Geography and ecology loom large. Obvious in the case of constraining production possibilities in various zones, they play a role in explaining much else, accounting in part for the Northwest European edge in a world-economy with important Atlantic and Baltic zones, in part for the differences in Asian and American conquest, in part (because of forest depletion) for the English edge over France in colonization and technology (use of coal). Population size and movements, recognized to be importantly determined by social structure (*CWE*, p. 143; *MWS I*, p. 196), also enter into explanatory equations, from their role in the demise of feudalism, in the Goldilocks formulation of optimal size for productive and military strength on the one hand and for administrative control on the other, in the timing of the English push toward colonization (*MWS I*, p. 281). Wallerstein is very much a materialist—here Marxism and the *Annalists* converge to a degree; if he is more attentive to politics than the latter typically are, he is also better grounded in the rather less mutable forces of nature, including climate and disease, than has been the recent fashion in Marxism.

Technology and economy, class relations, and politics so suffuse *The Modern World-System* as to require little elaboration. What is worth noting here are a few of the not infrequent instances in which particular explanations run in the opposite direction from the tendency to economistic reductionism in his general assertions. Thus it is class struggle that propels capital flight and the organization of new forms of textile production in the sixteenth century and in part accounts for the very push to expand the area under the control of the Europe-wide ruling class (*MWS I*, pp. 220, 48). So also the political strength of the French nobility reduces French economic flexibility (*MWS I*, pp. 181-182). And thus it is that political factors determined class and economic outcomes: the strong Spanish state in the fifteenth century helps account for economic growth in the sixteenth (*MWS I*, p. 166); military geography and the organizational strength of Protestant sects help explain the results of the Netherlands revolt, as do the complicated power balance and array of interests of Spain, France, and England

(*MWS I*, pp. 206-208, 210); legal forms in part explain differential peasant success in resisting sharecropping (*MWS I*, p. 105). And even military relations with external arenas make an economic difference: the Ottoman cut-off of Bosnian and Serbian silver pushed the West European search for alternate sources of bullion (*MWS I*, p. 40), and a similar denial of grain from the Southeast Mediterranean hurt the North Italian city-states at a critical time (*MWS I*, p. 217).

As befits a militant materialist, ideological and psychological factors are given short shrift as explanations of long-term change. However much people believe in and “mean” their ideologies, which Wallerstein clearly thinks they do, those ideologies are to be interpreted as the expression of politico-economic interests (*MWS I*, p. 283). He does give limited causal weight to one ideological element, asserting that feudal “mysticism” gave early modern monarchs a centralizing lever lacked by Chinese emperors (*MWS I*, p. 63). As for psychology, it enters in a carefully hedged way into his explanation of the importance of bullion to economic life as an “essential” good as well as a “preciosity” in the fifteenth century (*MWS I*, p. 46): “...more fundamental than self-interest [of minting entrepreneurs] was the collective psychology of fear, based on the structural reality of a weakly articulated economic system.” Bullion was an essential “hedge” at a time when Europeans lacked the “collective confidence” necessary for sustained capitalist activity.

These examples should suffice to illustrate the disjuncture between Wallerstein’s general orienting concepts, and his analytical principles, (his rules for constructing detailed explanations). To be sure, this disjuncture is by no means total, nor does it necessarily invalidate his efforts at any of these levels. The ideas themselves are not so much incompatible as inconsistently articulated. Thus what the disjuncture calls for is an effort to revise the more general theoretical ideas in the direction of incorporating the useful interpretive notions invoked in particular accounts, a rationalizing codification of the rules of world-systems method.

THE WORLD-SYSTEM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

As might be expected from work so vast, so rich, so controversial, and sometimes so confusing, there is cause in *The Modern World-System* for (almost) everyone to complain about. It was both welcomed and attacked

from many disciplinary and ideological quarters. At least four interrelated areas of controversy warrant discussion: space, time, Marxism, and “economism.” As perhaps befits one given to “Goldilocks” formulations, Wallerstein has critics on both sides of his position in each of these areas.

Two issues have arisen regarding Wallerstein’s handling of space, one theoretical, the other substantive. In the latter vein, challenges have been raised to his excluding at least certain Ottoman lands and also parts of Africa from the sixteenth-century world-economy, the former because of heavy commercial and political intercourse, the latter because of slave trading.⁸ Wallerstein himself admits to difficult boundary problems, especially where adverbial quantification is the best one can arrive at. He seems to use two criteria to draw the necessarily fuzzy lines: the distinction between “essentials” and “luxuries,” and the transformation of production relations. Most of the Ottoman commerce (and the Asian trade) was in luxuries, most of the slave trade in captives. These activities were clearly important to the economic life of the areas in which they occurred, and especially the latter had far-reaching long-run consequences. They may be argued to have been accelerators, or perhaps even necessary catalysts of the formation of a capitalist world-economy in the sixteenth century. Perhaps Wallerstein underestimates the importance of “external arena” markets, if only as a step toward the transition to peripheral incorporation. But it is clear from his analyses of West Africa⁹ that for him full incorporation means the production of commodities guided by the incentives of the world market and more often than not by the all-too-palpable whip of a capitalist. What remains at issue is the extent and kind of effects external arenas and the capitalist world-economy had on each other before incorporation, exactly one of the items on Wallerstein’s unfinished research agenda (*CWE*, p. 136).

If the substantive spatial critics say, “too small,” the theoretical ones cry, “too large.” For the theoretical issue revolves around the claim that the world-economy is *the* proper unit of analysis for the study of modern social change. The standard unit of analysis in liberal social science has been the

⁸ On the Ottomans, see particularly Frederic C. Lane (1976); on Africa, the review by Walter Carroll, *MERIP Reports* #52, pp. 24-26.

⁹ See especially Wallerstein (1976:30-57), and *MWS III*, ch. 3.

national state, sometimes the region (as in economic geography), sometimes a smaller political unit (as in urban sociology or most anthropology), sometimes the international arena (as in international relations). Marxist social science has typically taken over these units of analysis with a different name for national state (“social formation”) and in some usages for regional economy (“mode of production”). Some suggest that “classes” are units of analysis, just as some liberals have focused their studies on groups or organizations, but this is to miss the rootedness of human life in physical space: a subject for analysis is not the same thing as a unit of analysis, within which groups, organizations, even individuals orient their action if not always with fully rational consciousness. Both liberals and conventional Marxists operate on the assumption that spatial boundaries have expanded over the last millennium or so in linear fashion, say, manorial in the tenth century, town-centered in the thirteenth, regional in the fifteenth, national in the nineteenth, international in the twentieth, global in the twenty-first. The more or less parallel developments of at least the more advanced nation states (social formations) follow more or less similar paths, and the primary determinants of those developments are said to be “internal,” with “external” factors like trade and war perhaps having some causal importance, but only secondary importance.

Trapped in this “internal”/“external” usage, they have tended to see Wallerstein as claiming that external factors are primary, internal secondary. But is this so? Not in our understanding. Rather, that particular question has been made into a variable by redrawing the analytical boundaries so that one is looking at a world-economy with more or less permeable state boundaries. The “world market” is not the same as international trade but synonymous with all non-local, non-subsistence production, whether or not it crosses state boundaries in the course of its transformation from resource extraction to final consumption. The promotion, within a national territory, of highly capitalized production, by some combination of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats (“development” in conventional parlance), becomes contingent upon garnering a certain share of the world market through a variable combination of “national” and “international” markets; mercantilism, “Listism,” and “socialism in one country” become historically successive mechanisms for attempting such promotion. Furthermore, it is not that “external” factors are more important than “internal” in analyzing country X or Y; it

is that the two are necessarily and dialectically connected because *both* are internal to the world-economy of commodity chains, class struggles, and state structures. And in places, Wallerstein suggests that the emphasis in the world-system as a whole alternates between the salience of its inter- and intra-national aspects.

On the temporal side, Wallerstein is once again in the middle, between those who argue that his dating of the transition to the modern world-system is “too late,” and those who argue that it is “too soon.”¹⁰ Those who say “too late” focus on the medieval innovations in commercial practices, or the early importance of long distance trade in gold and textiles, or the inter-polity political system of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. (Or, like Frank, they posit a 5000-year world system that knew no major break in the sixteenth century.) In our view, these are phenomena of the previous epoch that in part contribute to and in part survive the feudal crisis. Those who say “too soon” tend toward the predominant liberal and Marxist view that the eighteenth century “English” industrial revolution cum massive urbanization is the proper point of departure for modern capitalism, with the three centuries between 1450 and 1750 variously described as the age of discovery, or absolutism, or of merchant or commercial capital,

or petty commodity production, or simply as “transitional.” These critics stress the wage-relation and factory discipline as the molecules from which “true” capitalism is built. Do they not miss, on the one hand, the extent of disciplined wage labor in core agriculture (hence the sub-title of Volume I) and in transportation and mining before 1750, and, on the other hand, the capitalist character of peripheral production? Some skeptics on this account will perhaps be persuaded by the arguments and evidence of the first chapter of Volume II, regarding the differences between the feudal crisis and the seventeenth-century contraction. The remainder of Volume II may persuade others, and surely not everyone—not only critics on this issue—agrees with the way Wallerstein treats the change to factory textile production in Volume III. Were the fundamental structures of capitalism in place by 1640, after “the long period of creation?” (*MWS I*, p. 124). Especially

¹⁰ In the “too late” camp are Domenico Sella (1977), and in a sense Zolberg (1979). The “too soon” camp includes Robert Brenner (1977); Edward J. Nell (1977); and Robert A. Dodgshon (1977). Remarkably, Dodgshon cites Polanyi against Wallerstein.

since this issue is tied up with the next one, it is unlikely to be settled to everyone’s satisfaction.

Again, with regard to Marxism, Wallerstein is in the middle, too Marxist for some, not Marxist enough for others.¹¹ Those who claim “too Marxist” point to the principled disregard for cultural explanations of political and economic change, to the neglect of comparative advantage and mutual profitability in international trade, to the concept of exploitation, to the construction of “a framework founded on class analysis alone” (Zolberg 1979: 46). Those who claim “not Marxist enough” assert that Wallerstein relies too heavily on demography and commerce for explanation, not heavily enough on relations of production. In this view, there is neither enough class determination in Wallerstein’s explanatory scheme nor is sufficient emphasis given to class struggle from below. Once more we have a controversy which is unlikely to go away, given the political and ideological commitments of the participants and their audience. And of course, there is the further complication that there are Marxists on several sides of most of these questions, including those who understand Marx as a teleological functionalist.

Finally there is the question of economism, on which some find Wallerstein too economic, others not economic enough.¹² One critique emerged around the Weberian or Hintzean claim that modern capitalism is one thing, the modern international state system another, and that “co-determination,” to use Hintze’s phrase, is appropriate. But if from this perspective Wallerstein’s formulations are insufficiently political, from others they seem too political: Sella, hedging, sees a “somewhat one-dimensional approach” (p. 32) in the explanatory reliance on state power to reinforce and perpetuate the world-system; Schneider finds him insufficiently appreciative both of the role of luxury trade in determining pre-capitalist structures and of the role of abundant pastures and long-staple wool in gaining an edge for England

¹¹ Wallerstein is “too Marxist” for Morris Janowitz (1977); for Sella (1977); for Zolberg (1979); for Markoff (1977) and for Kenneth Boulding (1978). He is “not Marxist enough” for Brenner (1977), Nell (1977), or Ernesto Laclau (1977:43-50).

¹² Wallerstein’s formulations are “too economic” for Skocpol (1977), Brenner (1977), Zolberg (1979), and Peter Gourevitch (1978). They are “not economic enough” for Sella (1977), or Jane Schneider (1977).

in textile manufacture. It seems fair to say that Wallerstein's position here represents a synthesis of the economism of the 2nd and 3rd International with the antithetical "politicism" of its Gramscian and Maoist critics.


To summarize, Wallerstein's method of reconceptualization and reinterpretation has regenerated many long-standing controversies in social science. To some extent, this is due to the confusing disjuncture between general concepts and explanatory building blocks. To some extent, it is due to the difficulty of giving new technical meanings to familiar words, such as "world" (as applying to anything less than the globe), "empire" (as applied in the usage "world-empire" to redistributive totalities), and "capitalism" ("capitalist" accumulation plus "primitive" accumulation within a system of unequally strong, competitive states). But if some of the contributions to these controversies are old songs sung by new voices, most seem to be sophisticated and useful in advancing both theoretical and substantive work on questions of large-scale, long-term change. The work of Wallerstein and his collaborators, while still unfinished, has provided a major push to historical social analysis, including historical analysis of the present. While some have rejected it outright, most have either borrowed from it variables to enrich their own accounts of national, regional, or local social changes, or accepted its claim to paradigmatic status as the basic framework for the study of modern social change and hence the modern world itself. Our world does truly seem to be neither rushing toward doom or Utopia, nor staying the same as always. Rather we seem fated to change slowly, and, barring nuclear catastrophe, both to theorize and to practice the transformation of enduring structures.

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I. GENERAL ISSUES

THE COLUMBIA SOCIAL ESSAYISTS*

Albert J. Bergesen

Wallerstein came of age intellectually at Columbia University, where he was an undergraduate, graduate student and faculty member for a quarter of a century (1947-1971). While we often think of his work on African politics and his concern with third world development as precursors to world-system theory, a large part of his intellectual biography was shaped by those Columbia years. They mark the high point of a triple hegemony of university, city, and nation, as at this time Columbia was the leading university in the leading city of the hegemonic nation. It was a time before the 1960s when the New Left and Berkeley would challenge the centrality of New York and Columbia as undisputed centers of American social thought and it was before what would be called the policy intellectuals would emerge in Washington DC in the 1970s/80s. It was also a time before the great influx of federal money in the 1960s which spurred social research and lifted other universities to prominence. It was a time of what I will call The Columbia Social Essayists, referring to scholar/intellectuals such as C. Wright Mills, Daniel Bell, Lionel Trilling, Richard Hofstadter and Meyer Schapiro.

There is a literature on each of these prominent academic intellectuals, and it is not my purpose to go into any further detail about their particular interests or differences. I am more interested in what they share in common than in what made them unique, for it is on the basis of their commonalities

Albert J. Bergesen
Department of Sociology
University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona 85721
<http://w3.arizona.edu/~soc/>
albert@u.arizona.edu

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that they are meaningfully grouped together to constitute a definite chapter in American intellectual life. They existed at a particular time and place, Columbia at its peak between the later 1940s and the 1960s, while some of their careers start earlier in the 1930s and others continued into the 1970s and beyond. They knew each other, were friends and enemies, and taught some classes together. Bell helped Mills get acquainted with the world of New York authors and aided his early article publishing career; Hofstadter and Mills both taught earlier at Maryland and came to Columbia at the same time in 1946; Hofstadter and Bell conducted a faculty seminar together; and Mills critiqued Trilling and Hofstadter in print, and they in turn responded (Horowitz, 1983). As was often said of the larger New York Intellectual community there was affect and disagreement.

While university professors, they found their voice in the more generalized format of the essay, and like the broader New York Intellectual community, published in small intellectual journals (Trilling, Schapiro, Mills, and others published in *Partisan Review*). As a broad generalization they tended to be left or liberal in political persuasion, social in explanatory mode, and open in content. Their essays were less pure critical opinion and political line, and more expository analysis of social institution, political movement, literary text, or art object, and in that sense they reflected their complicated social position as university faculty grounded in disciplinary traditions as well as intellectual commentators on the American condition. The tradition of the Columbia Social Essay continues today—one thinks of Arthur Danto on art or Edward Said on the ideology of Eurocentricism, but it reached its zenith as a contribution to American intellectual life in an earlier period. While we are aware of the passing of the more general community collectively known as the New York Intellectuals (see Cooney, 1986; Bloom, 1986; Barrett, 1982; Abel, 1984; Howe, 1968; Podhoretz, 1967, 1999; among the many), the world of the Columbia Social Essayists is also gone. There was an overlap with the broader world of New York Intellectuals, of course, but the Columbia academic/intellectuals provided their own identifiable contribution to both American intellectual life and sociological thought.

C. Wright Mills was a professor in the College and is best known for his studies of the emerging middle strata of bureaucracy (*White Collar*) and the concentrations of power at the top of different social institutions as a new

pattern of social power in America (*The Power Elite*). He was also known for his criticisms of the very general and abstract theory of Talcott Parsons and the quantitative research of his Columbia colleague Paul Laszarsfeld (*The Sociological Imagination*), but Mills' lasting sociological heritage is not what most think, for his central contribution turns out to have been, ironically, empirical, not the criticism of American society or professional sociology. The attacks on general abstract theory, the essay, "Grand Theory," make little lasting sense, for abstraction in and of itself isn't right or wrong, nor does whether an account is long winded or circuitous, make any difference. The issue is whether one gets it right or not, and in this regard the downfall of Parsons lay in the truth value of his propositions not in how he stated his theory. Marx certainly can be abstract, long winded, and obscurantist, and reading Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* is certainly as difficult as Parsons' *The Social System*, yet social thought continues to extract insights and hypotheses from Gramsci while Parsons is, excepting sporadic German or Russian interest in social functionalism, largely ignored. Mills' reaction to abstract formulations, then, seems more a critique of form than content, and in terms of Trilling's essay, "Reality in America," Mills would seem to be a prime representative of that American belief in reality as something hard, practical, and concrete, such that Parsons' theoretical exercises generate in Mills an almost aesthetic reaction to form of expression as much as to what was actually said. The spunk and cynicism in Mills' critique of Parsons reflects an American distrust of large theoretic schemes, and if anti-intellectualism is too strong, then it certainly reflects the practicality of a progressive Texan's skepticism toward fancy Harvard theoretical renderings.

Mills' real contribution it turns out was his illumination of 20th century changes in the occupational structure and a refiguring of power relations. There were two fundamental observations. *White Collar* draws attention to the proliferation of middle level bureaucratic positions throughout society as part of the next stage of American, and by extension, social and economic development in general. Ironically, it is Mills' empirical eye that is stronger than his later Marxian theoretical outlook, for he helps document, through illustration, an important qualification of the more orthodox Marxian conception of capitalist class structure. Rather than a model where people are forced into a proletarian status in an ever more polarizing class structure, what he observes is that the leading capitalist economy shows another trend:

a post-1945 proliferation of a Weberian middle stratum of functionally specific organizational roles, captured in his “white collar” designation. Second, his idea of “the power elite” is, in its essence, an empirical observation about the basis of power in developed capitalist societies. He notes that the simpler model of power being ultimately derivable from landed or capitalist classes doesn’t map on to the present distribution of power in a variety of institutional realms from the military to politics and the economy. What the focus on power, as opposed to just class, does is to open the door for understanding society in a more pluralist or liberal way. This is one of the central observations of late 20th century social life that will have to be factored into the next great round of social theory analogous to what Marx/Weber were for the end of the 19th century. One of the implications emphasized by Mills is that one cannot have a model where one institutional area subordinates all the others, as would a class model. Political, military, economic and media institutions are all hierarchical orders, hence power orders, and hence at the top have elites or higher circles.

Daniel Bell was also a professor of sociology and wrote general essays about virtually all aspects of American political and economic life, from organized crime to class structure, status politics, and some of the cultural contradictions of capitalism. Bell introduced Mills to New York and is perhaps the most general of the Columbia essayists, often acting as something of an intellectual mid-wife between more esoteric original sources of sociological theory and a wider reading public. His primary intellectual contribution lies in the introduction of a number of seminal ideas that captured complex aspects of social change and American society, such as “the end of ideology,” “post industrial society” and “the cultural contradictions of capitalism.” One of his more direct contributions to the sociological heritage lies in his collaboration with Richard Hofstadter and S.M. Lipset in explicating the notion of “status politics” and generalizing it to conservative social movements in the 1950s and 1960s.

Lionel Trilling. Not all Columbia Social Essayists were professional sociologists. In fact, what makes the group so interesting is their utilization of generalized social theories as explanatory variables in so many different disciplines. One of these was Lionel Trilling, professor in the English department and social and literary critic, whose essays placed a great deal of emphasis upon the distinctly societal context of the novel. While his pri-

mary area of expertise was 19th century English literature his social concerns were prominent, writing on the relation of the writer to America, attitudes toward American culture, the relation of culture and personality more generally, and the complexity of moral stances taken in both literature and life. The importance of such social factors can be seen in the titles of the collections of essays comprising his major works: *The Liberal Imagination*, *Beyond Culture*, and *Sincerity and Authenticity*.

The contributions of non-sociologists such as Trilling to the corpus of generalized sociological concepts lies in their perspectives on literature, history, and art. These domains of culture have been the most difficult to quantify and turn into variables for systematic sociological analysis, and sociologists themselves often do not know enough about the specifics of art, history, or the novel to meaningfully dissect variation in these cultural products. The point was, I think, originally Hofstadter’s, when he was talking about the importance of reading literary criticism for the study of history and argued that the vocabulary of literary criticism provided concepts that could be utilized by the historian to more accurately describe and capture cultural dimensions of the historical process. The same general point goes for sociology, except here I would add both the distinctions of art history and social history to those of literary criticism. It is in this regard that the Columbia Social Essayists are of particular importance for the development of sociological concepts, for with their already finely tuned sociological eye, they provide something of a half-way house for the professional sociological imagination to enter into distinctions made by the literary and art historical critic. Just history, or just the aesthetics of art or the novel, are often difficult to translate into sociological concerns, but when the critic has a social bent of mind, then the distinctions are already in something of a sociological shape and are much more easily digestible by the professional sociologist.

Richard Hofstadter was a professor of American history whose central idea was the interface of social status and social change as an explanatory mix to account for some of the unique properties of social movements from the Progressive Era (*The Age of Reform*) to McCarthyism and the Radical Right (*Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, and *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*). There has been a direct impact upon Columbia sociology in the form of Lipset and Bell’s work on status politics, the radical right, and the dispossessed as generalizations on Hofstadter’s observations about the

status anxieties generated by the social change surrounding the progressive movement. Wallerstein's MA thesis was on just such a topic. Second, the displacement-leads-to-protest hypothesis is similar to Charles Tilly's generalization of the experiences of the protest of the "little people" of the French Revolution into ideas of "reactionary" collective violence. Both Tilly and Hofstadter followed a similar process: start with an historical example, Progressive Era and revolt of the Vendee or Parisian little people, and generalize their experience into notions like "status politics" and "reactionary collective violence," which capture the same general social dynamics of historical change loosening the ties, or displacing from positions of status and power, social groups that defensively react in protest and collective violence. This tradition has continued not only from the Progressive era into the McCarthyism in the 1950s, but in Goldwaterism of the 1960s and the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, and the Christian Right of the 1980s and 1990s.

Meyer Schapiro was a professor of art history who looked for the relevant social context to account for shifts in artistic styles. If Trilling focused upon the social conditions of literature, Schapiro did the same for art. In one of his early essays on abstract art, Schapiro points to the limits of explanations of change in art that are totally internal to the art making process. In such a view, "the history of modern art is presented as an internal, immanent process among the artists; abstract arises because...representational art had been exhausted....but no connection is drawn between the art and the conditions of the moment" (Schapiro, 1968: 187,188). In Schapiro's work art movements from the introduction of perspective in the Renaissance to the abstraction of Italian Futurism are linked to socio-economic changes. His work is relevant for post-colonial studies and the relationship between the aesthetics of the colonizing European core and the art styles taken from the colonized periphery. "By a remarkable process the arts of subjected backward peoples, discovered by Europeans in conquering the world, became aesthetic norms to those who renounced it. The imperialist expansion was accompanied at home by a profound cultural pessimism in which the arts of the savage victims were elevated above the traditions of Europe. The colonies became places to flee as well as to exploit" (Schapiro, 1968: 201).

COLUMBIA AND AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

If we make a continuum between more micro, localized, concrete, neighborhood empirical analysis at one end and more general abstract theorizing at the other, the Columbia Social Essayists fall somewhere in between. At one end would be the style of work pioneered by the Chicago School of sociology comprised of neighborhood ethnographies and systematic analysis of urban life. If Chicago sociology is known for its concrete empirical studies and urban ethnographies, at the other end of the continuum lies the abstract general theorizing of Talcott Parsons at Harvard. This distinction, though, isn't as clear or obvious as it once seemed, for Parsonian theory turned out to be more classic European theory synthesized and abstracted into an elaborate set of principles and social functions, constituting a towering edifice of layer upon layer of abstract social structure. It turned out that aside from synthesizing some European thought, there was not a lot of original social theory emanating from Harvard at all, and ironically, Chicago, for all its empirics was the originating point for Mead, Goffman, and what would become Symbolic Interactionism, which, in retrospect, is perhaps America's unique contribution to world class social theorizing. R.K. Merton would speak of "middle range theory" as a goal of social theory, and in some sense that is an accurate characterization of Columbia's position in social thought between the more particularistic Chicagoans and the excessive generality of Parsonian Harvard.

The Columbia Social Essay was about something—it wasn't just Parsons on pure structure and function—nor Chicago with an ethnographic description of a neighborhood. They were theoretically informed studies, or studies from which theory would be extracted, or theory could be applied. A Chicagoan description of the institution, social movement, political party, novel or art object was not the end, nor were they mere fodder for very abstracted theoretical models of "the social system." The interest was half way: half theory, half historical social arrangement, and the essay was the perfect expressive format for this style of work, for the theory part centered more on introducing a concept or explanatory idea than in explicating the specifics of a case study or general theoretical scheme.

THE HEGEMONIC INTELLECTUAL

Accounting for the intellectual predominance of Columbia's Essayists during this period involves more than the absence of other university competitors. The overlap with the more generalized New York intellectual community is certainly part of the story of the prominence of the Columbia Essayists. But there is another factor which centers on the fact that the heart of the prominence of the Columbia Social Essayists is also is also the high point of American hegemony in the larger world-system.

While world-system theories of culture are not well developed, hegemony does appear to generalize, such that leading positions in finance, production, and military dominance correlate with a leading position in cultural production. We are not just speaking of a volume of cultural production, but both cutting edge cultural innovation and critical and moral authority in aesthetic judgement. The High Renaissance under the Habsburg hegemony in the early sixteenth century, British Neo-Classicism and Romanticism under their generalized hegemony of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and the High Modernism under American hegemony after 1945 all involved discourse about the state of artistic/literary being in its most general terms. During the Italian Renaissance under the Habsburg hegemony Vasari sorts and orders artistic output with a moral eye finding early Renaissance art more wooden and stiff and late Renaissance art more emotional and convulsive, with the High Renaissance judged to be the proper balance of form and content, creating "classic" art. Under American hegemony there are similar efforts at moral judgement of a final and encompassing sort. The New York critic Clement Greenberg sorts and orders the history of painting, finding an almost "classic" perfection of the medium in American Abstract Expressionism of the 1950s, and judges other periods to be of a less pure quality, and in literature Lionel Trilling's collection of essays, *The Liberal Imagination*, assess the state of the preeminent form of literary expression, the novel, and renders absolute judgement as to its essential nature, praising the nineteenth century British novel and finding fault with the American for its lack of a well developed sense of manners and social structure around which the narrative story can be erected.

The novel, then, is a perpetual quest for reality, the field of its research being always the social world, the material of its analysis being always manners as the indication of the direction of man's soul....Now the novel as I have

described it has never really established itself in America...the novel in America diverges from its classic intention, which, as I have said, is the investigation of the problem of reality beginning in the social field. The fact is that American writers of genius have not turned their minds to society. Poe and Melville were quite apart from it; the reality they sought was only tangential to society. Hawthorne was acute when he insisted that he did not write novels but romances—he thus expressed his awareness of the lack of social texture in his work. (Trilling, 1950: 212).

This absence of discourse about the social field would matter less, if it were not judged to be the essence of the novel, and one which the Europeans were quite capable of mastering, hence their qualitative superiority over American literary efforts.

The novel...tells us about the look and feel of things, how things are done and what things are worth and what they cost and what the odds are. If the English novel in its special concern with class does not...explore the deeper layers of personality, then the French novel in exploring these layers must start and end in class, and the Russian novel, exploring the ultimate possibilities of spirit, does the same—every situation in Dostoevski, no matter how spiritual, starts with a point of social pride and a certain number of rubles. The great novelists knew that manners indicate the largest intension of men's souls as well as the smallest and they are perpetually concerned to catch the meaning of every dim implicit hint. (Trilling, 1950: 211-212).

This brings us to another, and deeper point about the relationship between the political economy of hegemony and the form and content of literary, and by generalization, cultural judgement. On the surface the British, French and Russian novels are praised and the American found short which would seem like an effort to subvert, rather than support, American hegemony. But at a deeper level the real issue of hegemony lies in the ability, and will, to evaluate and judge in a critical fashion from the point of view of purportedly universalist standards. The exercise of mind over all that lies before it regardless of the substance of the verdict rendered is the essence of hegemonic intellectuals. It is also that moral authority to judge that has been abandoned with the Postmodernist impulse, which is in reality the culture of hegemonic decline, claiming that such universalist standards are but masks for the exercise of power of particular racialized, gendered, classed, and sexual preferenced social groups. It is not an accident, then, that with American economic decline starting in the 1970s that the cultural under-

standings of the world system turned toward the introduction of ideals of not privileging any theoretical discourse, nor judgements, nor received opinion, wisdom, or theory, in what came to be called Postmodernism. If the culture of universalist standards, and the moral authority to judge and apply those standards is the height of Modernism, and if such a formalism is also the culture of American political economic hegemony, it stands to reason that with materialist decline there would also be a shift in cultural position toward a more relativist, non judgmental position, based upon postulating the equality of points of views and claiming the impossibility of any one universalist standard with which to judge, and thereby to rank order by a single standard the art, literature, and social thought of multitudinous groups. Such “multiculturalism” is, then, the official ideology of hegemonic decline, as “modernism” had been of hegemonic ascent.

The period of the Columbia Social Essayists is also the period of uncontested American hegemony, and it is the period of universalist moral judgement. The answer to the question who is to exercise such moral judgement lies with the notion of the triple hegemony, which is something of a trickle down model of cultural authority. At the top is the hegemony of the United States, uncontested from the end of the second world war through the 1960s. Within that sphere of hegemonic authority there is the secondary hegemony of New York, the lead city, morally positioned because of that hegemonic status to be the home of cultural judgement. And then, the third hegemony, that of Columbia university, which brings us to the Columbia faculty’s social concerns, and ability or flair with the essay format and their desire to judge history, art, literature, and society.

Imagine these hegemonies as platforms. American global hegemony is a platform of power and entitlement upon which everyone stands and might feel entitled to judge and comment authoritatively on everything from the future of the novel to the essence of power in America to our national character flaws. Upon that platform sits a much smaller one, the hegemony of New York City within the city system of the United States. Upon this narrower, but higher platform of social empowerment and subsequent moral authority, New York writers obtain a vantage point and moral authority to further judge and apply even more final and absolute criteria. Finally, there is the hegemony of Columbia, the lead university within the lead city within the lead nation: the final step of the triple hegemony. Here is an even

smaller, yet even higher platform upon which to judge, evaluate, and determine the essence of art, literature, and social institution. On this last platform stand the Columbia Social Essayists, and, because of that perch the implicit taken for granted moral authority that underscores the tone of their voice and the finality of their assertions.

One of the keys to understanding this connection between intellectuals and hegemony is the intellectual’s primary mental function. Intellectuals, of course do many things, but in essence, the intellectual is not the artist, writer, or playwright, as actual doing is different from knowing about, and knowing what is the good and the serious, is different from producing good and serious art or literature. The intellectual’s goal is not to write good literature, or paint good paintings, write great plays, but to “know” what makes a great novel, for the mental task is the act of segmenting, sorting, dividing, making distinctions between what is good and average, what is high culture and what is kitsch, who are the best novelists of our time and who aren’t, between what is important and what isn’t. It is a matter of judgement and exercising a moral will in the act of creating a moral hierarchy. Hegemony provides the critical mind the moral authority to make absolute judgements and prize the act of judgement as the essence of mental activity. Being serious seemed to matter as much as what one was serious about and so armed with a critical intent one could then range over literatures—prose, poetry, novel, short story—for what mattered was the operation of mind upon material, not the material itself. It was truly the life of the mind. It was not the creations of the mind as novel, painting, play, or symphony, but the mind’s activity—the mental act of combining, and recombining, sorting and ordering intellectual products—that constituted the heart of New York intellectuality. Evaluation and prioritizing, hence standards, hence seriousness of approach is what mattered, and this is a manner of control and reason, not the expressive irrationality of the artist. From the perspective of the mental operations of such critical evaluation, New York intellectuality came to be described as something of a state of mind, a mental being, a poise or awareness involving mental discipline and agility.

In their published work during these years, the New York intellectuals developed a characteristic style of exposition and polemic. With some admiration and a bit of irony, let us call it the style of brilliance. The kind of essay they wrote was likely to be wide-ranging in reference, melding notions about literature and politics, sometimes announcing itself as a study of a writer or literary

group but usually taut with a pressure to “go beyond” its subject, toward some encompassing moral or social observation. It is a kind of writing highly self-consciousness in mode, with an unashamed vibration of bravura and display. (Howe, 1968: 41)

The intellectual quality I prized most at that state of my life was brilliance, by which I meant the virtuous ability to put ideas together in such new and surprising combinations that even if one disagree with what was being said, one was excited and illuminated. Everyone in the Family [i.e. NY Intellectuals] had this ability—it was in effect the main requirement for admission....the art historian Meyer Shapiro, whose lectures at Columbia were generally considered the *ne plus ultra* of brilliance. (Podhoretz, 1999: 143).

Irving Howe and Norman Podhoretz. Two memories, almost thirty years apart, yet virtually the same description of New York intellectuality. Such an argumentative style is usually treated as a derivation from the more contentious jostling immigrant culture from which many of the New York Jewish Intellectuals arose, and while such bottom-up explanations capture much of the phenomena, it is also the case that there is a top-down element as well, the platform of moral certainty provided for by the triple hegemony.

An intelligentsia flourishes in a capita: Paris, St. Petersburg, Berlin. The influence of the New York writers grew at the time New York itself, for better or worse, became the cultural center of the country. And thereby...the New York writers slowly shed the characteristics of an intelligentsia and transformed themselves into—An Establishment? (Howe, 1968: 44).

Behind the moral authority of Lionel Trilling to judge what is the essence of the novel; of Meyer Schapiro to judge what is the essence of style and abstract art; of C. Wright Mills to judge what is power in America; of Richard Hofstadter to judge what is the essence of America’s political personality; and of Daniel Bell’s willingness to judge whether we have reached the end of ideology, lies the triple hegemony of nation, city, and university.

WALLERSTEIN TOO

In general, American intellectual life seems more often the story isolated figures, rather than schools of thought, or forms of expression, such as the Columbia Social Essayists. Part of this, no doubt, is attributable to our values of individualism which transform the collective history of ideas into stories of individuals rather than schools of thought. We are aware of New England Transcendentalists, Southern Agrarians, and New York Intellectuals,

als, but in the end it seems it is the individual—even if a member in some such grouping—which stands out. I also think, whether as a consequence of our values, or our social arrangements, that American intellectuals have, in fact, a tendency to be isolated as their natural social condition. It’s a consistent pattern clearly seen in history from Thoreau to the present, and I would guess that more isolated intellectuals like Noam Chomsky and Gore Vidal will be remembered more than schools or communities like the New Left or the New York Intellectuals. In a similar way, Wallerstein, even though the originator of a school of thought, world-system theory, and surrounded by the Braudel Center and the journal *Review* seems, in the final analysis, more the American isolated scholar/intellectual. It’s not that life at McGill, Binghamton, Yale, or yearly visits to Paris, have not been without significance for him, but somehow they don’t seem traceable to characteristics of his work or political outlook. This may be contested by those closer to the work and influence of the Braudel Center, but I still suspect that when the story of Immanuel Wallerstein and world-system theory is more completely written, that the Braudel Center will be judged to have been more of a material support structure than an intellectual influence of any lasting significance.

While the story of the isolated intellectual remains a social fact of the American landscape, I think the tradition of the Columbia Social Essay had an effect upon Wallerstein. Like Bell, Trilling, Schapiro and Hofstadter, he excelled in essay form. For many he is associated with his present academic residence, the State University of New York at Binghamton, but Wallerstein is first and foremost part of the Columbia tradition, the same way Daniel Bell, even after moving to Harvard, is still Columbia in breadth of intellectual commitment, wide historical scope of inquiry, and generalized essay format of expression. For both of them the essay allows an easy introduction of complex ideas and most importantly forces a focus of expression. The essay allows ideas and concepts to be introduced without the burden of having to fully document, prove, or support their validity. The essay is a sort of mid-wife to concept formation, doing away with the necessity of filling additional pages with supporting material. One can just introduce the idea, say of the semiperiphery, or the core-periphery division of labor, or the long sixteenth century, or idea of the modern world-system itself. The essay also condenses the mind as there is less for the theoretical imagination to engage tangential issues, side points, or supporting evidence. There is just

enough room to make the point and provide an example or two. It worked for Trilling and Hofstadter—they are recognized for their essays—but it also worked for Wallerstein. “Three Paths of National Development” and “The Rise and Future Demise of the Modern World-System” are classic Wallersteinian essays that succinctly spelled out the essence of what was to become the world system perspective.

There is, then, something of a world-system analysis for the pioneer of world-system theory captured in the idea of the triple hegemony. It may be more a sociology of knowledge of form than content, but it does add to our understanding of the manner of Wallerstein’s expression and something about the broad sense of his intellectuality and politics. The final contribution of Columbia to his work will no doubt be debated. I may have exaggerated the influence here. That is for others to decide. My sense, though, is that it minimally constitutes the bed rocks of his approach. Many of the characteristics of his work overlap with those of the Columbia Social Essayists.

The Essay. The writing is dominated by the potentials of the essay. It allowed both political commentary, wider audiences, and condensed theoretical exposition. The match of the Columbia mode of expression with the natural inclinations of Wallerstein was close to perfect. He used the essay to perfection, and in it lies his most interesting and engaging sociology.

The Middle Ground. His focus was quintessentially Columbia; neither Chicago in depth study of a social particularity, nor a Parsonian Harvard discourse on general systems, but somewhere in between. His world-system is an historical world-system (the concrete and specific) but it is also an abstract system of a core-periphery division of labor, commodity chains, long term trends and cycles (the theoretically general).

The Concept. With essay and middle ground the intellectual contribution lay with introducing concept and idea, the most significant of which is the very idea of a “modern world-system.” Like the genius of Goffman whose concepts of presentation of self, interaction rituals, and stigmatized identities are taken as parts of realities, and not the theoretic concepts they were when he first introduced them, so too do we think of the world-system as a thing, and not an idea introduced by Wallerstein. The concept is a Columbia product too. Status politics, the Radical Right, the Liberal Imagination, White Collar, the Power Elite, and now the World-System and the Semi-

Periphery, all Columbia-like theoretic concepts rather than elaborated theoretical systems or in depth documented historical particularities.

Intellectually Empowered. What the triple hegemony did most, I think, is to provide the moral certainty to generate universal standards and apply them to all that the sociological eye could see. The goal was to determine the essence of things: of the novel (Trilling) of abstract art and style (Schapiro) of the pathologies of American national character traits (Hofstadter) of power in America (Mills) of the cultural contradictions of capitalism (Bell), and with Wallerstein, of the essential nature of global power and exploitation. If the concern with “manners and morals” characterized the essence of the novel for Trilling, and “anti-intellectualism” and the “paranoid style” the essence of national character pathologies for Hofstadter, and “White Collar” the new middle strata of occupational positions for Mills, then, the “core-periphery division of labor” constituted the essential structure of the capitalist world economy.

It was neither the moral status of Binghamton, nor its material resources, nor the intellectual contacts made in Paris, but the triple hegemonic platform that was coming of age intellectually in Columbia in New York in America that provided Wallerstein with the sense of intellectual entitlement to conceptualize the world as a singular system, and to plead for its democratic and egalitarian transformation.

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IMMANUEL AND ME WITH-OUT HYPHEN

Andre Gunder Frank

This essay is my personal and intellectual tribute to Immanuel Wallerstein. It takes the form of my also personal intellectual account of our first independent, then joint, and again increasingly separate journeys through the maze of the world [-] system with and without a hyphen. Imagine our relations as a horizontal Y shaped rope. It began with strands that, in the 1960s, ran parallel, becoming intertwined during the 1970s and 1980s until the strands (or at least some) separated again in the 1990s, going off in increasingly different directions like a horizontal Y. Why?

My answer is both circumstantial and personal, in which the personal choices and trajectories are driven primarily by world and local political circumstance. Of course, my account reflects my own perspective on this story. However it also includes other colleagues and friends of Immanuel's and mine, in particular our co-authors in several books and edited volumes, Giovanni Arrighi and Samir Amin, with whom I can check this account. Others, alas, are no longer with us.

OUR PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1960S

Significantly, all early world-systematizers previously worked in and on the 'Third World,' which led to our subsequent collaboration and friendship. Immanuel, Terence Hopkins, Giovanni Arrighi, Otto Kreye, Samir Amin and Herb Addo worked in or on Africa, and the latter two were born there. My 'dependency' colleagues, like Theotonio dos Santos, and I of course worked in, and primarily on, Latin America. Our respective and also common personal commitments to and scholarly cum political experiences

Andre Gunder Frank
Florida International University
University of Miami
[http://csf.colorado.edu/archive/agfrank/
franka@fiu.edu](http://csf.colorado.edu/archive/agfrank/franka@fiu.edu)

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in various parts of the Third World are therefore inescapable antecedents and components of the development of the world-system [henceforth WS] perspective/approach/theory/analysis. Indeed, I recalled in my contribution to the festschrift for Theotonio dos Santos (Lopez ed. 1997), to which Immanuel and Samir also contributed, that Theotonio did so from a Latin American perspective because, as he said, the Third World losers must analyze the workings of the WS and imperialism for themselves rather than letting the WS winners use their own triumphalist platform to write WS history for them (see dos Santos 1978, 1993 among many others).

Indeed, in some cases the insistence on the WS capitalist structure/accumulation/development/history whole world pie actually preceded the detailed analysis of African, Latin American, or Brazilian dependent slices of the pie. Thus, it was Samir Amin's 1957 doctoral dissertation that was then expanded into his *Accumulation on a World Scale*, which was published in French in 1970 and later in English. Only after his dissertation did Samir write a number of dependence type works on Africa. Giovanni, Samir and I met in Paris in 1968/9, and Samir visited me in Santiago in 1971, where I introduced him to Theotonio and other dependentistas. Samir then invited us and others to a major international conference he organized in Dakar in 1972 to introduce dependency theory to Africans. With his agreement, some of us also smuggled some nascent WS theory and analysis in as well.

Working in Latin America I had pleaded for an analysis of the 'world system' [without a hyphen] since the mid-1960s and in 1970 presented a 150 page paper on "the development of a theory and analysis adequate to encompass the structure and development of the capitalist system on an integrated worlds scale" to a conference in Lima. Further expanded, that became two complementary books written in Chile before the 1973 military coup and published in 1978, *World Accumulation 1492-1789* and *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*.

However, while still in Chile in 1973, I also received, welcomed and marveled at the manuscript of Immanuel's *Modern World-System*. It came with a request from the publisher, I presumed at Immanuel's suggestion, to write a blurb for the dust jacket. I gladly did, writing: The first and only serious, comprehensive and successful attempt to advance an analysis and explanation of the early development of a world economy, the understanding of which is essential for the proper appreciation of all subsequent devel-

opment. This book should become a classic immediately upon publication.

Immanuel and I, working independently but parallel (and, to some extent Samir, who also helpfully commented on mine) had written about the development of the same world capitalist system from its origins in Europe between 1450 and 1500 and its spread from its West European center to incorporate more and more of the world overseas. Our independent treatments were similar, not only with regards to center-periphery relations, but also of West-East European relations and their impact on such 'minor' controversial issues as the 'second serfdom' in Eastern Europe. One major difference between our books was that Immanuel's much more erudite and detailed one ended in 1640, while my more superficial one went on to 1789, a period Immanuel would take up in his second volume. Another major difference was Immanuel's more detailed focus on the core/periphery/semi-periphery structure of the system, as compared to my attempt to identify the cyclical dynamics of the system, especially how the recurrent long economic crises of capital accumulation modified the geographic extension and economic structure of the world capitalist system. In his volumes II and III Immanuel would devote increasingly more attention to this cyclical dynamic and its structural consequences as well.

OUR COMMON DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970S AND 1980S

It should therefore not be surprising that in the 1970s and 1980s some of our work became intertwined, although our circumstances and styles remained very different. We collaborated at conferences, co-authored books, and Immanuel published articles of mine in his journal, *Review*, even after we started to disagree. At dozens of conferences we both attended, no matter what the issue—and there were many—Immanuel and I were now mostly in greater agreement with each other than either of us was with anybody else.¹

¹ Among these have been the more than a dozen International Conferences on World-Economy sponsored by his Braudel Center, the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, and the first Max Planck and then Starnberger Institut of Otto Kreye whom I introduced to Immanuel when I was a visiting fellow there in 1974/5. Three members of each of the institutes, eg. Terry Hopkins, Giovanni and Immanuel for his institute plus Samir and myself were the original inner sanctum. We were joined at almost every conference

Our world-systemic historical interests, then as always, included concerns with 'the present as history' to use the *bon mot* of Paul Sweezy, who published several of our products on contemporary affairs at *Monthly Review*. Immanuel initiated a long 'Kondratieff' cycle research group at his Fernand Braudel Center and devoted a whole issue of *Review* (II,4, Spring 1979) to its research hypotheses. Giovanni Arrighi had already persuaded me in 1972 that we were in a new long Kondratieff cycle B phase; contrary to his intentions, he claims, since he now disavows the existence of any K cycle. But Samir and I devoted much attention to this Kondratieff crisis and its repressive political consequences in many co- and individually authored books and articles, some featuring George Orwell's 1984 Big Brother (Frank and Amin 1974/5, 1976, 1978), Frank (1980).

Other collaborative projects were some books co-authored by Samir, Giovanni, Immanuel and myself. The division of labor would be that each of us would write his own chapter on one aspect of the whole, which would then be discussed by all of us for subsequent revision again by each of us. We would then write a common introduction to stress our agreements (that distance the four of us from most others) and a common conclusion identifying the remaining differences among us. These agreements and disagreements were hammered out in several hour-long meetings at Samir's apartment in Paris. Interestingly, the line ups on many issues turned out to be 3 to 1, but on one issue they were A,B,C vs. D and on the next one A,B,D vs. C and so on. All things considered, the greatest conflict among us was about yes-or-no-smoking there and at dinner afterwards; on that issue I was always the suffering odd no man out. The first of these books also focused on the Kondratieff 'B' down phase and was entitled *Dynamics of Global Crisis*

by Theotonio, Anibal Quijano from Peru and the German/Venezuelan Heinz Rudolf Sonntag, representing Latin America, Amiya Bagchi, Kinhide Mushakoji and Pu Shan from Asia and a more changing cast of characters from Africa and Europe. And as the site of the conference moved around the world the local organizer invited additional 'regional representatives' for each occasion. My late wife Marta negatively likened us to the "Canasta Club" of the same old ladies in tennis shoes, going around to each other's homes to play, a reasonable analogy except that we went around the world to do so, from Germany to France and Italy, to Senegal, Brazil, Venezuela, India and Japan.

(Amin et al 1982). The second one was *Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World-System* (Amin et al 1990).²

A very important question in all this, both theoretically and politically, was whether this world capitalist system[ic] crisis excludes or includes the 'socialist' countries. As Immanuel pointed out, the received wisdom on the left was that the socialist countries were part of what Stalin, in his swan song about socialism in 1953, had called a separate 'world system.' In 1982, Christopher Chase-Dunn credited Immanuel and other Braudel Center colleagues for the "inspiration" to edit *Socialist States in the World-System*, which still included chapters on both sides of the question. Immanuel and Giovanni, however, placed the Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe squarely into their 'semi-periphery' category of the MW-S and therefore included it in the WS itself. I had already argued in 1972 that the 'socialist' countries would be again increasingly drawn into this world capitalist system and its crisis, and since then insisted on treating their contemporary and prospective developments as part and parcel of this same world economy and its crisis of accumulation. At one and another conference only Immanuel and I agreed consistently on this issue [Samir changed his mind back and forth and Giovanni did not much pronounce himself despite putting them in his semi-peripheral bag]. So it was gratifying if in retrospect perhaps not so surprising that in 1977 Immanuel published my then still outlandish seeming "Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Countries in the Capitalist International Division of Labor" in Volume I, Number 1 of his *Review*. In 1983, this was followed by my book *The European Challenge—From Atlantic Alliance to Pan-European Entente for Peace and Jobs*, which predicted and supported "a pan-European alternative political, economic, and strategic rapprochement," as the back cover summarized. However, the book's final paragraph also warned that "the implementation

² We originally also planned a book on our respective and intersecting world systemic trajectories, but that one fell by the wayside. Parts of its hypothetical contents have however appeared as Samir's autobiographical Intellectual Itinerary (Amin 1994) and my own (Frank 1991 and 1996) and in the prefaces to Frank (1993 and 1998) as well as in the present essay.

of such global political economic realignments would not eliminate East European and Third World dependence.” Again, Immanuel and I were among the few who lent some credence to these arguments.

OUR DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1990S

Immanuel and I began to differ most—and increasingly so—on the prospects for the future: Immanuel always ends with the conclusion that for better or worse the present world capitalist system is doomed to be replaced by some other ‘system.’ I saw, and continue to see, less and less evidence for any such prospective ‘systemic’ transformation. This different perception between Immanuel and me about the future either derived from, or also led us to, increasing divergences about the past, or both. Accordingly, our WS rope began to disentangle into separate strands that are no longer parallel as they had been in the 1960s, nor as entangled as in the 1970s and 1980s, but that now increasingly diverge as in a horizontal Y. The initial parting of the ways came in 1989 as we were completing work on our *Transforming the Revolution*, and it coincided with the events at Tiananmen Square and the Berlin Wall. How much it was influenced by these events is hard to tell.

However, our divergence already had at least two identifiable antecedents in the 1980s. One was that Joseph Needham had invited me to contribute to the planned Volume VII of his monumental *Science and Civilization in China* with a chapter on why Europe and not China made an industrial revolution. I declined on the grounds that I was not qualified to do so. Needham also invited Immanuel, who accepted and wrote “The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World-System” circulated in manuscript form in 1989. [For many reasons, including Needham’s death, this Volume 7 was still-born, so that Immanuel eventually published his paper separately in *Review* (1991) and elsewhere, and finally in a book by the other contributors and himself (Blue, Brook & Wallerstein 1999)]. My argument was that what Immanuel had written about Europe, the three, six, or twelve essential, defining characteristics of capitalism in Europe applied equally to the world elsewhere and earlier so. Therefore, it could not be true that the MW-S was born and bred in Europe, and there is nothing distinctive about ‘capitalism’ and even less about ‘feudalism’ and ‘socialism.’ Hence my title “Transitional Ideological Modes: Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism” published in *Critical Anthropology* (1991) and elsewhere with a reply by Immanuel entitled “World System vs.

World-Systems: A Critique.” Both, in addition to a similar 1991 critique by Samir Amin, were also included in my book *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (Frank and Gills 1993)

The other antecedent of Immanuel’s and my growing divergence about world system history is that I was invited to comment on an early version of Janet Abu-Lughod’s work on the thirteenth century world system that later appeared as *Before European Hegemony* (1989). Doing so obliged me to reconsider my choice of 1492, and Immanuel’s choice of 1450, for locating the emergence of the world system. If there was one—even if not the same one as she claimed—already in the thirteenth century, then how and when did that world system emerge, and why not also already earlier than that? Moreover, perhaps there was a continuity in the world system across all these ages. Perhaps what seemed to be beginnings and ends of supposedly different world systems only masked cyclical ups and downs in the same world system. The subsequent pursuit of these questions resulted first in my “A Theoretical Introduction to 5,000 Years of World System History.” It was my first wide-ranging critique of Immanuel’s account and theory of the alleged fifteenth century beginnings of the MW-S, which was graciously published by Immanuel in his *Review* (Frank 1990). He also published a subsequent “World System Cycles” elaboration of the same by Gills and Frank (1992).³

Since these discussions are all available in published form in the aforementioned book and elsewhere, it should be sufficient here to reproduce only part of Immanuel’s own clarification of a major issue between us:

Note a detail in word usage that distinguishes Frank and Gills from me. They speak of a “world system.” I speak of “world-systems.” I use a hyphen; they do not. I use the plural; they do not. They use the singular because, for them, there is and has only been one world system through all of historical time and space. For me there have been very many world-systems.... The modern world-system” (or the “capitalist world-economy”) is merely one system among many....That brings us to the hyphen. My “world-system” is

³ For more details on these developments, I refer the reader to the story in the Preface and to my 1993 World System book with Barry Gills, which contains the above mentioned essays about cycles and ideological modes as well as several others by Immanuel, Samir, Janet, Barry and myself which debate these issues.

not a system “in the world” or “of the world.” It is a system “that is a world.” Hence the hyphen, since “world” is not an attribute of the system. Rather the two words constitute a single concept. Frank and Gills’ system is a World system in an attributive sense, in that it has been tending over time to cover the whole world (Wallerstein 1991,1993: 294-295).

Gills’s and my response was that:

...the real debate/disagreement revolves around the question of what structure constitutes a “system” or a “World(-)system” in particular....In our view, Amin and Wallerstein continue in the footsteps of Polanyi and Finley and underestimate the importance of capital accumulation via trade and market in the ancient world system....The real dispute is over the character of the “international” or world system division of labor—not over its very existence....Wallerstein stresses what in our view is only a particular modern phase in the development of this world system division of labor at a higher level of integration than may have generally prevailed earlier (Frank and Gills 1993:298).

So, our historiographic and theoretical disputes are over “the character of the world system” as Gills and I put it in our discussion with Immanuel quoted above. Yet elsewhere, Immanuel goes so far as to write “let’s not quibble about the unit of analysis” (Wallerstein 1997). That is a strange thing to say for someone who has built his career on the proposition that, a ‘society’, ‘country’ or state are not adequate units of analysis, whereas the ‘world-system’ is. So the unit is not just a quibble. It is the question. But then we insist the question also becomes which world-systemic unit, the Braudel/Wallerstein European world-system or the real world global economy and system?

Braudel (1992) said that Immanuel had taken the largest possible geographical unit in which his systemic relations were still identifiable. But it turns out, as Gills and I already demonstrated several years ago, that by this criterion the world economy and system is far larger and older than Immanuel’s capitalist “Modern World-System.” So the first question was how much larger and older? The derivative second question became what implications the extent and age—not to mention structure and transformation—of this larger and older real world system has for the empirical and theoretical foundation of world-systems theory [or even analysis], as well as the remainder of the social theory that we have inherited from Marx and Weber. The answer is that the larger and older unit of analysis pulls the historical and theoretical rug out from under all of this received wisdom.

Alas, that includes denying the alleged distinctive ‘capitalist’ character of the modern world economy and system.

And that is no quibble.

Therefore, the dispute between Immanuel and me has also been extended further to a ‘higher level of integration’ at least for the period from 1400 to 1800. In recent years, our WS paths have diverged in several additional steps and ways. In the course of the 1990s, Immanuel’s work has turned increasingly to contemporary and future affairs and to ‘opening the social sciences,’ while for personal reasons I had to stop working and thus also disengage from current events for several years; when I returned to work I turned increasingly to history. My “The Modern World System Revisited: Rereading Braudel and Wallerstein” argued—I said demonstrated—that Braudel’s and Wallerstein’s Eurocentric thesis is contradicted time and again by their own ample evidence reviewed below, as well as by the evidence and analysis of others” (Frank 1995:163). In response, Immanuel made a strong plea to “Hold the Tiller Firm: On Method and Unit of Analysis.” Both essays appeared in Sanderson, ed. (1995) as did Albert Bergesen’s “Let’s Be Frank about World History.”

Al poses three alternative paths to “Challenging Today’s Social Science Models:” (1) Total denial—as practiced by my friend Bob Brenner—that the received wisdom poses any problem whatsoever; (2) Stretching old theory, such as social evolution and the logic of capitalism, to fit the new stretched history, as per Chase-Dunn and Hall and of course Immanuel and Samir; (3) Letting go of the old models altogether and beginning to build a new model of world-historical development. That is where Bergesen pigeonholes me in his discussion and title. In deference to the old admonition ‘better to say nothing if you can’t say something nice,’ he says that I am in effect arguing that ‘if you can’t categorize world history in a new way, don’t categorize it at all....He is not arguing for nihilism or antitheorism, but [is] simply saying that a new conceptualization is needed. Stretching past theory is not enough, even if it seems to roughly fit. What is needed is new theory” (Bergesen 1995: 199,200). No wonder that Immanuel insists that we hold the theoretical/conceptual W-S tiller firm lest we drift off course altogether without a [political] rudder, which is what Immanuel and also Samir claim I have already done, the latter in his contribution to my Festschrift (Chew & Denmark, eds. 1996).

Nonetheless, Immanuel and I have both pushed ahead to navigate the troubled world-systemic waters without maps and with uncertain grips on the tiller. Immanuel has steered an elegant Gulbenkian Commission passenger liner with a Nobel laureate and other blue ribbon crew in his attempt to *Open the Social Sciences* (1996). It laudably invokes inter/supra/non-disciplinary social science as a goal. But with the tiller held as firm as Captain Immanuel insists, the ship cannot be steered out of the well traveled Mediterranean and Atlantic historical waters and into Afro-Asian and global ones. To do that, we still need to divest ourselves of the good old European—indeed Eurocentric—navigational charts, historiography, and social theory that still guide Immanuel and his tiller.

That is my goal in *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Frank 1998), where Immanuel and I really part company. I asked myself three related questions: (1) What are the implications for Braudel's 'European World-Economy' and Immanuel's capitalist 'Modern World-System' of my having argued that our single World System goes back at least five thousand, and not just five hundred, years? (2) What are the implications for the continuation of the world system since 1400 if Janet Abu-Lughod's "Thirteenth Century World System" was a step in the development of that same system, so that it did not break down in 1350 as she argued, and was not reborn in Europe in 1450 as Immanuel still insists? (3) What is to be done both historically/empirically and theoretically/analytically if the Braudel/Wallerstein models of a European world-economy and capitalist modern world-system are unsatisfactory, as I argued in my "Re-reading" of them in Sanderson ed. (1995)? To begin even to answer all three questions, we must examine the world economic [at least that!] evidence and system on a global and not just a 'European world-economy' scale. But that global economy can in no way be crammed into the MW-S European capitalist procrustean bed, no matter how much we try to stretch it, as Bergesen already warned. And unlike Goldilocks, we cannot just chose among three or any other number of existing bear-beds. Since no one thought—and many even denied and still deny—that there was a global economy before 1800, nobody has so far sought to build an empirical and analytic world economy-bear size bed large enough to encompass it. And, as Bergesen observed, stretching past small- or medium-size theory to fit that global economy is not enough. What is

needed is new theory. And that is a tall order after we have all muddled through with the old small-bed classical theory for nearly two centuries and then two-three decades ago tried to amend it or [stretch?] it to a medium-size 'modern world-system' analytical bed.

Alas, however much we continue to try to stretch the Braudelian world-economy and the Wallersteinian world-system, they will never be able to encompass the bulk of humanity and its world economy which until 1800 was and remained in Asia. In Immanuel's book until 1750 all of Asia and even Russia and the Ottomans remained outside of and did not begin to be incorporated into the world-economy/system that had its origins in 1450 according to Immanuel or earlier according to Braudel, but in either case in Europe. So where was this 'other' eighty percent of humanity? Literally out of it, by these Eurocentric lights. An insufficient step ahead in this regard is Giovanni's prize-winning book *The Long Twentieth Century* (1994) and his present work in which he has discovered the importance of East Asia in the earlier world economy/system (Arrighi, Hamashita and Selden, 1997). Working alone, Giovanni tried to fit the world economy into a Procrustean theoretical bed that rests on 'financial innovations' by and financial instruments of Braudelian city states in southern and then northern Europe. But in reality, the southern ones rested on the "Oriental trade" with Asia and the northern ones were financed by silver from the Americas that was used as collateral for credit raised on much more developed financial markets in Asia. So with his co-authors and next to his European one, Giovanni is now setting up an additional East Asian bed. Yet they still fail to deal with the world economic baby, because it is too big to fit into either or even both of their Procrustean beds.

Modelski and Thompson (1996) do try to fit the world economy into a single bed that rests on the 'technological innovations,' which drive the nineteen Kondratieff cycles they claim to have identified since 930 A.D. Alas, after the first four of these that are centered in Song China, their bed collapses on them there; and from the thirteenth century onward they set it up again in Western Europe. That is because they allege that after the first four K cycles the world economic innovative motor force suddenly jumped from East to West and has remained there through the fifteen so far succeeding K cycles. They note in passing but completely disregard the significance of

the observation that all but one of the first dozen “Western” innovations and cycles in fact reflect and rest on important economic events in the East and/or its relations with the West. So in their attempt to fit in more world economic evidence, all three of these innovative authors and friends [or all five counting Giovanni’s co-authors] are still trying to stretch their Procrustean theoretical beds to and beyond the limits, which as Bergesen already warned simply cannot be done. To encompass the real world economy and system, we need a new theory, and to construct that we need to begin by looking at and analyzing the world economy as a global whole.

ReOrient first demonstrates both empirically and theoretically that the real world economy or historical world system simply will not fit into the Braudelian European World-Economy or the Wallersteinian capitalist Modern World-System, no matter how much anybody tries to neglect the evidence of a truly global division of labor and competitive economy within which Asia was central—and Europe marginal—until 1800. To encompass that in a global economic bed something has to give way, and that is the Eurocentric wisdom and received theory from Marx to Wallerstein [and Frank Mark I]. In my book [Frank Mark II?], the two-thirds of humanity living in Asia in 1750 accounted for four-fifths of all production in the world economy. This world economy’s international division of labor had already been well developed, at least throughout Afro-Eurasia, by the fifteenth century when Immanuel’s ‘modern world-system’ allegedly only just began to emerge in a marginal peninsula of the real world system.

Therefore, we need to review, and I fear more reject than refurbish, the historiography and social theory, including especially all attempts to account for the Rise of the West, that we have so far all been taught, including by Immanuel. He will, of course, agree with me about the bankruptcy of Bergesen’s ‘denialist’ category #1: The supposed European exceptionalism [a la Weber and others] by which the West allegedly pulled itself up by its own bootstraps and/or its Marxist version of doing so simply by changing its class structure from feudal to capitalist with a bit of colonial loot thrown in. But alas, much the same is the case for Bergesen’s #2 category of ‘stretchers’ who privilege ‘The Expansion of Europe’ and the progressive [or regressive] ‘incorporation’ of more and more of ‘The Rest’ by ‘The West’ in the capitalist “Modern World-System” set out and analyzed by Immanuel. Unfortunately,

that will no longer do either, particularly at a time when the world economy and system is itself reorienting de facto.

For a major limitation of the stretched category #2 is that it retains and only stretches the ‘societal’ mode of production’ of #1 out to the range of the MW-S of category #2. The reason is of course that those who do so—including me then and Immanuel still—need something [‘capitalism’] that historically replaced something else [‘feudalism’] and hence is logically subject to being itself again replaced by something else [socialism?]. Witness that every one of his analyses of the real past and present ends with an unsubstantiated—and unsubstantiable—prediction: The future mode will be different, sometimes even ‘socialist’, sometimes maybe better, sometimes maybe not, because ‘things can’t go on this way’ and ‘all things must come to an end.’ So our 1991 dispute about ‘a hyphen’ already was about the character of the real world [-] system and the political [and policy] implications to be derived therefrom. That is why already in my 1991 critique of Immanuel’s essay for the Needham book, I asked if there is any scientific basis for, and whether we still have a political/ideological need for, the ‘transitional ideological modes: feudalism, capitalism, socialism.” My answer was and remains no. Immanuel’s remains yes, and that is the difference a hyphen makes.

The moral of the story is therefore that the outstanding question of theory and praxis is not what to do in or about a world that was not born in or by Europe, as has been mistakenly alleged by everybody from Marx and Weber to Braudel and Immanuel. The question is instead how to *ReOrient* our historiography and social theory, to take account not only of the “Global Economy in the Asian Age” before the year 1800 but probably also after the year 2000 (Frank 1998). It is strange, and for me sad, that after so long a road traveled together Immanuel’s and my paths should now diverge on that account. All the more so since, to close my personal and theoretical tribute to him, I can do no better than to quote Immanuel himself where we still agree:

The expectation of universality, however sincerely pursued, has not been fulfilled thus far in the historical development of the social sciences.... It is hardly surprising that the social sciences that were constructed in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century were Eurocentric. The European

world of the time felt itself culturally triumphant.... Every universalism sets off responses to itself, and these responses are in some sense determined by the nature of the reigning universalism(s).... Submitting our theoretical premises to inspection for hidden unjustified a priori assumptions is a priority for the social sciences today.

–Immanuel Wallerstein for Gulbenkian Commission
Opening the Social Sciences [1996]

Amen!

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STILL PARTNERS AND STILL DISSIDENT AFTER ALL THESE YEARS? WALLERSTEIN, WORLD REVOLUTIONS AND THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE

William G. Martin

I. THE DEMISE OF WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS?

This essay owes its origins to the provocative title of a recent article by Immanuel Wallerstein: “The Rise and Future Demise of World-systems Analysis” (1998a).

“Demise”? What might this mean?

The title evokes, of course, Wallerstein’s pathbreaking 1974 essay that spoke of “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System.” Twenty-five years later, Wallerstein is bold enough to speak of the demise of the perspective, a perspective that now encompasses a global group of scholars. For world-systems scholarship has, since 1974, thrived in book series, journals, universities and professional organizations—creating in the process a world-systems diaspora scattered around the planet.

To speak of the future, much less the demise, of world-historical scholarship thus raises a critical issue for a large group of scholars and programs not just in Binghamton, or even the United States, but around the world. And we do indeed face, as several of our elder scholars have noted, an uncertain future—especially as we seek to secure the conditions to sustain the next, third generation of world-systems scholars. It is in relation to this larger group that I pose the question: What were the origins of the

William G. Martin
Fernand Braudel Center
Binghamton University
State University of New York
Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
[http://fbc.binghamton.edu/
wgmartin@binghamton.edu](http://fbc.binghamton.edu/wgmartin@binghamton.edu)

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world-systems community, and why should it flourish or even survive in the coming decades?

My response is straightforward: world-systems scholarship was born of the world revolution of 1968, and its promise, and indeed survival, depends on sustaining its relationship with antisystemic movements—movements that today are the inheritors of, but very different from, the world revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Other analyses of world-systems work reach quite different conclusions. For many, particularly sociologists, the world-systems perspective is the victim of its own success. For as “globalization” has been accepted within and across the social sciences and the humanities, world-systems work has, from this point of view, lost its distinctiveness through the acceptance of its globalizing premise. As Giddens posed it in his first introductory text (1995), as a global society emerges the world-systems perspective finds its fulfillment. A variant of this is posed by Tilly, who recently argued (1995) that large-scale comparative work, of which world-systems stands at the most macro level (Tilly 1984), is no longer possible due to the effects of globalization.

For many working in the field itself, the evolution of our work follows another path, that of paradigm development. Hence, for example, Chase-Dunn’s and Hall’s argument that our work has proceeded from perspective to scientific theory, reaching a stage where “the study of world-systems promises to wrest our expectations about the future away from theology and into the realm of science” (1995:415). For yet others still, such claims reveal only how world-systems analysis has been bypassed by a more radical, post-modern turn that rejects the field’s historical, structural and so-called Third World or Marxist foundations. If we speak of global relationships at all from this standpoint, they should be cast as constantly shifting landscapes, as in Appadurai’s enticing formulation.¹ Meanwhile the master of the field, Immanuel Wallerstein, talks of the demise of the perspective as it dissolves into a central position among, and potentially unifies, all the social sciences.

¹ Specifically “ethnoscapes,” “mediascapes,” “technoscapes,” “fianncescapes,” and “ideoscapes,” which designate cultural flows that are “the landscapes that are the building blocks of...imagined worlds” (1997:33).

I do not believe that we can discriminate among these assessments by employing the common strategy of tracing the linear evolution of our research projects and publications over the last twenty-years.² What I propose to lay out instead is an interpretation-sketch, as Terry Hopkins would have called it, of the origins of world-systems analysis and our present and future choices. This leads, as we shall see, to the assertion that we face an extraordinarily favorable, world conjuncture that calls for more distinctive, critical world-systems work than before.

Put more sharply, my thesis is this: Child of 1968, world-systems analysis depends upon reclaiming and reinventing our dissident stance—methodologically, intellectually, and in relation to our global allies. From this flows quite concrete priorities, research agendas, and institutional initiatives.

I shall proceed in three parts:

- (1) unearthing the origins of world-systems analysis in the world revolution of “1968”
- (2) evaluating the character and imperatives of three current antisystemic movements, and their relation to world-historical analysis, and
- (3) tracing out concrete institutional conditions for reinventing world-systems work and supporting the next, third generation of world-historical scholars.

II. BACK TO 1968

I start with a simple question: what is the genealogy of world-systems analysis?

Academics naturally tend to trace backward to the history of authors, ideas and texts. In this regard the first (1974b) volume of Wallerstein’s *The Modern World-System* (TMWS) stands out, of course, as the accepted breakthrough. Indeed, to have gotten us all fascinated about sixteenth century Europe and a second serfdom was no mean feat!

² These can vary widely. See for example Chase-Dunn and Hall (1995), Martin and Beittel (1998), Wallerstein (1997), or on the Fernand Braudel Center “Report on an Intellectual Project: The Fernand Braudel Center, 1976-1991” <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/fbcintel.htm> (November 14, 1998).

But wherein lie the roots of this achievement and its attraction for such a wide scholarly audience? Harriet Friedman, in claiming the *TMWS* as one of the most important sociology books of the century, argues:

Wallerstein in 1974 forged a deeply influential perspective by merging American [sic] sociology with French social history. His importation of the *Annales* school into US sociology compares with Parson's early importation of Max Weber. He reconnected American sociology with a boldly original elaboration of themes from European scholarship (1998:319).

Others, more numerous and closer to the core of sociology as a discipline, have located—perhaps “contained” is the more accurate word—world-systems analysis as a radical variant of development studies. Thus for example Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes trace world-systems analysis back to the emergence in the early 1970s, “primarily in sociology,” of a:

rapidly growing group of social scientists [who] recognized that ‘national’ development could only be understood contextually, as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding European-centered “world” economy (1995:387-8).

Daniel Chirot's and Thomas Hall's assessment is similar, with its own peculiar twist:

World-system theory is a highly political approach to the problem of economic development in the Third World. It was created by policy-oriented intellectuals in countries at a medium level of development to account for their societies' demonstrable inability to catch up to the rich countries (1982:81).

Clearly the reference is dependency theory and its variants, and presumably indicates major scholars such as Samir Amin, Cardoso and Faletto, Andre Gunder Frank, and Walter Rodney³ as world-systems “theorists”;⁴ in the case of Wallerstein the influence of early work on and in Africa is equally important (see Wallerstein 1986 and the introduction, pp. 3-11, to *TMWS*).

³ The dates and subjects of their works bear some attention; see Samir Amin (1974; French original in 1970), Cardoso and Faletto (1969), Andre Gunder Frank (1969), and Walter Rodney (1972).

⁴ Surely at least several of these would bristle at the appellation of “world-systems theorist,” and would reject at being cast as “policy-oriented” intellectuals (even if one did defect to become President of Brazil in order implement anti-dependency policies).

If all these statements agree on the timing of the emergence of world-systems studies—the early to mid-1970s—they surely differ on the major concepts and claims of world-systems analysis and the locations of the scholars involved. One could nevertheless reconstruct the origins of the perspective by noting its reliance upon, and synthesis of, three traditions: (1) studies of imperialism and colonialism—usually Marxist or Panafricanist in inspiration—that stressed the interdependent nature of European and Third-World development, and thus an international if not “world” division of labor; (2) the *Annales* tradition, with its emphasis upon multiple, contingent temporalities and localities; and (3) radical studies of European capitalism which, although more nationalist in unit, provided insights into phases of economic stagnation and expansion, creative destruction, and hegemony. Each of these lineages brought with it critical insights, as well as limiting assumptions.

We do have in hand a number of studies that trace out these contributions and concepts,⁵ and this task surely deserves further work, especially concerning the methodological origins and implications of a world-embracing, social division of labor. Continuing down the road of constructing a narrative of such advances would, however, contribute little to the task at hand here. For as Wallerstein suggested in his recent *Demise* essay, “If world-systems analysis took shape in the 1970s, it was because conditions for its emergence were ripe within the world-system...” (1998:103) Thus even as we acknowledge the roots of the perspective in three previous traditions, we must still ask: what were the world-economic conditions in the early 1970s that opened up the space for such a synthesis and perspective *and* drew in so many scholars from around the world? And we might ask what Wallerstein did not in his essay: what do conditions thirty years later, today, hold for the future of the paradigm, its scholarship, its scholars?

The late 1960s and early 1970s were of course a peak period, as Friedman notes in her analysis of *TMWS*, “of intellectual, political, and academic interest in international power and exploitation.” And it would be easy to run down a list of radical events and ruptures, from Third World resistance to European and US rule, to the decline of U.S. commercial, financial, and

⁵ See our own contributions: Martin 1994, Martin and Beittel 1998.

productive hegemony, through the oil “crises” of the mid- and late-1970s, to the calls for a new international economic division of labor, etc.

Academic work on international issues also flourished, with one group of scholars seeking to advance “political order in changing societies” from Vietnam to South Africa, while others attacked such programs through critiques of Euro-American modernization theory and inconclusive attempts to theorize post-World II imperialism.⁶ As already noted, world-systems scholarship clearly developed from the latter camp, constructing novel analyses of global hegemonies, world-economic relationships and inequality, trends and cycles of world-economy expansion and contraction, and so forth.

For many these remain the hallmark features of the perspective. Yet tracing out anti-modernization and even world-economic analyses would still mislead us. For this procedure not only obscures substantive shifts in the perspective over time, but focuses far too narrowly on concepts and discourse. Here Wallerstein points our attention in a different direction by noting that “The prime factor (behind the rise of world-systems analysis) can be summarized as the world revolution of 1968 (1998:103).”

Yet we must still ask: what was this epochal shift, and, more concretely, how did it lead to world-systems analysis? Wallerstein, in an essay targeted upon world-systems’ challenge to the social sciences, did not elaborate—somehow the development of the perspective got severed from the fate of the conditions and the movements that apparently gave it birth. Certainly the events and movements of the 1968 conjuncture are well known, ranging as they did from anti-Vietnam war movements around the globe, to Black power and consciousness movements on all sides of the Atlantic, through student movements in France, Mexico, Japan, to the Cultural Revolution in China, the Naxalite movement in India, and the emergence of armed national liberation movements in Africa, etc. It would be easy to extrapolate from this “context” to the relevance and pursuit of global studies of exploitation and the birth of the world-systems school.

⁶ The most elegant of these, which demonstrated the inapplicability of late nineteenth and early twentieth century theories of imperialism to the post-World War II epoch, was Arrighi (1983).

This might make for a compelling narrative—and even a good book—of events, biographies and ideas. Yet far more was involved than attacks upon US hegemony at home and abroad, and the emergence of scholars addressing these phenomena, and, later yet, the stilling of the movements’ energies. For capital, core states and the academy were each in quite separate ways radically challenged by the eruption of global protest, protest pitted directly against prevailing modes of incorporating and taming past movements. And it was here that a world-systems perspective provided a central locus for understanding and coalescing much of this ferment by students and scholars.

It did this through two critical advances, which it is useful to recall. First, world-systems scholars have insisted that capitalist accumulation has always been a global process, while political rule has been exercised through multiple, relationally-constructed institutions. This has been stated and developed in many different ways over the last two decades. But it clearly separated our work from dependency theory and modernization theory, not to mention contemporary proponents of “globalization” who proclaim to see, only today, a world-scale economy and the demise of the nation state.⁷

Second, we have consistently pursued methodological and conceptual formulations premised upon ever-expanding, deepening and polarized relational networks. Capital accumulation may thus be world-scale in its operations, but it rests upon uniting differentiated locales of production and accumulation. Whether one uses terms such as core-periphery, state formation and deformation, or even North-South, we have been insistent on bridging and linking locations across continental, national, and local boundaries.⁸

What we have failed to notice, perhaps, is that these two starting points of our work derived directly from the fundamental challenges posed by the

⁷ Or for many of their opponents, who argue the case for the retention of national states and economies, e.g. Hirst and Thompson (1997).

⁸ Here too there were precursors we all studied, many rooted in the transcontinental Black scholarly tradition, such as Black scholars’ assertion of the concomitant birth of industrialization and plantation production, European freedom and American slavery (e.g. Eric Williams, Oliver Cox, etc.).

movements of the “world revolution of 1968.” As was suggested in the slim and remarkable volume *Antisystemic Movements* (Arrighi, Hopkins, Wallerstein 1989), the historical singularity of the 1960s movements was not simply that they accused the older left—from industrial working class leaders and social democrats in power in core states, to the leaders of new, postcolonial states in the south—of the great sins of weakness, corruption, co-optation, neglect and arrogance. More critically, this charge was a rejection everywhere of the dominant, antisystemic strategy of seeking liberation through capturing and then exercising state power. For those coming to power, as in the late victories of national liberation movements, the central problem was openly posed as the new state and neo-colonial bourgeoisie—as projected by Fanon and Cabral; where left parties were long in power, as in Eastern Europe, South Asia or China, new movements were launched against the party and state. What the brighter stars of the movement—such as Malcolm X, Fanon or Cabral—thus challenged us to understand might be simply stated as: how do we make sense of a world where state power and party political organization—the essential inheritance of 1848 and 1917—have become the route not to freedom and equality, but rather a reinforcement of inequality, underdevelopment and autocracy?

And it is here that world-systems analysis entered, setting out in sharp and elegant terms the conceptual and methodological tasks necessary to understand a world with a single, relentlessly unequal and imperial economy, and yet multiple, relationally-sovereign states. It is hardly surprising that the perspective, and the graduate programs key senior scholars worked at, drew in so many dissident young scholars with experience in the movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁹

The late 1970s and 1980s were, moreover, hardly conducive to such efforts as structural adjustment was applied to higher education. Nevertheless world-systems scholars and allied graduate programs did survive, and

⁹ Binghamton’s graduate program was not alone in this process, but it clearly constituted the core location primarily due to the efforts of Terence Hopkins (see the chapters in Wallerstein 1998b, including my own on the graduate program (Martin 1998)). It is worth noting that few new graduate or research programs were created and sustained by other leading senior scholars of the day. We should not fail to note this as we face the problem of fostering a third generation of world-systems scholars.

even flourished. As can be seen from scholarly biographies, Binghamton—the case I know best—drew students and faculty from all over the world,¹⁰ a highly unusual feature by contrast to the prevalent parochialism of US sociology (or political science) departments, including even the rare few that had, like Binghamton’s, a significant group of Marxist scholars. To be sure, there were fewer Black, Latino/a, and female scholars than there might have been; still both the faculty and student body made for an unusual program—one deemed in an external review conducted in the early 1980s (if I remember correctly) as a “high risk” one, given its deviation from the sociological norm.

In summary: while it is common to trace the history of world-systems work through the development of key concepts and publications, the role of antisystemic movements was critical: they posed the key conceptual challenges, provided the talented and passionate young scholars, and sustained the development of new programs in Binghamton and elsewhere.

In short: no antisystemic movement, no world systems analysis.

III. FROM 1968 TO 1998 AND BEYOND: LIVING IN THE INTERREGNUM, OR REVIVAL?

If this conclusion is plausible, we must then ask: How do these factors explain our situation today? And beyond?

For many of course the 1980s and 1990s represent a period of the containment, suppression, roll-back, or dissolution of the Black, Latino/a, national liberation, women’s, youth and students movements of late 1960s and early 1970s—matched by a parallel flight of scholars into discourse and ivory towers. And while scholars retreated from these engagements and the public arena, it is often argued, capital proceeded from strength to strength

¹⁰ There are several print sources that reveal this, and might be examined more closely. The most public sources are the lists of faculty of, and Ph.d.s granted by, Binghamton’s sociology department and other programs, as contained in the American Sociological Association’s annual *Guide to Sociology Departments*. For the Fernand Braudel Center, one might examine the annual newsletter, as well as the membership and affiliate lists published by the Center. In addition of course are other centers of world-systems work, ranging in the U.S. from a quantitative stream emanating from John Meyer’s group at Stanford, the Santa Cruz group, Chase-Dunn and others at Johns Hopkins, etc. The location and content of the PEWS annual conference provides another, related source of information.

on a world scale. World conditions might thus easily be said to have moved decisively against the kinds of work we do, and the institutions and relationships we rely upon.

These assertions are, I would argue, not simply a caricature of the conjuncture we find ourselves in, but politically and intellectually misleading—and dangerous as a guidepost for our future work. Let me try to reach a quite different conclusion.

We cannot of course claim false victories: we are a long way from 1968 in any space/time calculation. Recall that in the late 1960s capital and the US state faced widespread insurgency and then the outbreak in the early 1970s of a global economic panic—and in response moved faster than the movements. Here world-systems research provided much insight by path-breaking analyses of US hegemony and capital's response to unruly labor in the North, and calls for a new international division of labor (and information) from the South.¹¹ While claims of a radically new international division of labor¹² were surely overstated, few would contest such innovative responses as the relocation of industrial production processes, the abandonment of postwar US-style liberalism and developmentalism (see Wallerstein 1995a), and the application of neo-liberal policies to tame the South by granting new regulatory and repressive roles to the IMF and the World Bank.

As the 1990s proceeded, it became evident that these initiatives heralded both a formative response to the challenges of the 1960s *and* were reconstituting the relational processes that underwrote class, racial, and gender formation on a world scale. Yet it also became evident, as the 1990s flowed on, that these projects rebounded upon their formulators in quite unforeseen ways—weakening both capital and core states on the one

¹¹ These are far too numerous to list here. In addition to individual works on the evolution of the world economy by Amin, Arrighi, Frank, Wallerstein, etc., there were also co-authored works that pitted one analysis—and set of expectation and predictions—against another. On the latter see for example the very different expectations of Amin, Arrighi, Frank and Wallerstein in their 1982 volume *The Dynamics of Global Crisis*.

¹² For one of the early and most-cited statements see Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1977).

hand,¹³ and propelling forward movements on the other.

There would be no return to 1968. But by the late 1990s it is possible to perceive the even greater utility of a world-systems analysis—especially as it relates to an incipient blossoming of antisystemic movements, which will challenge us, as in the 1968 phase, to break new ground yet again.¹⁴ Let me illustrate this charge and the challenges it poses for us with three quick sketches of three antisystemic movements.

Labor and the Global Division of Labor

We stand on firmest ground in relation to class-based movements and those most classically presented as machine/industrial-based, working class movements. The reason is straightforward: we have considerably more conceptual and historical work to draw on, given the centrality of Europe and the United States to studies of working class formation.

What world-systems scholars have achieved in the last decade is to demonstrate how capital's response to labor protest in core areas has only served to form new labor movements in semiperipheral areas, and, *prima facie*, a century-long process of linked labor protest on a world scale. The central insights draw directly upon methodological principles laid out in the mid-1970s: no single state process of class formation, but rather a global, trans-territorial one.

What we have not achieved, I think we must frankly admit, is a conceptual rendering of this world-wide, historical process of class formation—we remain still prisoners of an outward movement from Europe and the United States. Thus we have strong studies of the rise of labor in semiperipheral states, allied to notions of Fordism and/or industrial relocation, but these are heavily centralized upon factory, waged labor—and thus constitute but

¹³ One result was the turn to financial speculation; the key work here is of course Arrighi 1994.

¹⁴ A small but growing literature exists on contemporary transnational organizations and movements, with particular attention to new non-governmental organizations in the field of environmental, human rights, indigenous and feminist movements; see for example Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997, and Keck and

partial accounts of the global process of labor formation. We most certainly have not achieved a resolution of the challenge posed by the 1960s movements: how do we understand processes of class formation that are necessarily world-scale, and yet labor movements' historic containment within narrow, national political aims? Discussions in the 1970s—of proletarian and bourgeois nation-states, unequal exchange, internal colonialism in core areas, and settler classes and labor aristocracies in the “Third World,” among others—pointed out the issue of class formation on a global scale, but clearly left it unresolved.

In this area labor may well be moving ahead of us, calling upon scholars, as in 1968, to offer new understandings of labor protest—whether we speak of the US, Europe or, especially, workers' movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. For in all these areas capital's post-1968 strategy has laid bare the central contradiction posed by world-systems analysis in the wake of 1968: how can capital, which operates on a world-economic scale, be successfully engaged by territorially-organized and racially- and gender-bounded labor organizations?

To see this advance we need but recall that in 1968 the new left accused old labor of the sin of abandoning Third World labor, Black labor, and women workers—and that today few if any labor movements are unaware of the global character of capital, the growing polarization of rich and poor, and the necessity of linking across national, racial, and gender boundaries.

There is much analytical work and empirical evidence charting these developments, as the articles by Armbuster, Bonacich, and Silver, among others, document in the 1998 symposium in the *Journal of World-Systems Research* (JWSR). Illustrations of these processes at work are quite vivid, ranging from such well-known efforts as the global GAP and NIKE campaigns to UAW and UNITE anti-Nafta initiatives. Indeed U.S. academics need go no further than their own campuses, where management has privatized food and housing and vending services, triggering student protests against the corporate monopolies on campus, cuts in local workers' wages in the newly privatized food and housing operations, and the sweatshop production abroad of campus-licensed athletic apparel.

To watch these developments and protests is to realize that capital and core states' responses to the challenges of 1968 have not only failed to provide stable zones of labor exploitation and labor peace abroad, but also

instigated a new, world-wide awareness of the systemic character of capital accumulation. For capital this is surely a portent of dangerous, antisystemic challenges, pushing well beyond the labor movement conditions that prevailed in 1968.

These kinds of developments challenge world-systems researchers to develop new conceptions and investigations of capital-labor relationships and, especially, new forms of class formation and labor organizing across national and continental, core and peripheral, boundaries. Of one thing we may be certain: others, mired in the poverty of nationally-bounded and linear models of Euro-North American working class formation on the one hand, or localized postmodern contexts on the other, have little to contribute to this task.

In short we stand in a very different, and potentially much more fruitful, conjuncture. This challenges us, as in the immediate wake of 1968, to advance further, quicker and on a broader world scale.

Moving beyond Labor and Capital

Could one make a similar case in other areas, beyond the classic and deeply studied arena of industrial working class movements? Indeed, what of the movements that in 1968 denounced the labor aristocracy of the old, white male, working-class movement and unions, and turned to cultural forms of political awareness, if not action? As before, I would argue: we stand, thirty years later, on the precipice of a new wave of antisystemic protest and intellectual work. Let me give two examples of this among many: research and movements in the area of “gender” and “race.” (This sets aside the even more obvious, world-wide cases such as the environmental, anti-structural adjustment, and indigenous movements.)

Feminism, Difference, and the Wage-Unwaged Relationship

The explosion of feminist scholarship has undoubtedly been one of the most enduring contributions of the 1960s movements. One of the primary targets was, of course, older left analyses that excluded women, as absent actors, in working class or nationalist struggles; in the language of the old left, women's liberation would await the revolution, the seizure of state power, or the creation of a socialist state.

The sweeping feminist attack on such positions quickly expanded into a broader intellectual realm. Central was the analysis of women's activity and work—and here strong lines of convergence emerged with the fundamental methodological and conceptual work being advanced by world-systems scholars. Feminists' insistence on revaluing women's non-waged work, and opening up voices from these domains, matched, for example, world-systems scholars' insistence that the rise of waged labor, modern cities, and democracy in Northwestern Europe was only possible through the parallel creation of new forms of non-waged, coerced and slave labor—not to mention the conquest of whole new peoples and continents.

This central conceptual and methodological premise set our work distinctly apart from developmentalists (including many Marxists), comparativists, and modernizationists alike. While many of the latter sought to chart how informal sectors might exist alongside of formal economic life, world-systems scholars turned to examining how the interdependent gendering of waged and non-waged labor operated historically. This entailed not simply linking, for example, the creation of peasantries to feed raw materials to Europe's factories, but unearthing how export cash crops became male crops, and food crops female crops. Or how in other locales, in the words of Maria Mies and others, "housewifization of women is... a necessary complement to the proletarianization of men" (1998:10), colonialism dictated different but linked forms of patriarchy in Europe and its colonies (see for example Mies 1986, Mies and Shiva 1993), and how female labor has been central to the reorganization of the international division of labor and the rise of mobile factory systems in East Asia. As these comments suggest, consideration of gender and non-waged labor pressed world-systems scholars to work at a far more micro-scale than a grand world-economic narrative suggested; emblematic of such work were the volumes by the Binghamton group on conceptualizing household structures and waged and non-waged labor.

The poststructuralist and postmodern turn has lent emphasis to this research trajectory, as has the rejection of any universal, essential "woman" and the recognition of difference among women's local situations and struggles. Indeed one of the necessities and dangers of work on gender and feminist movements is that it calls for intensive local studies, by contrast for example to studies of working class movements which tackled the global

division of labor, multinational corporations, hegemony, and state power. Thus one finds many collections such as Amrita Basu's *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective* which emphasize local conditions and cultures, and provides only the most tentative links across micro case studies. "Global" in such cases often indicates only the compilation of a variety of individual case studies.

The great difficulty here, of course, is that as one abandons any generalization about "women," one reverts intellectually to the ideographic position of conventional historiography—and politically to the inability to perceive any unity across local struggles. Some have thus called for, in Spivak's terms, the tactical acceptance, for political purposes, of a "strategic essentialism"—surely an admission of pitfalls of particularism in many intellectual and movement positions.

As Nancy Forsythe's careful and rich methodological discussion (1998) of this conundrum reveals, the world-systems perspective offers a way out of this problem, a way to reject both a universal, essentialized woman on the one hand, and the construction of gender difference site by separate site on the other. Rather, as Forsythe suggests, we need to focus upon basic world-systems principles of the relational nature of information and differentiation within a single social and historical world. This means we need to

articulate the relationship between gender differentiation and other kinds of social differentiation as processes of a world-historical system. As parts of a single historical system, the relationship between gender and other social differences is "built in." The primary intellectual, or theoretical, question concerns the unit of analysis of which each analytically discrete process of differentiation is a part—but only a part—and in which the relationships among processes of social differentiation adhere. (1998:117)

Thus: "we should... stop referring to gender at all, or refer to it as a shorthand for what it is we mean when we use the term: the processes through which gender is differentiated."¹⁵ (1998:117)

¹⁵ See also, for example, Mies' and Shiva's discussion of the pitfalls of the global-local discourse and cultural relativism, and the manner by which women's movements superceded this, in their "Introduction" (pp. 1-21) to *Ecofeminism* (1993), esp. pp. 8-12.

Just how processes of gender differentiation proceed remains, even among world-historical feminists, very much a matter of debate. Some, such as Sassen, see a radical rupture in the present period (1998), due in part to demise of the nation-state and state sovereignty. From this position difference may be constructed increasingly without reference to core/peripheral boundaries that most often rest on state boundaries. Thus Torry Dickinson not only argues that processes of accelerating income inequality on a world scale are intertwined with increasing gender polarization (1998:99), but that (like Sassen 1998) state boundaries operate with far less force than in past centuries. "Accordingly, it is hard not to be struck by the uneven checkerboard, patchwork, or quilted appearance of today's world, which increasingly differentiates areas within nation-states, making parts of the North seem more like parts of the south, and areas in the South seem like parts of the North" (1998: 99). It follows in this view that state boundaries are increasingly less effective in segregating women and feminist movements in different locales and cultures from each other: "One consequence of the differentiation within zones may be that women in the North and South can now find more common ground giving them greater ease as they talk about and address their globally-related differences" (1998:99).

For still others, the long-standing process of gender differentiation and oppression based upon waged/non-waged labor formation is a continuing, indeed accelerating one. Hence the tendency in this period of global stagnation to see the commodification of female labor in some locales and the enhanced reliance upon non-wage and even de-commodified female labor in yet others. For still others heightened levels of female non-waged labor indicate a successful resistance strategy by women as they seek to withdraw from capitalist relations altogether (see Dickinson 1998).

What is evident despite these varying interpretations is that processes of gender and social differentiation are not leading to a global homogenization and proletarianization of female labor, as is predicted by modernizationists, comparativists, and globalization theorists. And yet neither are women's local contexts and struggles unrelated. This is evident on the ground, as an increasingly global feminist movement has developed in ways unimaginable in the 1960s and 1970s. As is well known, feminists have had to confront the often volatile divisions among women's organizations and experiences by location in the global hierarchies of wealth and race. Early assumptions,

for example, that development would lead to similar wealth and positions of core, white women's households—and thus their demands would eventually be the demands of women everywhere—have been challenged and debated, leading to quite new understandings of how patriarchy and gender are differentiated on a world-scale.

If one response to these developments was a turn to locality and context by scholars, another more fruitful one is greater dialogue among women activists worldwide, and thus a far stronger movement. One can see this process increasingly at work as local women's organizations and campaigns have found common ground at national and international levels—particularly by debating and relating local reproductive and non-wage issues and struggles. Such dialogue across the global fault lines that divide women has become a regular feature at such meetings as the Women's Linking for Change Conference in 1994, the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995, the Women's Day on Food Conference in Rome in 1996, etc.

There is of course no assurance these discussions, campaigns and intellectual analyses will march from success to success. But we should recognize that the present world conjuncture is not 1968 in a very positive sense. As Dickinson puts it,

With the exception of a small number of feminist and world-economy scholars, twenty years ago few scholars in the North accepted the idea that the global profit-making system had been one of the primary forces determining the destiny of the world's people. (1998:98)

Today both scholars and grassroots activists understand this very well. No longer can patriarchy and capital accumulation—which have depended so long on hidden non-wage work and the praise of so-called local cultural and family norms—avoid being revealed as world-historical processes which accelerate and link gender difference. The advance of a shared understanding of this situation among both activists and scholars is a significant advance. It is thus not simply increasing awareness of patriarchy and inequality that marks a qualitative leap forward from 1968,¹⁶ but the recognition of, and increasingly interlinked movement organization against, the global processes that sustain such inequalities.

¹⁶ See Mies' conclusions, 1998:22.

In short: there can be no question that we stand on the threshold of a very different understanding of how patriarchy is created and recreated through hierarchies and inequalities on a world-scale. As with class-based movements so too with feminist movements: today's movements have built upon the legacy of the 1960s, moved beyond celebration and study of local differences, and now grasp the fundamentally world-historical system they confront. As Forsythe concludes,

What is clearly discontinuous at present is the development of women's empowerment on a global scale... While patriarchy reigned in the past, simply seeing more of it in the modern world-system prevents us from seeing what is historically unique, and, more importantly, what is politically most relevant of the unfolding of the historical system. The most urgent questions for feminists today center, not so much on capitalism and women's oppression, but on capitalism and women's empowerment, the fact that the modern world-system has been witness to the emergence of women's empowerment. (1998:121-22)

A very bold question thus follows:

If the current period does mark the end of male domination (male hegemony)... does the shift in gender relations in the current period suggest a new periodization in which the modern world-system is an end point? (1998:123).

An answer to this question can best be pursued, for all the reasons argued above, by a new wave of feminist, world-systems research.

Racing World-systems: subjecthood and nationhood on a world scale

If the relation of feminist movements and world-systems work suggests that the spirit of 1968 is alive and well, a similar case for new, antisystemic advances can be made if we look at contemporary Black movements. This is admittedly a thinner case, intellectually and theoretically, given the smaller number of scholars and resources committed to Black studies in the last generation.

It is also, as is the case of women's movements, where the standard academic narrative fails us. We are often told this is the age of the declining significance of race and the end of modernity's essentialized racial categories, and the rising recognition of hybrid cultural-racial identities. Even phenomena associated with the African-centered movement—from the growing

celebration of Kwanzaa to a Black Cleopatra and Nile—become in this context little but signs of diffuse racial and cultural imaginings.

Drawing on colleagues' work and basic world-systems premises, I would argue a very different thesis: we stand on the verge of a fourth grand wave of Black nationalism—to use Michael West's formulation¹⁷—a movement heir to the antisystemic breakthroughs of the last wave in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and desperately seeking to advance its antisystemic inheritance. And to develop this historical thesis we need to reinvent and reinvest the fruits of a generation of world-historical research.

This is a long and optimistic charge, one that I can only sketch here. But let me extend a point made above: as in the case of other “new” movements, Black nationalists (like all uses of the term nationalism, a Janus-faced notion to be sure) in the 1960s and early 1970s rejected their predecessors' belief in the promise of state power and liberalism as a route to freedom.

This was true, we should recall, both at home and abroad. Indeed one of the major misfortunes of the last three decades of national histories of the period was to deny the global Black character of this movement. In the US one needs only to point to the rejection by Black nationalists of the civil rights movement's early pursuit of integration into a common US culture and citizenship, or for Malcolm X's call for world-wide human, as opposed to *national*, civil rights abroad one needs only to glance at Fanon's and Cabral's warnings of the pitfalls of nationalist consciousness and misplaced expectations for the postcolonial state.

World-systems scholars drew directly from this movement and its intellectual predecessors, as can be seen from the biographies of many of our leading scholars. In proposing the fundamental notion of multiple states

¹⁷ See his “Like a River: The Million Man March and the Black Nationalist Tradition in the United States,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* (1999). West's dating for the four waves of Black nationalism (in the US one should note) are roughly 1850 to 1861, 1919 to 1925, 1964-1972, and 1980 onward; for a contrasting historical overview similarly inspired by recent Black movements, see Cha-Jua 1998. How US Black nationalism links to contemporary Africa and US foreign policy remains unexplored. Historians, unlike their colleagues in the social sciences, have at charted these links through the 1950s; see Plummer 1996 and Von Eschen 1997.

and yet a singular world-economy, early world-systems scholarship openly sought to build upon the work of such predecessors as Eric Williams and Oliver Cox, while addressing more directly the 1960s puzzle of the relation between global racial oppression, national liberation, and institutional political power.

What was not anticipated was how the displacement of the equivalency between liberation, state power and economic power would call for far more radical formulations than proposed by both scholars and social movements of the day. For what the failure and often rejection of social-democratic and socialist solutions to global racism left unresolved was the conceptualization of racial inequality and identity as national or even local process. The end of formal colonialism or segregation might reveal the false hopes of advancing national economies and civil rights, and the rising significance of race and racial polarization—a fundamental position advanced by Black nationalists and world-systems scholars alike. But it did not develop any resolution of how we might construct new understandings and new conceptions of how “race” and racial inequalities have been constructed and reconstructed on a *world* scale, within and across the boundaries of sovereign states.

There were of course many explorations, almost all resting on the world-wide character of resistance to racial oppression. It was not by chance for example, that the opening pages of *Black Power* by Ture and Hamilton started with the notion of internal colonialism, a concept derived via dialogue with African national liberation movements—or that this term would be extended to analyze South Africa, the Caribbean, Canada, Ireland, Native Americans, etc. Yet here too the essential contradiction between race and residence, nationhood and citizenship, remained unresolved. More recent analyses—which stress how the colonial status of “subject” remains embedded in postcolonial states while citizenship is denied (e.g. Mamdani 1996)—reveal the continuing search for new formulations, and the lingering hold and hope of national solutions.

Some, such as proponents of a present rupture into globalization, would tell us this is simply the debris left behind by the ongoing demise of states. What this misses, of course, is the antisystemic movements’ continuing rejection of the state solution—and the current political renewal of transnational movements as they confront global processes of racial inequality and stratification. In key ways the movements may be advancing ahead of

us, as in the early phases of 1968 period. Need we recall that this breaking of political identities and rights away from the state was central to all the movements that blossomed in the 1960s?

In this respect the current wave of Black nationalism, which expresses a common Black condition worldwide, should not be understood as simply a return to the panafricanism of the epoch of anti-colonial and national liberation movements. For today’s transcontinental Black movements threaten African and American states and rulers alike. Thus on the one side of the Atlantic, for example, we witness the overthrow of old dictators in Africa and the search for a “Second Independence;” on the other side we see a new generation’s rejection of integrationist and statist solutions, and the search for a broader, African-centered identity and ideology. The forging of an interrelated Black identity through global cultural linkages is even more striking. These movements are, moreover, linked across state and continental boundaries. Walking into the student union of a Black South African university in the 1990s, for example, one should not be surprised to see posters of Tupac Shakur on sale and KRS-One on the radio. Or if one is in Chicago, watch South African reggae performers speaking of a common home world where “They won’t build no hospitals no more... All they build will be prison, prison.” (Dube 1989).

Many relegate such transatlantic cultural expressions to the thin realm of popular consumption and commercial exchange—hardly the strongest case for a revived, global wave of Black nationalism. Yet what does one make of the refashioning of “Africa and Black” as so evident in the millions of feet that marched in the Million Man and Million Women Marches? Or the emergence of the more sharply radical and focused Black Radical Congress, where attention to global conditions and movements, Black feminism, and youth was and is so heavily stressed (see among others Boyd 1998, Cha-Jua 1998, West 1999)?

Sociologists of course want harder, empirical evidence. Let me suggest some: the ICPSR recently released the raw data of their latest Black politics survey (1995). Take one question posed to young Black males, which asked them to choose between these two beliefs:

Africa is a special homeland for all black people including blacks in the US”

–OR–

“America is the real home for black people here”.

What would we expect as answers? What would be an antisystemic or systemic response, a response that indicates a transnational and anti-statist position?

Does it surprise us that a majority of these citizens of the world’s most central state, proclaim themselves not citizens of the U.S. but of a broader Africa?¹⁸ Or that over seventy percent of Black adults believe their children should be taught an African language? What might we ask, has happened to the promises of national development and a national citizenship? It should be noted as well that these phenomena contradict the postmodern claims of the emergence of ever-more fragmented, localized, and multi-racial identities. For here we have instead a transnational construction of a shared racial position, a very different matter. Indeed, might one not ask if this putative fourth wave of Black nationalism in the US prefigures another global wave of antisystemic Black movements—and this time around, movements that openly acknowledge their common situation and the failure of statist strategies?

To ask these kinds of questions is to reveal how little research and theoretical development has taken place in this area. Long ago Wallerstein argued, in the critical essay on “Peoplehood,” that “race, and therefore racism, is the expression, the promoter and the consequence of geographical concentrations associated with the axial division of labor” (1991:80). As such

¹⁸ See Michael Dawson, Ronald Brown, and James S. Jackson, *National Black Politics Study*, 1993 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1998. The actual choice was answered by over 1200 respondents. Of the 18-30 year old males questioned, 50% answered Africa, 41% America, and the remainder refused the choice and answered both or neither. The figure for young women was 45% Africa and 49% America. I must thank colleague Todd Shaw of the University of Illinois Department of Political Science for bringing this data to my attention. He is engaged in a collaborative project on Black nationalist attitudes; see the forthcoming revision of Todd Shaw, Robert Brown, Cathy Cohen, and Marwin Spiller, “Lessons Learned? Black Intergenerational and Gender Differences on Black Nationalism and Feminism,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, 1998.

racism is always and everywhere a global process and never a national or local one, unifying zones through racial domination and resistance—and has accordingly become increasingly virulent as polarization between zones has accelerated over the last four centuries (on this last point see Wallerstein 1983).

Such formulations point the way forward, but only that. World-systems scholars might first ask for parallel explorations along the lines associated with studies of feminist or class movements:

- Can we chart, as for labor movements, global waves of racism and resistance?
- Can we explain, as for women’s movements, difference and unity on a world-scale?
- Does global racial inequality parallel global income and gender inequality and polarization?
- Are there distinct epochs or phases, of stability, rupture, and reformation in global racial stratification and ideologies over the last four centuries?
- Is there a post-1968 rupture or advance in antisystemic, antiracist movements? Is the fourth wave a global wave, and how is it distinct from the 1960s Black power/consciousness or other panafrican movements?
- Do current stirrings of post-1968 movements presage a frontal attack on notions of nation-state allegiance and identities that have served to contain past anti-systemic movements?

To ask such questions indicates the immediate relevance, indeed necessity, of a world-historical perspective. For we can only approach such issues by presuming race is fundamental to over four hundred years of global capitalist accumulation—and indeed is accelerating in relevance to systemic transformation and antisystemic resistance. Indeed, as we have argued above, current movements threaten not only the central ideologies and inequalities that underpin the capitalist world, but the very political foundations of the world-economy by destabilizing the nation-state bounding of claims for civil rights, subjecthood, and citizenship. To understand this advance beyond national states, and toward a global movement composed of locally distinct movements, requires far more world-systems work on both racial oppression and antisystemic movements as a group.

IV. TOWARD A THIRD GENERATION OF WORLD-SYSTEMS SCHOLARSHIP

If we stand—intellectually as I have argued, and most certainly in terms of movements' awareness of the structure of the world-system—far in advance of the situation in the 1960s and 1970s, how do we proceed? If one is willing to admit the possibility of the resurgence of antisystemic movements, how do we ensure that world-historical research and researchers may flourish in response? How, in very concrete terms, can we work to ensure that world-systems programs continue to attract dissident young scholars' interest and, yes, even the foundation and university support necessary to sustain and launch the next, third, generation of world-systems scholarship?

I have assumed here agreement on the inability of "globalization" research to respond to these challenges, and an acceptance that world-systems work is not a fully evolved, scientific, paradigm—two among many possibilities suggested by other, more distinguished scholars. And I am posing a more problematic path, it might also be noted, than Wallerstein's projection of the "demise" of the perspective as world-systems research moves into a central—could we say hegemonic?—position in the social sciences. This is a far bolder, longer-term vision. My aim is more modest: what might the immediate conjuncture, the next five to fifteen years, bring?

Let us first ask: if world-systems work arose out of the "world revolution of 1968," what of such factors today? Conditions today, are argued above, are significantly different. Rather than being propelled by a strong if ebbing tide of protest, we confront instead an anticipatory moment of movement advance—and one that is increasingly differentiated and yet consciously world-wide in operation. We similarly live in not a rich, world-wide boom period as in 1968, but in a moment at the end (hopefully) of a long phase of global stagnation [indeed where is the A-phase of global expansion that was to begin in 1990, according to the early 1980s predictions of Wallerstein and others!].

Despite these unfavorable factors, in key respects our ability to foster research and the next generation of scholars may be better than has existed for several decades. We do not face the task of forging a body of world-historical scholars and programs; the work of the last generation has given us this foundation. And we certainly are in a far more favorable situation than our elders were in the 1970s and 1980s (as well I remember), who confronted

far harsher conditions of academic downsizing, the institutionalization of Reaganite opposition to radical work, and the unshakable domination of the disciplinary and international/area studies establishment. As I, and others, have argued,¹⁹ higher education in the US has proven unable to respond to the "global" challenge so well recognized by not just university administrations but capital and state politicians. Thus the core disciplines remain resolutely mired in parochial studies of the United States and, at best, their comparative application to other areas of the world. This is especially true of sociology, the home discipline of many world-systems scholars, which has fewer "international" scholars than many other disciplines. Indeed what is one to make of the American Sociological Association's recent Commission on Graduate Education recommendations, backed by the ASA President, that called for a more scientific core for the discipline, fewer international students, the expulsion of radical students, and less interdisciplinary cooperation?²⁰

Meanwhile those who might respond better, those located in comparative and especially area studies, remain blocked by adherence to national units of analysis, their comparison, and Eurocentric models and theory. Charles Tilly's recent admission (1995), that the comparative method and Big Case Comparisons are gone, is but one indicator of how comparativists stand far behind world-systems methodological studies inspired by the early work of Terry Hopkins (see Bach 1980, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982, McMichael 1990, and Tomich 1994 among others). As I have argued recently with Mark Beittel (1998), there is little chance that comparative or international development research will adequately address the world of the late twentieth much less twenty-first century.

¹⁹ This is a long story, of which my collaborative contributions are focused on the history of African and area studies; the Gulbenkian commission report stands out of course at another end of such an analysis; see among others West and Martin 1997 and 1999, Palat 1996, and Wallerstein et al. 1996.

²⁰ See Joan Huber (1995), as well as responses by Bill Gamson (1992), Norm Denzin (1997), and the reply by Mirowsky and Huber (1997).

Nor are area and international studies programs likely to fare much better, despite considerable and volatile discussions in these areas. Here startlingly new initiatives by capital and especially the major research foundations, the SSRC, etc.—all of whom have called for a new form of “global” education suited to the next century—have told area specialists they must, to put it bluntly, change or suffer a steady decline. Area studies programs, in particular, have been the recipients of much attention and funding, and yet have failed to date to provide innovative responses to the “revitalizing” sought by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, among others.

Indeed the dominant disciplinary and area structures on the major research campuses have constituted the primary obstacle to the innovation sought by foundations, astute provosts and chancellors, and senior scholars concerned with global initiatives. As in the 1970s, it has often been on the stronger, smaller campuses where new, innovative programs have been able to take root. In short: there is an increasing awareness of the necessity of world-historical and world-relational research and education—and world-systems scholars are, I would argue, best suited to seize these opportunities. And in doing so we should consider, obviously, ways to enhance current programs and utilize resources we did not have in the 1970s and 1980s—including the world-systems diaspora.

To do so, however, will require us to keep our critical edge, to continue, as one (Maoist) title of Wallerstein’s says, “to keep the tiller firm.” (1995b). In this we have allies—both in the new world-wide movements and in higher education, upon whom we must, as in the 1960s, depend and draw inspiration. Workers in the field of world-systems work, in looking to the future, could do no better than to continue to form a family of dissidents.²¹ Indeed, we could no better than to follow the dictum inspired by the life of CLR James: *to grow more dangerous as we grow older*.

²¹ See Wallerstein (1995:241), who describes the broad scholarly group of post-World War II, world-historical scholars by saying: “Let me call this the family of dissidents, in the sense that they all were dissenting from the views that had dominated, still largely dominate, the universities.”

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TIME, SPACE, AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE: THE TIMES AND PLACE OF THE WORLD AND OTHER SYSTEMS

Göran Therborn

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At two hours in length, Immanuel Wallerstein's Presidential Address to the XIVth World Congress of Sociology in Montreal on July 26, 1998, was almost as that of a Secretary General's Report. Although long, it nonetheless managed to spellbind a most undisciplined audience of innumerable factions through the speech's unique combination of audacity, erudition and circumspection. The theme and title were "The Heritage of Sociology, The Promise of Social Science." The address was the outgoing President's conclusion to a worldwide congressional discussion he had initiated; however, neither the heritage of sociology nor the promise of social science is a finite inquiry. My contribution here is thus meant to continue that debate.

Given the context, a brief personal note of introduction is in order. I belong to that group of Immanuel's admirers who see him more as a challenge than as the master of truth or as the leader of the Movement—a challenge in the form of mind-opening scholarship as well as daring questions and provocative statements. From the position of outsider, both in terms of scholarly collaboration as well as personal relations, there are two little pieces of firsthand testimony I would like convey here.

The first is that of Immanuel as the friendly, amiable colleague. We first met in 1974, when I looked him up at McGill in Montreal. This was (just) before the appearance of the first volume of the *Modern World-System*.

Göran Therborn

Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (SCASSS)

Götavägen 4

752 36 Uppsala

SWEDEN

<http://www.scasss.uu.se/>

Goran.Therborn@scasss.uu.se

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Immanuel Wallerstein to me then was the radical Africanist, Africa being a very important interest to me, particularly in the 1960s. What I remember from this encounter is the kindness and equality with which I was received, someone unknown to Immanuel, someone from far away who had just received his Ph.D. We talked about African prospects, and he told me about his new work with a self-confident modesty, very discreetly indicating the breaking of a new scholarly path. Later on, in the ISA context, I have noticed how he has kept this collegial stance (he probably would not mind having it called comradely) toward local and younger scholars, completely free from the far-from-uncommon effects of success: narcissism and arrogance.

In the International Sociological Association I also had the opportunity to observe and admire at close hand Immanuel, the indefatigable worker. Appearing everywhere, never (visibly) jet-lagged, with a firm grasp and leadership of organizational practicalities as well as constantly spawning new ideas and intellectual provocations, initiating conferences all over the world, communicating with the whole ISA membership, clearing Canadian visa hassles for sociologists from suspiciously poor countries, yet all the while writing new, fascinating lectures and papers. The source and the rationale of this vast amount of surplus labour put into the organization of the world's sociologists reconfirms the rationale for the heterodox affiliation with Marx, of which Immanuel Wallerstein's oeuvre is a major example.

THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM AND ITS FUTURE

Provocative *and* open-minded originality are, to me, the central characteristics of Wallerstein's intellectual style. It is that style which inspires the reflections below, full of respect and admiration for a forceful, singular thinker.

The *Modern World-System* is not only the title of Immanuel Wallerstein's lasting contribution to social science. The three words also sum up both his own, and what he conceives of as others', most important challenges to the social sciences. Time, space, and knowledge connect Wallerstein's empirical work with his recent preoccupation with "unthinking" and reconstructing the social sciences. They also interrelate his analyses of the past with his recent "utopistics" and thinking about the future.

Each of these concepts refers, in fact, to a whole heap of issues still

largely unknown, uncharted and unassessed. Wallerstein has had the daring to poke into them, but fundamental questions remain open. The intention of this paper is to point to some of the latter, and to hint at possible alternative answers.

Modernities: Temporalities and Their Applications

In his Presidential Address to the ISA, Wallerstein underscored that "...time is at the center of most of the challenges [to the culture of sociology and to the social sciences today]."¹

However, there are scholars' time and actors' time; Wallerstein is apparently only interested in the former. In his Address he refers to Braudel's four temporalities, all of which are temporalities of scholarship alone. Scholars' time refers to the way in which scholars—be they historians, social scientists or those engaged in some other branch of knowledge production—conceive of and use time in their studies. Actors' time, on the other hand, is the time orientation of all human actors, including, as a tiny minority of course, scholars. This neglect of actors' time, it may be argued, misses an important aspect of modernity and postmodernity.

There is one important strand of scholarship attempting to make actors' time orientation the defining characteristic of modernity. A three-fold change, from cyclical to linear time; a change from an orientation to the past as the repository of values, knowledge, and beauty manifested in supreme achievements, to expectations of the future, as something different from, and, at least potentially better than, the past. Thirdly, a new orientation towards a this-worldly future, not inscribed as the Paradise (or Hell) of the Sacred texts of the past.

In any theory of social action and of social systems, in any social or cultural history, such a 180 degree change of the positioning of actors should not be neglected—from looking back to the wisdom of ancestors and to the beauty of a past Golden Age, to looking forward to a horizon within our reach—thus far unattained—where something new might be constructed.

This temporal conception of modernity has one of its major fronts against modernization theories. It is free of the Euro- or US-centricity of defining modernity in terms of some Western European or North American institutions, allowing for trajectories and institutions of multiple modernities, and pushing conflict to the fore.

In this perspective it is possible, I have found, to discern four major routes to modernity by analyzing the positions of the forces for and against. In Europe, both sets of forces were endogenous, which meant that the European route to modernity was one of civil war, revolutions and religious wars and conflicts. In the New World of the Americas, the modern thrust developed among the settlers, asserting itself against a metropolitan pre-modernity overseas through wars of independence, and against local pre-modernities through genocide and violent marginalization.

In the colonial zone, from Northwestern Africa to Papua New Guinea, modernity arrived from the outside, from the barrels of guns. However, the distinctive basis of colonial modernity was that colonialism gradually came to provide a model of modernity to the colonized, which the latter made use of in their new struggles for national self-determination and democracy against the colonial powers. Finally, there were cases, from Japan to the Ottoman empire and its Turkish successor (in particular), of Externally Induced Modernization, of modern conceptions imported by a segment of the ruling elite threatened by seemingly superior foreign imperialist powers.

These four routes seem to have left lasting traces of social and cultural patterns, of people-elite and class relations, religion/secularization, national mythologies, collective identities, combinations of tradition and novelty, in institutions, normative patterns of behavior, rituals, and aesthetics, etc.²

A temporal conception of modernity also spares us a number of controversies over rationality. There is no longer any need of demonstrating a pre-modern irrationality or arationality. The modern time orientation implies a new rhetoric or argumentation in terms of means to ends in the future rather than in terms of experiences of the past. To call the former “reason” or rationality, and the latter “tradition” or prejudice, is part of the assertion of modernity, not of its analysis.

World-system analysis pays no attention to the temporal irruption of modernity, although Wallerstein himself has come to acknowledge the historical phenomenon of modernity in temporal terms.³ Its “modern” world system is scholarly time; in fact, its timing seems little connected to the time of the historical actors. Only with the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution did a new actors’ temporal orientation emerge across several fields of thought, after some adumbrations in English 17th century natu-

ral science and in one current of French late 17th century aesthetics. Only in the course of the Revolution and its aftermath, for instance, did the notions of “revolution” and “reform” lose the retrospection of their Latin prefixes and come to refer to ways of opening doors to the future.⁴

The French Revolution was a watershed in temporal orientations, not only in Europe but also in Latin America and in the heartland of Islam. Wallerstein touches obliquely on the subject, but locates it, by and large, outside his own range of interest. “The [French] Revolution provided the needed shock to the modern world-system as a whole to bring the cultural-ideological sphere at last into line with the economic and political reality. The first centuries of the capitalist world-economy were lived largely within ‘feudal’ ideological clothes. This is neither anomalous nor unexpected. This sort of lag is normal and indeed structurally necessary.”⁵

No scholarly account is a full historical account. However, this neglect of actors’ time seems to have had two significant effects on Wallerstein’s work. First, it unnecessarily limits the scope and the analytical precision of world-systems analysis itself, which might very well, and to its own advantage, have accommodated a systematic attention to actors’ orientations. Temporality, and the complexity of temporalities beyond the old simple idea of cultural lag, might very well have been incorporated into the conception of the system, as one of its variable characteristics.⁶

Secondly, it clearly restricts the relevance of Wallerstein’s diagnosis of current challenges to social science. In this context, his invocation of some (on this topic) abstruse arguments of Bruno Latour about the non-occurrence of modernity appears as an irrelevant digression, a *détour*.

From a temporal perspective, postmodernism signifies a disillusionment with the future. Again, as in regard to modernity, definitions and conceptions abound. However, rhetoric aside, it seems clear that a strict temporal perspective captures a core of postmodernism as the end of master narratives [of historical development], *avant-gardes*, linear time, and the predictability of the future. Because Wallerstein does not pay attention to the temporality of modernity, he can combine a strong, explicit sympathy for postmodernism with an unabated modernist orientation to the future and the foreseeable demise of the world system of capitalism.⁷ But, in principle, if not necessarily in this context, I think he would agree that one neglects contradictions at one’s own peril.

Table 1 – Major Modern Past-Future Contrasts

The Past Was:	The Future Is:
Heteronomy, Oppression	<i>Emancipation, Liberation</i>
Poverty, Ignorance, Stagnation	<i>Progress, Evolution, Growth</i>
Different in its preconditions.	<i>Victory, successful survival.</i>

Nonetheless, postmodernism does constitute a significant challenge to social thought, scientific and otherwise. One way of grasping the meaning of this challenge is to compare it, not with caricatures or arbitrary critiques, but instead with the spectrum of modernist conceptions, right, left, and center. (See Table 1)

With regard to the future, there are three variants of modern conceptions that have been particularly important historically. In the postmodernist language of Lyotard and others, these are the grandest of the narratives of modernity.

The “future as emancipation” comprised Kantian Enlightenment, modernist nationalists, abolitionists, socialists, and a series of contemporary liberation movements, including Women’s Liberation and Gay Liberation. The “future as emancipation” has tended to be the futurist perspective of the modernist left.

The future as progress, evolution and growth was the dominant futurist position of modern science and of modern economic actors, be they capitalists, farmers, or workers. In a political spectrum defined largely by others, this was usually a center position, one of liberalism.

Rightwing modernism emerged later than the others. Its characteristic *Denkfigur* (figure of thought) has been the future victory or successful survival, alternatively defeat, decline, disappearance, in struggle, rivalry, or competition. Social Darwinism, inter-imperialist rivalry, and competitive nationalism gave rise to this somber rightwing modernism in the last quarter of the 19th century. It was part of the modern side of Fascism, after the defeat of which it has currently been sublimated into economics, particularly into neoliberal globalization. Inexorable global competition is replacing the inexorable struggle for *Lebensraum* (vital space) of the 1930s and early 1940s.

The “dark sides” of modernity derive basically from the intrinsically conflictual character of the latter, and not from any particular narrative thereof.

Everybody did not experience the past as oppression, ignorance and misery. Therefore, some—perhaps many—people did not see the present as necessitating liberation, illumination, advance. On the contrary, they may see the modernist projects as sacrilegious, blasphemous, depraved, incomprehensible, futile, repugnant, or simply disturbing and worrying.

Emancipation and progress not only have costs—of effort and struggle—but include self-undermining tendencies as well: issuing new denunciations and orders, demanding new acceptance, discipline, conformity. The latter may be handled with varying regard, tact, and success, though, and are by no means necessarily self-defeating.

The third major conception of modernity, viewing the present as struggle and the desirable future as victory, on the other hand, is rather self-fulfilling in its view of the present. Seeing the latter primarily as competition, rivalry, combat, means, by and large, to make it such. (Victory or success in this struggle is less self-fulfilling.)

Social and Cognitive Space, and the Costs of Spatializing the Social

World-systems analysis has meant above all a fundamental spatial reorientation of social analysis. As such it has been eminently fruitful and justly successful. Through its system conception it has, until recently, avoided the current costs and dangers of spatialization of social discourse and of politics, which is nevertheless a current challenge to social science. “Globalization” is perhaps the most topical of this spatialization of the social, but there are also “Europeanism,” localism, and other forms. In Europe, there is the overriding political preoccupation with the smoothing of the expanse of the EU, the Single Market and the Monetary Union, and with its extension to the East. “Globalization” and “European integration” are both a function (*inter alia*) of modernity’s flight into space. “Localism” (a concentration on local contexts) local actors, local knowledge, local narratives have their postmodernist appeal as an alleged exit from modernity.

Space is an important social feature, and a concept often not taken seriously enough in social analysis. However, a spatialization of sociology, politics, economics and history also has its limitations and opportunity costs. There is a non-metaphorical flatness to its focus on horizontal relations. Vertical relations of domination, exploitation, hierarchy, power, their assertion and the resistance to them, slide out of focus. Space connects and dis-

connects. It does not confront social and cultural issues and problems. It may expand or contract, but it neither preserves nor transforms the quality of social and cultural patterns.

By way of its Marxian heritage, world-systems analysis has kept an eye on the contradictions and dialectical dynamics of world capitalism. But, perhaps as a result of its rather more critical than constructive thrust⁸, neither has it been very interested in the spatial complexity of the world. When the focus is mainly on the spatial location of centers of accumulation systems the effect is a relative neglect or systematic downplaying of other differences of capitalist development than the shift of spatial centers, say from Genoa and the Genoese diaspora to the United States.⁹

Recently, closely following the demise in the 1990s of the “capitalism versus socialism” discourse of the 1960s and 1970s, some world-systems theorists, but not Wallerstein, have turned the world system concept into a purely spatial category, flattening it out. Andre Gunder Frank has made this turn most dramatically, in his characteristic personal style of no-holds-barred iconoclasm. “...the categories of ‘capitalism’ and ‘feudalism’ and ‘socialism’... are really empty—that is, devoid of any real world meaning...” The only, current, reality for Frank is “universal history,” “the global economy,” and the “Five Thousand Year World System.”¹⁰

In the report on the social sciences by the Gulbenkian Commission chaired by Wallerstein, the traditionally “state-centric” nature of the social sciences is highlighted as a problem.¹¹ In the challenges of the ISA Presidential Address, space appears as an issue of “Eurocentrism” and in the form of a two contrasting civilizations conception of the world by Anwar Abdel-Malek in which civilizations are viewed fundamentally in terms of conceptions of time.¹²

Through Wallerstein’s generous presentation of Abdel-Malek we may catch a glimpse of actors’ time, but only implicitly and at the price of what appears to be an evaporation of space into time.

Another path well worth taking here may be to confront head-on *the variable geometry of social space*. Multidimensional network analysis seems to provide a useful analytical foundation. Economic exchanges and trade patterns, power relations, processes of cultural “hybridization” as well as culture areas and civilizations, can all be analyzed in networks terms, and as variables of extension and density, possibly overlapping and crisscrossing each

other. Stateness and globality, regions and localities can thus also be studied as variables across both time and space instead of being assumed to be fixed and exclusive entities.

But how far multidimensional network analysis will take us will depend crucially on how multidimensionality is handled and how the virtually unlimited variability of relations between actors’ networks and social systems is grasped. Basic issues are still clearly not disentangled here.¹³

There is already a considerable amount of scholarship of this orientation. But the classical heritage of social science has a bimodal structure centered on the two polarities of, on one hand, a spatially unspecified conception of “civilized” or “modern” society, and, on the other, a view of society and culture as delimited by nation-states, actual or aspiring. In the German discussion of the 19th and early 20th century (the time of Max Weber and before) the two alternatives were put as the “cosmopolitan” or “cosmopolitical” versus the “political.”¹⁴ The predominant spatial conception of most social science still seems to be a linear continuum of world—and occasionally supranational—nation-state and locality, with the focus on one or the other, depending on their relative significance in the analysis. The bulk of the current globalization literature is in this vein.

The States of Disciplines and Their Space

Disciplines may be seen as spatial organizations of knowledge production, not only in their different academic sites, but also in their division of areas of research and teaching. Wallerstein has challenged the existing disciplinary pattern of the social sciences in the strongest of terms as rationally indefensible and as obstacles to any sensible statement on their self-proclaimed fields. In large part, this critique of disciplines appears to follow from the world-systems perspective, which certainly has cut through prevailing disciplinary conventions. This also stems from world-systems analysis’ relative institutional success, providing it with a position of strength from which to “un-think” the historical legacy of social science.¹⁵ Whether this is hubris or not, a question Wallerstein raises himself and answers negatively, I shall leave aside. Rather, I shall take it as a challenge, not to un-think but to rethink our inherited spatialization of knowledge production.

How shall we look at the disciplinary heritage? Why are the disciplines with us?

Rather than focus on its nineteenth century obsolescence, we may explore instead the historical contingency of the disciplinary division of labor and how it has changed both over time during the 20th century, and across political—be they nations or sub-national—systems of education and research. The timing, sequence and the rationale of disciplinary establishments have varied enormously, as have their trajectories.

Sociology presents a good example. It was institutionalized as a discipline in two countries—the United States and France—in the first decade of this century, in Germany precariously in the 1920s, in Sweden after World War II. In Britain and many other countries, sociology only took off in the 1960s. In Germany, contemporary political science is regarded as younger than sociology; in many other countries a political discipline preceded sociology. Whereas early US sociology reproduced and mutated itself into grown-up adulthood and relative power and prestige, early French sociology declined, to the point of near extinction.¹⁶

Disciplines are in their little world rather similar to nation-states, as their timing, size, boundaries, and character are, of course, historically contingent. Both organizations tend to generate their founding and historical myths. Both claim contested sovereignty over a certain territory. Both fight wars of boundaries and of secession. Both have elaborate mechanisms and procedures for the production of organizational identity and loyalty, and both are also undercut or transcended by cross-boundary identities and loyalties.

However, in all this arbitrary variety there is a certain global directionality which has a largely 19th century origin—in the cases both of disciplines and nation-states—but which has proliferated in the second half, or even the last third, of the 20th century. The UN currently recognizes 185 nation-states, equal in principle and similar as such. Similarly, most of the current social science disciplines may today be found, qua disciplines, in most countries, something which was less common fifty years ago, and rare a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago.

Is this no more than a manifestation of mounting absurdity, of accumulating irrationality and obsolescence? Although we shouldn't dismiss this view *a priori*, I also do not believe that we should adopt it as our first hypothesis. I do not pretend to have the answer, but I find it a provocative and important question, and furthermore, one that Immanuel Wallerstein has

inspired us to ask. It refers us both to modernity's arrow of time and to the complexity and multidimensionality of social space.

Disciplines fulfill a number of valuable functions for their members. They provide passports, credentials of importance at the border of academia's interface with non-academia, especially to paymasters of salaries and research grants, as well as inside the academic system itself. Once established, they provide shelter, protection and opportunities for upward mobility to their citizens. They create communities of discourse and of collective identity by the elaborate socialization of their members.

Their definition, boundaries and construction do not reflect any ontological or epistemological necessity, but are historically contingent, variable, and in that sense, fundamentally arbitrary. Government policies, private donors, social movements, academic administrators, international role models and academic entrepreneurship have all contributed, and are continuously contributing, to the structures of disciplines.

Have the disciplinary structures of the social sciences become more arbitrary in recent decades? Are they more of an obstacle or nuisance to knowledge production than previously? There seem to me to be at least three reasons for doubting this contention.

First, some tendencies of social development tend to reinforce the inherited division of academic labour. The difference between disciplines of the past and of the present, for instance, has been reinforced by the enormous expansion of methods for studying specifically the present and the very recent past. The survey is the most spectacular, exploring people's opinions, living conditions and life course. Students of the present are hereby creating their own data on a massive scale. Furthermore, decision-makers and bureaucrats have, on the whole, become much more accessible to scholars than at the time of Weber and Durkheim.

Even apart from new methods and means of access, the institutionalization of public information production and gathering has widened the gap between the amount of data about the present and the past, a gap that is constantly widening.

In most social milieux of the world, there seems to have been a tendency during the twentieth century towards allocating less interest and/or weight to lessons of the past. At the turn of the last century, scholarship's orientation to the past was much more pronounced in the fields of politics, eco-

nomics and historiography. "Political Science," to the extent that it existed at all, was largely the history and theory of constitutional law and the heritage of European political philosophy. "Economics" was in most countries not differentiated from economic history and from legal history. Very much engaged in contemporary controversies as they might be, historians were preoccupied only with the more or less distant past. *Zeitgeschichte* or contemporary history is mainly a post-World War II phenomenon. Durkheim's *l'Année Sociologique* devoted a large amount of effort and space to review works of historiography in a number of fields, an orientation very different from today's *Contemporary Sociology*. On the other hand, social policy issues apart, the major social science journals a century ago had much less to say on contemporary society. You don't find out much about social and cultural patterns of the French Third Republic from Durkheim, or about those of the Wilhelmine Reich from Max Weber.

In this aspect of viewing the present above all in the light of the past and bringing lessons of the latter to predict the future, world-systems analysts constitute a noteworthy circle of dissent still holding high the banner of the historical argument. Arguing, for instance, that (interpretations of) 16th-18th century relations between capitalism and military state power provide the best available guide to what will happen in the 21st century.¹⁷ Without any claim of competence whether this kind of historical argumentation is right or wrong, I think it is a minority view, clearly more so than it was, say, in the times of Spengler or Toynbee. This tendency is, of course, not necessarily irreversible, but so far it has been reinforcing rather than undermining the inherent disciplinary boundary between past and present.

Secondly, disciplines, like modern states, are not fixed and rigid territorial organizations which remain unchanged till they break or collapse. They are capable of internal change, even radical internal change. The way they are coping with the now glaringly obsolete division between Western and non-Western studies is a major example. On one hand, anthropologists and ethnographers are increasingly using their skills of close observation and applying their theorization of culture to contemporary Europe and North America, and to current processes of globalization. Economists of inflation, stabilization policies and growth apply their models and issue their recommendations to all corners of the world. Political scientists interested in issues of democracy, public bureaucracy and policy implementation are

increasingly plying their trade on all continents. Sociologists studying social values, social movements, social stratification or mass media reception, are no longer confined to North America and Western Europe. Big social science departments, (so far mostly in the US though) have started to recruit disciplinary scholars with special (non-American) area skills.

One of the safest bets about the future of social science is that Euro/US-centrism will decline, at least in the sense that knowledge of non-Western languages, cultures and societies among social scientists will grow vigorously and will bear upon future developments of conceptualization, methodology, and theorization. Less certain, however, is the spatial location of this less parochial knowledge production, and the spatial distribution of its accessibility.

It may become concentrated in the rich elite universities and research institutions of a handful of rich countries, the US above all. Or it may be spread amongst the peoples and the institutions of the world. As far as I can see, current tendencies are mainly going in the former direction, of institutional concentration, similar to the direction of natural science Nobel prizes after World War II. In other words, Eurocentrism and US-centrism appear to become far more a university and research resources problem, than a disciplinary one.

Thirdly, disciplinary sovereignty is neither absolute nor exclusive. The proliferation of disciplines has been accompanied by a growth of sub-disciplinary networks and identities, of inter-disciplinary travelling and networking, of cross-disciplinary journals, and by the growth of inter-disciplinary trade of methods and concepts. There is a proliferation of non-disciplinary organizations, NDOs. In this world of both *de jure* and *de facto* limited sovereignty, of dual citizenships and complex and partial loyalty patterns, the conventional state/market/society division of study is not necessarily even a nuisance. We may even discern, in the past half-century, some tendencies which rather seem to have contributed to the reproduction of the state/market/society convention.

The emergence of a constant stream of macroeconomic data (on growth and employment, for example), and the development of mathematical market modeling have provided "stronger" rationales for a discipline of economics. The growth of the state and the, less pronounced, growth of its visibility and accessibility, the spread of competitive elections and the rise

of survey methodology, have all stimulated the discipline of political science with a focus on policy and electoral studies. The growth of the welfare state brought the problematization of social conditions, full employment and workers' assertiveness brought industrial relations into widespread concern, the rise of mass leisure and entertainment meant a new social area, that of new subjects, e.g., women, ethnic groups, homosexuals. All of these highlighted new depths to formerly adult white male social science. These developments brought new interest to "society" as a field poorly covered by governments or markets. True, they have also spawned a number of non-disciplinary centers, institutes, and conferences. But the skills, and the academic passports, which disciplinary training have brought to these new NDOs have often been of value to the latter.

However, the inter-discipline system is likely to change in the new century, like almost everything else. On one hand, the identity of existing old disciplines is being undermined by their growth and by the widening specialization of their members, but without replacement by sufficiently strong identities for separatist disciplinary movements. On the other hand, the space of the social disciplines is, like before, dependent on that of the humanities and the natural sciences. Developments in them and perceptions of disciplinary developments by education and research politicians and administrators will crucially affect the future of the social disciplines.

In this situation, it seems to me the primary task is not to try to accelerate an undoing of the existing inter-disciplinary system, but to try to rethink and develop key concepts and modes of approaching and grasping the social world.

Systems and Their Dynamics

System is a key concept of social analysis, and a particularly central one in Wallerstein's writings. His use of it, however, is both remarkable and curiously under-theorized.

It is remarkable in its claim to exclusivity and to exhaustiveness. "...the only real social systems are, on one the hand, those relatively small, highly autonomous subsistence economies, not part of some regular tribute-demanding system, and, on the other, world-systems. ...[T]hus far there have only existed two varieties of such world systems: world empires and 'world economy.'" There is, though, a "third possible form of world-system, a socialist world government."¹⁸

The author might now perhaps express himself somewhat differently, but he still emphasizes the key importance of the "unit of analysis" while making no explicit reformulations of the previous statement. Methodologically, the world-system is now characterized as an "historical system", explicitly seen as analogous to an "organism."¹⁹ Furthermore, although the conceivability of "multiple kinds of social systems," which Wallerstein would prefer to call historical systems, is granted as a fundamental question, "our existing historical system (world-system)" is still a singular reality.²⁰

At the same time, this exclusive reality /historical organism is left under-specified and little theorized. The three volumes, so far, of *The Modern World-System* are mainly historical narratives with a bare minimum of systematic theoretical argumentation. This is apparently hardly a matter of style or the result of oversight. It seems, rather, to have been a deliberate choice. This is why he rejects the conventional label of his movement—"world systems theory"—insisting instead on "world systems analysis," viewing it as a "perspective" and a "critique."²¹ "It is much too early to theorize in any serious way, and when we get to that point it is social science and not world-systems that we should be theorizing."²¹

The logic of the last part of that statement has escaped me, but let me point to some questions and issues about world and other systems that are emerging and calling for theoretical reflection and elucidation.

Hypothesizing the modern world-system as the only social system of the modern world means separating the analysis of the former from virtually all other social science. That approach functioned well for a critical movement well attuned to a powerful social movement, as the world-systems perspective was to the social movements of 1968. It would continue to function very well, if it were true that "the historical system in which we live is in terminal crisis."²² Whether or not this is true, no one knows, and neither Wallerstein nor I is likely ever to find out, (as Wallerstein usually gives the current system at least another fifty years to live). The important thing, then, is what people believe is true. I don't think it is a very risky generalization to say that, by the end of the 1990s, fewer people believe they are living in the terminal crisis of world capitalism than in the 1970s, the end of the 1940s, the beginning of the 1930s, or in the industrialized world around the previous turn of the century.

In this context, new departures in the 1990s from the world-system

movement become symptomatic. Andre Gunder Frank's extension of *the world system* to a period of five thousand years and to the whole of "Afro-Eurasia" raises questions about the meaning, boundaries, and the possibly variable system-ness of social systems. Wallerstein acknowledges the point obliquely. "Everything that can be denoted as a system can be shown to be 'open' at some points of its perimeter. One can always take this opening and insist that the presumed system is really part of some larger system."²³ That should imply logically, that any given system may also be seen as a system of smaller systems, and that the boundaries of social systems are not empirically self-evident but theoretically problematic. But Wallerstein dismisses such issues as unimportant, and his basic problem with Frank's new view is that it impedes a negative vision of the historical record of capitalism.²⁴

If systems are thus used as analytical tools for capturing complexity and variability, we may also grasp an important difference of system-ness brought to light by current developments of world capitalism and world culture. That is the difference between, on one hand, systems constituted by the interdependence and the interactions of exogenous actors, be they tribes, cities, states or whatever, and on the other hand, systems operating through actors formed by the system itself, such as corporations formed on global markets and cultural groups formed by global cultures. System-ness of endogenous or exogenous elements/actors is probably better seen as a continuum than as a dichotomy. But here my point is that the analysis of world systems is likely to benefit from a more analytical concept of system, of which the variability of system-ness is one aspect.

The modern world-system is both a capitalist economy and an interstate system. The dynamics of this system have not been very much elaborated, although states are "institutions of the system," and are, "...repsponding to the primacy of this capitalist drive."²⁵ Nor is the systemic dialectic very clear, although its existence is vigorously asserted. Indeed, Wallerstein makes it an ontological postulate: "Contradictions [distinct from conflicts] exist within all historical systems."²⁶ In the "terminal crisis" of the capitalist world-system, the weakening of states is argued to be the most important factor, as "capitalist producers need the states far more than do the workers." States, in turn are being weakened "because of the growing collapse of the ideology of liberalism", in turn due to disillusionment with the state's capacity for social reform.²⁷

While the empirical argument about a fatal weakening of the repressive capacity of states may not convince everybody as it stands—to put it cautiously—the system dynamics driving the world-system to a fatal weakening of the state is not spelled out.

Discussions of the future prospects of world capitalism, and of any other social system, may profit from a distinction which Wallerstein has always refrained from making, one between system and contingency, but which Marx and many others have used. The outcome of a historical system would depend both on the dynamics of the system and on exogenous contingencies. But to the extent that the system concept has any explanatory power, such a distinction would make it easier to avoid confounding systemic problems and challenges with an insurmountable systemic crisis, always a very difficult and delicate task.

In the meantime, some world-system analysts, like Chase-Dunn and Frank, are abandoning any concern with any capitalist dynamic of the world-system. Wallerstein refers to their example as the nomothetic and the ideographic temptation, respectively. I think the most noteworthy aspect of their new departures is their common *spatialization of the social*, their flattening out of social dialectics. And I wonder whether that development has not been facilitated by Wallerstein's own unconscious attraction to his third "temptation," by the reification of the world-system-concept.²⁸

The reliance of world-systems analysis on being in tune with the times seems now to be working rather in the direction of what Albert Bergesen has called a "post-Wallersteinian World Systems Theory," in which the prospect is no longer the transition from the capitalist world-system to a socialist world government, but the return of Asia to its centrality of the world.²⁹

In this situation, I hope it is not too late to theorize in a serious way about world-systems, and about other social systems. Before that, it seems too difficult for the movement of world-system analysts to "lay...claims to formulating the central questions of the enterprise [of social science]."³⁰

Hier bricht dieses Manuscript ab, but reflections on and debates with Immanuel Wallerstein, the perennial thought-provoker, will continue.

ENDNOTES

¹ I. Wallerstein, 'The Heritage of Sociology, the Promise of Social Science,' International Sociological Association 1998, p. 48-9. <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/iwpradfp.htm>

² See further, G. Therborn, 'The Right to Vote and the Four World Routes to/through Modernity,' in R. Torstendahl (ed.), *State Theory and State History*, London, Sage, 1992; *European Modernity and Beyond. The Trajectory of European Societies 1945-2000*, London, Sage, 1995, chs. 1-2; 'Modernities and Globalizations,' in B. Isenberg (ed.), *Sociology and Social Transformation*, Lund, Dept. of Sociology of Lund University, 1998.

³ "Modernity as a central universalizing theme gives priority to newness, change, progress. Through the ages, the legitimacy of political systems had been derived from precisely the opposite principle, that of oldness, continuity, tradition." I. Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 175.

⁴ G. Therborn, 'Revolution and Reform: Reflections on Their Linkages Through the Great French Revolution,' in J. Bohlin et al. (eds.), *Sambällsvetenskap Ekonomi Historia*, Göteborg, Daidalos, 1989.

⁵ I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World Economy, 1730-1840s*. San Diego: Academic Press 1989, p. 111.

⁶ Giovanni Arrighi seems to be suggesting something in this direction, although his hint of defining capitalism as "an interstitial formation of both pre-modern and modern times" is not (yet) clear in what is meant by "modern times;" G. Arrighi, 'The Rise of East Asia and the Withering Away of the Interstate System,' Fernand Braudel Center, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1995, <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/gaasa95.htm>

⁷ True, that Wallerstein differs from most modernists in believing that modern history so far has been overwhelmingly negative. See, e.g., I. Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism*, London, Verso, 1983, pp. 101ff.

⁸ I. Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise of World-System Analysis,' *Review XXI* (1998), pp. 108-9. <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/iwvsa-r&.htm>

⁹ See, e.g., G. Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, London, Verso, 1994.

¹⁰ A.G. Frank, *ReOrient*, Berkeley, California University Press, 1998; quoted sentence on p. 337.

¹¹ I. Wallerstein et al., *Open the Social Sciences*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996

¹² A. Abdel-Malek, *Civilizations and Social Theory*, London, Macmillan, 1981.

¹³ Michael Mann, for instance, once launched a research program of historical power networks analysis by arguing that "there is no social system", *The Sources of Social Power* vol. I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 2. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, 'Cross-World-System Comparisons,' in S. Sanderson (ed.), *Civilizations and World Systems*, London, Altamira Press, 1995, p. 109, on the other hand, define "world-systems" as "intersocietal networks of regularized and systemically important competitive and cooperative interaction", which seems to involve a circular argument about systemness. While systems of interaction of different scope are certainly very well worth studying, whether anything is gained net by treating them as analogous to the Wallersteinian world system is less clear, and whether a system conception of space is capable of grasping interesting complexities of social spatiality is far from obvious. Neither author appears to go very far in terms of the multidimensionality of networks, neither power nor trade (in prestige and in bulk goods), politico/military

competition, and information is clearly grasping the complexity of cultural space. I should add as a limitation of my own argument here, that I do not have the latest book by Chase-Dunn and Hall available at the time of writing, *Rise and Demise, Comparing World Systems*, Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1997.

¹⁴ W. Hennis, 'A Science of Man: Max Weber and the Political Economy of the German Historical School,' in J. Kocka and J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Max Weber and His Contemporaries*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1987, pp. 32-3.

¹⁵ I. Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise' op. cit. pp. 110-12.

¹⁶ Cf. P. Wagner et al. (eds.), *Discourses on Society. The Shaping of Social Science Disciplines*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1991.

¹⁷ G. Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century* op. cit. p.355. Cf. I. Wallerstein, *Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-first Century*. New York: New Press, 1998. p. 46.

¹⁸ I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* [1974], Text ed., New York, Academic Press, 1976, p. 230. Emphasis added.

¹⁹ I. Wallerstein, 'Hold the Tiller Firm,' in Sanderson, *Civilizations and World Systems* op. cit., pp. 239-40.

²⁰ I. Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise of World-System Analysis,' op. cit. p. 111.

²¹ I. Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise of World-System Analysis,' op. cit. p. 103.

²² Ibid. p. 112.

²³ I. Wallerstein, 'Hold the Tiller Firm' op. cit. p. 244.

²⁴ Loc. Cit.

²⁵ I. Wallerstein, *Utopistics* op. cit. p. 10.


²⁶ I. Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 105.

²⁷ I. Wallerstein, *Utopistics* op. cit. pp. 46 and 47, respectively. Cf. the similar, more elaborate argument in T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein et al., *The Age of Transition*, London, Zed books, 1997, pp. 221ff, 236ff.

²⁸ I. Wallerstein, 'Hold the Tiller Firm' op.cit. pp. 241-5.

²⁹ A. Bergesen, 'Let's Be Frank About World History,' in Sanderson op. cit., p.201. Wallerstein's confidence in being in pact with the times, and the importance of it, is expressed, e.g., in his 'The Rise and Future Demise.' op. cit. p. 112. A conquest of social science is one possible demise of world-systems analysis, another is its decline as a critical movement.

³⁰ I. Wallerstein, 'The Rise and the Future Demise.' op. cit., p. 111.




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FLIGHT TO THE CENTRE: WINNIE GONLEY, 1930S COLONIAL COSMOPOLITAN

Anna Davin

Winnie Gonley (1909-1995), my mother, was an Irish New Zealander who at the age of 28, in 1937, left friends and family for Europe. She stayed there the rest of her life but never changed her New Zealand passport for a British one. She was a feminist who for nearly sixty years put her man first; a writer who published almost nothing; a Bohemian for whom Paris was eldorado but who spent most of her life as an academic wife in Oxford; a free spirit who brought up three daughters in an apparently conventional household; a well-educated and hard-working woman of great independence whose employment never remotely matched her abilities. And she was a woman who lived a rich and generous life.

As I read the papers she left—mainly poems and correspondence—and cross-check them against family memories and stories, old photographs, and the biography by Keith Ovenden of my father, Dan Davin,¹ I wonder who she was before I knew her? What cultural influences and experiences were significant? How was she affected by the relationships and events I read about? How did she feel about the gaps between her original ambitions and the course her life took? Behind these questions, and in whatever answers to them I may eventually be able to develop, lie global cultural interactions, across generations, across class and gender, across a life-span, across the world. In this paper I focus on her as a cultural migrant, coming from what

Anna Davin
43 Evershot Rd.
London N43DG
UK
adavin@a1.sas.ac.uk

Department of Sociology
Binghamton University
State University of New York
Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
<http://sociology.binghamton.edu/>

she and her friends felt to be the other side of the world to Paris, the centre of modern culture. I will look first at the ways in which her own cultural identity was shaped, through family, education and life events, then at her experiences in moving to prewar Europe.

IRISH IN NEW ZEALAND

Winnie was born in 1909 in a small country-town in the extreme south of New Zealand (latitude 46), where Antarctic winds bring bitter winter cold. She belonged to an Irish and Catholic community which her Galway grandparents had helped to establish, although New Zealand settlers were predominantly Scottish and Presbyterian.² Her mother's parents and brothers all farmed in the area.

The large network of Winnie's maternal family provided stories which my sisters and I loved to hear and which took us not only across the world to New Zealand but also back to mid nineteenth-century Ireland. At their centre was her formidable grandmother. Ellen Silke left a Galway village in 1866, aged twenty, and set off for New Zealand, as a government-sponsored migrant,³ to join John Crowe, to whom she was engaged. She worked in Christchurch for a couple of years, till in 1868 they married. After farming first in South Canterbury, they moved in 1882 with their four first children to Southland. In this southernmost region settlers were still sparse and cheap mortgages were available. The Crowes and their neighbours the O'Hallorans, with others who followed, built up a strong Irish community in their area. It was sustained by economic networks and intermarriage, and perhaps still more by shared culture. Irish was commonly spoken while the older generation survived.⁴ Evenings were often passed with stories and song, especially during the visits of Larry Hynes, the travelling Galway storyteller, who cycled from one community or farmstead to another on regular circuits.⁵ Catholic practices were part of daily and weekly routine, and the year was structured by the religious as well as the agricultural calendar. Monthly race meetings also brought the community together: they were great family occasions, as were wakes, funerals and weddings. All social and ceremonial events were lubricated by whisky, which was also seen as a medicine. There was a strong sense of shared and reciprocal responsibility beyond the family as well as within it, based originally, as my mother pointed out, on necessity.⁶

My grandmother disliked the wife of one of her neighbours, Mrs O'Halloran. But they had to help each other, for there were no doctors, no nurses, no social services, no public services such as water or electricity, no public transport. Co-operation was an absolute necessity.

Like other aspects of their lives, reciprocal help was gendered. In my mother's childhood, when someone was lost in the 'bush' (wild country), people gathered from all around at the nearest farmhouse and the men went out in search-parties while the women cooked endless food.

Winnie's father, Michael Gonley (c.1874-1933), left his home in the north-west of Ireland as a young man. After a spell at sea he worked his way around Australia, then ended up in Southland at the turn of the century. After marriage, he and Winnie Crowe settled in Otautau, a small country town where he had the main-street barber's shop and a billiard hall (and took bets under the counter), while she ran an adjoining newspaper shop with stationery and fancy-goods. The growing family—Winnie was the third of five children—lived in a house behind the business premises. Gonley installed a generator, and theirs was the first building in town with electricity, as subsequently with gas. They made monthly visits back to the Crowe farm some twenty miles away, by horse and buggy and later by car. Winnie retained fond memories of the place and the visits.⁷

In the late 1920s the aging Ellen Crowe joined this household, and Winnie and her sister nursed her in her final illness. Winnie loved her stories of Galway life.⁸ Her grandmother made her promise to be present at her laying-out: a woman of her family had to be there. That it was to be Winnie rather than her mother or her sister reflected the special relationship between them.⁹

In the early photographs Winnie's mother (another Winnie) looks lively and alert, and in family stories too she sounds spirited. She decreed that boots and shoes were always to be cleaned by the boys, because she had hated having to clean her seven brothers' boots! But by the time of the letters that I have, which start from 1931, she is a shadowy figure, terminally ill. A letter from Winnie to Dan in the months before her death suggests the complexity of the parental relationship.¹⁰

They who hate and quarrel, they know a love more perfect than I have or could have imagined: whose apparent lack of love induced cynicism in me, now its revelation has made [me] humble and awe-struck. What I have thought sentimentalism no it is not that. It is opposed to reason as sentiment-

talism is, but it is a real fundamental love, deeper than consciousness: so that my mother's death will be in some sort the destruction of my father's life.

This proved all too true: without her mother, who died in June 1932, the spring of her father's life ran down. The business faltered; he grew ill and increasingly difficult to live with; and in September 1933 he too died.

Winnie's parents were literate and respected education, though their own formal schooling had been scant. Her mother tried to limit domestic responsibilities for her daughters so as to support their studies. (Mollie became a domestic science teacher in Invercargill.) Her father liked reading;¹¹ he also stressed the importance of qualifications for girls, because it was harder for women to earn a decent living without.¹² When Winnie's teacher suggested she try for a scholarship to a prestigious Catholic boarding-school in Dunedin, they endorsed the idea. She and her father took the train there and stayed in a hotel; and to make the most of being in the city, he took her to the theatre each evening.¹³ Late nights notwithstanding, she won the scholarship. At St Dominic's she received a solid academic grounding, especially in French and Latin, with a brilliant group of friends. She went on to Otago University in 1927 (again with a scholarship), and there the group maintained their friendship, not least through their 'Ten Stone Club' (whose members banned all boring discussion of weight). From then till 1932 she studied languages and literature. During the vacations she returned to Otautau, where she cared in turn for her grandmother, mother and father in their final illnesses; ran the house (which included getting up at five to get the washing done);¹⁴ and worked in the shop, on weekdays open from nine, sometimes till eleven.¹⁵

MODERN IN DUNEDIN

Winnie in Dunedin was a modern young woman. She and her friends stood out in the rather stuffy provincial town. They smoked, drank, danced and went to the cinema;¹⁶ despite exiguous funds they dressed with flair; they flouted conventional curfews and segregation. Winnie's close friends were both women and men, scientists as well as arts graduates, all full of intellectual vitality and eager for talk. She read extensively: classics and contemporary literature, Russian, American and European, in French and sometimes Italian as well as in English. She threw herself into studying. After one summer vacation she wrote: 'I long to work, tremendously hard

work, Anglo-Saxon grammar, anything.'¹⁷

During her student years Winnie wrote reviews, poetry and stories.¹⁸ She helped establish the Otago Literary Society (1931); and as editor and contributor was closely involved with the annual *Otago University Review*. Fellow-editor Geoffrey Cox's recollection of editorial meetings is 'above all of laughter.'¹⁹

Winnie brought to them not only her keen intelligence, but her marvellous sense of humour. It was not a mocking sense of humour, but rather one of sheer enjoyment of life in all its variety.

He notes that in these years literature was seen as 'an effete activity' for men; and this gave a particularly important role to the universities and to women.²⁰

Winnie, as one of the leading University writers of the time, therefore played a wider role than just contributing to the University publications which became the main outlet for new writers. It was a role of importance for New Zealand literature as a whole, not just for the work of students. And Winnie's influence was wider than her own writing, because she also gave unstinting support and encouragement to other writers, or would-be writers, of the time.

...

She was a very good literary editor. She could detect the potential in a piece of prose or verse which at first sight had seemed destined for the waste-paper basket, and would often seek out the author and suggest ways in which it could be modified or developed.

Winnie's MA thesis, 'New Zealand Life in Contemporary Literature' (1932), starts by exploring national character. She recognizes the strong tie with Britain ('of all England's colonies, New Zealand is the most remote in space from the Mother Country but nearest to her in time'),²¹ yet suggests differences which are also advantages: Maori influence on literature and art; cosmopolitanism resulting from mixed origins; and comparative absence of class distinction ('the lack of rank and blood and ... of a leisured class'). She examines novels, autobiography, short stories and poetry by various writers, then in the last chapter focuses on Katherine Mansfield. Mansfield left New Zealand for Europe in 1908, produced a series of exquisite short stories while living a tempestuous Bohemian life, but died of tuberculosis in 1923. For Winnie, she was 'one of the finest modern English prose-writers': a very early recognition.²² The thesis revealed Winnie's critical powers as well

as her wide reading, but work on it was a struggle, especially when reading minor works of fiction. She commented in one letter: 'I'm sick of my thesis, fed up with typing. It is only fifth rate literary criticism of tenth-rate novelists for the most part, except when I talk about Katherine + there it is an impertinence.'²³

In 1931 she had met the young Dan Davin, in his first term at Otago University. He was another Irish Southlander, a railwayman's son from Invercargill, the regional centre.²⁴ Winnie was soon guiding his development. She introduced him to modern literature (especially Joyce, Proust, and the Russians, but also Lawrence, Compton Mackenzie, Huxley and various French authors) and to older writers such as Thomas Hardy and George Moore;²⁵ and she brought him into her sparkling circle of older friends. The letters between them during vacations (when they lived with their families respectively in Otautau and Invercargill, thirty long miles apart) show the rapid growth of passion alongside intellectual support and exchange.²⁶ Although stormy and for a time interrupted, their emotional and intellectual relationship endured for the rest of their lives.

Throughout 1932 Winnie did courses at the Teacher Training College in Dunedin, while working on her thesis there and during the visits home. After a summer in Otautau, without success in finding a teaching post, she returned to Dunedin in March 1933 and supported herself by coaching and successive temporary teaching posts, at the Dunedin Technical Institute and in small-town and rural schools. She kept on her Dunedin room with a sympathetic landlady and came back for weekends. Gossip about her relationship with Dan almost certainly blocked her from regular employment.²⁷

Over the summer of 1933-4 she and Dan saw more of each other in Southland. Dan was again living with his family in Invercargill, and working on the wharfs at Bluff, the port. Several letters from her express her happiness. 'I'm jubilant and excited and glad, but I'm content too and certain,' she wrote; 'I'm so dripping with happiness, with love of you, that I'm sure this letter will be Ethel M Dellish or something horrible and you'll wish you had a good girl who wouldn't be so sentimental and rhapsodical.'²⁸

Then in February 1934 she heard that Toni McGrath, ex-flatmate and close friend who had left for Britain in 1932, had killed herself. Shortly after that she was asked to do two months teaching in Balclutha—too far to visit

Dunedin easily. She threw herself into the new job and also continued her studies: embarking on an Honours year in French she told Dan that she would be writing to him only in French.²⁹ At the end of March there was a further fearful blow: Harry Aitken, another dear friend, also in Britain, had died of a brain haemorrhage. With support from Dan and others she soldiered on. Then on 28 June her much-loved younger brother Mick was killed in a car accident in Otautau. She abandoned the current teaching post and the French courses, and retreated to Otautau and the shop, at times close to breakdown.

Dan, in the months after Mick's death, was studying hard and trying for a Rhodes Scholarship. He was also restless. According to his biographer, Keith Ovenden, he may have felt 'an element of duress' in Winnie's need for his support.³⁰ In any case he developed an infatuation with someone else, and in December, after hearing that he had not won the coveted scholarship, he disappeared with her for eight days. Winnie and he met only to quarrel bitterly. An estrangement followed.³¹

Encouraged by news that he had gained a first in English Dan pulled himself together. He decided to do an MA in Latin and try again for the Rhodes; the infatuation began to fade. By Easter Winnie and he had made it up. As Ovenden comments, the bonds between them were in some ways strengthened.³²

It is easy to see that Winnie was now tied to Dan: what it may be too easy to lose sight of is that he was equally bound to her. What they had shared in four short years, both of happiness and misery, gain and loss, immeasurably outweighed anything that any third person might try to interpose between them. In its own way this brought a kind of peace to Winnie. She always feared that her Dan would be unfaithful to her, and her fears were often enough realized, but she rarely underestimated the strength of her own hold over him, and, as the future was to show, he never underestimated the power of her mind or the subtlety of her judgement, on both of which he was dependent.

This pattern of mutual dependence did indeed continue for the rest of their lives, if with fluctuations.

Over the following year Dan applied himself to work—an honours year in Latin—and also to building support for his second Rhodes application. This time, in December 1935, he was to succeed. But Winnie had given up her Dunedin room and was stuck in Otautau, where without Mick she was now in charge of both businesses. She spent a quiet year: as she wrote to

her friend Mary Hussey, her life consisted of 'grief and worry due to business reverses, amusement over the Young Lovers [her older sister Mollie was courting], and occasionally an hour of enjoyment achieved (usually) through alcohol.' She was often depressed and subdued. In March she wrote to Dan, 'We have in five years somehow in some incomprehensible manner changed places. You are now confident and insouciant, I incredulous and inept.'³³ They decided that he should go ahead to Oxford, and she should try to sell the ailing Otautau business and then join him.

Before he was due to leave, however, there was a fire in the Otautau billiard saloon which spread to the house. Winnie described it to Mary Hussey a few days later.

About 1.30 [a.m.] on Sunday—Mick's anniversary—Ray Hope found the shop + saloon burning, + rushed round + woke me up. There were two men with him + they were all a bit tight, but we tried to put it out with buckets of water. It was no good. So we shifted out the piano, the honeysuckle chest, sewing machine + I grabbed a few clothes and then the policeman made me come out, although there was still time but the sitting room was burning by then and nearly all my books were there. I got the books from the top of the piano + those from my bedroom, but my bookcase with most of them were burnt.³⁴

This event was in some ways a liberation, though Winnie felt 'terrible,' not only at the loss of her books: 'I've wished that place burnt, and I felt as if a man you'd sometimes felt like murdering lay dying of poison, and you wondered almost if your wishing had done it.' They kept the tobacco and papers business going next door, and restarted the billiards before long. But Winnie was able to join Dan for a series of farewells not only in Invercargill but in Dunedin, up the coast of the North Island in Opunake (where they announced that they were engaged), and finally in Auckland, whence on 12 August 1936 he sailed for Europe. Because the Rhodes Scholarship astonishingly did not cover his fares to Oxford, he had approached the father of a student friend with connections to the NZ Shipping Line to try and arrange for him to work his way over, with the result that he was 'shouted' a first-class passage.³⁵ (One of Winnie's friends was less fortunate. In 1936 she won a scholarship to study anatomy at the Middlesex Hospital in London, but it was withdrawn on the eve of her departure, because they had 'no facilities' for women.)

The insurance money from the fire eventually allowed Winnie too to set

off for Europe. She wired Dan in April 1937 that she was coming;³⁶ set up a London bank account complete with cheque book, money to be paid every three months, so that I can't starve and can't spend too much;³⁷ and on 18 May sailed from Wellington, where her friends gave her a fine send-off ('letters, flowers and books which made me feel like a prima donna leaving our shores'),³⁸ to Sydney, where she boarded the S.S. Ormonde for the main voyage, via Colombo and Suez to the Mediterranean.

A high-spirited letter from the first ship survives; here and in letters from the Ormonde to her sister Molly she comes over as a popular passenger who enjoyed meeting all kinds of people.³⁹ She practised her French whenever possible. A Norwegian fellow passenger, William Aasberg, who had lived in Paris, worried that she would have trouble finding work there.⁴⁰

But I just laugh. I'm not worried. I thought of the etymology of 'feckless' the other day...[It] is from A.S. [Anglo-Saxon] feoh property, or money. Isn't that a pleasing thought.

In a letter to Dan from the Ormonde she is less confident.⁴¹ She has dreamt that her father, hands on her shoulders, warned her not to go: 'There is disaster for you at the end of your voyage, and I said, I am going. Nothing + nobody will stop me.' Worrying about Dan, she has written a charm to protect them. And she is 'terribly frightened in strange ports,' partly because too much alone: the passengers she gets on with 'all travel en famille or avec ami and I don't.' Still, she has decided to make Paris her headquarters rather than settle in Oxford near him.

I think you get such long holidays there is no need for me to be in England all the terms and just living in Paris would be a good thing for my French. I might take classes at the Sorbonne yet, if finance isn't too hellish. What do you think?

She plans to try for a job in the Paris Exhibition.

PARIS: 'I'M LEARNING TO LIVE IN A CITY'

Dan came to meet her when the Ormonde reached Toulon on 25 June. They stayed there a while, spent two weeks on the beach at Rapallo, moved on to Florence, then retreated to Paris, in flight from heat and mosquitos. Two exuberant letters to Mary Hussey supply vignettes of other residents in the block of modest apartments where they settled, on the Square de Port-Royal; tell of visits from several of Dan's Oxford friends; what she had liked

in that year's Paris Exhibition, especially the related Van Gogh Exhibition ('I'm absolutely exhausted after this attempt to tell you of what was for me a great pleasure and also a tremendous experience'); and present set-pieces on a night out and on buying a new suit.⁴²

Before I bought my autumn suit I had come to a fearful pass for clothes, being indeed in the mortifying case of being unable not only to find in my wardrobe clothes that were in the slightest degree decorative, but being quite incapable indeed of producing anything that was not either overwhelmingly hot or too thin for this weather, and moreover none of my clothes, whether too hot or too thin were by this time clean. I put on therefore my linen dress, which I bought in New Zealand and wore there and on the boat, and which is my kitchen dress here and which has not been washed for three weeks because it is forbidden to wash in these rooms and laundry is dear, and I donned Mollie's farm rain-coat, which is begrimed with the dust of three continents since it left Mabel Bush, and with a beret and my green suede shoes which have undergone an amelioration without cause—it must be a sea-change—I shambled down the Champs Elysées, the cynosure of all eyes, which so disconcerted me as to force me to light a cigarette. There I found an establishment 'de haute couture,' and there I stayed till I was transformed into so elegant a creature that when I swaggered forth I was again the cynosure of the Champs Elysées. In the establishment of haute couture I was treated with extraordinary consideration and deference, the general opinion being, I think, that a woman who dressed like that must be either foreign royalty or an international spy in disguise, or else a millionairess.

Both Winnie and Dan were studying:

He's reading Plato and I'm procrastinating. I've been reading a good deal, English + French, but nothing of world-shaking importance.

They played chess—on the night out described, after the 'Boule Blanche' night-club closed they 'buzzed off to the Dome, one of the very big Montparnasse cafés, where we drank coffee and played chess and I checkmated Dan 3 times for the first time in my life.' They ate cheaply but well in a neighbourhood restaurant ('L'Alsacienne'), and they walked a lot. There is no mention of meeting anyone French, and life even in cosmopolitan Montmartre was perhaps quieter at times than they had expected.

Dan misses his Oxford friends though not as much as his N.Z. groups. But here there's no-one to talk to. Of course I'm used to that from Otautau, + there's all the world to look at. But you get tired of gaping at people you don't know, + to go about costs money, + besides we both have to work. So we don't go around much.

Family stories record high spots, however: their performance of an 'aero-plane dance,' the night when they were out celebrating Dan's birthday with a friend and Winnie stormed off in a huff and ended up in 'Le Monocle' (a lesbian-run night-club), the time she put their last coins into a fruit machine instead of buying cigarettes to last them till funds could be replenished—and won.

At the end of September Dan returned to Oxford for the new term. Winnie stayed on, studying at the Alliance Française, taking German lessons, visiting exhibitions, doing some coaching and some writing, and looking for freelance work.⁴³ She had a lively time with friends they had made over the summer and with new ones. In one letter to Dan she wrote in mock penitence, 'I wish I weren't so susceptible, darling, and led a more retired life, but it's always like this. Things happen all the time, so I suppose it's the way I am shaped.'⁴⁴ The core group of friends were Americans and a German; others mentioned are Turkish, Moroccan, Norwegian and a very persistent Pole whom she had to fend off. There was sometimes some heavy drinking. After 'a booze' which lasted 'from 11 a.m., ending as far as cautious questions will disclose at 6 a.m.,' Winnie told Dan, 'I was completely drunk for the first time in my life I now realize... The result is a state of abject penitence.'⁴⁵ Another letter describes a night which began near the Place de Monge.⁴⁶

Well we stayed a fair while in the Café, sipping and drinking, and called at another café near there where some prostitutes were making merry singing songs. We got very chummy; they were reckless careless merry devils, unkempt and unworried, and we got into a sort of impromptu figure dance, they and I, while Norman + Betty sat there laughing, and Peter scowled + smiled alternately. When we emerged a bit tight we wandered vaguely over the street, where a policeman jumped out of the shadows + demanded to see our *Passports*. Of course Peter had his and of course the rest of us hadn't so the Policeman said we'd have to go to the Centrale Police + answer questions. (It's about one o'clock by then.) He pointed to the Police Car, a long thing with seats like a bus, fairly full of policemen. Well darling as soon as I saw it I leapt over and jumped in, yelling with delight, and some police got out to make room for us, and away we went. I sang most of the time, and captured the admiration of a young fresh-faced policeman who spent the rest of our morning in the Police Centrale trying to grab my hand surreptitiously + make a date + asking me anxiously if I thought the agents de Paris were pas gentils. Well, they weren't. They wouldn't let us go.

Released eventually, the revellers went off to Montparnasse and the Monocle (where her last visit had ended in discord).

Peter danced with 3 taxi-girls who didn't ask him for a drink, while I smoked cigars cynically + listened to the proprietress who tried to persuade me that the last time was a misunderstanding on my part, + bribed me to friendliness by divulging State Information that Marlene Dietrich was coming to the Monocle again the next night... she said they were keeping it dark to keep out all the unwanted spectators—just *entre nous*, honey. Then we went to the Dome, where they wouldn't cook us anything, + I found our Norwegian novelist "Only the tame birds have a longing"⁴⁷ sitting outside the terrace in the bitter cold so we all went to the Coupole where Peter + he quarrelled bitterly while Norman + Betty + I ate eggs + bacon. So ended another Parisian night.

As the end of term approached, they discussed plans for the vacation. Winnie was torn between staying in Paris to show him her discoveries ('I'm learning to live in a city') and the lure of further travel.⁴⁸

If you like, we will stay in Paris, but I think I'd sooner go to Germany, or Holland, or Italy, and perhaps return to Paris before you go to England. But why Freiburg? I don't care, but I think Munich sounds a good city, + I've got a fearful lust to see all the cities of Europe. I'm turning into a devouring lion of cities. Well, come to Paris + we shall see. Or what about living in London? I had made up my mind to go there, + try to find all Toni's things, + see people I knew, + try to reconcile all my lives to each other.

In the end, Paris won the immediate contest.⁴⁹ But by the end of the vacation she had decided to leave. Money was probably a major reason: she was not managing to earn much there. Perhaps fun with friends was beginning to pall, or to seem too much of a distraction from study and creative writing. Lacking French friends, her progress with spoken French may have seemed discouragingly slow. She had not yet been to England either: was this from love of Paris, the wish to assert her independence, or simple procrastination? Or was it because of the painful association with her friend Toni's suicide in 1934. Perhaps now the desire to find out what happened to Toni prevailed.

LONELY IN LONDON; SEASONAL MIGRATION

In mid-January Winnie came to England. Dan was back in Oxford and she spent much of her time on endless job applications for teaching work—in Lausanne, in Prague, as governess with a family about to go to Rome. Her first letters to him are rather bleak: it is cold, she has no money, she misses him, London friends are mostly away. Far worse, when she finds

people who had known Toni their account is deeply distressing: in her last months she had frequented low dives in Frith St where she was 'a kitten among the wolves,' she was penniless, ill and depressed.⁵⁰

Towards the end of the month Winnie began to take heart. Friends returned, and she went to see paintings and plays with them. The *Evening Standard* printed her article about the New Zealand mutton-bird and its cultural and economic importance, especially to the Maori, and sent a cheque.⁵¹ And finally she got a job, two months at St Helen's School, Willesden Green. This was followed in May by a post teaching English and Latin at a Surrey convent school.

From then until Dan's Finals in the summer of 1939, they lived apart during term, snatching weekend visits when they could, and spent vacations together, usually in Paris, where the patterns set in their first visit continued. Her attitude to life there was perhaps more equivocal. She wrote from Paris in January 1938 to Marge Thompson (another Ten-Stone Club member).⁵²

I think a mass emigration from N.Z. is indicated—not because living is pleasant here, it's usually damned unpleasant, but at least you feel as if you're in the main stream of life, + enjoying + enduring the destiny of our generation. Once you're in it that sees for some incomprehensible reason, important.

Her writing was stalled, and her confidence low:

As for me, I can't write anything. I can't even talk without stammering. I have a scheme in hand but don't know if I'll ever get it done. I'll let you know if I do. Can't be bothered talking about it. It's no good anyhow just a pot-boiler. Hope I can find a publisher to agree with me if I ever get it done.

While Dan had 'seven short stories finished now, and about 20 Poems,' she reports: 'I've written nothing lately. I think all I did was drivel anyway.' More-over the future was uncertain, both personally and politically.

Dan changes his mind at least once a month as to what he intends to do after June. Lately he thought he would return to N.Z. but now he is determined to stay grimly in London + intends to attempt to get a job connected with publishing.

She ends the letter again summoning her friend: 'come over for the war. We'll weather it together. Isn't it hell? Everyone here just awaits it fatalistically.'

With Dan's First in Oxford in June 1939 he was released from the

Rhodes obligation of bachelorhood and in July they married, deciding also to start a family; then left to savour a final summer in Paris before the inevitable outbreak of war. On 1 September they heard of the invasion of Poland from their Norwegian friend Annie, and confirmed it with Geoff Cox, now foreign correspondent for the *Daily Express*. After a day of packing and farewells,⁵³

We spent our remaining francs on a last delicious French dinner at the Rotonde, then left Paris on a desperately full train, and embarked at Dieppe on an even more crowded ship, but Dan found a Balliol friend, Peter, aboard, and they threw me up on to a stack of luggage where I crouched comfortably while they stood all night.

WIFE AND MOTHER; WARTIME AND AFTER

Back in England Winnie returned to teaching; Dan joined up. Then, pregnant and aware how little time together might be left, she became a camp-follower. I was born in Oxford in July 1940. Dan was now a second lieutenant in the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and Winnie (with me) again turned camp-follower till his Battalion sailed early in 1941.

By the autumn, Winnie and Anna were established at the Bristol University Settlement, which for three years provided home and ready-made community as well as useful work and a supplement to the meagre stipend of a soldier's dependent. She was responsible for a hostel in the country, providing respite for mothers and children from the difficulties of wartime daily life. It took considerable energy (besides ingenuity and even charm) to equip, fund and run it, but the project was successful and satisfying.⁵⁴

In August 1944 Dan returned from the front line in Italy to take up a post in the War Office, as New Zealand representative on the Control Committee for Germany. We lived in a small and dilapidated house in Notting Hill, my sister Delia a baby. Suddenly there was family life, under the difficult conditions of rationing, blackout, flying bombs and coal shortage. In 1945 Dan was recruited by the Oxford University Press, and the family—soon increased by the birth of Brigid—settled in Oxford.

OXFORD

The contrast between life before the war and after was huge. Dan's stipend at the Press was at first no more than his Rhodes Scholarship had

been, but now it had to support a family. Winnie's time was consumed by domestic labour—as once in Otautau—and by childcare. In February 1947 the Oxford household was joined by Elisabeth Berndt and four-year-old Patty, born in 1943 after an affair between Elisabeth and Dan in Egypt. They had been living in Palestine, but after the war Elisabeth found it increasingly hard to manage, despite remittances from Dan. Eventually Dan and Winnie managed to get an English work permit for her, and the last money from the Otautau business bought their fares (instead of the washing machine for which it had been earmarked). Winnie of course knew about the affair (now thoroughly over), but wary of gossip they explained Elisabeth as a Danish refugee and their housekeeper. She and Patty stayed in Oxford, mostly with us, for the next three and a half years. In the winter of 1949-50, when Winnie made a trip back to New Zealand, Elisabeth looked after the household.⁵⁵ Delia, Brigid and I adored Patty and wished she could be our sister, not knowing till many years later that in fact she was.

Winnie started to do part-time editorial work, mainly home-based, and marked school exam papers. She worked with Dan editing *New Zealand Short Stories* and *Katherine Mansfield: Selected Stories* (both Oxford University Press World's Classics 1953) and *English Short Stories of Today* (OUP 1958, reissued as *Classic English Short Stories*, OUP 1988); she did indexes and proof-reading for the Oxford University Press; and she worked on the *Oxford Junior Encyclopedia* as contributor and as editor of Volume 11 ('The Home,' 1958), then supervised the Encyclopaedia's US edition. She worked fulltime only from 1967 till 1974, in OUP's Education Department. On reaching retirement age she continued part-time work, on dictionaries.

All the years in Oxford they kept open house. *Closing Times*, Dan's collection of memoirs of friends, was appropriately dedicated 'to W.K.D without whom there would have been neither friends nor book.' Visitors came from far and wide to 103 Southmoor Road (and its extension in the local pub), and through Winnie's labour and skills family life was enriched rather than jeopardized by the endless hospitality. What suffered, perhaps, was her own creative writing. Dan's work, his needs and those of children and visitors always came before hers. After a sonnet sequence written when Dan first returned, she seems to have produced only a handful of poems. Most were written when away from the domestic scene: one on the way to New

Zealand in 1949, two or three in the fifties (possibly when Dan was away), and two on a visit to my sister in China in 1964.

If Dan, as published writer and as publisher, was even by the fifties the better-known figure, the quality of Winnie's intellect, as well as her warmth and wit, were recognized by intimates. The poet Louis MacNeice was an especially close friend, until his premature death in 1963. So was the novelist Joyce Cary. As Cary's health deteriorated Winnie became his right hand. After his death in 1957, as literary executor she brought unfinished work to posthumous publication, supervised the transfer of his papers and books to the Bodleian Library, and for many years supported and advised scholars working on Cary. Her essay on him for the *Dictionary of National Biography* is exemplary.

Winnie loved Kiwi visitors, and remained eager to the last for news of friends, family, events and developments there. She always saw herself as a New Zealander, for instance wryly identifying her amazing resourcefulness as 'pioneer spirit.' There was also perhaps inevitably some sense of loss. Here is a poem, 'Homing Charm' (1949), written on the voyage back for her first return visit.

Homing Charm

The Milky Way
The Coal Sack
The Southern Cross.

In my mother's room the fire glows,
In the dark we prime the pump,
My father sings a sailor's song.

The Milky Way
The Coal Sack
The Southern Cross

Enclose the world.
The sky becomes itself again
In love and fear and faith again.

The Milky Way
The Coal Sack
The Southern Cross

Roof my lost world.

The Plough to which I set my hand
Is faraway and long ago.

L'Envoi Venus and Pleiades guide me,
Guide me from my lost world,
Homing to the stern Pole Star.

This poem reveals and distils her different cultural worlds. It suggests the tension between the 'homes' of southern and northern hemisphere, remembered and present, with their differing stars and constellations. As a charm, it evokes on the one hand the protective charms of her Galway grandmother and on the other the Anglo-Saxon texts which she had studied, still more ancient, but more recently learnt. The modern city girl evokes the rural cabin, and casts her electricity-loving father back into firelight and memories of his youthful sailor days. The Oxford wife and mother admits loss and uncertainty, yet plays with the cosmos. Cosmopolitan, she seeks home on both sides of the world.

As students Winnie and her Dunedin friends, would-be free spirits, looked longingly to Europe for intellectual, artistic, spiritual and perhaps sexual freedom, though they knew that the life of the pioneer held its dangers in the old world too. Dan's first year, before Winnie joined him, was marked by depression.⁵⁶ Bohemia was perhaps especially risky for women. Katherine Mansfield had blazed the trail and died young; and Winnie's friend Toni McGrath also fell. Winnie and Dan's Paris experiences, though exhilarating, had their limits; and she gave up her attempt to survive there independent.

The youthful vision was not wholly extinguished, even by the war, though it changed for each of them. Dan, despite a fulltime job and family life, for years kept one foot in Fitzrovia—London's postwar Bohemia. Winnie brought Bohemia into our Oxford home. She made it a cultural hub, where visitors brought and found continual supplies of literary and artistic sustenance, of talk and song, and where weary or hard-up writers and artists renewed their energies. This domestic microcosm was not a conventional nuclear family. It combined the ancestral Irish love of talk and company, the settler need for reciprocity and complementarity, the escape from stifling tradition into the adventure of the modern city and the sweep

of global culture. It embodied Winnie's imagination and generosity, and in it she glowed and we thrived. Her eager intellect, her passion for poetry, people and life, continued to draw others as once Europe had beckoned her.

As a cultural migrant from halfway across the world she had arrived in Europe seeking to escape intellectual and social constrictions and to embrace the heart of culture. The shape of what she sought was formed before she came. A letter to Dan from Otautau in 1932 illumines some of her fantasies about Europe:⁵⁷

I play a fascinating game of backgrounds for us. Us in a farmhouse. Us in a flat with Swedish steel furniture, sharp clear outlines, austere shadows. Us in vast rooms in Paris, full of ornate furniture, faded gilt, thick beautiful curtains. Us in strange warm hotels, steam in their corridors: and weary in foreign trains, exhausted after the strain of making Russians and Hungarians and Lapps understand what we want to eat and where we want to sleep. Us at Covent Garden hearing the operas. Have you heard any operas, darling? In the smiling half-consciousness with which sensual singing and music after dinner envelops one. And climbing mountains. Snow and cold and the glow the triumph of being warm. We shall know all the works of all men, and all the corners of the earth, uh, Dan?

Earlier generations had left Ireland for New Zealand in search of opportunity; now she returned, but it was the siren song of Europe and Paris which she heard, the romance of European civilization (to which she saw England as marginal), in both classical and modern form.

Yet the relation (complementary and dialectic) between one side of the world and the other remained inescapable. She was not returning to her roots; nor soliciting cultural endorsement in the colonial Mother Country. She did not leave behind her Irish heritage or her New Zealand education, formal and informal. She already had her passion for words, for language, for people, for stories, for the beautiful. A New Zealander in Europe, but a cosmopolitan as much as an exile, as she narrated her experiences in Europe for her correspondents 'back home,' she was shaping her own understandings, of what she had left behind, who they were, what she might have been, what she was. Like other migrants in the world system she was trying to 'reconcile all my lives to each other,' across generations and the globe.

ENDNOTES

¹ Keith Ovenden, *A Fighting Withdrawal: the Life of Dan Davin, Writer, Soldier, Publisher*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. It was written after Dan's death in 1990 and before Winnie's in 1995; she worked closely with the author in its preparation and sent him comments on the final draft.

² See James Belich, *Making Peoples: a History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the end of the Nineteenth Century*, Allen Lane, Penguin Press, Auckland, 1996, chap 13, esp. p.316. The early organizers of immigration to NZ tried to keep Irish numbers down and to bring only Protestant Irish, but between the 1860s and the 1890s this proved impossible. The 100,000 assisted emigrants in the 1870s were at least 25 per cent Irish, and at least three quarters Catholic. Moreover single women were in short supply, and young Irish women were more ready than others to migrate. Charlotte Macdonald shows that of the 3,810 single women brought to the province of Canterbury between 1857 and 1871, a third were Irish: *A Woman of Good Character: Single Women as Immigrant Settlers in 19c New Zealand*, Allen and Unwin, Wellington NZ, 1990, p.44.

³ See Macdonald, *A Woman of Good Character*, p. 66 for Ellen Silke, and chapter 3 for general conditions during the passage. In family tradition it took six months.

⁴ In my mother's family Irish was spoken as well as English until her grandmother's death in 1930. My father's father regularly brought Irish-speaking friends back for Sunday lunch and afternoons.

⁵ My father too had heard the classic Irish stories from Hynes. Long afterwards, on a visit to Dublin in the 1950s (?) they met Seamas Delargy of the Irish Folklore Commission, who was delighted to hear what had become of the last Hynes brother—the older six had all been traced and recorded.

⁶ Transcript, as note 2.

⁷ Later Winnie wrote in a letter to Dan ('Sunday night by the fire.' [24 Jan 32]): 'I wish you had known my grandmother. We could have stayed with her: you would have harvested, and I would have carried tea down to the paddocks in the hot sun. And as soon as harvesting was finished it would have rained, steadily. We could build great fires of pine cones and read and talk till the fire made us sleepy so that it was pleasant to hop out for a walk in the rain. And at night it would be good, with great fires, and the flickering lamp, and to bed early, because the lamp used to go out at 11.30, and we have to be up early in the morning. Getting heaps of pine cones in the plantation, very early in the morning: before breakfast, because it smells so good then. You see, it *always* rained at night at my grandmother's.'

⁸ Later she told them to us: see Davin, 'Historical Novels for Children,' *History Workshop Journal*, 1, 1976, pp. 156-7.

⁹ I went and got Mrs Connell, as my grandmother had instructed me. We brought into the room the trunk in which my grandmother kept perfect her burial clothes, airing them occasionally, ironing them to make sure they were not suffering from damp, and replacing white silk stockings which I regularly commandeered for tennis matches. We unpacked the exquisitely embroidered and tucked white nightdress, the white silk stockings, the brown Franciscan shroud with white applique crosses. We washed

the corpse, closed the eyes, sealed the entrances, clothed the body, lighted the candles.' Transcript as note 2.

¹⁰ WKG to DMD, Otautau, Monday [6 June 1932]. Reading a life of Tolstoy, after the war, she saw similarities in his relation with his wife.

¹¹ My aunt Mollie told me that sometimes he would spend a whole Sunday reading Dickens or Wilkie Collins: notes from my 1984 visit.

¹² This perception was probably sharpened by the difficulties his widowed mother had experienced during his childhood.

¹³ It may have been then that she saw Shaw's 'St Joan' (published in 1924). Joan of Arc was canonized in 1922 and Winnie took the name Joan upon her confirmation soon afterwards.

¹⁴ KG to DMD, 'Otautau, Monday' [8 Feb. 1932].

¹⁵ Mollie Baird: notes from my 1984 visit.

¹⁶ She and her friends used to wash their hair before going to a matinee and sit next powerful heating vents to dry it as they watched the film.

¹⁷ WKG to DMD, Dunedin, Tuesday [16 Feb. 1932?].

¹⁸ She won first prize in the Literary Society's 1931 Short Story Competition.

¹⁹ Geoffrey Cox, speech at Winnie's memorial, p. 2.

²⁰ Geoffrey Cox, speech at memorial, pp. 1-2.

²¹ W.K. Gonley, 'New Zealand Life in Contemporary Literature' M.A. thesis, Dunedin 1932 (held in Dunedin Public Library), pp. 1-2.

²² 'New Zealand Life,' p. 45. A critical bibliography of Katherine Mansfield (which Winnie did not know) by Ruth Elvish Mantz came out in 1931 (Constable, London); and there were studies by Elisabeth Schneider ('Katherine Mansfield and Chekhov,' *Modern Language Notes* 50, pp. 394-6) in June 1935, and Arthur Sewell (*Katherine Mansfield: a Critical Essay*, Auckland) in 1936: see Antony Alpers, *The Life of Katherine Mansfield*, bibliography.

²³ KG to DMD, 'Wednesday night by the fire' [Otautau, ?8 June 1932]. She was also having typewriter trouble—'the ribbon won't run + the roller won't roll + my wrist is aching.'

²⁴ Dan's father, an immigrant labourer in his mid-twenties, attended primary school early in the century because employment by the railway company required literacy.

²⁵ See Ovenden, pp. 52-7 (her reading list for him p. 57).

²⁶ Winnie combined them amusingly in a letter in 1932: she was reading Einstein, and wrote, 'You're my system of co-ordinates' and 'Think of me every minute. If you don't, I'll know and I'll disintegrate into lost atoms and homeless electrons': WKG to DMD, Friday [Dunedin, 2 December 1932].

²⁷ Cf. Ovenden p. 69, 78-9.

²⁸ WKG to DMD, Otautau, Thursday [18 Jan. 1934].

²⁹ WKG to DMD, Crown Hotel, Balclutha [7 March 1934].

³⁰ Ovenden, p.86.

³¹ Her poem, 'In his own image and likeness,' was published at this point in *Otago University Review* 1935, p.65 and reflects her anger and loss.

³² Ovenden, p.93.

³³ WKG to DMD, 18 March 1936; cit. Ovenden p.96.

³⁴ KG to Mary Hussey, 3 July 1986; see also *Otago Daily Times* Monday 29 1936, p.3.

³⁵ Winnie left a two-page account of this incident.

³⁶ COMING ARRIVING ORMONDE SUEZ DISEMBARKING TOULON TWENTYFIFTH SEE TOULON BUSINESS SOLD BABY FLOURISHING PAISH CONVERT ENGAGED DICK THOMPSON LOVE = WINUSHKA

³⁷ WKG to Mary Hussey, Wellington n.d. [?mid May 1937].

³⁸ WKG to Marge [Thompson], Mary [Hussey] and Joan [McGrath], 19 May from the R.M.S. Manganui, en route to Sydney.

³⁹ The letters to Mollie, which I saw on a visit to New Zealand in 1984, have not survived.

⁴⁰ WKG to Marge, Mary [Hussey] and Joan [McGrath], 19 May.

⁴¹ WKG to DMD, S.S. Colombo (Orient Line), May-June 1937.

⁴² WKG to Mary Hussey, Paris, 6 August 1937; 22 August 1937.

⁴³ Letters mention a couple of articles sent to newspapers in England and New Zealand, but I have yet to track them down.

⁴⁴ WKG to DMD, Paris, 8 Nov. 1937.

⁴⁵ WKG to DMD, Paris, undated.

⁴⁶ WKG to DMD, Paris, 16 Nov. 1937

⁴⁷ This writer thought the first sentence of his novel so good that was unable to follow it: 'Only the tame birds had a longing; the wild birds fly.'

⁴⁸ WKG to DMD, Paris 19 Nov. 1937.

⁴⁹ They did visit Germany in August 1938 (rather surprisingly perhaps). But in Munich Winnie tried to light her cigarette from the Eternal Flame at the Nazi Martyrs' Memorial; they narrowly escaped arrest for insulting behaviour and left the country.

⁵⁰ WKG to DMD, London, [18] Jan. and [19] Jan. 1938.

⁵¹ WKG to DMD, London, 26 Jan. 1938. reports unexpected arrival of cheque (12/6): she had thought they weren't going to use the piece. I have yet to identify the issue it appeared in, but she had sent him the m.s. in a previous (undated) letter.

⁵² WKG to Marge Thompson, Paris, 13 Jan. [1939].

⁵³ 'A Soldier's Wife,' her unsigned contribution to the New Zealand collection, Lauris Edmond with Carolyn Milward (ed.), *Women in Wartime*, Government Printing Office, Wellington (1985) reprinted Government Publications 1996, p.65.

⁵⁴ See 'A Soldier's Wife,' as previous note.

⁵⁵ For a more detailed account of this episode, see Ovenden, chaps 8, 9, 10.

⁵⁶ See letter WKG to Marge and Mary and Joan, 19 May 1937; and Ovenden, chap. 6.

⁵⁷ WKG to DMD, Otautau, 24 Jan 32, 'Sunday night by the fire'

Recent years have witnessed a virtual epidemic of nationalist violence in the world. In 1994, for example, eighteen of the twenty-three wars being fought were based on nationalist or ethnic challenges to states. About three quarters of the world's refugees were fleeing from, or were displaced by, ethnic or nationalist conflicts. And eight of the thirteen United Nations peacekeeping operations were designed to separate the protagonists in ethnopolitical conflicts.


As a result, much attention of late has been devoted to two questions. Can this violence be contained—say, by adopting particular institutions and policies? And if so, then what might such institutions and policies consist of? The answers to these vitally important questions are unclear. In part, they are unclear because there are fundamental disagreements about the motivations of the participants in nationalist movements, and more specifically, about the rationality of nationalism.

For some observers, nationalism is anything but rational—it results not from benefit/cost calculation but from deep-seated sentiments and emotions that are virtually immutable. If nationalism basically springs from the old Adam, then little, if anything, can be done to contain it. We would have about as much luck containing the destructive force of nationalism as in dealing with El Niño.

If, however, nationalism springs from rational roots, then its course conceivably might be affected by institutions that decrease individuals' *incentives*

Michael Hechter
 Department of Sociology
 University of Washington
 Box 353340
 Seattle, WA 98195-3340
[http://www.soc.washington.edu/
 hechter@u.washington.edu](http://www.soc.washington.edu/hechter@u.washington.edu)

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to participate in it. The prospects for containing nationalist violence therefore hinge on the extent to which nationalists are rational—and thus might respond to institutional incentives. Yet is nationalist violence rational?

Consider three examples of nationalist violence culled from different parts of the world. Our itinerary begins in Sri Lanka. In the midst of a light-hearted celebration of May Day taking place in the city of Colombo in 1993, a man rushed through the parade toward the marching 68-year-old President Premadasa of Sri Lanka and set off explosives that were attached to his body. The President and his assassin were instantly killed, as were at least ten other people. The government of Sri Lanka blamed the Tamil Tigers, a rebel group that had waged a ten year war of secession in the country's north and east and had used suicide bombers in the past to kill government and army officials (Gargan 1993). Whereas such self-sacrifice in the name of a nationalist cause is relatively rare, it is far from unique. For example, Irish Republican Army hunger strikers in Northern Irish detention centers were willing to pay the ultimate price on behalf of their own national movement. And Hamas suicide bombers in Israel effectively set the stage for the victory of the hard-line Likud Party in the 1996 Israeli elections.

Now move on to the metropolitan heartland—England. Consider the movie *Patriot Games*, in which two members of the Irish Republican Army target a prominent British politician for assassination. (Luckily for the distinguished British target, Harrison Ford was lurking in the neighborhood to make sure that the assassin's best laid plans would go awry.) Although this particular story is, of course, a fiction its main outlines are all too real (Feldman 1991).

This little tour ends—where else?—in that territory now known as The Former Yugoslavia. In late October 1992, some of the Croatians who had fled towns in Krajina that had been taken by Serb forces returned to their former homes in the company of United Nations troops. They soon discovered that Serb gunmen had desecrated the graves of their ancestors. Serbs had pulled the covers off Croatian tombs and machine gunned their remains. Surely this bizarre event must reveal great irrationality; it must take some very odd passions to make these Serbs waste valuable ammunition on Croats who, after all, were already long dead (Fearon 1994).

On the basis of stories like these, it is no wonder that many observers regard nationalism as irrational. Thus,

- * The dyed-in-the-wool nationalist is a romantic, not a rationalist. He is a communitarian, not an individualist. He thinks in terms of the spirit and culture of his people, not in terms of bargains and calculations. He will fight for his cause despite any number of rational arguments showing it to be unjustified (Birch 1989: 67).
- * There remain 'irrational' elements of explosive power and tenacity in the structure of nations and the outlook and myth of nationalism... The conflicts that embitter the geo-politics of our planet often betray deeper roots than a clash of economic interests and political calculations would suggest, and many of these conflicts, and perhaps the most bitter and protracted, stem from just these underlying non-rational elements (Smith 1986: 363).
- * The passions evoked by ethnic conflict far exceed what might be expected to flow from any fair reckoning of 'conflict of interest' (Horowitz 1985: 134-35).
- * As Chateaubriand expressed it nearly 200 years ago: "Men don't allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions." To phrase it differently: people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational (Connor 1993: 206).

Before rushing to judgment, however, it must be appreciated that the claim that nationalism is irrational can mean two quite different things. It is obvious that nationalism can be *collectively* irrational, for it is often associated with undesirable social outcomes like economic decline and civil war. It is questionable whether such outcomes are the consequence of individual irrationality, however. After all, it is well-known that many undesirable outcomes—like rush hour traffic, overfishing and environmental pollution—are by-products of rational action (Kollock 1998).

For this reason, the claim that nationalism may be the product of *individual* irrationality is more provocative. For anthropologist Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1994: 31), nationalists regard congruities of blood, language and custom as having "an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, *ipso facto*; as a result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself."

The hallmark of rational individual action is its instrumentality. People are rational to the extent they pursue the most efficient means available to attain their most preferred ends. These ends may be material or non-material. Thus people are irrational when they pursue a course of action regardless of its consequences for their personal welfare. This need not condemn altruistic actions to the realm of the irrational if the altruist's own personal welfare is enhanced by her giving. In some circumstances, committing suicide may even be rational, for death can be preferable to a life that promises little but extreme and unremitting physical suffering. Not so, however, for political suicide: it cannot be rational to consider social ties as binding regardless of their consequences for one's own welfare.

Now let's return to the three stories. How can it be rational to knowingly die for a cause, engage in terrorism, or waste ammunition on corpses in a cemetery? Of the three, the Sri Lankan story is the only one that qualifies as irrational. This is because suicide bombers know *with certainty* that they will die in carrying out their mission.¹

By contrast, the Irish Republican Army took pains to minimize risks for its snipers. Even ostensibly individual events like sniper attacks involve elaborate planning and the coordination of many different people—from the gunman, to support staff providing weapons, ammunition, and vehicles, to sympathetic bystanders.

¹ Can the political suicide carried out by young Tamil Tigers be considered to be a rational act? There is no hard and fast answer because there is an ongoing debate among social scientists about the status of beliefs in rational action. Some writers insist, with Pareto, that an agent must have scientifically valid beliefs to act rationally (Elster, 1989). On this view, all action that owes to faith or religious belief is irrational. Since scientific research is based on metaphysical premises about the existence of an ordered universe, it too would have to be considered as irrational by a Paretian. Others hew to a more subjective conception of rational action (Boudon, 1996). On this view, political suicide is rational if agents have a firm conviction that they will be adequately compensated in the hereafter. This raises other questions, however. Should we consider paranoid schizophrenics who dress like Napoleon to be rational, as well? Hardly, but why not? Popper's (Popper 1994) idea that rational people must show a readiness to revise their beliefs in the face of much contrary evidence provides one possible answer. Since it is the most intellectually conservative option, in this paper I choose to regard political suicide as irrational.

Typically, paramilitary snipers employed a typical "runback", or escape route, against British occupational forces in Northern Ireland. The point of the runback was to provide maximum security for the sniper and his team. Security must be provided, in turn, to induce rational members to undertake the risky business of attacking a British Army troop carrier. Unlike in the Sri Lankan example, the participants here are presumed to be at least somewhat self-interested.²

Fair enough, but why would a rational person ever join a treacherous organization like the Irish Republican Army? Whereas it is easy to appreciate that, in certain circumstances, nationalist groups might strategically adopt violent means to attain their goals, is it a mystery to understand why individuals might bear very high risks of injury, punishment and even death to help bring the collective good of sovereignty to their nation? Not at all.

One might surmise that the use of violent means will tend to attract members who are skilled in violence, and will discourage others who are neither skilled nor interested in it. But there is a deeper reason, as well. To the degree that members are dependent on a solidary group that adopts violent means, they may be willing to take great risks. (Much the same can be said of membership in inner-city gangs in North America, or in the Sicilian mafia). Risk-taking is not irrational: people have always engaged in risky occupations. Although it is dangerous to build sky scrapers, or to be a policeman or a fireman, that people can be found to fill these positions is no cause for consternation. The riskiness of membership in a violent nationalist group is not so very different.

What of the Yugoslav example? An event that on its face seems wildly irrational can also have an instrumental explanation. Fearon (1994) argues that the Serb gunners' behavior was consciously designed to heighten the salience of the boundary between Serbs and Croats. Under Tito's regime, this boundary had been downplayed, and there was considerable social integration (indicated by relatively high rates of exogamy between these two

² Further, detailed ethnographic analyses of intergroup riots in Sri Lanka, India and other South Asian countries reveal that the participants were usually organized and acting purposively, often with the complicity of the police and other authorities (Tambiah 1996).

communities.) In such a context, desecrating Croat cemeteries had a predictable effect: it instantaneously heightened the salience of the Serb/Croat boundary:

In both Serbian and Croatian culture ancestral graves are endowed with great significance. For example, ceremonies are held and offerings made regularly at the graves of important family members. Serb gunners knew this, of course, knew that the Croats knew it, and knew that the Croats knew that they knew it. Desecrating cemeteries is part of a calculated plan by Serb extremists to make ethnic cohabitation impossible by spreading and deepening hatred across groups. Likewise for the Serb policy of systematic rape in the Bosnian war. Such measures do more than just make Bosnian Muslims or Croats too angry to live with Serbs in the future. *They are also calculated to make it more difficult for less virulently nationalist Serbs to live with Muslims or Croats, due to fear of reprisal or discrimination* (Fearon 1994).

Whereas in the 1980s Serbs carrying symbols of Serbian iconography were treated with contempt even by many fellow Serbs, a decade later, Serbs were punished for their failure to make Serbian their primary social identity. Serbs who clung their Yugoslav identity were subjected to harsh punishments (Glenny 1993). Serb paramilitary units that swept into multiethnic Bosnian villages first killed those *Serbian* residents who were in favor of ethnic integration. Only later did they turn their attention to non-Serbian residents (Mozjes 1994).

Spending time and effort to desecrate Croat cemeteries is strategic given the knowledge that Croats are bound to regard this behavior as highly threatening—akin to cross-burning in the American South. Extremist Serbs, in turn, counted on their ability to predict how Croats would act given this provocation.

So a good deal about the kind of nationalist violence that, on the face of it, seems to be irrational has, at least, a plausible rational account. If nationalist violence is largely, if not wholly, the result of rational action, this suggests that, under certain conditions, it indeed can be contained because rational actors will respond to institutional incentives. If so, then what kinds of institutions can contain it?

Now many people might think that theory in general, or rational choice theory in particular, provides an answer to this question. For example, I was recently asked to write an encyclopedia article about ‘the rational

choice theory of nationalism.’ After some reflection I turned this offer down because, so far as I am aware, no such creature exists. To be sure, a rational choice theorist can always say that nationalism can be contained by adopting institutions that raise the costs of nationalist violence and/or decrease its benefits. But this answer is practically vacuous: in particular, it does not tell us what kinds of institutions provide the requisite incentives.

To illustrate this point, I consider an institution that has long been associated with nationalism. One of the most venerable ideas in social theory, harking back at least to the 16th century German political theorist Althusius (Althusius, 1964), is that political decentralization—or *federation*—is best suited for the governance of multinational polities. This idea has also been forcefully advocated by the political scientist William Riker (Riker, 1964). According to Riker, federation is the outcome of a bargain between rulers of the central state and leaders of its territorial sub-units. As in all bargains, this one only works because it appeals to both parties. Federation enables the territorial sub-units to attain some degree of political self-control while profiting from access to the greater resources and military protection that is afforded by membership in large polities. At the same time, the federal bargain offers central rulers a relatively-cost effective means of maintaining their state’s territorial integrity.

However, recent events—including the collapse of federations in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, and the continued thirst for secession among the cultural minorities in federations like Canada and Spain—have led many scholars to question the ameliorative effects of political decentralization. These events suggest the very real possibility that, far from inhibiting nationalist conflict, federation instead exacerbates it. Still other observers argue that federation has no determinate effects on nationalist conflict at all. Evidently, the nature of the relationship between federation and nationalist conflict is highly contentious.

Does federation reinforce nationalism by empowering national leaders, and whetting their appetites for even greater powers or privileges, does it erode nationalism by enabling nations to satisfy their demands within the existing state, or does it have no determinate effects at all? There are three views.

WHY FEDERATION COULD INTENSIFY NATIONALIST CONFLICT

The causal mechanism responsible for this effect owes to the very nature of federation. Federation diverts some government functions—and hence resources—from the center to territorial sub-units. Federation may stimulate nationalist conflict because it provides potential nationalist leaders with patronage and other resources that can be mobilized for nationalist ends. Federation also tends to provide institutional supports for nationalism:

Federalism...is an important source of institutional capacity because it provides a set of political levers and access to resources that make group mobilisation more likely. While often put in place as a means of accommodation and cooptation, federal institutions can be quickly turned to new agendas when a coopted leadership is replaced or changes its preferences (Meadwell 1993: 200; Roeder 1991)

In addition to the material incentives to nationalist mobilization that it may provide, federation also may have cognitive implications. When nations are given many of the accoutrements of real states, this also encourages people to think and act according to national categories (Brubaker 1996).³ Moreover, federation may be better suited to resolving material differences between units than cultural ones (King 1982: 47-8). All told, federation may provide both material and cognitive supports for nationalist conflict. This view has at least one clear policy implication: *to contain nationalist conflict, local leaders should be offered meaningful, substantial careers in the central government* (Laitin, 1998). By this means, nationalist leaders will be transformed from peripheral magnates anxious to drain power from the state into stakeholders committed to upholding it. The historical record provides ample evidence linking federation to nationalist conflict. The United States civil war broke out in a federation; Pakistan—another federation—lost Bangladesh. The only socialist states that dissolved following the climactic year of 1989—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—also just happened to be federations.

Moreover, Soviet policies aiming to defuse nationalism by decentralizing authority backfired (Kaiser 1990). Federation encouraged congeries of local groups to form nations where none had previously existed. In each union republic, the titular nationality used its position whenever possible to develop its own version of great power chauvinism, limiting the rights of its own minorities (save, of course, for Russians). For example, Georgia became

a protected area of privilege for Georgians. They received the bulk of the rewards of the society, the leading positions in the state, and the largest subsidies for cultural projects, while the Armenians, Abkhazians, Ossetians, Ajarians, Kurds, Jews, and others were at a considerable disadvantage in the competition for the budgetary pie. Although Soviet leaders decentralized to coopt indigenous elites, when these elites began tilting towards nationalism, the Soviets abruptly switched gears and centralized from 1934-38.⁴

Similarly, the recent increase in Quebec's regional authority does not seem to have dampened the fate of the separatist political party. Despite taking over the Quebec government—and the subsequent passing of extensive language legislation protecting French and the Francophones, a near-majority of Quebecois voted for separation in 1995. Nor has Spain's devolution of power to the Basque region put its separatist party (ETA) out of business.

The opposing view is also based on an intuitively appealing causal mechanism. Since federation is a form of indirect rule, it ought to reduce the demand for sovereignty (Hechter 2000). On this account, federation should also serve to mute nationalist conflict.⁵ Since nations are by definition culturally distinctive, individual members' values reflect (to some degree) these distinctive national values. Although members of national groups share values—minimally, those relating to the attainment of wealth, power and prestige—in common with all the other inhabitants of a given multinational state, they also share a set of values derived from their national culture that are distinctive. Typically, these values include preferences to speak a distinct language, and practice a distinct religion.

⁴ If Soviet decentralization generated nationalism, so did the subsequent attempt to increase central control. Re-centralization proved impossible in an increasingly complex economy; even when regional leaders were motivated to act in the center's interest, they lacked the information necessary to do so. Hence, the only policies they could pursue were nationalist in outcome (Kaiser 1994: 331).

⁵ This advantage is far from costless, however. "The more decentralized a state is, the more the coordination or negotiation that will have to be carried on between the different jurisdictions. Therefore, the total cost of coordination increases as the degree of decentralization increases (Breton and Scott 1980: xvi-xvii)."

Governments provide a range of collective goods. Some of these goods—like defense—are universally valued by inhabitants. Others—like education in a particular language, and state support for a particular religion—appeal to only a portion of the state's inhabitants. Whereas some universally-valued goods may better be provided centrally,⁶ goods that are valued only by a segment of the society are better provided locally (Oates 1972). Local provision of these goods is superior because it increases the likelihood that the right mix of goods will be produced—the mix that is most congruent with the distinctive values of the national group.⁷ As federation involves the devolution of (at least some) decision-making to localities, it increases local self-governance. To the degree that at least some of the units in a federal system constitute nations, then federation should have the effect of inhibiting nationalism. Since sovereignty is neither more nor less than self-governance, it follows that to the degree federation increases a nation's self-governance, its demand for sovereignty must be correspondingly reduced.⁸

This reasoning implies that the less self-governance a nation has in a multinational state, the greater the possibility of nationalist conflict. Assuming that nations make up at least some of the constituent local or state sub-

⁶ There is even some doubt about this. Whether collective goods are optimally produced by central rather than local authorities probably depends on the production functions of these goods—in particular, on scale economies. Defense, for example, probably gains from central provision because it entails large economies of scale. Many other state-provided goods, however, may be optimally provided on a more decentralized basis. The decentralized provision of collective goods, which is a characteristic of federation, is likely to be superior because it sets up a market for governmental rules and regulations giving incentives for citizens to 'vote with their feet' (Ostrom 1961; Weingast 1995).

⁷ This is one reason why political theorists have traditionally insisted that all true democracies must be small societies (Sale 1980). Plato, for instance, argued that the ideal number of citizens was 5,040.

⁸ In this respect, it should be noted that surveys indicate that federation is even popular among the inhabitants of regions which are culturally similar to state cores. Thus, popular support for subnational governments (*Länder*) in Germany has risen steeply since their introduction in 1949, and is on the rise in Italy (Putnam 1994: 59). Despite a sharp decline in survey measures of Americans' trust in their central government in the past thirty years, trust in state and local governments has remained at high levels (Jennings 1998).

units in a multinational polity, then the greater the powers of the central government relative to those of state and local governments, the greater the nationalist conflict. A constitution that minimizes the state's control over disposable, transferable revenue and rights presents a very small target for nationalists. It stands to reason that local politicians are less likely to play the nationalist card when their constituents see less benefit in sovereignty. This view has quite a different policy implication: to contain nationalism, *the central rulers of multinational states ought to grant political devolution to mobilized national minorities.*

In spite of the apparent failures of federation alluded to above, this argument also commands ample supportive case-study evidence. Many central rulers have turned to federation as a means of reducing nationalist discontent, and they continue to do so. Britain's recent offer of devolution to Scotland and Wales was welcomed by voters in both lands; further, the more thoroughgoing devolution in Scotland was more enthusiastically supported than its relatively anemic Welsh counterpart. Spain and Belgium have recently undergone significant constitutional moves from unity toward federation as a means of resolving national conflicts (Forsythe 1989), and even France—traditionally, the archetypal unitary state—has granted Corsica a certain amount of devolution (Savigear 1989). In the Spanish, Belgian and British cases, very significant powers have been granted to the relevant sub-units. Swiss federation has been widely celebrated (Smith 1995: 14; McGarry 1993:31).⁹ Finally, the federal United States has experienced little in the way of nationalist conflict since the Civil War (Glazer 1977). This evidence suggests that federation may indeed mute, if not inhibit, nationalist conflict.

There is yet a third view of these matters. Some scholars claim that nothing general can be said about the effects of decentralization at all because it

⁹ Of course, Swiss cantonalism also entails some difficulties. Drawing up of appropriate levels of government and winning consent for them is problematic. Securing such consent has much to do with the way in which local identities overlap in complex ways, so as to reduce the prospects of ethnic tension. The success of cantonalism for the Swiss federation is largely due to the fact that "the overlapping boundaries of language and religion...have weakened by language and religion as divisive forces, for each linguistic group contains representatives of both faiths and...vice versa (Dikshit 1975: 234)."

can occur on a practically infinite number of dimensions (King, 1982). Centralization of expenditure may be the key factor, rather than political decentralization. Much depends on the precise nature of the governing institutions (Habermas 1994), especially the party system.¹⁰ Whereas these caveats derive from the historical record, there are also theoretical reasons why decentralization may not have a determinate effect on nationalism. Instead, nationalism may result from path-dependent contingencies that cumulate into “reputational cascades” (Kuran 1998). On this third view, therefore, *neither systematic co-optation of local leaders nor devolution ought to have determinate effects on the containment of nationalist conflict.*¹¹

Evidently, the nature of the relationship between federation and nationalism is contentious. Each view is grounded in a plausible causal mechanism and consistent with at least some of the relevant empirical evidence. Finally, these rival views cannot be distinguished on purely theoretical grounds, for each can be derived from the same instrumental motivational assumptions.

Is there any relationship at all between political federation and nationalist conflict? If so, what might its nature be?

SOME NEW EVIDENCE

Until recently, there was no means of assessing the proposition that local decision-making decreases nationalist conflict. Now, however, two different sources of evidence can be merged to shed some light on the question. The first, *Minorities at Risk*, consists of a large cross national data set based on

¹⁰ Suppose the parties are highly centralized. Then, it would seem that all the constitutional and institutional prohibitions guaranteeing constituent governments against revision of the federal bargain would be ineffectual. If, on the other hand, the officials of the central government do not have partisan supporters operating the constituent governments, they may expect some opposition to their breaking of the guarantees (Riker 1964). Where there is a political party symmetry between the central government and the sub-units, this should help integrate the federation. Where there is a notable asymmetry between regional (provincial) parties and central parties, where the latter often lack viable affiliates in the sub-units, then this is likely to promote intergroup conflict (Smith 1995: 9).

¹¹ “In establishing that small differences between two populations may produce large variations in their observed behaviors, this essay suggests that statistical relationships between aggregate ethnic activity and its determinants are bound to exhibit high standard variation (Kuran 1998: 651).”

newspaper reports of nationalist conflict since 1970 (Gurr 1993). These data contain variables describing various types of collective action carried out by national groups, as well as measures of the various conditions these groups face in their host states. The second consists of a cross-national data set on *Government Finance Statistics* collected by the International Monetary Fund that documents the degree to which government revenues and expenditures are centralized in a large number of countries.

Nationalist conflict is measured by two indicators of anti-regime activity—*rebellion* (including political banditry, terrorist campaigns, guerrilla activity and protracted civil war), and *protest* (including expressions of verbal opposition, symbolic rebellion, and demonstrations). These indicators characterize the mean level of rebellion and protest events for all the ethnically distinct groups in a given state.

Although there are many different types of centralization, fiscal centralization is key, for any decentralization that occurs without granting budgetary power to a sub-unit is well-nigh hollow. The *Government Finance Statistics* data set contains four variables that indicate the degree of fiscal centralization in each country. These indicate the revenue collected and expenditures made by each level of government in every country by year.

Using these measures, new light is cast on the relationship between decentralization and nationalism (Hechter & Takahashi 1999). First, centralization does indeed have a significant effect on nationalist collective action. Second, protest and rebellion events behave quite differently in these data. Although centralization is positively associated with rebellion events, it is negatively associated with protest. This suggests a possible reconciliation of the two opposing arguments in the literature. *Whereas decentralization may provide cultural minorities with greater resources to engage in collective action, leading to a rise in protest events, at the same time it may erode the demand for sovereignty.* Since secession is always an uncertain prospect, and groups tend to be more averse to uncertainty than individuals, this decrease in the demand for sovereignty ought to reduce the incidence of nationalist rebellion.¹²

¹² Secession is a fundamentally uncertain prospect for at least two reasons. In the first place, it is impossible to predict how third parties in the international system

If nationalist groups engage in violent tactics as a means of pursuing sovereignty, then rebellion should be more likely to occur among groups with the greatest opportunity to attain this end (McAdam 1996). Groups concentrated in territories that already have their own governance structures—such as American states, Canadian provinces, or French *départements*—can make a more plausible demand for sovereignty than groups concentrated in regions lacking a governance structure.¹³

To determine if this logic holds, the rebellion indicators from the *Minorities at Risk* data set were reconstructed by excluding all non-spatially-concentrated groups, as well as those concentrated groups whose territory does not coincide with some intermediate-level political boundary.¹⁴ The countries in bold italic have at least one minority group that is concentrated in a region with its own governance structure, while countries in regular font lack such a group. Figure 1 clearly shows that centralization has a strong positive effect on nationalist rebellion.


These results should not be overinterpreted. Fiscal centralization is an indirect indicator of local decision-making, and both the meaningfulness and comparability of measures of fiscal centralization have been questioned (Bird, 1986). Further, due to data limitations, the number of countries in the analysis is relatively small. Despite these caveats, the consistency of the results is impressive across three decades of recent history.

Yet two questions remain. First, since most of the violent nationalism during the 1980s occurs in less developed countries—such as Uganda, the

will react to the new entity. For example, separatists argue that a sovereign Quebec would maintain current economic relations with Canada and would also be included in the North Atlantic Free Trade Association, but they have no means of proving these assurances. In the second place, it is impossible to gauge the stability and effectiveness of any prospective new sovereign government.

¹³ This contention is supported by empirical analyses of the determinants of secessionism in Russia and Eastern Europe (Beissinger 1996; Treisman 1997).

¹⁴ The groups included in the analysis are Amazonian Indians in Brazil, Quebecois in Canada, Indigenous Peoples in Colombia, Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, Basques in France, Papuans, Chinese and East Timorese in Indonesia, Palestinians in Israel, South Tyrolians and Sardinians in Italy, Igorots in the Philippines, Basques and Catalans in Spain, Jurassians in Switzerland, Malay-Muslims in Thailand, Acholi and Baganda in Uganda, Scots in the United Kingdom, Native Americans in the United States, and Hungarians in Yugoslavia.



Philippines, and Indonesia—is the relationship in Figure 1 merely an artifact of the overall level of economic development? On the one hand, people may be less inclined to take action against central governments in rich states because they have more to lose from the resulting disorder. On the other, since democracy may be associated with economic development, so, perhaps, is fiscal decentralization. Further analysis reveals, however, that the relationship holds even when each country's Gross Domestic Product per capita is controlled (Hechter and Takahashi 1999).

Second, how robust is the relationship? There is at least one reason to wonder. Yugoslavia's placement in the extreme southwestern part of the scatterplot for the decade of the 1980s would seem to imply that this should be the country that is most *immune* to nationalist rebellion. Yet in the very next decade the country was plunged into a severe and prolonged civil war and the term "ethnic cleansing" entered the English vocabulary. If, as Figure 1 suggests, nationalism is contained by political decentralization, then how can Yugoslavia's trajectory be accounted for?¹⁵

Whereas decentralization inhibits nationalist rebellion, it stimulates nationalist protest. Herein lies a quandary. Decentralization is a spur to mobilization among minority nations, for it places greater resources (especially government jobs) in the hands of national leaders. As long as these leaders see a benefit in remaining part of the host state, decentralization ought to contain nationalist rebellion. If the central state implodes, however, then it has little to offer peripheral leaders and fragmentation is the likely consequence. This is what happened in the Soviet Union, which split apart on national grounds in a bloodless revolution.

The discussion of federation and nationalist conflict heretofore has been based on the implicit premise that the key dynamics are endogenous to existing political boundaries. But that premise is questionable: time and again nationalism has been strongly affected by exogenous forces. A country that decentralizes as a means of containing nationalist violence is at risk of *fragmenting* when its center declines due to exogenous shocks such as military defeat or fiscal crisis. This was Yugoslavia's sorry fate.

Decentralization and Fragmentation in Yugoslavia

From 1948 through 1991 Yugoslavia had managed to contain nationalism, despite the disparate interests of its various republics.¹⁶ The country was held together by a constitutional order enforced by the resources of the central (federal) state that was explicitly designed to mitigate conflict between its constituent nations. This constitution aimed to provide equality among republics, as well as security for national minorities within each republic. Its goal was to prevent any single national group from gaining political dominance over the state. Federal policy depended on cooperation from republican leaders, who had the capacity to veto any decision.

All federal activities were required to take the proportional representation of individuals by constituent nationality into account. Nationalities were also guaranteed freedom of cultural expression. Individuals retained their national right to self-governance even if they lived outside their home nation's republic, and the choice of a national identity was voluntary. The manifestation of nationalism, however, was regarded as a threat to the social order and outlawed.

As a socialist state, Yugoslavia guaranteed its citizens subsistence, and central and local governments shared responsibility for individual welfare. Public sector employment was the primary source of living standards. The economy was sustained by substantial amounts of foreign aid, largely from the United States, as well as access to foreign credits and capital markets. The basis of this exogenous support was geopolitical, and owed to the regime's neutrality during the Cold War.

During the 1980s, however, a deadly combination of exogenous economic and political shocks weakened the central government's ability to maintain this constitutional order. Yugoslavia shared in the worldwide economic recession of the 1980s. To revive economic growth, the government appealed for assistance from the International Monetary Fund and similar bodies. Some assistance was offered, but only on the basis of commitments that the central government would enact policies promoting economic

¹⁵ I owe this question to Adrian Raftery.

¹⁶ This section is drawn from (Woodward, 1995), who provides a compelling narrative analysis of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

privatization and cut public expenditures for welfare, public employment, and social services.

The government accepted these conditions, but, as a result, living standards began to decline. Unemployment and inflation soared. By requiring constitutional revision, the debt-repayment regime turned normal disputes between central and regional governments into constitutional conflicts. The republics best able to adapt to the economic and political reforms of the debt-repayment package—Slovenia and Croatia—sought increasing autonomy from the center. Those that were disadvantaged by these reforms argued for recentralization. The upshot was a constitutional crisis that was carried out between republican leaders seeking to enhance their control over economic and political resources within their territories.

Many other countries faced austerity measures in the 1980s but did not suffer Yugoslavia's fate. Yugoslavia had the misfortune of being the only multinational state that faced another kind of exogenous shock. The central government's ability to withstand peripheral nationalism was dealt a severe blow by the abrupt and unanticipated end of the Cold War. Yugoslavia had profited greatly from its neutrality in the Cold War. The demise of the Soviet Union sharply decreased the country's strategic value to the United States, however. It also ended forty years of American-backed guarantees of financial assistance and support for Yugoslav independence and integrity.

This combination of exogenous economic and political shocks so weakened the central government that its ability to contain nationalism was effectively destroyed. Although the center attempted to prevent the secession of Slovenia and Croatia by force, it no longer had sufficient resources to prevail. Here, too, exogenous forces played a significant role; Germany's recognition of the sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia spelled Yugoslavia's final chapter. Once the constitutional guarantees for minority rights were null and void, there was little to restrain intergroup violence.

At least two important lessons can be learned from the Yugoslav case. On the one hand, its complex decentralized constitutional provisions managed to contain nationalism for four decades; this is no mean feat. Whereas the constitution was designed to keep the country territorially intact, its extreme decentralization made it difficult for the center to adapt to exogenous economic shifts. On the other, the Yugoslav federation relied too

heavily on the country's strategic position in the Cold War. When—against all expectations—the Cold War ended, the center's resource base was substantially diminished.

Clearly decentralization can proceed so far that it courts fragmentation, which can be another source of intergroup violence. The relationship between decentralization and nationalist violence, therefore, is likely to be U-shaped rather than linear. *If too little decentralization causes rebellion, then too much is likely to engender fragmentation.* To contain nationalist violence, thus, a balance must be struck between peripheral regions' dependence on the center for military and economic resources, and the autonomy that allows them to pursue their own interests. Whereas federation is no panacea for nationalist violence in relatively centralized states,¹⁷ it does offer substantial hope for mitigating nationalism's dark side.

CONCLUSION

Containing nationalist violence is a pressing social issue in the contemporary world. If this kind of violence largely emerges from irrational roots, then there is little hope of containing it. I have argued, however, that the

¹⁷ Some nationalist violence continues to occur in spite of decentralization. A virtual natural experiment has been going on the Spanish Basque and Catalan regions, both of which developed strong nationalism since the death of Franco. Despite the high levels of fiscal and political self-governance granted to these regions by recent Spanish constitutional reforms, Catalan nationalism has been notably peaceful, while ETA in the Basque country is among the most violent nationalist organizations in the world. Differences in social structure between the two regions may help account for the difference in nationalist violence (Diez-Medrano 1995). Whereas both Basque and Catalan capitalists opposed secession because of their economic dependence on the Spanish state, initial economic development in the two regions differed markedly. The Basque region specialized in the production of capital goods (steel, shipbuilding and financial services), whereas Catalonia specialized in the production of consumer goods (textiles). As a result, the Basque bourgeoisie was smaller, more concentrated, and more dependent on the Spanish state and markets than its Catalan counterpart. Because they were less dependent than their Basque counterparts, the Catalan elite was more nationalist. This meant that Catalan nationalism had a much broader base of support than its Basque counterpart. Because the Basque bourgeoisie was anti-nationalist, Basque nationalists were fiercely anti-bourgeois. Not so for Catalan nationalists. As a result, Basque nationalism was far more politically extreme than Catalan.

preponderance of nationalist violence seems to have strategic roots, and therefore can be regarded as the outcome of individually rational action. This means that certain kinds of social institutions can provide incentives that should contain nationalist violence.

But what kinds of institutions will do the trick? General theory can tell us little about the answer to this key question. Theorists fundamentally disagree about the effects of federation on nationalism: some think that federation will exacerbate it, others think it will inhibit it. The best available evidence shows that whereas federation stimulates nationalist political mobilization, it decreases nationalist violence. This is an optimistic conclusion, at least for everyone interested in containing nationalism's dark side.

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CASTE IN ITSELF, CASTE AND CLASS, OR CASTE IN CLASS

Ramkrishna Mukherjee

After the British conquered Bengal and eventually the whole of India, they set out to administer the colony. In this context they encountered two phenomena with which they were not familiar: (1) the relation of people to land for production (and not for revenue receiving, household living, etc.), and (2) the caste system of India, viz. the *jati* stratification of society.

Soon they realized that the *varna* stratification of society (which denotes the *varnas* of Brahmins—mainly the priests, Kshatriya—the warriors, Vaishya—the husbandmen, and Sudra—the lowly people) is not unique to Indian society. In the late 19th and early 20th century, J. Jolly (1896), H. Oldenberg (1897), E. Senart (1927), and others clarified that the *varnas* denote the status system in Hindu society, which (e.g. *varnas*) are found with different nomenclatures in other societies of the world. I had discussed this point in my book entitled *The Dynamics of Rural Society* (1957a).

Yet, in 1962, M. N. Srinivas (1962: 63-69) rediscovered the distinction between *varna* and *jati*, and, in 1995, A. Beteille (1996:16) eulogised this “pathbreaking essay” of Srinivas at the All-India Sociological conference in Bhopal. But that *jatis* denoted the caste system of India was universally acclaimed; namely, the smallest endogamous groups of people within each *varna*.

The relation of Indian people to land for production (and the ancillary activities of trade and petty craft production) did not, at first, undergo this kind of confusion. It was found by the British researchers in the 18th-

Ramkrishna Mukherjee
17/3 Moore Avenue
Calcutta 700040
INDIA

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19th centuries that the instruments for production (viz. plough, cattle, seed, manure, etc.) were held by the Indians familywise, but the land for production was held by the villagers in common under the village community system. As later admitted by Lord Bentinck (1829), this unified strength of the Indian peasants, artisans, and traders under the village community system was shattered by introducing the *zemindary* system. This system was first introduced in 1793 in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa (the *Subah* of Bengal) as the *Permanent Settlement of Land*, and in due course spread all over India.

Some European scholars in the late 20th century argued that the manorial system was present in India from early times in pre-British India, and that the village community system was a myth. However, the falsification of history in this manner has not been accepted by the bulk of scholars.

They have documented that the village community system had originated at the threshold of the present millenium or some centuries earlier, and flourished up to the 11th century A.D. The steady but slow growth of indigenous capitalism in India tried to undermine the village community system, especially during the Mughal period, and ventured upon establishing the manorial system. This point was first mentioned by D. D. Kosambi (1955) and, later, elaborated by I. Habib and others. However, such was the gravity of the village community system that it could not be uprooted by indigenous capitalism: indeed, it made the capitalist development of India slow because the latter could not penetrate village India and create a home market. The point was underscored as late as the middle of the present century by the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee (1951).

However, the falsification of the role of caste (*jati*) system in India took a distinctive turn from the beginning of researches into the caste system by the British scholars in the 18th-19th centuries and most of the Indian scholars swallowed the myth hook, line, and stinker.

In my aforementioned book and in *The Rise and Fall of the East India Company* (1957 b: 140-212) I had shown that the *jati* division of society denoted the relation of people to land for production and the ancillary artisanal and trading activities. The *jatis* proliferated along with specialization and division of labour in society; but movements against the *jati* system gathered momentum along with the advent of capitalism in Indian society on its own merit. The point has been elaborated by later scholars.

I had also shown, especially in *The Dynamics of Rural Society*, that the

caste system received a new lease on life by invaginating itself into the colonial class system ushered in by the colonialists. Moreover I discussed in *The Rise and Fall of the East India Company* (1957 b: 313-335) that the anti-caste movements of 14th-17th centuries were suppressed by the British by enacting laws supporting the Hindu and the Muslim orthodoxies from the time of Warren Hastings in India (1772-1786). But this real history of India was distorted by the British scholars, and the bulk of the Indian scholars followed suit.

The *jati* division of society was viewed in the realm of "Cultural" relations, viz. interdining, intermarriage, purity-pollution, and such other customary behaviour and perception. The fact that in British India the landlords, big landowners, wholesale traders, moneylenders, etc., belonged essentially to the high castes was overlooked, as was the fact that the bulk of self-sufficient peasants, small-scale artisans, petty traders, etc, belonged to the middle castes in general. And, those at the lowest echelon of the growing colonial-capitalist class structure (such as, the marginal peasants, landless workers, etc.) belonged overwhelmingly to the lowest castes and the "Tribes." This is how the caste structure had invaginated itself into the class structure that evolved in colonial India.

Undoubtedly, all high caste people did not belong to the highest echelon of the growing class structure, just as all those belonging to the middle castes did not belong to the middle echelon of the class structure, and all those belonging to the correct castes did not belong to the lowest echelon of the class structure. But an overview of Hindu society substantiated this correlation between the caste and the capitalist class structures (Mukherjee 1957 a:1-58). Contrariwise, the view that was ideologically imposed by those who hailed the British rule in India is that the caste structure ruled the society.

Max Weber denounced the fact that the caste system denoted the relations of production and property in ancient and medieval India by proclaiming that it was the product of "Brahmanical theodicy." In his own words (Weber 1958: 131):

All factors important for the development of the caste system operated singly elsewhere in the world. Only in India, however, did they operate conjointly under specific Indian conditions: the conditions of a conquered territory within ineffable, sharp, 'racial' antagonisms made socially visible by skin colour. ... [This] well-integrated, unique social system could not have originated or at least could not have conquered and lasted without the pervasive

and all-powerful influence of the Brahmins. It must have existed as a finished idea long before it conquered even the greater part of North India. The combination of caste legitimacy with *karma* doctrine, thus with the specific Brahmanical theodicy—in its way a stroke of genius—plainly is the construction of rational ethical thought and not the production of any economic ‘condition’.

As opposed to this “cultural” interpretation of *caste in itself*, Karl Marx had written earlier (1964: 101-102):

The primitive forms of property dissolve into the relations of property to the different objective elements conditioning production; they are the economic basis of different forms of community, and in turn presupposes specific forms of community. These forms are significantly modified once labour itself is placed among the *objective conditions of production* as in slavery and serfdom.

[Where] the particular kind of labour—i.e. its craft mastery and consequently property in the instruments of labour—equals property in the conditions of production, this admittedly excludes slavery and serfdom. However, it may lead to *an analogous negative development in the form of a caste system*. (emphasis added)

Marx’s formulation of *caste for class* under specific fendal conditions was stoutly rejected by Weber who, however, had misconceived caste by his formulation of “Brahmanical theodicy” to denote merely the *varna* stratification of society. Later Indianists following Weber extended the formulation *caste in itself* to the *jati* stratification of society. In this respect, Louis Dumont (1966) raised the misconception to an Olympian height by declaring the uniqueness of caste-ridden Indian people as Homo Hierarchicus. The general run of Western scholars and the great majority of Indian scholars, led by M. N. Srinivas, supported and propagated the perception that caste *sans* class represented “modern” India. *Sanskritization* and *Westernization* were proclaimed to be the vehicles for ushering “social change in modern India” (Srinivas 1966).

A false consciousness was thus generated in India, and spread in society. No wonder that a political scientist wrote in *Reader’s Digest* in 1950 that caste is in Indian blood!

Meanwhile, the inexorable course of capitalism, doubtless colonial in character, was spreading in India. From the 1920-s, in particular, land and crops began to turn into commodities from their subsistence character. Alienation of land and accumulation of crops enriched some (though not

many) peasants, artisans and traders who were placed low or still lower in the caste hierarchy. Now, in conformity with their enhanced economic status, they aspired to a better “social” status. A new alignment between caste and class was in the making, in place of the caste structure merely invaginating itself into the class structure of society.

This alignment was viewed by the national chauvinists, as a variant of the decolonized modernizers upholding the view of caste in itself, as the interaction of two discrete entities *caste and class*: class being imported by the Raj and not displaying itself from immemorial times as caste for class—in the view of Marx. N. K. Bose (1949, 1976) portrayed the structure of Hindu society in terms of caste division, and A. Beteille (1966) elaborated the thesis by clearly writing on *caste, class and power*.

Caste and class became a catchy formulation to denote the social structure of Indian society. However, with its ideological (“cultural”) commitment it soon merged itself into the formulation of caste in itself and employed the same idioms as *sanskritization* and *westernization* to denote “social change in modern India.”

Meanwhile, colonial capitalism and, and later, the independent Indian capitalist system, had their impact on the invagination of *jatis* into the capitalist social structure. In the last days of the Raj, the “Depressed Classes” clamoured for equality in economic and cultural perception and behaviour with the “high castes,” and the Raj pacified them by enacting the Scheduled Castes Order in the 1930s, in order to consolidate their own political position in society. After independence in 1947, the Indian rulers retained the nomenclature of the Scheduled Castes, and added that of the Scheduled Tribes, although, by this time, there were no tribes as undifferentiated (or little differentiated) groups of people even in the remote corners of India (see for instance—P. K. Bose 1985). Later, the Government further categorized the “Other Backward Classes” in order to make the new Avatar of caste hierarchy complete; namely, the high castes, other Backward Classes, the Scheduled Castes, and the Scheduled Tribes.

Yet, the social processes heralding the triumph of class structure over the caste hierarchy could not be altogether ignored by the Avatar makers of caste. But they obfuscated reality. M. N. Srinivas mooted the notion of “Dominant Caste” in the 60s, in which *caste* was in the appellation and not in content. His identification of a “Dominant Caste” was composed of

6 attributes; namely, (1) “sizeable amount of the arable land locally available,” (2) “strength of numbers,” (3) “high place in the local hierarchy,” (4) “western education,” (5) “jobs in the administration,” and (6) “urban sources of income” (Srinivas 1966: 10-11).

All these attributes are secondary or tertiary expressions of the formation of the top stratum of the class structure in rural society. But the proclamation of class relations was an anathema to these conservative scholars. So, class was forcibly funnelled into an amorphous identity of the “Dominant Caste” because, as later admitted by its progenitor, all its six attributes need not be present in one caste entity. In other words, the “Dominant Caste” could be identified in $(2^6 - 1 =)$ 63 ways!

The result was that the devout young scholars were duly brain-washed to search for the “Dominant Caste” in different societal segments in various ways, and even assert the dominant *class* character of the identified “Dominant Caste”! For example, in Jehanabad district of the state of Bihar the landless agriculturists of low castes have organized themselves for a better deal from the big landowners—the Bhumihaar Brahmins, while the landowners have retaliated ruthlessly. They have even formed a paramilitary force by the name of Ranvir Sena which regularly organizes mass murder of the landless families. The government hardly takes any action on this issue, while some enthusiastic academics search for the role of “dominant caste” at this junction in society. Instances like this, found in Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, etc., have led to the confusion of the “caste ridden” society to be worse confounded, which provides succour to the role of the caste system in present day India.

Today, casteisation of society is proceeding at the level of *hoch politik* with the help of some academics. At the other extreme, at the level of *neben politik*, caste is denoted more and more as an identification *within* the class-stratum its constituents belong to. This is similar to the distinction drawn between the Jews and the Gentiles, or the ethnic groups, within the class structure of U.S.A., Britain, etc.

Indeed, the reinforced false consciousness, generated by the scholars and the politicians alike, has been so pervading in the upper political level that even in relatively recent times the *Mandal Commission* earmarked caste as the criterion of Backwardness in Indian society. Scholars like M. N. Srinivas were a party that enforced the false consciousness of social reality of India.

From the academy I. P. Desai’s was the lone voice to castigate this manner of falsification of social reality. In a seminal article (Desai 1984: 1115), he emphasized that the criterion of “backwardness” should be sought in the class relations in modern India. But his voice was smothered by the dominant scholars and politicians.

In the meantime, reality went on asserting itself at the grassroots level. The correlation between caste and class in Colonial India is being transformed into “caste *in* class.” The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes—not to speak of the other Backward Classes—are ranged within the spectrum of the high, middle, and low echelons of the class system in society. This is manifest in the political alliances among these categories.

Also in “cultural” matters, the differentiation is being growingly manifest within the evolved class categories of the Scheduled Castes and “Tribes,” such as even among the Santals, Oraons and Mundas of Bihar, Lodhas of Bengal, Sabaras of Orissa and Bengal, etc.

In this respect, I found from a quality of life study in 1980 in Delhi and its environs that the upper echelon of the Scheduled Castes were aspiring to “cultural” equality with the upper echelon of the high caste. K. L. Sharma said in a seminar of the Department of Sociology of Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1997 that he has found from his study of a number of villages in Rajasthan over 10 years that the “upper” Scheduled Castes are inviting the upper echelon of the “high castes” to their life-cycle ceremonies like marriage, and the latter ones are heartily participating in the ceremonies (see Sharma 1997).

On the other hand, rumblings of discontent are heard within the monolithic constructions of the lowly castes; such as, of the Dalits (literally, the down-trodden). M. V. Nadkarni has shown (1997: 2160-2171) that in southern parts of Tamil Nadu the “weaker” sections of the Dalits are raising their voice against the usurping “stronger” segment of the Dalits. Such discontent is not unheard of in Maharashtra, Gujarat, and even in Bihar (such as, among the Santals and Oraon-Mundas).

Thus it is that we should not look at caste as a “New Avatar” as scholars like M. N. Srinivas have recently proclaimed. Class structure has cut across the caste hierarchy, forming new alliances and antagonisms. Indeed, it is in the process of withering away with the march of history or otherwise remains atavistic, such as the distinction between the Jews and the Gentile,

the Hindus and the Muslims. Yet, it is propped up, for their own sake, by the politicians and a band of social scientists. Today, in India, caste *in* class depicts the reality, and not caste *per se* or caste *and* class.

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INTRODUCCION

La colonialidad es uno de los elementos constitutivos y específicos del patrón mundial de poder capitalista. Se funda en la imposición de una clasificación racial/étnica de la población del mundo como piedra angular de dicho patrón de poder y opera en cada uno de los planos, ámbitos y dimensiones, materiales y subjetivas, de la existencia social cotidiana y a escala societal.¹ Se origina y mundializa a partir de América.

Con la constitución de América (Latina),² en el mismo momento y en el mismo movimiento históricos, el emergente poder capitalista se hace mundial, sus centros hegemónicos se localizan en las zonas situadas sobre el Atlántico—que después se identificarán como Europa—y como ejes centrales de su nuevo patrón de dominación se establecen también la colonialidad y la modernidad. En breve, con América (Latina) el capitalismo se hace mundial, eurocentrado y la colonialidad y la modernidad se instalan asociadas como los ejes constitutivos de su específico patrón de poder,³ hasta hoy.

En el curso del despliegue de esas características del poder actual, se fueron configurando las nuevas identidades societales de la colonialidad, *indios, negros, aceitunados, amarillos, blancos, mestizos* y las geoculturales del colonialismo, como *América, Africa, Lejano Oriente, Cercano Oriente* (ambas últimas Asia, más tarde), *Occidente o Europa* (Europa Occidental después). Y las relaciones intersubjetivas correspondientes, en las cuales se fueron fundiendo las experiencias del colonialismo y de la colonialidad con las necesi-

Aníbal Quijano
Apartado Postal 14-277
Lima 14
Peru
aquijano1@hotmail.com

Department of Sociology
Binghamton University
State University of New York
Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
<http://sociology.binghamton.edu/>

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dades del capitalismo, se fueron configurando como un nuevo universo de relaciones intersubjetivas de dominación bajo hegemonía eurocentrada. Ese específico universo es el que será después denominado como la *modernidad*.

Desde el siglo XVII, en los principales centros hegemónicos de ese patrón mundial de poder, en esa centuria no por acaso Holanda (Descartes, Spinoza) e Inglaterra (Locke, Newton), desde ese universo intersubjetivo fue elaborado y formalizado un modo de producir conocimiento que daba cuenta de las necesidades cognitivas del capitalismo: la medición, la cuantificación, la externalización (u *objetivación*) de lo cognoscible respecto del conocedor, para el control de las relaciones de las gentes con la *naturaleza* y entre aquellas respecto de ésta, en especial la propiedad de los recursos de producción. Dentro de esa misma orientación fueron también, ya formalmente, *naturalizadas* las experiencias, identidades y relaciones históricas de la colonialidad y de la distribución geocultural del poder capitalista mundial.

Ese modo de conocimiento fue, por su carácter y por su origen, eurocéntrico. Denominado *racional*, fue impuesto y admitido en el conjunto del mundo capitalista como la única racionalidad válida y como emblema de la *modernidad*. Las líneas matrices de esa perspectiva cognitiva se han mantenido, no obstante los cambios de sus contenidos específicos y las críticas y los debates, a lo largo de la duración del poder mundial del capitalismo colonial y moderno. Esa es la modernidad/racionalidad que ahora está, finalmente, en crisis.⁴

El eurocentrismo, por lo tanto, no es la perspectiva cognitiva de los europeos exclusivamente, o sólo de los dominantes del capitalismo mundial, sino del conjunto de los educados bajo su hegemonía. Y aunque implica un componente etnocéntrico, éste no lo explica, ni es su fuente principal de sentido. Se trata de la perspectiva cognitiva producida en el largo tiempo del conjunto del mundo eurocentrado del capitalismo colonial/moderno y que *naturaliza* la experiencia de las gentes en este patrón de poder. Esto es, las hace percibir como *naturales*, en consecuencia como dados, no susceptibles de ser cuestionados.

Desde el siglo XVIII, sobre todo con el Iluminismo, en el eurocentrismo se fue afirmando la mitológica idea de que Europa⁵ era pre-existente a ese patrón de poder, que ya era antes un centro mundial del capitalismo que colonizó al resto del mundo y elaboró por su cuenta y desde dentro la modernidad y la racionalidad. Y que en esa calidad Europa y los europeos

eran el momento y el nivel más avanzados en el camino lineal, unidireccional y continuo de la especie. Se consolidó así, junto con esa idea, otro de los núcleos principales de la colonialidad/modernidad eurocéntrica: una concepción de *humanidad* según la cual la población del mundo se diferenciaba en inferiores y superiores, irracionales y racionales, primitivos y civilizados, tradicionales y modernos.

Más tarde, en especial desde mediados del siglo XIX y a pesar del continuado despliegue de la mundialización del capitalismo, fue saliendo de la perspectiva hegemónica la percepción de la totalidad mundial del poder capitalista, y del tiempo largo de su reproducción, cambio y crisis. El lugar del capitalismo mundial fue ocupado por el estado-nación y las relaciones entre estados-nación, no sólo como unidad de análisis sino como el único enfoque válido de conocimiento sobre el capitalismo. No sólo en el liberalismo sino también en el llamado materialismo histórico, la más difundida y la más eurocéntrica de las vertientes derivadas de la heterogénea herencia de Marx.

La revuelta intelectual contra esa perspectiva y contra ese modo eurocentrista de producir conocimiento nunca estuvo exactamente ausente, en particular en América Latina.⁶ Pero no levanta vuelo realmente sino después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, comenzando por supuesto en las áreas dominadas y dependientes del mundo capitalista. Cuando se trata del poder, es siempre desde los márgenes que suele ser vista más, y más temprano, porque entra en cuestión, la totalidad del campo de relaciones y de sentidos que constituye tal poder.

Desde América Latina, sin duda la más influyente de las tentativas de mostrar de nuevo la mundialidad del capitalismo, fue la propuesta de Raúl Prebisch y sus asociados de pensar el capitalismo como un sistema mundial diferenciado en “centro” y “periferia.” Fue retomada y reelaborada en la obra de Immanuel Wallerstein, cuya propuesta teórica del “moderno sistema-mundo,” desde una perspectiva donde confluyen la visión marxiana del capitalismo como un sistema mundial y la braudeliana sobre la larga duración histórica, ha reabierto y renovado de modo decisivo el debate sobre la reconstitución de una perspectiva global, en la investigación científico-social del último cuarto del siglo XX.⁷

En ese nuevo contexto están hoy activos otros componentes del debate latinoamericano que apuntan hacia una nueva idea de totalidad histó-

rico-social, núcleo de una racionalidad no-eurocéntrica. Principalmente, las propuestas sobre la colonialidad del poder y sobre la heterogeneidad histórico-estructural de todos los mundos de existencia social.

LA CUESTION DEL PODER EN EL EUROCENTRISMO

Tal como lo conocemos históricamente, a escala societal el poder es un espacio y una malla de relaciones sociales de explotación/dominación/conflicto articuladas, básicamente, en función y en torno de la disputa por el control de los siguientes ámbitos de existencia social: (1) el trabajo y sus productos; (2) en dependencia del anterior, la “naturaleza” y sus recursos de producción; (3) el sexo, sus productos y la reproducción de la especie; (4) la subjetividad y sus productos, materiales e intersubjetivos, incluido el conocimiento; (5) la autoridad y sus instrumentos, de coerción en particular, para asegurar la reproducción de ese patrón de relaciones sociales y regular sus cambios.⁸

En las dos últimas centurias, sin embargo, y hasta la irrupción de las cuestiones de subjetividad y de género en el debate, la mirada eurocéntrica no ha podido percibir todos esos ámbitos en la configuración del poder, porque ha sido dominada por la confrontación entre dos principales vertientes de ideas: una hegemónica, el liberalismo, y otra subalterna, aunque de intención contestataria, el materialismo histórico.

El liberalismo no tiene una perspectiva unívoca sobre el poder. Su más antigua variante (Hobbes) sostiene que es la autoridad, acordada por individuos hasta entonces dispersos, lo que ubica los componentes de la existencia social en un orden adecuado a las necesidades de la vida individual. Aunque de nuevo actual, como sustento del neoliberalismo, durante gran parte del siglo XX cedió terreno a la predominancia de las propuestas del estructuralismo, del estructural-funcionalismo y del funcionalismo, cuyo elemento común respecto del problema es que la sociedad se ordena en torno de un limitado conjunto de patrones históricamente invariantes, por lo cual los componentes de una sociedad guardan entre sí relaciones continuas y consistentes en razón de sus respectivas funciones y éstas, a su vez, son inherentes al carácter de cada elemento. Con todas esas variantes hoy coexisten y se combinan de muchos modos, el viejo empirismo y el nuevo postmodernismo para los cuales no hay tal cosa como una estructura global de relaciones sociales, una sociedad, en tanto que una totalidad determinada

y distinguible de otras. De esa manera, se dan la mano con la antigua propuesta hobbesiana.

Para el materialismo histórico, la más eurocéntrica de las versiones de la heterogénea herencia de Marx, las estructuras sociales se constituyen sobre la base de las relaciones que se establecen para el control del trabajo y de sus productos. Tales relaciones se denominan relaciones de producción. Pero a diferencia de las variantes del liberalismo, no sólo afirma la primacía de uno de los ámbitos—el trabajo y las relaciones de producción—sobre los demás, sino también y con idéntica insistencia, que el orden configurado corresponde a una cadena de determinaciones que proviene del ámbito primado y atraviesa al conjunto. Desde ese punto de vista, el control del trabajo es la base sobre la cual se articulan las relaciones de poder y, a la vez, el determinante del conjunto y de cada una de ellas.

A pesar de sus muchas y muy marcadas diferencias, en todas esas vertientes se puede discernir un conjunto de supuestos y de problemas comunes que indican su común linaje eurocéntrico. Aquí es pertinente poner de relieve, principalmente, dos cuestiones. En primer término, todas presuponen una estructura configurada por elementos históricamente homogéneos, no obstante la diversidad de formas y caracteres, que guardan entre sí relaciones continuas y consistentes—sea por sus “funciones,” sea por sus cadenas de determinaciones—lineales y unidireccionales, en el tiempo y en el espacio.

Toda estructura societal es, en esa perspectiva, orgánica o sistémica, mecánica. Y esa es, exactamente, la opción preferencial del eurocentrismo en la producción del conocimiento histórico. En esa opción algo llamable “sociedad,” en tanto que una articulación de múltiples existencias sociales en una única estructura, o no es posible y no tiene lugar en la realidad, como en el viejo empirismo y en el nuevo postmodernismo, o si existe sólo puede ser de modo sistémico u orgánico.

En segundo lugar, en todas esas vertientes subyace la idea de que de algún modo las relaciones entre los componentes de una estructura societal son dadas, ahistóricas, eso es, son el producto de la actuación de algún agente anterior a la historia de las relaciones entre las gentes. Si, como en Hobbes, se hace intervenir acciones y decisiones humanas en el origen de la autoridad y del orden, no se trata en rigor de ninguna historia, o siquiera de un mito histórico, sino de un mito metafísico: postula un estado de natura-

leza, con individuos humanos que entre sí no guardan relaciones distintas que la continua violencia, es decir que no tienen entre sí genuinas relaciones sociales. Si en Marx se hace también intervenir acciones humanas en el origen de las “relaciones de producción,” para el materialismo histórico eso ocurre por fuera de toda subjetividad. Esto es, también metafísica y no históricamente. No de modo distinto, en el funcionalismo, en el estructuralismo y en el estructural funcionalismo, las gentes están sometidas ab initio al imperio de ciertos patrones de conducta históricamente invariantes.

La perspectiva eurocéntrica, en cualquiera de sus variantes, implica pues un postulado históricamente imposible: que las relaciones entre los elementos de un patrón histórico de poder tienen ya determinadas sus relaciones antes de toda historia. Esto es, como si fueran relaciones definidas previamente en un reino óntico, ahistórico o transhistórico.

La modernidad eurocéntrica no parece haber terminado con el ejercicio de secularizar la idea de un dios providencial. De otro modo, concebir la existencia social de gentes concretas como configurada ab initio y por elementos históricamente homogéneos y consistentes, destinados indefinidamente a guardar entre sí relaciones continuas, lineales y unidireccionales, sería innecesaria y en fin de cuentas impensable.

LA HETEROGENEIDAD HISTORICO-ESTRUCTURAL DEL PODER

Semejante perspectiva de conocimiento difícilmente podría dar cuenta de la experiencia histórica. En primer término, no se conoce patrón alguno de poder en el cual sus componentes se relacionen de ese modo y en especial en el largo tiempo. Lejos de eso, se trata siempre de una articulación estructural entre elementos históricamente heterogéneos. Es decir, que provienen de historias específicas y de espacios-tiempos distintos y distantes entre sí, que de ese modo tienen formas y caracteres no sólo diferentes, sino discontinuos, incoherentes y aún conflictivos entre sí, en cada momento y en el largo tiempo. De ello son una demostración histórica eficiente, mejor quizás que ninguna otra experiencia, precisamente la constitución y el desenvolvimiento históricos de América y del Capitalismo Mundial, Colonial y Moderno.

En cada uno de los principales ámbitos de la existencia social cuyo control disputan las gentes, y de cuyas victorias y derrotas se forman las relaciones de explotación/dominación/conflicto que constituyen el poder,

los elementos componentes son siempre históricamente heterogéneos. Así, en el capitalismo mundial el trabajo existe actualmente, como hace 500 años, en todas y cada una de sus formas históricamente conocidas (salario, esclavitud, servidumbre, pequeña producción mercantil, reciprocidad), pero todas ellas al servicio del capital y articulándose en torno de su forma salarial. Pero del mismo modo, en cualquiera de los otros ámbitos, la autoridad, el sexo, la subjetividad, están presentes todas las formas históricamente conocidas, bajo la primacía general de sus formas llamadas modernas: el “estado-nación”, “la familia burguesa,” la “racionalidad moderna.”

Lo que es realmente notable de toda estructura societal es que elementos, experiencias, productos, históricamente discontinuos, distintos, distantes y heterogéneos puedan articularse juntos, no obstante sus incongruencias y sus conflictos, en la trama común que los urde en una estructura conjunta.

La pregunta pertinente indaga acerca de lo que produce, permite o determina semejante campo de relaciones y le otorga el carácter y el comportamiento de una totalidad histórica específica y determinada. Y como la experiencia de América y del actual mundo capitalista muestra, en cada caso lo que en primera instancia genera las condiciones para esa articulación es la capacidad que un grupo logra obtener o encontrar, para imponerse sobre los demás y articular bajo su control, en una nueva estructura societal, sus heterogéneas historias. Es siempre una historia de necesidades, pero igualmente de intenciones, de deseos, de conocimientos o ignorancias, de opciones y preferencias, de decisiones certeras o erróneas, de victorias y derrotas. De ningún modo, en consecuencia, de la acción de factores extrahistóricos.

Las posibilidades de acción de las gentes no son infinitas, o siquiera muy numerosas y diversas. Los recursos que disputan no son abundantes. Más significativo aún es el hecho de que las acciones u omisiones humanas no pueden desprenderse de lo que está ya previamente hecho y existe como condicionante de las acciones, externamente o no de la subjetividad, del conocimiento y/o de los deseos y de las intenciones. Por ello, las opciones, queridas o no, conscientes o no, para todos o para algunos, no pueden ser decididas, ni actuadas en un vacuum histórico. De allí no se deriva, sin embargo, no necesariamente en todo caso, que las opciones estén inscritas ya en una determinación extrahistórica, suprahistórica o transhistórica, como en el Destino de la tragedia griega clásica. No son, en suma, inevitables. ¿O

lo era el que Colón tropezara con lo que llamó La Hispaniola en lugar de con lo que llamamos Nueva York? Las condiciones técnicas de esa aventura permitían lo mismo el uno que el otro resultado, o el fracaso de ambos. Piénsese en todas las implicaciones fundamentales, no banales, de tal cuestión, para la historia del mundo capitalista. Sobre el problema de la colonialidad del poder, en primer término.

La capacidad y la fuerza que le sirve a un grupo para imponerse a otros, no es sin embargo suficiente para articular heterogéneas historias en un orden estructural duradero. Ellas ciertamente producen la autoridad, en tanto que capacidad de coerción. La fuerza y la coerción, o, en la mirada liberal, el consenso, no pueden sin embargo producir, ni reproducir duraderamente el orden estructural de una sociedad, es decir las relaciones entre los componentes de cada uno de los ámbitos de la existencia social, ni las relaciones entre los ámbitos mismos. Ni, en especial, producir el sentido del movimiento y del desenvolvimiento históricos de la estructura societal en su conjunto. Lo único que puede hacer la autoridad es obligar, o persuadir, a las gentes a someterse a esas relaciones y a ese sentido general del movimiento de la sociedad que les habita. De ese modo contribuye al sostenimiento, a la reproducción de esas relaciones y al control de sus crisis y de sus cambios.

Si desde Hobbes el liberalismo insiste, sin embargo, en que la autoridad decide el orden societal, el orden estructural de las relaciones de poder, es porque también insiste en que todos los otros ámbitos de existencia social articulados en esa estructura son *naturales*. Pero si no se admite ese imposible carácter no-histórico de la existencia social, debe buscarse en otra instancia histórica la explicación de que la existencia social consista en ámbitos o campos de relaciones sociales específicas y que tales campos tiendan a articularse en un campo conjunto de relaciones, cuya configuración estructural y su reproducción o remoción en el tiempo se reconoce con el concepto de sociedad. ¿Dónde encontrar esa instancia?

Ya quedó señalada la dificultad de las propuestas estructuralistas y funcionalistas, no sólo para dar cuenta de la heterogeneidad histórica de las estructuras sociales, sino también por implicar relaciones necesariamente consistentes entre sus componentes. Queda en consecuencia la propuesta marxiana (una de las fuentes del materialismo histórico) sobre el trabajo como ámbito primado de toda sociedad y del control del trabajo como el primado en todo poder societal. Dos son los problemas que levanta esta propuesta y que requieren ser discutidas.

En primer lugar, es cierto que la experiencia del poder capitalista mundial, eurocentrado y colonial/moderno, muestra que es el control del trabajo el factor primado en este patrón de poder: éste es, en primer término, capitalista. En consecuencia el control del trabajo por el capital es la condición central del poder capitalista. Pero en Marx se implica, de una parte, la homogeneidad histórica de éste y de los demás factores, y de otra parte, que el trabajo determina, todo el tiempo y de modo permanente, el carácter, el lugar y la función de todos los demás ámbitos en la estructura de poder.

Sin embargo, si se examina de nuevo la experiencia del patrón mundial del poder capitalista, nada permite verificar la homogeneidad histórica de sus componentes, ni siquiera de los fundamentales, sea del trabajo, del capital, o del capitalismo. Por el contrario, dentro de cada una de esas categorías no sólo coexisten, sino se articulan y se combinan todas y cada una de las formas, etapas y niveles de la historia de cada una de ellas. Por ejemplo, el trabajo asalariado existe hoy, como al comienzo de su historia, junto con la esclavitud, la servidumbre, la pequeña producción mercantil, la reciprocidad. Y todos ellos se articulan entre sí y con el capital. El propio trabajo asalariado se diferencia entre todas las formas históricas de acumulación, desde la llamada originaria o primitiva, la plusvalía extensiva, incluyendo todas las gradaciones de la intensiva y todos los niveles que la actual tecnología permite y contiene, hasta aquellos en que la fuerza viva de trabajo individual es virtualmente insignificante. El capitalismo abarca, tiene que abarcar, a todo ese complejo y heterogéneo universo bajo su dominación.

Respecto de la cadena unidireccional de determinaciones que permite al trabajo articular a los demás ámbitos y mantenerlos articulados en el largo tiempo, la experiencia del patrón de poder *capitalista, mundial, eurocentrado y colonial/moderno* no muestra tampoco nada que obligue a admitir que el rasgo *capitalista* haya hecho necesarios, en el sentido de inevitables, los demás. De otra parte, sin duda el carácter capitalista de este patrón de poder tiene implicaciones decisivas sobre el carácter y el sentido de las relaciones intersubjetivas, de las relaciones de autoridad y sobre las relaciones en torno del sexo y sus productos. Pero, primero, sólo si se ignora la heterogeneidad histórica de esas relaciones y del modo en que se ordenan en cada ámbito y entre ellos, sería posible admitir la unilinealidad y unidireccionalidad de esas implicaciones. Y segundo, y a esta altura del debate debiera ser obvio, que si bien el actual modo de controlar el trabajo tiene implicaciones sobre, por

ejemplo, la intersubjetividad societal, sabemos del mismo modo que para que se optara por la forma capitalista de organizar y controlar el trabajo, fue sin duda necesaria una intersubjetividad que la hiciera posible y preferible. Las determinaciones no son, pues, no pueden ser, unilineales, ni unidireccionales. Y no sólo son recíprocas. Son heterogéneas, discontinuas, inconsistentes, conflictivas, como corresponde a relaciones entre elementos que tienen, todos y cada uno, tales características. .

La articulación de heterogéneos, discontinuos y conflictivos elementos en una estructura común, en un determinado campo de relaciones, implica pues, requiere, relaciones de recíprocas, múltiples y heterogéneas determinaciones. El estructuralismo y el funcionalismo no lograron percibir esas necesidades históricas. Tomaron un camino malconducente reduciéndolas a la idea de relaciones funcionales entre los elementos de una estructura societal.

De todos modos, sin embargo, para que una estructura histórico-estructuralmente heterogénea tenga el movimiento, el desenvolvimiento, o si se quiere el comportamiento, de una totalidad histórica, no bastan tales modos de determinación recíproca y heterogénea entre sus componentes. Es indispensable que uno (o más) entre ellos tenga la primacía—en el caso del capitalismo, el control combinado del trabajo y de la autoridad—pero no como determinante o base de determinaciones en el sentido del materialismo histórico, sino estrictamente *como eje(s) de articulación del conjunto*.

De ese modo, el movimiento conjunto de esa totalidad, el sentido de su desenvolvimiento, abarca, trasciende, en ese sentido específico, a cada uno de sus componentes. Es decir, determinado campo de relaciones societales se comporta como una totalidad. Pero semejante totalidad histórico-social, como articulación de heterogéneos, discontinuos y conflictivos elementos, no puede ser de modo alguno cerrada, no puede ser un organismo, ni puede ser, como una máquina, consistente de modo sistémico y constituir una entidad en la cual la lógica de cada uno de los elementos corresponde a la de cada uno de los otros. Sus movimientos de conjunto no pueden ser, en consecuencia, unilineales, ni unidireccionales, como sería necesariamente el caso de entidades orgánicas o sistémicas o mecánicas.

NOTA SOBRE LA CUESTION DE LA TOTALIDAD

Acerca de esa problemática es indispensable continuar indagando y debatiendo las implicaciones del paradigma epistemológico de la relación entre el todo y las partes respecto de la existencia histórico-social. El eurocentrismo ha llevado a virtualmente todo el mundo, a admitir que en una totalidad el todo tiene absoluta primacía determinante sobre todas y cada una de las partes, que por lo tanto hay una y sólo una lógica que gobierna el comportamiento del todo y de todas y de cada una de las partes. Las posibles variantes en el movimiento de cada parte son secundarias, sin efecto sobre el todo y reconocidas como *particularidades* de una regla o lógica general del todo al que pertenecen.

No es pertinente aquí, por razones obvias, plantear un debate sistemático acerca de aquel paradigma que en la modernidad eurocéntrica ha terminado siendo admitido como una de las piedras angulares de la racionalidad y que en la producción del conocimiento concreto llega a ser actuado con la espontaneidad de la respiración, esto es de manera incuestionable. Lo único que propongo aquí es abrir la cuestión restringida de sus implicaciones en el conocimiento específico de la experiencia histórico-social.

En la partida, es necesario reconocer que todo fenómeno histórico-social consiste en y/o expresa una relación social o una malla de relaciones sociales. Por eso, su explicación y su sentido no pueden ser encontrados sino respecto de un campo de relaciones mayor al que corresponde. Dicho campo de relaciones respecto del cual un determinado fenómeno puede tener explicación y sentido es lo que aquí se asume con el concepto de totalidad histórico-social.

La continuada presencia de este paradigma en la investigación y en el debate histórico-social desde, sobre todo, fines del siglo XVIII, no es un accidente: da cuenta del reconocimiento de su tremenda importancia, ante todo porque permitió liberarse del atomismo empirista y del providencialismo. No obstante, el empirismo atomístico no sólo se ha mantenido en el debate, sino que ahora ha encontrado una expresión nueva en el llamado postmodernismo filosófico-social.⁹ En ambos se niega la idea de totalidad y de su necesidad en la producción del conocimiento.

La renovación y la expansión de la visión atomística de la experiencia histórico-social en plena crisis de la modernidad/racionalidad no es tam-

poco un accidente. Es un asunto complejo y contradictorio. Da cuenta, por un lado, de que ahora es más perceptible el que las ideas dominantes de totalidad dejan fuera de ella muchas, demasiadas, áreas de la experiencia histórico-social, o las acogen sólo de modo distorsionante. Pero, por otro lado, tampoco es accidental la explícita asociación de la negación de la totalidad con la negación de la realidad del poder societal, en el nuevo postmodernismo tanto como en el viejo empirismo.

En efecto, lo que el paradigma de la totalidad permitió percibir en la historia de la existencia social de las gentes concretas fue, precisamente, el poder como la más persistente forma de articulación estructural de alcance societal. Desde entonces, sea para ponerlo en cuestión o para su defensa, el punto de partida ha sido el reconocimiento de su existencia real en la vida de las gentes. Pero, sobre todo, fue la crítica del poder lo que terminó colocado en el centro mismo del estudio y del debate histórico-social.

En cambio, en la visión atomística, sea del viejo empirismo o del nuevo postmodernismo, las relaciones sociales no forman campos complejos de relaciones sociales en los que están articulados todos los ámbitos diferenciables de existencia social y en consecuencia de relaciones sociales. Es decir, algo llamable sociedad, no tiene lugar en la realidad. Por lo tanto, encontrar explicación y sentido de los fenómenos sociales no es posible, ni necesario. La experiencia contingente, la descripción como representación, serían lo único necesario y legítimo. La idea de totalidad no sólo no sería necesaria, sino, sobre todo, sería una distorsión epistemológica. La idea que remite a la existencia de estructuras duraderas de relaciones sociales, cede lugar a la idea de fluencias inestables y cambiantes, que no llegan a cuajar en estructuras.¹⁰

Para poder negar la realidad del poder societal, el empirismo y el postmodernismo requieren negar la idea de totalidad histórico-social y la existencia de un ámbito primado en la configuración societal, actuando como eje de articulación de los demás. El poder en el viejo empirismo sólo existe como autoridad, en un sólo ámbito de relaciones sociales, por definición, dispersas. En el postmodernismo, desde sus orígenes post-estructuralistas, el poder sólo existe a la escala de las micro-relaciones sociales y como fenómeno disperso y fluido. No tiene sentido, en consecuencia, para ninguna de tales vertientes del debate, pensar en el cambio de algo llamable sociedad en su conjunto y ubicar para eso sus ejes de articulación o los factores de determinación que deben ser cambiados. El cambio histórico sería estrictamente

un asunto individual, aunque fueran varios los individuos comprometidos, en micro-relaciones sociales.

En esa confrontación entre las ideas orgánicas y sistémicas de totalidad, de un lado, y la negación de toda idea de totalidad, del otro, pareciera pues tratarse de opciones muy contrapuestas, incluso referidas a perspectivas epistémicas no conciliables. Ambas tienen, sin embargo, un común linaje eurocéntrico: para ambas posiciones el paradigma eurocéntrico de totalidad es el único pensable. Dicho de otro modo, en ambas subyace el supuesto nunca explicitado y discutido, ya que nunca fue una cuestión, de que toda idea de totalidad implica que el todo y las partes corresponden a una misma lógica de existencia. Es decir, tienen una homogeneidad básica que sustenta la consistencia y la continuidad de sus relaciones, como en un organismo, o en una máquina, o en una entidad sistémica. En esa perspectiva, la negación de la necesidad de esa idea de totalidad en la producción del conocimiento es extrema, pero no del todo arbitraria. Para nuestras actuales necesidades de conocimiento histórico-social, esa idea de totalidad implica hoy distorsiones de la realidad tan graves como las desventajas del viejo empirismo atomístico. Pero ¿qué pasa si nos enfrentamos a totalidades que consisten en una articulación de elementos históricamente heterogéneos, cuyas relaciones son discontinuas, inconsistentes, conflictivas?

La respuesta es que en la existencia societal las relaciones entre el todo y las partes son reales, pero necesariamente muy distintas de las que postula el eurocentrismo. Una totalidad histórico-social es un campo de relaciones sociales estructurado por la articulación heterogénea y discontinua de diversos ámbitos de existencia social, cada uno de ellos a su vez estructurado con elementos históricamente heterogéneos, discontinuos en el tiempo, conflictivos. *Eso quiere decir que las partes en un campo de relaciones de poder societal no son sólo partes.* Lo son respecto del conjunto del campo, de la totalidad que éste constituye. En consecuencia, se mueven en general dentro de la orientación general del conjunto. Pero no lo son en su relación separada con cada una de las otras. Y sobre todo cada una de ellas es una unidad total en su propia configuración porque igualmente tiene una constitución históricamente heterogénea. *Cada elemento de una totalidad histórica es una particularidad y, al mismo tiempo, una especificidad, incluso, eventualmente, una singularidad.* Todos ellos se mueven dentro de la tendencia general del conjunto, pero tienen o pueden tener una autonomía relativa y que puede ser, o llegar a ser, eventual-

mente, conflictiva con la del conjunto. En ello reside también la moción del cambio histórico-social.

¿Significa eso que la idea de totalidad no tiene allí lugar, ni sentido? Nada de eso. Lo que articula a heterogéneos y discontinuos en una estructura histórico-social es un eje común, por lo cual el todo tiende a moverse en general de modo conjunto, actúa como una totalidad, pues. Pero esa estructura no es, no puede ser, cerrada, como en cambio no puede dejar de serlo una estructura orgánica o sistémica. Por eso, a diferencia de éstas, si bien ese conjunto tiende a moverse o a comportarse en una orientación general, no puede hacerlo de manera unilineal, ni unidireccional, ni unidimensional, porque están en acción múltiples, heterogéneas e incluso conflictivas pulsiones o lógicas de movimiento. En especial, si se considera que son necesidades, deseos, intenciones, opciones, decisiones y acciones humanas las que están, constantemente, en juego.

En otros términos, los procesos históricos de cambio no consisten, no pueden consistir, en la transformación de una totalidad históricamente homogénea en otra equivalente, sea gradual y continuamente, o por saltos y rupturas. Si así fuera, el cambio implicaría la salida completa del escenario histórico de una totalidad con todos sus componentes, para que otra derivada de ella ocupe su lugar. Esa es la idea central, necesaria, explícita en el evolucionismo gradual y unilineal, o implicada en las variantes del estructuralismo y del funcionalismo y, aunque algo en contra de su discurso formal, también del materialismo histórico. Así no ocurre, sin embargo, en la experiencia real, menos con el patrón de poder mundial que se constituyó con América. El cambio afecta de modo heterogéneo, discontinuo, a los componentes de un campo histórico de relaciones sociales. Ese es, probablemente, el significado histórico, concreto, de lo que se postula como contradicción en el movimiento histórico de la existencia social.

La percepción de que un campo de relaciones sociales está constituido de elementos homogéneos, continuos, aunque contradictorios (en el sentido hegeliano), lleva a la visión de la historia como una secuencia de cambios que consisten en la transformación de un conjunto homogéneo y continuo en otro equivalente. Y el debate sobre si eso ocurre gradual y linealmente o por “saltos,” y que suele pasar como una confrontación epistemológica entre el “positivismo” y la “dialéctica” es, en consecuencia, meramente formal. No implica en realidad ninguna ruptura epistemológica.

Puede verse así que lo que lleva a muchos a desprenderse de toda idea de totalidad, es que las ideas sistémicas u orgánicas acerca de ella han llegado a ser percibidas o sentidas como una suerte de corset intelectual, porque fuerzan a homogenizar la experiencia real y de ese modo a verla de modo distorsionado. Eso no lleva a negar, desde luego, la existencia posible o probada de totalidades orgánicas o sistémicas. De hecho hay organismos. Y mecanos cuyas partes se corresponden unas con otras de manera sistémica. Pero toda pretensión de ver de esta manera las estructuras sociales es necesariamente distorsionante.

Desde una perspectiva organística o sistemística de la totalidad histórico-social, toda pretensión de manejo de totalidades histórico-sociales, en especial cuando se trata de planificar de ese modo el cambio, no puede dejar de conducir a experiencias que han dado en llamarse, no por acaso, totalitarias. Esto es, reproducen a escala histórica el lecho de Procusto. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, puesto que no es inevitable que toda idea de totalidad sea sistémica, orgánica o mecánica, la simple negación de toda idea de totalidad en el conocimiento histórico-social no puede dejar de estar asociada a la negación de la realidad del poder a escala societal. En realidad, desoculta el sesgo ideológico que la vincula al poder vigente.

LA CUESTION DE LA CLASIFICACION SOCIAL

Desde los años 80, en medio de la crisis mundial del poder capitalista, se hizo más pronunciada la derrota ya tendencialmente visible de los regímenes del despotismo burocrático, rival del capitalismo privado; de los procesos de democratización de las sociedades y estados capitalistas de la “periferia”; y también de los movimientos de los trabajadores orientados a la destrucción del capitalismo. Ese contexto facilitó la salida a luz de las corrientes, hasta ese momento más bien subterráneas, que dentro del materialismo histórico comenzaban a sentir cierto malestar con su concepción heredada acerca de las clases sociales.¹¹ El pronto resultado fue, como ocurre con frecuencia, que el niño fue arrojado junto con el agua sucia y las clases sociales se eclipsaron en el escenario intelectual y político.

Es obvio que ese resultado fue parte de la derrota mundial de los regímenes y movimientos que disputaban la hegemonía mundial a los centros hegemónicos del capitalismo o se enfrentaban al capitalismo. Y facilitó la imposición del discurso neoliberalista del capitalismo como una suerte de

sentido común universal, que desde entonces hasta hace muy poco se hizo no sólo dominante, sino virtualmente único.¹² Es menos obvio, sin embargo, si fue única o principalmente para poder pasarse con comodidad al campo adversario, que muchos habituales de los predios del materialismo histórico se despojaron, después de la derrota, de una de sus armas predilectas. Aunque esa es la acusación oída con más frecuencia, no es probable que sea la mejor encaminada.

Es más probable que con la cuestión de las clases sociales, entre los cultores o seguidores del materialismo histórico hubiera estado ocurriendo algo equivalente que con las ideas orgánica o sistémica acerca de la totalidad: las derrotas y sobre todo las decepciones en su propio campo político (el “socialismo realmente existente”) hacían cada vez más problemático el uso productivo, en el campo del conocimiento sobre todo, de la versión del materialismo histórico sobre las clases sociales.

Esa versión había logrado convertir una categoría histórica en una categoría estática, en los aptos términos de E.P. Thompson, y en amplia medida ese era el producto que, según la descripción de Parkin a fines de los 70,¹³ se “fabricaba” y mercadeaba” en muchas universidades de Europa y de Estados Unidos. Y puesto que para una amplia mayoría, dicha versión era la única legitimada como correcta, el respectivo concepto de clases sociales comenzó a ser sentido también como un corset intelectual.

Los esfuerzos para hacer más llevadero ese corset, si bien no muy numerosos, ganaron amplia audiencia en los 70s. Piénsese, por ejemplo, en la resonancia de la obra de Nicos Poulantzas, en una vereda, o la de Erik Olin Wright en la de enfrente. Esfuerzos de crítica mucho más fecunda, menos numerosos, con menos audiencia inmediata, como la de E.P. Thompson, desafortunadamente no llevaron hasta una entera propuesta alternativa.¹⁴

¿De dónde proceden las dificultades con la teoría de las clases sociales del materialismo histórico? El rastro más nítido conduce a una historia con tres estancias distintas. Primera, la constitución del materialismo histórico a fines del siglo XIX, como un producto de la hibridación marxo-positivista, en el tardío Engels y en los teóricos de la Social-Democracia europea, alemana en especial, con amplias y duraderas reverberaciones entre los socialistas de todo el mundo. Segunda, la canonización de la versión llamada marxismo-leninismo, impuesta por el despotismo burocrático establecido bajo el estalinismo desde mediados de los años 20. Finalmente, la nueva

hibridación de ese materialismo histórico con el estructuralismo, francés especialmente, después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.¹⁵

El materialismo histórico, respecto de la cuestión de las clases sociales, así como en otras áreas, respecto de la herencia teórica de Marx no es, exactamente, una ruptura, sino una continuidad parcial y distorsionada. Ese legado intelectual es reconocidamente heterogéneo y lo es aún más su tramo final, producido, precisamente, cuando Marx puso en cuestión los núcleos eurocentristas de su pensamiento, desafortunadamente sin lograr encontrar una resolución eficaz a los problemas epistémicos y teóricos implicados. Admite, pues, heterogéneas lecturas. Pero el materialismo histórico, sobre todo en su versión marxismo-leninismo, pretendió, no sin éxito, hacerlo pasar como una obra sistemáticamente homogénea e imponer su propia lectura a fin de ser admitido como el único legítimo heredero.

Es sabido que Marx dijo expresamente que no era el descubridor de las clases sociales, ni de sus luchas, pues antes lo habían hecho los historiadores y economistas burgueses.¹⁶ Pero, aunque él, curiosamente, no la menciona,¹⁷ no hay duda alguna de que fue en la obra de Claude Henri de Saint-Simon y de los saintsimonianos que fueron formulados por primera vez, mucho antes de Marx, en el mero comienzo del siglo XIX, los elementos básicos de lo que un siglo después será conocido como la teoría de las clases sociales del materialismo histórico. En particular en la famosa *Exposition de la Doctrine*, publicada en 1828 por la llamada izquierda saintsimoniana, de extendida influencia en el debate social y político durante buena parte del siglo XIX. Vale la pena recordar uno de sus notables tramos:

“La explotación del hombre por el hombre que habíamos demostrado en el pasado bajo su forma más directa, la más grosera, la esclavitud, se continúa en muy alto grado en las relaciones entre propietarios y trabajadores, entre patronos y asalariados; se está lejos, sin duda, de la condición en que estas clases están colocadas hoy día, a aquella en que se encontraban en el pasado amos y esclavos, patricios y plebeyos, siervos y señores. Pareciera inclusive, a primera vista, que no podría hacerse entre ellas ninguna comparación. No obstante, debe reconocerse que los unos no son más que la prolongación de los otros. La relación del patrón con el asalariado es la última transformación que ha sufrido la esclavitud. Si la explotación del hombre por el hombre no tiene más ese carácter brutal que revestía en la antigüedad; si ella no se ofrece más a nuestros ojos sino bajo una forma suavizada, no es por eso menos real. El obrero no es como el esclavo, una propiedad directa de su patrón; su condición todo el tiempo precaria está fijada siempre por una transacción entre ellos:

¿pero esa transacción es libre de parte del obrero? . No lo es, puesto que está obligado a aceptar bajo pena de vida, reducido como está a esperar su comida de cada día nada más que de su trabajo de la víspera.”

El texto prosigue poco después diciendo que:

“Las ventajas de cada posición social se transmiten hereditariamente; los economistas han tenido que constatar uno de los aspectos de este hecho, la herencia de la miseria, al reconocer la existencia en la sociedad de una clase de “proletarios.” Hoy día, la masa entera de trabajadores es explotada por los hombres cuya propiedad utilizan. Los jefes de industria sufren ellos mismos esta explotación en sus relaciones con los propietarios, pero en un grado incomparablemente más débil: a su turno ellos participan de la explotación que recae con todo su peso sobre la clase obrera, es decir sobre la inmensa mayoría de los trabajadores” (traducción de A.Q.)¹⁸

Las tensiones que origina la división en clases de la sociedad, dicen los autores, sólo podrán saldarse con una revolución inevitable que pondrá término a todas las formas de la explotación del hombre por el hombre.

Es sin duda notable, y no puede ser negado, que en esos párrafos esté ya contenido virtualmente todo el registro de ideas que serán incorporadas a la teoría de las clases sociales del materialismo histórico. Entre las principales: (1) La idea de sociedad en tanto que una totalidad orgánica, desde Saint-Simon eje ordenador de toda una perspectiva de conocimiento histórico-social y de la cual el materialismo histórico será la principal expresión. (2) El concepto mismo de *clases sociales*, referido a franjas de población homogenizadas por sus respectivos lugares y roles en las relaciones de producción de la sociedad. (3) La explotación del trabajo y el control de la propiedad de los recursos de producción como el fundamento de la división de la sociedad en clases sociales. En Marx formarán más tarde parte del concepto de relaciones de producción. (4) La nomenclatura de las clases sociales acuñada desde ese postulado, amos y esclavos, patricios y plebeyos, señores y siervos, industriales y obreros. (5) La perspectiva evolucionista, unidireccional, de la historia como sucesión de tales sociedades de clase, que en el materialismo histórico serán conocidas como “modos de producción.” (6) La relación entre las clases sociales y la revolución final contra toda explotación, no mucho después llamada revolución “socialista.”

No se agotan allí las notables coincidencias con el materialismo histórico respecto de la cuestión de las clases sociales. Para un texto escrito después de 300 años de historia del capitalismo mundial eurocentrado y colonial/

moderno, no puede dejar de ser llamativa su ceguera absoluta respecto de: (1) la coexistencia y la asociación, bajo el capitalismo, de todas las formas de explotación/dominación del trabajo; (2) que en consecuencia, incluso reduciendo las clases sociales solamente a las relaciones de explotación/ dominación en torno del trabajo, en el mundo del capitalismo no existían solamente las clases sociales de “industriales,” de un lado, y la de “obreros” o “proletarios,” del otro, sino también las de “esclavos,” “siervos,” y “plebeyos,” “campesinos libres”; (3) sobre el hecho de que las relaciones de dominación originadas en la experiencia colonial de “europeos” o “blancos” e “indios,” “negros,” “amarillos” y “mestizos,” implicaban profundas relaciones de poder que, además, en aquel período estaban tan estrechamente ligadas a las formas de explotación del trabajo, que parecían “naturalmente” asociadas entre sí; (4) que en consecuencia la relación capital-salario no era el único eje de poder, ni siquiera en la economía; (5) que habían otros ejes de poder que existían y actuaban en ámbitos que no eran solamente económicos, como la “raza,” el género y la edad; (6) que, en consecuencia, la distribución del poder entre la población de una sociedad no provenía exclusivamente de las relaciones en torno del control del trabajo, ni se reducía a ellas.

El movimiento de la indagación de Marx sobre las clases sociales, no fue probablemente ajeno al debate de los saintsimonianos. Pero junto con sus similitudes, tiene también notables diferencias que aquí apenas es pertinente señalar.

En primer término, Marx se mantuvo, es verdad, hasta casi el final de su trabajo dentro de la misma perspectiva saintsimoniana, eurocéntrica, de una secuencia histórica unilineal y unidireccional de sociedades de clase. Sin embargo, como se sabe bien ahora, al irse familiarizando con las investigaciones históricas y con el debate político de los “populistas” rusos, se dió cuenta de que esas unidireccionalidad y unilinearidad dejaban fuera de la historia otras decisivas experiencias históricas. Llegó así a ser consciente del eurocentrismo de su perspectiva histórica. Pero no llegó a dar el salto epistemológico correspondiente. El materialismo histórico posterior eligió condenar y omitir ese tramo de la indagación de Marx y se aferró dogmáticamente a lo más eurocentrista de su herencia.¹⁹

Es cierto, por otra parte, como todo el mundo advierte, que hay una distinción perceptible entre su visión de las relaciones de clase implicadas en su teoría sobre el Capital y la que subyace a sus estudios históricos. *El Capital* en

esa teoría es una relación social específica de producción, cuyos dos términos fundamentales son los capitalistas y los obreros. Los primeros, son quienes controlan esa relación. En esa calidad, son “funcionarios” del Capital. Son los dominantes de esa relación. Pero lo hacen en su propio, privado, beneficio. En esa calidad, son explotadores de los obreros. Desde ese punto de vista, ambos términos son las clases sociales fundamentales del Capital.

De otro lado, sin embargo, y sobre todo en su análisis de la coyuntura francesa, especialmente en *El 18 Brumario de Luís Bonaparte*, da cuenta de varias clases sociales que, según las condiciones del conflicto político-social, emergen, se consolidan o se retiran de escena: burguesía comercial, burguesía industrial, proletariado, grandes terratenientes, oligarquía financiera, pequeña-burguesía, clase media, lumpen-proletariado, gran burocracia. Así mismo, en *Teorías de la Plusvalía*, advierte que Ricardo olvida enfatizar el constante crecimiento de las clases medias.²⁰

El materialismo histórico posterior, en especial en su versión marxismo-leninismo, ha manejado esas diferencias en la indagación marxiana por medio de tres propuestas. La primera es que las diferencias se deben al nivel de abstracción, teórico en *El Capital* e histórico-coyuntural en *El 18 Brumario*. La segunda es que esas diferencias son además transitorias, pues en el desenvolvimiento del Capital la sociedad tenderá, de todos modos, a polarizarse en las dos clases sociales fundamentales.²¹ La tercera es que la teoría de *El Capital* implica que se trata de una relación social estructurada independientemente de la voluntad y de la conciencia de las gentes y que, en consecuencia, éstas se encuentran distribuidas en ella de manera necesaria e inevitable, por una legalidad histórica que las sobrepasa. En esa visión, las clases sociales son presentadas como estructuras dadas por la naturaleza de la relación social; sus ocupantes son portadores de sus determinaciones y por lo tanto sus comportamientos deberían expresar dichas determinaciones estructurales.²²

La primera propuesta tiene confirmación en las propias palabras de Marx. Así, ya en el famoso e inconcluso Capítulo sobre las Clases, del vol. III de *El Capital*, Marx sostiene que “Los propietarios de simple fuerza de trabajo, los propietarios de capital y los propietarios de tierras, cuyas respectivas fuentes de ingresos son el salario, la ganancia y la renta del suelo, es decir, los obreros asalariados, los capitalistas y los terratenientes, forman las tres grandes clases de la sociedad moderna, basada en el régimen capitalista

de producción.” Sin embargo, comprueba que ni siquiera en Inglaterra, no obstante ser la más desarrollada y “clásica” de las modernas sociedades capitalistas, “se presenta en toda su pureza esta división de la sociedad en clases,” ya que clases medias y estratos intermedios no dejan que sean nítidas las líneas de separación entre las clases. Pero inmediatamente advierte que eso será depurado por el desenvolvimiento de la ley del desarrollo capitalista que lleva continuamente a la polarización entre las clases fundamentales.²³

Con *El 18 Brumario*, sin embargo, ocurre un doble desplazamiento de problemática y de perspectiva, que no se puede explicar solamente porque se trate de un análisis histórico coyuntural. En el movimiento de la reflexión marxiana, están implícitas, de una parte, la idea de que en la sociedad francesa de ese tiempo no existe sólo el salario, sino varias y diversas otras formas de explotación del trabajo, todos articulados al dominio del capital y en su beneficio. De algún modo, eso prelude la diferenciación entre capital (relación entre capital y salario) y capitalismo (relaciones heterogéneas entre capital y todas las demás formas de trabajo), que confronta anticipadamente a la teoría de la articulación de modos de producción, producida más tarde por el materialismo histórico. De otra parte, la idea según la cual las clases se forman, se desintegran o se consolidan, parcial y temporalmente o de modo definido y permanente, según el curso de las luchas concretas de las gentes concretas disputando el control de cada ámbito del poder. No son estructuras, ni categorías, anteriores a tales conflictos.

Esa línea de reflexión de Marx también está presente en *El Capital*, a pesar de todas sus conocidas ambigüedades. Por eso, la tercera propuesta establece una diferencia básica entre la perspectiva marxiana y la del materialismo histórico. Mientras que en éste las clases sociales son ocupantes de una suerte de nichos estructurales donde son ubicadas y distribuidas las gentes por las relaciones de producción, en Marx se trata de un proceso histórico concreto de clasificación de las gentes. Esto es, un proceso de luchas en que unos logran someter a otros en la disputa por el control del trabajo y de los recursos de producción. En otros términos, las relaciones de producción no son externas, ni anteriores, a las luchas de las gentes, sino el resultado de las luchas entre las gentes por el control del trabajo y de los recursos de producción, de las victorias de los unos y de las derrotas de otros y como resultado de las cuales se ubican y/o son ubicadas, o clasificadas. Esa es, sin duda, la propuesta teórica implicada en el famoso Capítulo sobre La

Llamada Acumulación Originaria.²⁴ De otro modo, la línea de análisis de *El 18 Brumario de Luis Bonaparte*, no tendría sentido.

En la línea marxiana, en consecuencia, las clases sociales no son estructuras, ni categorías, sino relaciones históricas, históricamente producidas y en ese específico sentido históricamente determinadas, aún cuando esa visión está reducida a sólo uno de los ámbitos del poder, el trabajo. En cambio en el materialismo histórico, tal como lo señala E.P. Thompson, se prolonga la visión “estática,” es decir ahistórica, que asigna a las clases sociales la calidad de estructuras establecidas por relaciones de producción que vienen a la existencia por fuera de la subjetividad y de las acciones de las gentes, es decir antes de toda historia.

El materialismo histórico ha reconocido, después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, que en su visión evolucionista y unidireccional de las clases sociales y de las sociedades de clase, hay pendientes problemas complicados. En primer lugar por la reiterada comprobación de que incluso en los “centros”, algunas “clases pre-capitalistas,” el campesinado en particular, no salían, ni parecían dispuestas a salir de la escena histórica del “capitalismo,” mientras otras, las clases medias, tendían a crecer conforme el capitalismo se desarrollaba. En segundo lugar, porque no era suficiente la visión dualista del pasaje entre “precapitalismo” y “capitalismo” respecto de las experiencias del “Tercer Mundo,” donde configuraciones de poder muy complejas y heterogéneas no corresponden a las secuencias y etapas esperadas en la teoría eurocéntrica del capitalismo. Pero no logró encontrar una salida teórica respaldada en la experiencia histórica y arribó apenas a la propuesta de “articulación de modos de producción,” sin abandonar la idea de la secuencia entre ellos. Es decir, tales “articulaciones” no dejan de ser coyunturas de la transición entre los modos “precapitalistas” y el “capitalismo.”²⁵ En otros términos, consisten en la coexistencia—transitoria, por supuesto—del pasado y del presente de su visión histórica !

Al materialismo histórico le es ajena y hostil la idea de que no se trata más de “modos de producción” articulados, sino del capitalismo como estructura mundial de poder dentro del cual y a su servicio, se articulan todas las formas históricamente conocidas de trabajo, de control y de explotación del trabajo. Pero es así, a pesar de todo, como existe el poder capitalista mundial, colonial/moderno. Y eso es, finalmente visible para todos a la hora de la globalización.

¿EL CONCEPTO DE CLASE: DE LA “NATURALEZA” A LA “SOCIEDAD” ?

La idea de “clase” fue introducida en los estudios sobre la “naturaleza” antes que sobre la “sociedad.” Fue el “naturalista” sueco Linneo el primero en usarla en su famosa “clasificación” botánica del siglo XVIII. El descubrió que era posible clasificar a las plantas según el número y la disposición de los estambres de las flores, porque éstas tienden a permanecer sin cambios en el curso de la evolución.²⁶

No pareciera haber sido, y probablemente no fue, básicamente distinta la manera de conocer que llevó, primero a los historiadores franceses del siglo XVIII, después a los saintsimonianos de las primeras décadas del XIX, a diferenciar “clases” de gentes en la población europea. Para Linneo las plantas estaban allí, en el “reino vegetal,” dadas, y a partir de algunas de sus características empíricamente diferenciables, se podía “clasificarlas.” Los que estudiaban y debatían la sociedad de la Europa Centro-Nórdica a fines del s.XVIII y a comienzos del XIX, aplicaron la misma perspectiva a las gentes y encontraron que era posible “clasificarlas” también a partir de sus más constantes características diferenciables, empíricamente, su lugar en los pareados de riqueza y pobreza, mando y obediencia. Fue un hallazgo saintsimoniano descubrir que la fuente principal de esas diferencias estaba en el control del trabajo y sus productos y de los recursos de la naturaleza empleados en el trabajo. Los teóricos del materialismo histórico, desde fines del siglo XIX, no produjeron rupturas o mutaciones decisivas en esa perspectiva de conocimiento

Por supuesto, al transferir el sustantivo *clase* del mundo de la “naturaleza” al de la “sociedad,” era indispensable asociarlo con un adjetivo que legitimara ese desplazamiento: la clase deja de ser botánica y se muta en *social*. Pero dicho desplazamiento fue básicamente semántico. El nuevo adjetivo no podía ser capaz, por sí solo, ni de cortar el cordón umbilical que ataba al recién nacido concepto al vientre naturalista, ni de proporcionarle para su desarrollo una atmósfera epistémica alternativa. En el pensamiento eurocéntrico heredero de la Ilustración Continental,²⁷ la sociedad era un organismo, un orden dado y cerrado. Y las clases sociales fueron, pensadas como categorías ya dadas en la “sociedad,” como ocurría con las clases de plantas en la “Naturaleza.”

Debe tenerse en cuenta, en relación con esas cuestiones, que otros términos que tienen el mismo común origen naturalista, *estructura*, *procesos*,

organismo, en el eurocentrismo pasan al conocimiento social con las mismas ataduras cognoscitivas que el término *clase*. La obvia vinculación entre la idea eurocéntrica de las clases sociales con las ideas de estructura como un orden dado en la sociedad y de proceso como algo que tiene lugar en una estructura, y de todas ellas con las ideas organísticas y sistémicas de la idea de totalidad, ilumina con claridad la persistencia en ellas de todas las marcas cognoscitivas de su origen naturalista y a través de ellas, de su duradera impronta sobre la perspectiva eurocéntrica en el conocimiento histórico-social.

No se podría entender, ni explicar, de otro modo, la idea del materialismo histórico o de las sociólogos de la “sociedad industrial,” según la cual las gentes son “portadoras” de las determinaciones estructurales de clase y deben en consecuencia actuar según ellas. Sus deseos, preferencias, intenciones, voliciones, decisiones y acciones son configuradas según esas determinaciones y deben responder a ellas.

El problema creado por la inevitable distancia entre ese presupuesto y la subjetividad y la conducta externa de las gentes así “clasificadas,” sobre todo entre las “clases” dominadas, encontró en el materialismo histórico una imposible solución: era un problema de la conciencia y ésta sólo podía ser o llevada a los explotados por los intelectuales burgueses (Kautsky-Lenin) como el polen es llevado a las plantas por las abejas. O irse elaborando y desarrollando en una progresión orientada hacia una imposible “conciencia posible” (Lukacs).²⁸

REDUCCIONISMO Y AHISTORICIDAD EN LA TEORÍA EUROCENTRICA DE LAS CLASES SOCIALES.

La impronta naturalista, positivista y marxo-positivista de la teoría eurocéntrica de las clases sociales, implica también dos cuestiones cruciales: (1) En su origen la teoría de las clases sociales está pensada exclusivamente sobre la base de la experiencia europea, la cual a su vez está pensada, por supuesto, según la perspectiva eurocéntrica, es decir distorsionante. (2) Por esa misma razón, para los saintsimonianos y para sus herederos del materialismo histórico, las únicas diferencias que son percibidas entre los europeos como realmente significativas—una vez abolidas las jerarquías nobiliarias por la Revolución Francesa—se refieren a la riqueza/pobreza y al mando/obediencia. Y esas diferencias remiten, de un lado, al lugar y a los roles de las gentes respecto del control del trabajo y de los recursos que en la naturaleza sirven para trabajar, todo lo cual será a su tiempo nombrado como

“relaciones de producción.” De otro lado, a los lugares y roles de las gentes en el control de la autoridad, ergo, del Estado. Las otras diferencias que en la población europea de los siglos XVIII y XIX estaban vinculadas a diferencias de poder, principalmente sexo y edad, en esa perspectiva son “naturales,” es decir hacen parte de la clasificación en la “naturaleza.”

En otros términos, la teoría eurocéntrica sobre las clases sociales, y no solamente en el materialismo histórico marxo-positivista, o entre los weberianos o en los descendientes de ambos, sino en el propio Marx, es reduccionista: se refiere única y exclusivamente a uno sólo de los ámbitos del poder, el control del trabajo y de sus recursos y productos. Y eso es especialmente notable sobre todo en Marx y sus herederos, pues no obstante que su propósito formal es estudiar, entender y cambiar o destruir el poder en la sociedad, todas las otras instancias de la existencia social donde se forman relaciones de poder entre las gentes no son consideradas en absoluto o son consideradas sólo como derivativas de las “relaciones de producción” y determinadas por ellas.

Todo aquello significa que la idea de clases sociales es elaborada en el pensamiento eurocéntrico, entre fines del siglo XVIII y fines del XIX, cuando ya la percepción de la totalidad desde Europa, por entonces el “centro” del mundo capitalista, ya ha sido definitivamente organizada como una dualidad histórica: *Europa* (y en el caso, sobre todo Europa Central e Inglaterra) y *No-Europa*. Y esa dualidad implicaba, además, que mucho de todo lo que era No-Europa, aunque existía en el mismo escenario temporal, en realidad correspondía al pasado de un tiempo lineal cuyo punto de llegada era (es), obviamente, Europa.

En No-Europa existían en ese mismo momento, siglo XIX, todas las formas no-salariales del trabajo. Pero desde el saintsimonismo hasta hoy, en el eurocentrismo son el pasado “precapitalista” o “pre-industrial.” Es decir, esas clases sociales son “precapitalistas” o no existen. En No-Europa habían sido impuestas identidades “raciales” no-europeas o “no-blancas.” Pero ellas, como la edad o el género entre los “europeos,” corresponden a diferencias “naturales” de poder entre “europeos” y “no-europeos.” En Europa están en formación o ya están formadas las instituciones “modernas” de autoridad: los “estados-nación modernos” y sus respectivas “identidades.” En No-Europa sólo son percibidas las tribus y las etnias, el pasado “pre-moderno,” pues. Ellas serán reemplazadas en algún futuro por Estados-Nación-como-en-

Europa. Europa es civilizada. No-Europa es primitiva. El sujeto racional es Europeo. No-Europa es objeto de conocimiento. Como corresponde, la ciencia que estudiaría a los Europeos se llamará "Sociología." La que estudiaría a los No-Europeos se llamará "Etnografía."

¿ TEORIA DE LAS CLASES SOCIALES O TEORIA DE LA CLASIFICACION SOCIAL ?

A esta altura del debate no es, pues, suficiente mantenerse en los conocidos parámetros, porque eso no agota la cuestión, ni resuelve los problemas planteados en el conocimiento y en la acción. Limitarse a insistir que es necesario historizar la cuestión de las clases sociales, es decir, referirla a la historia concreta de gentes concretas, en lugar de mantener una visión "estática" o ahistórica de las clases sociales, o poner a Weber en lugar de Marx o explorar sus entrecruzamientos viables como suele hacerse en la sociología escolar, ya es inconducente. En cualquiera de esas opciones y en todas juntas, se trata sólo de clasificar a las gentes por algunas de sus dadas características diferenciales y no hay realmente nada fundamental que ganar si son tales o cuales las características que se escogen, o deben ser escogidas, para que la operación clasificatoria resulte menos "ideológica" y más "objetiva."

Con la clasificación de los elementos de la "naturaleza" lo que importaba era, como correspondía a la racionalidad cartesiana, descubrir las "propiedades" que "definen," es decir distinguen y al mismo tiempo emparentan a determinados "objetos" entre sí, o en otras palabras los distinguen individualmente y muestran su género próximo y su diferencia específica. Pero con la cuestión de las clases sociales, lo que realmente está en juego y lo estuvo desde el comienzo en el propósito de quienes introdujeron la idea, es algo radicalmente distinto: la cuestión del poder en la sociedad. Y el problema es que ninguna de aquellas opciones, ni juntas, ni por separado, son aptas para permitir aprehender e indagar la constitución histórica del poder y mucho menos la del poder capitalista, mundial y colonial/moderno.

Por todo eso, es pertinente salir de la eurocéntrica teoría de las clases sociales y avanzar hacia una teoría histórica de la clasificación social. El concepto de clasificación social, en esta propuesta, se refiere a los procesos de largo plazo en los cuales las gentes disputan por el control de los ámbitos básicos de existencia social y de cuyos resultados se configura un patrón de distribución del poder centrado en relaciones de explotación/dominación/conflicto entre la población de una sociedad y en una historia determinadas.

Fue ya señalado que el poder, en este enfoque, es una malla de relaciones de explotación/dominación/conflicto que se configuran entre las gentes en la disputa por el control del trabajo, de la "naturaleza," del sexo, de la subjetividad y de la autoridad. Por lo tanto, el poder no se reduce a las "relaciones de producción," ni al "orden y autoridad," separadas o juntas. Y la clasificación social se refiere a los lugares y a los roles de las gentes en el control del trabajo, sus recursos (incluidos los de la "naturaleza") y sus productos; del sexo y sus productos; de la subjetividad y de sus productos (ante todo el imaginario y el conocimiento); y de la autoridad, sus recursos y sus productos.

En ese sentido específico, toda posible teoría de la clasificación social de las gentes, requiere necesariamente indagar por la historia, las condiciones y las determinaciones de una dada distribución de relaciones de poder en una sociedad.

Porque es esa distribución del poder entre las gentes de una sociedad lo que las *clasifica socialmente*, determina sus recíprocas relaciones y genera sus diferencias sociales, ya que sus características empíricamente observables y diferenciables son resultados de esas relaciones de poder, sus señales y sus huellas. Se puede partir de éstas para un primer momento y un primer nivel de aprehensión de las relaciones de poder, pero no tiene sentido hacer residir en ellas la naturaleza de su lugar en la sociedad. Es decir, su *clase social*.

HETEROGENEIDAD DE LA CLASIFICACION SOCIAL

Desde América, en el capitalismo mundial, colonial/moderno, las gentes se clasifican y son clasificadas según tres líneas diferentes, pero articuladas en una estructura global común por la colonialidad del poder: trabajo, raza, género. La edad no llega a ser insertada de modo equivalente en las relaciones societales de poder, pero sí en determinados ámbitos del poder. Y en torno de dos ejes centrales: el control de la producción de recursos de sobrevivencia social y el control de la reproducción biológica de la especie. El primero implica el control de la fuerza de trabajo, de los recursos y productos del trabajo, lo que incluye los recursos "naturales" y se institucionaliza como "propiedad." El segundo, implica el control del sexo y de sus productos (placer y descendencia), en función de la "propiedad." La "raza" fue incorporada en el capitalismo eurocentrado en función de ambos ejes. Y el control de la autoridad se organiza para garantizar las relaciones de poder así configuradas.

En esa perspectiva, las “clases sociales” resultantes son heterogéneas, discontinuas, conflictivas. Y están articuladas también de modo heterogéneo, discontinuo y conflictivo. La colonialidad del poder es el eje que las articula en una estructura común de poder, como podrá ser mostrado más adelante.

En tanto que todos los elementos que concurren a la constitución de un patrón de poder son de origen, forma y carácter discontinuos, heterogéneos, contradictorios y conflictivos en el espacio y en el tiempo, es decir cambian o pueden cambiar en cada una de esas instancias en función de sus cambiantes relaciones con cada uno de los otros, las relaciones de poder no son, no pueden ser, una suerte de nichos estructurales pre-existentes en donde las gentes son distribuidas, de los cuales asumen tales o cuales características y se comportan o deben comportarse acordemente.

El modo como las gentes llegan a ocupar total o parcialmente, transitoria o establemente, un lugar y un papel respecto del control de las instancias centrales del poder, es conflictivo. Es decir, consiste en una disputa, violenta o no, en derrotas y en victorias, en resistencias y en avances y en retrocesos. Ocurre en términos individuales y/o colectivos, con lealtades y traiciones, persistencias y deserciones. Y puesto que toda estructura de relaciones es una articulación de discontinuos, heterogéneos y conflictivos ámbitos y dimensiones, los lugares y los papeles no necesariamente tienen o pueden tener las mismas ubicaciones y relaciones en cada ámbito de la existencia social, o en cada momento del respectivo espacio/tiempo. Esto es, las gentes pueden tener, por ejemplo, un lugar y un papel respecto del control del trabajo y otro diferente y hasta opuesto respecto del control del sexo o de la subjetividad, o en las instituciones de autoridad. Y no siempre los mismos en el curso del tiempo.

Desde ese punto de vista, la idea eurocéntrica de que las gentes que en un dado momento de un patrón de poder ocupan ciertos lugares y ejercen ciertos roles, constituyan por esos sólo factores una comunidad o un sujeto histórico, apunta en una dirección históricamente inconducente. Semejante idea sólo sería admisible si fuera posible admitir también que tales gentes ocupan lugares y cumplen papeles simétricamente consistentes entre sí en cada una de las instancias centrales del poder.

La distribución de las gentes en las relaciones de poder tiene, en consecuencia, el carácter de procesos de clasificación, des-clasificación y re-clasificación social de una población, es decir de aquella articulada dentro de un

patrón societal de poder de larga duración. No se trata aquí solamente del hecho de que las gentes cambian y pueden cambiar su lugar y sus papeles en un patrón de poder, sino de que tal patrón como tal está siempre en cuestión, puesto que las gentes están disputando todo el tiempo, y los recursos, razones y necesidades de esos conflictos nunca son los mismos en cada momento de una larga historia. En otros términos, el poder está siempre en estado de conflicto y en procesos de distribución y de redistribución. Sus períodos históricos pueden ser distinguidos, precisamente, en relación a tales procesos.

LA PRODUCCION DEL SUJETO COLECTIVO

Dejo para otro trabajo el debate más detenido sobre la cuestión del “sujeto histórico” que ha sido puesto en la mesa por las corrientes postmodernistas. Por el momento creo necesario indicar, apenas, primero mi escepticismo respecto de la noción de “sujeto histórico” porque remite, quizás inevitablemente, a la herencia hegeliana no del todo “invertida” en el materialismo histórico. Esto es, a una cierta mirada teleológica de la historia y a un “sujeto” orgánico o sistémico portador del movimiento respectivo, orientado en una dirección ya determinada. Tal “sujeto” sólo puede existir, en todo caso, no como histórico, sino, bien al contrario, como metafísico.

De otro lado, sin embargo, la simple negación de toda posibilidad de subjetificación de un conjunto de gentes, de su constitución como sujeto colectivo bajo ciertas condiciones y durante un cierto tiempo, va directamente contra la experiencia histórica, si no admite que lo que puede llamarse “sujeto,” no sólo colectivo, sino inclusive individual, está siempre constituido por elementos heterogéneos y discontinuos y que llega a ser una unidad sólo cuando esos elementos se articulan en torno de un eje específico, bajo condiciones concretas, respecto de necesidades concretas y de modo transitorio.

De una propuesta alternativa al eurocentrismo no se desprende, en consecuencia, que una población afectada en un momento y una forma del proceso de clasificación social, no llegue a tener los rasgos de un grupo real, de una comunidad y de un sujeto social. Pero tales rasgos sólo se constituyen como parte y resultado de una historia de conflictos, de un patrón de memoria asociado a esa historia y que es percibido como una identidad y que produce una voluntad y una decisión de trenzar las heterogéneas y discontinuas experiencias particulares en una articulación subjetiva colectiva,

que se constituye en un elemento de las relaciones reales materiales.

Las luchas colectivas de sectores de trabajadores, que llegan a organizarse en sindicatos, en partidos políticos; o las de identidades llamadas “nacionales” y/o “étnicas”; de comunidades inclusive mucho más amplias que se agrupan como identidades religiosas y que son perdurables por largos plazos, son ejemplos históricos de tales procesos de subjetificación de amplias y heterogéneas poblaciones, que son incluso discontinuos en el tiempo y en el espacio. Y, muy notablemente, aquellas identidades que han llegado a constituirse en los últimos 500 años, precisamente, en torno de las “razas.”²⁹

Sin embargo, no todos los procesos de subjetificación social o de constitución de sujetos colectivos, pueden ser reconocidos como procesos de clasificación societal. Y en algunos de los casos se trata restrictamente de un problema de formación de identidades, de un proceso identitario que no pone en cuestión para nada esas instancias de poder societal. *Desde nuestra perspectiva, sólo los procesos de subjetificación cuyo sentido es el conflicto en torno de la explotación/dominación, constituye un proceso de clasificación social.*

En el capitalismo mundial, son la cuestión del trabajo, de la “raza” y del “género,” las tres instancias centrales respecto de las cuales se ordenan las relaciones de explotación/dominación/conflicto. Ergo, los procesos de clasificación social consistirán, de todos modos, en procesos donde esas tres instancias se asocian o se disocian respecto del complejo explotación/dominación/conflicto.. De las tres instancias, es el trabajo, esto es, la explotación/dominación, lo que se ubica como el ámbito central y permanente. La dominación hace posible la explotación y no se la encuentra sino muy raramente actuando por separado. Las otras instancias son, ante todo, instancias de dominación, ya que la explotación sexual, específicamente, es discontinua. Esto es, mientras que la relación de explotación/dominación entre capital-trabajo es continua, el mismo tipo de relación varón-mujer no ocurre en todos los casos, ni en todas las circunstancias, no es, pues, continua. Así mismo, en la relación entre “razas” se trata, ante todo, de dominación. En fin, la articulación entre instancias de explotación y de dominación es heterogénea y discontinua. Y por lo mismo, la clasificación social como un proceso en el cual las tres instancias están asociadas/disociadas, tiene también, necesariamente, esas características.

Una idea, que originalmente fue propuesta con claro carácter histórico

por Marx, fue posteriormente mistificada en el materialismo histórico: el *interés de clase*. En la medida en que la idea de clase se hizo reduccionista y se ahistorizó, el interés de clase en el capitalismo fue reducido a la relación entre capital y salario. Los de los demás trabajadores, fueron siempre vistos como secundarios y susceptibles de ser subordinados a los de los asalariados obreros y en particular de la llamada clase obrera industrial.³⁰

¿Qué ocurre, sin embargo, si se asume, como es imperativo hoy, que el capitalismo articula y explota a los trabajadores bajo todas las formas de trabajo y que los mecanismos de dominación usados para ese efecto, “raza,” “género,” son usados diferenciadamente en ese heterogéneo universo de trabajadores? En primer término, el concepto de interés de clase requiere ser también pensado en términos de su heterogeneidad histórico-estructural. En seguida, es necesario establecer, en cada momento y en cada contexto específico, el eje común de relación de explotación/dominación/conflicto entre todos los trabajadores, sometidos a todas las formas de trabajo y a todas las formas de dominación, con el capital y sus funcionarios.

Por esas razones, acerca de la clasificación social o procesos de subjetificación social frente a la explotación/dominación, la cuestión central es la determinación de las condiciones históricas específicas respecto de las cuales es posible percibir los modos, los niveles y los límites de la asociación de las gentes implicadas en esas tres instancias (trabajo, “género” y “raza”), en un período y en un contexto específicos.

De todos modos, ningún proceso de clasificación social, de subjetificación de las gentes frente al capitalismo, podrá ser suficientemente seguro para reproducirse y sostenerse por el periodo necesario para llevar a las víctimas de la explotación/dominación capitalista a su liberación, si desde la perspectiva inmediata de las gentes concretas implicadas, esas tres instancias son percibidas y manejadas de modo separado o peor en conflicto. No por acaso, mantener, acentuar y exasperar entre los explotados/dominados la percepción de esas diferenciadas situaciones en relación al trabajo, a la “raza” y al “género,” ha sido y es un medio extremadamente eficaz de los capitalistas para mantener el control del poder. La colonialidad del poder ha tenido en esta historia el papel central.

En la historia conocida antes del capitalismo mundial, se puede verificar

que en las relaciones de poder, ciertos atributos de la especie han jugado un papel principal en la clasificación social de las gentes: sexo, edad y fuerza de trabajo son sin duda los más antiguos. Desde América, se añadió el fenotipo.

El sexo y la edad son atributos biológicos diferenciales, aunque su lugar en las relaciones de explotación/dominación/conflicto está asociado a la elaboración de dichos atributos como categorías sociales. En cambio la fuerza de trabajo y el fenotipo, no son atributos biológicos diferenciales. El color de la piel, la forma y el color del cabello, de los ojos, la forma y el tamaño de la nariz, etc., no tienen ninguna consecuencia en la estructura biológica de la persona, y ciertamente menos aún en sus capacidades históricas. Y, del mismo modo, ser trabajador “manual” o “intelectual” no tiene relación con la estructura biológica. En otros términos, el papel que cada uno de esos elementos juega en la clasificación social, esto es, en la distribución del poder, no tiene nada que ver con la biología, ni con la “naturaleza.” Tal papel es el resultado de las disputas por el control de los ámbitos sociales. Por lo mismo, la “naturalización” de las categorías sociales que dan cuenta del lugar de esos elementos en el poder, es un desnudo producto histórico-social.

El hecho de que las categorías que identifican lugares y papeles en las relaciones de poder, tengan todas la pretensión de ser simplemente nombres de fenómenos “naturales,” tengan o no alguna referencia real en la “naturaleza,” es una indicación muy eficaz de que el poder, todo poder, requiere ese mecanismo subjetivo para su reproducción. Y es interesante preguntarse porqué.

Mientras la producción social de la categoría “género” a partir del sexo, es sin duda la más antigua en la historia social, la producción de la categoría “raza” a partir del fenotipo, es relativamente reciente y su plena incorporación a la clasificación de las gentes en las relaciones de poder tiene apenas 500 años, comienza con América y la mundialización del patrón de poder capitalista.³¹

Las diferencias fenotípicas entre vencedores y vencidos han sido usadas como justificación de la producción de la categoría “raza,” aunque se trata, ante todo, de una elaboración de las relaciones de dominación como tales. La importancia y la significación de la producción de esta categoría para el patrón mundial de poder capitalista eurocéntrico y colonial/moderno, difícilmente podría ser exagerada: la atribución de las nuevas identidades

sociales resultantes y su distribución en las relaciones del poder mundial capitalista, se estableció y se reprodujo como la forma básica de la clasificación societal universal del capitalismo mundial, y como el fundamento de las nuevas identidades geo-culturales y de sus relaciones de poder en el mundo. Y, así mismo, llegó a ser el trasfondo de la producción de las nuevas relaciones intersubjetivas de dominación y de una perspectiva de conocimiento mundialmente impuesta como la única racional.

La “racialización” de las relaciones de poder entre las nuevas identidades sociales y geo-culturales, fue el sustento y la referencia legitimatoria fundamental del carácter eurocentrado del patrón de poder, material e intersubjetivo. Es decir, de su colonialidad. Se convirtió, así, en el más específico de los elementos del patrón mundial de poder capitalista eurocentrado y colonial/moderno y pervadió cada una de las áreas de la existencia social del patrón de poder mundial, eurocentrado, colonial/moderno.

Hace falta estudiar y establecer de modo sistemático (no sistémico) las implicaciones de la colonialidad del poder en el mundo capitalista. En los límites de este texto, me restringiré a proponer un esquema de las principales cuestiones.

I. COLONIALIDAD DE LA CLASIFICACION SOCIAL UNIVERSAL DEL MUNDO CAPITALISTA

(1) Lo que comenzó con América fue mundialmente impuesto. La población de todo el mundo fue clasificada, ante todo, en identidades “raciales” y dividida entre los dominantes/superiores “europeos” y los dominados/inferiores “no-europeos.”

(2) Las diferencias fenotípicas fueron usadas, definidas, como expresión externa de las diferencias “raciales.” En un primer período, principalmente el “color” de la piel y del cabello y la forma y el color de los ojos. Más tarde, en los siglos XIX y XX, también otros rasgos como la forma de la cara, el tamaño del cráneo, la forma y el tamaño de la nariz.

(3) El “color” de la piel fue definido como la marca “racial” diferencial más significativa, por más visible, entre los dominantes/superiores o “europeos,” de un lado, y el conjunto de los dominados/inferiores “no-europeos,” del otro lado.

(4) De ese modo, se adjudicó a los dominadores/superiores “europeos” el atributo de “raza blanca” y a todos los dominados/inferiores “no-europeos,” el atributo de “razas de color.”³² La escalera de gradación entre el “blanco” de

la “raza blanca” y cada uno de los otros “colores” de la piel, fue asumida como una gradación entre lo superior y lo inferior en la clasificación social “racial.”

II. COLONIALIDAD DE LA ARTICULACION POLITICA Y GEO-CULTURAL

(1) Los territorios y las organizaciones políticas de base territorial, colonizadas parcial o totalmente, o no colonizadas, fueron clasificados en el patrón eurocentrado del capitalismo colonial/moderno, precisamente, según el lugar que las “razas” y sus respectivos “colores” tenían en cada caso. Así se articuló el poder entre “Europa,” “América,” “Africa,” “Asia” y mucho más tarde “Oceanía.” Eso facilitó la “naturalización” del control eurocentrado de los territorios, de los recursos de producción en la “naturaleza.” Y cada una de esas categorías impuestas desde el eurocentro del poder, ha terminado finalmente admitida hasta hoy, para la mayoría, como expresión de la “naturaleza” y de la geografía, no de la historia del poder en el planeta.

(2) Los grupos dominantes de las “razas” no-“blancas,” fueron sometidos a ser tributarios, es decir, intermediarios en la cadena de transferencia de valor y de riquezas de la “periferia colonial” al “eurocentro,” o asociados dependientes.

(3) Los estados-nación del centro se constituyeron teniendo como contrapartida los estados-coloniales, primero y los estados-nacional dependientes después. Como parte de esa relación, los procesos de ciudadanía, de representación desigual pero real de los diversos sectores sociales, la retribución en servicios públicos de la producción y de la tributación de los trabajadores (llamado Welfare State), no ha dejado de ser, en definitiva, privilegio del centro, porque su costo se paga en muy amplia medida por la explotación del trabajo de la periferia colonial en condiciones no democráticas y no nacionales, esto es como sobre-explotación.

(4) Debido a esas determinaciones, todas los países cuyas poblaciones son en su mayoría víctimas de relaciones “racista/etnicistas” de poder, no han logrado salir de la “periferia colonial” en la disputa por el “desarrollo.” Y los países que han llegado a incorporarse al “centro” o están en camino hacia allí, son aquellos cuyas sociedades o no tienen relaciones de colonialidad, porque, precisamente, no fueron colonias europeas, o de modo muy corto y muy parcial (Japón, Taiwan, China), o donde las poblaciones colonizadas fueron en un comienzo minorías pequeñas, como los “negros” al formarse Estados Unidos de América del Norte, o donde las poblaciones aborígenes fueron

reducidas a minorías aisladas, si no exterminadas, como Estados Unidos, Canada, Australia, Nueva Zelandia.³³

(5) De allí se desprende, de nuevo, que la colonialidad del poder implica, en las relaciones internacionales de poder y en las relaciones internas dentro de los países, lo que en América Latina ha sido denominada como dependencia histórico-estructural.

III. COLONIALIDAD DE LA DISTRIBUCION MUNDIAL DEL TRABAJO

No menos decisiva para el capitalismo eurocentrado colonial/moderno, fue la distribución mundial de trabajo en torno de la colonialidad del poder.

El capitalismo ha organizado la explotación del trabajo en un complejo engranaje mundial, en torno del predominio de la relación capital-salario. Para muchos de los teóricos, en eso consiste todo el capitalismo. Todo lo demás es pre-capitalista y, de esa manera, externo al capital. Sin embargo, desde América sabemos que la acumulación capitalista hasta aquí no ha prescindido en momento alguno de la colonialidad del poder.³⁴ El esquema de un mundo capitalista dualmente ordenado en “centro” y “periferia,” no es arbitrario precisamente por esa razón, aunque probablemente habría sido mejor pensar en “centro colonial” y “periferia colonial” (en el sentido de la colonialidad y no sólo, y no tanto, del colonialismo), para evitar la secreción “naturalista,” físico-geográfica de la imagen.

En el “centro” (eurocentro), la forma dominante, no sólo estructuralmente, sino también, a largo plazo, demográficamente, de la relación capital-trabajo, fue salarial. Es decir, la relación salarial fue, principalmente, “blanca.” En la “periferia colonial,” en cambio, la relación salarial fue con el tiempo estructuralmente dominante, pero siempre minoritaria en la demografía como en todo lo demás, mientras que las más extendidas y sectorialmente dominantes fueron todas las otras formas de explotación del trabajo: esclavitud, servidumbre, producción mercantil simple, reciprocidad. Pero todas ellas estuvieron, desde la partida, articulados bajo el dominio del capital y en su beneficio.

Globalmente, la relación salarial ha sido siempre, hoy inclusive, la menos extendida geográfica y demográficamente. El universo mundial del trabajo y de los trabajadores del capital fue, en cambio diverso y heterogéneo. En consecuencia, las “clases sociales” entre la población del mundo no sólo no se redujeron al lugar de las gentes en el control del trabajo y de sus productos,

sino que inclusive en ese restringido ámbito, quedaron ordenadas sobre la base principal de la colonialidad del poder.

En el Eurocentro, pensado de modo aislado y separado de la “periferia colonial,” la clasificación social apareció, inevitablemente, sólo en relación al trabajo, ya que los “europeos” no se percibían aún como “racialmente” diferenciados, como, en cambio, no dejarían de percibirse hoy, cuando las poblaciones víctimas de la colonialidad del poder han logrado instalarse en las sedes originales de los colonizadores. Las “clases sociales” fueron, por eso, conceptualmente separadas y diferenciadas de las “razas,” y sus recíprocas relaciones fueron pensadas como externas.

Globalmente, sin embargo, como fue siempre la condición misma de existencia del capitalismo, las “clases sociales” fueron diferenciadamente distribuidas entre la población del planeta, sobre la base de la colonialidad del poder: En el “Eurocentro”: los dominantes son Capitalistas. Los dominados son los asalariados, clases medias, campesinos independientes. En la “Periferia Colonial,” los dominantes son Capitalistas Tributarios y/o Asociados Dependientes.. Los dominados son: esclavos, siervos, pequeños productores mercantiles independientes, reciprocantes, asalariados, clases medias, campesinos.

Esa clasificación social diferenciada entre el centro y la periferia colonial, ha sido el mecanismo central del engranaje de acumulación global en beneficio del centro. De hecho, es lo que ha permitido producir, mantener y costear la lealtad de los explotados/dominados “blancos” frente a las “razas,” ante todo en la “periferia colonial,” pero también dentro del “centro,” como no ha terminado de ocurrir sobre todo en Estados Unidos.

IV. COLONIALIDAD DE LAS RELACIONES DE GENERO

Las relaciones entre los “géneros” fueron también ordenadas en torno de la colonialidad del poder.

(1) En todo el mundo colonial, las normas y los patrones formal-ideales de comportamiento sexual de los géneros y en consecuencia los patrones de organización familiar de los “europeos” fueron directamente fundados en la clasificación “racial”: la libertad sexual de los varones y la fidelidad de las mujeres fue, en todo el mundo eurocentrado, la contrapartida del “libre”—esto es, no pagado como en la prostitución, más antigua en la his-

toria—acceso sexual de los varones “blancos” a las mujeres “negras” e “indias,” en América, “negras” en el Africa, y de los otros “colores” en el resto del mundo sometido.

(2) En Europa, en cambio, fue la prostitución de las mujeres la contrapartida del patrón de familia burguesa.

(3) La unidad e integración familiar, impuestas como ejes del patrón de familia burguesa del mundo eurocentrado, fue la contrapartida de la continuada desintegración de las unidades de parentesco padres-hijos en las “razas” no-“blancas,” apropiables y distribuibles no sólo como mercancías, sino directamente como “animales. En particular, entre los esclavos “negros,” ya que sobre ellos esa forma de dominación fue más explícita, inmediata y prolongada.

(4) La característica hipocresía subyacente a las normas y valores formal-ideales de la familia burguesa, no es, desde entonces, ajena a la colonialidad del poder.

V. COLONIALIDAD DE LAS RELACIONES CULTURALES O INTERSUBJETIVAS

Ya quedaron anotadas muchas de las implicaciones mayores de la hegemonía del eurocentrismo en las relaciones culturales, intersubjetivas en general, en el mundo del capitalismo colonial/moderno.³⁵ Aquí apenas vale apuntar lo siguiente:

(1) En todas las sociedades donde la colonización implicó la destrucción de la estructura societal, la población colonizada fue despojada de sus saberes intelectuales y de sus medios de expresión exteriorizantes u objetivantes. Fueron reducidos a la condición de gentes rurales e iletradas.

(2) En las sociedades donde la colonización no logró la total destrucción societal, las herencias intelectual y estética visual no pudieron ser destruidas. Pero fue impuesta la hegemonía de la perspectiva eurocéntrica en las relaciones intersubjetivas con los dominados.

(3) A largo plazo en todo el mundo eurocentrado se fue imponiendo la hegemonía del modo eurocéntrico de percepción y de producción de conocimiento y en una parte muy amplia de la población mundial el propio imaginario fue, demostradamente, colonizado.

(4) Last but not least, la hegemonía eurocéntrica en la cultura del mundo capitalista, ha implicado una manera mistificada de percepción de

la realidad, lo mismo en el “centro” que en la “periferia colonial.” Pero sus efectos en la última, en el conocimiento y en la acción, han sido casi siempre históricamente conducentes a callejones sin salida. La cuestión nacional, la cuestión de la revolución, la cuestión de la democracia son sus emblemáticos ejemplos.

VI. DOMINACION/EXPLOTACION, COLONIALIDAD Y CORPOREIDAD

Hay una relación clara entre la explotación y la dominación: No toda dominación implica explotación. Pero ésta no es posible sin aquella. La dominación es, por lo tanto, sine qua non del poder, de todo poder.. Esta es una vieja constante histórica. La producción de un imaginario mitológico es uno de sus más característicos mecanismos. La “naturalización” de las instituciones y categorías que ordenan las relaciones de poder que han sido impuestas por los vencedores/ dominadores, ha sido hasta ahora su procedimiento específico.

En el capitalismo eurocentrado, es sobre la base de la “naturalización” de la colonialidad de poder que la cultura universal fue impregnada de mitología y de mistificación en la elaboración de fenómenos de la realidad. La lealtad “racial” de los “blancos” frente a las otras “razas,” ha servido como la piedra angular de la lealtad, incluso “nacional,” de los explotados y dominados “blancos” respecto de sus explotadores en todo el mundo y en primer término en el “eurocentro.”³⁶

La “naturalización” mitológica de las categorías básicas de la explotación/ dominación es un instrumento de poder excepcionalmente poderoso. El ejemplo más conocido es la producción del “género” como si fuera idéntico a sexo. Muchas gentes piensan que ocurre lo mismo con “raza” respecto, sobre todo, de “color.” Pero esta es una radical confusión. Después de todo, el sexo es realmente un atributo biológico (implica procesos biológicos) y algo tiene que ver con “género.” Pero “color” es, literalmente, un invento eurocéntrico en tanto que referencia “natural” o biológica de “raza,” ya que nada tiene que hacer con la biología. Y, encima, el “color” en la sociedad colonial/moderna no siempre ha sido el más importante de los elementos de racialización efectiva o de los proyectos de racialización, como en el caso de los “arios” respecto de los demás “blancos,” incluidos los “blancos” “judíos,” y más recientemente, en los procesos de “racialización” de las relaciones israelo-árabes. Estas son, si falta hiciera, eficientes demostraciones históricas del carácter estrictamente mítico-social de la relación entre “color” y “raza.”³⁷

“Raza” es una categoría cuyo origen intersubjetivo es, en ese sentido, demostrable.³⁸ ¿Porqué entonces ha llegado a ser tan presente en la sociedad “moderna,” tan profundamente introyectado en el imaginario mundial como si fuera realmente “natural” y material?

Sugiero un camino de indagación: porque implica algo muy material, el “cuerpo” humano. La “corporalidad” es el nivel decisivo de las relaciones de poder. Porque el “cuerpo” mienta la “persona,” si se libera el concepto de “cuerpo” de las implicaciones mistificadoras del antiguo “dualismo” eurocéntrico, en especial judeo-cristiano (alma-cuerpo, psiquis-cuerpo, etc.). Y eso es lo que hace posible la “naturalización” de tales relaciones sociales. En la explotación, es el “cuerpo” el que es usado y consumido en el trabajo y, en la mayor parte del mundo, en la pobreza, en el hambre, en la malnutrición, en la enfermedad. Es el “cuerpo” el implicado en el castigo, en la represión, en las torturas y en las masacres durante las luchas contra los explotadores. Pinochet es un nombre de lo que le ocurre a los explotados en su “cuerpo” cuando son derrotados en esas luchas. En las relaciones de género, se trata del “cuerpo.” En la “raza,” la referencia es al “cuerpo,” el “color” presume el “cuerpo.”

Hoy, la lucha contra la explotación/dominación implica sin duda, en primer término, la lucha por la destrucción de la colonialidad del poder, no sólo para terminar con el racismo, sino por su condición de eje articulador del patrón universal del capitalismo eurocentrado. Esa lucha es parte de la destrucción del poder capitalista, por ser hoy la trama viva de todas las formas históricas de explotación, dominación, discriminación, materiales e intersubjetivas. El lugar central de la “corporeidad” en este plano, lleva a la necesidad de pensar, de repensar, vías específicas para su liberación, esto es, para la liberación de las gentes, individualmente y en sociedad, del poder, de todo poder. Y la experiencia histórica hasta aquí apunta a que no hay camino distinto que la socialización radical del poder para llegar a ese resultado. Eso significa la devolución a las gentes mismas, de modo directo e inmediato, el control de las instancias básicas de su existencia social: trabajo, sexo, subjetividad, autoridad.

Lima, enero de 1999.

ENDNOTES

¹. Colonialidad es un concepto diferente de, aunque vinculado a, Colonialismo. Este último se refiere estrictamente a una estructura de dominación/explotación donde el control de la autoridad política, de los recursos de producción y del trabajo de una población determinada lo detenta otra de diferente identidad y cuyas sedes centrales están además en otra jurisdicción territorial. Pero no siempre, ni necesariamente, implica relaciones racistas de poder. El Colonialismo es obviamente más antiguo, en tanto que la Colonialidad ha probado ser, en los últimos 500 años, más profunda y duradera que el Colonialismo. Pero sin duda fue engendrada dentro de éste y, más aún, sin él no habría podido ser impuesta en la intersubjetividad del mundo de modo tan enraizado y prolongado. Pablo Gonzáles Casanova y Rodolfo Stavenhagen (respectivamente, *Internal Colonialism and National Development*, en *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Nos. 1-4, 1965 y *Clases, Colonialism and Acculturation*, en *Studies in Comparative International Development*, No. 4-7, 1965) propusieron llamar Colonialismo Interno al poder racista/etnicista que opera dentro de un Estado-Nación. Pero eso tendría sentido sólo desde una perspectiva eurocéntrica sobre el Estado-Nación. Sobre mis propuestas acerca del concepto de colonialidad del poder remito, sobre todo, a mis textos *Colonialidad y Modernidad/Racionalidad*, en PERU INDIGENA, vol.13, No.29, 1991, pp.11-29. Lima, Perú; *Colonialité du Pouvoir et Democratie en Amerique Latine*. FUTURE ANTERIEUR: AMERIQUE LATINE, DEMOCRATIE ET EXCLUSION. L' Harmattan, 1994, Paris, France. *América Latina en la Economía Mundial*. En PROBLEMAS DEL DESARROLLO, VOL. XXIV, No. 95, 1993. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, UNAM, México. Y con Immanuel Wallerstein: *Americanity as a Concept or the Americas in the Modern World System*, en *International Journal of Social Sciences*, No. 134, Nov. 1992, UNESCO-ERES, Paris, France.

². La apropiación del nombre América por Estados Unidos de Norteamérica ha originado una extendida confusión que aquí obliga a recordar que originalmente el nombre correspondía exclusivamente a los dominios ibéricos en este continente, que abarcaban desde Tierra del Fuego hasta más o menos la mitad suroeste del actual territorio de los Estados Unidos.

³. Ver *La Modernidad, el Capitalismo y América Latina nacen el mismo día*. Entrevista al autor en ILLA, No.10, enero 1991. Lima, Perú.

⁴. He discutido antes esas cuestiones en *Modernidad, Identidad y Utopía en América Latina*, Ediciones Sociedad y Política 1988. Lima, Perú (tr. Al Inglés como "The Paradoxes of Modernity," *International Journal of Culture, Politics and Society*, Vol. 3 ,No.2, 1989). Y *Colonialidad y Modernidad/Racionalidad*, en PERU INDIGENA, vol. 13, No. 29, 1991. Lima, Perú.

⁵. Europa es aquí el nombre de una metáfora, no de una zona geográfica y de su población. Se refiere a todo lo que se estableció como una expresión racial/étnica/cultural de Europa, como una prolongación de ella, es decir como un carácter distintivo de la identidad no sometida a la colonialidad del poder.

⁶. Una crítica explícita al evolucionismo unilineal y unidireccional del eurocentrismo está ya presente, por ejemplo, en *El Antimperialismo y el APRA* (escrita según su autor en

1924 aunque su primera edición es de Ercilla 1932, Santiago, Chile) de V.R. Haya de la Torre. Y la percepción de las relaciones económicas de poder en el Perú, implicada en el primero de los *Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana* (Lima 1928) de José Carlos Mariátegui, puede ser considerada como el embrión del concepto de heterogeneidad histórico-estructural elaborado a mediados de los años 60 (Aníbal Quijano: *Notas sobre el concepto de Marginalidad Social*. CEPAL 1966, Santiago, Chile).

⁷. De Raúl Prebisch *Hacia una dinámica del desarrollo latinoamericano*, México, FCE, 1963; *Crítica al capitalismo periférico*, en *Revista de la CEPAL*, 1er. Semestre, 1976; *Capitalismo Periférico, crisis y transformación*. México, FCE 1981. Y de Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*. 3 vols, New York: Academic Press 1974-1989.

⁸. No entraré esta vez en la discusión de los orígenes y fuentes de ese tipo de relaciones sociales.

⁹. El término *filosófico-social* cumple aquí la función de hacer notar que el intenso proceso de renovación del debate filosófico tiene un sello peculiar: no se trata sólo de una prolongación del viejo debate sobre las viejas cuestiones de la metafísica eurocéntrica, sino mucho más de las cuestiones levantadas en el debate histórico-social de los últimos 200 años y en particular en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. El reconocimiento de este rasgo es importante para nosotros, no sólo y no tanto porque indica la influencia de las ciencias sociales sobre la filosofía, sino ante todo porque este debate es vital para la elaboración de una racionalidad alternativa a la eurocéntrica y para la renovación de los fundamentos del conocimiento histórico-social.

¹⁰. En Roland Anrup: *Totalidad Social: ¿Unidad conceptual o unicidad real?* LA REVISTA DE EXTENSION CULTURAL, No. 20, 1985, pp-5-23, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia, una buena revisión de las posiciones en debate y un bien armado ataque contra el concepto de totalidad.

¹¹. El debate sobre el problema de las clases sociales está ya muy cargado de años, aunque se hizo más intenso después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Una incisiva revisión es la de Dale Tomich: *World of Capital/Worlds of Labor: A Global Perspective*, en *Reworking Class*, John Hall ed., Cornell University Press, 1997. Ithaca and London. Sin embargo, probablemente fue la conocida polémica de Ellen Meiskins Wood (*A Retreat from Class: A New "True" Socialism*, Verso 1986, Londres) frente a Ernesto Laclau-Chantal Mouffe (*Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Verso 1985, Londres) lo que dió cuenta del momento de flexión climática mayor de la atmósfera intelectual del llamado "marxismo occidental" respecto de la cuestión de las clases sociales. Desde entonces, se extendió rápidamente el desuso del concepto, como ha ocurrido con casi todos los problemas teóricos centrales del debate precedente. Fueron simplemente sacados del debate y las ideas y conceptos en juego entraron en desuso. Su regreso comienza, más bien rápidamente, con la crisis de hegemonía global, arrastrada por los apetitos predatorios del capital financiero y el desprestigio mundial del neoliberalismo.

¹². *Pensamiento Unico* es el nombre acuñado y reiteradamente usado por Ignacio Ramonet en las páginas de *Le Monde Diplomatique*, que él dirige.

¹³. Frank Parkin, *Marxism and Class Theory. A bourgeois critique*. Columbia University Press, 1979. New York, USA.

^{14.} De Nicos Poulantzas, en especial, *Pouvoir et Classes Sociales*. París, 1968. De Erik Olin Wright, *Class, Crisis and the State*, NLB 1978 y *Classes*, Verso 1985. De E.P. Thompson *The Making of the English Working Class*, Pantheon Books, 1964, *Poverty and Theory*, Londres 1978. En Castellano, los ensayos reunidos bajo el título de *Tradición, Revuelta y Conciencia de Clase*, Ed. Crítica 1984, Barcelona.

^{15.} Acerca del marxopositivismo ver *Theodor Shanin: The Late Marx: The Russian Road*. MRPress, 1984. New York. De la avasalladora influencia del estructuralismo francés en el materialismo histórico después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la obra de Althusser y de los althusserianos es una convincente y conocida demostración. Y de lo devastadora que llegó a ser entre algunos de ellos, seguramente un notorio ejemplo es la obra de Hindess, B. and Hirst, P.Q. : *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*. Routledge 1975, London.

^{16.} Carta a Weydemeyer (Londres 5 de marzo de 1852). En *Marx-Engels: Correspondencia*, pp. 71-74. Editorial Problemas, 1947. Buenos Aires, Argentina.

^{17.} No se puede pasar por alto la intrigante ausencia en Marx de casi toda mención del pensamiento saintsimoniano, en especial de la Exposition de la Doctrine, tanto mayor por el hecho de que usó todos los conceptos básicos y la terminología de esas obras: la lista de clases sociales antagónicas que encabeza el Cap. I del Manifiesto, ya está íntegra en la Exposition (amos y esclavos, patricios y plebeyos, señores y siervos), así como clase obrera, trabajadores asalariados, proletarios. Además, no tiene que forzarse nada la Exposition para encontrar que la perspectiva entera de la relación entre clases sociales e historia y entre la explotación de la clase obrera o proletariado y la revolución para poner punto final a todas las formas de explotación, están ya formuladas allí antes de reaparecer para la posteridad como las claves de la teoría revolucionaria del materialismo histórico. En ese sentido el reconocimiento por Engels (*Del Socialismo Utópico al Socialismo Científico*) de la “genial perspicacia” de Saint-Simon mientras lo ubica entre los “socialistas utópicos,” es tardío e interesado.

^{18.} *Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition, Première Année, 1829-* Nouvelle édition publiée avec Introduction et Notes para C. Bouglé et Elie Halevy. París 1924, pp. 235 ss. (Conocida como la *Exposition de la Doctrine*, fue publicada por Bazard y Enfantin (el llamado Papa Saintsimoniano) antes de que sus frustraciones con la Iglesia Saintsimoniana los llevaran a dedicarse a las grandes construcciones y a Enfantin a montar las bases del sistema bancario francés. Acerca del pensamiento de Saint-Simon y los saintsimonianos, de Aníbal Quijano *La Imagen Saintsimoniana de la Sociedad Industrial*, en REVISTA DE SOCIOLOGIA, No. 1, Departamento de Sociología, Universidad de San Marcos, 1964. Lima, Perú, de donde se toma la cita. Otro texto de esa misma época en el cual ya está formulada la idea de clases sociales es *L'Union Ouvrière*, de Flora Tristan, la franco-peruana que, después de su frustrante estadía en el Perú de comienzos del siglo XIX, se convirtió en agitadora y organizadora de los trabajadores franceses.

^{19.} Shanin, op. cit.

^{20.} Citado en Martin Nicolaus: *Proletariat and Middle Class in Marx*. En *Studies on the Left*, No. 7, 1967.

^{21.} No es otro, obviamente, el sentido de la polémica obra de Lenin contra los “populistas” rusos: *El desarrollo del Capitalismo en Rusia*. Pero también el de algunos sociólogos de la “sociedad industrial,” en particular Ralf Dahrendorf: *Class and Class*

Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford University Press, 1959.

^{22.} La que fue durante más de medio siglo considerada como la más autoritativa de tales propuestas es la Lenin, en la conocida *Una gran iniciativa*, en Marx, Engels, Marxismo, p.479. Editorial Progreso, Moscu.

^{23.} Marx, *El Capital*, vol. III, pg. 817. Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1966. México.

^{24.} *El Capital*, vol. I, Cap. XXIV, pp. 607 ss. Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1966. México

^{25.} Esa línea caracterizó las investigaciones y los debates científico-sociales entre los marxistas estructuralistas franceses durante los años 70 sobre todo (entre otros, Pierre Philippe Rey, Claude Meillassoux). En Inglés, la compilación de Harold Wolpe: *The Articulation of Modes of Production*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, London. En América Latina, una parte de los investigadores optó por una perspectiva diferente, según la cual el capitalismo es una estructura de explotación/dominación donde se articulan todas las formas históricamente conocidas de explotación del trabajo, en torno de un eje común: las relaciones capital-salario. Es la línea seguida en mis propios trabajos, por ejemplo, desde *Lo Cholo en el Conflicto Cultural Peruano*, Lima 1964, en *Imperialismo, Clases Sociales y Estado en el Perú*, de 1973, integrado en el volumen del mismo título. Mosca Azul 1978, Lima, Perú, *Naturaleza, Situación y Tendencias de la Sociedad Peruana*, publicada originalmente por el Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos (CESO), de la Universidad de Chile en 1969. Santiago, Chile. Esa es la perspectiva denominada histórico-estructural, desde mis *Notas sobre el concepto de Marginalidad Social*, originalmente publicadas en CEPAL, 1966, Santiago, Chile.

^{26.} Carlos de Linneo (Carolus Linnaeus en Latín y en sueco Carl Von Linné (1707-1778), el primero en elaborar un sistema de clasificación de los organismos, botánicos en primer término, desde 1730. Ver de James L. Larson: *Reason and Experience: The Representation of Natural Order in the Work of Carl Von Linné*. N.Y 1971.

^{27.} Sobre esta distinción, mi texto *Lo Público y lo Privado: un Enfoque Latinoamericano*. En *Modernidad, Identidad Y Utopía en América Latina*. Lima, 1988.

^{28.} 28 Esta idea tiene un curioso paralelo con la propuesta scheleriana de una relación entre la conducta individual y un reino de “valores,” de carácter ahistórico, pero “material,” es decir, “real.” En Lukacs, la “conciencia posible” tiene para la “clase” una función referencial de horizonte de orientación y de ejemplaridad, nunca plenamente logrado en la historia concreta, como en Scheler la tiene el “valor” respecto de la conducta individual. La “conciencia posible” lukacsiana habita, pues, un reino tan ahistórico como los “valores” schelerianos. No por coincidencia accidental, quizás, pues Max Scheler, no obstante su filiación fenomenológica mientras estaba afanado en esa especulación, apela también a Hegel y a Marx como referencias fundamentales en *El Formalismo en la Etica y la Etica Material de los Valores* (*Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Berlin, 1916). De Georgy Lukacs, *Historia y Conciencia de Clase* (*Geschichte und Klassenwebustsein*, se publicó originalmente en Berlin 1923).

^{29.} Hay una cuestión mayor por indagar sistemáticamente en esa experiencia histórica: que los ejes de articulación que llevan a poblaciones heterogéneas y discontinuas a identificarse diferencialmente de otras de modo muy intenso y muy prolongado, tienen carácter mítico-social: religioso, nacional, étnico, racial.

³⁰. No es ocioso mencionar aquí que ya en el Manifiesto Comunista está explícitamente establecido que el “fantasma del comunismo” recorre Europa, no el resto del mundo y que la liberación del proletariado depende de la acción unida de “por lo menos los países más civilizados.” En otros términos, entonces europeos “occidentales” y “blancos.” Ver mi nota *Un Fantasma recorre el Mundo*, en HUESO HUMERO, No. 34 (en prensa), 1999, Lima, Perú.

³¹. Llevaría a otra parte discutir aquí extensa y específicamente la cuestión racial. Remito a mi estudio “Raza, Etnia, Nación: Cuestiones Abiertas,” En José Carlos Mariátegui y Europa. Amauta 1992, Lima, Perú. Y la literatura de este debate no cesa de crecer. Quizás la más útil entre las publicaciones recientes es la de Jonathan Marks, *Human Biodiversity. Genes, Race and History*. Aldine de Gruyter, 1995, NY, USA. Entre los menos recientes, la compilación de Raymond Mack: *Race, Class, and Power*, American Book Co., 1963. Ciertas almas piadosas quisieran la igualdad entre las “razas,” pero juran que éstas son realmente existentes. Así, en virtualmente todas las universidades de Estados Unidos hay cátedras sobre “Race and Ethnicity” y el servicio de Migraciones tiene una prolija clasificación “racista/ etnicista,” basada en los rasgos fenotípicos, color sobre todo, aunque el gobierno federal haya sido obligado a admitir la igualdad “racial.” Y casi todos los indígenas de otros países que estudiaron en esas universidades y pasaron por ese servicio de migraciones, regresan a sus países convertidos a la religión del “color consciousness” y proclaman la realidad de la “raza.”

³². El proceso de producción social del “color” como el signo principal de una clasificación social universal del mundo colonial/moderno y eurocentrado del capitalismo, es todavía una cuestión cuya investigación histórica sistemática está por hacerse. Aquí es indispensable señalar que antes de América el “color” no se registra como clasificador de las gentes en las relaciones de poder. El eurocentramiento del nuevo patrón de poder no fue, sin duda, inevitable. Pero fue su establecimiento lo que dió origen, explicación y sentido a la imposición de la categoría “raza” y del “color” como su marca externa, desde el siglo XVI hasta hoy.

³³. Ver sobre la relación entre colonialidad y “desarrollo,” mi texto *América Latina en la Economía Mundial*, en PROBLEMAS DEL DESAROLLO, revista del Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas de la UNAM, Vol. XXIV, No. 95, oct-dic. 1993. México.

³⁴. No entraré aquí en el debate, necesitado con urgencia de ser renovado, sobre las relaciones entre capital, salario y no-salario en la historia del capitalismo colonial/moderno.

³⁵. Un debate más detenido en mi trabajo sobre *Eurocentrismo y Colonialidad del Poder*, de próxima publicación. Véase también mi *Colonialidad y Modernidad/Racionalidad*, op. cit.

³⁶. Se trata de un fenómeno muy conocido, como lo testimonia la continuada segregación de los “negros” en las centrales sindicales dirigidas por “blancos” en EEUU. Pero no afecta sólo a los trabajadores mismos, sino, peor, a sus ideólogos y líderes políticos que se reclaman socialistas. Los más ilustrativos ejemplos son la división entre todos los “socialistas,” primero, y de los “marxistas” después, frente al “racismo” y al colonialismo en Africa y en Asia, en los siglos XIX y XX. Ver el documentado estudio de Horace Davis: *Nationalism and Socialism*. Monthly Review Press, 1967, NY, USA.

³⁷. Debo a Immanuel Wallerstein el habernos recordado a propósito de la colonialidad del poder, en un reciente simposio en Binghamton University (diciembre de 1998), una frase de Jean Genet en su conocida pieza teatral *Le Nègre* (Gallimard, 1977, Paris, Francia):

³⁸. Entre otros Louis Dumont: *Homo Hierarchicus*, Gallimard 1986, Paris. Mark, Jonathan, *Human Biodiversity*, op. cit. Quijano, A. *Raza, Etnia, Nación: Cuestiones Abiertas*, citado.

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WALLERSTEIN: L'AFRIQUE ET LE MONDE: UNE VISION PROVOCANTE AU CARREFOUR DE L'HISTOIRE ET DE LA SOCIOLOGIE

B. Verhaegen

L'oeuvre de Immanuel Wallerstein s'est construite depuis quarante ans autour de deux axes principaux: d'une part une recherche épistémologique et une mise en cause des sciences sociales issues du XIX siècle; *Impenser la science sociale* publié en 1991 est une étape importante dans la progression de cette recherche; d'autre part des travaux de sociologie historique fondés sur des recherches empiriques. Commencées en 1959 en Afrique, celles-ci se sont élargies à l'Europe et au développement du capitalisme devenu Economie-monde.

Ces deux axes de pensée sont inséparables et n'ont cessé de s'influencer et de se féconder l'un l'autre même si à certaine période l'un domine et entraîne une révision de l'autre. Ainsi les crises et les ruptures qui se manifestent dans les système et les structures, conduisent à une mise en question de certaines règles épistémologiques et notamment la conception pluridisciplinaire des sciences sociales qui se révèlent incapables de saisir l'histoire dans sa totalité en mouvement.

La profondeur du champ historique varie également en relation avec l'objet ou la période concernée. Étudier l'Afrique au moment où s'amorce le processus général de décolonisation conduit à privilégier le temps conjoncturel ou même événementiel; par contre la transformation du capitalisme en économie-monde ne peut se comprendre qu'à l'échelle séculaire.

Benoit Verhaegen
CHANEL
26510 Montreal les sources
France

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LES DÉBUTS AFRICAINS DE IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

Au Congo peu d'ouvrages ont été autant lu et apprécié que le premier texte de Immanuel Wallerstein écrit en 1961 et édité en 1966 en français par Présence Africaine: *L'Afrique et l'indépendance*. C'était dans les années 1960. L'université Lovanium de Léopoldville au Congo ex-belge commençait à accueillir massivement des étudiants africains surtout dans les facultés de sciences humaines: droit et sciences sociales. Les professeurs avaient besoin d'un manuel introduisant à la connaissance de l'Afrique contemporaine qui répondent à la fois aux exigences de la rigueur scientifique et aux attentes d'un public d'étudiants à la recherche d'un enseignement ayant rompu avec la tradition coloniale et missionnaire. L'ouvrage de Wallerstein répondit pleinement à ces exigences et aux attentes des étudiant à qui il dédiait son livre: "aux jeunes d'Afrique qui construisent leur avenir comme il leur semble sage et qui de ce fait méritent notre respect." L'ouvrage est à dominante politique comme l'était l'Afrique au temps des luttes pour l'indépendance et de la construction des états-nations. Les mouvements nationalistes, les partis politiques et le parti unique africain, le rôle du leader charismatique, héros et chef incontesté, le panafricanisme font l'objet d'analyses qui prennent le contre-pied des idées reçues et de l'idéologie coloniale.

Un chapitre est consacré à la renaissance culturelle et à la réécriture de l'histoire de l'Afrique. Celles-ci n'étaient pas seulement nécessaire pour fonder la révolution anticoloniale, elle permettait "de renverser le mythe de la supériorité européenne qui paralysait tant d'évolués africains."

L'ouvrage était limité expressément au champ politique et culturel. L'auteur justifie son choix: "Tout cela me conduisit à la conclusion plus générale encore que, si l'étude de l'organisation sociale était si souvent défectueuse, c'était parce que l'on oubliait fréquemment de prendre en considération le contexte juridique et politique dans lequel agissait à la fois les organisations et leur divers membres."¹

L'optimisme de l'Auteur quant à l'avenir de l'Afrique indépendante est sous-jacent dans tout l'ouvrage. Il est proclamé dans le dernier chapitre qui se termine ainsi: "L'Afrique a de la grandeur dans son passé comme elle en a dans son présent. L'avenir probablement lui en réserve encore."

Ce premier essai magistral fut prolongé par la publication en 1967 d'un ouvrage également à dominante politique: *Africa: the Politics of unity—An*

Analysis of a Contemporary Social Movement. C'était le fruit d'une recherche entreprise de 1963 à 1965 dans différents pays africains, mais en particulier au Ghana de Nkrumah et dans la Tanzanie de Nyerere. L'insistance de l'Auteur sur l'importance du mouvement vers l'Unité de l'Afrique et sa confiance dans l'avenir de ce projet politique ont certainement été influencé par les contacts avec ces deux dirigeants africains, tous deux convaincus de la nécessité de l'Unité africaine; chefs d'état de petits pays comparés à la dimension de l'Afrique, ils ne pouvaient concevoir l'avenir politique que dans le cadre d'une unité territoriale élargie au dimension du continent.

LES CRISES AFRICAINES DÉMENTENT L'OPTIMISME DES PREMIÈRES ANALYSES

Dès 1967 Wallerstein est attentif aux crises qui secouent certains pays africains. Dans *Africa: The politics of unity*, deux chapitres sont consacrés à la crise congolaise de 1960-61 et à celle de 1964. L'éviction de Nkrumah est évoquée. Les divisions internes des pays africains, qu'elles soient d'ordre social, régional ou ethnique sont relevées. Les conclusions de l'Auteur sont moins optimistes que dans ses premiers écrits. Il envisage la possibilité que l'Afrique ne soit pas capable de développer une idéologie révolutionnaire et ne puisse mettre en place une organisation politique susceptible de lui assurer une certaine autonomie politique, économique et culturelle. Le mouvement vers l'unité africaine en serait compromis.

A défaut de perspectives réalistes de changements, l'auteur reprend une citation empruntée à Ernest Renan, de Modibo Keita, alors président du Mali: "Rien de grand ne peut être construit sans chimères."

L'histoire de l'Afrique a démenti depuis lors presque point par point les espérances que Wallerstein avait énoncées dans son premier ouvrage écrit en 1961 à l'aube des Indépendances, et dans son apologie de l'unité africaine de 1967. Toutes les structures, les actions et les personnes qui fondaient légitimement ces espérances se sont délitées.

Les mouvements nationalistes et les partis politiques qui en étaient l'instrument se sont dilués dans le factionalisme. Les élites dirigeantes ont utilisés le pouvoir et l'appareil de l'état à leur profit et pour satisfaire des clientèles parasites dont la principale raison d'être était de protéger leur pouvoir au détriment de tout processus de contrôle démocratique. Les lea-

ders charismatiques ont été écartés du pouvoir par des militaires. Certains ont été assassinés; d'autres ont sombré dans l'autocratie. Le pan-africanisme, l'unité africaine ne sont plus que des rêves du passé. Les guerres interafricaines dont l'Afrique centrale et le Congo sont actuellement l'enjeu, présentent une version inédite du "scramble for Africa" de la fin du XIX siècle. Les richesses naturelles du Congo font à nouveau l'objet de convoitises sordides et d'expéditions militaires, mais commandités aujourd'hui par des états africains.

DE L'AFRIQUE À L'ÉCONOMIE-MONDE: DE LA CONJONCTURE AFRICAINE AU TEMPS LONG DU CAPITALISME

Dans l'introduction de *Capitalisme et économie monde* Wallerstein analyse les limites de ses recherches sur le nationalisme africain et décrit le passage vers un autre espace et une autre temporalité. L'analyse des états-nation africains devenus indépendants, se heurtait à des problèmes conjoncturels et de champ d'analyse. Les concepts clé de modernisation, d'industrialisation et de système capitaliste désignaient des réalités d'origine étrangère. Pour les comprendre et pouvoir les utiliser correctement il fallait retrouver leurs racines historiques et leur évolution dans les pays européens où ils étaient nés et situer ce processus dans le contexte mondial de l'époque. Plutôt que de multiplier les analyses par pays et restituer ensuite les résultats des recherches dans un contexte mondial, Wallerstein choisit alors l'espace mondial et la longue durée comme unité d'analyse. Son champ de recherche est le système social qui ne peut être borné par les frontières des états ou même des empires.

Wallerstein a souligné les difficultés de son entreprise: "Je pouvais expliquer les changements internes des États souverains comme découlant de l'évolution du système mondial et des interactions au sein du dit système. Mais tout s'en trouvait, en même temps, compliqué. Car je n'avais qu'un seul exemple d'un pareil système dans l'ère moderne."² Or, pour l'étudier, pour établir des liens de causalité, il aurait fallu un certain nombre de cas dont on aurait pu comparer les structures et le fonctionnement. Mais il n'y eut jamais qu'un monde moderne, qu'un seul capitalisme-monde, celui qui, né à la fin du XVI siècle en Europe, a peu à peu phagocyté les autres économies du monde, y compris les tentatives de créer des empires.

LES SCIENCES SOCIALES EN QUESTION

La compréhension des systèmes mondiaux ne se heurte pas seulement à la nouveauté et au caractère unique des phénomènes constitutifs, et donc à l'absence d'un champ expérimental, elle manque d'outils conceptuels, d'une théorie de la connaissance adaptée à ce nouvel objet. Cette lacune n'est pas due à un défaut de clairvoyance ou de compétence de la part des intellectuels et des savants. Jamais ceux-ci ne furent aussi nombreux et aussi bien équipés. Elle découle du pouvoir de changement et de révolution que pourrait conférer aux savants la compréhension du système-monde capitaliste. Un précédent existe: à la fin du XVIII siècle ce fut le courant de pensée des Encyclopédistes et des savants qui fut à l'origine de la chute de l'ancien régime en France. Aujourd'hui les intérêts de tous ceux qui profitent des rapports d'exploitation au sein du système capitaliste et qui en contrôlent les rouages, s'opposent avec efficacité au développement d'une science sociale nouvelle. Avec l'accroissement du coût des recherches et le caractère de plus en plus totalitaire des structures dominantes qu'elle soient culturelles, économiques ou politiques, l'indépendance des sciences sociales est de plus en plus restreinte au profit de la pensée unique. Le sort réservé actuellement à la pensée issue de Marx et à tout ce qui peut s'apparenter de loin ou de près au modèle communiste, est significatif de l'emprise du système-monde capitaliste sur la vie intellectuelle.³ Wallerstein tout en mettant en question les fondements mêmes des sciences sociales au XIX siècle, ne démentira jamais ce qu'il doit à Marx, même si, comme Marx lui-même, il ne se proclamera jamais "marxiste", ce qui serait contraire à sa conception historique du développement de la pensée.

De Marx il retient entre autres cette caractéristique essentielle du système capitaliste: l'objectif est ni de produire, ni de consommer, mais de réaliser un profit et de pouvoir l'accumuler. Les moyens sont indifférents: augmenter la production pour gagner sur les quantités, la diminuer pour jouer sur les prix, ou contrôler la circulation des biens ou de l'argent pour prélever des dîmes.⁴

Son objectif dans *Impenser la science sociale* est de réviser les sciences sociales et entre autres de rejeter leur division en disciplines de plus en plus cloisonnées. Il se prononce pour une science sociale unidisciplinaire correspondant à l'unité de l'objet réel de la connaissance: le "système-monde", et non "l'Etat-nation." La seconde caractéristique d'une nouvelle science sociale

est d'intégrer la longue durée contrepartie de l'extension de son champ spatiale au monde. Elle permet d'analyser les systèmes-mondes comme des objets historiques qui naissent, se développent et disparaissent et dont les structures ne sont pas figées.

La troisième caractéristique de l'analyse du système-monde est qu'il s'agit d'un système-monde bien particulier, unique dans l'histoire, "l'économie-monde capitaliste" dont les contradictions entraînent des mouvements antisystémiques et la crise systémique actuelle. Aussi Wallerstein nous convie-t-il à "clarifier le réseau des forces en jeu, élaborer des vecteurs possibles, et donc des lieux d'interférence possible, d'intervention consciente."⁵ Certes il ne s'agit pas d'actions politiques ou de spéculations, mais de recherches dans le cadre de la nouvelle science sociale unidisciplinaire dont il a tracé les contours.

Au vu de la crise actuelle, tant sur le plan du fonctionnement réel du système-monde capitaliste et des poussées antisystémiques, que sur celui de l'épistémologie adaptée à la crise, Wallerstein est pessimiste:

"Nous avons, en plus, l'énorme tâche de produire, au sujet des systèmes-mondes, des données qui reflètent cette réalité imprécise avec le maximum de pertinence. C'est un travail d'imagination intellectuellement difficile, qui prendra, pour des dizaines de milliers de chercheurs, un bon demi-siècle avant de devenir vraiment payante. Car nous avons attendu trop longtemps."⁶

HISTOIRE IMMÉDIATE OU SOCIOLOGIE-HISTORIQUE

La méthode de l'histoire immédiate est décrite dans plusieurs publications. Nous avons utilisé la plus récente.

L'Histoire immédiate est une méthode de connaissance au confluent de l'histoire, de la sociologie et de l'anthropologie.⁷ Son champ d'observation est limité, aux sociétés et aux événements contemporains. Elle emprunte à l'histoire classique le recours aux sources documentaires et inertes et ses techniques d'analyse et de critique de sources; à l'anthropologie et à la sociologie, leurs sources vivantes (l'observation, la participation, le témoignage, l'échange oral) et les techniques d'analyse; mais elle le fait de manière novatrice.

Le terme immédiat n'est pas utilisé ici dans un sens chronologique, mais épistémologique. Il ne vise pas l'événement le plus récent ou la situation actuelle pour lesquels les termes "Histoire instantanée" conviendrait mieux. Une connaissance serait réellement immédiate au sens épistémologique lorsque les deux termes en présence (le sujet et l'objet de connaissance) sont en rapport sans qu'il y ait de troisième terme, sans intermédiaires. Il est évident

qu'aucune espèce de connaissance, même celle fondée sur l'intuition, ne fonctionne sans médiation et donc le terme "immédiat" doit être pris dans un sens relatif. Le caractère immédiat de la connaissance, ne supprime pas les médiations, mais, d'une part, il les réduit le plus possible en rapprochant physiquement, culturellement et psychologiquement le chercheur de l'objet de sa recherche; d'autre part, elle construit leurs relations sur un mode d'intersubjectivité dialectique. L'Histoire immédiate, même lorsque le chercheur se trouve dans la position de l'ethnologue en face de son informateur, reconnaît qu'il existe entre le sujet et l'objet de la connaissance une distance, une opacité, des divergences et mêmes des tensions. Le langage, l'idéologie, la position de classe, de sexe, d'âge ou de race sont autant d'obstacles qu'il faut réduire.

En recourant au concept d'échange dialectique et intersubjectif, l'Histoire immédiate suppose qu'il y a moyen d'établir, sous certaines conditions, entre les deux partenaires du procès de connaissance des rapports d'interaction et de transformations réciproques.

Le chercheur doit reconnaître en l'autre, non seulement un informateur passif, mais un acteur de l'histoire, un sujet et à la limite, un autre savant, c'est-à-dire capable d'une connaissance critique. Il doit également accepter sa propre subjectivité d'acteur engagé, et donc sa perméabilité à l'autre. Restitué dans la perspective d'un échange dialectique et reconnu comme acteur conscient, l'informateur peut se révéler au cours du dialogue comme un partenaire à par entière du procès de la connaissance. Non seulement il informe, mais il analyse et influence le chercheur parce qu'il est, en tant qu'acteur, porteur d'un sens qui échappe au chercheur.

L'acteur historique n'est pas n'importe quel individu ou groupe qui prend la parole ou la plume; dans les sociétés de classe, dans celles où il y a un système d'exploitation, c'est la fraction dominante, souvent la seule lettrée, qui contrôle la production des documents de l'histoire et qui accapare la parole historique pour défendre ses positions et justifier l'inégalité et l'oppression.

L'Histoire immédiate qui veut comprendre le mouvement de l'histoire reconnaît comme acteurs ceux qui sont au cœur de la crise, qui ont intérêt au changement, c'est-à-dire les fractions exploitées, les minorités sociologiques, les marginaux, les catégories opprimées., les colonisés.

Ces catégories sociales sont souvent passives et muettes pendant les périodes de stabilité et d'équilibre. Ce sont les conjonctures de crise qui conduisent à la prise de conscience politique, à la lutte, à la prise de parole et au changement. C'est pendant la crise que se nouent les contradictions, que l'unité des différents niveaux (économique, politique, idéologique) des pratiques sociales apparaît et que la lutte politique éveille et finalise la conscience des acteurs.

On peut se demander ce que vient faire la méthode de l'histoire immédiate dans un texte consacré à l'éloge d'une épistémologie fondée sur la

longue durée et l'espace-monde. Certes cette épistémologie nouvelle reconnaît l'importance de la recherche empirique et la collecte des faits, mais elle les sélectionne en fonction de leur pesanteur sur le cours long de l'histoire. Pour opérer cette sélection elle s'écarte de l'histoire événementielle et des conjonctures récurrentes.

La méthode de l'histoire immédiate au contraire privilégie le temps court, la conjoncture; le temps long n'est pas exclu; il a son importance, mais est limité par le champ de la mémoire des acteurs. La méthode est également limitée par l'espace qui est celui de l'observation ou de l'action des témoins.

Il faut reconnaître d'emblée la différence de niveau des deux approches: la première est une épistémologie à vision globale dans le temps et dans l'espace. Elle vise à connaître l'histoire du monde actuel conçu comme système, ses contradictions, ses mouvements anisystémiques et ses crises. Elle espère par cette connaissance peser sur l'issue de la crise et découvrir les contours d'un système-monde nouveau, étant entendu que le progrès n'est pas déterminé d'avance et l'issue de la crise incertaine.

Au delà de leurs différences, les deux approches offrent des points de convergence importants. Toutes deux sont fondées sur une conception unidisciplinaire des sciences sociales et intègrent la perspective historique aux sciences sociales dépendantes des temps courts.

Mais plus fondamentalement elles privilégient toutes deux les périodes de crise, de transition et de changement; c'est le temps que Wallerstein, à la suite de Paul Tillich appelle le *kairos*, le "temps juste" ou "qualitatif" pour l'opposer au *chronos* le "temps formel", celui des calendriers et des quantités.⁸ Certes Wallerstein nous met en garde de ne pas abuser des concepts de crises et de transition et de ne pas les identifier trop rapidement aux changements longs et structurels alors qu'il s'agit de temps conjoncturels les plus souvent répétitifs; mais il insiste sur l'importance des phases de mobilisation au cours des mouvements antisystémiques parce que c'est alors que les consciences se transforment et deviennent des forces libératrices et il précise: "Dans un conflit grave, l'opprimé a une vision plus claire de la réalité présente car il a tout intérêt à percevoir correctement les problèmes pour mieux dénoncer les hypocrisies des gouvernants. Il a moins d'intérêt à la déformation idéologique."⁹

La méthode de l'histoire immédiate est fondée sur la même constatation: une période de crise et, en ce cas, de contestation du système colonial

provoque une prise de conscience de la part des opprimés devenus acteurs historiques. Le chercheur doit les écouter et dialoguer avec eux.

Il est possible que leur voix soit recouverte par d'autres événements et par la parole d'autres forces sociales comme ce fut le cas au Congo à partir de 1965, mais il demeure que leur action et leur témoignage ont une portée qui dépasse le cycle de la conjoncture politique. Ils sont à part entière et, malgré les échecs et les silences, des éléments significatifs du cours long de l'histoire.

L'Histoire immédiate peut dès lors apporter sous certaines conditions une pierre utile à l'édification de cet immense projet qu'est la connaissance du système-monde capitaliste confronté à son déclin, voir à son implosion.

En guise de conclusion nous formons le vœux que les anciens étudiants des universités du Congo qui furent impressionnés dans les années 60 par la lecture de *L'Afrique et l'Indépendance* reprennent le chemin des ouvrages de Immanuel Wallerstein. Ils y trouveront un fil conducteur pour aider à la compréhension du chaos actuel et peut-être des raisons de ne pas désespérer.

ENDNOTES

^{1.} *Capitalisme et économie-monde*, p. 10.

^{2.} *Capitalisme et économie-monde*, p. 13.

^{3.} L'exemple d'une dérivation caricaturale de cette nouvelle, "chasse aux sorcières" de type McCarthiste est le succès remporté par l'ouvrage *Le livre noir du communisme* édité par Robert Laffont en 1997.

^{4.} Au sujet de Marx, Wallerstein écrit dans "*Le capitalisme historique*", p. 12: "Je ne puis terminer cette introduction sans mentionner Karl Marx, qui représente un monument de l'histoire intellectuelle et politique moderne. Il nous a laissé un héritage immense, de par sa richesse conceptuelle et son inspiration morale." Il faut lire également les deux chapitres très nuancés consacrés à la théorie marxiste dans *Impenser la science sociale*, pp. 175-211.


^{5.} I. Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

^{6.} *Ibidem.*, p. 308.

^{7.} Voir l'ouvrage dirigé par J. Omasombo, *Le Zaïre à l'épreuve de l'histoire immédiate*, Karthala, 1993, pp. 280-281; Laurent Monnier qui participa à l'élaboration et à l'application de la méthode dans les années 60, a rédigé un texte intitulé "Aux origines de la méthode de l'histoire immédiate au Congo" à paraître dans un Cahiers de l'IUED de Genève consacré au "Développement comme planification de l'ignorance", thème qui rejoint les critiques du développement de Wallerstein.

^{8.} I. Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy*, 1979, p. 271 et *Impenser la science sociale*, 1991, p. 169.

^{9.} I. Wallerstein, *Capitalisme et économie-monde*, 1980, p. 9.




III. WORLD-SYSTEMS: HISTORICAL

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THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Amiya Kumar Bagchi

I. THE CONCEPT OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS THROUGH HISTORY

Like most human institutions—the family, the village, the city, the state, customs, laws, the nation—the developmental state was born long before anybody thought of naming it. There are debates about when it was born, whether all developmental states (as they are usually characterized) are properly labeled, and whether there have been developmental states overlooked literature. In this paper, it will be claimed, *inter alia*, that indeed there were developmental states long before economists, political scientists or historians recognized them as such, and that not all developmental states, as conventionally labeled, have been true members of the select club of developmental states.

First, let us see what a developmental state (DS) means in the era of the global spread of capitalism. It is a state that puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal. The instruments would include the forging of new formal institutions, the weaving of formal and informal networks of collaboration among the citizens and officials and the utilization of new opportunities for trade and profitable production. Whether the state governs the market or exploits new opportunities thrown up by the market depends on particular historical conjunctures. One feature of a successful

Amiya Kumar Bagchi
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta
R-I, Baishnabghata Patuli Township, Calcutta-94
West Bengal, India.
<http://www.socialsciencecal.org/>
bagchi@cssc.ernet.in

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developmental state is its ability to switch gears from market-directed to state-directed growth, or vice-versa depending on geopolitical circumstances, as well as combine both market and state direction in a synergistic manner, when opportunity beckons.

Thus the degree and nature of DS involvement in economic activity are likely to vary over time, with neither undiluted *etatisme* nor a dogmatic commitment to the free market likely to characterize a successful DS. We will also see that the instruments for pursuing these goals are likely to change from state to state and epoch to epoch.

II. THE NETHERLANDS AS A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

The first DS in our sense to emerge since the sixteenth century was that of the northern part of the Spanish Netherlands which, after the reconquest of the southern part by Spain, evolved into today's Netherlands. The beginning of an independent state of Netherlands is generally dated to 1568, when the Protestant dukes of Egmont and Hoorn were executed at Brussels by the Spanish authorities. In 1572, the Calvinist 'Sea Beggars' captured Den Briel, a port at the mouth of the Rhine. In 1579, the seven northern provinces formed themselves into the United Provinces, with a States-General elected as the legislative (and executive) body for the federation. In 1581, William I of Orange, speaking on behalf of the seven provinces, renounced allegiance to Spain, and their career began as federated States (Boxer 1973: 332-3; Israel 1995: chapters 9-11).

During the next fifty years, the Netherlands, a country of about 1.5 million people in 1600 (Klep 1988: Table 13.4), became the top seafaring nation in Europe and the world, with an empire that dotted the globe from Indonesia (and briefly Formosa, today's Taiwan) to the Caribbean. There were many elements that led to this achievement; geography, social structure, nationalism, a fierce spirit of independence, undaunted realism and an ability to adapt their strategy to the military and political needs of the day all played a part (Israel 1995: chapters 11-24).

Feudalism had been virtually unknown in Holland and other maritime provinces of the Netherlands since the thirteenth century, and geography at least partly contributed to this situation (Israel 1995: chapters 2-6). Dikes had to be built in order to protect the land, water had to be drained in order to reclaim it, and an elaborate system of maintenance had to be devised in

order to ensure that centuries of effort were not swept away in devastating floods. This 'flood society' dispensed with both the functional need and the historical justification that buttressed social dependence in the rest of the European countryside. If deference to social superiors was based on reciprocity for physical safety, it was the dike reeve and the locally elected *heemraadschappen*, the water guardians, rather than any vassal lord, who were in the best position to require it. The autonomy of local communities in respect of taxing themselves to meet hydraulic needs was the territorial basis for their assumptions about 'the "ascending" nature of political authority, conferred (or at least assented to) from below, rather than devolved from above' (Schama 1987:40). Intensive involvement in trade and commerce facilitated by numerous rivers, inlets and ports, and the innovations called forth in the struggle to subdue an inclement nature made the agriculture and animal husbandry of the Low Countries the most productive in the whole of western Europe and provided the basis for a highly urbanized society in which more people engaged in trade, industry and other non-agricultural activities than in agriculture by the middle of the seventeenth century (De Vries 1976: 69-75; De Vries and Van der Woude 1997: chapter 11).

The revolt of the Netherlands against Habsburg rule was triggered by the determination of Philip II to impose Roman Catholicism on a country in which a large proportion had renounced it and his attempt to impose centrally appointed (and inexperienced) dike inspectors and centralize the power to tax the villages and towns for the purpose of maintaining the dikes and waterworks. The burgher oligarchs of the major towns prevailed in open conflict with their erstwhile Spanish overlords, sometimes in opposition to rural landowners exercising political power in the inland provinces. Thus, successful revolt in turn strengthened a state run by merchant princes and manufacturers. Burgher rule was a very potent weapon for the victory of the Dutch over many of their enemies still ruled by feudal lords (Boxer 1973: chapter 1; Schama 1987: chapters 1-4; Israel 1995: chapters 17-22).

A second factor which made the Netherlands into a formidable DS was the intense patriotism of the Dutch. This was strengthened in their epic conflict with the most powerful state in Europe. The Dutch rejected most of their recent history, except that part which invoked the heroism and martyrdom of their revolutionary leaders; and they reached back into the days of the Roman empire and the history of the Jews in order to create a patriotic

lore for themselves. They thought of themselves as the inheritors of the Batavian republic which reputedly resisted Roman rule, and also as the Chosen People who would be tested by God in trials by water and fire (Boxer 1973: chapter 1; Mulier 1987: chapter 1; Schama 1987: chapters 1 and 2).

Their nationalism was, however, intensely practical. While they were ever ready to combat Spanish aggression and smite the Popish infidels wherever they could, they would make peace whenever the oligarchs considered it profitable to consolidate their gains rather than squander their resources seeking glory. The Dutch expected their rulers to engage in prodigious efforts and had no problems with sacrificing them when national interest seemed to demand it. Thus Johan van Oldenbarneveldt, the chief minister of the Dutch Republic, personally promoted a huge land reclamation project and also played an active part in promoting the Dutch East India Company. The latter proved a formidable agency for wresting control of the trade of Indonesia and the spice trade from the Portuguese (Boxer 1973: 25-6; Schama 1987: 38-9). Oldenbarneveldt guided the destinies of the republic for most of the period of the twelve years' peace with Spain (from 1609 to 1621). But he was executed on a trumped-up charge in 1619, when the war party, represented by Maurice of Nassau, gained the upper hand. Normally, the two most important personages among the rulers of the country would be the Stadholder, always a member of the house of Orange, and the Grand Pensionary of Holland. But between 1650 and 1672, the country was without a Stadholder (who was a half-way incumbent between the commander-in-chief of the Dutch armed forces and a constitutional monarch) and was guided by Johan De Witt, a fervent republican (Mulier 1987). However, in 1672, the Netherlands got involved in a war with two of their most powerful enemies, the English and the French. The brothers De Witt were murdered by an Amsterdam mob, and William III, the then Stadholder, assumed charge of Dutch defence.

Not only were the practical Dutch willing to sacrifice their rulers when need arose, the rulers also did not hesitate to tax themselves, and, of course, the common people for keeping up the defence forces, maintaining the elaborate infrastructure for agriculture and trade, and to some extent, succouring the poor who were no longer looked after by the church. Ironically enough, the Republic extracted a higher tax revenues from the Dutch burghers than the Spanish rulers ever managed.

A third notable characteristic of the Dutch DS was its religious tolerance. While Protestantism or even its narrower version, Calvinism, was declared the state religion in several of the states, the regents generally managed to keep the zealots among the Calvinists from enacting Draconian measures against the dissenters (Boxer 1973: chapter 5; Schama 1987: chapters 1-2). As a result, not only did the persecuted Protestants from southern Netherlands and Huguenots from France find a refuge in the northern Netherlands, but Jews and heretics fleeing the Spanish Inquisition also flocked to the republic. The influx of these refugees strengthened the skill-base of the republic and raised its productivity. The southern Netherlands, and especially Antwerp, had enjoyed primacy in trade and commerce before the revolt of the Netherlands. But they lost it after the reconquest by the Spanish army and the sacking of Antwerp by the mutinous soldiers of that army in 1576, when Philip II went bankrupt yet again. The departure of the Protestant burghers contributed to this downfall. Conversely, the northern Netherlands gained from the influx of the same refugees.

A fourth characteristic of the Dutch republic was a deliberate attempt to create institutions and habitats which would facilitate clean living and growth. The cleanliness of Dutch cities and the orderliness of its institutions of credit and taxation became a by word among contemporaries. Between 1640 and 1655, the rate of interest at which the Dutch republic was able to raise government loans came down from 6.25 percent to 4 per cent. Even in 1672, when the French troops overran the Dutch territory, the republic was able to raise loans for hiring auxiliary troops (Clark 1947: 44-5). The Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, became a model for all subsequent state or state-backed banks of western Europe, and presided over a system of public and private credit extended at low rates of interest. These low rates in turn encouraged accumulation.

In many of their designs and projects the Dutch consciously emulated Italian city states, or Spain and Portugal. But they introduced their own innovations so as to adapt the foreign designs to their needs. This applied to the variety of Dutch ships which had to be easily maneuverable in the treacherous shoals and islands of the North Sea while also allowing them to carry guns that would be effective in naval warfare on the open seas. Even in armed warfare on land, Maurice of Nassau and his brother William Louis introduced major innovations such as constant drill in peacetime, and coun-

termarches by formations of soldiers armed with slow-firing muskets who could fire almost continuous volleys at the enemy (McNeill 1983: 128-36; Parker 1988: 18-19). Maurice was also the first to use modern instruments such as the telescope in the business of war (for a list of Maurice's innovations, see Clark 1947: 112-3).

It is important to note that all these innovations presupposed a ruling class which was literate and often highly educated. The Dutch ruling class encouraged education and the useful arts and founded academies or training institutes for advancing them. New universities were founded at Leyden (in 1575) after the siege of the town by the Spanish army had been lifted (in 1574), at Harderwijk in 1600, Groningen in 1614, and Utrecht in 1634. These universities proved to be the most open seats of learning in Europe of the seventeenth century (Clark 1947: 291-2; Israel 1995: chapter 24). Thus the Dutch also displayed a high degree of ability and willingness to learn from others.

The Dutch republic, of course, was not an idyllic commonwealth. It was a highly unequal society, with great differences in income and political power between the poor and the rich. Only the wealthy merchants and landowners could participate in the apparatus of rule at different levels, and the poor were kept tightly under control. But the poor were looked after, even if under a harsh regime. The rasp-houses (where brazilwood was rasped to serve as dyes) and spinning houses of Holland became tourist attractions and later, models for workhouses in other west European countries (Lis and Soly 1982: 118-19; Schama 1987: chapter 1). During its career as an effective developmental agency, the Dutch state followed a policy of full employment for its original inhabitants and for the immigrants whom it recognized as legal entrants.

Later, we will briefly examine the causes of the demise of the developmental state of the Netherlands and some of its consequences. As we shall see, both the success of that state and the malignity and accession of strength to its competitors made for the death of the developmental state and the decline of the Netherlands (Wilson 1939).

III. ENGLAND (OR BRITAIN) AS A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1560-1851

In many (if not most) accounts of the triumph of industrialization in England and its emergence as the first industrial nation, only the role of private enterprise and free trade are emphasized. However, in the victory of

private enterprise, the construction of a state fostering its growth played a critical role, and free trade as a policy did not gain ascendancy until Britain had already emerged as the most powerful nation in the world economically, militarily and politically. It was the maturation of the DS that made a policy of free trade optimal for the British ruling classes. Without the success of the former, such an outcome might have remained highly problematic.

The recognition of England, and later on, the United Kingdom, as a DS has been delayed for several reasons. First, it was very slow in its maturation process. Secondly, long before it became a fully free-trading nation it had begun preaching the doctrine of free trade to others, even enforcing it with gunboats and soldiers, as in the case of the first Opium War or England's intervention in the wars of independence launched by the Latin American *criollos* against Spain and Portugal. Thirdly, although by the beginning of the eighteenth century Britain had emerged as a state with all powers of national policy-making centralized in the Parliament, it operated a highly decentralized state apparatus run by the property-owners in the counties, provincial cities and towns. Still, this failure to recognize England as a DS has begun to change (see, for example, Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Brewer 1989).

The beginnings of the DS in Britain go back to the sixteenth century, if not earlier. The peasant revolts from the fourteenth century managed to eradicate most of the real content of serfdom and feudal subjugation of the peasantry by the time the Tudor kings came to rule England. The Reformation in England occurred very much as a state-led enterprise. This had the momentous result of destroying the established (Roman Catholic) church as owner of property and a power independent of the throne while also creating a new section of landowners who became enriched through the expropriation of the church. The remnants of English feudalism were abolished in the civil war between the king and the parliament, and under the short-lived but mighty republic created by the parliamentary party led by Oliver Cromwell (Hill 1961: chapters 3 and 9; Corrigan and Sayer 1985: chapters 3 and 4). England was the first large country in Western Europe (barring the Netherlands, that is) to abolish all the usual appurtenances of feudalism and convert land into a commodity, transferable, salable and heritable, except for restrictions which sought to preserve large properties in their entirety. In the rest of Western Europe, it took another century and a half (from the 1780s to the end of Napoleon's wars) for feudalism to release

land and peasants from its bondage. In much of Central and Eastern Europe feudal tenures were not abolished until after the revolutions of 1848, and in Russia, Hungary and Rumania, it was only in the 1860s that feudal tenures and serfdom were formally abolished (Blum 1978: chapters 16-19).

The abolition of feudal tenures and the formal freeing of labour from non-market bondage, the easing of medieval restrictions on trade, and the acquisition of political power by a group who owed their position to ownership of property rather than rank and birth *per se* gave England an enormous advantage over all its proto-capitalist competitors in Europe. In the sequel, England beat first the Netherlands and then France in the race for political, economic and military dominance in Europe and extended that dominance to the whole world by the middle of the nineteenth century. The acquisition of colonies and the envelopment of the major part of the Atlantic slave trade by Britain helped it to accumulate capital and ease its climb to the position of supremacy. This ability to conquer other lands militarily and economically must be seen as a result primarily of the domestic transformation that made it the formidable DS that it became.

A second aspect of the DS was the enormous capacity of the British state and society for learning from others and its ability to make its own adaptations and innovations on the foundation of foreign learning. The British learned from the other European countries, of whom perhaps the foremost were the Italian city states. Theories of states guided by precepts other than those of religion or feudal notions of honor and vassalage were borrowed from Machiavelli and other Italian writers. Then in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and a host of other theorists formulated the principles of sovereignty and citizenship in constitutional monarchies and republics alike.

In the area of technology the British learned from the Italians, the Huguenot refugees from France, the Dutch (especially in the areas of agriculture, irrigation, drainage and land reclamation) and later on from the Chinese and the Indians. During the reign of Elizabeth I, the British imitated the practice of the Venetians in granting patents for introduction and use of foreign innovations on English soil and encouraging domestic innovations. These patents were granted to foreign immigrants endowed with the scarce knowledge and skill, and increasingly to Englishmen (Corrigan and Sayer 1985: 66; MacLeod 1988: chapter 1). In order to prevent

abuse of Englishmen's patents by arbitrary rulers, the parliament introduced the Statute of Monopolies in order to restrict the issue of patents to genuine innovations and select projects judged to be of overriding public interest. By the eighteenth century Britain emerged as the pacesetter of technological innovations the world over.

In the economic development of Britain, the role of the state has been underestimated because the state was rendered 'invisible' to many observers, and partly even to the common people in normal times through measures of decentralization, the taxing of property of the landowners and the operation of the navy rather than a large national standing army as the bulwark of British defence and its major offensive force (Corrigan and Sayer 1985: chapter 5). But the British state was strong nevertheless and exerting its influence on both the supply and the demand sides of burgeoning private enterprise. On the supply side: the growth of private enterprise was smoothed by the removal of most restrictions on the mobility and transferability of assets; the regulation of the labour market and the disciplining of labour through a series of legislative Acts going back to the Statute of Artificers of 1563; various Acts regulating the relations of masters, and 'servants'; the outlawing of workers' combinations, draconian laws such as the Black Act of 1723 protecting property (including Acts that made petty stealing a capital offence) and public and private Acts enforcing the enclosure of millions of acres of land. (Thompson 1977; Corrigan and Sayer 1985: 95-99). On the demand side the national market was protected for the production of corn, sugar, textiles, naval stores, and timber with tariffs, the banning of the importation of various kinds of goods from foreign countries including France, Spain, India, from colonies (such as Ireland). Navigation Acts passed in 1651 and 1662, made it illegal to import goods from abroad in foreign or third country bottoms, and sumptuary regulations restricted or banned the consumption of certain kinds of foreign goods within British territory.

On the demand side, again, the navy played a very important role by providing support for a host of industries catering to shipbuilding and naval armament. The British state generally spent much more on the navy than on the army (Clark 1947: 110; Brewer 1989: chapters 2-4). As the strength of the British economy and its armed forces grew, so too did military spending. Between 1710 and 1780, the estimated national income of Britain rose from £59.8 million to £97.7 million and military spending increased from £5.4

million to £12.2 million (Brewer 1989: 41). Both were to grow, and military spending at a much faster rate, during the 1790s and up to 1815, as a result of the wars with the French. Moreover, owing to the necessity of managing naval ships and large merchant boats, the skills of organizing and disciplining the workforce of large factories became diffused among property owners in Britain. A typical man-of-war in the eighteenth century cost several times a cotton spinning mill, the largest modern factory known at that time.

This scale of public expenditure required a reliable system of public credit and taxation. Here also the British learned from advanced foreign competitors and added innovations of their own. The British consciously followed the example of the Bank of Amsterdam in establishing their own Bank of England in 1694. The latter was a private bank but most of its capital was laid out for loans to the government which in turn allowed the bank to issue its own notes which could be used to settle public dues. The Bank of England, the East India Company and the South Sea Company provided the bastion of public credit which allowed the British state to raise loans at a low rate during wars as well as in peacetime (Dickson 1967; Brewer 1989).

Wars also required higher taxes. Here the British ruling classes showed their sense of responsibility as rulers by taxing themselves. They also, of course, raised a number of indirect taxes which impinged on the poor. But with the onset of the wars under Dutch William in the 1690s, a land tax was introduced on landowners without any exemption. The landowners generally managed to pass the tax on to their tenants and to consumers through higher prices (since the production of corn was protected by tariffs, or sometimes, outright prohibition of imports) (Corrigan and Sayer 1985: chapter 5). The upper classes did pay the tax and did not generally try to evade it. In the 1760s Britain succeeded in appropriating about 20 per cent of the nation's output in taxation, almost twice the corresponding French figure' (Thane 1990: 3). This was very important at the time, because France had emerged as England's chief political rival. Not only did the French state fail to get as large a percentage as the British state in taxes, its taxes were also resented more by the general population. Indeed, the taxation system was a major contributor to the popular upsurge that led to the French revolution. Again, in 1799, the British parliament imposed an income tax which was levied on all incomes above a certain level; it promptly abolished it in 1816, when it was deemed no longer necessary with the defeat of the French.

The taxability and disciplining of the upper classes as well as the lower is thus a characteristic of the DS. For example, the economic decline of the Netherlands in its 'periwig' phase occurred partly because its upper classes chose a life of ease rather than one of stern self-discipline.

Finally, we turn to another aspect of Britain as a DS which is often relegated to a chapter on social history, or with Polanyi, is considered a positive hindrance to Britain's career as the first fully evolved market economy. This is the extensive and decentralized system of poor relief evolved since the time of Elizabeth I. 'The Elizabethan poor laws, an amalgam of earlier laws and practices, were codified in 1597-98 and reenacted in 1601. The latter...established the principles of the "old poor law" as it later became known: the parish as the basic unit of administration, a compulsory poor rate levied on householders by overseers appointed by the local justices (the overseers obliged to serve under penalty of a fine), and various types of relief for various kinds of needy—alms and almshouses for the aged and infirm, apprenticeships for children, and work for the able-bodied (and punishment or confinement for the "sturdy beggar")' (Himmelfarb 1984: 25). The poor laws were, of course, enforced with differing degrees of slackness or harshness in the succeeding centuries. But they were taken seriously enough for them to have cost more than £2 million in rates in the second decade of the eighteenth century, in a total population of under 6 million (*Ibid.* 26). The objective of the laws (including a law which allowed the local authorities to send back paupers or persons who might claim poor relief to the parish they came from) was to discipline labour and regulate the labour market as well as to succour the poor.

By the end of the eighteenth century it was accepted that the local authorities had a special duty to relieve the poor in periods of acute scarcity. During the French wars of the 1790s prices of necessities rose all round and severely hit the poor. 'The justices of Berkshire [in England], meeting at the Pelikan Inn, in Speenhamland, near Newbury, on May 6, 1795, in a time of great distress, decided that subsidies in aid of wages should be granted in accordance with a scale dependent upon the price of bread' (Polanyi 1957: 78). This measure still did not prevent real wages, especially of agricultural labourers, from declining substantially in the decades up to the 1820s and 1830s in many counties of England. But they helped contain social and

political discontent and put a ratchet below the domestic demand for the basic consumer goods.

IV. THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN GERMANY 1850-1914

The spectacular rise of a unified Germany between 1871 and 1914 to the position of the premier industrial nation in Europe, ranking only second to the USA, has obscured the fact that the career of Germany as a DS had begun considerably earlier. The real beginnings can be traced back to 1850. According to Tilly's new estimates the real acceleration of the rate of growth of net domestic product in Germany dates to the 1850s. Moreover, it was only after the abortive revolution of 1848 that the last remnants of feudalism were abolished throughout the German territory (Tilly 1991:176-77).

Many of the usual explanations for the pattern of German development take either Hoffman's theory of stages of industrial development or Gerschenkron's hypothesis of the advantages of moderate backwardness as their starting point. According to the former theory (based primarily on Britain's experience), the share of capital goods in factory production goes up only at a later stage of development while consumer goods produced in factories act as the lead sector in the beginning. Germany did not fit this pattern since by the time factory production made its presence felt on any scale production of iron, steel and mineral products took the lead. Gerschenkron's hypothesis adds on to this early growth of capital and basic goods sectors certain institutional features, such as a more pervasive intervention of the state in guiding the economy, and a more pronounced role of banks in financing industry as characteristics of the development of a backward economy (Hoffman 1955; Gerschenkron 1965).

The beginning of Germany's 'relative backwardness' within western Europe can be traced back to the Thirty Years' War in the first half of the seventeenth century. That war led to a precipitous population decline, a devastation of the infrastructure, and the consolidation of feudal-military authoritarianism in a Germany which was fragmented into a few large states (such as Prussia or Bavaria) and hundreds of tiny principalities. In the eastern parts of Germany the commercialization of the grain trade had induced a further consolidation of feudal power and the reduction of the dependent peasants to virtual slavery (Borchardt 1973: 85-98). The abolition of feudalism in most German states was the direct outcome of the challenge posed

by a revolutionary France which was easily able to defeat the military forces of the most powerful German princes until the final overthrow of Napoleon in 1815. The end of feudalism (which took place between the 1810s and 1850s) led also to the creation of a rural proletariat because emancipation came with a stiff price for the peasants. The latter had to buy the land they cultivated at a price capitalized at twenty years' rent, leaving hundreds of thousands of peasants landless when they were unable to raise the required sum (Blum 1978, Borchardt 1973).

The process of abolition of direct rule by feudal princes and the emergence of Prussia as by far the most powerful state in Germany facilitated German unification. In the centuries of feudal consolidation since the sixteenth century, German nationalism had remained dormant, and mostly confined to the sphere of literature and culture. It gained a new impetus from the example of the power of French nationalism that was unleashed after 1789 (Greenfeld 1992: chapter 4). The major central and south German states (except Austria which was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire) joined a customs union with Prussia in 1834, and the other German states joined the union between 1835 and 1867 (Borchardt 1973:105).

The economic unification of the German states, the abolition of internal tariffs, customs and serfdom, and massive investments in railway networks by Prussia and other German states from the 1830s led to a vigorous expansion of the domestic market. The bourgeoisie did not manage to gain control of the state apparatus, which was manned by the powerful bureaucrats and nobility with roots in the *ancien regime*. But the state effectively pursued goals of capitalist development, partly as a means of enhancing its military power and partly, of course, with the objective of enhancing the standards of living of all Germans. The state remained highly authoritarian in character. Authoritarianism acquired a nationalist rationale under Bismarck with his successful pursuit of a policy of Prussian imperialism. From the 1880s, the social democrats challenged the authoritarian and inegalitarian policies of the Prussian state, but this did not alter the character of the state until the German empire collapsed in defeat in the first World War. For our purpose, it is not necessary to enter into debates about whether the German state was ruled by bureaucrats and aristocrats who embraced bourgeois values or whether Germans were effectively 'feudalized' in their values and behaviour (for a survey of the debate see Blackbourn and Eley 1984). There is little

doubt, however, that, especially after the consolidation of rule by conservative forces under Bismarck's patronage and the pact between the landlords and industrialists on tariff protection, the power of the *Junkers* in Prussia gained a new lease on life, and agrarian capitalism remained constrained to that extent (on *Junker* power and agrarian capitalism, see Byres 1991:23-7).

A successful DS actively encourages learning from foreigners, adaptation of technologies and organizations to local conditions and introduction of productive innovations. In that respect, even small German principalities and states had been gearing up to enable the full development of a DS long before Germany was unified. Most German states had founded universities by the eighteenth century where theology, philosophy, law, mathematics and even science were taught. Most of the states encouraged the formal training of craftsmen and technologists in state-supported or guild-supported technical schools (Blackbourn 1984:176-7). From the eighteenth century many states also encouraged the setting up of factories on the British model. While only a few of these enterprises proved financially viable, they acted as training grounds for businessmen, technocrats and technologists and laboratories for trying out the techniques and products that might ultimately win the race (Landes 1965:364-6). Some constituent states were among the pioneers of compulsory education in Europe. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Germany, with a much larger population than Britain, had a considerably higher rate of literacy. Within Prussia, already by 1850, the percentage of bridegrooms who signed with marks (and were, therefore, functionally illiterate) had declined to 10 per cent, whereas in England and Wales, even in 1853-5, the corresponding percentage was 30. In the latter it was only in 1886 that the same degree of literacy as in the Prussia of 1850 was attained (Mitchell 1973:801-2). In the discussion of the retardation of the British economy since the last third of the nineteenth century, this aspect of the British underperformance compared with the German is often overlooked.

We finally turn to the other aspects of the developmental state, particularly in unified Germany, that have received considerable attention in the literature surrounding the Gerschenkron hypothesis—the character of state patronage, and especially its paternalism and protectionism, the sectoral composition of German industrial growth, and the role of the banking system.

In Germany, both the state and the big employers tried to act paternalistically towards the workers (Lee 1978; Craig 1981:150-2). The big employers such as Krupp and Zeiss of Jena, provided housing and other facilities to workers, partly to attach the workers to the company, partly to protect industrial secrets through close surveillance, and partly to fend off the threat of militant trade unions which became a serious force after the growth of the social democratic party under the leadership of Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel. In the 1880s, Germany took the leadership in Europe in passing successively a sickness insurance law for workers (in 1883), an accident insurance law (in 1884) and an old age and disability insurance law (in 1889). These laws were accompanied by the savage anti-socialist policies, backed by legislation, followed by Bismarck since 1879. Creating loyalty among workers, fighting trade unions with ideologies which challenged the established order and fending off the socialists—all of these acted as powerful motives for Bismarck and the other conservative-authoritarian elements guiding the destinies of Germany between 1866 and 1914. There were some differences between the large firms or cartels operating in iron and steel, electrical and chemicals, and other industries in which the predominant elements were small firms or even craftsmen among whom trade union organization faced lesser obstacles. During this period German scientists and technologists made major innovations (such as the Haber process for producing ammonia) which proved highly profitable. They also proved adept at taking over and further advancing inventions from other countries (such as innovations in the electrical industry by Siemens and AEG, and the Gilchrist-Thomas process for reduction of phosphatic iron ore). However, side by side with such innovations originating in or affecting large-scale firms, Germany continued the old system of apprenticeship and certification by craft associations and guilds, and built up perhaps the best-educated and best-trained working force in Europe. This system was a major departure from that prevailing in Britain, illustrating the point that every successful DS introduces its own innovations in the economic and social organization of the country and cannot afford to simply live on imitations.

In the banking sector, Germany created the system of universal banking, and the associated arrangement under which banks had a strong presence on the boards of companies funded by them, often exercising a supervisory function, particularly in periods of crisis. This system developed since the

days of the railway boom of the 1830s and 1840s but matured after the economic crisis that followed the boom and inflation produced by the German victory in the Franco-Prussian war (Tilly 1986, 1991; Sylla 1991). The interventionist policy of banks partly compensated, and partly substituted, for the lack of a developed stock market until the industrialization process had gone quite far.

Finally, the German DS was highly protectionist and interventionist especially from the late 1870s (Craig 1981:78-100; Tilly 1991). The pre-unification German states had been strongly influenced by free trade doctrines and were only moderately protectionist. However, the agricultural depression beginning in 1873 hit the East German grain producers hard and some producers of iron and steel also found it difficult to cope with foreign competition. So Bismarck presided over a marriage of 'iron and rye' by steeply increasing duties on imported iron and steel and grain. The grain tariff was increased again in 1888 and 1902 as the German producers were threatened by increases in imports. The economic growth of Germany was spurred not only by this protection but also by the strong growth of capital goods industries sustained by high rates of private capital accumulation, public expenditure on social overhead capital and military expenditures (Tilly 1978). German rates of capital formation as a proportion of net national product were about one-eighth in 1870, but had risen to about one-sixth in 1899. The corresponding figures for the U.K. were a little above one-sixteenth in 1870 and one-eleventh in 1899 (Mitchell 1978: Table J1).

The German DS was hampered by its burden of military expenditure and the associated authoritarianism that kept the growth of real wages below the strong rates of growth of productivity. The full flowering of this DS, as in the case of Japan, was to be witnessed only after the military authoritarian apparatus had been largely dismantled as a result of defeat in the second World War.

V. THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN JAPAN

As in the case of other DSs, the Japanese DS also evolved over time until it assumed its mature form in the late 1950s. The beginning of modern Japanese development is generally assigned to the period of the Meiji Restoration, and by and large this chronology is right. But some preconditions for the construction of a DS had been laid down before 1868. These included

freedom from foreign rule; in spite of the unequal treaties imposed on Japan after Commodore Perry's successful bombardment of Japanese ports, the Japanese attained a high degree of national autonomy in policymaking. Other factors included the intense nationalism of the Japanese ruling class and its demonstrated ability to learn from foreigners such as the Chinese who had better technologies of production or war, or useful principles for organization of the state and society (Kahn 1973: chapter 2; Morishima 1982: Introduction).

After the Meiji Restoration, the earlier, feudal '...categories of court noble, warrior, peasant, merchant and outcast were done away with and restructured into two new classes—a small nobility and everyone else. By 1876 the government also succeeded in pensioning off all the former members of the warrior class [the *samurai* A.B.]. Previously they had received stipends from Tokugawa or from their domains—at a cost of over 200 million yen' (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1978:142-3). The Meiji law also freed rural labour from various degrees of debt bondage, ranging from servitude for life to bondage only for the duration that the loan was not repaid (Taira 1978: 170). But the law did not give the land to the peasants as Rosovsky and Ohkawa (1978:143) claim. It converted feudal into private tenures and most of the dependent peasantry of feudal times became tenants or part-time tenants eking out their income from their small holdings with labour on the fields of others. Around 1853, about 80 per cent of the people were farmers. By 1940 this proportion had gone down to 40 per cent, but the absolute number of families dependent on agriculture had gone up from 5,518,000 in 1886 to 5,642,000 in 1932 (Ladejinsky 1947:70). Because of the highly unequal distribution of land in a land-scarce economy (with 2.7 acres of land per agricultural household in 1939), in the 1940s 28 per cent of the farmers owned land, and 40 per cent had to supplement their income from owned land by leasing land from others (*Ibid.* 68). Because of the scarcity of land and lack of fast expanding alternative employment opportunities, the tenants and part tenants were virtually tied to the land and landlords and had to pay very high rents. In the 1930s, a survey of 9,134 villages by the Japanese Department of Agriculture showed that 'in 70 per cent of the cases the rental from a single-crop field constituted more than 50 per cent of the crop; from a two-crop field the rent [was] around 60 per cent of the crop' (*Ibid.* 41). The net income of the peasant was even lower than this figure

indicates, because he had to bear the costs of cultivation, and pay a number of taxes besides the land tax.

Thus the DS in Japan was even more hampered, before the second World War, by the burden of a highly exploitative landlord class than the DS of Bismarck's Germany. This is one of the main reasons why, in spite of a tremendous effort to industrialize without allowing foreigners to gain control of any sector of the economy, the rate of growth of the Japanese economy did not attain the spectacular levels that have been witnessed since 1953 or so, by which date Japan had reconstructed her war-ravaged economy (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1978: Table 28; Ohkawa et al. 1993: Table 2.4). The annual rates of growth of Japanese national income in the periods 1897-1919 and 1919-1938 were 2.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively, and these were pulled up by two war-induced spurts in the periods 1912-1917 and 1931-1937 when the respective annual rates of growth of GNP were 4.56 per cent and 5.71 per cent (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1978: Table 28). By contrast, the annual rates of growth of Japanese national income in the periods 1953-1969 and 1969-1979 were 10.0 per cent and 8.5 per cent respectively (Ohkawa et al. 1993: Table 2.4).

Despite the failure to abolish landlordism in the countryside and to take adequate measures to succour the working population, the quality of the effort made, and the strategy adopted, by the Japanese ruling classes after the Meiji Restoration remain very impressive by the standards of Japan's forerunners in the industrialization race, especially in contrast with the trajectories travelled by the ruling classes of most other non-European nations. For example, many members of the *samurai* played an important role in abolishing their own class and the old rank-order of society: they realized that these impeded the release of the energy of the country and its defence against aggressive Western powers. For example, Itagaki Taisuke, head of a middle level samurai family argued in 1871 that 'human skills were the result of natural endowment' and did not depend on 'a division into classes, as samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants' (Beasley 1973: 384). He wanted the responsibility for civil and military function to be spread among the people without confining them to the *samurai*, so that 'each [might] develop his own skill and abilities' (*Ibid.*). Itagaki cited the stiff resistance from ordinary Frenchmen against Prussian aggression at the time of the Paris Commune to argue for the creation of institutions that accorded dignity to the people:

In order to make it possible for our country to confront the world and succeed in the task of achieving national prosperity, the whole of the people must be made to cherish sentiments of patriotism, and institutions established under which people are treated as equals. There is no other course...After all, the people's wealth and strength are the government's wealth and strength, and the people's poverty and weakness the government's poverty and weakness (Memorial by Itagaki Taisuke, 1870-71, as translated and quoted by Beasley 1973:384-5).

The leaders of the Meiji Restoration realized the supreme importance of education in their pursuit of 'civilization and enlightenment,' and their campaign for strengthening the state so as to be able to resist the Western intruders. Hence, in 1872, a law was proclaimed which set out a scheme of education from the primary to university levels, also making primary education compulsory. The enforcement of this law was not smooth-sailing (Taira 1978:196-9), but eventually resistance was overcome and the money was found for funding the programme. As a result, while in 1873 only 28 per cent of the school age population was attending school, the corresponding figure had risen to 98 by the end of the century, rendering Japan one of the most literate countries in the world (Morishima 1982:102). The close integration of government planning and business strategies also date from the early days of the Meiji Restoration.

Many other institutions characteristic of the Japanese economy—the close links between conglomerates and banks, the life-time employment system for skilled workers and managers, the promotion of managers on the basis of seniority, profit-sharing systems tying workers and employers, extensive subcontracting between a few principals and numerous small and medium-scale firms—had their basis in a bedrock of nationalism, and the ability of the Japanese ruling classes—many of them *ex-samurai* but many springing from families of merchants or prosperous farmers—to work together so as to keep out foreign control. But the specific institutions grew out of particular circumstances in different phases of post-Meiji Japanese history (Watanabe 1987; Wan 1988).

In a sustained effort to speed up the development of the economy and increase its military potential, the Japanese government promoted and financed railways, telegraph lines, ports, shipyards and naval installations. But it also set up pioneer factories. Most of these state-sponsored shipyards and factories were later turned over to private enterprise. But they acted

as training grounds for workers, technologists and managers, and led to adaptations of techniques and management styles to Japanese conditions and requirements. Because of the government's continued interest in the development of capital goods industries and armaments factories and its repeated involvement in war, starting with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the close collaboration between government and business continued and was even intensified in the most militaristic phase of Japan's history viz., the period from 1931 to 1945.

The close relation of banks and trading houses grew up quite early in the Japanese drive toward industrialization: trading houses found that it was useful to start a bank which would finance their trading, and even more, their long-gestation investment activities; they were devices for mobilizing capital and spreading risks (Yamamura 1972:1978).

Similarly, the profit-sharing system and the relatively low differential in salaries between different levels of management and skilled workers and managers was a response to the shortage of trained personnel in the initial decades of industrialization and the disincentive effects of conspicuously large salaries in a society in which a sense of duty and responsibility to the state still exerted a powerful influence (Taira 1978; Morishima 1982: chapters 3-4). Again, the so-called lifetime employment system which governs perhaps a third of the male workers in large enterprises in Japan was a response to severe labour shortages, absenteeism and labour poaching during the first World War and the 1920s. Paradoxically enough, these institutions, along with a deliberate management strategy to win the loyalty of workers through the formation of company or plant-level trade unions, were strengthened in response to some initiatives taken by the post-Second World War American occupation authorities (SCAP) to provide security to workers (Taira 1978; Bagchi 1987b).

Throughout these years, even when unequal treaties were still in force, Japan kept foreign capital and foreign enterprise at bay. While showing a fierce determination to learn 'the skills of the barbarians,' the Japanese government got rid of foreign experts as soon as the skills had been absorbed and never allowed foreign enterprises to obtain a foothold in any major sector. Japan's drive for increasing exports at almost any cost was also motivated by a desire to avoid dependence on foreign capital and resulting foreign political control. It is a measure of the strength of Japan's nationalism

that such policies could be continued even when Japan was occupied by the Allied (American) forces.

Despite all these remarkable features of the society and economy, the Japanese miracle did not happen until after the Second World War. A key factor contributing to that miracle was the thoroughgoing land reform carried out under American supervision. There had been a number of attempts in Japan from 1922 to improve the condition of tenants and redistribute land to them, but the lack of any provision for confiscation or compulsory sale of land by landlords with ownership holdings above a certain size rendered such efforts ineffectual (Ladejinsky 1947:87). In December 1945, a defeated Japanese government placed before the Diet a land reform law which would have allowed landlords to retain up to 5 hectares of owned land, and would have freed forty per cent of the tenanted land as the property of former tenants (Dore 1959; Tadashi 1967). But the occupation authorities proposed a much more drastic land reform which was enacted the following year as the 'second land reform law'. This law specified that '(1) all the land of absentee owners [was] to be purchased by the government; (2) all tenanted land owned by resident landowners in excess of one *cho* (2.5 acres), or 4 *cho* in Hokkaido, [was] to be purchased by the government'; and '(3) the purchase price' would be 'in bonds bearing interest rates of 3.6 per cent and redeemable in 30 years' plus some bonus in cash (Tsuru 1993: 21). This was virtually a confiscatory land reform. This measure destroyed the power of the landlords in the countryside and released the surplus rural labour for non-agricultural employment when economic growth started at unprecedented rates in the 1950s.

The SCAP imposed on Japan a number of other reforms in the areas of civil service, labour and industrial relations (which we have already referred to), constitutional provisions and institutions for establishing formal, western-style democracy (Tsuru 1993:18-36). The Occupation authorities at first also wanted to break up the *Zaibatsu*, the Japanese conglomerates, as they saw them as major pillars of militarism. However, in every case, the Japanese ruling class adapted the reforms to suit their own conditions. This was made easier after the U.S. involvement in the Korean War when the American government came to regard Japan as the main bastion of their defensive wall against communism in Asia, moving to revive Japan's economy rather than allow it to remain weakened.

The Japanese ability to turn defeat into an opportunity is exemplified by the outcome of the attempted abolition of the *Zaibatsu* by the occupation authorities. When the directors and controllers of the *ex-Zaibatsu* groups were removed, the middle-level managers of the companies:

...found themselves unexpectedly promoted to the top without any preparation...these new young executives began securing their positions by making their friends' companies become big shareholders in their own companies so that these persons could support them.

However, these new shareholders were poor because they too had first been promoted from positions of middle management... They exploited the power accompanying [their new] positions to establish a system for the mutual support of these proletarian managers...(Morishima, 1995: 151-2).

Thus the interlocking of directorships of different firms, and of trading and industrial firms and banks, and the close involvement of banks and firms in monitoring one another was re-established in postwar Japan and was styled on the relationship between *keiretsu* firms. This system largely insulated firms from hostile takeover bids, from 'short-termism' and liquidity crises and financial collapses stemming from short-term difficulties. These relations, together with profit-sharing arrangements between firms and their employees, and the reluctance of firms to get rid of employees who had served them for a long time also ensured a degree of management-employee collaboration which was the envy of most advanced capitalist countries (Aoki 1987, Koike 1987; Ito 1993: chapter 7). Institutional reforms of the land and labour markets contributed substantially towards relatively egalitarian income distribution and expansion of the home market (Minami 1998). The relatively egalitarian distribution of earnings between managers and workers, and the drive to increase market shares of firms, contributed to the growth of the domestic market, making Japanese firms formidable competitors in export markets. The opening of western European and US markets, of course, also contributed to Japanese growth. The abolition of the burden of military expenditures freed Japanese resources and innovations for concentration on the development of products for civilian use.

The full-grown Japanese DS was very much a post-war phenomenon as was the Japanese miracle. This state began facing a crisis only at the end of the 1980s. Still, while it lasted it, this DS raised Japan to the position of the second industrial power globally and allowed the Japanese a standard

of living equal to or greater than those of the Western European countries, U.S.A., Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

VI. SOUTH KOREA: THE FINAL FRONTIER OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE?

We now turn to South Korea, which has been celebrated in the recent literature as one of the four East Asian dragons or tigers. South Korea is distinguished from our earlier examples of developmental states by two major characteristics, namely: it is a former colony of an imperial power, and secondly, its spectacular growth is almost entirely a post-second World War phenomenon. Formally the Netherlands had also been a colony of Spain. However, the Netherlands was only a part of the so-called Holy Roman Empire, with a system of governance of its own. Korea under Japan had been an abject dependency, and its maturation into a DS required special geopolitical conditions.

It has been sometimes argued, especially by some Japanese and American scholars, that Japanese colonialism laid the foundations of postwar growth in Korea, that Korean growth can be understood as a more or less continuous process since the days of Japanese colonialism (cf. Fei, Ohkawa, and Ranis 1985; Kikuchi and Hayami 1985). In fact, under Japanese colonialism, the growth of Korea (and Taiwan) was respectable by the standards of most nonwhite colonies of the European powers, but not at all that spectacular, indeed and may have coincided with the impoverishment of the mass of Koreans (Ladejinsky 1940; Woo 1991: chapter 2).

Alice Amsden (1987, 1989: chapter 1), in her otherwise excellent book, has alleged that South Korea shares with other 'late industrializers' the peculiarity that its industrialization was based on learning from other countries rather than any innovations in processes or products. As we have seen, one distinguishing mark of any successful DS in history has been its ability to learn from others. There were not many product or process innovations which were associated with the emergence of the Dutch as the supreme naval power in Europe in the seventeenth century, except perhaps in shipbuilding. In the case of Japan, the most important 'late industrializing country' by Amsden's criterion, innovations in automatic looms in cotton weaving preceded the second World War, and Japan has emerged as a major innovator in a whole range of consumer durables and processes of production involving microelectronic technologies since the 1960s. Moreover, inno-

variations in organizational techniques have been almost wholly neglected by Amsden.

Korea was formally occupied by Japan in 1910. It was then developed as a base for the supply of rice to Japan. The Japanese government deployed its army and police to prevent peasant mobilization and instituted a cadastral survey and compulsory land registration. In the process, vast numbers of Koreans who could not prove their title lost their land to the occupying government or Japanese companies and individuals. The Japanese established the Oriental Development Company for exploiting Korean resources, but also passed 'a Corporation Law that empowered the colonial government to control, and to dissolve if necessary, both new and established businesses in Korea' (Woo 1991: 22). 'Through 1919...those industries that thrived in colonial Korea were mostly household industries that did not require company registration, and large-scale factories employing more than fifty workers numbered only 89 (and were mostly Japanese owned), even as late as 1922'. (*Ibid.* 23) In 1929, 'the bulk of manufacturing output still remained in foodstuffs at 63.5 per cent, followed by textiles at 10.9 per cent.' (*Ibid.* 24).

When Japan tried to conquer Manchuria and the rest of China, the Japanese government, and Japanese financial and industrial firms sought to convert Korea into a supply base for the war. The Bank of Chosen, supposedly the central bank of Korea, the Oriental Development Company, the Dai-Ichi Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Japan extended long-term loans to development corporations, and the *Zaibatsu* to establish hydroelectric power stations, steel mills, heavy machinery works and chemical factories in Korea. This policy also led to an extreme concentration of heavy industries in the hands of a few *Zaibatsu*. By 1945, one single *Zaibatsu* under the control of Noguchi Jun controlled about 35 per cent of Japanese direct investment in Korea (*Ibid.* 35). 'By 1945, Japanese ownership, most of which was in the hands of the *Zaibatsu*, constituted 81.7 per cent of the paid-up capital of all industrial enterprises in Korea; 97 per cent in chemical industry, 93 per cent in metal and machinery, 97 per cent in cement. Even in light manufacturing such as textiles and flour mills, the ratios were 80 per cent and 81 per cent, respectively'. (*Ibid.* 40).

Under Japanese programmes of development and exploitation, the output of farm products, especially rice, increased quickly in colonial Korea, as did landlessness and tenancy. According to one estimate, in Korea,

whereas in 1914, out of a total number of farming households of 2.59 million, 0.57 million were owner-cultivators, 1.07 million were part-owners and part-tenants, and 0.91 million were full tenants, by 1938, the number of owner-cultivator households and part-tenant and part-owner households had declined to 0.54 million and 0.81 million respectively, whereas the number of part-tenant households had risen to 1.51 million (Ladejinsky 1940:50). It was estimated that by the end of 1930, the Japanese owned 1.5 million acres or about 11 per cent of the taxable land area in the colony (*Ibid.*, p.51). By the time of the US occupation of Korea after the defeat of Japan, land held by Japanese companies and individuals amounted to 13-15 per cent of arable (Choudhury and Islam 1993: 62).

The confiscation of Japanese property thus at once transferred a large stock of industrial assets to the successor government as well as a substantial percentage of the cultivable land which could then be distributed to the Koreans. The American authorities and the Korean government proceeded with land reform measures out of fear that peasant unrest would prepare the road for the victory of communism as in China. Moreover, there were strong nationalist and left-wing movements demanding the abolition of landlordism of the Japanese and Koreans since the Korean landlords were seen as collaborators of the colonial power. In their initial drive through South Korea during the period of the Korean War, the North Koreans had abolished landlordism even during their brief sway in South Korea (Cumings 1987: 66). The Korean land reform law was similar to the Japanese in that the government was empowered to purchase the lands of all absentee landlords, lands entirely given out in lease, and all lands above 3 hectares per household (even when they were cultivated by the owners). This land was then sold to tenants or owners with a holding size of less than 3 hectares on relatively easy terms (Lee 1979; Choudhury and Islam 1993: 62-3). As a result of the land reform process, between 1947 and 1965 the percentage of full owners among farm households increased from 16.5 to 69.5, whereas that of pure tenants declined from 42.1 to 7.0 only. Correspondingly, the number of landholdings above 3 hectares per household declined from 31,000 in 1947 to 3,000 in 1965, and the number of households owning from less than 0.5 hectares to 1 hectare of land increased from 1,619,000 to 1,780,000, while the number of households owning between 1 hectare and 3 hectares showed a marginal decline (Lee 1979:26). These data also indicate the very low land/person ratio in Korea.

As a result of the pro-peasant land reform measures, rural incomes and assets became relatively equalized, and they increased substantially after 1963, particularly in the 1970s (*Ibid.*) Land was eliminated as an asset for speculation or as a lever for keeping actual producers dependent. Thus, landlordism was eliminated in South Korea as one of the major characteristics of a DS was instituted.

South Korea also fulfilled another characteristic of a DS, namely a strong and realistic sense of nationalism. This sense worked in unsuspected ways. Syngman Rhee, the dictatorial ruler of South Korea from the late 1940s to 1960, when he fell as a result of student revolt which the military refused to suppress, was utterly dependent on U.S. military and economic aid. But he played on American fears of the resurgence of communism and his threat to invade North Korea and drag the USA again into a major war, in order to extract more aid and thwart various American designs (Haggard 1990: 54-61; Woo 1991: chapter 3). He frustrated American attempts to privatise state-owned assets and to liberalise the foreign trade regime so as to make Korea revert to its prewar place of mainly supplying agricultural products in an East Asian international division of labour (mirroring the Japanese-engineered Co-prosperity Sphere) with Japan at the centre of it. During the 1950s, Rhee's regime presided over an import substitution process and a quite respectable rate of economic growth—4.5 percent of GDP growth per year.

Another contribution of the Rhee era was the education of the Koreans. From relatively low levels of literacy at the time of the end of Japanese colonial rule, the adult literacy rates were raised to 71 percent already by 1960, and by 1980, an impressive 92 percent (Chaudhury and Islam 1993:152).

Of course, American aid and the Korean involvement in feeding the supply lines of the American war effort and military presence in the whole of East Asia, including China, Korea and later Vietnam, helped ease South Korea's resource constraints and aided its skill formation (Mason *et al.*, 1980:165; Bagchi 1987:33-35). Still, a special effort at focusing the national effort and coordination of strategies was needed to utilize the privileged access South Korea enjoyed to U.S. capital and U.S. markets, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.

The turn in the 1960s in the South Korean economic policy has been often portrayed as the turn to export-led growth (e.g., Haggard 1990:

chapter 3). It is better seen as a turn towards coherent planning and a drive towards accumulation for the sake of greater national strength. The bases for this had already been laid in the 1950s. A national planning body had been established in 1958, and the short-lived government of Chang Myon had drawn up a five year development plan. But real teeth were put into planning when the Park government organised an Economic Planning Board which took over the Bureau of the Budget from the Ministry of Finance, and the Bureau of Statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Its head was given the rank of Deputy Prime Minister (Jones and Sakong 1980: 46-8, and Bagchi 1987: 36). Since Korea had a large balance of payments deficit, it made sense to put special emphasis on exports in order to gain policy autonomy *vis-à-vis* the US government, the sole source of aid. The basis for the export drive had been laid in the 1950s through the growth of the textile industry and a number of other light industries. The 1950s had also seen the emergence of the South Korean *chaebol*, organizations closely corresponding to the Japanese *zaibatsu*. Park's government proceeded to discipline them for purposes of national accumulation, first by arresting the chief tax-evaders among the big businessmen, and then allowing them to go free and make money on condition that they invested in areas designated by the government. The government made sure of this by nationalizing all the commercial banks (which had been briefly privatized under US pressure) and taking over all foreign exchange for allocation between designated uses (Bagchi 1987: 36-8; Dreze and Sen 1989: 193-7; Woo 1991: chapters 4-5).

While exporters were allocated foreign exchange on a priority basis, the relative price structure did not particularly favour exports (Bagchi 1987: 38-40). What favoured exports was growth, improvements in productivity through rising levels of education of the workforce, learning by doing and learning by using, and exploitation of economies of scale through the favoured treatment of large firms especially in exports (Bagchi 1987: 40-49). The regulation of real wages, which rose with productivity but at a lower rate, a rise in the share of profits and their systematic reinvestment drove the growth process forward but, of course, led to a more unequal distribution of income (*Ibid.*, and Amsden 1989: 16-17n). One difference between the Japanese and Korean developmental states and the Dutch and the British ones is that there was little explicit provision for preventing destitution through national social insurance or anti-poverty measures. However, in both cases,

drastic, pro-peasant land reforms removed the worst cases of rural poverty after the second World War, and rapid growth and a tightening labour market raised real wages, especially for the more skilled male workers.

Eventually higher expenditures on R&D, a determined tying up of R&D set-ups run by the government and industrial firms, and a deliberate restructuring of industry with emphasis on such sectors as shipbuilding, electronics, automobiles, iron and steel, and petrochemicals made South Korea one of the champion performers in domestic investment and saving, the growth of national income, and exports of manufactures (Bagchi 1987: chapter 3; Amsden 1989: chapters 4-6). In this process, the close collaboration between government and business and the effective monitoring by government of strategic business decisions played a highly important role.

As the South Korean manufacturing sector developed and South Korea began generating large surpluses *vis-à-vis* the U.S.A., the Korean government played a less interventionist role in the economy. Many of the formal restrictions on entry of foreign goods and foreign capital were relaxed, partly under pressure from the US government and foreign transnational corporations.

In the 1990s, the South Korean DS entered into a phase of precocious maturity and decline. Several factors contributed to this. The deliberate promotion of *chaebol* by the South Korean government up to 1982-83, and in many cases even beyond that date, created a number of South Korean transnational corporations which set up branches and subsidiaries in many countries of the world, including the USA, Canada and major European countries. The latter now demanded freer entry for the investments and products of their firms into South Korea. Until 1993 or thereabouts, South Korea, following the Japanese example, had kept inward foreign investment at bay. After that year, restrictions on foreign portfolio and direct investment were relaxed and a much greater mobility of capital was permitted in international transactions. This led to an inflow of foreign capital. Moreover, the Japanese yen and the Chinese won were substantially devalued from around the same date. These developments led to an overvaluation of the Korean currency, and South Korea ran up large deficits in its balance of payments account. South Korean firms now borrowed large amounts abroad to meet the deficits and to take advantage of lower interest rates abroad. By the beginning of 1997, South Korea was caught in a debt trap, and in the last

quarter of that year it had to seek IMF assistance in order to avoid declaration of debt default. (Bagchi 1998). The usual IMF conditionalities ended, at least temporarily, South Korea's status as a DS.

Even though the currency crisis seems to have overwhelmed most of South and Southeast Asia, several developmental states are alive and kicking in East Asia. The most dynamic among them is the People's Republic of China, but the delineation of that state as the prime mover in development deserves a separate essay. We turn next to the financialized twilight of the developmental states.

VII. THE TWILIGHT OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: THE DOMINANCE OF FINANCE OVER PRODUCTION

The Dutch DS first faltered and then crumbled. A number of reasons can be assigned to the decline: the small size of the domestic market, the rise of wages beyond what would give the Dutch a competitive edge in comparison with their two major rivals, (Britain and France), and the unequal military competition in which the Netherlands became engaged with England and France all played their part (Wilson 1939; Boxer 1973: chapter 10; De Vries 1982). But there are three other features which I would emphasize as major contributory factors. (By the criteria set out earlier, Britain between the reign of Elizabeth I and the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 was also a DS. When that DS entered into its twilight state it shared most of the characteristics of the twilight of the Dutch DS, except, of course, its subjugation by a foreign power). The first was the enmeshing of the economy in a network of international trade which prevented it from competing on equal terms with the newly emerging DS. While Britain, France and other close competitors of the Dutch in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took measures to protect their fisheries, ship-building, or infant textile industries against foreign competition and unified their national markets, the Dutch could not follow them to the logical end without hurting their *entrepot* trades. Moreover, the decentralized nature of their state prevented the Dutch from getting their act together against the increasingly centralized British and French states.

Secondly, changes in the social structure, the increasing transformation of shipowners-cum-ship captains or merchants into pure shipowners, the inability of the Dutch with a stagnant population and an over-urbanized state to find seamen and other workers in adequate numbers, and the large-

scale conversion of Dutch bourgeoisie into pure financiers and rentiers blunted the competitive edge of the Dutch (Boxer 1973: chapter 10; Israel 1995: chapters 37-39). Moreover, when the British industrial revolution set the pace for technical innovation in Europe, the Dutch failed not only to innovate but also to learn from other countries. As a result such vital branches of economic activity as ocean navigation, shipbuilding, whale-fishing and textiles suffered obsolescence and decline.

Finally, the Dutch capitalists increasingly used their capital to finance the public debts, private enterprises and wars of England and other countries which had emerged as their major competitors. By 1782, for example, out of an estimated Dutch investment of a thousand million florins in public loans and precious metals, fully 335 million was invested in foreign loans and another 140 million in colonial loans. Of the 335 million lent to foreigners, 280 million was invested in English loans (Braudel 1984: 267). In 1801, the Dutch were found to be the largest foreign holders of English national debt: they held £10.54 million out of £17.44 million of the English debt held abroad (Neal 1990: 207).

The Dutch Republic finally ended in 1806, after suffering the humiliation of rule by the French. In the nineteenth century Dutch industrialization had to be resumed on different foundations; explicitly, as the follower of the British. The latter aided this effort by allowing the Dutch to retake Indonesia as a colony as part the post-Napoleonic settlement. The colonial plunder of Indonesia enormously aided Dutch industrialization and the re-entry of the Dutch into the western European club of affluent nations (Bagchi 1982: chapter 4).

I need not devote much space here to the decline of the British DS, for the explanation of the end of British economic hegemony in the nineteenth century has spawned an enormous literature. The decline of the spirit of entrepreneurship, the conversion of businessmen to the ethos of the public school and its school-boy codes of honour, the stiff upper lip, the values of the gentleman who scorn trade and the sordid affair of making money, all these have been added to the more strictly economic factors such as a relatively low rate of saving and insufficient investment in the domestic economy in order to explain the decline of Britain as an economic hegemon (Elbaum and Lazonick 1986; McCloskey 1973; Wiener 1981). Through the nineteenth century, British capital markets remained imperfect, system-

atically discriminating against domestic industry in favor of agriculture and portfolio foreign investment and foreign and colonial public loans (Kennedy 1987). Britain invested half of its savings in foreign loans and investments during the period 1870-1914, but that investment was in fact matched by the income generated by its past investments (Pollard 1985). British agriculture and some parts of its staple industries suffered badly in the so-called Great Depression from the 1870s to the 1890s. British policies favoured free trade and free mobility of capital because the interests of the empire and its payments balances and those of its upper class demanded these policies. Domestic industrial growth could be traded against burgeoning incomes from the empire and foreign investments. The dominance of finance and empire ultimately proved detrimental to the upkeep of a developmental state.

Is Japan bound to follow the earlier example of the Dutch republic and Britain, allowing finance to dominate industry, and foreign investment to lord over the priorities of domestic economic growth? There has been a deep crisis in the stock markets and prices of real estate in Japan since the end of the 1990s (Morishima 1995), but it is not inevitable that Japan will fall into the trap of financial dominance. The close linkages of industrial firms, their subcontractors and the main banks are still in place despite some deregulation of money and capital markets (Ito 1992: chapters 5 and 7; Aoki 1994). Again, the proportion of imported manufactures in the consumer basket of the Japanese remains far lower than the corresponding figure for other affluent countries with similar levels of income. Finally, the Japanese have proved more tenacious than other advanced countries in retaining so-called sunset industries, allocating considerable amounts of public funds for adapting those industries to competition from lower-wage countries.

VIII. FAILED DEVELOPMENTAL STATES: THE SOVIET UNION, BRAZIL, INDIA

The collapse of the Soviet Union is generally seen as the failure of 'actually existing socialism'. But it is perhaps understood better if we view it as the breakdown of a DS that could not cope with the challenge of a resurgent global capitalism. The Soviet Union provided the model of developmentalism for many countries. The Soviet Five Year plans, implemented at the time of the deep crisis of the capitalist system, inspired developmentalism even in countries where the ruling classes professed anti-communist ideology.

The Soviet DS clocked up some major achievements up until the 1950s. It raised the rates of economic growth, however measured, way above the historical trends. It led to a high rate of industrialization and a rapid transformation of the occupational structure, so that the majority of the people ceased to be employed in agriculture. The tremendous effort at accumulation and the building of capital goods industries, and the ideology of a working class bent on building socialism, helped a relatively economically backward Soviet Union resist the onslaught of Nazi Germany, playing a major role in its downfall. The reconstruction of the Soviet Union and major parts of Eastern Europe after the Second World War, with little help from the hostile Western capitalist powers, was again a major achievement. In the fields of technology, the independent construction of nuclear power plants and the credit of putting the first man in space also belong to this era. Through the 1950s and until the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviet citizen also gained tremendously in general health and longevity.

Bairoch's calculations of comparative industrialization levels (Bairoch 1982: 281) show that the per capita index for the USSR (with the level in the U.K. in 1913 equal to 100) was 20 in 1913, remained 20 in 1928 (after recovery from the destructive effect of the first World War, foreign invasion and civil war), but increased to 73 in 1953 (after recovery from the effects of the Second World War). For Japan, the per capita levels of industrialization were 20 in 1913, 30 in 1928 and 40 in 1953. Thus, economically, the USSR was doing better than Japan up until the 1950s. After that date, however, there was drastic slippage: in 1980 the per capita industrialization levels were 252 for the USSR but 353 in Japan. This retrogression is evident also from measured rates of productivity growth (Bergson, 1989, chapter 6). The total factor productivity growth (percentage per year) in the USSR were 3.63, 1.83, and only 0.26 over the periods 1950-60, 1960-70 and 1970-75 respectively. Over this period the Soviet workers also made impressive advances in education. If allowance is made for growth in educational attainments of labour, the productivity growth rates over the three periods (1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-75) come down to 3.26, 1.29 and -0.21 respectively (*Ibid.* 113).

Even before the crisis of the 1980s engulfed Eastern Europe it was known that the Soviet economic system had become bound up in a number of mutually reinforcing problems (Nove 1977). Public enterprises systematically demanded more resources than were available and planning authorities

failed to discipline them. The result was over-investment and a fall in the productivity of inputs. The problems were compounded by an inability to devise an incentive system that would allow the results of R & D to be used for civilian production purposes: innovations in the military field were not applied to raise standards of consumption in other fields. Even when innovations were put to use in some factories no mechanism existed for their speedy diffusion to other enterprises. Partly because of Western embargoes on transfers of key technologies to the Soviet Union, but also because of the blinkered attitude of the Soviet bureaucratic-political system, the USSR increasingly failed to absorb advances in technology made in other countries (Nove 1977: chapter 6).

Behind the failure of the Soviet DS lay several political and social failures. There was little democracy within the Communist party and in the functioning of the political apparatus. The Soviet Union failed to use the market mechanism as a supplement to planning and for smoothing out awkward corners (Brus 1995). Finally, a failed DS was unable to tackle the military and economic challenge posed by an aggressive capitalist block in the 1980s (Halliday 1990). However, there was nothing inevitable about the collapse of Soviet developmentalism or Soviet-style socialism as it existed until the 1950s. It has been cogently argued (Chandra 1993) that the real rot set in during the 1960s when Khrushchev's attempts to reform the party apparatus, and its relation to the people, and his bid to discipline enterprise managers through the imposition of an obligation to make profits in a more competitive environment were defeated by an entrenched and self-perpetuating party bureaucracy led by Breznev. The fruits of land reforms, expulsion of foreign oligopolists, universal education and an egalitarian income distribution were squandered by a self-serving *nomenklatura*, and a mockery was made of the real goals of socialism.

The cases of the failed Brazilian and Indian DS can be disposed of much more summarily. The reason for failure of Brazilian developmentalism was not simply that it was authoritarian (Fiori, 1992). After all, the Prussian (German), Japanese and South Korean DSs were also not exactly democratic. But Brazilian authoritarianism had insecure foundations, and was directed towards a rather narrow range of objectives. First, there was never any serious attempt to introduce or implement pro-peasant land reforms in Brazil. This led to the entrenchment of landlord power in the villages, and

the tentacles of that power extended to the cities and the political apparatus of the nation, involving workers, businessmen, and political bosses in intricate patron-client relations. Secondly, the state did not try to discipline domestic or foreign capitalists. As domestic investment faltered, the economy became increasingly dependent on foreign capital, and the autonomy of state action became seriously compromised, even when the military seemed to control the whole state apparatus. Thirdly, a weak educational base and an increasingly unequal distribution badly impaired productivity growth and the international competitive prowess of Brazil.

Very similar comments would apply to the Indian DS, some of whose planning ideologies were consciously imitative of Soviet precedents. However, socialism was only a slogan for the top Indian decision-makers (Bagchi 1995a; Chaudhuri 1995; Kaviraj 1995). Except in the three states of Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal, no serious redistribution of land rights in favour of cultivating peasants was effected, and most of India's countryside continued to be dominated by landlords wielding non-market power. Secondly, the progress of education took place at a snail's pace, and the majority of India's population remained illiterate even in the 1980s. Thirdly, significant sectors of the Indian economy were controlled by foreign capital, which inhibited domestic capital and independent entrepreneurial initiatives. Fourthly, property laws governing the major business communities remained family-based and created barriers to entry and enormously increased transactions costs.

Democracy acted as a mechanism for arriving at compromises among the ruling, upper class strata. But it also provided an apparatus for resisting the worst excesses of domestic monopoly capital and TNCs. However, the debt crisis of 1991, which was almost deliberately engineered by certain sections of technocrats, businessmen and politicians favouring increased liberalisation, badly damaged the policy autonomy of the Indian state *vis-à-vis* the IMF, World Bank, transnational capital and internationalized domestic capital. The rise of a Hindu fundamentalist party and the fall-out of its nuclear adventurism have further eroded the prospect of rebuilding a DS on stronger foundations of social capital. The continued crisis in external payments balances has been aggravated by the increase in defence expenditures resulting from the nuclear tests, by the Asian currency crisis and by the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S.A. and some of its allies. The

'Swadeshi' (indigenous) bomb has made India more dependent on private inflows of foreign capital and subservient to transnational capital than even before.

IX. THE FUTURE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

At least since the sixteenth century, the DS has played a major role in pushing forward the development of economies and societies in major regions of the world. Moreover, the DS is very much alive and kicking in East Asia.

It has been argued that strong economies of scale preclude domestic nurturing of infant firms or the generation of new technologies. On the other hand, the densely networked economies of East and South East Asia have demonstrated that many such economies can be reaped by regional cooperation within countries and between countries as well, but market-driven regional integration seems to have reached its limits in that region (Bagchi, 1998). In the so-called Third Italy centered on Emilia Romagna we have witnessed the power of municipal nurturing of industry associations which can overcome problems connected with large overhead expenditures, exploiting the external economies of networking. The remarkable growth and dynamism of the town and village enterprises and some of the surviving collective village organizations in China have also shown the power of consciously designed networks of cooperation in production, research, marketing and finance. In fact, with appropriate changes in social organization and continuous upgrading of human skills through education and learning by doing, a developmental state can be energized by something akin to cellular developmentalism.

The experience of the period since the Second World War demonstrates that, with appropriate strategies in place, economies can grow much faster now than they ever did before the War. Japan and Italy made their real transition to affluence after 1945 (Maddison 1996; Zamagni 1993:37). Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea have also caught up with or even surpassed standards of living of many OECD countries.

We have stressed the role of nationalism in enabling a state to pursue a cohesive, sustained development-oriented policy. The ability of the state to pursue such a policy is in turn contingent on the rapid accumulation and diffusion of what has sometimes been styled 'social capital' (Loury 1977;

Coleman 1988; Benabou 1993, 1996) sometimes called 'social construction of economic institutions' (Granovetter 1992), and sometimes covered under the generic name of 'public action'. The different analysts have focussed, however, on different aspects of the building up of social capital. Economic theorists have used game theory to model 'trust' as a 'commodity' or corporate culture resulting out of the interaction of utility-maximizing individuals (Dasgupta 1988; Kreps 1990). Historians have shown how trust, and hence the moral basis of major segments of society, can be destroyed through inimical public policies (see, for example, Pagden 1988).

'Social capital' can also be used to designate the willingness and ability of dominant groups in society to engage in the construction of enabling institutions and devote resources to the spread of education, sanitation and more generally, the conditions of better living (Loury 1977; Coleman 1988). The forms the construction of such social capital take will vary from country to country, and epoch to epoch, even in the case of a successful DS. In the case of the Dutch DS, as we have seen, the construction of 'social capital' involved the reclamation and protection of land from the sea and the building up of clean cities and educational institutions. After the abolition of the properties of the Roman Catholic Church and its doles, it also involved the provision of succour against destitution under highly punitive conditions. The decline of the DS in the eighteenth century was also associated with the deterioration of the institutions for supporting or building social capital (Israel 1995: chapters 37 and 39).

In Britain, the building of a unitary nationalism under Elizabeth I also coincided with the enactment of laws for succouring the destitute and controlling the masterless men that swelled in visibility, if not in numbers, as a result of the expropriation of the church and the massive transfers of land that took place between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The Speenhamland system was introduced to cushion some of the worst effects on the poor, especially wage-earning poor, of the inflation attending the Napoleonic wars. The new Poor Law, introduced in the 1830, was meant mainly to ease the burden of the Poor Rates on local bodies and shift some of that burden from the losing parishes on to those which gained in population because of the growth of industry. Neither in the Dutch Republic nor in Britain were property owners particularly compassionate towards the poor. They had no compunction in cutting nominal wages when they were facing stiffer

competition, nor in executing or jailing offenders against property rights. However, their consciousness of the dependence the prosperity and health of their realm had on the general social conditions covering both the rich and the poor led them collectively to build up social capital. This collective action was often locally based and apparently detached from the supreme government based in Amsterdam or London. But action by the towns of the seventeen states in the Dutch Republic, or scores of local bodies spread throughout England, created a network of local and global public goods which created a positive synergy between cleanliness, health and education.

The emphasis on an active creation of social capital is necessary to correct the impression that market-driven economic growth necessarily ensures sustained human development in the long run. The Dutch DS eventually failed not only to meet the challenges of the new, larger DS of Britain but also to reverse the demographic decline of the eighteenth century. In Britain, the industrial revolution was attended with a huge increase in mortality in many of the industrial towns. The threat of social disorder was also present in many of these towns. It was only repeated action by the central government, local bodies and private charities that led to improvement in health and education, and kept the threat of social disarray at bay (Szreter 1997; Thompson 1990). By the beginning of the twentieth century, these efforts proved to be visibly inadequate (as shown, for example, by the poor physique and morale of the common British soldier fighting the Boers of South Africa) and Lloyd George proceeded to lay the foundations of the welfare state in Britain.

Similar examples of faltering and renewed build-up of social capital can be culled from the experience of the Nordic countries and Germany (cf. Senghaas 1985). The building up of social capital will often be differentiated along class lines, and in a capitalist DS the working class will be differentiated from the capitalists by education, habitat and standards of public health. But if the demarcation line becomes an almost unbridgeable barrier and intergenerational mobility across class lines becomes too difficult then the policing costs of the social order will rise, the process of continuous upgradation of skills will be hampered, productivity growth will slow down and the state will find itself lagging behind in international competition (Benabou 1993:1996). If such stratification begins early enough, it will choke off the possibility of a country ever constructing a DS. If such strati-

fication occurs when a DS has attained or passed the stage of maturity then capitalist affluence will be not only punctuated by the usual business cycles but also characterized by high levels of unemployment, widening earnings differentials and endemic social violence. This has been the experience of many cities of the USA for a long time, and this experience is being repeated in many European cities with large immigrant populations.

The West European DSs and Japan have joined the club of affluent nations; unregulated mobility of capital between them has led to realignments of locational patterns, and pockets and regions of severe unemployment. This pattern will be repeated again, especially if Japan ultimately demolishes most of the non-transparent barriers against the entry of foreign goods and capital. However, with similar levels of labour productivity and with endowments of TNCs in every OECD country, these countries are likely to grow at a positive rate, even if the dominance of finance over industry leads to a slowdown of investment everywhere. However, a dismantling of the welfare state is taking its toll on living standards in most of the OECD countries. In virtually all of these countries real wages of low-skilled labour have stagnated or even declined since the onslaught of financial liberalization beginning in the 1980s, and inequality has increased enormously in virtually all the European countries, as well as the U.S.A. and Canada (Atkinson et al., 1995).

The developing countries which have failed to construct DSs are now being bullied by the IMF, the World Bank and transnational capital into opening up their economies to unrestricted entry of foreign goods, services and capital, and the state is withdrawing from all sectors of economic activity except the provision of infrastructure. At the same time, their ability to raise resources for creating social capital has been crippled by the doctrine that taxing the rich is harmful for the economy. These policies have hampered the prospects of growth at a respectable rate (say 5-8 per cent per annum) and led to an increase in income inequality in these economies, even in cases, such as Brazil, where such inequality was already very high (UNCTAD 1997: Part II). There is mounting evidence that in the long run, increases in inequality tend to depress income growth further (for a summary of the evidence and the analysis, see UNCTAD 1997: Part II, chapter 5). Thus without a drastic change in policies leading to increased construction of

social and physical capital, these developing countries will remain doomed to poverty and social disarray.

For the existing DSs in East Asia not yet members of the OECD club several dangers loom ahead. The first is unregulated or badly monitored financial liberalization, which we have discussed earlier, whose effect has been evident in the recent Asian currency and macroeconomic crisis. The second is the dismantling of institutions for the building of social capital and upgrading of the skills, health and security of labour under the illusion that such dismantling and lowering of wages and public expenditures will make the country more competitive in export markets. The third danger is that the DSs concerned will continue to rely on market-driven integration without aiming at integration as a political project to be executed through deliberate policies. In Europe, individual countries achieved partial integration with one another by pursuing similar policies and permitting free mobility not only of productive capital but also labour. From the end of the Second World War, European integration was pursued as a political project with determination on the part of most segments of opinion. Such an active willingness to integrate is as yet not in evidence in East and Southeast Asia despite the existence of the ASEAN (Bagchi 1998). The difficulties recently faced by South Korea are partly attributable to this absence of integration and unregulated competitiveness prevailing in that region.

I conclude by observing that if today's underdeveloped countries are to provide decent standards of living to their citizens, construction of viable developmental states, consciously integrated with other similarly placed DSs, will have to remain high on their agenda.

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
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THE HARD-EARNED INTEGRATION OF THE EAST IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Silviu Brucan

World socialism was a subsystem of the world-system and as such could not run deeper than the system of which it was a part. Had Lenin realized the workings of the world economic system, he would have concluded that Russia had no chance whatsoever to build an antisystemic economy in the midst of an overpowering world capitalist system. In his earlier writings, Lenin had a glimpse of that reality, hoping that another socialist revolution would break out in Germany, bailing out the Russian one. Instead, as his dream failed to materialize he began a desperate enterprise: socialism in one country.

In retrospective, I venture to say that the pervasive power of the world-system expressed itself in the fact that Lenin and Stalin, unconsciously, conceived both socialist society, as well as the future communist society, within the limits of the industrial system, which historically belongs to the capitalist epoch. This began when Stalin presented industrialization as the goal of socialism (industrialization being essentially a capitalist operation), and ended with Lenin's definition of communism "Soviets plus electrification," and Stalin's threshold to communism expressed in terms of millions of tons of pig iron, steel, coal and oil both indicating the limit of their historical perspective within the industrial system. Never did they formulate a *new type of productive forces* that would usher in the formation of a postcapitalist society, remaining intellectual prisoners of the industrial system.

Silviu Brucan
Str. Helesteului 26
Sector 1
71297 Bucuresti
Romania

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Stalin tried hopelessly to escape from that theoretical framework. *First*, he argued that socialist economies could be insulated from the world system; *Secondly*, he maintained that industrialization would make socialist states independent. Industrialization not only failed to make socialist states independent, but it instead became the trap whereby socialist nations were caught in the world economic system. As socialist states industrialized they only became dependent on world markets, world prices of raw materials and up-to-date technologies. Of course, the Western powers also benefited from socialist industrialization, milking socialist states through unequal West-East trade exchanges via the superiority of Western currencies and growing foreign debt until socialism was ruined and broke. As for the ideological split of the world market, this was a basic misconception of Stalin with regard to the workings of the world-system. As Samir Amin has pointed out: the predominance of the capitalist mode of production is manifest in the fact that, in the world-system, both central and peripheral formations are arranged in a single system, organized and hierarchical. Thus there are not two worlds markets but only one: the capitalist world market, in which Eastern Europe participated marginally.¹

In the 1980's, COMECON's marginal position in the world-system was set by three figures: almost 30% of the world industrial output, but only 11% of the world trade, and merely 9% of the world financial transactions.

THE WEST IS MILKING THE EAST

With the downfall of the Soviet bloc, all postcommunist societies began to institute a market economy, liberalizing their trade and monetary exchanges, consequently being sucked into the whirlwind of the world economic system. They opened their gates wide to Western corporations with the hope these would bring new technologies that might make their factories more competitive. In fact, Western companies show a taste for labor-intensive industries undergoing privatization. They tend to inject the latest technologies, maintain a low-cost labor force, and thus produce cheap goods for world markets. But the real trouble is the growing foreign debt, which

THE HARD-EARNED INTEGRATION OF THE EAST IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM 446
is sending half of the hard-earned exports of postcommunist nations to the West in order to service this debt.

Stated bluntly, the claims by Western governments to have helped East Europeans establish a market economy is a big hoax. In 1995, while visiting London, I was invited by a Vice-Minister to the Foreign Office. When he asked me what the West could do to help us improve the economic situation, I answered: "Stop milking us!" He was astounded, so I gave him some data. The foreign debt of the emerging democracies has skyrocketed to such an extent that the money needed to service this debt is much higher than all the economic aid coming from the West. In figures, the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe owed more than \$150 billion, which means they were paying annually about \$20 billions as principal and interest. In comparison, the actual grants they got from the West never surpassed \$5 billion annually. The trade picture did not look better. The average score of the 1990's in the East-West trade is \$7 billion in exports to \$12 billion in imports. In brief, the *main cash flow in Europe has been from the poor East to the rich West*, and not vice-versa.

THE KEY OF SUCCESS TO MARKET REFORM: THE MIDDLE CLASS

The evaluation of progress in postcommunist societies is usually made in terms of political and economic achievements. Seldom are changes in the social sphere taken into account, although these affect society much more profoundly and are more indicative of both present stability and the future of these nations. Examining the social stratification of these societies, we find at the top the common phenomenon of the rapid enrichment of the new capitalists, involving in most cases enterprising members of the communist *nomenklatura*. However, as we move down, an obvious discrepancy appears between the Central European nations and Russia: the *middle class*.

To better understand the genesis and dynamics of the middle class in the region, we must go back to the pre-communist era. In Central Europe, the motive force of social development was capitalist-industrial growth, while in Russia, rigid feudal structures with millions of illiterate peasants were dominant. Apparently, in the Russia of modern times there has always been one class lagging behind the historical process. In October 1917, when the task was the socialist revolution, the supposed agent of change, the *proletariat* was missing. Today, when the task is the building of a modern market

¹ Samir Amin, *Unequal Development*. Sussex: Harvester, 1976, pg. 22.

economy, it is the *middle class* that is missing. American historian Richard Pipes makes a perceptive point: "Russia's inability to produce a large and vigorous bourgeoisie is usually seen as a major cause of its deviation from the political institutions and practices." Russian historian Yuri Afanasiev also emphasizes that Russia today lacks a social base for democratic reform, leading to an oligarchic system.

Not so in Central Europe. In Czechoslovakia, the interwar regime of President Masaryk was on par with Western Europe in terms of capitalist-industrial development and democracy. Here, a powerful social stratum survived even during the four decades of communism, enjoying a standard of living characteristic of a middle class (home and automobile ownership, significant cultural expenditures, holidays abroad, and the like). For obvious reasons, official statistics never mentioned that category, but Western sociologists discovered that, in the 1970's and 1980's, families with high incomes and a middle class lifestyle in Czechoslovakia represented about 30% of the active population; in Hungary the figure was 20-25%, in Poland, 15%. In retrospect, we now realize that the Prague Spring and the reformist drive that swept Hungary and Poland actually reflected petit-bourgeois trends toward liberalization rather than typical working-class grievances.

Romania was left behind the Central European countries in this respect. *Breviarul Statistic* reveals that in the inter-war period, the urban petit-bourgeoisie was made up of 128,000 owners, 327,000 store managers, 25,100 liberal professionals, and 19,500 family members; in total 3-5% of the active population. Under communism, a study, published by the Center for Sociological Research in 1988, showed that a "higher status" in society (in terms of housing comfort, cars, cultural consumption, and the like) was enjoyed by 5% of the active population. Such a low percentage was caused by Ceausescu's statist policy, which stifled any private economic activity. Even private peasants and owners of private plots were harassed by the militia whenever they tried to sell their products on the market.

In the U.S.S.R., besides the party and state dignitaries who enjoyed high salaries, only artists, musicians, scientists and managers in the military-industrial complex had a higher income. They represented no more than 1% of the active population. Sociologist Mikhail Tchernik considers that this very thin stratum taking shape after Gorbachev's opening of *perestroika* in 1985 had a monthly income of \$250 to \$2000 per person, owning usually an

Table 1 – Transition in Post-Communist States

Countries	Potential middle-class before 1989 (%)	Per capital GDP(%)	1995 Average Monthly wage (\$)	GDP Growth(%)
Czech Republic	30	4,338	303.1	4
Slovakia	25	2,926	253.0	6.4
Hungary	20-25	3,882	328.0	4.0
Poland	15	3,167	307.0	6.5
Romania	5	1,380	110.0	3.8
Bulgaria	5	1,176	118.0	2.8
Albania	1	332	50.0	6.0
Russia	1	2,393	126.3	-2.0

Source: *Financial Times* and *Business Central Europe*

apartment, an automobile, a TV set, an imported last-generation refrigerator, a VCR, and a small dacha outside town.

As shown in Table 1 there is an almost direct relationship between the percentage of potential middle class before 1989, and the progress of the market reform as of 1995 measured in per capita GDP and average monthly wage. The Czech Republic, with a 30% middle class has become the post-communist front-runner with more than \$4,000 in per capita GDP and an average monthly wage of \$300, whereas Russia, despite its enormous natural riches trails the group with only 1% middle class. In brief: *the middle class is the key to success in market reform.*

How was the middle class born in those countries? With forceps! The market economy could not possibly function with workers and peasants alone. Merchants and entrepreneurs, businessmen and intermediaries, salesmen and managers are all a *must*. Therefore, the formation of a class made up of such people is both vital and urgent. Eastern Europeans cannot afford to replicate the slow and gradual process of middle class formation, a process that took many decades in the West. We witness here instead a social birth abrupt, painful, forced and accelerated, with contenders cutting their way through the loopholes of a rudimentary and inadequate legislation. A *savage middle class*, I call it.

But the most striking social outcome of the revolution in the East is the making of a host of millionaires in just five or six years. The novelty of that phenomenon stems from the peculiar condition of their genesis: *the accumulation of capital was censured and illegal in communist society, so the post-1989 capitalists made their fortune at the expense of state property and capital,*

grabbing the assets, machinery, real estate—and even the social capital—of state enterprises or commercial organizations. In the forefront of this large-scale robbery were the former party and state bureaucrats who held strategic positions that allowed them to operate quickly and with great efficiency. A study of one hundred top Russian businessmen, undertaken by the Institute of Applied Politics in Moscow, found that 60% belong to the former *Nomenklatura*. A Polish economist who examined the trajectories of several hundreds of former party bureaucrats in the period 1988-93 discovered that more than half of those became managers in the private sector; in Hungary the percentage is even higher.

Again, Moscow had led the way. Russia, with its enormous riches and natural resources, was naturally in the vanguard of this historical plunder, its new capitalists showing an unexpected ingenuity after seventy years of Bolshevism. Serghey Yegorov, former president of the U.S.S.R. State Bank, and head of the Financial Section of the C.C. of PCUS, became the president of Commerce Banking Association, a tycoon worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Nikolai Rijkov, Gorbechev's Prime Minister, took over Tver-universal Bank, while Piotr Aven, former minister of Commerce, became president of Alpha Bank. Ranking at the top, Prime Minister Viktor Cernomyrdin was director of the gigantic gas company Gazprom, which was secretly privatized through a method that allowed the former boss to take the lion's share. In 1995, as Cernomyrdin created a party called *Nash Dom* (Our house), Russians used to call it *Nash Dom Gazprom*. The clan of pro-Yeltsin magnates is known as the "big eight," a consortium of major banks and companies; journalists refer to the group as "The Octopus," because its tentacles seem entangled in every big economic venture. Characteristic of the capital-power symbiosis is a breathtakingly bold proposal: in 1995 it offered a loan of \$2 billion to the cash-strapped government in exchange for shares in state enterprises. Most of these new capitalists own newspapers and radio or television stations. The cozy partnership of big business and the Kremlin was once more demonstrated in November, 1996, as the media mogul, and rakish business tycoon, Boris Berezovski was appointed deputy chief of the National Security Council.

In Table 2 we see a world premier in the history of capitalism: a small number of big magnates control not only the major banks and industries of the nation but also the most important newspapers, radio and television

Table 2 – Russia's Main Financial–Industrial Groups

Powerhouses	The Boss	Financial positions	Industrial interests	Media control**	Political friends
Gazprom	Rem Vyakhirev	Bank Imperial (with Lukoil) Gazprom Bank National Reserve Bank	Gazprom (gas, oil)	<i>Trend</i> <i>Rabichaya Tribuna</i> NTV (with most)	Victor Chernomyrdin
Berezovsky	Boris Berezovski	Obyedinenny Bank Logovaz	Sibneft* (oil)	ORT (with others) <i>Nezavisimaya Gazeta</i> <i>Ogoniok</i>	Yeltsin family circle Valentin Yumashev Alexander Lebed (recently)
Uneximbank	Vladimir Potanin	Uneximbank MFK Renaissance	Sidanco (oil) Norilsk Nickel (metals) Svyazinvest (telecoms)	<i>Komsomolskaya Pravda</i> <i>Russky Telegram</i> <i>Tzvestia</i> (with Lukoil)	Anatoli Chubais
Lukoil	Vagit Alekperov	Bank Imperial (with Gazprom)	Lukoil (oil)	<i>Tzvestia</i> (with Uneximbank)	
Menatep	Mikhail Khodorovsky	Bank Menatep	Yukos* (oil)	Independent Media	Huri Luzhkov
MOST	Vladimir Gusinsky	MOST Bank		<i>Sevodnya: Itogi</i> NTV (with Gazprom)	
SBS-Agro	Alexander Smolensky	SBS-Agro Bank		<i>Kommersant</i>	
Alpha	Mikhail Tridman	Alpha Bank	Trumen Oil trading firms		

Sources: *The Economist* and Russian reliable press reports

* Sibneft merged with Yukos

** NTV, ORT are television stations; other titles are newspapers and magazines

stations, occupying all of the strategic positions in the structures of power and government. Such a concentration of power in the hands of big business is unprecedented, particularly keeping in mind it was achieved in less than a decade.

The perpetuation of the old *nomenklaturists* in leading positions—political and economic—characterizes the transition period in all Eastern European countries, though the existence of a rapidly growing middle class makes a divergence from the Russian picture. The party bureaucrats have passed with unexpected easiness from the party headquarters onto the boards of big companies or banks. The remark of a former American diplomat in Budapest turned director of a New York investment bank is very telling: “Whenever I have a meeting at a big Hungarian company, I face over the table somebody I had to deal with at the time when Hungary was communist.”

The Polish publication WPROST made a thorough inquiry of more than two hundred managers of the most important Polish companies. The inquiry revealed entrepreneurs involved in strategic arrangements, businessmen closely connected with political leaders, sometimes acting as their advisers and regular companions in state visits abroad. In most cases, they were coming from the communist *nomenklatura*, having rapidly adapted to the market economy. The man to be found most often in the presidential airplane is Andrzej Skowronski, General Director of Elektrim, the largest holding company in Poland which controls more than one hundred enterprises in electricity, telecommunications, and the agro-food business. Another prominent figure is Gregorz Tuderek, General Director of Budimex SA (the former Foreign Trade Construction Enterprise), now the largest construction company in Poland. Tuderek supported President Walesa in the early 1990’s, but in 1995 he switched to President Kwasniewski, accompanying him to the Davos World Economic Forum and to Moscow. *L’eminence grise* of the new Polish establishment is Sobieslaw Zasada, a friend of all men in power. As such, he has succeeded in acquiring major government contracts such as Mercedes motor cars for the Armed Forces.

In Romania, I examined thoroughly the rapid enrichment of the new millionaires. How did they make it so big in so short a time? I found six ways and means that had been utilized and described them in detail in a special study. To mention but one here: Directors of state factories set up

a private “shell” firm run by a wife or a son, gradually transferring to this shell firm machinery, raw materials, and even contracts with third parties and bank credits guaranteed by state assets. Ultimately, the state enterprise would go bankrupt, while the private firm took over its business, becoming prosperous in the process. As we have seen in Poland, many new magnates have succeeded in the foreign trade sector. In terms of personnel, this sector was the best equipped and qualified for the market economy. The staff had traveled in the West, they were familiar with industrialists, bankers, and businessmen; they spoke foreign languages fluently, and knew the ropes of on world markets. Therefore, small wonder that after 1989 they fired the most spectacular “cannons” in the history of Eastern wild capitalism.

Petru Crisan had been the director of Romano-Export. In 1990, he immediately privatized his enterprise, reaping the lion’s share (55.9%) of the capital. In only five years, he became the manager and owner of 14 enterprises. With such a performance, Crisan qualified as Minister of Commerce in the Vacaroiu government, given the authority to, among other things, approve export and import licenses. The right man in the right place!

Apparently, *the symbiosis between power and capital is a main feature of the transition period*. The fact, so amply demonstrated in this essay, that the formation of the new capitalist class has been achieved mainly at the expense of the state in all post-communist societies leads to the conclusion that the power-capital symbiosis, far from being accidental, is the result of a *social process both necessary and inevitable*. The major industrialists, bankers or merchants could not possibly make a fortune and assert themselves on the social plane without the support of those in power. In turn, those who hold power cannot isolate themselves from the new social milieu that is forming around them, and they can hardly resist the temptation to get involved more or less directly in the business profits made under their noses and, in fact, at their hands.

WHITHER RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE?

A recent public opinion poll regarding the future of Romani revealed that 50% of its citizens did not know where the country was heading, while 40% were divided: toward *capitalism*, toward *Western socialism* and even toward the *restoration of communism*.

After 1989, political leaders chose to talk about *democracy* and the *market economy* without indicating that these two historical tasks could only be implemented within the context of a capitalist social system. After so many decades of demonizing the defects of capitalism, leaders did not dare to mention it by name. However, Romanian society, as well as the other Eastern European societies, has gradually acquired the characteristic features of capitalism, although state ownership maintains an important place in the economy. Social polarization has become increasingly visible: at one pole millions of people beset by poverty, unemployment, illness; at the other pole, the millionaires with their fabulous profits, living in luxury and glamour. In between, the middle class—the stabilizing factor in modern society—is taking shape rapidly.

This social transition has been strongly stimulated by the external environment and such institutions as the Council of Europe and the International Monetary Fund, which are directing and monitoring the transition to capitalism in Eastern European nations. Actually, *the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures* is the supreme strategic objective of all these countries. Whoever is in power B center-right or center-left B will follow the same basic economic policy, enthusiastically or grudgingly. The fact that in Poland and Hungary leftist governments, composed chiefly of ex-communists, have carried on with equal determination the march toward capitalism proves once again that the Euro-Atlantic objective, and the political urge to fulfill its requisites, constitute the *decisive factor* in the evolution of these societies.

Not so in the case of Russia. Apparently, Russia's way will depart from that of Eastern Europe. Indeed, *while the mechanism of the world economic system compels Eastern European nations to play by the rules of the world market, the referee being the International Monetary Fund, the dynamics of power politics generate in a great power like Russia the will to resist, and even oppose, the tendency of the Western Powers to assert their supremacy.*


To sum up: although the Western model of society will extend throughout the whole Eastern European area, it will stop short at the Russian border.

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WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ON THE GENESIS OF A CONCEPT

Theotônio dos Santos

I. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Political-economy has been generated during national economies and nation-state constitution; the theoretical effort that served as basis for the rise of economics as a science may be written within the boundaries of the analysis of national economies. This was, for example, Quesnay's great contribution when establishing the economic-cycle concept by departing from the agricultural production and circulation process and going through the manufacturing and other "non-productive" activities. He disputed the mercantilist doctrines which saw wealth's origin in trade, manufacturing, or gold or silver, according to their English, French or Spanish versions, respectively. The reaction Quesnay represented sought to show that wealth formation depended either on agricultural production, or on "productive labour"—what he called primary production—viewing circulation, trade, and the financial sector as "unproductive" activities, dependent on productive labour.

This line of thought established by Quesnay was deepened by the classical economists like Smith and Ricardo who posited the basis for national wealth in labour, widening the "productive labour" concept to include manu-

Theotônio dos Santos
Coordenador da Pós-Graduação de Economia
Universidade Federal Fluminense
Rua Tiradentes 17–Ingá
Niterói
Rio de Janeiro (RJ)
CEP 24.210-510
Brazil
sectheo@vmhpo.uff.br
<http://www.uff.br/econ/>

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facturing labour. They put special emphasis on the role of productivity, with the division of labour seen—at that time—as the main tool to reach such higher productivity.

It is natural then, that eventually economic science was compelled to face the relations between those national economies with the “outside world” as a problem that demanded—in one way or another—the theoretical opening-up of that national economic system. To analyze these relations, Adam Smith elaborated his theory of the absolute advantages which intended to show the need for a specialization in those sectors in which the national economy looked capable of reaching a better standard of productivity. Deep down he was more interested in the effect of external relations on the national economy than in the analysis of the international economy to which he refers sometimes when dealing with the colonial problem.

Later on, Ricardo assumed in a much more radical way, the idea of specialization when defending the comparative advantages theory, showing that it is useful—even when a country does not enjoy absolute advantages regarding some products—for it (and for the other country that buys from and sells to it) to specialize in those products that reflect a relative advantage as a result of the higher productivity of some products in relation to others. In a certain way, therefore, it is an internal decision in each country to specialize in those sectors in which it achieves higher productivity, importing the products in which it achieves lower productivity even if the prices of these products abroad are not lower than the national ones. The fundamental issue is that the greater specialization of each one, and the exchange amongst all, produces higher productivity for the set and advantages for all.

This view of international economics as an external factor only complementary to the logic of national economics became the drive for the whole theoretical effort of classical economics, from what Marx later called vulgar economics, through to the adoption of the consumer’s viewpoint, generating utility theory and the neoclassical school of thought. The maximum that one will advance will be towards the increase of the factors that explain comparative advantages, but the analysis’ aim will always be to orient resource allocation in accordance with a specialization each time more sophisticated in face of an increased complexity of the economic activities. The analysis’ aim will be to go on comparing national economies with others because of a possible exchange amongst them.

Factors’ diversification that condition the comparable advantages goes through a complex process by including the function of production in the international exchange, which means to introduce the relationship labour/capital in the analysis. People responsible for this “discovery” (a bit late, because capital’s organic composition had already informed Marxist analysis some decades before) were Heckscher and Ohlin whose theorem not only assumes heroic conditions but also establishes a tendency to international equilibrium, a situation which does not seem to develop in the real world economic system.

The diversification of this universe began when Leontieff decided to submit these propositions to an empirical test. This took him away from his “paradox,” when discovering that the tendencies of North American international trade did not follow the deductive directions of the comparative advantages theory, which provoked a search for explanations and new concepts. According to Heckscher-Ohlin’s theorem, one should expect North America to specialize in capital intensive products, an abundant factor in the region. Leontieff, however, found an export agenda with a predominance of labour intensive products, particularly agricultural ones. The ensuing debate concentrated on increasing the number of factors to be considered within the production function or, at its best, took into consideration some macro-economic variables that were not considered in the theory before.

The theory of world economics continues to be a theory of external trade effects on national economies. This inner limitation of the economic theory only starts to be truly questioned when one starts to accept—a century after the existence of the phenomenon and its study—the existence of capital movements and, much later, labour movements.

It is evident that all such theoretical and analytical efforts are based upon extremely restrictive assumptions. The first one is that economic units are essentially national, an assumption which provides the basis for the whole effort of economic theory. The second is that these national economic units get into relationships with others and basically only exchange goods. Here we have a third assumption, that those national economies are not open either to capital or labour movements, or technology. One assumes comparable advantages in a certain productivity standard that varies in each one of those national economies, in great part due to factor allocation. No thought, let alone research, is allowed on the possible transfer of technology.

When introduced the technological variable was assumed to be a universally available technological asset, as if patent laws and technological monopoly—which is at the basis of contemporary economics—did not exist.

It is true that important economists such as J.S. Mill had already called attention to the fact that the exchange of goods commercial relation assumed the existence of internal markets getting in touch. The analysis of that exchange, therefore, should have also taken up an analysis of internal markets and economies. In spite of widening the basis for analysis, this stand continued at the same level of relations amongst national economies, that is, closed economic units irreducible to each other.

It isn't worth our time to delve into the monetary theories that aggregate this new dimension of a unique theoretical model. Currencies are studied as national currencies that have certain exchange rates established according to their exchange with other national currencies. This view was developed precisely during the historical period in which the dollar converted itself into a world currency, anchored by the Bretton Woods agreements and in which capital movements spread throughout the world, followed by globalization of the international financial system.

The analysis of these concrete phenomena either was done at the fringe of theory or was analyzed separately as each country's internal economic policies. Thus, there was a denial of any phenomenon that might be understood as an international economy different from the relations between national economies, a global economy which could be analyzed as a reality in itself.

This theoretical and methodological scenario could not survive the evolution of the international economy, as all the assumptions on which it was based were broken as the world capitalist economy advanced. Already, at the time in which this theoretical model was constituted, its distance from humanity's historical experience was assured. The mercantilists, against whom a great part of the constituent effort of classical economy was built up, expressed the European reality of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, in which the economic power of the emergent nations in Europe constituted itself as strategies for linking with international trade.

Mercantilism emphasized these emergent national economies' position within that world trade because it was an expression—in the theoretical field—of merchant capital's then hegemonic interests. This turn to the

national dimension created a genuine barrier to rethink these national structures as part of a world economy becoming more complex. Such power constituted itself through the physical and organizational power of monopoly, financial capital, nation-states and, later on, multinational, transnational and global corporations.

History shows us that international trade precedes modern national economies, even being one of its constituent elements. We cannot speak of the creation of Portuguese and Spanish national economies without the processes of maritime discoveries upon which the foundations of these economies were built. It is absurd to talk of their independent constitution apart from international trade since these national economies are the offspring of the expansion achieved through the wars against the Moors, and the maritime and navigation discoveries. Hence, the assumption of a national economy, internal to itself and independent from international trade is, evidently, a heroic assumption, and an ideological violence, but one accepted in the 18th century as England consolidated itself as a manufacturing and industrial economy. It was such consolidation of a national economy that allowed England to take the hegemonic position at the international level.

Actually English wealth and national state power could not have been possible without the international effects of gold discovery in Minas Gerais (which Pierre Vilar (1974) analyses in a magnificent way in his historical studies on gold and currency); without its still feeble Asian expansion; without the hegemonic relations established between it and the Portuguese state through the Methuen Treaty (which made viable the transference of enormous surplus from the Portuguese colonies to the purchase of English commodities); and finally, without the profitable slave trade which was one of the main sources of primitive accumulation that made the English national economy viable.

Smith's and Ricardo's theoretical efforts turned in great part toward the opening of England to cereal imports, allowing for a reduction in labour costs inside the country at the expense of the destruction of traditional English agriculture and liberating the agricultural labour force for its absorption by the rising industries.

Finally, the colonial phenomenon was also an essential part of the national uniformities of those countries: Portugal, Spain, Holland, Belgium,

England and France—European centers for capital accumulation—were essentially colonizing economies, and the colonial trade was one of the fundamental sources of capitalist accumulation in those economies. I also suggest a detailed reading of the third volume of the book *Civilização Material: Economia e Capitalismo do Século XVI ao Século XVIII*, by Fernand Braudel (1979c), as well as *Ouro e Moeda na História entre 1450 e 1920*, by Pierre Vilar (1974).

In *Os Descobrimentos da Economia Mundial*, by Vitorino Magalhães Godinho (1981), the history of discoveries is coupled with Portuguese economic history (in which, by the way, he was preceded by other great Portuguese historians, such as Antônio Sérgio). I also propose one take into consideration Immanuel Wallerstein's book (1974), *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of European World Economy in the XVI Century*. All these studies insist on the thesis that national economies stem from a world economy, or—in Wallerstein's case—a world European economy which was converted into the basis for the world economic system.

Here, we are not so concerned with refining the historical analysis, but rather with the methodological issues. The thesis that national economies were the basis for international economic relations was, evidently, a historical and methodological violence which began disappearing once—in the 18th century—national economies began to acquire a certain degree of independence from that world economy. By independence I do not mean secession or withdrawal but, actually, a more and more determinant role within that world economy. The industrial revolution produced a technological leap substantial enough to allow national economies to become hegemonic within the world economy due to their internal productive capacity.

Adam Smith's theoretical inquiry makes sense. The origins of the nations' wealth lay in their systems' productivity. Those national systems that reach a high degree of productivity through the division of labour and adoption of modern manufacturing manage to establish, at a national level, the hegemony of a strong nation-state with a hegemonic industrial bourgeoisie.

We will see, however, different theoretical traditions that posit other foundations for economic development. We could point out in the work of the authors quoted here—Smith, Ricardo, J.S. Mill, etc.—very impor-

tant considerations about the colonial phenomenon at their time and on the world economy itself that have not been sufficiently stressed by followers of these theorists. We emphasize here those who have been doing a different reading of these theorists' works, an alternative body of theoretical work where the elements of the world economy and the idea of a world economic system have not been erased and denied.

Karl Marx apparently did not dedicate himself specifically to the study of world trade and world economy as essential elements in the constitution of his theoretical scenario. A first reading of Marx could even indicate that he would have followed a path similar to Smith and Ricardo by starting from the national economy in order to later open up an analysis of the international economy, a task he did not even manage to carry out due to his premature death. However, a more detailed analysis results in a different reading. *Capital* begins with the commodity, an analysis which does not assume, necessarily, the idea of a world economy. Nevertheless, by creating the category of commodity, Marx shows that it is produced in the context of trade, and is essentially a phenomenon of intertribal, inter-communities, international. So, when Marx sets the category of commodity as constituent of a given economic system—in this case the capitalist system—he is situating this system within a wider context than local units, either imperial or national.

Marx did not build the category of world economics elaborated much later, and in a brilliant fashion by Fernand Braudel (1979a, b, and c; 1987 a and b). Braudel showed that the basic economic units of capitalism were neither local nor national, but were rather regional economic units which included several local realities, linked amongst them by a system of relations (mainly commercial) that constituted a world economy. That concept shows us how the concept of commodity assumed the existence of a phenomenon of the sort of a world economy, finally, of a region relatively important where there is an exchange of commodities with a certain division of labour amongst their various parts that establish relations relatively systematic between them.

By rethinking the category of commodity in the present context of economic history, we want to reaffirm Marx's methodological effort's power, of great methodological and theoretical implications, because, by taking the category of commodity as central element from which one could deduct

the basic economic relations for the constitution of a capitalist production mode, Marx situated capitalism as a result of a given historical process that, in no way, can be thought only as a national process, and that, above all, he did not think as an exclusively national process.

Such evidence is in the *Capital's* chapters he devoted to the issue of primitive accumulation, that is, the accumulation that serves as basis for the constitution of the capitalist mode of production and subject it to its logic. For him, such primitive accumulation is made of resources acquired through the expropriation of communal lands, until then administered by peasants, which was done by merchant capital and allowed it to concentrate a big wealth. Primitive accumulation was also based upon profits of world trade, whose enormous increase and high productivity allowed capital to lay up a big treasure. Sheer and simple pillage besides colonial tax charges also allowed—through the expropriation of the wealth obtained by other economic systems—one to reach an enormous capital concentration.

Besides colonial trade—which was based upon value and exchange according to the value law—there was a wild commerce based upon exploitation of cultural and civilization differences which allowed Europe to obtain enormous profits generated by prices without any evident regulation. Moreover, there was the slave trade, one of the biggest sources of wealth in this historical period, on which Marx puts great emphasis. Hence, in *Capital*, modern capitalist economic constitution clearly goes through the generation of capital surplus gotten in the context of a world economy. The possibility that merchant relations being converted to its hegemonic way of social and economic relations—not only creating local spaces but also originating national markets—could only happen in the context of modern world trade.

This historical and logical standpoint adopted by Marx—who substantiates his methodological dialectical view—does not allow us to situate Marx within classical political economy's thought. Such theoretical reduction is only possible through an aslant reading with disregard to Marx's methodological wealth, to his Hegelian and dialectical view, in order to be led simply by concepts on which Marx worked, a great part of them coming—actually—from classical political economy. The historical and logical treatment entirely exits the field of classical political economy, up to an extent that Marx's understanding by economists educated in such a limited

methodological field becomes impossible. The evidence that a reading of Marx only within classical political economy would not be correct, is the fact that Marx's followers and pupils go naturally towards reinforcing the analysis of capitalism as a world economic system.

One of the peaks of intellectual effort pointing at this theoretical direction is the book, originally published in 1904 by Hilferding (1981), *Financial Capital*. When analyzing the phenomenon of economic concentration and modern monopolies' constitution, he showed the bank system's hegemony over the industrial one, which would have originated financial capital. Hilferding also shows that capitalism was getting into a new stage in which merchant relations changed content once the price system and the commercial exchange were more and more under the hegemony of such financial capital. Based upon monopoly, it imposed on the economy as a whole a logic characterized by price administration and by global investment decisions, where average profit imposed itself over the interests of each branch or sector. Protectionism and colonial policy are two consequences of these changes occupying a relevant role in his analysis. So we see that his Marxist education conducts him to a global view and does not restrict him to the nations' universe as a basis for theoretical reflection.

Rosa Luxemburg's (1976) famous book of 1913, *Capital Accumulation*, also gives some thought to the issue of capitalist reproduction in the imperialist context. Marx, in the second volume of *Capital* could give the impression of having restricted himself to a closed system at a national level when, thinking of the reproduction process, he departs from a scheme similar to Quesnay's and establishes a national cycle where capital would reproduce itself within that national context. Rosa Luxemburg tries to show how this limitation to the national context is a difficulty for the Marxist scheme. (We should not forget that *Capital's* second volume is an unfinished work and that Marx intended—in posterior volumes—to devote himself to five big topics: income, wages, state, international trade and world economy, which were in his original program of political economy's critiques, basis for *Capital*. In *Capital's* methodology, each new theoretical stage enrolls the previous analysis to a new level of abstraction which—in its turn—redefines all the concepts previously studied. We can assume, therefore, that the analytical level of international trade would redefine many concepts and laws found in the previous volumes.)

Luxemburg examines the reproduction process in the face of technological change which Marx himself analyzed, in the sense of an increasing organic composition of capital. She examines the reproduction process in face of pre-capitalist economies, thought of as colonial economies or economies towards which the capitalist system expanded at a world level. She analyzes still the fundamental role of economies external to capital's pure movement, such as military and State intervention expenditures, which also become explanatory elements of the real movement of capitalist reproduction and accumulation. Rosa Luxemburg compels us to think capitalism as a world system in order to reach a right conception of its evolution and its theoretical movement.

Lenin's studies go in the same direction (1979). In his 1916 book *Imperialism, Final Stage of Capitalism*, he collects a contribution from Hilferding and Hobson (1983), in order to create his imperialism theory as capitalism's new phase, beginning at late XIX century (he sometimes refers to the date of 1895). For him—as his book title suggests—the monopolist system, based upon financial capital and capital exportation—Hobson's typical problematic—would represent a superior stage of capitalism. Later, he re-dimensions the key elements of such new stage by introducing the issue of state intervention and the constitution of State monopolist capital. Such new phase would be characterized by monopoly, monopolist enterprise, capital movements and state action's importance which would generate the new sort of contradictions between groups of States or state alliances at a world level and would give birth to capitalist system's new phase, seen, thus, as a world system. This same view is shared by Bukharin (1979), Lenin's pupil, and also by Trotsky (1971), who also views the Russian Revolution process of 1905 within a world system which—in constant transformation—results in a permanent revolution, that becomes one of the central issues of his political thought in the book with the same title published in 1930. (See Trotsky 1979).

Bukharin represents an important moment in the elaboration of a world system's theory by stressing the role of international division of labour within the State Nations for the constitution of a modern capitalist world economy. Such economy is actually based upon the contradiction between its international character and its national basis, mutually being the dependent. The more national economies are strengthened, the more their inter-

national interests get stronger and the deeper their interdependence with these international economies become.

It was the internationalist standpoint adopted by Marx, Hilferding, Hobson, Rosa Luxemburg, Kautsky, Lenin, Bukharin and Trotsky among others, that theoretically was the basis for the creation of the first and the second Workers International, and that was on the basis of the creation of Lenin's Third International, out of which 21 statements demanded affiliation to a world party that had national sessions. Paradoxically, such supranational conception of the Third International seemed to be inspired by the conception of ultra-imperialism Kautsky had developed in 1913. According to this thesis—that Lenin and Bukharin fought with special emphasis—capitalism would evolve to a unique world economy in which a unique monopoly would prevail bound to an unique State. Lenin and Bukharin's efforts were in a sense to show that before such a unique economy could have been produced, the internal contradictions of capitalist accumulation would produce revolutions and confrontations on international and national scales. In a certain way Lenin and Bukharin analyzed the world not only of the inter-imperialists wars—as the First World War which they had seen—but also anticipated the Second World War and the great anti-colonial and national liberation struggles. By the way, in evolving the Third International's influence became more effective exactly within the societies in which this national issue was imposed as essential.

We can also quote the evolution of different Marxist schools of thought which—after the Russian revolution—spread out at an international level and insisted on treating imperialist phenomena as a contemporaneous world designing factor. Within the Leninist tradition the Communist International's congresses preceded any analysis of national reality by a world juncture which would start to determine the global strategy and tactics at the international level besides the national ones.¹ Thus interpretative line gained

¹ Maybe the first attempt to produce a world juncture analysis took place at the League of the Nations soon after World War I. The Third International or Communist International's congresses produced several studies on the world juncture. In the I Congress see *Tesis sobre la Situación Internacional y la Política de la Entente*, in the II Congress one ends up with a Manifesto on *El Mundo Capitalista y la Internacional Comunista* (Pasado y Presente 43-1ª parte); the III Congress opens up with a *Tesis sobre la Situación Mundial y la Tarea de la Internacional Comunista*; the IV Congress shows—besides a resolution on the

more substance with the creation of the World Economics Institute in the Soviet Union which had Eugênio Varga as its great leader. Two fundamental theories for the understanding of the present ideological struggle had their birth in this institute: the theory of capitalism's general crisis which would have begun in 1917—with the Russian Revolution—and the theory of monopolist state capitalism which anticipated the growth of the State as a necessary trend of the hegemony established by monopolist capital.

The Trotskyist tradition—within the Fourth International—followed the same method of the great analysis of international juncture that preceded the national scenarios analysis, thus creating a fractional contentious model of political programs and juncture reports that became famous among the world's left-wing. The debate between the communist parties of the USSR and Yugoslavia were marked by this style in which the discussion on the trends of world economics had a fundamental place. Such confrontation assumed, since the start, on the side of the Yugoslavian party, an opposition to Cold War, which led it to formulate a Third Way that ended up with

Versailles Treaty and the thesis on the East—a resolution on a International Communist tactics that makes up a chapter about capitalism decaying period, the international political situation, capital's advance, international fascism and the possibility of new pacifist illusions (Pasado y Presente, n. 47, 2nd part). The V Congress considered a report *Sobre la Situación Económica Mundial* besides the traditional chapter on the international situation which opens up the resolutions about communist tactics (Pasado y Presente, n.55 and 56). The VI Congress already acquires a shape that becomes classic in *Tese Sobre a Situação e as Tarefas da Internacional Comunista* starting with a chapter on world economics and its technique, following it with the thesis on the struggle against the imperialist war and then, the thesis on the revolutionary movement and the colonies and semi-colonies that consolidate III International's relationship with the colonial countries, were presented (Pasado y Presente, n.66). The reports of the congress show Bukarin's work on *The International Situation and the Communist International Tasks* (Pasado y Presente, n.67).

René Dreiffus (1987) describes with much detail research institution formation and public policies formulation in the international entrepreneurial field which, by chance, start at the same time as the Communist International, May 1919, with the Round Table Groups which give birth to the Council of Foreign Relations, under the incontestable leadership of Morgan Group which moves itself “in the past thirty years to the Rockefeller group.” See also the organized data in the book by Hugo Assman and others (1998).

Tito's participation in the Bandung Conference and in the non-alignment doctrine's formulation.

The same happened to the conflict between the Soviet Union and China that marked the 60's and a big part of the 70's. The Chinese critiques had already started in the late 50's when the Chinese Communist Party attacked Yugoslavian revisionism manifested in the peaceful coexistence thesis that ended up by being adopted by the USSR's Communist Party. Thereupon, critiques started to widen up to the extent of the theory on countryside seizing the cities, which at an international level had the design of agrarian countries seizing industrial ones. From this doctrine comes the thesis of alliance between North-American imperialism and Soviet search for hegemony (the latter had even reached the extent of being considered the main enemy).

Such pretentious theoretical formulations many times hid the more immediate interests and policies' conflicts, provoking an analytical and political inflexibility extremely negative for the mental health of the militants who handled them. But the formulations of the international ideological struggle apparatus associated with intelligence, diplomatic or even academic schemes—not always more open or more successful—were not less sectarian and ambitious. Actually, international studies' tradition started to become a requirement for the international organizations' analysis since the creation of the League of the Nations. Once more, Marxist thought did not nothing else than anticipate themes and viewpoints which would later generalize to the remaining theoretical or doctrinal studies.

Within the Marxist tradition, there is, however, a theoretical scenario more differentiated. Rosa Luxemburg's followers insisted on the world problematic. Amongst them we should stress the work of Fritz Sternberg (1926), whose analysis of imperialism followed rigorously the thesis of under-consumption, whose origin would be found in the work of Rosa Luxemburg. He put—in his written books after the Second World War—a special emphasis on military expenditure, a thesis that maintains his link to his Luxemburgist past, already quite forgotten at that time. Grossmann (1927-1979) puts more emphasis on the accumulation and reproduction processes, as well as Moskowska (1943-1981), Paul Sweezy (1938) and Paul Baran (1957) who followed—in great part—this under-consumption tradition, without dismissing, however, the role of international trade. But many times they tried

to analyze them departing from a micro-economic context, in which the monopolist enterprise functioning gains a central position. This theoretical tradition did not stop being a necessary precedent for the contemporaneous analysis of transnational enterprises, which followed, in great part, the advances produced by these authors, by linking the micro-economic to big capital movements in the international arena.

In post-war France, very peculiar Marxist tendencies turned up. They were developed within an intellectual environment marked by rationalism's traditional presence, but carrying a very strong new existentialist element. We can distinguish a group that—in spite of cultivating a viewpoint predominantly geared to the sociology of technology and labour—extrapolates their analysis to the world economic level, under the influence of their Marxist theoretical origins. Georges Friedmann and Pierre Naville were to find themselves amongst their best representatives. On the other hand, magazines such as *Argument* or *Socialisme ou Barbarie* give birth to a whole planetary philosophical viewpoint very influenced by changes in the media and by the analysis of a new popular culture. These sectors were identified many times as a sort of special detachment from Trotskyism but are actually classified under Luxemburg's influences.

There are also some authors who have been under the influence of the Yugoslavian experience—in a band close to a sociological thought which tried to combine Marx, Weber and Durkheim—and that followed its own line of historical interpretation. It is in this universe where we can situate Georges Gurvitch and the big sociologists, anthropologists and economists group that were around him, in the "Revue Française de Sociologie," seeking a global viewpoint, capable of establishing at the same time a typology of the possible societies in the industrial phase.

In the more specific field of economics, François Perroux deserves an outstanding position. He is the one to recover a view of a world economy that served as basis for a modern economic thought. He did not restrict himself only to the macro-economic plan but also sought to find the peculiarities of the modern macro-economic level when in those post-war decades the differentiation idea between the micro and the macro started to become widespread. Economic theory starts to penetrate sociological theory under the influence of Physics evolution to the atomic and nuclear level, creating a micro level that Henri Mendras seeks to reproduce by trying to create a

micro-economic and micro-sociological analysis space.

Such evolution is very rich in what it is going to leave as theoretical advance. Undoubtedly, it is in this field that Fernand Braudel develops his work. He reached notoriety in the 60's and 70's as one of the main theoreticians of the world economic system with his book *Material Civilization: Economics and Capitalism*. That tradition, however, can be seen as independent from Marxism, sometimes even critical of Marxism, but very much built in the debate with it, in relation with it and with its distinct ways: a critique of Stalinism, Trotskyism, Luxemburgism, etc. and a critique of Marxism as a whole. This scenario reaffirms the idea that it's necessary to build a model for theoretical analysis of economic, sociological and political realities, in which world economics phenomena are present and is truly a dialectical precedent of the idea of national economies.

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WHAT ON EARTH IS THE MODERN WORLD- SYSTEM? FOODGETTING AND TERRITORY IN THE MODERN ERA AND BEYOND

Harriet Friedmann

Human continuity is virtually synonymous with good farming.

Wendell Berry, "People, Land and Community," p.149

How much force does it take to break the crucible of evolution?

Edward O. Wilson, *The Diversity of Life*, p.15

The promise, and dangers of genetic technologies have refocused the attention of city dwellers on an enduring reality of the human species: We are eating animals. We are breathing animals, too, forced (as we render them extinct) to notice that we exchange gases with plants. We are drinking animals, forced (as we render it toxic) to notice that the same water we drink and urinate in circulates through rivers, seas and clouds, and through the cells of all species. Until we pushed back the wild places of earth—that is, until very recently—humans were able to take oxygen, water, and the infinitude of wild beings for granted. Not so with food. Only since our fascination with industry developed has human attention drifted away from the source and meaning of food.

Civilizations were built on agriculture, a decisive break in human foodgetting. Agriculture inaugurated a new complex of relations between humans and our habitats—one as crucial as fossil fuels or nuclear energy.

Harriet Friedmann
Department of Sociology
University of Toronto
725 Spadina Ave.
Toronto, Ont. M5S 2J4

[http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/sociology/
harriet.friedmann@utoronto.ca](http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/sociology/harriet.friedmann@utoronto.ca)

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Luxury came through control over specific territories, over domestic species of plants and animals, and over the humans whose skills and energies reshaped domestic species and landforms. Through these hierarchies rulers and urban dwellers first entertained the idea that foodgetting was an aspect of a lower animal nature and thus appropriate to slaves, peasants, and women. However, there was no mistaking foodgetting as the basis of power and wealth, nor domesticating landscapes—transforming wild places—as the way to raise plants and animals to eat (Mumford 1961:12,17).

Only with the regional specialization of agriculture, underlying the formation of the modern world-system four hundred years ago, could humans begin to entertain the illusion of transcending our animal and earthly existence. With industry, a mere two hundred years ago, the illusion extended to more and more humans. Even those who manufacture plants and animals into edible commodities, and who carry them across the earth in ships, railways, trucks and airplanes, even those who cook and serve meals, seem to be part of something different: industrial or service workers or houseworkers, but not foodgetters. Plants and animals have been turned into homogeneous rivers of grain and tides of flesh, more closely resembling the money that enlivens their movement from field to table, than their wild ancestors (Cronon 1991). Post-animal humans appear to eat commodities rather than other living beings. Our need appears to be less food than money.¹

This essay explores a paradox of human species life. On one side, humans get food by altering the concentrations and locations of plants and animals. They necessarily alter *webs of living cycles and material cycles* of air, water and soil. On the other side, since the sixteenth century, many foodgetting practices have flowed from an illusion of transcendence over these webs and flows.

Taking a hint from the subtitle of Volume One of Wallerstein's *The Modern World-System* (1974), "Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century," I argue that the agrarian roots of the modern world-system are enduring. My interpretation focuses on the agroecological changes brought on by the modern world-

¹ This is the argument, made with considerable subtlety and grace, of Kate Soper (1981).

system through a specific link between foodgetting and territory. This suggests that ecological crisis is intertwined with crises of foodgetting and of territorial states/economies. It points to a grounded exit from the three crises of the "modern" world-system, parallel to the "modern" exit from the crisis of European feudalism. I focus my exploration on the history of the hamburger, whose banality conceals hidden depths.

LOOKING BACKWARDS: THE HAMBURGER AS GLOBAL CUISINE

The project of a common world cuisine, the culinary equivalent of English as a world language, is embodied in the fast-food hamburger (Harris 1985: 121; Ritzer 1993). The history of the hamburger and its ingredients, wheat and beef cattle, also traces the larger story of reconstellation and suppression of ecosystems, from the forests of Europe to the grasslands of North America, to the rainforests of South America.

The fast food hamburger condenses much of the simplification of human diet, of the underlying complexity of the agrofood system, and of the still deeper simplification of ecosystems to supply wheat and beef. Let us begin with some common distinctions. Is the hamburger an American food imposed on the world, an edible enticement of cultural imperialism? One could say so. It was invented in the U.S. despite its Germanic name and its culinary roots in European wheat and beef cuisines, specifically fried disks of ground flesh. It followed bottled bubbly flavoured water (Coca Cola and Pepsi-Cola, by name) into the local street food markets of the world. Like the early wordless television advertisements intended for world consumption, showing happy, healthy, frolicking, youthful people drinking Coke or Pepsi, the commercial propaganda for hamburgers devotes considerable artistry, technique, and money to create images of luxury and freedom designed to lure humans all over the world into ingesting the food of America and valuing it above the unglamorous cuisines of their ancestors.

Yet one can also argue that the hamburger is less an American than a corporate food. The hamburger did not become a standard of American diets until it became a corporate food, available in a reliably consistent texture, taste, and architecture through franchises tightly controlled by corporate headquarters. The same structure allowed it to travel abroad, sometimes modified to specific tastes or taboos, a complexity of manufacture and presentation far exceeding those of bottled drinks. The same

structure pioneered not only standard eating, but also a new way to make work standard. The very recent shift, from fixed production lines manned by stable work forces with longterm employment and structured mobility, to flexible production systems employing part-time and on-call workers with no security, was refined by fast food operations and has generated the language of McDonaldization (Ritzer 1993) and McJobs. It has individualized lives, bringing women and young people back into the workforce—often at the expense of more secure institutions once dominated by male workers (Friedmann 1999)—and made family or community meals an endangered institution (Mintz 1995).

In this sense, the hamburger is the commodity condensing many aspects of a new relation between human individuals and the fictive individuals called (as if they had bodies) corporations.² It condenses an emergent way of organizing foodgetting and all that is built upon it, what McMichael (1996) calls the Globalization Project. Through this project, national cultures and national states, which were both created in recent centuries (Anderson 1991, Tilly 1990) are subordinated to corporate freedom, usually called freedom of that far more abstract fiction, the “market.” Agreements among states increasingly empower such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and institutions created by the North American Free Trade Agreement. However, at the same time, both national states and international institutions set rules that empower private corporate actors. Of course, the power of corporations is illusory: they exist by virtue of state-made rules and state-enforced agreements that create and sustain the fiction that they, like persons, are agents. The Globalization Project allows these legal constructs to reshape individuals into a working class with some global dimensions, and into consumers within a market with some global dimensions.

At the same time, through arrangements with media giants (Disney) and retailers, images such as the Golden Arches of McDonalds appear on

² The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1973) gives the first legal definition of corporation, dated 1611 as “A body corporate legally authorized to act as a single individual; an artificial person created by royal charter, prescription, or legislative act, and having the capacity of perpetual succession.”

dolls (which still teach children about parenting), on games (which are the play of youth) and on musical and theatrical spectacles (which are the common expressions of the cultural life of human groups). Both, therefore, are true: the hamburger is at once American and corporate, a bearer of meaning and a commodity.

The elements of the hamburger, crushed wheatseeds and minced cowflesh, acquired these paradoxical qualities long before the hamburger became a common object of desire and a standard way to organize food manufacture. This happened within the United States in the nineteenth century. Yet, in a prior paradox, wheat and cattle, like the humans who bred them, were exotic transplants to New World ecosystems.

LOOKING FORWARD: THE ORIGINS OF THE GLOBAL FOODGETTING

Domestic species travelled slowly before the sixteenth century. It took thousands of years for wheat cultivation to spread from the rivers flowing into the Persian Gulf to the ancient Greek and Roman Empires and to Northern Europe.³ Something totally new happened when Europeans transplanted themselves and their dependent species to the ecologically distinct New Worlds of America and Australia/New Zealand. The first stage of global foodgetting began with wheat and cattle from the Old World displacing native species in the New Worlds of America and Australia/New Zealand. It speeded up the simplification of human-affected ecosystems from millenia to centuries. The second stage of global foodgetting began only in the twentieth century, with industrial agriculture, and corporations that organize production on a world scale. This development speeded up human-induced ecological simplification from centuries to decades or even years.

The Modern World-System: Reconstellating Ecosystems

In Wallerstein’s theory (1974:90-94), coerced cash-crop labor, which defined the peripheries of the emerging capitalist world-system, was

³ The spread was not linear or even. Wheat spread along with civilizations and conquest, and was long associated with cities and markets. When the latter contracted, for instance during the centuries following the end of the Roman Empire, wheat cultivation also declined. It revived with Medieval commerce and rule (Montanari 1998: 50-54).

devoted to monocultures for export: wheat in Eastern Europe and a variety of transplanted species, notably sugar, in colonial Hispanic America. The importation of wheat allowed for more complex mixes of crops in Western Europe, the core of the world-economy. The world-economy made possible and necessary both specialized production and sale in world markets. The complementary ecological effects of specialization on agro-ecosystems remain to be explored.

Commerce mimics natural cycles. Commerce, in a way, replaces natural cycles, by inducing ecological simplification and substituting in its place social complexity (division of labor). The circulation of cultivated plants and animals, and the parallel circulation of money, insinuate themselves into the livelihoods and perceptions of humans. The price of wheat creates a new value in tension with old values defined by taste, texture, nourishment of body, spirit and community. The price of meat or cheese takes over the rate of breeding of cattle—not how many bullocks are needed to pull the plow, nor how many animals can be grazed on fallow land to drop their manure, nor how much meat, milk or leather can be obtained with the resources of land and labor in the village. The production of cattle or wheat becomes determined by markets rather than mixes of natural species and material cycles. The effects of displacement from material and biological cycles may not be noticed as long as the prices, as the economists say, are right.

Agriculture inherently disrupts processes of natural succession and simplifies mixes of species. Farmers clear an area—a field—of its interdependent species and plant one (or a small number) of species with the intention of harvesting them. The banished species try their best to return. Farmers treat them as competitors, either for space and nutrients in the field, or for the crop. They pull weeds, chase birds or land animals wanting to eat the crop and select and breed plants resistant to diseases that thrive with the concentration of their hosts. Not only that: the specific plants chosen for cultivation in the five to ten thousand years of agriculture are seedbearing grasses (grains). They are annual plants, which thrive at early, simple stages of natural succession. In an undisturbed state these annual grasses give way to more and more complex plants, mainly perennials, until a stable, climatic and most stable stage, the most complex or climax, is reached (Duncan 1996:14-24). Perennial plants, such as cedar and maple trees, are not dense in edible foods for humans. As a result, humans have to work to keep natural

succession at bay—a reality to match the myth of banishment from Eden (Sahlins 1972). Yet in domesticating plants and animals, and controlling the activities of unwanted species, humans continue to work with, to monitor, to live within the possibilities of intertwined biological and material cycles—or they move on to domesticate untouched regions.⁴

Complex civilizations grew up within living cycles, discovering practical ways to replace soil nutrients removed by cultivation and to incorporate byproducts or to allow them to be reabsorbed. For instance, the city of Edo (now Tokyo) in the early 18th century, then the largest city in the world, supported a population of one million at a comfortable standard by working with the material cycles of sea, city, and agricultural hinterland; soil runoff from terraced cultivated mountains fed micro-organisms in the bay, which fed fish, which (together with crops) fed people, whose fishing sustained the balance of life in the bay; human nightsoil from the city was collected daily by farmers to use as fertilizer, otherwise the sea would have been polluted and the soil depleted (Murota 1998: 128-29). Civilizations that failed to renew material cycles had to adopt new ways of life or move to new regions; for instance, by overclearing forests and then overgrazing domestic animals on the grasslands that replaced them, humans changed the Mediterranean region over several thousand years from forest to dry, sandy lands.

Europe before the rise of the modern world-system grew wheat as much as possible, mainly for rent payments for landlords. Peasants relied on coarser grains, such as barley, oats, spelt and the hardiest one, rye, which were more reliable (Montanari 1992:30). Because wheat cannot be grown twice in succession, farming systems grew up around the complementary grains and fallows developed over centuries in each ecosystem. A two-year rotation roughly characterized Southern Europe, and a three-year rotation Northern Europe. Complementary crops included rye, oats, spelt, millet,

⁴ When European wheat-eaters unified the globe through colonial expansion in the sixteenth century, they inaugurated the first major shift in a global balance of self-contained ecosystems that had evolved over millenia. Until then, human groups either adapted to changes in ecosystems (such as deforestation of the Mediterranean) or moved to adjacent ecosystems, and the wildness surrounding them absorbed depletion and wastes.

and barley. These lesser desired grass-seeds provided food for most humans and for animals. Animals came to be used for other purposes—transport and war—but were integrated into European agronomy and diets in a way unique to the farming systems of the world. Europeans, especially Northwest Europeans, are “champion milk-digesters” (Crosby 1986:48). They included dairy products and meat in their diets. Horses and oxen became “energy slaves” for plowing dense soils of cleared forest lands (Bayliss-Smith 1982: 37-55). Manure of animals grazing fallow lands or stubble in harvested fields was the principle method for renewing soil. Wheat and cattle emerged from the wider mix—unique to Europe—of crops and livestock (Braudel 1974: 68-78).

As regions shifted from self-renewing agronomy to specialized crops and livestock, both practices and experiences changed. Interdependence of species with local configurations of soil and water was, in part, substituted by interdependence of specialized regions linked by trade. Wheat and cattle became not only useful to eat, to renew soil, and to pull plows, but also, and more significantly, to bring in money. Circulation of money became a referent for farming as much as, and perhaps more than, interdependent cycles of species and material cycles.

If we shift focus from one periphery to another, the ecological implications of the modern world-system come more into focus. Wallerstein focused on Eastern Europe’s specialization in wheat. Here, the crop was pre-existent so increasing monoculture was a question of degree rather than transformations. The American colonies of Europe, the other periphery, were less clearly defined by specific exports in the sixteenth century. The reason, perhaps, was the staggering challenge of a project to replace all native species, not only native humans, with transplants from Europe. European colonists settled, with a panoply of dependent species. Wheat and cattle were two of many “portmanteau species” (Crosby 1986), wanted and unwanted, carried by Europeans as they crossed the Atlantic to a world that was more deeply “new” than our political economy recognizes. Columbus reported on experiments to transplant wheat and cattle, along with other domestic species. The Spanish planted Old World crops in every farm; by 1535 wheat was exported from Mexico and imported European cattle were transforming the ecology of Colombia and Peru (Sokolov 1991:69,87).

World commerce and regional specialization enlarged the scale of interaction between domesticated species and self-organizing earthly processes, making this interaction more difficult to observe. It would take the advent of the science of ecology, late in the nineteenth century, to make conscious the interactions that formed the practical knowledge gained over centuries of experience by farmers. That science is still rarely applied in agriculture, which has instead become industrial in method and consequences.

Industry and Monoculture: Subordinating Ecosystems

Commerce made possible material, geographical disconnections between the inputs and outputs of manufacture. Eventually, through the domination of prices over material and biological cycles, commerce itself became the necessary link among production sites. Supported by commerce across ecosystems, industry was a step beyond specialized agriculture, working by a logic that not only displaced, but necessarily disrupted, earthly cycles.

Industry ignores natural cycles. Duncan (1996:116), following the distinction of eighteenth century Physiocrats, puts it this way: while “agriculture necessarily rides on living ecological cycles... industry transforms dead matter, changing only its form.” Industry works on matter that has been removed from the earth, either through mining or through harvesting wild or cultivated plants or animals. These may come from any region, and industry may be located in any region.⁵

Industry disrupts natural cycles, not only where it creates waste, but also in distant places where matter is removed to supply raw materials. Separated from local cycles, industry contains no way to replace substances taken from the earth or to absorb the multiple substances yielded. Rather, industry simply turns natural substances (from anywhere) into “resources,” and divides multiple products into commodities (to be sold anywhere) and “wastes” (with no good place to go). Resources, or inputs, are external to the linear material process of industry, and the market that connects raw mate-

⁵ This statement applies to matter transformed. Industries were tied to energy sources until fossil fuels replaced water and wind power. They were tied to waterways until manmade transport routes came to dominate: roads, railways, and airports.

rials regions with industrial regions cannot link either one to living cycles. Resources must be depleted; wastes cannot be absorbed.

This focus on material aspects suggests a more complex understanding of the capitalist nature of the modern world-system. Several decades before ecological thought was formulated theoretically, during the same period that industry was becoming the new way of organizing human energy, capitalist farmers in England began to apply site-specific science, and rational control of natural cycles to achieve an ecological agriculture unrivalled in the following years. Called High Farmers, they developed the most sophisticated form of self-renewing agriculture known in the West, rivalling the rice cultivation of Asia in both yields and sustainability.⁶

This flowered for only a few decades, until new laws exposed it to world commerce. It succumbed to the ecologically catastrophic, implicitly industrial, lower-priced monoculture of North America.

The controversies over High Farming focus on its capitalist, rather than material aspect. That is, how it structured relations among people, rather than how people worked with physical substances and processes. Some historians celebrate the "agricultural revolution" brought about by "improving landlords," who greatly increased yields per acre and per worker. Other historians condemn the misery inflicted on masses of villagers evicted by the

⁶ Of the three great seed-based civilizational complexes, the wheat-based European civilization became the basis for organizing the world-system. The great rice and maize civilizations of Asia and the Americas were colonized or marginalized by European colonial conquest. The rice-based civilizations had far more productive, labor-intensive, and sustainable agricultural systems than those of Europe. The ratio of rice seeds per plant at the time of colonial integration of the world, had long been 100:1, compared to the 4:1 or 5:1 of European grains, and the labor and land-intensive techniques of terracing, irrigation, and transplanting had supported vastly different but equally complex human hierarchies and specialized occupations and regions (Palat 1995). Until the introduction of industrial techniques through the so-called Green Revolution, the intensive system of cultivation relied on highly sophisticated attention by the farmer of each small paddy, so that natural cycles of complementary plants (blue-green algae) and other features of the altered ecosystem allow for renewal of soil fertility even with multiple cropping (Bayliss-Smith 1982:70-73). There may be something to recover from the untaken rice path, with its continuing close relation between humans and specific natural cycles.

same landlords. Indeed, capitalist tenant farmers, who had engrossed village lands and enclosed commons, forced some of their former neighbors to leave for work in exploitative mines and mills, and employed those who remained in even more exploitative relations on the land. Duncan (1996:50-87) emphasizes that English High Farming demonstrates that under specific conditions (not likely or even desirable to repeat) capitalist agriculture was ecologically sustainable. Despite the exploitation of agricultural laborers, there is much to learn from the techniques of High Farming.

In ecological terms, High Farming introduced a four-crop rotation (wheat, turnip, barley, and clover crops), which was precisely integrated with sheep rearing (and horses for pulling plows) in such a way that the condition of the land was maintained indefinitely, and previously infertile land was improved and brought into sustainable production, all the while increasing yields per acre of wheat. The key to this achievement was "biological or ecological, as opposed to industrial (chemical), methods" (Duncan 1996: 65). The farmer sought to achieve the proper balance between wheat output and animal manure, which in turn required including winter forage crops for the animals in the rotation. Turnips and clover added nutrients to the soil, allowing wheat yields to rise. Most importantly, sheep carried nutrients from uncultivated to cultivated soils. After grazing on hillsides by day, by night sheep were enclosed in movable fences called folds, located where manure was needed. Experience of the specific cycles of species in each field, taught farmers how to adjust rotations to achieve what is now called biological pest control.

Bayliss-Smith (1982: 37-55), who equally celebrates the *ecological* merits, insists on the *social* unsustainability of High Farming. Using an energy measure of material inputs and outputs, he shows that High Farming, using horses as "energy slaves," achieved the most productive and sustainable wheat farming ever known. However, the distribution of the grain product, the wool byproduct and money income was so unequal that agricultural laborers worked far more hours and received less food than swidden cultivators in New Guinea. The comparison is quite specific as, in both situations, pigs supplemented the starchy staple. Only a few agricultural laborers in a Wiltshire High Farm, described by William Cobbett in 1826, could afford to keep a pig.

Yet High Farming succumbed not to social inequality or popular resistance (the Luddist uprising) but to exposure to world commerce. In 1846 the British Parliament abolished protective tariffs, called Corn Laws. Russian wheat, already exported since the rise of the world-system more than two centuries earlier, flowed in (Fairie 1965, Friedmann 1983). Ecologically, this was still a trade in Old World wheat which had moved gradually throughout Europe before and during the Roman Empire. A true world wheat market, spanning Old and New Worlds, began in the 1870s, with the flows of wheat transplanted to, and then exported back from a distinct ecosystem in North America (Friedmann 1978a). Only then, through transplantation of Old World cultivated foodgrains to an alien ecosystem, were High Farmers prevented from continuing their ecologically benign mix of domestic species.

Old World humans faced challenges and opportunities in transplanting themselves and their dependent domestic species—wheat and cattle—to the untilled soils of the semi-arid Great Plains of North America (Webb 1931). First of all, breaking the soil was difficult. Pioneering European farmers faced thick mats of native grasses which had evolved to withstand the trampling of the vast herds of native buffalo. These grasses would not yield, even to the deepcutting iron plows which had allowed cultivation of the heavy soils of the forest ecosystems of northern Europe.⁷ Native cultivators in North America were tilling corn, beans, and squash with hoes, using only human labor, and only in small areas. European settlers finally broke the matted grasses with a steel plow, invented and manufactured by John Deere in the 1840s (Cronon 1991:99, McNight 1997:169). The plow was drawn by animals, more like European farming than that of indigenous people. The draft animals of settlers and, the cattle herded by cowboys, filled the niche of the slaughtered native buffalo. Both exotic crops and animals had to be fenced. Lacking wood in the treeless plains, fencing awaited the invention of barbed wire. Dwellings, made of buffalo skins by native people, required the import of lumber.

⁷ From the seventh century onwards the new plows transformed not only Medieval agriculture but the whole of village life (White 1962, 1995).

Plows, land, animals, materials to construct and enclose farms, all came from outside the farm and even the region. Cash was therefore scarcer and more pressing than natural fertility. Transplanted exotic humans were compelled from the beginning to grow and sell as much as possible (Friedmann 1978a). Mining the nutrients accumulated by nature over thousands of years, settler farmers, cowboys and ranchers could sell the products of transplanted species back to the Old World at cut-rate prices. However, soil that is not renewed is depleted. Settlers were more deeply embedded in markets than in the earthly cycles of the Great Plains.

When tractors arrived in the 1930s, followed by fossil-fuel driven harvester-threshers and fossil fuel-derived replacements for soil nutrients, the deepening of market penetration was a matter of degree. Replacement of horses by tractors, for example, opened land for cultivation formerly devoted to hay or grazing. Lost, but unrecognized, was the manure and the benefits of crop rotations among human and animal foods. Indeed, the separation of mixed animal and grain farms into specialized monocultures accompanied the replacement of horses by tractors and chemicals (Berlan 1991). By the odd accounting of modern governments, the purchase and sale of fertilizers from nonrenewable fossils (and later, toxins to kill weeds, fungi and insects that thrived in monocultural fields) added to national wealth, while the loss of organic self-renewing, living nutrients was unrecorded. Money, rather than enhancement of living processes, was the mark of improvement, soon to be called development. Market logic, reinforced by ever greater vulnerability of self-renewing cycles, was dominant. The introduction of machinery further undermined the “natural integrities that precede and support agriculture” (Berry 1997:150).

The grasslands of North America, called the Great Plains, are a distinct ecosystem not amenable to methods and implements used to colonize regions east of the Mississippi River, which were more similar to the cleared forest lands of northern Europe. Later called the breadbasket and cowranch of the earth, the unbroken prairies were called the Great American Desert until the Civil War (Webb 1931:152-60). The native grasses held moisture and soil in place. Both were crucial under the conditions of low rainfall punctuated by violent downpours unknown in Europe or Eastern North America. After the prairie was broken by the new steel plows, soil could not hold moisture and was washed away by rainstorms. Settler farmers, with

their experience of the gentle steady rains of northern Europe, were not prepared to understand or cope.

Ecologically unaware, and trapped into markets, settlers created the ecological catastrophe of the Dust Bowl within two generations. Within that time, they sent enough cheap grain, holding the stored fertility of the ages, to England to destroy High Farming. After that time, when the U.S. (and Canadian) economy recovered from Depression, prairie wheat farms recovered from the Dust Bowl by deepening the industrial transformation of wheat farming. After World War II, farmers turned to the markets to replace the lost riches of dark earth, measured in feet rather than inches (Cronon 1991:98). They bought industrial fertilizers, made from fossils stored in the earth over millions of years, and tractors, run by fossil fuels, to replace each season the nutrients that had once seemed inexhaustible.

The transplanted wheat and cattle of the Old World simplified the agro-ecosystems of North America. One rule of thumb is that every alien species displaces about ten native species (Mills 1997:276). The Great Plains weren't settled according to the contours of land and water, by following river systems and other natural features. The fields were laid out in a grid, a design simplified for monocultural wheat or cattlefeeds implemented by mapmakers, surveyors, and government officials. Unlike the slow adaptation to natural features of landscapes, to mixes of species in relation to natural predators, competing species (weeds), pollinating insects, and the intricate self-renewing webs of life in soil, exotic farmers were set down in fields organized in a mathematical grid (Cronon 1991:102). Despite the subtlety of prairie microregions, this imposition on natural topography is very far from riding living cycles. This was a break with all agriculture that came before.

When the prairies were first broken in the 1840s and 1850s, farmers simplified only partly, building on their experiences in land cleared in forest ecosystems. They created monocultures in each field, but rotated among wheat (the most desirable but also the riskiest crop), corn, and to various degrees oats, rye, barley, and hay, all supplemented by vegetables, dairy cows, poultry, hogs, sheep, and apple orchards. These are the farms of the American imagination, resembling the mixed farms of Europe. Except for corn (native, but grown in greater quantities to convert to pork or whiskey), all were the domestic plants and animals of Europe. These first farms extended out from the forest ecosystems of Eastern North America first along the

rivers, bordered by trees and allowing for bags of grain to be shipped to market. These were not the farms, however, that became the dominant suppliers of wheat and beef, driving out old world farmers, from the 1870s onwards.

To create a world market, the colonized ecosystem (Crosby 1986) was subjected to a series of far more radical simplifications. This was accomplished by means of some very complex social inventions that turned wheat and cattle into commodified substances detached from any specifics of the land or people which had created them. Wheat was transformed from a specific product of a specific piece of land cultivated by a specific farmer, to a "golden stream" of commodified seeds, as anonymous as the new futures contracts bought and sold to sustain its flow. Wheat left the bags that had previously maintained its identity in relation to a field and a farmer right up to the final purchaser in New York or London. Railways replaced natural waterways for transportation. Elevators mixed and stored wheat from many farms, substituting a new set of distinctions called "grades." Wheat poured through railcars, elevators, and ships. To manage this physical flow of uniform seeds, traders in Chicago invented new forms of money called futures. Eventually futures contracts not only organized markets in wheat, but themselves came to be traded on markets (Cronon 1991:97-147).

A parallel story can be told of beef. It took considerable violence to slaughter the native bison, whose numbers have been estimated between twenty and forty million. After the end of the Civil War, railways cut into the wild grasslands roamed by vast herds and the slaughter began, first for sport and later for commerce. Within twenty years only a few stragglers could be found. Destruction of the animals that provided food, clothing and shelter to the indigenous nations of the Great Plains was more profoundly damaging than the military campaigns that completed the removal of native peoples. The native Great Plains mix of humans, animals and plants was undone with astonishing rapidity by alien humans using trains and guns. In their place, Europeans and their cattle were first driven on the hoof to new slaughterhouses in Chicago. Those that grazed the unbroken prairie to some extent replaced the native bison in sustaining short native grasses. But the larger movement was to fence the prairies, turning grasslands into managed pastures. These in turn gave way to feedlots, where animals were fattened on grains grown for the specific purpose in monoculture fields. Cattle

(and pigs) were bred to fatten more quickly and to adapt to continuous feeding rather than seasonal cycles. They were transported in rail cars to giant industries where “disassembly lines” turned them into tides of packaged flesh to be transported again in refrigerated railcars and ships. Like grainseeds, animal flesh became physically organized into standard commodities whose flow was organized through complex financial instruments (Cronon 1991: 207-59).

The ingredients of the global diet, then, are deracinated—their roots torn from Old World agro-ecosystems. Transplanted to North America, wheat and cattle became tightly integrated into commercial networks of unprecedented complexity. The radical simplification of North American prairie grasslands was ecologically disastrous. Like the massive murder of native human inhabitants, the destruction of native grasses and bison was not simply the replacement of one mix of species with another. The substitution diminished the numbers and varieties of plants and animals, the complexity of inter-relationships among species and the inter-relationships among those species and the water cycles and renewal of soil.

Agriculture became industrial in North America some fifty years later because it was integrated into commerce at the expense of integration into living cycles. In Polanyi’s (1965) terms, exotic domestication of the Great Plains *disembedded* practices of farmers and ranchers from the land. The land, understood in this way, is not an abstract “factor of production,” but the habitat of multiple interdependent species, from humans to the vast web of micro-organisms composing fertile soils. With settler agriculture, specific cycles and flows of the region were disrupted.

The land thenceforth required management or compensatory inputs, in some way organized through markets, to substitute for recycling of nutrients. These included industrial fertilizers to replace depleted soil, and toxins to kill pests that thrive in the concentrated food supply provided by monocultural fields. Some pests were imported unintentionally with European species; seeds of European weeds mixed with wheat and other grain seeds or were carried on the clothing of immigrants. Others were native insects or birds eager to feed on the new arrivals (Crosby 1986). Dependent on outside resources, wheat and beef production became industrial. Managers of the land found themselves more dependent on markets and money than on the living cycles of their fields and wild surrounds.

Global Ingredients for Industrial Food: Exotics Rule

Having reconstellated North American grassland ecosystems in the nineteenth century, monocultural production of wheat and cattle in the late twentieth century leapt to a third ecosystem: tropical rainforests. Here ecological simplification was even more gross, as rainforest ecosystems are more fragile than temperate grasslands. Not only is ecosystem disruption deeper and more difficult to reverse in each phase, but the cumulative effect of successive transplants of exotic domestic species is to reduce the wild places between the disrupted areas, thus reducing the diversity of life forms, self-organizing regions, and human cultures adapted to specific places. The organized project to adapt techniques of U.S. industrial agriculture to post-colonial countries, many of them tropical and subtropical, was called the Green Revolution.

It is difficult to grow wheat in warm, humid regions. The Nigerian government is a well-documented case of the folly of transplanting wheat to a tropical ecosystem. Andrae and Beckman (1985) show how the Nigerian government tried to induce farmers to grow wheat instead of subsistence crops in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In seeking explanation for such folly, we must investigate the strange twists the wheat market took between the Depression of the 1930s and the “food crisis” of 1973.

After World War II, an entirely new pattern of specialization and monoculture grew up around wheat production and trade. The United States became the “breadbasket” of the world through an innovative combination of government subsidies for domestic prices, restriction of imports into the U.S. and subsidies for U.S. exports (Friedmann 1981, 1994). Domestically, the New Deal programs restabilized prairie production after the Dust Bowl through a combination of measures designed to prevent soil erosion, remove the least productive (most fragile) lands out of production, convert many acres to soybean and maize for intensive livestock feed and to subsidize wheat prices at a high level, keeping farmers on the land (and voting for the government). This worked in a particular way that led to the U.S. government’s holding large, chronic surpluses. It disposed of these surpluses outside the framework of markets (which were referred to as if they existed, despite government management of trade and administration of prices). Recipients were governments with no dollars to pay for wheat. The mechanism was subsidized exports, called food aid. Other exporters, such

as Canada, Australia, and Argentina, could not afford to support farmers or subsidize exports to the same extent; in this way U.S. exports came to dominate world trade.

Countries of what came to be called the “Third World” (and later the “South”) became major wheat importers, whether or not wheat was part of their traditional agriculture or cuisines. Because it was subsidized by the U.S. government twice—once to support U.S. farmers and again for sale via specially negotiated prices in the soft currencies of countries short of dollars—wheat became more widely used in these countries. Governments of Third World countries found cheap wheat a convenient way to lower wage costs to foster industry. It could also be used in a variety of ways to create political stability and support for the government. U.S. subsidized wheat became most popular in cities, echoing the place of wheat as the privileged and urban grain of pre-industrial Europe.

Suddenly, in 1973, after decades of strictly separating trade between the Soviet and U.S. centered blocs of the Cold War world order, the U.S. and the Soviet Union entered into a massive grain deal—the economic aspect of Detente, a thaw in the Cold War. Prices shot up from two three times their previous levels just at the time that oil prices also shot up. Third World countries were caught in a trap of dependence on imported wheat and oil. Under these conditions, it was tempting for the Nigerian government to try to induce farmers to grow wheat within the country. This policy was consistent with the practice of import substitution that had been key to building up national economies in the period 1945-75, what McMichael (1996) has called the “development project.”

The development project celebrated industry, and, with it, a faith in technology blind to the limits of nature. The Nigerian government attempted to overcome resistance from farmers, a group which, after all, had experience with cultivation in the various regions of the country. The government was not unusual in valuing, above the experience of its farmers, a widely shared faith that science could overcome natural ecosystem obstacles. Narrow studies of temperature, water, and soil underlay incentive programs to convince farmers to participate in government projects. They not only failed to grow wheat, but also caused much damage to the farmers, their communities, and the natural cycles on which cultivation of traditional crops depended (Andrae and Beckman 1985:100-38). Industrial fertilizers,

which were part of the project, came from international agencies as part of the Green Revolution. The Green Revolution was an international project to apply industrial principles to Third World grain cultivation, following the pattern set in the U.S.: hybrid seeds combined with industrial chemicals and machinery. Sometimes these increased yields, though at the cost of other crops in farmers’ diets and in the destruction of self-renewing agroecologies. The results included soil depletion, water pollution and loss of biodiversity in both farms and surrounding forests (Shiva 1992).

Cattle were more successful than wheat in colonizing and simplifying tropical ecosystems, and the results were correspondingly serious. Tropical rainforests were cleared on a massive scale from the sixties onwards. Timber, plantations, and other replacement of tropical forests with simplified, often monocultural land use, had long been a feature of colonial economies. Late twentieth century land clearing occurred for multiple reasons; chief among these cattle grazing for the burgeoning fast food hamburger industry.

Clearing of rainforests involves displacement of indigenous peoples and destruction of the most diverse array of species in the most complex ecosystem on earth. Just as the soils of North American temperate grasslands were more fragile than the soils of temperate forests in Europe, so the soils of tropical forests were again more fragile. The nutrients cycling through a tropical rainforest are kept primarily in the fast growing vegetation. Few nutrients are stored directly in the soil, rather they are taken up by new growth as the old growth rapidly decomposes. Virtually no soil runs off into waters; waterways fed by undisturbed forests are almost as pure as distilled water. Yet the nutrient cycle is mainly carried through the water cycle, through evaporation and rain. Small areas indigenous shifting cultivators are quickly recolonized by surrounding species. When large areas are cleared the soil quickly dries, wicking clay from the subsoil that, if allowed to harden, forms a hard crust. Destruction is irreversible as new growth consists of a far simpler mix of shrubs (Collinson 1977:121-34).

Two social and historical aspects of the transformation of rainforest ecosystems into grazing lands are also significant. First, in the smaller areas of rainforests cleared by peasant farmers in South and Central America between the sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries cattle were part of peasant mixed farming. Peasant farmers were, and are, various mixes of indigenous and European peoples who formed new cultures and adapted,

often over generations, to the living cycles of farms and farming regions. They created agroecologies that mix indigenous and exotic species with pre-modern staples, such as potatoes and maize, dominating the cycles. Sideline cattle became difficult to maintain when commercial ranching and intensive livestock took over and squeezed out local cattle markets (Sanderson 1986). These mixed peasant farms using mixtures of indigenous and transplanted species as well as indigenous shifting cultivators and foragers, are displaced by monocultural cattle raising. This is the second stage of ecological imperialism.

Second, the cattle in the cleared rainforests are part of a second phase of economic and political reorganization of the world economy, organized not by governments but by transnational corporations. In the first phase of ecological imperialism wheat and beef were exported by small farmers to distant markets. In the second, there is direct organization of international production chains by transnational corporations. During the nationally-focused years of the development project, transnational corporations formed international links beneath apparently national agricultures. Intensive livestock sectors grew up in core national economies; meat production and consumption was an important sign of development. Yet each one depended entirely on soybeans and maize, usually imported from the U.S., to feed the livestock. This livestock feed industry was transnationally organized (Friedmann 1994).

After relying on this deeper private transnational structure for thirty years, agrofood corporations eventually rejected the limits of national frameworks and pushed for free trade agreements—notably the World Trade Organization—to allow them to operate freely across national boundaries. Corporations are attempting to regulate transnational beef production chains on their own. Cattle in cleared rainforests are part of their global supply system, as are the deepening monocultures and the growing farm crises in the U.S. and other industrial export regions since the late 1970s. These crises were precipitated by export promotion's neglect and abandonment of conservation practices introduced after the Dust Bowl of the 1930s.

Now the corporations respond to the crisis from which they grew, and which they have fostered, by offering the solution of biotechnology. So far, biotechnologies developed for agriculture have mainly been devoted to

overcoming limits to the use of toxins. By creating plants that can withstand heavier doses, sales of chemicals and deepening of monocultures will continue. With them the dependence of farmers on industrial inputs that continually disrupt and simplify natural cycles will deepen and the manufacture of replacements for these cycles will grow (Lappe and Bailey 1998).

These practices have pushed back natural limits for local ecosystem disruption to the point where the renewal of soil, water, air, temperature, and other conditions supporting human life are in danger. Forests regulate temperature everywhere on earth, the exchange of gases between plants and animals (which humans remain as long as we are embodied), and the cycles of water and minerals that sustain living cycles of all species. The attempt to substitute finance, management, technology and the circulation of commodities for self-renewing ecosystems, took humans to the next stage. Here the choice is between faith in continuing human substitutions for disruptions to earthly cycles (both technical and financial/commercial), or using our big brains to redirect science, society and livelihoods toward a more harmonious, post-industrial sourcing of food supply.

EMERGENT PROPERTIES OF RULE: RETHINKING TERRITORY AND FOODGETTING

Territories and states have been crucial to the complementary stories of ecosystem disruption and social integration. Colonies, transplanted species, markets, and limited liability corporations—whether national or international—are organized by actions of states (e.g., Arrighi forthcoming). These are states of a particular kind that originated, like the use of the word territory itself, in the sixteenth century.⁸ For Wallerstein the territorial state was a defining feature of the modern world-system. It is now, like many of

⁸ Building on Latin words, territory is a word of late Middle English. Its earliest use, according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, was 1494: "the land or country belonging to or under the dominion of a ruler or state." Even the more general use of territory to mean a less well bounded region includes an defining element of governance or rule: "The land or district lying round a city or town and under its jurisdiction." The five hundred year usage combining clearly demarcated spaces with absolute rule (in principle) or sovereignty has come to seem obvious. If the two elements were to diverge our language would be an obstacle to understanding.

the ways of ruling and of living from the earth, in crisis. Ruggie (1993) asks whether the territorial state may be yielding to a post-territorial, and therefore post-modern, form of rule. Foodgetting, as the central human relation to the earth, is a grounded way to explore the question.

Territory: An Earthly Perspective on the State System

Wallerstein (1974) reshaped our views of states, markets and the division of labor by arguing that a *modern* world-system emerged in the sixteenth century that consisted of three defining features. The first was world commerce, different from ancient trade in that it set prices for local sellers and buyers. It operated on a global scale, detached from the specifics of any place. World commerce in turn allowed for the second defining feature of the modern world-system: a larger-than-local pattern of specialized production and interdependence.

What Wallerstein called regions can be seen as physical *territories* whose borders were not clearly demarcated, which were sometimes larger than states and sometimes smaller or cross-cutting. These regions came to specialize in commodities for exchange with other specialized regions. The endpoint of regional specialization in agriculture is monoculture. While Wallerstein's emphasis was on ways of organizing relations among humans, from serfdom and slavery to sharecropping to free wage labour, I have redirected attention to the effects of specialization on local webs of interdependent species and cycles of minerals, water, and air. These are organized not through statemaking but through self-organizing complexes of vegetation, animal life, soil contours, and water flows. Such areas, nested from very local to vast areas such as grassland ecosystems, can be called bioregions (Sale 1991).

The third feature was a system of states, whose autonomy or sovereignty, was defined relative to the encompassing market. Each state was one in a *system of territorial* states, whose sovereignty depended on mutual recognition of borders between states. As eighteenth century thinkers understood it, the relation among states, like the surrounding market, was a "self-regulating equilibrium" in which "sovereign states followed their ordered paths in a harmony of mutual attraction and repulsion like the gravitational law that swings planets in their orbits" (Wight 1973:98, cited in Ruggie 1993: 146).

Wallerstein located the metaphorical gravitational field of states within the circulation of commodities on a world scale.

The ecological grounding for the vision of global circulation is the concept of *biosphere*. The earth consists of self-organizing *material cycles*—flows of water, light and air, biochemical renewal of minerals and organisms in soil, and successions of complexes of mutually dependent living organisms. These self-organizing cycles constitute specific ecosystems, each entwined with the planetary ecosystem, the self-renewing biosphere of earth. Since the successive creation of water and oxygen billions of years ago, water/air cycles, plant photosynthesis and animal (including human) respiration have regulated temperature and other conditions of life (Murota 1998). Until recently wild areas separating and surrounding local ecosystems were numerous and large enough to absorb the effects of local human disruptions. It was not sufficiently consequential that the territories ruled by states and the simplified, even monocultural, farming created by the world-system in no way corresponded to the contours of the earth or the interdependent cycles of living beings and material flows.

Via the market, territorial states, and specialized productions, then, the modern world-system inattentively reshaped local ecosystems. First, it *linked* parts of the earth in ways that allowed for greater ecosystem simplification vis a vis local farming. The latter requires humans to engage with, as they disrupt them, the self-renewing cycles in their habitats. Second, it *displaced* material and biological cycles with the circulation of commodities and money. By linking and displacing local ecosystems, the modern world-system *obscured* humans relations to the rest of nature. It created the first basis for human illusions about markets and money as the apparent basis of life. The second basis came with industry, which was made possible by world markets and specialized agriculture. Industrial agriculture not only displaced and obscured earthly cycles, but *ignored* them. Industrial agriculture is linear rather than cyclical. It is in principle separate from the sources of physical "inputs" and from the destination and use of physical "outputs." What formerly had to be renewed could be depleted, and what formerly had to be absorbed could become waste—but only for local ecosystems. *Suppressed* material cycles eventually *reappeared* at the global level, bringing awareness of the biosphere supporting human economy and human life.

The connection between bioregions and the biosphere parallels the connection between nation-states and the world-system. The material/biological and political/economic systems are mismatched, one reason so many problems are emerging in material and living cycles, and in relations of rule—e.g. the state system. The earth preceded human existence, and will certainly outlive it. It makes sense, therefore, to look to earthly cycles to interpret problems of human economy and rule.

John Ruggie (1993: 151, 165) explores the paradoxical quality of territorial rule, and the possibility of epochal change in forms of governance. The modern system of rule, he writes, “appears to be unique in human history.” Territorial rule is different from earlier Medieval patterns of overlapping sovereignty among landowners, local rulers, kings, and religious officials. It is based on the differentiation of subject populations into “territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion.” The key feature of modern territorial rule was “the consolidation of all parcelized and personalized authority into one public realm...[creating] two fundamental spatial demarcations: between public and private realms and between internal and external realms” (Ruggie 1993:151).

Yet absolute jurisdiction, to adapt Polanyi’s (1944) term for the self-regulating market, is “utopian”—by pursuing the ideal, its opposing tendencies are continually called into existence. A minor but persistent theme in the history of national states is “unbundling” of the various dimensions of governance combined in territoriality (Ruggie 1993:165). Unbundling began with the creation of “extraterritorial” spaces for foreign embassies; each ruler had to accommodate representatives of other “absolute” rulers, allowing them to practice religion and other activities forbidden to territorial subjects (Ruggie 1993: 165). Waterways have often required extra-territorial adjustments. Over time, more and more extra-territorial issues have become recognized in “international” law and institutions.⁹

⁹ In past work (Friedmann 1993) I have explored inherent limits to territoriality evident from colonial rule, followed by the system of military and monetary alliances of the Cold War era. I argued there that military alliances and monetary rules structured the world-system into units between states and the totality, which I call “blocs.” Types of bloc can differentiate periods in the history of the world economy. Imperial blocs were the organizing structures of rule from the sixteenth to the early twentieth century. Cold

As extra-territorial aspects implicit in territorial rule become explicit, ruling institutions may move towards something that is, in Ruggie’s phrase, “beyond territoriality.” Now, in Ruggie’s account, and also in many accounts of the world-system, various types of territorial unbundling are pressing the limits of absolute sovereignty, suggesting an old/new, even “neo-medieval,” system of overlapping sovereignties. The identified agents of transformation are the corporate creators of transnational webs of production, trade, and finance. Yet Ruggie (1993:147) also suggests that the recent vision of the ecosphere implies the possibility of “postmodern” forms of rule.

I hope that the link I have made between two types of territory, social and ecological, opens the way to understanding possibilities for epochal change. I have tried to show how a recurring process of consolidation and displacement of *territory* has underpinned the evolution of wealth and rule. Consolidation of territorial borders remains the only possible goal of statemaking elites (Tilly 1995). Yet the accumulation of wealth within larger-than-national markets, and through transnational property ownership and wage relations, displaces material activities—making and using goods—from concrete places.

Mobility of capital and labor, global sourcing and marketing, all disrupt the living and material cycles of local ecosystems and then attempt to compensate for the disruptions through more technology, more purchase of inputs, more selling or using of wastes. This can sustain itself for a prolonged period of time, but not indefinitely. Over time, capital movements and markets eliminate the remaining wild places surrounding ecosystems. Thus, ecosystems are relinked through the very social institutions—markets and transnational corporations—that disrupt them. Markets and industrial techniques are called upon to find ever larger solutions, yet the only place that substances (and models) can be found is in the very earthly cycles needing repair.

War blocs were the structure of rule from 1947 to 1991. It remains to be seen whether a new system of rule will create new blocs, or move beyond blocs. If so, it may move beyond states, which in my view have not had a stable existence apart from one or another type of bloc.

It follows that disruptions to ecosystems eventually become greater than Polanyian limits to self-regulating markets. Political movements for self-protection could at some point be more than recurring cycles in the relation between markets and territorial states; they may signal a crisis in territoriality itself. If so, it is a crisis both of governance and in human inhabitation of the land.

Foodgetting: An Emerging Imagination

Agriculture, the method of human foodgetting, is key to transforming economy and governance. Our techniques of foodgetting, which have underlaid the immense carapace of social organization, culture, and rule from the beginning of civilization, remain key to human effects on earthly webs of life. Humans not only continue to interfere with natural and material cycles in domesticating plants, animals, landscapes and waterways, but must do so. Colin Duncan (1996) argues that an ecologically sustainable society must transform human foodgetting by placing it at the center of economy, governance, and science. Foodgetting, and the activities built around it, will be responsible only when they respect and accommodate living cycles. In other words, after a half century of agricultural subordination to industry, and disruption of the living cycles, the future depends on reviving human capacities to secure necessities in ways that work with, alter, even enhance (from a human perspective) living cycles. This will require subordinating industry to agriculture.

The living cycles of the earth are self-organizing. They exist as contours of earth, formations of living soils, flows of waters and currents of air. These cycles support, and are renewed (and changed) by, webs of living organisms. The oldest smallest—the single-celled organisms that break down matter and allow it to recombine in new forms—are also the most important. They renew soil, which is not dead dirt, but a staggeringly complex and dynamic weave of mutually dependent organisms. Micro-organisms also work within human bodies to digest the hamburgers we eat, to allow our bodies to turn them into energy and the substance of new cells. Earthworms and ants are more important to human life than cattle and wheat. Yet human foodgetting in the modern era has multiplied the numbers of cattle and wheat at the expense of many other organisms, in ways that diminish the numbers and interactions of other organisms. Industrial agriculture, monocultures

and trade operate with far less attention to the web of living beings than our peasant ancestors showed.

This understanding is sound and sensible, yet highly divergent from the principles and ideas governing the present rules and practices of markets, capital, industry, and industrial agriculture. To shift society requires, as Ruggie argues, a new social imagination. This is not something willed—it is far too large and long—but something that can be identified in history and may guide our attention to, and interpretation of, apparently small changes. It seems unlikely that anyone in fifteenth century Europe could have envisioned the modern capitalist economy or state system.

Ruggie (1993:157-60) argues that modernity was based on the emergence around the sixteenth century of a radically new “social episteme”—a web of meaning and signification.¹⁰ Its elements included: the right of the ruler to choose religions, the shift of imperial powers to territorial rulers, the rediscovery of the Roman legal concept of absolute property, the creation of national languages, the rise of individual subjectivities and new interpersonal sensibilities and, perhaps most significantly, the invention of single-point perspective in the arts. This transformation, Ruggie states, was “literally mindboggling” to contemporaries. He offers examples of administrative decisions at the time that equally boggle a late-modern mind.

Ruggie cites global ecology as a potential source of a “new and very different social episteme—a new set of spatial, metaphysical, and doctrinal constructs through which the visualization of collective existence on the planet is shaped.” Ecology, and a variety of other named perspectives, such as Chaos Theory, offer holism and interdependence in place of absolute separation (of individuals and states) as organizing principles. Ruggie cites as an example of post-territorial thinking the concept of international custodianship, in which no institution tries to replace territorial states, but states mutually enforce community norms, such as preservation of cultural heritage or biodiversity. Such innovations displace one of the defining features of social episteme of modernity that underlay the vision of the state as the defining point of “its” territory—the single-point perspective (Ruggie 1993:

¹⁰. See also Anderson (1983).

157-60,173). In its stead, something more akin to a medieval multiperspectival approach displaces the state from the absolute centre, just as it displaces the human species from absolute dominion over the earth.

As the principal image of modern rule, property, and individuality, territory is a site of transformation. Ruggie's (1993:149-50) invocation of medieval rule is suggestive, not because we could or should go back (though there may be something to learn), but because it opens our minds to the possibility of overlapping jurisdictions. Medieval rulers belonged in common to an intertwined (if not harmonious) set of ruling lineages (royalty or nobility), whose marriage and inheritance united them across territories and separated them from their subjects. These rulers assumed patchwork governance across the European continent, relying on a fluid continuum between public territories and private estates. These were divided not by clear boundaries but by large transitional zones. Christendom and the Universal Church (whose language was Latin) provided an overarching moral universe, constituting fluid jurisdictions over sacred and secular matters, and overlapping sovereignties.

A unifying ecological imagination may be key to resituating human society within nested, overlapping, ecologically defined terrains (bioregions)—from the microcosms of fields to watersheds, climatic zones, and the biosphere. As agriculture is pivotal to human relations with greater-than-human nature, an ecological imagination can begin with agriculture. Our species life depends on the inescapable need for food. Foodgetting is the crucial and inescapable intervention humans make into more-than-human natural cycles.¹¹ By reimagining social organization in light of this reality, we can begin to see how to enhance the material and biological cycles of the earth to human benefit. This requires a redefinition of what it means to be human.

CONCLUSION: ANTICIPATIONS OF A POST-HAMBURGER WORLD-SYSTEM

The hamburger, then, condenses the dominant movement of human integration of the planet since the sixteenth century. First European colonists carried their favourite domestic species (and their pests, e.g., dandeli-

¹¹ —which of course are effects on ourselves.

ons, rats and smallpox), which thrived at the expense of New World grasses and buffalo. It was a drastic ecological simplification. Chief among the favored dependents were cattle and wheat. Then, in the nineteenth century, transplanted species became the basis for a startling leap in social complexity and ecological simplification. European humans, like exotic wheat and cattle, had shallow roots in North American grassland ecosystems. They substituted complex social, technical, and financial instruments to turn wheat and cattle into rivers of seeds and flesh (Cronon 1991:120). Deracinated settlers specialized in industrial monocultures of wheat and cattle, compromising the living cycles of untilled grasslands.

Within the context of wheat and cattle monocultures, there arose in the middle of the twentieth century two new phenomena. The U.S. rose to hegemony in the state system and in world agrofood markets. Markets became deepened by corporations that organized transnational sectors of food (as other) production. The corporate hamburger thus arose in the United States, produced from ingredients gone rampant in an alien agroecosystem. Fast food corporations transplanted the cattle (especially) once again, this time to a still more fragile ecosystem, tropical rainforests. Thus another stage in social complexity, the organization of commodity chains across the globe, accompanied another stage in ecological simplification.

The effects, of course, are cumulative. As wild places are destroyed, local ecosystem disruptions become linked. The substitution of money circulation for disrupted earthly cycles approaches a material/biological limit (Wilson 1992). The official recognition of common danger came with the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (Knelman 1999: 124-42). The biosphere concept entered public discourse at about the same time that food and energy markets became turbulent in the early 1970s. Since then, humans have developed two competing and evolving visions of the earth: global production chains managed by transnational corporations, which disrupt and attempt to replace self-organizing cycles; and a biosphere in which humans work with the self-organizing material living processes of the planet.

Foodgetting is at the crux of the choice, as foodgetting is the necessary relationship to larger-than-human nature. Are there practices and relationships in foodgetting that, parallel to Medieval cities and trade, might prefigure a new social episteme and a post-territorial world of nested bioregions?

In the prairie heartland, limits of both industrial agriculture and exotic monocultures are being noticed. U.S. farmers have reached the limits of chemical fertilizer use, where additional units no longer increase yields. They have applied steady, or even declining, quantities since the early 1980s (Brown et.al. 1992:38). Two solutions are offered. One is the further development of industrial technology in the form of genetic engineering and so-called "precision farming." The latter directs equipment on the ground to dispense specific mixes of chemicals according to satellite-generated analysis of soil composition in small areas.

The second solution reverses this logic, and at first seems as strange as Galileo.¹² Wes Jackson is a pioneer farmer-geneticist-ecologist who founded the Land Institute in Salina, Kansas, in 1976. Based on studies of soil degradation and the decline of ancient civilizations, and practical and scientific knowledge of prairie ecosystems, Jackson has taken up the challenge of sustainable farming in North American grasslands. He notes that European methods of tilling and row planting in the prairie ecosystem lead to soil loss and decline in soil water retention. His solution shifts both methods and crops. He seeks to enhance (for human benefit) what he calls the "wisdom of the prairie"—the complex inter-relationships among living beings and material cycles that evolved over millions of years. Like evolutionary biologists (e.g. Wilson 1992), like nineteenth century thinkers who emphasized the parallel between forest ecologies and field ecologies, like present-day ecofeminists who criticize the linear, simplifying practices of the Green Revolution (Shiva 1993), Jackson emphasizes the astonishing and *unknowable* complexity of living processes and the appropriate cultural attitude of respect (if not awe). He experiments with "no-till" farming, using mixed perennial grasses to approximate the original (untilled) prairie ecosystem and creating a renewal of interwoven cycles of crops and micro-organisms.

Jackson's experiments are, after a century of monoculture and exports, a return to the self-organizing processes of the specific ecosystem upon which

¹² Galileo still seems strange if we consider that most of us still experience the sun as rising, that is, as revolving around the earth. It takes a mighty effort to imagine what I "know" to be true, that I am held by a giant ball as it turns towards the vastly larger ball of fire that holds my planet in orbit.

many of the world's humans depend for grain. Jackson mimics through scientific observation and experimentation what peasant cultivators learned over thousands of years: how to practice self-renewing foodgetting. In its systematic guidance of living processes, and its incorporation of changes from year to year (ecosystem succession), it resembles the extraordinary experiments of pioneer self-taught Japanese agronomist Fukuoka (1978), who substitutes attention and minimal intervention for annual disruptions of tilling, planting and leaving the soil bare after harvesting. This recalls the English attitude of High Farming, not in its disregard of people, but in its attention to the living cycles of plants, animals, and soils.

These experiments in self-renewing agriculture, in what is being called "habitat-enhancing agriculture" (Imhoff 1998:8), reverses the logic of industrial agriculture. Because North American grasslands were never farmed by a peasantry, the application of socially and ecologically sustainable methods have no traditions to draw from. A scientific approach is necessary. It is a different science, working from and with different principles from the linear, industrial methods that broke the matted grasses and mined the riches of soil continuously manured by millions of buffalo.

Meanwhile, monocultural farming based on industrial techniques, vast transport systems and elaborate commercial and financial instruments, are being rapidly exported to the rest of the world. The complexity and self-renewal of those systems are in danger, as is biological diversity and the renewal of water and air cycles necessary to human life. Jackson's experiments, and those in other North American agro-ecosystems (see Imhoff 1998) by necessity pioneer a type of agriculture based in ecological science. Agroecology self-consciously recovers the self-renewing qualities of much (not all) traditional agriculture, such as traditional paddy rice cultivation in South India (Bayliss-Smith 1982:69-73).

It is encouraging to consider the urban-inspired changes in farming. Jacobs (1985) argues that agriculture may have emerged after cities rather than before then. From ancient Rome on, cities, wheat cultivation, and agronomy waxed and waned in tandem (Montanari 1992: 30, 50-54). Today, when the majority of people inhabit cities (what Crosby [1986] calls "monocultural stands of humans"), the choice of crops, the knowledge of cultivation and the application of human energy will likely find their renewal in cities. In a time of degraded employment, it is encouraging to consider the pos-

sibilities of combining skill, work, and roots in a specific place. In a time of cultural confusion, it is encouraging to anticipate a movement of individuals into intentional communities centered on wise, self-renewing practices for foodgetting. In a time of rapid change in climate and other signs of biosphere disruption, it is heartening to consider the possibility of refocusing human livelihood in the self-renewing processes of local fields, watersheds, and bioregions.

But no doubt utopian. International custodianship and recognition of common interests in regulating climate, biodiversity, air and water quality and cultural diversity seem puny in comparison to growing wars, specialization, trade and loss of public regulation. Habitat-enhancing agriculture is dwarfed by the rapid plantings worldwide of genetically modified crops (often with associated increases in toxic chemicals), by concentration of small companies specializing in “organic foods” and by cooptation of the “organic” market, including standards and farms, by transnational agro-food corporations (Imhoff 1998). Yet our future depends on alternatives in place if and when local collapses occur, particularly in monocultural export regions.

If epochal change in social relations and governance are upon us, then they will be either intentionally guided or disastrously eruptive. Ruggie reminds us that modern territorial rule, together with capitalist social relations, arose from prolonged crises. They were not the functional outcome of changes “necessary” for “capitalism” or “sovereignty,” words that became imagined only in the course of the long, arduous birth of modern institutions. The institutions of feudal society and rule were deeply entrenched in the imagination and practices of people throughout Europe and formed the world against and within which town dwellers and merchants, farmers and landowners, experimented with new ways of life. Feudal institutions succumbed to massive suffering and chaos in the fourteenth century—which we blandly summarize as the Black Death and the Hundred Years War. Perhaps there was no other option then, and perhaps not now either.

New epistemes, Ruggie reminds us, grow in obscure corners of the old. Consider the following commercially successful enterprise in Toronto. Three young people, two women and a man, own and work in a company called Annex Organics. They sprout seeds in a facility belonging to an innovative, quasi-public, quasi-non-governmental organization called FoodShare,

and in season grow vegetables on the large roof. One of them conceived the idea after dropping out of graduate studies in biology, after discovering that research would always be in a laboratory. The three individuals share knowledge at home and abroad. One of their educational projects is to teach urban gardeners how to save seeds from crops to replant in future years. Imagine their surprise when commercial farmers turned up to learn how to save seeds! It is a sign of the times that farmers did not know this, and that they went not to government extension agents, not to seed corporations, not to agricultural programs in universities, but to educated, enterprising young people engaging in a self-conscious version of what farmers used to do.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF 'THE WORLD OF ECONOMY': EASTERN EUROPE IN 9TH-12TH CENTURIES

Henryk Samsonowicz

The concept of Immanuel Wallerstein¹ refers to the world before the times of European hegemony. It was not a homogeneous economy. Regardless the scale and forms of activity, there existed separate, greater regions that were basically self-sufficient. Apart from them there were areas where only local ties, based on the natural economy, functioned. Taking into account the above premises, Janet Abu-Lughod² discussed the eight macro-regions which existed in Europe, Asia and Northern Africa in the 13th-14th century. They were mutually linked by communication routes and by the activities of the major economic centres, i.e. towns. Among these regions, the author listed the European region, extending along the axis connecting England with Italy, the Mediterranean region (from Spain to Crimea), the Mongolian region (from Beijing to Kiev) and the Egyptian region (ranging from East Africa to the Indian coast at Calicut). Different countries partially belonged to spheres which were well constituted internally by world economic entities preceding the rise of a world system.

In the 13th century, however, relations in these regions depended, at least to a certain extent, on internal contacts. It is difficult to imagine the development of the Western European world without the latter's contacts with the 'Egyptian world.' Also in the earlier Middle Ages, there emerged macro-regions of homogeneous or similar economic systems, such as the Mongolian macro-region, which lasted as long as they played a role on a much larger, supra-regional scale.

Henryk Samsonowicz
Instytut Historyczny
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-325 Warszawa
POLAND

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The lands of the *barbaricum*³ situated in Eastern Europe (Scandinavia, countries located to the east of the Laba and to the west of the Danube rivers) were inhabited from the times of the Great Migration to the 8th century by mutually connected local communities. In the 9th century, the situation underwent changes. Growing internal ties as well as greater influence of other economic regions on these territories could be noticed. These were vast territories. The European lands in the 8th century could be, very simply, divided into three parts, i.e. Carolinian, Byzantine and barbarian (not including Muslim territories of the Caliphate of Cordoba, almost deserted lands near the Polar Circle as well as taiga behind the Volga river and steppes inhabited by the Chazarian people). Among these three parts the largest was the barbarian one. It included the lands reaching central Scandinavia, the Finnish Gulf, the middle Volga basin—totalling circa four million km², as compared with 1,200,000 km² of the lands in the West and approximately 700,000 km² in the Byzantine part. Naturally, in the times when economic position depended on the density of population, Europe was the weakest. One could think that population density could have reached up to three persons per km², with thirteen persons per km² in the western part and not more than 7-8 persons in the eastern part.⁴

There are some criteria of the existence of ties connecting the barbarian world of Europe in the 9th century. The first were permanent trade routes, ensuring both the internal communication of these lands and their contacts with the outer world. The second one was a system of market centres, which operated on a similar basis, and were visited by merchants from Arabian countries, Byzantium and Rome. The third one was the structure of commerce, where the main commodity supplied from outside were slaves. The fourth criterion of unity were emerging social structures, where the importance of groups of merchants-warriors was growing. Originally they consisted of Norman Vikings.⁵ Later, probably already in the 9th century, also of other ethnic groups, mainly Slavonic, which is confirmed in the onomastics used in the whole Arabian world.⁶ Last but not least, the fifth common criterion was the territories' adoption of political and religious systems from the Christian countries, which was manifested in the form of emerging states.

During the 10th century the European political stage gained new lands, where new states were created in chronological order: Bohemia replaced by

Hungary, Ruthenia, Norway, Czechia, Denmark, Poland and Sweden.⁷ The emergence of all these new organisms was based on the inflow of means which made it possible for the formation of elites interested in building new social organisations.⁸ This was also supported, especially in later periods, from the mid-9th century, by the activities of bandits who were transformed into a group of merchants. They were the Vikings who traded mainly in slaves and transported them to the Muslim countries. It was also supported by new, thriving trade routes, which linked the whole territory with Rome and Byzantium.⁹ The main routes were laid along waters. First, the Baltic linked all the Scandinavian countries with the German, Slavonic and Baltic neighbours. At least from the 8th century, land routes were also made. There were crossing market centres where merchants met the local elites.¹⁰ Trade routes crossed the whole area of Europe, the most important route, it seems, being the water route along the Baltic. One could believe that it was originated in the Rhine delta, in Duurstede, where it merged with the routes heading south. From the Netherlands it went along a water route eastbound, through Schlezwig (Haithabu) to Old Lubeck, through Rugia (Arkona), Wolin, Koobrzeg, Truse, Wiskiauty to Stara Ladoga. Off the Baltic coast, there were routes heading south and, as a rule, using navigable rivers. The most important route was along the Volga river, through the Great Bulgar to the Chazarians at the Caspian Sea. Another one led more to the west, along Dniepr river, through Kiev to the Black Sea harbours. It was complemented partially by a water route, along the Vistula and Bug rivers, and partially by a land route, through Woy to Kiev. The oldest preserved customs tariffs¹¹ (Raffelstetten, Pomnichów) shows that the goods (i.e. slaves, weapons, salt, cloth, cattle) were transported in both ways. Additional data are included in a Carolinian capitulary, which bans transport of weapons to the Slavs and lists numerous land routes leading eastbound from the watch-towers situated at the border of the empire from Altona, Magdeburg and Erfurt.¹² The water route linking the east with the west was the Danube linking the Frankish States with Byzantium.

In the light of customs tariffs, capitularies and several archeological data, we can learn about the structure of trade linking Barbaricum with the Latin and Greek empires. Instead of slaves, and to a small extent, of cattle, fur and perhaps amber, products necessary for building social organisations, such as weapons for professional bands, which constituted the military power of the

country as well as all necessary capability of this social group whose interest was to create a new state system, were delivered to the north. There were Arabian, Byzantine, Frank and Anglo-Saxon coins (Ancient Roman coins were also circulating), with which it was possible for the elite to buy necessary services. Ideology (religion), chancellery, diplomatic and propaganda service (e.g. construction of monumental buildings) were essential for the operation of new organisations. It depended on the experts coming from the south and west of Europe.

The great trade carried out by the wealthy was forming the new power elites. Cemeteries from the 10th century¹³ reveal burials of people belonging to at least two social strata: the majority of graves were equipped traditionally. A minority had rich weapons, jewelry and decorative items.

There is a well-known, though contested by some researchers, opinion of Henry Pirenne about the influence of Islam on the consolidation of Western Europe. In the light of the latest research, this opinion could be corrected as the rise of the great world of Islam created a demand for the only product which could be taken out from a destroyed Europe, namely people.¹⁴ Similarly, in the 9th–11th century a circle of slave trade was created, this time situated in the territories beyond the Carolinian *limes*. There also emerged new forms of organisation of society.

A change was brought about in the following centuries, however. The raid of the Mongols, fall of Byzantium and gradual economic deterioration of the Muslim countries led to a decrease in the significance of the great exchange with the Mediterranean zone. The character of states was also changing. They were transformed from patriarchal monarchies into local powers. Simultaneously adopting the organisational patterns from the Western Empire or from Byzantium also led to tighter economic ties between the region and Western as well as Southern Europe.

During the period in which the states were emerging in the east of the continent from the 9th to 11th century we can talk about the emerging 'world of economy' which was internally linked, and, despite ethnic differences, creating similar forms of social ties. Adopting homogeneous forms of social organisation and common religion, led to the connections between Eastern Europe in the 13th century with neighbouring countries. Scandinavia, Poland, Czechia and Hungary became the peripheral territories of Western European macro-region. After Byzantium collapsed and Kiev Ruthenia was

conquered by the Mongols, the zone created in the 9th century ceased to exist in the 13th century.

ENDNOTES

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¹⁴. H. Pirenne. *Mahomet et Charlemagne*, Paris 1937; R. Hodges, D. Whitehouse, *Mohammed, Charlemagne and the origins of Europe*, London 1983, p. 169; S. Belin, "Mohammed, Charlemagne and Ruric," *The Scandinavian Economic History Review* 1, 1953, p. 5.

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HOUSEHOLD AND SMALL BUSINESS ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES

Nicoletta Stame

HOUSEHOLD AND BUSINESS: MODERNIZATION THEORY AND COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF DISCIPLINES

Households, which are seen as income pooling units (Wallerstein, Martin, Dickinson 1982), play a crucial role in the world-system analysis. Individuals enjoy income that accrues to their households, a unit embedded in a network of different social relationships among people, kin or not kin, living under the same roof or sharing some important living function. Thus, social relations are seen as ways of obtaining different types of income (wages, rent, profit, social exchange, gifts) and ways of ensuring different welfare services.

This conceptualization of the household fits in the world-systems analysis criticism of two main tenets of the linear model of modernization theory:

It contrasts the modernization thesis of the evolution of the family from extended to nuclear family (and neo-local), and of social organization from a model of diffusion to one of institutional specialization (production within the firm, socialization within the family, redistribution within the state) (Smith and Wallerstein 1992)

[I]t contrasts the segregation of disciplines—seen as a necessary result of specialization—according to which economics deals with the market (income and its distribution), political science deals with the state and power, while

Nicoletta Stame
Dipartimento di Sociologia
Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"
Via Salaria 113
00198 Roma
<http://www.soc.uniroma1.it/>
nstame@aconet.it

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sociology deals with the rest, that is, social relations like those of the family (Wallerstein 1991:241).¹

Living in Italy, one cannot ignore the pervasiveness of the family and its influence on different spheres of social life. In this country—as Ginsborg (1994) says—the family is still one of the few shared values. But its transformation has been impressive. On the one hand, it has adapted to all of the changes that, since 1968, the youth and feminist movements brought about in law² and personal behavior. It became open and egalitarian (Barbagli 1990), and it has lived through the most important demographic revolutions, such as less children per marriage and more *de facto* families. On the other hand, the family has played more and more (and not less) economic roles. Its indirect role, as in wealth redistribution and in consumption, is acknowledged: a criticism is now brought against welfare policies that implicitly treat the family as a partner in personal care and assistance, and reduce the state expenditure by leaving the burden of assistance to the family (Saraceno 1998). Moreover, families invest in the future of their children, allowing them to live with their families much longer than in other countries, even after higher education until they can earn a living similar to their parents.³ Households also play a direct role in the economy: just think about the family business.

In Italy, as in many European countries, the large majority of businesses are SMEs which normally means family businesses. They are a pivotal ingredient of the Third Italy (the Center Northeast) and of the industrial districts, but they also exist all over the country. Most jobs are being created in SMEs, which therefore have become the target of many social programs aiming at self-employment, enterprise creation, or supporting existing businesses. However, such programs are not oriented to family support if they are industrial programs; and they are not oriented to entrepreneurial family support if they are social policies. This expresses a difficult conceptualization of family businesses.

¹ In this distinction there is also the implication that economics and politics deal with what is rational, and sociology with the rest, that is what is irrational.

² In the '70s radical changes in family law followed the introduction of divorce and of the right to abortion.

FAMILY BUSINESSES: A MISUNDERSTOOD SUBJECT

Family businesses do not suit well mainstream thinking following the linear model of modernization and the segregation of disciplines.

First, there is a “modernist” objection, according to which family business is a residue of the past, the old subsistence economy of the patriarchal family. Second, there is an “economistic” objection, according to which it is a hybrid: neoclassical economics considers family business as a transient moment (startup) in the life cycle of the company, and a backward phase in the development of industrialization (an expression of family capitalism as opposed to managerial capitalism) (Berle and Means 1932). Accordingly, family business is thought to be weak for two main reasons. First, in order to get bigger it should attract external capital, which the family prefers to avoid lest they lose control; so it stays small. Second, the family fears the growth of managerial skills external to the original nucleus even when they are unable to reproduce their managerial capacities.³

Both of these notions are today under attack from many points of view. As for the “economistic” objection, its weakest point is the underlying idea of a separation between the rational behavior of entrepreneurial logic, and the irrational “familistic” behavior. Action favoring the family is supposed to be detrimental to the company. In a brilliant work, Michel Bauer (1993) offers us a different picture of the entrepreneur. Small or big as he may be, he thinks with three heads: that of “*homo oeconomicus*” looking for profit; that of “*paterfamilias*” caring for the welfare of his kin; and that of “*homo politicus*” aiming at consolidating the power he has created within his firm. The head of *homo oeconomicus* is not the only one to be rational. Each firm strives for an equilibrium state that is the result of different combinations of kin and power relations, which all contribute to the economic success of the business.

Thus, it may be true that a small family business can go bankrupt if brothers disagree on profit reinvestment or on the style of leadership. However, it is also true that the family bond can last even in a big business, as when a single business grows bigger and become a part of a panoply of firms

³ It is the famous Buddenbrook effect, that predicts that entrepreneurial capacities will not be developed beyond the third generation...

run by various relatives (the company model originated in Veneto with the Benetton family, now found also in the rest of the country), or when consortia are created, as in food distribution, among separate family businesses.

As for the “modernist” objection, thanks to the literature on industrial districts of the Center Northeast, one can say that the traditional views have received a powerful blow. The development of this industrialized area is attributed to a good integration between economic and social forces. The family business of sharecropper origin is considered as the model of the new flexible post-fordist production.⁴

This does not mean, however, that the old ideas are gone forever. Instead, they are back, with a vengeance. Rather than acknowledging the contribution of family businesses to development in general, the real issue has become understanding the differences that may exist between different socio-economic environments. Much has to be understood about the evolution of other local socio-economic systems, observed in other parts of the country like the South, which have points in common with, and differences from, the industrial districts. However, many studies have recently been undertaken on the semi-underground, gray economy and on local systems of small firms (Meldolesi 1998; Bàculo 1994; Meldolesi and Aniello 1998). They show how behind the vitality of firms systems invisible to a naked eye, but clear to an accustomed eye,⁵ there is always a family business. This observation is not offered as a statement in passing—as do many works on SMEs which point at their family nature as a cause of weakness and an indicator of immaturity; instead, it is a systematic remark on the link between firms and terrain, and on the utilization of an effective potential of development, notwithstanding the fact that their actual productivity levels are lower than those in the Center North.

⁴ See articles by Becattini, Brusco, Dei Ottati and others in Cossentino, Pyke and Senderberger (1996). For a special attention to the topic of family and business in industrial districts see Pescarolo (1994).

⁵ They are located in garages and backyards, and are not easily detected either by official statistics nor by fiscal controls.

FROM “FAMILISM” TO FAMILY STRATEGIES

What blocked an understanding of the relationship between family and business in the South was the thesis of “amoral familism” that Edward Banfield (1958) worked out in his famous study of a “backward community of the South” (that he called Montegrano), after WWII. The Southern family was said to behave according to an ethos that pushed it to “maximize material and immaterial advantage to the nuclear family and to suppose that everyone behaves in the same way,” thus putting an obstacle to solidarity with the outside and to trust, which are the basic roots of entrepreneurship and democracy.

The fate of this thesis is rather odd. At the beginning, the picture of a disaggregated⁶ South was rejected, and the psychological foundations of the theory were considered unable to explain the structural reasons for such a behavior (which was seen as rational in that village, as Pizzorno (1967) said, “thanks to its historical marginality there (was) nothing to do in Montegrano”). Nowadays it has become the stereotype of the Southern society, and it is the basis on which Robert Putnam (1993) has built his theory of the absence of civicness and of the bad performance of Southern public administration, contrary to the good performance of local administration in the North East areas of the country, where family and social bonds gave way to a sense of civicness and trust. Even Enzo Mingione (1990), a scholar keen on the problematics of the informal economy, maintains that “familism”⁷ is efficient in the North (because of its links with the market) and “amoral” in the South because it has been absorbed inside “assistentialism.”⁸

Studies on the Southern family conducted in the tradition of network analysis have acquired great momentum showing the versatility of family

⁶ Mutti (1998) notes that the theses of Putnam are based on a blend of Banfield plus Gramsci; the latter’s ideas on the social disaggregation of the agrarian South (as opposed to the industrial North) had often been utilized to explain the underdevelopment of the South.

⁷ Note the frequent semantic sliding from family to familism. Actually, here one should always talk of family, better of families. See below.

⁸ This term alludes to the way of getting consensus through money transfers that are provided to their own part, and not for work or productive activities, thus simply for assistance.

strategies in economic activities (Piselli 1983; Gribaudo 1993). However, the message has not passed through to other disciplines. Paradoxically, the Center North family is seen as potential subject of a flexible small business, while the Southern family continues to be only considered as the link of a mechanism of subordination to the “assistant” state, therefore as a cause of inefficiency and an obstacle to entrepreneurship.

Such analyses need to be completely revised. The supposed weaknesses of the development basis of the South epitomizes the way in which the development potential of a large part of the world is assessed. We dare say that what is happening in Southern Italy can be studied as a laboratory for potential alternative development paths.

First, the stereotype of familism is being opposed from within. Starting from internationally comparative studies on family values, Sciolla and Negri contest that entertaining an attachment for the family is tantamount to backwardness, since this feeling is the most widespread in countries like the USA and UK, relative to which Italy comes in a further order. Moreover, they show that the Italian South is not more familistic than the rest of the country, rather less so (Sciolla 1998; Negri and Sciolla 1997). There is interesting data on trust: it is mostly placed in the family, and the more so in the Center Northeast regions (similar findings are reported in all analyses in this area). On the other hand, numerous studies show that there are no great differences between North and South regarding the evolution of roles between genders (toward more egalitarianism) and generations (toward greater democracy). What is different is trust in the state, which is lower in the Northeast, and higher in the South.

However, our purpose is not so much to rescue the category of familism (or of clientelism, both originating from particularism) and to understand what would be its better mix with universalism, as Mutti (1998: 106)⁹ would suggest. This would lead us to reckon with abstract categories and self-contained models. The problem lies elsewhere. The family is a social

⁹ Mutti has done research on Abruzzi, a Southern region that is today considered developed, so much so that it no more received the incentives accorded by the European Structural Funds to underdeveloped areas. His thesis is that the local patron, Gaspari, developed a system of “open clientelism.”

bond that evolves according to strategies conditioned by what resources are available¹⁰. Being an evolving versatile social relationship, based on hierarchy and cooperation, it can reorient its own activities toward a democratic and developmental path.

In other words, our unit of analysis should be neither an abstract concept (familism) nor an institution (the family, with its boundaries and internal rules), but the strategies of cooperation among the people who belong to it and who in this way define the environment of its activity. Not all kin work in the family business, and those who don't are less involved in its development strategies and in the redistribution¹¹ of its profit. Not only kin work in the business, since there can be friends who nonetheless entertain egalitarian relationships, and employees that are considered “like kin.”

It is true that the South is a low trust area (Fukuyama 1995), and that intra-family relationships are more intense than external ones. However kin people do live in the common world. They may be students who want to learn new technologies, young women who quest for an equal role in society, and men and women who know how to do something and want to exploit their capacity. When these conditions coalesce with an entrepreneurial idea, the familial mobilization of economic and social resources can be impressive. Family businesses are born around craftsman abilities that were never lost, as activities for a third party (a commissioner), phases in a productive chain which is run by external or local commissioners, and are undertaken in particular moments of a life cycle (a birth, a marriage) and then pursued. In cases like these, an activity often starts as a joke (Bàculo 1994) and is later transformed into a real business, in a move analogous to that of kin “associated for love” (Turnaturi 1991) that gave rise to social movements for defense against the injustice they have suffered, and which later acted on the universalistic level of the promotion of new rights. It is a democratic process

¹⁰ I have dealt with this in Stame (1990).

¹¹ It is a modernist prejudice that according to which the family business is in danger from the appetites of absent but exacting kin. In our researches it is clear that there are kin who can aim at profit redistribution because they work in the business, or because they could not work (the young, the old): i.e. out of a logic of production or of welfare. Those kin who do not contribute to the business cannot aim at sharing any advantage from it.

of popular entrepreneurship that is assessing its place all over the South, in contrast to the widespread image of desolation and criminality.

At the same time, it is true that for a long time dependence on public spending and the state's redistributive system prevailed, and that many families utilized welfare state resources in such a way as to modify their previous situation (leaving heavy and less remunerated jobs that are now taken up by immigrants; subsidizing their children's education in order to invest in a better and more secure position). But for this same reason, in the new frame of national and European welfare policies and reduction of transfer payments, the development of small entrepreneurship, mainly family based, can be seen as the only path to keep income levels felt to be adequate.

SMALL BUSINESS AND FAMILY IN THE SOUTH OF ITALY

The recent studies on the Southern local systems we have mentioned above focus on development processes based on small business, organized in districts, or systems of diffused industrialization. The family origin of businesses can be easily forecasted in those sectors where tacit knowledge exists, where the firm can grow out of an artisanal activity (garment, textile, shoemaking, furniture) or of trade (pedlars, petty trade), catching opportunities for large scale production (the "made in Italy"), and of forward and backward linkages. But it can manifest itself also in new and technologically innovative sectors, if the family supports the children's training in higher level studies.

Here the relationship with the past is complex indeed. All diffused industrial areas have been wiped out by the heavy industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s (Becattini, 1998). The destruction of a fabric of small family businesses gave way to a quest for a secure job in the big firm or in the state, feeding clientelistic and assistantial-like behavior. Facing the actual crisis of those relationships that is felt everywhere owing to a change in external (the end of the cold war, the strengthening of Europe) as well as internal (the need for reducing deficit spending) pressures, it is possible that a new tendency toward autonomous work and enterprise creation would increase. The latter could only stem from solidarity among members of the family, better or less trained, who are still responsive to traditional social values of hard-working, responsibility and thrift. It would be an alternative to the assistant-ism of the recent past, utilizing older virtues in a process of political recovery of the civil society.

Of course, the process we are talking about would take into account local differences. In these studies are often distinguished:

- areas in the "bone,"¹² inland areas, where strong peasant and catholic traditions persist: Everybody feels concerned when the family starts up a business.
- areas in the "flesh," in the valleys, along the coast or the motorways, more open to external pressures: family and business adapt to each other in changeable ways.
- areas in the historical centers (big as Naples, small as Bitonto), where a low cultural level exists, together with strong traditions, but the social and productive fabric are intertwined, and an atmosphere reigns that is favourable to business.

Local variations account for the degree to which the family role approaches these standards. First, there is a core nucleus composed of kin (people related by kin, not necessarily all the members of a nuclear family, nor of an extended one) lacking which there would be no initiative. It is a favorable environment, with tighter and looser links, from friends to kin, within which there is trust and collaborative relationships. Its determination prevails over the external environment, often scarcely favorable to business (either out of criminal activity or of bureaucratic inefficiency).

Second, the family facilitates self-financing. Banks do not lend money to those who cannot offer warranty, and are not able to assess the potential of new initiatives. Therefore, the family network feels the duty of giving those who decide to start a business money or real goods. Naturally, this accounts for the quantity of resources that can be mobilized which sometimes is scarce.

Third, the family contributes to work. Family members divide tasks according to their competence; and if the latter is lacking, children are invited to get it by training. Among the new generations this division does not take place along gender lines since young women who want to work in

¹². "Bone" and "flesh" was a very influential distinction drawn by Manlio Rossi Doria in his studies of Southern agriculture in the post WWII. His studies on the different agricultural areas are still illuminating for an understanding of the actual situation.

the business get the same type of training as their male counterparts. The situation is different from the older generations where the mother often takes up the tasks of administration or quality control, while the father acts as the technical and managerial entrepreneur. Among family members there is generally an egalitarian relationship and a democratic atmosphere. This is normal when relatives are of the same generation, but even when there are two generations an authoritarian leadership of the old generation is rare.

The organization of labor among relatives gives rise to some peculiarities. Flexibility is the rule. Family members work when they are asked to and with no attention to time. Kin collaboration is different from other associations or employment. For the entrepreneurial family work time and family time may even overlap,¹³ in any case their distinction is not as sharp as that of other families who get together only in leisure time. Gains are shared according to needs, not to productivity, even if it is not rare that a relative can get a salary. Profits are often reinvested, although there are different behavioral models according to areas. As for the selection of personnel, in some cases employing family members may lead to the detriment of the required competence, which pushes for their training. But there could be a reverse side of the story, that family members who have got used to role rotation, would become interchangeable. This is close to the idea of most contemporary approaches to training, which insist on hands-on training, a tenet that the entrepreneurial family has always considered important.

Lastly, family businesses are distinctive for their conflict management. First, in these businesses there is very little employer-employee conflict. Employees work side by side with family members, who sometimes work more than they do, and cannot think of the boss' family as that of a rentier. A largely shared idea is that the employees also "belong to the family," mostly owing to the contiguity that they work in. If at times the working hours are longer than established by contract (if a contract exists!), at other times the employees are allowed time off for family reasons. Not to mention the fact that where the industrial fabric is not strong, having a job is considered an advantage not to be lost lightheartedly. All this speaks for the social force of

¹³ There are many similarities with the families of industrial workers in a family capitalism township studied by Tamara Hareven (1986).

the family business and the atmosphere favorable to it in these areas. Moreover, within the core nucleus of the firm, to be a family member is a factor of conflict moderation: "with kin in the end things get right," and family businesses resist better moments of crisis which would have brought about bankruptcy and divisions in other businesses.¹⁴ Of course, breaking bonds and leaving home are not infrequent: the boundaries of the entrepreneurial family are constantly redefined.

FAMILY AID TO THE FIRM

Having analyzed many small businesses¹⁵—born spontaneously, supported by the state, evolving by merging or partition—and having realized that most of them have a family base, and that they may be viable endeavors contributing to the development of the South, I think it is necessary to define what is a family business, and what can be considered as its strengths and weaknesses.

The family contributes to business in two main dimensions: horizontally, by the collaboration of people in the same generation; vertically, by socializing people in a family tradition. But family business dynamics are more complex than that. I came to two main observations:

- family members may collaborate in essential tasks, but are not required to collaborate in every task; what makes the difference is the way that various forms of collaboration combine. Hence, understanding the strategies and forms of collaboration is important.
- the push to entrepreneurship can be felt even inside families that have traditionally been far from business, thus enlarging the social base of business. Actually, family business is by no means synonymous with family capitalism. Small family businesses are born and die all the time, in a dynamic way. Family capitalism refers to the prevalence of the

¹⁴ It is true that the family has a collective interest in the good performance of the family business, but there may be conflict if some family member resists the overlapping of family and business roles. In these cases the way out can be a different combination of roles: some links are strengthened, other ones are loosened.

¹⁵ I refer here to a series of researches I am currently conducting in Puglia on family businesses born spontaneously, or supported by public incentives.

family in the control of companies. This can be obtained when family businesses have overcome the difficulties of succession.

I have then worked out a typology of family businesses that accounts for different types of collaboration (family aid), and of the presence or absence of a family tradition in the business.

In the first place, it should be noticed that the concept of aid I have utilized is in a way similar to that of income pooling in world-systems analysis. In the latter, it is believed that different forms of income, stemming from market relationships or social exchange, are pooled in the household. In the same way, we think that the aid that the family brings to the creation and consolidation of the firm can have different forms. As in the world-systems analysis the household is believed to work out different strategies in order to earn its living; here we think that family aid can be offered in different ways and combinations. In both cases the result is a mix of different resources, and the research problem is to find out what types of aid prevail or what mix is more favorable in which situation.

Three types of aid can be distinguished: cultural, financial, and working. They refer to different rationalities of the entrepreneur (see Bauer 1993) and are derived from different disciplinary realms: my contention is that all of them exist, although not always simultaneously.

Cultural aid is what supports the decision to get into business (from early socialization to a new strategy for training) as well as helps overcome the difficulties. Families which have a tradition in business socialize their children to risk taking or being "one's own boss." Also, salesmen, craftsmen, or employees use their technical knowledge to "stand alone." Cultural aid and business traditions do not always overlap. There can also be cultural aid from families with a productive tradition in a different sector. There can also be a longing for business among those who have a specific competence, like the workers who want to be self-employed. Therefore, the family can not only provide the tacit knowledge that the theorists of industrial districts talk about, but also a series of shared values that it gets from outside and puts to work in its own business. Conversely, members of an entrepreneurial family can feel a motivation to change, to try their way.

So far we talked about the aid provided by a culture that is favorable to business, be it coming from the family or present in a tacit way in the social environment. But one should also consider the opposite case: when

one has decided to go into business, it is possible for him or her to mobilize new collaborative forces that are able to change the values present in society from unfavorable to favorable to business. In this case, business creates the entrepreneurial family, and the favorable culture.

Financial aid is what contributes to investments or to the temporary need for cash: a loan without interest if a bank credit is not available, a piece of land, a building or an apartment for the firm if it would be difficult to find one on the market, etc.

Working aid is what supports the organization of the firm, the day to day activities, all of the forms of collaboration in the management of the business, either in the division of tasks that are on the same level (planning and design, production, quality control, administration, sales, etc.) and are often divided among kin of the same generation (brother and sisters, in-laws, cousins) or in the hierarchical positions that are divided between the old generation as the boss and the younger generation who are being trained. It also includes the overtime work offered when production has to be rapidly finished, when working rhythms are quicker than normal, or shifting roles etc. are required.

How is this distinction helpful? We can see that different families (with different cultures and levels of income) can at the same time support the entrepreneurial activity of some of their kin, offering one or more types of aid. Many family businesses cannot count on cultural or financial help, but only on working help (as when it is a worker that stands alone, or when a new business is created with public money and needs only a small sum of cofinancing).¹⁶ On the other hand, cultural aid can be offered even in the absence of other types of help, and is equally crucial for the formation of the business.

FAMILY BUSINESS AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Considering the second point outlined above, that is, the cultural background of the entrepreneurial family, one can distinguish family businesses

¹⁶ Many observations on this topic have been done doing research on a program of aid to young entrepreneurs, in which the state offers a strong financial incentive. The surprise has been that even in this case family aid, of any kind, was crucial (See the unpublished report "Famiglia e impresa: l'esperienza della legge 44/86").

according to whether or not a family tradition exists, in the same or other production sectors. We found the following four situations:

- “dynasty”: when aid comes from a family already operating in the same productive sector
- “atmosphere”: when aid comes from a family who is in business in a different productive sector
- “aspiration”: when aid comes from a family that has no previous experience in business
- “indifference,” when no other member of the family is collaborating in any way.

Our field work in different Southern localities, industrial systems or districts, or on SMEs selected by sector or type of government aid shows that “dynasty” and “aspiration” are more common, whereas “atmosphere” is less common, and “indifference” is very rare. This means that the family bond is crucial to the working of the business. But that it is by no means a symptom of social immobility.

If we now relate the three types of aid with the four situations, we can see that there is no correlation between type of aid and family experience. In “dynasty,” cultural or financial help may not be necessary, and sharing tasks for overcoming exceptional situations may be crucial. In the same way, in “aspiration,” working labor may not be prevalent. Sometimes what is crucial is a worker’s wish to change, to become his own boss, to “make sacrifices” in order to send a son or daughter to a technical college. The more interesting situations are those on the brink.

As for the situations of “indifference,” one should not get confused. If it is not the family that helps, it is mainly a group of friends: collaboration is not lacking. One should also note that these businesses are often women’s businesses, through which women wanted to open their independent way and break from an unbearable family tradition.

CONCLUSION

We have reported a series of observations on the recent evolution of diffused entrepreneurship in the South. They can be summed up as follows. A thrust toward self employment and entrepreneurship comes from many different environments: traditional entrepreneurial families, public and pri-

vate employees, craftsmen, salesmen. In most cases, behind this thrust there is family collaboration.

Contrary to the stereotype of “familism,” the family nature of this new entrepreneurship may account for its democratic outlook. First, as for access to business, everybody can draw from some form of family aid. Moreover, it is not true, as some authors maintain, that family businesses are an obstacle to social mobility, as they suppose that only those who have entrepreneurial family backing can succeed. We have observed that there are situations other than that of the “dynasty.” On the contrary, the fact that many family businesses are born and survive, even if they are not “dynastic,” is the sign of a new social mobility. This means that social mobility is a collective fact. It cannot be studied on an individual basis (father/son). A multiple series of factors shared by the group have to be taken into account.

Second, as for the business management, the relationships among kin are generally egalitarian and oriented toward acknowledgement of reciprocal competence. Many businesses are run by a core nucleus of relatives belonging to the same generation, who pooled together similar training resources. Even when the parents are still operating they mostly play a role coherent with their experience, and rarely behave as a patriarch. For these reasons, it is possible to look at these realities as an embryo of a new democratic movement toward industrialization.

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HAVENS AND CAGES: REINVENTING STATES AND HOUSEHOLDS IN THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM

Peter J. Taylor

All these institutions together—the states, the classes, the ethnic/national/status-groups, the households—form an institutional vortex which is both the product and the moral life of the capitalist world-economy. Far from being primordial and pre-existing essences, they are dependent and coterminous existences.

—Immanuel Wallerstein (1984:36)

The organisation of space, in the sense of devising, channelling and controlling social interactions, and the construction of places, in the sense of known and definable areas, is a key way in which groups and collectivities create a shared, particular and distinctive identity.

—Linda McDowell (1997:2)

INTRODUCTION

In the work of Immanuel Wallerstein the concepts of modern world-system and capitalist world-economy are used interchangeably; they are alternative names for the historical system we are currently living in. In the substance of his work, however, Wallerstein has been more concerned with capitalism than modernity. At one level this is unimportant because, if they are indeed 'two sides of the same coin,' understanding one must enhance inevitably our knowledge of the other. But, of course, it is never as simple as

Peter J. Taylor
Department of Geography
Loughborough University
Loughborough
England
LE11 3TU
<http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/gy/>
P.J.Taylor@lboro.ac.uk

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that. When we choose to think of our contemporary world as either capitalist or modern, we take on board a different social theoretical baggage. It was this train of thought which led me to ask “what’s modern about the modern world-system?” (Taylor, 1996a) and this essay is part of a continuing project (Taylor, 1996b; 1999) to link Wallerstein’s (1984: chapter 3) ‘institutional vortex’ to Marshall Berman’s (1982: Introduction) ‘modern maelstrom.’

The argument focuses upon two of the four ‘major institutions of the modern world’ which Wallerstein (1984:29) identifies. Whereas there are large literatures which provide ‘modernist’ interpretations of both classes and nations, this is less clear-cut in the cases of states and households. This may well be because of the simple continuities in spatial form with the latter two institutions. In the case of states, for instance, the medieval English kingdom is one of several states which cover approximately the same territory as the successor early modern kingdom implying continuity rather than a discontinuity. In the case of households, continuity can be represented by the dictum ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle.’ It is these simple spatialities which have encouraged me to explore the modernities of states and households through a critical territoriality approach.

Territoriality is a form of behaviour which is expressed as power to control access to a bounded territory (Sack 1986). As such it seems to be a ubiquitous behavioural strategy, trans-historical and even trans-species in nature. Hence the interest is in the historical specificities of its practice. So what is modern territoriality? Given the explicit concern for power in territorial behaviour, it is perhaps not surprising that it is political scholars who have used territory to define the modern: international relations researchers distinguish between pre-modern and modern in terms of territorial behaviour. By referring to the modern states system as the ‘Westphalia system’ it is argued that territorial sovereignty is the distinguishing characteristic of modern states. To be sure there were multiple interacting states in previous eras, but none of these operated through a territorial ordering based upon mutual recognitions of sovereignties. In the modern inter-state system all sovereign states have the mutually agreed right to control access across their boundaries. The message is clear: modern states are essentially territorial in nature. However, this territorial framework is largely taken for granted, territoriality has not been critically interrogated in the study of international relations (Ruggie 1993).

The territoriality of households has been interrogated even less than states. However, it is relatively easy to draw parallels between the two institutions in their uses of space. Like modern states, modern households operate through a collective budget to maintain and enhance their territory (residence) to which they claim the formal power to control access. Just as a state is destroyed when its territory is conquered so also is a household fatally undermined when made ‘homeless’: this was the basic threat of the pernicious Victorian ‘workhouse’ system for instance. Of course ‘governments-in-exile’ may eventually reconstitute their state just as households may be brought back together in happier times, both recoveries being dependent upon a renewed capacity to define boundaries.

There are two sides of modern territoriality. First, it can provide order, the ‘haven’ in my title. But this is only half the story, a top-down view of the world. Second, looking up from the bottom, for those who do not control the boundaries territory can be a prison, the ‘cage’ in my title. Unfortunately treatment of modern states is typically concerned with their ordering potentials which thus encompasses a limited view of their modernity—see, for instance, McClelland’s (1996: chapter 14) discussion of ‘the modernity of the modern state’ and Burch’s (1997) addition of modernity to international political economy. Similarly, the classic feminist critique of the ‘sociology of the family’ literature argues that studies of modern households focus upon order rather than power differentials within the institution (Friedman 1984: 41-2). In this essay I treat both sides of territorial behaviour as means to understand the ambiguities of modernity. A modern territoriality is posited based upon place-space tensions that defines a geography within modernity.

PLACE-SPACE TENSIONS

The English language is rich in words to answer where-and-what questions. In *Roget’s Thesaurus* (Browning 1986), for instance, ‘Words relating to space’ constitutes one of only six main classes of words. Quite remarkably, this category in turn is organised under 133 separate headings. This fecund lexicon has allowed the use of many terms to answer where-and-what questions in situations where space has entered social theory: region, territory, location, area, locality and landscape have all featured in their own specific theories of behaviour. I am going to concentrate upon the two concepts

of place and space which I will treat as more basic terms than the other concepts mentioned above. There is a sense in which the other terms can be reduced to either space or place: functional regions, economic locations and sovereign territories seem to qualify as spaces whereas homogeneous regions, urban social areas and cultural landscapes are more likely to be called places. But what is this 'sense'? Careful definition is in order.

The first point to make is that place and space are distinct and separate categories. This is a necessary starting point not just because the terms are popularly used interchangeably but also because several otherwise excellent social research studies blur the distinction (see, for instance, Shields 1991 and Urry 1995). I follow Yi-Fu Tuan (1977) in asserting that place and space are distinctively different. But how do they differ? "Space" is," according to Tuan (1977:6), "more abstract than 'place.'" This idea is basic to most understandings of the two terms with space treated as general and place as particular: space is everywhere, place is somewhere. Moreover place has content; the idea of an empty place is eerie, an empty space is merely geometrical. The politics of this distinction are quite interesting. This can be appreciated by adding the adjective *safe* to each term: a *safe place* implies lots of people around as famously described by Jane Jacobs (1961), a *safe space* is one monitored by cameras.

These distinctions are important definitionally, but I will follow Tuan in focussing on *relations between place and space*. For instance, he refers to place as 'humanised space' (1977:54). This implies a process whereby space is transformed into place. The best example of such a transformation occurs commonly in moving residence. The empty house or apartment which is inspected consists of spaces, functional rooms that have to be imagined as a potential home. It becomes the latter, a familiar place, when a new resident moves in and modifies the spaces to suit her or his needs in terms of content and decor. Furthermore, the idea of home can be enhanced beyond familiar place: it can be a much more intimate place even going as far as impinging directly on personal identity. This becomes clear in metaphorical uses of home at larger scales of activity: hometown and homeland are particularly special places because they encompass a politics of identity.

The last example highlights the fact that place can exist at different scales. This is not always the way place is interpreted. There is a widespread tendency to equate place with local. This leads to the idea of space as

'the stable framework that contains places' (Sack 1992:12). There is a good reason why places are often viewed as local: 'humanising' space is most easily accomplished through micro face-to-face contacts. But there is no need to limit place creation to this one process especially in political studies where the imagined community of the nation with its homeland place is central to so much research. Thus, Tuan (1977:149) insists that places exist at different scales from at 'one extreme a favorite armchair is a place, at the other extreme the whole earth.' Of course, since it is commonplace that space occurs at different scales, providing place with the same multiple-scale property means that relations between place and space can be explored beyond the local up to and including the geographical limit as both 'whole Earth' (an environmental place) and 'one world' (a globalization space) (Taylor 1999).

In this essay I go beyond Tuan by introducing the concept of place-space tensions. The key starting point is the notion that the same location can be both place or space: everywhere, in fact, has the potential for being both place and space. This can be historical as when a space is transformed into a place or *vice versa*. For instance, from the point of view of an expanding society, the movement in time of a frontier across the land is a transformation of an initially explored space to finally settled places. (Of course, in actuality, this involves the destruction of indigenous people's places and their replacement by new settlers' places.) Alternatively, transformation can be contemporaneous as when the same location is viewed from different perspectives. For instance, city planners may see space to plan where residents experience a place to live in. A classic example is Robert Moses, the planner, who by creating New York's 'expressway world,' destroyed the Bronx neighbourhood of Marshall Berman, the resident (Berman 1982:290-311). Such processes define what I call *place-space tension* between the producers of space and the makers of place. When place and space constitute a single entity they define a geographically-focused, contested politics. The questions of who defines an institution in spatial terms and who sees it as a place creates a modern politics of space and place. It is just such territorial politics which I apply to states and households to illustrate their reinvention as modern institutions. But before I do that I need to set this analysis into its concrete geohistorical context: I will interpret place-space tensions as a particularly geographical expression of ambiguity within modernity.

THE EMBEDDED AMBIGUITY OF MODERNITIES

The use of the adjective modern in contemporary language is so common as to seem ubiquitous. Advertisers have long realized that saying something is new and modern is a sure-fire means of promoting sales. But use of modern is not necessarily that purposive, in ordinary language modern is used to describe all manner of things from modern armies to modern zoos. Academics are not immune to the attractions of this word: in one bibliographic search of the social science literature since 1990 I managed to find over five thousand publications with modern in their title. One example is the *Cassell Dictionary of Modern Politics* (East and Joseph 1994) which, most revealingly, does not have an entry for modern. In this case modern is used as a self-evident idea in no need of definition and discussion. I assume that in most of the other writings in this search list modern is similarly taken for granted, that is to say it is not interrogated as a concept. We can infer that the idea of being modern is embedded in the way we think about the society we live in.

Currently modernity is the term used in social science and the humanities to capture the condition of being modern. There are two types of study of modernity relating to how the embeddedness of modern is treated, the analytic and the synthetic. Analytic study identifies different and separate sectors of behaviour in which the modern is embedded. This is the way 'international modern politics' is used in relation to Westphalia and also how 'modern politics' is treated in the publication highlighted above. In this usage international relations scholars and political scientists are in good company. In Stuart Hall's (1992) recent text on modernity he refers to four realms of modernity encompassing modern political relations, modern economic relations, modern social relations and modern cultural relations. This division of modernity into separate sectors is, of course, how social science has traditionally divided up its subject matter into disciplines. In contrast, Wallerstein has always promoted an approach which cuts across social science disciplines. This is synthetic study which interprets the embeddedness of modernity as necessitating a more holistic approach. Using broad concepts such as modern world, modern era, modern society, and, of course, modern world-system, the underlying assumption is that the realms or sectors identified by the social scientists are not autonomous but fundamentally depend one upon the other. That is to say, each so-called 'realm' is embedded

in the other 'realms' for which it depends for its successful reproduction. For instance, modern politics is a necessary prerequisite for modern economics and *vice versa*. More common amongst humanities scholars, including geographers and historians, the geohistorical perspective on modernity I use in this paper is pre-eminently synthetic in nature.

But which modernity am I referring to? In contemporary social theory the word most associated with modernity is ambiguity. There are, according to Lash and Friedman (1992:2), 'two faces' of modernity: one emphasizing change, the other stability. This has been expressed in many different ways; two recent examples are Peter Wagner's (1994) treatment of modernity as an interplay between liberty on the one hand and discipline on the other, and Boaventura de Sousa Santos's (1995:2) identification of 'two pillars' of modernity, 'regulation' and 'emancipation.' No wonder Zygmunt Bauman (1991:4) has argued 'order and chaos are *modern twins*' (emphasis in original). Hence, the really intriguing thing about the two sides of modernity is that they are polar opposites: it is one of those rare concepts with an antinomy inherent to its meaning. The key point for studying the condition of modernity is to treat both order *and* chaos which Berman (1982) has pioneered.

According to Berman (1982:15), to live in the modern world is to live in 'a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish.' The modernism movement which burst on to the arts scene a century ago explicitly provided the visions and images to try and capture, to make sense of, the maelstrom of modern life. Of course, coping with modernity extends far beyond artistic movements, ordinary people have to deal with it in their daily lives. To live in the modern world is a very paradoxical affair. Men and women experience rapid change as both opportunity for a better world and as destroyer of their existing world. In this context modern behaviour can be viewed as the attempt to avoid being an object of change by becoming your own subject. Hence the modern world's obsession with planning. All modern organizations operate by planning for the future in order to have a future. Corporations, both public and private, define strategic plans as part of the ordinary business of doing business. The turn of the last century was a classic time when 'planning' was all the vogue: at approximately the time modernists were attempting to capture change on their canvasses, there were numerous 'plan-

ning movements' geared to controlling change in several practical fields. For instance, 'urban planning' was created to impose order to the chaotic nineteenth century city, and the new 'management science,' was devised to ensure maximum efficiency and thus some security in the precarious world of business. I shall call these attempts to plan and manage the future, and thus to tame change, *modernity projects*. Despite their great variety, such projects share one basic property, to define an order within the modern maelstrom.

One way in which the ambiguity of modernity operates can now be understood. Modern people and institutions devise projects which aspire to ordering their world but without fully appreciating that modernity encompasses the antithesis of order. The modern world, therefore, is a perpetual battle between makers of order and the incessant change which is the condition of modernity. Obviously institutions and individuals vary widely in the successes of their projects and, in particular, in terms of how long their projects remain viable. In a perpetually changing world, all projects inevitably become out-of-date as soon as they begin to operate. They may be maintained by adapting to new circumstances but in the modern maelstrom they all eventually succumb to disintegration and are replaced by new projects. In recent years Soviet socialist planning, Keynesian economic planning, welfare state planning, third world development planning, Cold War military planning, urban structure planning, and Fordist corporate planning have all faced disintegration and have disappeared or been reformed to be replaced by new organisation incorporating rather less order.

Given the nature of modernity, it seems unlikely that any reasonably sustainable success story can ever be simply planned. And yet, certainly in its own terms, the modern world has been supremely successful. It has operated like a spiral of evermore growth, vanquishing all before it with evermore new products being bought by evermore new consumers year on year, decade on decade, century on century. To a very large degree this success has been the result of surreptitious *modern modes of change* rather than explicit modernity projects. By surreptitious I mean the cumulative result of a multitude of decisions operating through 'normal' everyday living. Basically such modes of change are successful when they capture ongoing trends wherein certain behaviours are rewarded at the expense of others. Two examples are particularly relevant here. First, the rise of suburbia in the twentieth century is an example of such a development in modernity. Although examples can be

found of government and corporate promotion of this revolutionary urban development, for instance the Hoover Report of 1931 which saw single family housing consumption behaviour as the key route out of economic depression, the intellectual establishment of architects and planners were always very much against this 'urban sprawl' (Hall 1988:297). Nevertheless, suburbia was so in tune with the growing aspirations of millions of ordinary men and women that it has vanquished all its enemies to change totally the nature of cities in the twentieth century (Fishman 1987:4). Second, the more recent rise of contemporary globalization is a similar case in point. Although manifest in many different processes, one important dimension has been Americanization and subsequently a more generalised consumerism (both intimately related to suburbia, of course), which have provided the enabling social conditions for globalization: Daniel Miller (1995:34) even goes as far as portraying the 'housewife' as 'global dictator'! These are processes I have elsewhere called 'ordinary modernity,' everyday ways of life cumulatively creating massive changes in the social order (Taylor 1996a, 1996b, 1999).

MODERN TENSIONS: NATION-STATE AND HOME-HOUSEHOLD

And so we return to households and states. Although these two institutions are as old as history itself, transcending the modern world, the argument I develop here is that under conditions of modernity, they have both been reconstituted through a politics of place-space tension. The modern practices of nation-building and home-making have created new places to be combined with the spaces which are states and households. The modern maelstrom has created the need to reinvent state as nation-state and household as home-household thus creating place-space tensions at the heart of our modern existence.

Nation-state and home-household are modern humanised spaces. Building upon territorial behaviour focusing on defence, they have become geographical havens within modernity, intimate places which provide important elements of identity to modern people. This positive interpretation is complemented by negative uses of their territoriality. The latter political strategy is never simply benign, the distribution of power within state and household ensures that the created nature of a given territory favours some at the expense of others. In fact, far from being a simple haven, both nation-

state and home-household have been portrayed as a 'cage' for the mass of citizens and 'captive wives' respectively. This haven-cage is the tension which constitutes these very modern institutions.

I shall begin with the notion that space is more abstract than place which immediately relates space to rationality, bureaucracy and the state. In this argument states are space-producers in their designation and recognition of boundaries. States impose spaces on places. The places being collected together or divided by the boundaries drawn by state elites are locations in which material life is reproduced in the everyday routinized behaviour. Such places can become centres of resistance to state penetration. Spaces, therefore, are the outcome of top-down political processes; places can be the site for bottom-up opposition. But the world is not this simple; the political processes do not stop there. Although initially imposed, boundaries can themselves become familiar, become embedded in society, and have their own effects on the reproduction of material life. In this way what were spaces are converted into places.

The most important such space to place transformation is the nation-state. In the modern world-system sovereign states existed long before the rise of nationalism. These states administered spaces—sovereign territories—created by a mixture of medieval legacy, dynastic alliances and military conquests. Although in early modern Europe small politico-military elites displayed some loyalty to these states, for the mass of those living in the state territory the state remained remote and, to the state, they were merely population to be counted and taxed within the territory. All this has changed in the last two hundred years. Nations have been constructed as imagined communities each with their own place in the world, their own homeland, some as 'fatherland,' others as 'motherland.' By combining state and nation in nation-state, sovereign territory has been merged with sacred homeland to convert a space into the place. Notice that, given the scale, this is an 'imagined place' but is nevertheless reproduced in routine everyday behaviour which Michael Billig (1995) has famously called banal nationalism. Modern states are so powerful because they have become constructed as places out of spaces.

This contemporary power should not blind us to the fact that nation-states have been both enabling and dis-enabling. Nineteenth century social theorists warned of the dangers of the modern state; Max Weber specifically

saw increasing rational bureaucratization leading to an 'iron cage' confining 'modern man' (Giddens 1971:242). However, the political nationalization of the state led to franchise extensions which provided new electoral opportunities for radical movements. Hence, towards the end of the nineteenth century radical political debate turns from emphasis on destroying the state to consideration of how to use the state. Only the anarchists really maintained the view that states were inherently dis-enabling: short term political gains came at long-term cost (Taylor 1991). Taking a global view today, from the point of view of the ordinary citizen it seems there are more dis-enabling states, constraining life potentials, across the world than there are enabling ones.

The creation of homes within households is a much less well-known story than the political rise of the nation. The home is the pre-eminent comfortable modern place. This is what lies behind the hall, the small entry room where the stairs begin and outside clothes are hung in the typical contemporary house. Of course, premodern houses of nobility and merchants famously had their halls but these were very different, dominating the whole house. These contrasting house arrangements represent two completely different worlds. The great halls of the past were multiple use spaces that were essentially public in nature: a location for transacting business, for cooking and eating, for entertainment and for sleeping at night (Rybczynski 1986:25). Today, the hall has been reduced to a small transition zone between a private home and a public outside. It is the modern home's frontier, the zone for entering and leaving and where visitors are dealt with. Although important for providing a home's initial image to the outside world, the hall does not have to be comfortable like other rooms because it is not a place where people are expected to stay for long. If the visitors are friends they may be invited beyond the hall to specialised rooms that are prized for their comfort and convenience—living room or lounge, dining room, kitchen, bathroom and bedrooms.

It is this private place of the home that has been an essential locus for the everyday experience of modernity, historically in town houses and country houses and, today, typically in suburbia. The key process has been the physical separation of work from residence, defining a boundary between public and private worlds (Hayden 1981). The effect of this division has been very different for men and women. For the former, home could become

a haven from a harsh demanding outside world. The position with regards to women has been more ambiguous (Mackensie and Rose 1986). On the one hand, the home could be seen as a 'woman's realm' thus providing a place of purpose and power. At the same time, it could be seen as severely limiting to the life chances of women by limiting their access to operate in the public sphere, Hannah Gavron's (1966) 'captive wife.' In this way the modern home-household has been both haven and cage. I would argue that, like the nation-state, the home-household is a politically ambiguous institution, both enabling and dis-enabling, being created as both place and space.

Since most of the literature on both nation-state and home-household has been largely positive in nature, I will conclude this section with particular reference to their territoriality as cages. I focus upon violence because of Weber's oft-quoted definition of the modern state as being the sole legitimate wielder of violence within its territory. Supposedly necessary to eliminate rival sources of power and to ensure order, such legitimacy is dangerous as recognised by the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights which contradicts territorial sovereignty. Born just after the Holocaust, the Declaration has had a limited effect: subsequent genocides have still been 'protected' by territoriality because of the general reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of another country. On a smaller scale of violence, the same practical principle obtains: a majority of states in the world have been indicted by Amnesty International for cruel and inhuman treatment, including torture, of portions of its caged citizens. And this caged violence looks set to increase: the great disaster of modern states is that there are many more potential nations than likely future viable states. The result is the rise of civil wars and 'ethnic cleansing' operating behind state boundaries: states are routinely becoming cages in which 'crimes against humanity' are carried out.

A parallel process has operated with households as cages in what Gelles (1974) calls the 'violent home.' Even more secretive than state crimes, there has been a similar territorial licence for violence within households. Traditionally using religious arguments to justify wife-beating, the head of the household, like the head of state, was seen to wield legitimate violence. In fact resistance, that is violence by women, was referred to as 'petty treason' (Davidson 1977:17). Thus, 'chastising' wives was legally condoned (short of murder and attempted murder) until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The change in law undermining the territorial sovereignty of the

husband may have come earlier than the 1948 Declaration for states but the same reluctance to infringe upon territoriality has been found. The 'discrepancy between the law and criminal justice policy' was a major issue for the women's movement in the 1970s (Dutton 1988:11). Not intervening in the internal affairs of a foreign country has its territorial parallel with the custom, for both police and neighbours, of not interfering in relations between 'man and wife.'

EARLY MODERN CONTRASTS: THE HISTORICAL PRIORITY OF 'BOTTOM UP' OVER 'TOP DOWN'

Given the theoretical stance which emphasises the invention of novelty of modern institutions, I will illustrate some of the practices of invention in the early modern period by advancing an argument about historical priority. Tracing place-space tensions at this time has one particularly interesting historiographical implication. Because the first creation of homes came before the creation of nations, this means that a key component of modernity was created first at a micro-scale, 'bottom-up' as it were, in the everyday bourgeois behaviour of ordinary persons. Macro-scale modern territorial behaviour as practised at Westphalia was too divorced from everyday life to construct more than an imperfect or incomplete component of modernity. Put in another way, in the modern world-system both home-households and nation-states define *secular* havens from a troubled and changing world. In other nonmodern world systems, haven is mediated through religious interpretation: heaven as the ultimate haven from an evil world. Modern haven on Earth was first produced at a micro-scale in seventeenth century Netherlands.

According to Rybczynski (1986:51), 'there was one place where seventeenth century domestic interiors evolved in a way that was arguably unique, and that can be described as having been, at the very least, exemplary.' This was the Dutch Republic where economic successes were accompanied by new cultural behaviours. Dutch merchants and artisans were family-oriented and lived in small households with few or no servants. Children were integral to the new family life and instead of being apprenticed stayed at home and attended school. In this way the Dutch invented what today is understood as childhood (Rybczynski 1986:60). New town houses were built or converted to adapt to these new practices and therefore eliminated the traditional mix of work with residency. The ground floor was still

treated as a public space to entertain visitors but the upper floors were a special family place. Friends allowed access to the upstairs were required to remove their street shoes so as not to disrupt the cleanliness of the home. This boundary between public spaces and private places was the new cultural idea which enabled houses to become homes (Rybczynski 1986:66).

The result was the creation of distinctive new places. In their new homes the Dutch could express their personal likes and dislikes to fit individual family needs such as decorating their walls with paintings. Although seventeenth century Dutch painting is justifiably famous, it is not always appreciated just how large this cultural phenomenon was: Israel (1995:555) indicates that in 1650 there were some two and a half million paintings in the Republic. With more pictures than people, it can be reasonably assumed that the typical Dutch house at this time would be bedecked with original paintings. And unlike earlier schools of painting, the Dutch were largely secular in their subject matters. Many Dutch families may have been devoutly Calvinist but their houses were certainly not religious shrines. Other domestic commodities reinforced the creation of secular homes. A contemporary English critic of the Netherlands, Sir William Temple, after noting the propensity for monetary tightness among the Dutch, gives one exception: expenditure on furniture and other commodities for the home (Rybczynski 1986:61). In this way every home was made to be unique to a particular family reflecting their tastes for different furnitures and genres of painting. All in all, the Dutch produced the first modern homes, cosy settings for the family life of ordinary people.

There is no doubt that these modern home-households acted as havens from the turbulent new mercantile world the Dutch were creating in the seventeenth century. In defining a boundary between public and private worlds the Dutch invented modern domesticity (Rybczynski 1986:75). Rybczynski (1986:74-5) interprets this as enabling for women as the house changed to become 'a feminine place, or at least under feminine control' (see also Hufton 1995:47-8). This 'central position of the woman in the Dutch household' (1986:74) was accompanied by married women of all social positions carrying out their own day-to-day household chores in a manner which can be interpreted as liberating (1986:72). And all this can be seen today in the domestic genre of seventeenth century Dutch painting:

During the Renaissance, when women had been solitary figures in a painting, it was as Madonnas, saints or biblical personages, the Dutch painters

were the first to choose ordinary women as their subjects. It was natural for women to be the focus of de Witte's paintings, because the domestic world that he was depicting had become *their* realm. The world of male work, and male social life, had moved elsewhere. The house had become the place for another kind of work—specialized domestic work—women's work. ... When a male is included in a Vermeer, one has the sense that he is a visitor—an intruder—for these women do not simply inhabit these rooms, they occupy them completely. Whether they are sewing, playing the spinet or reading a letter, the Dutch women are solidly, emphatically, contentedly at home. (Rybczynski, 1986:70-1)

But perhaps it was not quite as simple as this. The last line of the quotation brings to mind Gillian Rose's (1993:56) criticism of humanistic geographers' cosy interpretation of the home: 'only masculinist work could use the image of place as home so unproblematically.' And, of course, the image of the Dutch home bequeathed to us by Dutch genre painting is a male one: painters were organised into city guilds with apprenticeships restricted to young men (Kahr 1993:11). Hence the women's contentedness in the pictures is a male creation, women's images of the home are simply not available. As well as enabling as a woman's place, the home can also be interpreted as dis-enabling, curtailing women's life chances to just the 'space of the home,' as contemporary feminist critics have argued (Oakley 1974:32).

Although seventeenth century Dutch women can be found in the public sphere, notably in charity work, the political economy of mercantile modernity was pre-eminently a man's world. The place-space tension behind this gender separation is to be found in the new home-households, simultaneously constructed as a space and created as a place. The modern bourgeois notion that 'a woman's place is in the home' was first realized in the Dutch Republic as both haven and cage. Although currently expressed in a physically different form as the massive swaths of urbanization we call suburbia, seventeenth century Dutch town houses do define a fully modern existence, ordinary men and women coping with the modern maelstrom in ways which we can fully identify with today.

It is much harder for us to identify with the political economy of mercantile modernity. Nevertheless, it is the case that Westphalia created the territorial politics we continue to operate by, with multiple sovereignties producing a modern inter-stateness (Taylor 1995). Confirming the territoriality of states in 1648 was, of course, an explicit political reaction to space-conquering armies in the Thirty Year War destroying any places—cities,

towns and villages—which got in their way. After Westphalia, the nature of war was changed to a far less destructive form: boundary wars (Luard, 1986). In a very real sense this represented an extension of Dutch practice. Their eighty year war of independence in the Netherlands had long been a boundary war which Israel (1982:97) argues ‘could not have been more unlike that waged simultaneously, nearby in Germany.’ Whereas parts of central Europe lost a third of the population to war, in the Netherlands:

[i]n the main, villages, unprotected towns and prosperous, intensively farmed agricultural land on either side was kept, by mutual consent, and through fear of retaliation, safe from harm (Israel 1982:97).

In terms of regulating future war, Westphalia can be interpreted as the Netherlands boundary war writ large across Europe. But there was a price to pay for the new safety. As well as being spaces of peace, sovereign states as designated homogeneous religious spaces were cages for minority religious groups. The best they could hope for in the new states was mere political discrimination in the form of disqualification from public office.

With personal identity still focused upon metaphysical communities based upon religion, states could not become intimate places with which ordinary people could identify. Before the invention of the secular nation, there could be no homeland so that states remained largely spaces in the matrix of early modern politics. Perhaps the seventeenth century Dutch came closest to a homeland concept with the development of their notion of *bons patriots* (Duke 1990:191) but their war of independence was in no way a ‘national revolution.’ As Simon Schama (1987:62) points out, such an interpretation tells us more about nineteenth century historians than early modern Dutch politics. Dutch loyalties remained local, and therefore their state consisted of a collection of ‘patria’ rather than a single homeland. Hence, the Dutch Republic was not a place of prime identity but there is one important sense in which it created a new content for political spaces as a precursor of the later nation-state.

Mercantile theories gave state territories an economic content and the Dutch as the major instigators of mercantile practice were thus directly instrumental in the treatment of states as more than defensive spaces. The key point is that although many of the fiscal and other mechanisms used by state mercantilists were not in themselves new inventions, the manner of their application was in two ways. First, there is the matter of scale. Many

mercantile practices had long been used by cities in their competition with other cities but the Dutch economic successes, and English and French reactions to it, produced new economic policies which were system-defining. Second, in earlier state use of fiscal policy, it was seen as essentially extractive: the more the king taxed, the poorer his subjects. There was no concept of using fiscal policy to build the wealth of a country to make the tax base larger. With mercantilism it is widely accepted that the richer the subjects, the richer the king. Hence the search for policies to boost state economies, a thoroughly modern activity and one which is on-going.

In the late nineteenth century era of the ‘new mercantilism,’ especially amongst German writers, traditional mercantilist theories were widely praised as exemplary examples of state-building through controlling the ‘national economy’ (Heckscher 1955). Such later ‘new mercantilisms’ could be firmly coupled with a populist nationalism, not so the original mercantilism. In its Colbertist form it was quite the opposite, an absolutist mercantilism. Seventeenth century states did not have to be held to account as political places. Mercantile states were both defensive and economic spaces but they were not havens with which one could personally and collectively identify. In other words there was no place-space tension; how could there be before the invention of the nation-state? Hence I conclude that the modernity traits created top down at Westphalia were less developed than that described earlier for the domestic scale.

CONCLUSIONS

What has this particular iterative exercise between Wallerstein’s vortex and Berman’s maelstrom using the concept of territoriality achieved? Is it more than an elaborate spatial analogy between states and households? Much of the argument was indeed set up through such analogy but the discussion has advanced beyond similarities, away from parallel processes. This can be summarised in a linked sequence of four cardinal statements.

First, the institutions of states and households can be interpreted as cases of territoriality, with power vested in boundary control. Such identification with territory should not lead to neglect of power differentials within the institutions and therefore, *second*, place-space tensions are recognised within territories. Places of identity versus imposition of spaces simultaneously creates havens and cages for modern people. *Third*, there is

an antinomy of chaos and order at the heart of modernity which modern people have to navigate in havens from chaos while avoiding the order of cages. If this represents the geography in modernity then, *fourth*, inventing modern institutions was completed first with households and then with states as place-space tensions. Micro-level households preceding macro-level states counters most orthodox thinking on the making of the modern world where the everyday lives of ordinary people have been traditionally neglected. Of course, Wallerstein, following Braudel, has always insisted that it is changes in this 'material life' of the *longue durée* which ultimately shifts world-systems.

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